FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-827-gc9aa82b8a6-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC SYSTEMD_WATCHDOG FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:7595 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective disabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c88f70 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c88fa0 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a200 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a1c0 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a230 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a4d0 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c7bd90 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a4f0 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a510 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a540 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c0c370 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a580 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a1c0 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a5a0 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds | encryption algorithm assertion checks | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_16, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 16, IKEv2 id: 16 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 16 enum name: AES_CCM_C | IKEv2 ID id: 16 enum name: AES_CCM_C | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_12, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 15, IKEv2 id: 15 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 15 enum name: AES_CCM_B | IKEv2 ID id: 15 enum name: AES_CCM_B | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_8, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 14, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 14 enum name: AES_CCM_A | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: AES_CCM_A | encryption algorithm 3DES_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 3, IKEv2 id: 3 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: 3DES_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 3 enum name: 3DES | IKEv2 ID id: 3 enum name: 3DES | encryption algorithm CAMELLIA_CTR, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 24, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 24, IKEv2 id: 24 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | IKEv2 ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | encryption algorithm CAMELLIA_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 8, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 22, IKEv2 id: 23 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 8 enum name: CAMELLIA_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 22 enum name: CAMELLIA | IKEv2 ID id: 23 enum name: CAMELLIA_CBC | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_16, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 20, IKEv2 id: 20 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 20 enum name: AES_GCM_C | IKEv2 ID id: 20 enum name: AES_GCM_C | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_12, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 19, IKEv2 id: 19 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 19 enum name: AES_GCM_B | IKEv2 ID id: 19 enum name: AES_GCM_B | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_8, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 18, IKEv2 id: 18 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 18 enum name: AES_GCM_A | IKEv2 ID id: 18 enum name: AES_GCM_A | encryption algorithm AES_CTR, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 13, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 13, IKEv2 id: 13 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | IKEv2 ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | encryption algorithm AES_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 7, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 12, IKEv2 id: 12 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 7 enum name: AES_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 12 enum name: AES | IKEv2 ID id: 12 enum name: AES_CBC | encryption algorithm SERPENT_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65004, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 252, IKEv2 id: 65004 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65004 enum name: SERPENT_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 252 enum name: SERPENT | IKEv2 ID id: 65004 enum name: SERPENT_CBC | encryption algorithm TWOFISH_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65005, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 253, IKEv2 id: 65005 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65005 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 253 enum name: TWOFISH | IKEv2 ID id: 65005 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC | encryption algorithm TWOFISH_SSH, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65289, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 65289 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65289 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC_SSH | IKEv2 ID id: 65289 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC_SSH | encryption algorithm NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 23, IKEv2 id: 21 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 23 enum name: NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC | IKEv2 ID id: 21 enum name: NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC | encryption algorithm NULL, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 11, IKEv2 id: 11 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 11 enum name: NULL | IKEv2 ID id: 11 enum name: NULL | encryption algorithm CHACHA20_POLY1305, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 28 | IKEv2 ID id: 28 enum name: CHACHA20_POLY1305 Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 | hash algorithm assertion checks | hash algorithm MD5, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | hash algorithm SHA1, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | hash algorithm SHA2_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | hash algorithm SHA2_384, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | hash algorithm SHA2_512, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 | PRF algorithm assertion checks | PRF algorithm HMAC_MD5, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | IKEv2 ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA1, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 2 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | IKEv2 ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_384, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 6 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 6 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_512, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 7 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 | IKEv2 ID id: 7 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512 | PRF algorithm AES_XCBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 4 | IKEv2 ID id: 4 enum name: AES128_XCBC PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc | integrity algorithm assertion checks | integrity algorithm HMAC_MD5_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 1, IKEv2 id: 1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5 | IKEv2 ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5_96 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA1_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 2, IKEv2 id: 2 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1 | IKEv2 ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1_96 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_512_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 7, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 7 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512 | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512_256 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_384_192, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 6, IKEv2 id: 13 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 6 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 13 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384_192 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256_128, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 5, IKEv2 id: 12 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 5 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 12 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 252, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 252 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG | integrity algorithm AES_XCBC_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 9, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 9 enum name: AES_XCBC | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: AES_XCBC_96 | integrity algorithm AES_CMAC_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 250, IKEv2 id: 8 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 250 enum name: AES_CMAC_96 | IKEv2 ID id: 8 enum name: AES_CMAC_96 | integrity algorithm NONE, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 0, IKEv2 id: 0 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 0 enum name: NONE | IKEv2 ID id: 0 enum name: NONE Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null | DH algorithm assertion checks | DH algorithm NONE, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 0 | IKEv2 ID id: 0 enum name: NONE | DH algorithm MODP1536, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 5, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | DH algorithm MODP2048, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 14, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 14, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | DH algorithm MODP3072, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 15, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 15, IKEv2 id: 15 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | IKEv2 ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | DH algorithm MODP4096, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 16, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 16, IKEv2 id: 16 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | IKEv2 ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | DH algorithm MODP6144, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 17, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 17, IKEv2 id: 17 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | IKEv2 ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | DH algorithm MODP8192, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 18, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 18, IKEv2 id: 18 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | IKEv2 ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | DH algorithm DH19, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 19, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 19 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 19 enum name: ECP_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 19 enum name: ECP_256 | DH algorithm DH20, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 20, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 20 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 20 enum name: ECP_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 20 enum name: ECP_384 | DH algorithm DH21, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 21, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 21 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 21 enum name: ECP_521 | IKEv2 ID id: 21 enum name: ECP_521 | DH algorithm DH31, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 31, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 31 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 31 enum name: CURVE25519 | IKEv2 ID id: 31 enum name: CURVE25519 DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF FF EE DD CC BB AA 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff | ff ee dd cc bb aa 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key passed testing AES_GCM_16: empty string | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xcf063a34d4a9a76c2c86787d3f96db71" | decode_to_chunk: output: | cf 06 3a 34 d4 a9 a7 6c 2c 86 78 7d 3f 96 db 71 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb890 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb878 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x113b9785971864c83b01c787" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 11 3b 97 85 97 18 64 c8 3b 01 c7 87 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x72ac8493e3a5228b5d130a69d2510e42" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=0 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=0 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_gcm_vector: passed one block | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xe98b72a9881a84ca6b76e0f43e68647a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e9 8b 72 a9 88 1a 84 ca 6b 76 e0 f4 3e 68 64 7a | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb890 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb878 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x8b23299fde174053f3d652ba" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8b 23 29 9f de 17 40 53 f3 d6 52 ba | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0x28286a321293253c3e0aa2704a278032" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0x5a3c1cf1985dbb8bed818036fdd5ab42" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x23c7ab0f952b7091cd324835043b5eb5" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=16 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=16 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_gcm_vector: passed two blocks | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xbfd414a6212958a607a0f5d3ab48471d" | decode_to_chunk: output: | bf d4 14 a6 21 29 58 a6 07 a0 f5 d3 ab 48 47 1d | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb890 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb878 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x86d8ea0ab8e40dcc481cd0e2" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 86 d8 ea 0a b8 e4 0d cc 48 1c d0 e2 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0xa6b76a066e63392c9443e60272ceaeb9d25c991b0f2e55e2804e168c05ea591a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0x62171db33193292d930bf6647347652c1ef33316d7feca99d54f1db4fcf513f8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0xc28280aa5c6c7a8bd366f28c1cfd1f6e" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_gcm_vector: passed two blocks with associated data | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x006c458100fc5f4d62949d2c833b82d1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c 45 81 00 fc 5f 4d 62 94 9d 2c 83 3b 82 d1 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb890 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb878 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0xa4e9c4bc5725a21ff42c82b2" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a4 e9 c4 bc 57 25 a2 1f f4 2c 82 b2 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "0x2efb14fb3657cdd6b9a8ff1a5f5a39b9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 2e fb 14 fb 36 57 cd d6 b9 a8 ff 1a 5f 5a 39 b9 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0xf381d3bfbee0a879f7a4e17b623278cedd6978053dd313530a18f1a836100950" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0xf39b4db3542d8542fb73fd2d66be568f26d7f814b3f87d1eceac3dd09a8d697e" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x39f045cb23b698c925db134d56c5" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=16 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=14 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=16 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=14 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_gcm_vector: passed testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x AE 68 52 F8 12 10 67 CC 4B F7 A5 76 55 77 F3 9E" | decode_to_chunk: output: | ae 68 52 f8 12 10 67 cc 4b f7 a5 76 55 77 f3 9e | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x E4 09 5D 4F B7 A7 B3 79 2D 61 75 A3 26 13 11 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e4 09 5d 4f b7 a7 b3 79 2d 61 75 a3 26 13 11 b8 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x E4 09 5D 4F B7 A7 B3 79 2D 61 75 A3 26 13 11 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e4 09 5d 4f b7 a7 b3 79 2d 61 75 a3 26 13 11 b8 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x 7E 24 06 78 17 FA E0 D7 43 D6 CE 1F 32 53 91 63" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 7e 24 06 78 17 fa e0 d7 43 d6 ce 1f 32 53 91 63 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x51 04 A1 06 16 8A 72 D9 79 0D 41 EE 8E DA D3 88EB 2E 1E FC 46 DA 57 C8 FC E6 30 DF 91 41 BE 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 51 04 a1 06 16 8a 72 d9 79 0d 41 ee 8e da d3 88 | eb 2e 1e fc 46 da 57 c8 fc e6 30 df 91 41 be 28 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x51 04 A1 06 16 8A 72 D9 79 0D 41 EE 8E DA D3 88EB 2E 1E FC 46 DA 57 C8 FC E6 30 DF 91 41 BE 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 51 04 a1 06 16 8a 72 d9 79 0d 41 ee 8e da d3 88 | eb 2e 1e fc 46 da 57 c8 fc e6 30 df 91 41 be 28 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x 76 91 BE 03 5E 50 20 A8 AC 6E 61 85 29 F9 A0 DC" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 76 91 be 03 5e 50 20 a8 ac 6e 61 85 29 f9 a0 dc | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xC1 CF 48 A8 9F 2F FD D9 CF 46 52 E9 EF DB 72 D745 40 A4 2B DE 6D 78 36 D5 9A 5C EA AE F3 10 5325 B2 07 2F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c1 cf 48 a8 9f 2f fd d9 cf 46 52 e9 ef db 72 d7 | 45 40 a4 2b de 6d 78 36 d5 9a 5c ea ae f3 10 53 | 25 b2 07 2f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xC1 CF 48 A8 9F 2F FD D9 CF 46 52 E9 EF DB 72 D745 40 A4 2B DE 6D 78 36 D5 9A 5C EA AE F3 10 5325 B2 07 2F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c1 cf 48 a8 9f 2f fd d9 cf 46 52 e9 ef db 72 d7 | 45 40 a4 2b de 6d 78 36 d5 9a 5c ea ae f3 10 53 | 25 b2 07 2f | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x16 AF 5B 14 5F C9 F5 79 C1 75 F9 3E 3B FB 0E ED86 3D 06 CC FD B7 85 15" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 16 af 5b 14 5f c9 f5 79 c1 75 f9 3e 3b fb 0e ed | 86 3d 06 cc fd b7 85 15 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 4B 55 38 4F E2 59 C9 C8 4E 79 35 A0 03 CB E9 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4b 55 38 4f e2 59 c9 c8 4e 79 35 a0 03 cb e9 28 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 4B 55 38 4F E2 59 C9 C8 4E 79 35 A0 03 CB E9 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4b 55 38 4f e2 59 c9 c8 4e 79 35 a0 03 cb e9 28 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x7C 5C B2 40 1B 3D C3 3C 19 E7 34 08 19 E0 F6 9C67 8C 3D B8 E6 F6 A9 1A" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 7c 5c b2 40 1b 3d c3 3c 19 e7 34 08 19 e0 f6 9c | 67 8c 3d b8 e6 f6 a9 1a | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x45 32 43 FC 60 9B 23 32 7E DF AA FA 71 31 CD 9F84 90 70 1C 5A D4 A7 9C FC 1F E0 FF 42 F4 FB 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 45 32 43 fc 60 9b 23 32 7e df aa fa 71 31 cd 9f | 84 90 70 1c 5a d4 a7 9c fc 1f e0 ff 42 f4 fb 00 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x45 32 43 FC 60 9B 23 32 7E DF AA FA 71 31 CD 9F84 90 70 1C 5A D4 A7 9C FC 1F E0 FF 42 F4 FB 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 45 32 43 fc 60 9b 23 32 7e df aa fa 71 31 cd 9f | 84 90 70 1c 5a d4 a7 9c fc 1f e0 ff 42 f4 fb 00 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x02 BF 39 1E E8 EC B1 59 B9 59 61 7B 09 65 27 9BF5 9B 60 A7 86 D3 E0 FE" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 02 bf 39 1e e8 ec b1 59 b9 59 61 7b 09 65 27 9b | f5 9b 60 a7 86 d3 e0 fe | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x96 89 3F C5 5E 5C 72 2F 54 0B 7D D1 DD F7 E7 58D2 88 BC 95 C6 91 65 88 45 36 C8 11 66 2F 21 88AB EE 09 35" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 96 89 3f c5 5e 5c 72 2f 54 0b 7d d1 dd f7 e7 58 | d2 88 bc 95 c6 91 65 88 45 36 c8 11 66 2f 21 88 | ab ee 09 35 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x96 89 3F C5 5E 5C 72 2F 54 0B 7D D1 DD F7 E7 58D2 88 BC 95 C6 91 65 88 45 36 C8 11 66 2F 21 88AB EE 09 35" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 96 89 3f c5 5e 5c 72 2f 54 0b 7d d1 dd f7 e7 58 | d2 88 bc 95 c6 91 65 88 45 36 c8 11 66 2f 21 88 | ab ee 09 35 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x77 6B EF F2 85 1D B0 6F 4C 8A 05 42 C8 69 6F 6C6A 81 AF 1E EC 96 B4 D3 7F C1 D6 89 E6 C1 C1 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 77 6b ef f2 85 1d b0 6f 4c 8a 05 42 c8 69 6f 6c | 6a 81 af 1e ec 96 b4 d3 7f c1 d6 89 e6 c1 c1 04 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 14 5A D0 1D BF 82 4E C7 56 08 63 DC 71 E3 E0 C0" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 5a d0 1d bf 82 4e c7 56 08 63 dc 71 e3 e0 c0 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 14 5A D0 1D BF 82 4E C7 56 08 63 DC 71 E3 E0 C0" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 5a d0 1d bf 82 4e c7 56 08 63 dc 71 e3 e0 c0 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xF6 D6 6D 6B D5 2D 59 BB 07 96 36 58 79 EF F8 86C6 6D D5 1A 5B 6A 99 74 4B 50 59 0C 87 A2 38 84" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f6 d6 6d 6b d5 2d 59 bb 07 96 36 58 79 ef f8 86 | c6 6d d5 1a 5b 6a 99 74 4b 50 59 0c 87 a2 38 84 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xF0 5E 23 1B 38 94 61 2C 49 EE 00 0B 80 4E B2 A9B8 30 6B 50 8F 83 9D 6A 55 30 83 1D 93 44 AF 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 5e 23 1b 38 94 61 2c 49 ee 00 0b 80 4e b2 a9 | b8 30 6b 50 8f 83 9d 6a 55 30 83 1d 93 44 af 1c | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xF0 5E 23 1B 38 94 61 2C 49 EE 00 0B 80 4E B2 A9B8 30 6B 50 8F 83 9D 6A 55 30 83 1D 93 44 AF 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 5e 23 1b 38 94 61 2c 49 ee 00 0b 80 4e b2 a9 | b8 30 6b 50 8f 83 9d 6a 55 30 83 1d 93 44 af 1c | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xFF 7A 61 7C E6 91 48 E4 F1 72 6E 2F 43 58 1D E2AA 62 D9 F8 05 53 2E DF F1 EE D6 87 FB 54 15 3D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | ff 7a 61 7c e6 91 48 e4 f1 72 6e 2f 43 58 1d e2 | aa 62 d9 f8 05 53 2e df f1 ee d6 87 fb 54 15 3d | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xEB 6C 52 82 1D 0B BB F7 CE 75 94 46 2A CA 4F AAB4 07 DF 86 65 69 FD 07 F4 8C C0 B5 83 D6 07 1F1E C0 E6 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | eb 6c 52 82 1d 0b bb f7 ce 75 94 46 2a ca 4f aa | b4 07 df 86 65 69 fd 07 f4 8c c0 b5 83 d6 07 1f | 1e c0 e6 b8 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xEB 6C 52 82 1D 0B BB F7 CE 75 94 46 2A CA 4F AAB4 07 DF 86 65 69 FD 07 F4 8C C0 B5 83 D6 07 1F1E C0 E6 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | eb 6c 52 82 1d 0b bb f7 ce 75 94 46 2a ca 4f aa | b4 07 df 86 65 69 fd 07 f4 8c c0 b5 83 d6 07 1f | 1e c0 e6 b8 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x06a9214036b8a15b512e03d534120006" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 06 a9 21 40 36 b8 a1 5b 51 2e 03 d5 34 12 00 06 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 3d af ba 42 9d 9e b4 30 b4 22 da 80 2c 9f ac 41 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "Single block msg" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 3d af ba 42 9d 9e b4 30 b4 22 da 80 2c 9f ac 41 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "Single block msg" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xc286696d887c9aa0611bbb3e2025a45a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c2 86 69 6d 88 7c 9a a0 61 1b bb 3e 20 25 a4 5a | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 2e 17 99 6d 09 3d 28 dd b3 ba 69 5a 2e 6f 58 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 2e 17 99 6d 09 3d 28 dd b3 ba 69 5a 2e 6f 58 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x6c3ea0477630ce21a2ce334aa746c2cd" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 6c 3e a0 47 76 30 ce 21 a2 ce 33 4a a7 46 c2 cd | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c7 82 dc 4c 09 8c 66 cb d9 cd 27 d8 25 68 2c 81 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 34 38 2d 62 79 74 | 65 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 28 65 78 61 63 74 | 6c 79 20 33 20 41 45 53 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 29 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c7 82 dc 4c 09 8c 66 cb d9 cd 27 d8 25 68 2c 81 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 34 38 2d 62 79 74 | 65 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 28 65 78 61 63 74 | 6c 79 20 33 20 41 45 53 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 29 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x56e47a38c5598974bc46903dba290349" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 e4 7a 38 c5 59 89 74 bc 46 90 3d ba 29 03 49 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f0 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d8 | result: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c e8 2e ef be a0 da 3c 44 69 9e d7 db 51 b7 d9 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 aa ab ac ad ae af | b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ba bb bc bd be bf | c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf | d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db dc dd de df | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c e8 2e ef be a0 da 3c 44 69 9e d7 db 51 b7 d9 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 aa ab ac ad ae af | b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ba bb bc bd be bf | c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf | d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db dc dd de df | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x75f0251d528ac01c4573dfd584d79f29" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8f140 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8ef40 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8a5f0 (length 0) | | XCBC: data | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334640: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f210 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | Computing E[0] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 41 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8ef60 (length 16) | 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | chunk output 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8ef40 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@(nil) (size 0) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@NULL | symkey message NULL key has no bytes | XCBC: data | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1023: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fc00 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | Computing E[0] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 41 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: ffffffb1 ffffffbb 68 ffffffee 2a ffffffda ffffffdb 6e 5d 46 ffffffc9 ffffffc5 56 ffffffc1 ffffffe8 7f | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f160 | unwrapped: 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@NULL | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x5b376580ae2f19afe7219ceef172756f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8ef40 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f370 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8f160 (length 3) | 00 01 02 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334640: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f140 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | Computing E[1] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | c1 a6 a9 21 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8ef20 (length 16) | 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | chunk output 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f210 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (19-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 3 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 3-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (19-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 3) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c8be20 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 3 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: 5c 6a 47 ffffffb0 6a ffffff94 38 ffffffb4 ffffff9f fffffffe ffffffa8 fffffff5 ffffffb1 66 5d ffffff8a | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fe90 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f370 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[1] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | c1 a6 a9 21 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c916f0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: 5f ffffffe5 ffffff93 ffffffaa 57 ffffffb9 ffffff84 4f ffffffcd ffffffd0 08 ffffffd6 6a ffffffa0 49 ffffff84 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f370 | unwrapped: 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xd2a246fa349b68a79998a4394ff7a263" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8fe90 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f140 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8f370 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f160 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | XCBC: Computing E[1] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | bd 87 2d f8 93 a8 29 bf f0 b1 9b fd 0f 22 38 c4 | XCBC: MAC d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8ef20 (length 16) | d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | chunk output d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8ef60 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8ef40 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fc00 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | XCBC: Computing E[1] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | bd 87 2d f8 93 a8 29 bf f0 b1 9b fd 0f 22 38 c4 | XCBC: MAC d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: 70 43 31 65 6d ffffffee 32 ffffffd4 ffffff85 ffffff85 54 1c fffffff6 ffffffd1 ffffffcd ffffff9a | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fc00 | unwrapped: d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8ef40 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f160 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8fc00 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f370 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8f210 (length 16) | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | chunk output 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f140 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a ffffff92 0a ffffffbe 68 29 ffffff8f 00 fffffff3 44 19 ffffffd3 ffffff8d 44 79 11 ffffffdc | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c8f7d0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a5f0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: fffffffe ffffffd4 ffffff9f ffffffe4 ffffffb5 3c ffffffea 26 76 ffffffd7 ffffffc9 ffffff94 15 0d 38 ffffff85 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a5f0 | unwrapped: 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xf54f0ec8d2b9f3d36807734bd5283fd4" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8f370 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8a7b0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8a880 (length 32) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540619040: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a6e0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | XCBC: Computing E[2] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | b0 93 75 12 4c f5 a5 c0 b5 18 18 37 16 b2 15 67 | XCBC: MAC f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8fe90 (length 16) | f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | chunk output f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8ef60 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 32) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 32 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a 7e ffffffc3 ffffff98 4f ffffff9e 0e 66 06 2f ffffffdf 0d ffffff9c 34 ffffff96 03 ffffffc3 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c8fc20 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fc00 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | XCBC: Computing E[2] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | b0 93 75 12 4c f5 a5 c0 b5 18 18 37 16 b2 15 67 | XCBC: MAC f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8be20 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: fffffffc ffffff87 4f ffffffcf 25 ffffffaf ffffffbe 14 39 35 ffffff95 ffffffc3 68 ffffff85 5f 3c | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fc00 | unwrapped: f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xbecbb3bccdb518a30677d5481fb6b4d8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8ef60 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8a6e0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8a8b0 (length 34) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 20 21 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540619040: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a5f0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | Computing E[3] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 09 02 5e 5a 67 25 20 72 44 14 5c 6b 80 66 85 79 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | e8 84 75 fb c5 1f b4 74 1c 13 fc e7 48 88 55 17 | XCBC: MAC be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8f140 (length 16) | be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | chunk output be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f160 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 34 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 34-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 34) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c8be20 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 34 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 48 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a 7e ffffffc3 ffffff98 4f ffffff9e 0e 66 06 2f ffffffdf 0d ffffff9c 34 ffffff96 03 ffffffc3 ffffffee ffffff8b 6f fffffffd 00 39 70 fffffffa 26 64 63 79 08 07 1c 04 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 48 bytes at 0x557566c8f180 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | unwrapped: 20 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 20 21 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a7b0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[3] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 09 02 5e 5a 67 25 20 72 44 14 5c 6b 80 66 85 79 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | e8 84 75 fb c5 1f b4 74 1c 13 fc e7 48 88 55 17 | XCBC: MAC be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c916f0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: 53 ffffffcc 09 fffffff9 3b 0b ffffffab ffffffb3 ffffffe2 27 69 5e 1e 54 33 7d | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a7b0 | unwrapped: be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xf0dafee895db30253761103b5d84528f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8f160 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8a5f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c947f0 (length 1000) | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540028960: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8fc00 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | Computing E[63] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 5c 88 af cc 1e 1e 83 fc c4 2c 0c e4 12 12 f5 17 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 9d 2f 04 6d bc 24 17 fa 1c 2b ac 68 da fc 25 79 | XCBC: MAC f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8f210 (length 16) | f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | chunk output f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8ef20 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (1016-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 1000 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 1000-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (1016-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 1000) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c916f0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 1000 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 1008 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 1008 bytes at 0x557566c965a0 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a6e0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[63] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 5c 88 af cc 1e 1e 83 fc c4 2c 0c e4 12 12 f5 17 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 9d 2f 04 6d bc 24 17 fa 1c 2b ac 68 da fc 25 79 | XCBC: MAC f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: 1c 18 ffffffef 0c ffffff88 15 03 26 ffffffbc 0c 0d 28 6e 6c 33 0a | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a6e0 | unwrapped: f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8ef20 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8ef40 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8a6e0 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f1c0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8f370 (length 16) | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | chunk output 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f140 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a ffffff92 0a ffffffbe 68 29 ffffff8f 00 fffffff3 44 19 ffffffd3 ffffff8d 44 79 11 ffffffdc | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c8fc50 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f210 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: fffffffe ffffffd4 ffffff9f ffffffe4 ffffffb5 3c ffffffea 26 76 ffffffd7 ffffffc9 ffffff94 15 0d 38 ffffff85 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f370 | unwrapped: 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x00010203040506070809" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x0fa087af7d866e7653434e602fdde835" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8f1c0 (length 10) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 10 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 10-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | XCBC: Key 10<16 too small, padding with zeros | xcbc: reference tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb810 | result: tmp+=0-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c916f0 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb838 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8a5f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8f370 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: fffffff1 76 10 ffffffeb ffffff93 49 7b ffffff9d 11 ffffffed 75 05 ffffffb9 38 20 4f | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f140 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 50 ca b2 4d 03 34 45 5e 40 7b 25 0f dd 7c f8 d5 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8e f7 48 db 56 f1 f7 26 24 72 f2 c5 63 b0 3f 88 | XCBC: E[n-1] fe 1f 63 e9 65 1a 4b bb 3c cc cd 0d cc 83 e4 30 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 60 f9 39 21 b3 eb bc 9d 18 be 3f c8 af 33 db b8 | XCBC: MAC 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8ef60 (length 16) | 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | chunk output 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 10 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 10-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (size 10) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 10<16 too small, padding with zeros | xcbc: reference tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb840 | result: tmp+=0-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c8fe00 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: PRF symkey interface-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8fc00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c916f0 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c916f0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a ffffff92 0a ffffffbe 68 29 ffffff8f 00 fffffff3 44 19 ffffffd3 ffffff8d 44 79 11 ffffffdc | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c969a0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: fffffff1 76 10 ffffffeb ffffff93 49 7b ffffff9d 11 ffffffed 75 05 ffffffb9 38 20 4f | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a7b0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 50 ca b2 4d 03 34 45 5e 40 7b 25 0f dd 7c f8 d5 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8e f7 48 db 56 f1 f7 26 24 72 f2 c5 63 b0 3f 88 | XCBC: E[n-1] fe 1f 63 e9 65 1a 4b bb 3c cc cd 0d cc 83 e4 30 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 60 f9 39 21 b3 eb bc 9d 18 be 3f c8 af 33 db b8 | XCBC: MAC 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8be20 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: ffffffca 17 ffffffd7 ffffff91 61 78 45 ffffff8e ffffffd7 6b 01 29 ffffff9b ffffffb7 ffffffd3 6d | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8ef60 | unwrapped: 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c916f0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8fe00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fedcb" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | ed cb | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x8cd3c93ae598a9803006ffb67c40e9e4" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x557566c8f140 (length 18) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | ed cb | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb870 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 18 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 18-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c916f0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb858 | result: key-key@0x557566c8fe00 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c916f0 | XCBC: Key 18>16 too big, rehashing to size | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb810 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f8 | result: key-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | key extracting all 18 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | key: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | key: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1701522796: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a ffffff95 03 4c 15 37 2e ffffffa3 45 ffffff9f 17 ffffffeb fffffffe ffffffbe ffffffa6 fffffff9 ffffffd9 | key: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | key extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c8f7d0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: ed cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data ed cb | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c916f0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c916f0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)808460336: 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f160 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 e1 4d 5d 0e e2 77 15 df 08 b4 15 2b a2 3d a8 e0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb790 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb778 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8d 34 ef cb 3b d5 45 ca 06 2a ec df ef 7c 0b fa | XCBC: E[n-1] 0b 72 b2 ae 0a 37 79 81 75 6a d5 9c 79 c0 e6 96 | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 6b 8d dd 65 31 e2 3c 4b 73 40 39 43 96 bc ed 6c | XCBC: MAC 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8be20 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb810 | result: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f8 | result: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8a5f0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x557566c8ef60 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ffffffff 2e ffffffc4 09 ffffff8d 26 ffffffc4 47 0e 31 36 6f ffffff9e ffffff8e ffffffa0 ffffffa7 | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f210 | unwrapped: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K1 27 f3 88 2f b7 b9 4b a4 16 36 09 d5 d2 39 c5 7f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 50 9e d8 ae 74 5a 75 4c 93 4d 6c 91 98 fe e2 1b | XCBC: E[n-1] ec 26 f6 dd e8 bb 1b d1 ec 76 c4 91 78 37 ca 4b | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | ac a9 3c 60 1c e1 6e 9d 7f 3b a8 00 e0 c9 28 50 | XCBC: MAC 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x557566c8fc00 (length 16) | 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | chunk output 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 18 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 18-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8fe00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8fe00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 18) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 18>16 too big, rehashing to size | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb840 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb828 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | key symkey extracting all 18 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | key symkey: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | key symkey: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1701522796: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a ffffff95 03 4c 15 37 2e ffffffa3 45 ffffff9f 17 ffffffeb fffffffe ffffffbe ffffffa6 fffffff9 ffffffd9 | key symkey: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | key symkey extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c8f7d0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: ed cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data ed cb | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8fe00 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8fe00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)808460336: 36 ffffffb8 ffffffaa 21 ffffff80 22 18 ffffff96 fffffff4 ffffffd5 ffffffa9 ffffff96 09 ffffffc3 ffffff9a 6c | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a7b0 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 e1 4d 5d 0e e2 77 15 df 08 b4 15 2b a2 3d a8 e0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7c0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8d 34 ef cb 3b d5 45 ca 06 2a ec df ef 7c 0b fa | XCBC: E[n-1] 0b 72 b2 ae 0a 37 79 81 75 6a d5 9c 79 c0 e6 96 | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 6b 8d dd 65 31 e2 3c 4b 73 40 39 43 96 bc ed 6c | XCBC: MAC 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb840 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb828 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x557566c8f370 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803334848: ffffffea fffffff8 ffffffb7 3c 4b 49 ffffffac ffffffeb fffffff7 34 70 06 2f ffffffc2 71 5a ffffff92 0a ffffffbe 68 29 ffffff8f 00 fffffff3 44 19 ffffffd3 ffffff8d 44 79 11 ffffffdc | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x557566c8f7d0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | K: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ffffffff 2e ffffffc4 09 ffffff8d 26 ffffffc4 47 0e 31 36 6f ffffff9e ffffff8e ffffffa0 ffffffa7 | K: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8a5f0 | unwrapped: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K1 27 f3 88 2f b7 b9 4b a4 16 36 09 d5 d2 39 c5 7f | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: k1-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: k1-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 50 9e d8 ae 74 5a 75 4c 93 4d 6c 91 98 fe e2 1b | XCBC: E[n-1] ec 26 f6 dd e8 bb 1b d1 ec 76 c4 91 78 37 ca 4b | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | ac a9 3c 60 1c e1 6e 9d 7f 3b a8 00 e0 c9 28 50 | XCBC: MAC 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x557566c963a0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb880 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb868 | result: xcbc-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c963a0 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: ffffffc7 ffffff94 ffffffae ffffff89 ffffffa7 0f ffffffe3 64 30 ffffffca ffffffb1 38 ffffff85 54 4c ffffffe5 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f160 | unwrapped: 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c92f70 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8be20 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "Hi There" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 48 69 20 54 68 65 72 65 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x557566c8f370 (length 16) | 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb860 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb848 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a0 | result: trimed key-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c8be20 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7e0 | result: result-key@0x557566c8be20 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x557566c8f1c0 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x557566c8f160 (length 8) | 48 69 20 54 68 65 72 65 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d0 | result: message-key@0x557566c963a0 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x557566c963a0 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8fe90 (length 16) | 90 1d 23 73 2e dc c0 f1 a1 06 53 2f 6b e5 ec eb | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb760 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb748 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x557566c963a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: result-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: result-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c963a0 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8a5f0 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x557566c8a5f0 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | chunk output 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a0 | result: trimed key-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7e0 | result: result-key@0x557566c8be20 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x557566c8fc00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (24-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 8 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 8-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (24-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (8-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 8) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c963a0 (8-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f8 | result: result-key@0x557566c98060 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x557566c98060 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x557566c98060 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x557566c98060 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8ef60 (length 16) | 90 1d 23 73 2e dc c0 f1 a1 06 53 2f 6b e5 ec eb | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb780 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c999c0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb768 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c8be20 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x557566c98060 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: result-key@0x557566c98060 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: result-key@0x557566c999c0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c98060 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x557566c999c0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8fe90 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb840 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb828 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x557566c999c0 | : hashed-outer-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: ffffffe2 09 34 ffffffe6 ffffffcf ffffffa7 ffffffe2 ffffffbd ffffff9b ffffffe5 6e ffffffce 6a ffffff97 ffffffea ffffff8d | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8ef60 | unwrapped: 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c963a0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "Jefe" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4a 65 66 65 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "what do ya want for nothing?" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 77 68 61 74 20 64 6f 20 79 61 20 77 61 6e 74 20 | 66 6f 72 20 6e 6f 74 68 69 6e 67 3f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x557566c8fc00 (length 4) | 4a 65 66 65 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb860 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 4 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 4-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb848 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a0 | result: trimed key-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7e0 | result: result-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x557566c8fe90 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x557566c8f7d0 (length 28) | 77 68 61 74 20 64 6f 20 79 61 20 77 61 6e 74 20 | 66 6f 72 20 6e 6f 74 68 69 6e 67 3f | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d0 | result: message-key@0x557566c92f70 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x557566c92f70 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8a6e0 (length 16) | c3 db 14 c0 65 f5 52 03 b0 33 c8 1a 69 7b 97 c5 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb760 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c999c0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb748 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x557566c92f70 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: result-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: result-key@0x557566c999c0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c963a0 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x557566c999c0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c981c0 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x557566c981c0 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | chunk output 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 4 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 4-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 4) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x557566c999c0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a0 | result: trimed key-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c999c0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7e0 | result: result-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x557566c8fe90 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (44-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 28 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 28-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (44-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (28-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 28) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c92f70 (28-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f8 | result: result-key@0x557566c8be20 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x557566c8be20 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8f140 (length 16) | c3 db 14 c0 65 f5 52 03 b0 33 c8 1a 69 7b 97 c5 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb780 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb768 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x557566c8be20 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: result-key@0x557566c8be20 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: result-key@0x557566c98060 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c963a0 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x557566c98060 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x557566c98060 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x557566c98060 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8a7b0 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb840 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb828 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x557566c98060 | : hashed-outer-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c963a0 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: 4d ffffffa7 7e ffffffd7 2d 73 ffffff9f ffffffd6 5f 79 67 01 ffffffe4 54 53 ffffffb7 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f140 | unwrapped: 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c92f70 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c999c0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | decode_to_chunk: output: | aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD" | decode_to_chunk: output: | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x557566c8fe90 (length 16) | aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb860 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb848 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x557566c999c0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a0 | result: trimed key-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c999c0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7e0 | result: result-key@0x557566c999c0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x557566c8a7b0 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x557566c8f180 (length 50) | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8d0 | result: message-key@0x557566c963a0 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x557566c963a0 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8f370 (length 16) | 82 0a 6b 33 5d 18 7b 90 dc ba b1 7e f5 b4 26 ff | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb760 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb748 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c999c0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x557566c963a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d0 | result: result-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7b8 | result: result-key@0x557566c98060 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c963a0 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x557566c98060 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x557566c98060 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8a6e0 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x557566c98060 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x557566c8a6e0 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | chunk output 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: key symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x557566c98060 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7a0 | result: trimed key-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x557566c98060 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7e0 | result: result-key@0x557566c999c0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x557566c8a7b0 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8e0 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (66-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 50 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 50-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (66-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8c8 | result: message symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 50) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x557566c963a0 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb8f8 | result: result-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8f210 (length 16) | 82 0a 6b 33 5d 18 7b 90 dc ba b1 7e f5 b4 26 ff | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb780 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb768 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x557566c999c0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7f0 | result: result-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb7d8 | result: result-key@0x557566c8be20 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x557566c92f70 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x557566c8be20 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x557566c8f160 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb840 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x557566c999c0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb828 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x557566c8be20 | : hashed-outer-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1695379929: ffffff87 ffffff95 fffffffe 6e 37 fffffff6 ffffffe1 05 ffffff94 2d fffffff3 59 ffffff99 ffffffa8 ffffff83 7f | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x557566c8f210 | unwrapped: 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x557566c963a0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x557566c98060 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 started thread for crypto helper 1 started thread for crypto helper 2 started thread for crypto helper 3 started thread for crypto helper 4 started thread for crypto helper 5 started thread for crypto helper 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.2.11+ | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x557566c8f180 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c9bf10 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a7b0 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x557566c8a1c0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c9bfa0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c8f210 size 16 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb46b (length 11) | 4b 41 4d 45 2f 72 61 63 6f 6f 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8ef60 (length 16) | 70 03 cb c1 09 7d be 9c 26 00 ba 69 83 bc 8b 35 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc260 (length 46) | 4e 4c 42 53 5f 50 52 45 53 45 4e 54 28 4e 4c 42 | 2f 4d 53 43 53 20 66 61 73 74 20 66 61 69 6c 6f | 76 65 72 20 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 29 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8fc00 (length 16) | ec 22 62 b5 12 32 63 83 67 12 3b ce 3d 37 3c 5e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc290 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4d 61 6d 69 65 45 78 69 73 74 73 28 41 | 75 74 68 49 50 20 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 29 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8f140 (length 16) | 6f fe a4 ae ec 37 f4 9a 02 6f 97 cf b5 53 30 6d | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb5ee (length 17) | 49 4b 45 20 43 47 41 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 20 | 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8a6e0 (length 16) | e3 a5 96 6a 76 37 9f e7 07 22 82 31 e5 ce 86 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc2b8 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4e 65 67 6f 74 69 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 44 | 69 73 63 6f 76 65 72 79 20 43 61 70 61 62 6c 65 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8fe90 (length 16) | fb 1d e3 cd f3 41 b7 ea 16 b7 e5 be 08 55 f1 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb600 (length 23) | 4d 69 63 72 6f 73 6f 66 74 20 58 62 6f 78 20 4f | 6e 65 20 32 30 31 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c981a0 (length 16) | 8a a3 94 cf 8a 55 77 dc 31 10 c1 13 b0 27 a4 f2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb618 (length 22) | 58 62 6f 78 20 49 4b 45 76 32 20 4e 65 67 6f 74 | 69 61 74 69 6f 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8f1c0 (length 16) | aa 28 1f cc d6 8c f8 a8 dc b8 5c c0 a7 10 40 2a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb62f (length 28) | 4d 53 46 54 20 49 50 73 65 63 20 53 65 63 75 72 | 69 74 79 20 52 65 61 6c 6d 20 49 64 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c8a5f0 (length 16) | 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc2e0 (length 39) | 41 20 47 53 53 2d 41 50 49 20 41 75 74 68 65 6e | 74 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 4d 65 74 68 6f 64 20 | 66 6f 72 20 49 4b 45 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c981c0 (length 16) | ad 2c 0d d0 b9 c3 20 83 cc ba 25 b8 86 1e c4 55 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb64c (length 6) | 47 53 53 41 50 49 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c1b0 (length 16) | 62 1b 04 bb 09 88 2a c1 e1 59 35 fe fa 24 ae ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb653 (length 12) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c1d0 (length 16) | 05 41 82 a0 7c 7a e2 06 f9 d2 cf 9d 24 32 c4 82 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb660 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c1f0 (length 16) | b9 16 23 e6 93 ca 18 a5 4c 6a 27 78 55 23 05 e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb671 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c210 (length 16) | 54 30 88 8d e0 1a 31 a6 fa 8f 60 22 4e 44 99 58 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb682 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c230 (length 16) | 7e e5 cb 85 f7 1c e2 59 c9 4a 5c 73 1e e4 e7 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb693 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c250 (length 16) | 63 d9 a1 a7 00 94 91 b5 a0 a6 fd eb 2a 82 84 f0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb6a4 (length 18) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 34 | 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c270 (length 16) | eb 4b 0d 96 27 6b 4e 22 0a d1 62 21 a7 b2 a5 e6 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc308 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c290 (length 16) | fb f4 76 14 98 40 31 fa 8e 3b b6 19 80 89 b2 23 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc340 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c2b0 (length 16) | 19 52 dc 91 ac 20 f6 46 fb 01 cf 42 a3 3a ee 30 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc378 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c2d0 (length 16) | e8 bf fa 64 3e 5c 8f 2c d1 0f da 73 70 b6 eb e5 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc3b0 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c2f0 (length 16) | c1 11 1b 2d ee 8c bc 3d 62 05 73 ec 57 aa b9 cb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc3e8 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c310 (length 16) | 09 ec 27 bf bc 09 c7 58 23 cf ec bf fe 56 5a 2e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc420 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c330 (length 16) | 7f 21 a5 96 e4 e3 18 f0 b2 f4 94 4c 23 84 cb 84 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc458 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c350 (length 16) | 28 36 d1 fd 28 07 bc 9e 5a e3 07 86 32 04 51 ec | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc490 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c370 (length 16) | a6 8d e7 56 a9 c5 22 9b ae 66 49 80 40 95 1a d5 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc4c8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c390 (length 16) | 3f 23 72 86 7e 23 7c 1c d8 25 0a 75 55 9c ae 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc500 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 33 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c3b0 (length 16) | 0e 58 d5 77 4d f6 02 00 7d 0b 02 44 36 60 f7 eb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc538 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 33 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c3d0 (length 16) | f5 ce 31 eb c2 10 f4 43 50 cf 71 26 5b 57 38 0f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc570 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c3f0 (length 16) | f6 42 60 af 2e 27 42 da dd d5 69 87 06 8a 99 a0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc5a8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c410 (length 16) | 7a 54 d3 bd b3 b1 e6 d9 23 89 20 64 be 2d 98 1c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc5e0 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c430 (length 16) | 9a a1 f3 b4 34 72 a4 5d 5f 50 6a eb 26 0c f2 14 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc618 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c450 (length 16) | 68 80 c7 d0 26 09 91 14 e4 86 c5 54 30 e7 ab ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc650 (length 41) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 53 | 5f 56 45 4e 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb9d0 (length 16) | 44 76 1b d7 6b 80 85 41 74 87 ee 8a 51 cf fc f3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc680 (length 53) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 58 2e 35 30 39 2d 31 2e 33 2e 31 | 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 53 5f 56 45 4e | 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb9d0 (length 16) | b7 0e 8a c3 92 b1 6e 05 48 2f c4 dc 36 10 91 68 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc6b8 (length 58) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 58 2e 35 30 39 2d 31 2e 33 2e 31 | 20 4c 44 41 50 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 | 53 5f 56 45 4e 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb9d0 (length 16) | 97 1d ea 93 c3 c2 06 74 f9 ae 35 40 83 de 3e 2f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb791 (length 14) | 4f 70 65 6e 73 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7cb9d0 (length 16) | 08 72 0b ee 9e 28 95 3c e0 8f 0a 18 b6 e2 9d da | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc720 (length 37) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 73 74 65 6e 62 65 72 67 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 72 61 76 65 72 73 | 61 6c 2d 30 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c650 (length 16) | 27 ba b5 dc 01 ea 07 60 ea 4e 31 90 ac 27 c0 d0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc748 (length 37) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 73 74 65 6e 62 65 72 67 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 72 61 76 65 72 73 | 61 6c 2d 30 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c670 (length 16) | 61 05 c4 22 e7 68 47 e4 3f 96 84 80 12 92 ae cd | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb7b9 (length 10) | 45 53 50 54 68 72 75 4e 41 54 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c690 (length 16) | 50 76 0f 62 4c 63 e5 c5 3e ea 38 6c 68 5c a0 83 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc770 (length 38) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 68 75 74 74 75 6e 65 6e 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 65 73 70 2d 69 6e 2d 75 64 70 2d | 30 30 2e 74 78 74 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c6b0 (length 16) | 6a 74 34 c1 9d 7e 36 34 80 90 a0 23 34 c9 c8 05 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb7c4 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c6d0 (length 16) | 44 85 15 2d 18 b6 bb cd 0b e8 a8 46 95 79 dd cc | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb7e2 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c6f0 (length 16) | 16 f6 ca 16 e4 a4 06 6d 83 82 1a 0f 0a ea a8 62 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb800 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c710 (length 16) | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc798 (length 30) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 32 0a | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c730 (length 16) | 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb81e (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c750 (length 16) | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb83c (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c770 (length 16) | 99 09 b6 4e ed 93 7c 65 73 de 52 ac e9 52 fa 6b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb85a (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c790 (length 16) | 80 d0 bb 3d ef 54 56 5e e8 46 45 d4 c8 5c e3 ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb878 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c7b0 (length 16) | 4d 1e 0e 13 6d ea fa 34 c4 f3 ea 9f 02 ec 72 85 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb896 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c7d0 (length 16) | 43 9b 59 f8 ba 67 6c 4c 77 37 ae 22 ea b8 f5 82 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb8b4 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c7f0 (length 16) | 8f 8d 83 82 6d 24 6b 6f c7 a8 a6 a4 28 c1 1d e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb8d2 (length 26) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c810 (length 16) | 4d f3 79 28 e9 fc 4f d1 b3 26 21 70 d5 15 c6 62 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb8ed (length 8) | 52 46 43 20 33 39 34 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c830 (length 16) | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x557565104707 (length 13) | 46 52 41 47 4d 45 4e 54 41 54 49 4f 4e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c4b0 (length 16) | 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb99d (length 19) | 56 69 64 2d 49 6e 69 74 69 61 6c 2d 43 6f 6e 74 | 61 63 74 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c4f0 (length 16) | 26 24 4d 38 ed db 61 b3 17 2a 36 e3 d0 cf b8 19 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fc2b8 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4e 65 67 6f 74 69 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 44 | 69 73 63 6f 76 65 72 79 20 43 61 70 61 62 6c 65 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c4d0 (length 16) | fb 1d e3 cd f3 41 b7 ea 16 b7 e5 be 08 55 f1 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb5ee (length 17) | 49 4b 45 20 43 47 41 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 20 | 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c580 (length 16) | e3 a5 96 6a 76 37 9f e7 07 22 82 31 e5 ce 86 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb9b1 (length 14) | 4d 53 2d 4d 61 6d 69 65 45 78 69 73 74 73 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c5a0 (length 16) | 21 4c a4 fa ff a7 f3 2d 67 48 e5 30 33 95 ae 83 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650eabfd (length 10) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c5c0 (length 16) | 88 2f e5 6d 6f d2 0d bc 22 51 61 3b 2e be 5b eb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb9c0 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c560 (length 16) | 2c e9 c9 46 a4 c8 79 bf 11 b5 0b 76 cc 56 92 cb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb9d1 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9c9f0 (length 16) | 9d bb af cf 1d b0 dd 59 5a e0 65 29 40 03 ad 3e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb9e2 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ca10 (length 16) | 77 e8 ee a6 f5 56 a4 99 de 3f fe 7f 7f 95 66 1c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fb9f3 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ca30 (length 16) | b1 81 b1 8e 11 4f c2 09 b3 c6 e2 6c 3a 80 71 8e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba04 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ca50 (length 16) | 1e f2 83 f8 35 49 b5 ff 96 08 b6 d6 34 f8 4d 75 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba15 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ca70 (length 16) | dd 18 0d 21 e5 ce 65 5a 76 8b a3 22 11 dd 8a d9 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba26 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ca90 (length 16) | 4c 90 13 69 46 57 7b 51 91 9d 8d 9a 6b 8e 4a 9f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba37 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cab0 (length 16) | ab 07 46 22 1c c8 fd 0d 52 38 f7 3a 9b 3d a5 57 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba48 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cad0 (length 16) | 47 94 ce f6 84 34 22 98 0d 1a 3d 06 af 41 c5 cd | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba59 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9caf0 (length 16) | d3 f1 c4 88 c3 68 17 5d 5f 40 a8 f5 ca 5f 5e 12 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba6a (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cb10 (length 16) | 15 a1 ac e7 ee 52 fd df ef 04 f9 28 db 2d d1 34 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba7b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cb30 (length 16) | 58 49 ab 6d 8b ea bd 6e 4d 09 e5 a3 b8 8c 08 9a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba8c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cb50 (length 16) | 31 2f 9c b1 a6 b9 0e 19 de 75 28 c9 04 ac 30 87 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fba9d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cb70 (length 16) | bf 0f bf 73 06 eb b7 82 70 42 d8 93 53 98 86 e2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbaae (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cb90 (length 16) | d1 96 83 36 8a f4 b0 ed c2 1c cd e9 82 b1 d1 b0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbabf (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cbb0 (length 16) | ea 84 0a a4 df c9 71 2d 6c 32 b5 a1 6e b3 29 a3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbad0 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cbd0 (length 16) | 66 a2 04 55 07 c1 19 da 78 a4 66 62 59 cd ea 48 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbae1 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 39 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cbf0 (length 16) | 78 fd d2 87 de f0 1a 3f 07 4b 53 69 ea b4 fd 1c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbaf2 (length 17) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 31 | 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cc10 (length 16) | bf 3a 89 ae 5b ef 8e 72 d4 4d ac 8b b8 8d 7d 5f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb04 (length 17) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 31 | 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cc30 (length 16) | b7 bd 9f 2f 97 8e 32 59 a7 aa 9f 7a 13 96 ad 6c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb16 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cc50 (length 16) | 9f 68 90 13 25 a9 72 89 43 35 30 2a 95 31 ab 9f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb27 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cc70 (length 16) | ba b2 53 f4 cb 10 a8 10 8a 7c 92 7c 56 c8 78 86 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb38 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cc90 (length 16) | 2a 51 7d 0d 23 c3 7d 08 bc e7 c2 92 a0 21 7b 39 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb49 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ccb0 (length 16) | 2d 1f 40 61 18 fb d5 d2 84 74 79 1f fa 00 48 8a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb5a (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ccd0 (length 16) | 8c 4a 3b cb 72 9b 11 f7 03 d2 2a 5b 39 64 0c a8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb6b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ccf0 (length 16) | 3a 0d 4e 7c a4 e4 92 ed 4d fe 47 6d 1a c6 01 8b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb7c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cd10 (length 16) | fe 3f 49 70 6e 26 a9 fb 36 a8 7b fc e9 ea 36 ce | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb8d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cd30 (length 16) | 4c 7e fa 31 b3 9e 51 04 32 a3 17 57 0d 97 bb b9 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbb9e (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cd50 (length 16) | 76 c7 2b fd 39 84 24 dd 00 1b 86 d0 01 2f e0 61 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbbaf (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cd70 (length 16) | fb 46 41 ad 0e eb 2a 34 49 1d 15 f4 ef f5 10 63 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbbc0 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cd90 (length 16) | 29 99 32 27 7b 7d fe 38 2c e2 34 65 33 3a 7d 23 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbbd1 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cdb0 (length 16) | e3 7f 2d 5b a8 9a 62 cd 20 2e e2 7d ac 06 c8 a8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbbe2 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cdd0 (length 16) | 32 f0 e9 b9 c0 6d fe 8c 9a d5 59 9a 63 69 71 a1 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbbf3 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cdf0 (length 16) | 7f 50 cc 4e bf 04 c2 d9 da 73 ab fd 69 b7 7a a2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc04 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ce10 (length 16) | a1 94 e2 aa dd d0 ba fb 95 25 3d d9 6d c7 33 eb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc15 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ce30 (length 16) | 81 34 87 85 82 12 17 85 ba 65 ea 34 5d 6b a7 24 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc26 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ce50 (length 16) | 07 fa 12 8e 47 54 f9 44 7b 1d d4 63 74 ee f3 60 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc37 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ce70 (length 16) | b9 27 f9 52 19 a0 fe 36 00 db a3 c1 18 2a e5 5f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc48 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ce90 (length 16) | b2 86 0e 78 37 f7 11 be f3 d0 ee b1 06 87 2d ed | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc59 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ceb0 (length 16) | 5b 1c d6 fe 7d 05 0e da 6c 93 87 1c 10 7d b3 d2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc6a (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9ced0 (length 16) | 66 af bc 12 bb fe 6c e1 08 b1 f6 9f 4b c9 17 b7 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc7b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cef0 (length 16) | 3f 32 66 49 9f fd bd 85 95 0e 70 22 98 06 28 44 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc8c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cf10 (length 16) | 1f 44 42 29 6b 83 d7 e3 3a 8b 45 20 9b a0 e5 90 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbc9d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cf30 (length 16) | 3c 5e ba 3d 85 64 92 8e 32 ae 43 c3 d9 92 4d ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbcae (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cf50 (length 16) | 3f 26 7e d6 21 ad a7 ee 6c 7d 88 93 cc b0 b1 4b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbcbf (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cf70 (length 16) | 7a 6b f5 b7 df 89 64 2a 75 a7 8e f7 d6 57 c1 c0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbcd0 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cf90 (length 16) | df 5b 1f 0f 1d 56 79 d9 f8 51 2b 16 c5 5a 60 65 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbce1 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cfb0 (length 16) | 86 1c e5 eb 72 16 4b 19 0e 9e 62 9a 31 cf 49 01 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbcf2 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cfd0 (length 16) | 9a 4a 46 48 f6 0f 8e da 7c fc bf e2 71 ee 5b 7d | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd03 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9cff0 (length 16) | 9e b3 d9 07 ed 7a da 4e 3c bc ac b9 17 ab c8 e4 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd14 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d010 (length 16) | 48 5a 70 36 1b 44 33 b3 1d ea 1c 6b e0 df 24 3e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd25 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d030 (length 16) | 98 2b 7a 06 3a 33 c1 43 a8 ea dc 88 24 9f 6b cc | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd36 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d050 (length 16) | e7 a3 fd 0c 6d 77 1a 8f 1b 8a 86 a4 16 9c 9e a4 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd47 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d070 (length 16) | 75 b0 65 3c b2 81 eb 26 d3 1e de 38 c8 e1 e2 28 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd58 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d090 (length 16) | e8 29 c8 81 49 ba b3 c0 ce e8 5d a6 0e 18 ae 9b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd69 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d0b0 (length 16) | 42 a4 83 4c 92 ab 9a 77 77 06 3a fa 25 4b cb 69 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd7a (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d0d0 (length 16) | f6 97 c1 af cc 2e c8 dd cd f9 9d c7 af 03 a6 7f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd8b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d0f0 (length 16) | b8 f9 2b 2f a2 d3 fe 5f e1 58 34 4b da 1c c6 ae | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbd9c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d110 (length 16) | 99 dc 7c c8 23 37 6b 3b 33 d0 43 57 89 6a e0 7b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbdad (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d130 (length 16) | d9 11 8b 1e 9d e5 ef ce d9 cc 9d 88 3f 21 68 ff | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x5575650fbdbe (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d150 (length 16) | 85 b6 cb ec 48 0d 5c 8c d9 88 2c 82 5a c2 c2 44 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x557565104707 (length 13) | 46 52 41 47 4d 45 4e 54 41 54 49 4f 4e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x557566c9d170 (length 16) | 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. systemd watchdog not enabled - not sending watchdog keepalives | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x557566c8f090 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6450 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca64e0 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c0a5b0 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6500 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c9b1a0 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6520 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca65c0 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca65e0 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6600 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca66a0 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca66c0 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6760 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c9b1a0 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6780 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566c9b1a0 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:7716) using fork+execve | forked child 7716 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | pluto_sd: executing action action: reloading(4), status 0 listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6b30 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6b70 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6c00 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6c20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6c60 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6cf0 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6d10 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6d50 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6de0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6e00 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6e40 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6ed0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6ef0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6f30 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6fc0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6fe0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca7020 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca70b0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | id type added to secret(0x557566c9c0f0) PKK_PSK: @east | id type added to secret(0x557566c9c0f0) PKK_PSK: @west | Processing PSK at line 1: passed | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | pluto_sd: executing action action: ready(5), status 0 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.472 milliseconds in whack | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | pluto_sd: executing action action: reloading(4), status 0 listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6b70 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6b30 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6b30 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6b70 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6c60 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6c20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6c20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6c60 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6d50 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6d10 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6d10 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6d50 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6e40 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6e00 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6e00 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6e40 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6f30 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6ef0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6ef0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6f30 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca7020 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6fe0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x557566ca6fe0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566ca7020 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | id type added to secret(0x557566c9c0f0) PKK_PSK: @east | id type added to secret(0x557566c9c0f0) PKK_PSK: @west | Processing PSK at line 1: passed | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | pluto_sd: executing action action: ready(5), status 0 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.294 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 7716 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0138 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection east with policy PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1-MODP2048, 3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1-MODP2048 | from whack: got --esp=aes128-sha1;modp2048,3des-sha1;modp2048 | ESP/AH string values: AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96-MODP2048, 3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96-MODP2048 | counting wild cards for @west is 0 | counting wild cards for @east is 0 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x557566c735e0 added connection description "east" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east]...192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.166 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00342 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 01 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 d7 95 a5 fb 56 5d 1b fb | 04 e3 4e 28 6a 3d 4a ff 93 40 aa 83 7a 22 fa 87 | creating state object #1 at 0x557566ca9800 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp started | #1 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d "east" #1: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #1 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #1: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.645 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00244 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | 14 00 00 24 26 1c 08 0f 01 58 67 cd c5 18 7a 10 | ea 23 57 59 50 a4 78 83 de 74 80 45 f2 6b 3b e3 | 5e 89 94 3e 14 00 00 18 f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f | 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 7d 61 a2 ce 00 00 00 18 | fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | 23 b7 a2 36 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #1 is idle | #1 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566ca9d98 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566ca9da0 (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | 7d 61 a2 ce | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | natd_hash: hash= 7d 61 a2 ce | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566ca9d98 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566ca9da0 (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | 23 b7 a2 36 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | natd_hash: hash= 23 b7 a2 36 | expected NAT-D(me): f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | expected NAT-D(me): 7d 61 a2 ce | expected NAT-D(him): | fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | 23 b7 a2 36 | received NAT-D: f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | received NAT-D: 7d 61 a2 ce | received NAT-D: fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | received NAT-D: 23 b7 a2 36 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE scheduled in 20 seconds | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | #1 spent 0.187 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.328 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 1 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b94000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | Generated nonce: 5c 61 ff f3 c3 4d 6e 25 95 de 42 83 5b b0 ae ac | Generated nonce: be 47 47 9c bd 49 65 58 3c fe de 87 76 d6 24 50 | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.001219 seconds | (#1) spent 1.01 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #1 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | keyex value 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | keyex value 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | keyex value d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | keyex value 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | keyex value c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | keyex value 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | keyex value 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | keyex value 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | keyex value e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | keyex value 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | keyex value be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | keyex value 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | keyex value fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | keyex value d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | keyex value 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 5c 61 ff f3 c3 4d 6e 25 95 de 42 83 5b b0 ae ac | Nr be 47 47 9c bd 49 65 58 3c fe de 87 76 d6 24 50 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | 23 b7 a2 36 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | natd_hash: hash= 23 b7 a2 36 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 | NAT-D 23 b7 a2 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | 7d 61 a2 ce | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | natd_hash: hash= 7d 61 a2 ce | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | NAT-D 7d 61 a2 ce | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94000d60: transferring ownership from state #1 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #1 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #1 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #1: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | 14 00 00 24 5c 61 ff f3 c3 4d 6e 25 95 de 42 83 | 5b b0 ae ac be 47 47 9c bd 49 65 58 3c fe de 87 | 76 d6 24 50 14 00 00 18 fb 22 dd 85 40 7b ad d1 | 95 ae b2 d8 96 34 e2 67 23 b7 a2 36 00 00 00 18 | f4 6f 3b cd 36 f9 20 9f 6f d4 db 66 2c 23 b8 94 | 7d 61 a2 ce | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #1 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49488.916638 "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.428 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 2 | peer's g: 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | peer's g: 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | peer's g: 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | peer's g: fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | peer's g: 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | peer's g: e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | peer's g: d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | peer's g: ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | peer's g: 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | peer's g: 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | peer's g: be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | peer's g: 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | peer's g: 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | peer's g: e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | peer's g: 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | peer's g: e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c98060 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cab380 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cab3a4 (length 32) | 26 1c 08 0f 01 58 67 cd c5 18 7a 10 ea 23 57 59 | 50 a4 78 83 de 74 80 45 f2 6b 3b e3 5e 89 94 3e | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cab3c4 (length 32) | 5c 61 ff f3 c3 4d 6e 25 95 de 42 83 5b b0 ae ac | be 47 47 9c bd 49 65 58 3c fe de 87 76 d6 24 50 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001090 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074432: 3d fffffff8 1f ffffffff 48 fffffff0 4c ffffff91 53 ffffffeb 5f 2f fffffffc 5e 64 ffffff8c 55 ffffffe9 ffffffbf 64 fffffff6 ffffffec fffffff2 3f 4a ffffffa9 ffffff95 23 ffffff8f 36 fffffff1 ffffffd5 ffffffa0 68 fffffff4 63 0b fffffff6 7b 16 ffffff97 12 ffffff83 ffffffd6 fffffffd ffffffde ffffff8b ffffffcd 0f 57 5d 25 fffffffe 3f 4b 40 ffffffa7 55 ffffff89 ffffffd2 76 61 07 74 49 fffffffb 27 ffffff9f 14 42 ffffff8d 14 ffffffde ffffffe2 6c 34 ffffffdd fffffff8 19 75 ffffffa2 0c 33 fffffff9 5e 33 48 ffffff94 ffffffc6 73 03 79 34 51 ffffffd9 62 ffffffca ffffffda ffffffd5 ffffffb6 ffffff8a ffffffa0 ffffffc2 06 ffffffc4 ffffffc0 2a ffffffd0 ffffffe8 fffffff4 78 12 ffffff8f 4a fffffff5 0f ffffffa8 7a 2a ffffffc6 78 ffffffdf 5b ffffff89 78 ffffff86 ffffff95 1a fffffffb ffffffb7 ffffff87 fffffff5 5c 48 ffffffe4 ffffffe8 ffffffe3 ffffff83 0e 14 3f ffffffe6 ffffffd8 34 ffffffb7 6a ffffffce 61 ffffff90 ffffffaf 5e ffffffc3 3e 6a ffffffe2 45 f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b8c004db0 | unwrapped: 8d 1a fd 40 bd 83 2e db 81 90 93 40 2a dc c9 c9 | unwrapped: 7a d6 5b d6 93 d7 69 c2 83 b8 17 bf 37 9e fd 07 | unwrapped: db 99 56 76 c9 af b8 84 38 25 c7 86 ec 2f 93 b0 | unwrapped: ed 40 5c 90 2e cc 80 0e e8 75 55 f3 11 f2 6b d3 | unwrapped: 6f d6 6f c7 b1 f0 7f e3 ad 08 c9 b7 ab 33 9a f6 | unwrapped: 19 24 c5 79 42 be de d1 c8 91 40 f8 e2 16 f6 5a | unwrapped: 22 25 07 a1 92 2a a5 ac 35 06 cc ec c8 7d 84 91 | unwrapped: 74 70 0c de 69 67 11 86 0a 3f f7 e4 5c 8c 38 16 | unwrapped: 37 9d 6d 96 3d e0 47 6f e7 a3 73 22 da 49 90 31 | unwrapped: f6 63 cf ef 07 89 61 90 d3 7b f7 55 14 56 77 d7 | unwrapped: c2 33 e2 fa e5 e3 f4 64 3c 08 49 30 05 ac c2 65 | unwrapped: 0a cd 7f e0 d6 f6 38 ef 01 85 0a 1f 8e 70 3c a0 | unwrapped: c7 42 a6 e9 84 5f 4f 97 1e 17 61 e6 82 b3 b6 bd | unwrapped: 20 76 30 11 b3 07 96 d0 2a 98 63 af 03 ed 65 18 | unwrapped: e3 85 b6 d2 75 77 bd a8 36 0d bf 20 e1 b3 5d 2c | unwrapped: 80 a3 b4 ab 18 0a f3 90 b7 0e a5 1f 4e 4d 5e 78 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cab5e4 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cab5ec (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001ef0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074464: ffffffce ffffff9e 5d 01 59 38 ffffffe0 ffffffab 7e ffffffb2 53 69 ffffffc6 ffffff96 23 2b ffffffae 48 39 ffffffe1 00 21 fffffff7 ffffff97 06 ffffffd4 0b ffffffc0 ffffffbf ffffffdc 43 6b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b8c0020b0 | unwrapped: 00 ad 33 b2 c3 22 46 03 68 45 51 c9 12 7d f3 32 | unwrapped: 37 3f 9c e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074464: 3d fffffff8 1f ffffffff 48 fffffff0 4c ffffff91 53 ffffffeb 5f 2f fffffffc 5e 64 ffffff8c 55 ffffffe9 ffffffbf 64 fffffff6 ffffffec fffffff2 3f 4a ffffffa9 ffffff95 23 ffffff8f 36 fffffff1 ffffffd5 ffffffa0 68 fffffff4 63 0b fffffff6 7b 16 ffffff97 12 ffffff83 ffffffd6 fffffffd ffffffde ffffff8b ffffffcd 0f 57 5d 25 fffffffe 3f 4b 40 ffffffa7 55 ffffff89 ffffffd2 76 61 07 74 49 fffffffb 27 ffffff9f 14 42 ffffff8d 14 ffffffde ffffffe2 6c 34 ffffffdd fffffff8 19 75 ffffffa2 0c 33 fffffff9 5e 33 48 ffffff94 ffffffc6 73 03 79 34 51 ffffffd9 62 ffffffca ffffffda ffffffd5 ffffffb6 ffffff8a ffffffa0 ffffffc2 06 ffffffc4 ffffffc0 2a ffffffd0 ffffffe8 fffffff4 78 12 ffffff8f 4a fffffff5 0f ffffffa8 7a 2a ffffffc6 78 ffffffdf 5b ffffff89 78 ffffff86 ffffff95 1a fffffffb ffffffb7 ffffff87 fffffff5 5c 48 ffffffe4 ffffffe8 ffffffe3 ffffff83 0e 14 3f ffffffe6 ffffffd8 34 ffffffb7 6a ffffffce 61 ffffff90 ffffffaf 5e ffffffc3 3e 6a ffffffe2 45 f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b8c003ce0 | unwrapped: 8d 1a fd 40 bd 83 2e db 81 90 93 40 2a dc c9 c9 | unwrapped: 7a d6 5b d6 93 d7 69 c2 83 b8 17 bf 37 9e fd 07 | unwrapped: db 99 56 76 c9 af b8 84 38 25 c7 86 ec 2f 93 b0 | unwrapped: ed 40 5c 90 2e cc 80 0e e8 75 55 f3 11 f2 6b d3 | unwrapped: 6f d6 6f c7 b1 f0 7f e3 ad 08 c9 b7 ab 33 9a f6 | unwrapped: 19 24 c5 79 42 be de d1 c8 91 40 f8 e2 16 f6 5a | unwrapped: 22 25 07 a1 92 2a a5 ac 35 06 cc ec c8 7d 84 91 | unwrapped: 74 70 0c de 69 67 11 86 0a 3f f7 e4 5c 8c 38 16 | unwrapped: 37 9d 6d 96 3d e0 47 6f e7 a3 73 22 da 49 90 31 | unwrapped: f6 63 cf ef 07 89 61 90 d3 7b f7 55 14 56 77 d7 | unwrapped: c2 33 e2 fa e5 e3 f4 64 3c 08 49 30 05 ac c2 65 | unwrapped: 0a cd 7f e0 d6 f6 38 ef 01 85 0a 1f 8e 70 3c a0 | unwrapped: c7 42 a6 e9 84 5f 4f 97 1e 17 61 e6 82 b3 b6 bd | unwrapped: 20 76 30 11 b3 07 96 d0 2a 98 63 af 03 ed 65 18 | unwrapped: e3 85 b6 d2 75 77 bd a8 36 0d bf 20 e1 b3 5d 2c | unwrapped: 80 a3 b4 ab 18 0a f3 90 b7 0e a5 1f 4e 4d 5e 78 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cab5e4 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cab5ec (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b688 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001160 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074448: 52 23 5d ffffffef ffffff8e 39 6b 6f 7f ffffff85 ffffffd6 ffffffd6 fffffff8 31 06 ffffffed 23 0d ffffffe7 fffffff2 24 5e ffffffde 2e 22 7d ffffff9e ffffffc7 ffffffda 01 ffffffee 4e | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b8c0030a0 | unwrapped: 61 cb 7d b4 0d 8f 35 f1 fe 0c c3 4b 68 85 01 67 | unwrapped: d8 a4 5b 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074448: 3d fffffff8 1f ffffffff 48 fffffff0 4c ffffff91 53 ffffffeb 5f 2f fffffffc 5e 64 ffffff8c 55 ffffffe9 ffffffbf 64 fffffff6 ffffffec fffffff2 3f 4a ffffffa9 ffffff95 23 ffffff8f 36 fffffff1 ffffffd5 ffffffa0 68 fffffff4 63 0b fffffff6 7b 16 ffffff97 12 ffffff83 ffffffd6 fffffffd ffffffde ffffff8b ffffffcd 0f 57 5d 25 fffffffe 3f 4b 40 ffffffa7 55 ffffff89 ffffffd2 76 61 07 74 49 fffffffb 27 ffffff9f 14 42 ffffff8d 14 ffffffde ffffffe2 6c 34 ffffffdd fffffff8 19 75 ffffffa2 0c 33 fffffff9 5e 33 48 ffffff94 ffffffc6 73 03 79 34 51 ffffffd9 62 ffffffca ffffffda ffffffd5 ffffffb6 ffffff8a ffffffa0 ffffffc2 06 ffffffc4 ffffffc0 2a ffffffd0 ffffffe8 fffffff4 78 12 ffffff8f 4a fffffff5 0f ffffffa8 7a 2a ffffffc6 78 ffffffdf 5b ffffff89 78 ffffff86 ffffff95 1a fffffffb ffffffb7 ffffff87 fffffff5 5c 48 ffffffe4 ffffffe8 ffffffe3 ffffff83 0e 14 3f ffffffe6 ffffffd8 34 ffffffb7 6a ffffffce 61 ffffff90 ffffffaf 5e ffffffc3 3e 6a ffffffe2 45 f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b8c003bd0 | unwrapped: 8d 1a fd 40 bd 83 2e db 81 90 93 40 2a dc c9 c9 | unwrapped: 7a d6 5b d6 93 d7 69 c2 83 b8 17 bf 37 9e fd 07 | unwrapped: db 99 56 76 c9 af b8 84 38 25 c7 86 ec 2f 93 b0 | unwrapped: ed 40 5c 90 2e cc 80 0e e8 75 55 f3 11 f2 6b d3 | unwrapped: 6f d6 6f c7 b1 f0 7f e3 ad 08 c9 b7 ab 33 9a f6 | unwrapped: 19 24 c5 79 42 be de d1 c8 91 40 f8 e2 16 f6 5a | unwrapped: 22 25 07 a1 92 2a a5 ac 35 06 cc ec c8 7d 84 91 | unwrapped: 74 70 0c de 69 67 11 86 0a 3f f7 e4 5c 8c 38 16 | unwrapped: 37 9d 6d 96 3d e0 47 6f e7 a3 73 22 da 49 90 31 | unwrapped: f6 63 cf ef 07 89 61 90 d3 7b f7 55 14 56 77 d7 | unwrapped: c2 33 e2 fa e5 e3 f4 64 3c 08 49 30 05 ac c2 65 | unwrapped: 0a cd 7f e0 d6 f6 38 ef 01 85 0a 1f 8e 70 3c a0 | unwrapped: c7 42 a6 e9 84 5f 4f 97 1e 17 61 e6 82 b3 b6 bd | unwrapped: 20 76 30 11 b3 07 96 d0 2a 98 63 af 03 ed 65 18 | unwrapped: e3 85 b6 d2 75 77 bd a8 36 0d bf 20 e1 b3 5d 2c | unwrapped: 80 a3 b4 ab 18 0a f3 90 b7 0e a5 1f 4e 4d 5e 78 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cab5e4 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cab5ec (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b698 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_a 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_e 0x557566c999c0, enc_key 0x557566c8d6a0 | DH_i: 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | DH_i: 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | DH_i: 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | DH_i: fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | DH_i: 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | DH_i: e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | DH_i: d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | DH_i: ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | DH_i: 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | DH_i: 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | DH_i: be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | DH_i: 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | DH_i: 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | DH_i: e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | DH_i: 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | DH_i: e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | DH_r: 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | DH_r: 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | DH_r: 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | DH_r: d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | DH_r: 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | DH_r: c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | DH_r: 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | DH_r: 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | DH_r: 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | DH_r: e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | DH_r: 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | DH_r: be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | DH_r: 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | DH_r: fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | DH_r: d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | DH_r: 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cab3e4 (length 256) | 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cab4e4 (length 256) | 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b8c001230 (length 20) | bc 21 bc a9 b7 ec fd 90 fa 46 f0 81 dd d3 43 9b | 60 9a 71 47 | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.002763 seconds | (#1) spent 1.87 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c008420 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #1: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #1 | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.0202 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c008420 | spent 0.0026 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 42 32 82 1e | bc e8 cd 9f 81 0f fe f0 3b 49 5b 65 8e e0 74 d3 | 44 8a 5b b5 6d e8 ec e8 5c db 4d d3 7f 67 ab f5 | 13 f2 53 6b ce 6c 66 5f 19 5c bf c5 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: bc 21 bc a9 b7 ec fd 90 fa 46 f0 81 dd d3 43 9b | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 7f 67 ab f5 13 f2 53 6b ce 6c 66 5f 19 5c bf c5 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 27 db 0b 52 | f0 32 ae 54 22 f3 1f 4a 81 91 54 90 e5 ab 38 e3 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #1: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caa430 (length 256) | 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94000b20 (length 256) | 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9d98 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9da0 (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566c06480 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | 27 db 0b 52 f0 32 ae 54 22 f3 1f 4a 81 91 54 90 | e5 ab 38 e3 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94000b20 (length 256) | 93 38 93 e5 76 3c 29 98 86 01 e1 dd 2b 0d 06 84 | 14 1e 18 6c 19 d0 83 95 20 b4 2b 75 8f a0 84 91 | 15 53 d1 71 c0 ff ba f8 d2 72 01 36 02 9b 07 67 | d7 74 8f 5c 18 a1 f4 3b 23 85 86 0c f2 31 a9 79 | 7c d9 d5 aa f4 95 a8 7a 0e 5a 43 56 99 5c e9 c0 | c3 a5 9b a8 78 ac 9e ed 6d 37 b2 d0 3c c9 56 5c | 1c 60 14 01 c2 64 fd f3 95 e8 ba cd d7 48 b2 8b | 6b 56 5e cb 8b de 8e 8c 6a 67 d7 a1 0b 9a 73 5e | 0b 14 8c 0f 1c c9 18 d8 f7 b6 66 4a c1 61 cb 04 | e2 80 07 81 7e e3 e9 6b dc b1 fc 6b d6 0f 07 0e | 6d 6e 6c fc 84 c1 9d 14 17 b5 a9 85 22 b4 92 c1 | be ab 10 7b 68 0a 63 ea 03 77 ca f9 4d 2b a8 df | 09 11 d4 95 57 4a f6 60 c3 0c 64 26 44 f2 da 05 | fa 98 27 69 bd 2b 6a be 6c 29 34 89 1b 95 da 1c | d1 ae 78 4b 1a 41 38 9f b0 6b e9 7c 8a ef 1d e1 | 3e 89 13 84 f0 d3 b8 fe bd 9b 47 64 bc 9f c8 f1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caa430 (length 256) | 57 f3 5d e5 e3 7a c3 cb 06 a1 39 3b 3c a8 a0 ed | 86 6d cb 2e fc 27 1f 19 c1 fa 41 9c 8f d5 ed ab | 0c b7 f9 85 47 5e 85 04 a3 68 00 8e 3b 4f b3 a5 | fb 19 98 aa 1c 1a b2 b7 8e 24 1c 17 16 c7 f1 97 | 76 29 da 9b 9c 1a c3 a4 84 88 b5 6f 97 90 67 e7 | e6 85 d7 b9 ba 6c 72 4d 61 c3 8e 7a ac 6c 05 30 | d9 c6 1a 4a b3 5e c1 58 e3 30 1b cb e0 91 e9 b6 | ff 96 1c 7e d2 63 32 df 89 5a a3 be 89 f1 45 a6 | 05 77 6c fe bf 6d c4 6e 29 0b 41 60 d8 ed 1f 28 | 68 8b c0 c7 24 93 12 f0 70 cb 01 71 d2 d7 59 1b | be 0c 02 0d 78 fe 40 f2 11 e3 12 07 28 00 6b a0 | 05 6b 83 64 17 f3 cd 80 5e cc fe 89 b0 88 45 b4 | 50 cf 76 d5 7f d6 f7 36 60 ab 3d b4 d3 31 d6 50 | e5 26 70 7b 52 dc ac c2 d3 b8 4a 89 95 b5 d0 51 | 2f bf 28 83 b0 9b 85 1e 2f 96 0f ef 51 5c be 4f | e2 fb e0 c8 d4 9c 20 81 75 50 1e 21 e0 8f 8c ca | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9da0 (length 8) | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9d98 (length 8) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | 81 31 f5 4c b4 56 3e a0 b8 f4 d7 c7 eb 58 91 43 | 8c fa c2 8e | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 81 31 f5 4c b4 56 3e a0 b8 f4 d7 c7 eb 58 91 43 | HASH_R 8c fa c2 8e | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 81 31 f5 4c b4 56 3e a0 b8 f4 d7 c7 eb 58 91 43 | encrypting: 8c fa c2 8e | IV: 7f 67 ab f5 13 f2 53 6b ce 6c 66 5f 19 5c bf c5 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #1 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #1: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #1 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #1 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 0d 58 26 c1 | e5 20 b8 d1 7d 06 a5 b5 f4 21 06 95 99 c0 05 92 | ae bc 03 74 2e 5a 55 a3 00 18 a9 46 c7 3e 27 5a | e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #1 | #1 spent 0.661 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.809 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00274 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 20 01 78 14 ef e5 00 00 01 bc 83 74 ac da | a8 c1 89 1b 6a ec 8e 77 92 7d 44 1b 73 86 e7 c6 | 3e 11 da 54 81 09 7f b7 82 31 e7 d2 77 9c bd 76 | 22 b8 af 85 b9 2d 14 1f 73 9e 0a a5 3d 02 11 df | d0 0c 5d e0 2f df cb 58 8f 3e f5 cd 38 0f 2f b2 | 09 36 73 56 75 65 36 56 82 34 b7 04 ba 9a f0 09 | 26 b9 08 22 2f af cd 67 b8 3b da 7c 50 28 37 76 | e7 ef 15 49 be 31 6f b1 68 05 94 1c a8 5b 4e 0a | d4 3f 51 bd 7b 85 b3 4f f4 ea ed f1 67 a5 67 84 | c5 e9 af 63 43 62 c7 61 e5 59 61 b4 bf 95 86 f1 | 36 0a 68 d8 2f ec 84 15 98 71 44 14 47 42 62 7e | 8c 21 c3 8a c5 04 ad ed 96 f4 ab 9a 7a ad 63 3b | 7c 76 27 e2 14 85 25 6d ff a2 07 b7 1b bf 5f 0b | 85 80 dd 5d 36 37 03 d1 0d b7 15 f9 0d 71 46 26 | cc 4c 16 b3 84 eb 7b 60 05 6e a0 74 49 fb 04 78 | 42 6c 03 fd ec e8 75 16 84 29 79 50 51 b0 56 83 | 5d 45 5a b0 fb 67 0e 87 8d 7a b6 61 a9 3b 14 6e | ae 05 5b 29 c0 33 51 1f fd 13 2a ce fe 00 f4 c7 | d0 fb 7f 14 6e 11 20 39 90 25 4c c2 db 93 cb df | e3 07 25 c4 23 b9 8b 22 13 4f 0b 2d ea 0e 51 6c | 68 ff 4b 5f 98 19 2b 87 14 cd 66 de 33 60 ab e4 | 75 ba 40 90 bf 86 e2 8a 8a 25 b6 1f 4b 06 74 ef | 21 62 5b 19 2d bb 6c ff 0a 7a d2 97 d9 24 44 04 | 2f 1d 25 83 56 51 4d 1a 38 2a 22 b7 90 6d db 03 | 97 c4 ae c0 a3 b3 cc 00 b2 38 4a 82 1d 6e 7c a6 | 22 4f 31 27 19 14 56 ce 5c 61 09 fc 84 28 d5 13 | 3e 1f 9e a7 2f e8 66 ef 9a 06 4f 2f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2014638053 (0x7814efe5) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | current Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566ca9c90 (length 16) | c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 78 14 ef e5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566ca9c10 (length 20) | cc 69 2f 73 19 17 90 8f f9 fa af ad 61 1e 80 73 | b5 4f f9 71 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: cc 69 2f 73 19 17 90 8f f9 fa af ad 61 1e 80 73 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 84 28 d5 13 3e 1f 9e a7 2f e8 66 ef 9a 06 4f 2f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 20 01 78 14 ef e5 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 02 64 16 e8 24 e2 81 8b 87 ba 29 1a dc 6c fb 0e | 86 ae 6a 62 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 2c a6 9e 9a 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | 05 00 01 04 b2 e7 98 48 75 9d 79 e4 3f ff c9 be | 58 4b d5 54 46 b2 d3 10 47 3d d0 32 32 80 05 2a | d9 97 1c 0e a1 f2 1b ae 90 07 e8 be ac 54 f2 70 | ac 3d 2b 72 4b 49 36 a0 2c 2e ee 9e 0a 2f 6f 0a | a8 c0 7a df f0 cb 92 76 88 86 08 51 24 66 fe 8a | 9c ef 60 fc c3 6d 25 3f a2 b3 41 1b 10 5f 5c 40 | 75 cb 02 c7 e3 ab 5a a4 3b ab f7 87 6d 98 d5 b1 | 08 3c eb 70 b4 28 12 26 38 a8 6b 38 4d 40 18 41 | d5 a2 66 6b 7f 0c 1e f0 84 8f 9d 26 e4 4c e4 1e | da 32 7a ec d8 7c e8 1f 73 45 24 7a 30 b0 05 1c | 3b d8 cd 6b 02 1b 72 d5 cf 7d d3 09 94 6d bc 20 | 6b 12 5d 43 33 51 fb c4 cf fc 36 16 bd 60 1b a8 | 34 94 83 2f 00 2e 3c 98 6c 8c 98 ba 4b 33 e1 b7 | da 2f 22 2c 6d c2 77 d4 87 23 cc 20 de 24 52 91 | 6a fe 39 db 68 91 31 7b 6a 45 0b d4 2e f9 6a f4 | d4 86 c8 02 62 12 29 95 7a 8d 80 02 bf c3 35 69 | f0 74 44 ee 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 78 14 ef e5 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cab554 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 2c a6 9e 9a 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 21 d7 48 63 | d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed d0 0b b0 d2 | 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f 05 00 01 04 | b2 e7 98 48 75 9d 79 e4 3f ff c9 be 58 4b d5 54 | 46 b2 d3 10 47 3d d0 32 32 80 05 2a d9 97 1c 0e | a1 f2 1b ae 90 07 e8 be ac 54 f2 70 ac 3d 2b 72 | 4b 49 36 a0 2c 2e ee 9e 0a 2f 6f 0a a8 c0 7a df | f0 cb 92 76 88 86 08 51 24 66 fe 8a 9c ef 60 fc | c3 6d 25 3f a2 b3 41 1b 10 5f 5c 40 75 cb 02 c7 | e3 ab 5a a4 3b ab f7 87 6d 98 d5 b1 08 3c eb 70 | b4 28 12 26 38 a8 6b 38 4d 40 18 41 d5 a2 66 6b | 7f 0c 1e f0 84 8f 9d 26 e4 4c e4 1e da 32 7a ec | d8 7c e8 1f 73 45 24 7a 30 b0 05 1c 3b d8 cd 6b | 02 1b 72 d5 cf 7d d3 09 94 6d bc 20 6b 12 5d 43 | 33 51 fb c4 cf fc 36 16 bd 60 1b a8 34 94 83 2f | 00 2e 3c 98 6c 8c 98 ba 4b 33 e1 b7 da 2f 22 2c | 6d c2 77 d4 87 23 cc 20 de 24 52 91 6a fe 39 db | 68 91 31 7b 6a 45 0b d4 2e f9 6a f4 d4 86 c8 02 | 62 12 29 95 7a 8d 80 02 bf c3 35 69 f0 74 44 ee | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 02 64 16 e8 24 e2 81 8b 87 ba 29 1a dc 6c fb 0e | 86 ae 6a 62 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 02 64 16 e8 24 e2 81 8b 87 ba 29 1a dc 6c fb 0e | 86 ae 6a 62 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #1: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | fc_try trying east:192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 vs east:192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | fc_try concluding with east [129] | fc_try east gives east | concluding with d = east | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #2 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #2 in UNDEFINED | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #1 "east" as #2 for IPSEC SA | #2 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #1.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #2: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 2c a6 9e 9a | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | b2 e7 98 48 75 9d 79 e4 3f ff c9 be 58 4b d5 54 | 46 b2 d3 10 47 3d d0 32 32 80 05 2a d9 97 1c 0e | a1 f2 1b ae 90 07 e8 be ac 54 f2 70 ac 3d 2b 72 | 4b 49 36 a0 2c 2e ee 9e 0a 2f 6f 0a a8 c0 7a df | f0 cb 92 76 88 86 08 51 24 66 fe 8a 9c ef 60 fc | c3 6d 25 3f a2 b3 41 1b 10 5f 5c 40 75 cb 02 c7 | e3 ab 5a a4 3b ab f7 87 6d 98 d5 b1 08 3c eb 70 | b4 28 12 26 38 a8 6b 38 4d 40 18 41 d5 a2 66 6b | 7f 0c 1e f0 84 8f 9d 26 e4 4c e4 1e da 32 7a ec | d8 7c e8 1f 73 45 24 7a 30 b0 05 1c 3b d8 cd 6b | 02 1b 72 d5 cf 7d d3 09 94 6d bc 20 6b 12 5d 43 | 33 51 fb c4 cf fc 36 16 bd 60 1b a8 34 94 83 2f | 00 2e 3c 98 6c 8c 98 ba 4b 33 e1 b7 da 2f 22 2c | 6d c2 77 d4 87 23 cc 20 de 24 52 91 6a fe 39 db | 68 91 31 7b 6a 45 0b d4 2e f9 6a f4 d4 86 c8 02 | 62 12 29 95 7a 8d 80 02 bf c3 35 69 f0 74 44 ee | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 3 for state #2 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #2 and saving MD | #2 is busy; has a suspended MD | #1 spent 0.266 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.636 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 3 for state #2 | crypto helper 4 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 3 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b90000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 8f eb e2 79 79 4c 5b ad ad 16 39 c5 ef 25 2c 88 | c9 0f 68 96 38 1c 47 b3 89 88 2c 06 e5 84 19 9a | cb 66 55 45 df 06 c9 7d e5 ee 21 68 e6 ed c0 34 | d6 1b a0 62 0d 34 bd bb 3b a4 f9 c6 c9 45 29 d6 | aa 89 0b 8d b8 ed e0 55 dc f1 f5 d5 6f c5 e5 9c | 6d 13 e5 23 7f a8 63 01 94 08 2f 3d b6 32 88 5f | 67 86 5b 72 33 9d bc 79 42 fc b4 14 77 e5 73 93 | 42 ac 23 b6 6f dc 7c a8 77 8c a3 21 c6 50 3e e7 | 6c 8f ab 2a 27 a4 ca bb 26 80 b2 a2 80 1c a7 ed | 55 5a 58 57 8e 3c ab 48 ae 20 6c 7f 43 aa f3 06 | af 6c 96 99 6e 08 16 0f cc 45 83 99 e2 7d 76 12 | 44 f6 a9 60 40 d5 4c ab 09 e2 90 93 cb 91 be ce | f4 ae 58 3f d7 4e 7c 58 c5 2c 45 df 97 24 3a 1a | b2 82 f4 1d dd 54 e5 83 f3 9f 97 2f 7e d5 ed 9d | f0 6d 85 c3 9e 69 e2 26 f8 63 1e 9b 6c df 15 cf | 3b 8a 65 49 5a 07 d6 81 bb 6f 3a 44 df 90 22 1a | Generated nonce: 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | Generated nonce: 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | crypto helper 4 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 3 time elapsed 0.001189 seconds | (#2) spent 0.988 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 3: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 3 for state #2 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007fa0 size 128 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a5a0 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566cab0a0 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #2 | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 3 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #2: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #2 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90000d60: transferring ownership from state #2 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 4 for state #2 | state #2 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 size 128 | suspending state #2 and saving MD | #2 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #2 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #2 spent 0.0639 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007fa0 | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 4 for state #2 | crypto helper 6 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 4 | peer's g: b2 e7 98 48 75 9d 79 e4 3f ff c9 be 58 4b d5 54 | peer's g: 46 b2 d3 10 47 3d d0 32 32 80 05 2a d9 97 1c 0e | peer's g: a1 f2 1b ae 90 07 e8 be ac 54 f2 70 ac 3d 2b 72 | peer's g: 4b 49 36 a0 2c 2e ee 9e 0a 2f 6f 0a a8 c0 7a df | peer's g: f0 cb 92 76 88 86 08 51 24 66 fe 8a 9c ef 60 fc | peer's g: c3 6d 25 3f a2 b3 41 1b 10 5f 5c 40 75 cb 02 c7 | peer's g: e3 ab 5a a4 3b ab f7 87 6d 98 d5 b1 08 3c eb 70 | peer's g: b4 28 12 26 38 a8 6b 38 4d 40 18 41 d5 a2 66 6b | peer's g: 7f 0c 1e f0 84 8f 9d 26 e4 4c e4 1e da 32 7a ec | peer's g: d8 7c e8 1f 73 45 24 7a 30 b0 05 1c 3b d8 cd 6b | peer's g: 02 1b 72 d5 cf 7d d3 09 94 6d bc 20 6b 12 5d 43 | peer's g: 33 51 fb c4 cf fc 36 16 bd 60 1b a8 34 94 83 2f | peer's g: 00 2e 3c 98 6c 8c 98 ba 4b 33 e1 b7 da 2f 22 2c | peer's g: 6d c2 77 d4 87 23 cc 20 de 24 52 91 6a fe 39 db | peer's g: 68 91 31 7b 6a 45 0b d4 2e f9 6a f4 d4 86 c8 02 | peer's g: 62 12 29 95 7a 8d 80 02 bf c3 35 69 f0 74 44 ee | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x7f9b8c008420 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 6 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 4 time elapsed 0.000993 seconds | (#2) spent 0.993 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 4: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 4 for state #2 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84003590 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #2 | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 4 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #2: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2014638053 (0x7814efe5) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 2c a6 9e 9a | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xf1d809bc for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI f1 d8 09 bc | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #2: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:7814efe5} "east" #2: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #2: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | Nr 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 8f eb e2 79 79 4c 5b ad ad 16 39 c5 ef 25 2c 88 | keyex value c9 0f 68 96 38 1c 47 b3 89 88 2c 06 e5 84 19 9a | keyex value cb 66 55 45 df 06 c9 7d e5 ee 21 68 e6 ed c0 34 | keyex value d6 1b a0 62 0d 34 bd bb 3b a4 f9 c6 c9 45 29 d6 | keyex value aa 89 0b 8d b8 ed e0 55 dc f1 f5 d5 6f c5 e5 9c | keyex value 6d 13 e5 23 7f a8 63 01 94 08 2f 3d b6 32 88 5f | keyex value 67 86 5b 72 33 9d bc 79 42 fc b4 14 77 e5 73 93 | keyex value 42 ac 23 b6 6f dc 7c a8 77 8c a3 21 c6 50 3e e7 | keyex value 6c 8f ab 2a 27 a4 ca bb 26 80 b2 a2 80 1c a7 ed | keyex value 55 5a 58 57 8e 3c ab 48 ae 20 6c 7f 43 aa f3 06 | keyex value af 6c 96 99 6e 08 16 0f cc 45 83 99 e2 7d 76 12 | keyex value 44 f6 a9 60 40 d5 4c ab 09 e2 90 93 cb 91 be ce | keyex value f4 ae 58 3f d7 4e 7c 58 c5 2c 45 df 97 24 3a 1a | keyex value b2 82 f4 1d dd 54 e5 83 f3 9f 97 2f 7e d5 ed 9d | keyex value f0 6d 85 c3 9e 69 e2 26 f8 63 1e 9b 6c df 15 cf | keyex value 3b 8a 65 49 5a 07 d6 81 bb 6f 3a 44 df 90 22 1a | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #2 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cab2f0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e9c (length 4) | 78 14 ef e5 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b8c0030a0 (length 32) | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55756517d974 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 f1 d8 09 bc 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 48 b9 4b 58 | b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 7f 31 42 68 | 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c 05 00 01 04 | 8f eb e2 79 79 4c 5b ad ad 16 39 c5 ef 25 2c 88 | c9 0f 68 96 38 1c 47 b3 89 88 2c 06 e5 84 19 9a | cb 66 55 45 df 06 c9 7d e5 ee 21 68 e6 ed c0 34 | d6 1b a0 62 0d 34 bd bb 3b a4 f9 c6 c9 45 29 d6 | aa 89 0b 8d b8 ed e0 55 dc f1 f5 d5 6f c5 e5 9c | 6d 13 e5 23 7f a8 63 01 94 08 2f 3d b6 32 88 5f | 67 86 5b 72 33 9d bc 79 42 fc b4 14 77 e5 73 93 | 42 ac 23 b6 6f dc 7c a8 77 8c a3 21 c6 50 3e e7 | 6c 8f ab 2a 27 a4 ca bb 26 80 b2 a2 80 1c a7 ed | 55 5a 58 57 8e 3c ab 48 ae 20 6c 7f 43 aa f3 06 | af 6c 96 99 6e 08 16 0f cc 45 83 99 e2 7d 76 12 | 44 f6 a9 60 40 d5 4c ab 09 e2 90 93 cb 91 be ce | f4 ae 58 3f d7 4e 7c 58 c5 2c 45 df 97 24 3a 1a | b2 82 f4 1d dd 54 e5 83 f3 9f 97 2f 7e d5 ed 9d | f0 6d 85 c3 9e 69 e2 26 f8 63 1e 9b 6c df 15 cf | 3b 8a 65 49 5a 07 d6 81 bb 6f 3a 44 df 90 22 1a | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 20) | 6b 78 99 24 11 b1 59 d0 62 78 ab 04 ad 9c 43 c3 | a5 d1 b6 15 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 6b 78 99 24 11 b1 59 d0 62 78 ab 04 ad 9c 43 c3 | a5 d1 b6 15 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadec0 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: fffffff1 ffffffaf ffffffac 0c ffffffa2 ffffffc8 ffffff96 47 44 15 ffffffc7 ffffff86 ffffffbc 44 6b fffffffb fffffff8 0a 01 64 ffffffd3 ffffffdb 46 23 ffffffa4 ffffffc5 22 3a 18 fffffff0 09 79 68 00 ffffffcf ffffff8d 2c ffffffc2 0c ffffffba 16 ffffffa8 75 3f 39 50 58 ffffffcf ffffff94 61 53 07 08 ffffffe0 ffffffa1 6b 3b 56 ffffffe8 2e 1d ffffffe1 ffffff94 3e 19 ffffffd8 ffffff8f ffffffe9 2b 2f 7f 0e 77 0b 7a ffffff91 70 ffffffe3 fffffff6 ffffffef 7d 51 ffffffa2 ffffffc2 ffffff82 51 21 ffffffda ffffffc2 ffffffdd 10 ffffffb1 74 ffffff9b 1b 68 0b 2d ffffffd2 05 09 ffffff9e 50 fffffff8 fffffffc ffffffe6 ffffffda ffffff99 56 7e 7e ffffffcf ffffffa1 fffffff8 70 11 ffffff9d 23 25 1a 7e ffffffe6 02 ffffffe3 49 32 ffffffcd 6c ffffffdc 76 fffffff6 ffffffae ffffffb3 4e 1a 60 4f 08 ffffffaf ffffffcc 3d 06 ffffff8a ffffff93 64 ffffffac 52 ffffffc5 46 ffffffe7 ffffffbb ffffffa3 ffffffec 4d 4e ffffff9d 6d ffffffd3 03 75 ffffffc6 ffffffd0 fffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb3260 | unwrapped: 51 a3 00 82 4f 49 4c 37 88 13 69 11 04 75 58 6e | unwrapped: 28 6f 85 ba 57 12 bb 7f 1f c7 88 78 2d 59 42 9f | unwrapped: 47 85 a2 07 9d c9 81 3a 37 16 66 98 34 6b 97 aa | unwrapped: 74 b8 1c a1 59 f2 d2 30 a1 ba 4f 6b 80 f7 90 77 | unwrapped: 4f 24 91 1c 28 82 df 25 f0 bf a4 41 71 1b 5d 53 | unwrapped: 2a f2 ca a6 aa 6b ba c8 a7 1f 7f 0f 3a 7d a7 62 | unwrapped: b9 d6 81 01 8c 7c 2a 95 98 be 52 19 30 8a 02 71 | unwrapped: e5 10 45 3f ff b8 03 4b 99 1b 83 02 a1 a1 a3 0d | unwrapped: 78 4b e0 be 15 d5 8d d5 1a b3 e7 33 90 2d d9 49 | unwrapped: 62 23 f5 d2 df 0e ca 6e 92 ae 57 a6 8e f6 4a 04 | unwrapped: 88 52 d9 64 6f e8 84 d2 b3 cc 2d 96 db 7b 3d 00 | unwrapped: 41 9a d9 e9 12 bd 96 55 ed b8 dd 9c f6 ed 30 66 | unwrapped: 38 56 fd dc 89 33 75 22 c1 c4 e9 69 43 4f 3e 8c | unwrapped: 74 94 3b 93 eb 52 7f 2a 23 5d 0e 3e bf b2 4a be | unwrapped: 4e fe 70 87 56 db 93 49 6b 82 10 d6 ec 1d b9 45 | unwrapped: 8c 0b ab 55 70 48 c3 d9 75 02 cc 1b 11 a4 29 4a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: fffffff1 ffffffaf ffffffac 0c ffffffa2 ffffffc8 ffffff96 47 44 15 ffffffc7 ffffff86 ffffffbc 44 6b fffffffb fffffff8 0a 01 64 ffffffd3 ffffffdb 46 23 ffffffa4 ffffffc5 22 3a 18 fffffff0 09 79 68 00 ffffffcf ffffff8d 2c ffffffc2 0c ffffffba 16 ffffffa8 75 3f 39 50 58 ffffffcf ffffff94 61 53 07 08 ffffffe0 ffffffa1 6b 3b 56 ffffffe8 2e 1d ffffffe1 ffffff94 3e 19 ffffffd8 ffffff8f ffffffe9 2b 2f 7f 0e 77 0b 7a ffffff91 70 ffffffe3 fffffff6 ffffffef 7d 51 ffffffa2 ffffffc2 ffffff82 51 21 ffffffda ffffffc2 ffffffdd 10 ffffffb1 74 ffffff9b 1b 68 0b 2d ffffffd2 05 09 ffffff9e 50 fffffff8 fffffffc ffffffe6 ffffffda ffffff99 56 7e 7e ffffffcf ffffffa1 fffffff8 70 11 ffffff9d 23 25 1a 7e ffffffe6 02 ffffffe3 49 32 ffffffcd 6c ffffffdc 76 fffffff6 ffffffae ffffffb3 4e 1a 60 4f 08 ffffffaf ffffffcc 3d 06 ffffff8a ffffff93 64 ffffffac 52 ffffffc5 46 ffffffe7 ffffffbb ffffffa3 ffffffec 4d 4e ffffff9d 6d ffffffd3 03 75 ffffffc6 ffffffd0 fffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2f30 | unwrapped: 51 a3 00 82 4f 49 4c 37 88 13 69 11 04 75 58 6e | unwrapped: 28 6f 85 ba 57 12 bb 7f 1f c7 88 78 2d 59 42 9f | unwrapped: 47 85 a2 07 9d c9 81 3a 37 16 66 98 34 6b 97 aa | unwrapped: 74 b8 1c a1 59 f2 d2 30 a1 ba 4f 6b 80 f7 90 77 | unwrapped: 4f 24 91 1c 28 82 df 25 f0 bf a4 41 71 1b 5d 53 | unwrapped: 2a f2 ca a6 aa 6b ba c8 a7 1f 7f 0f 3a 7d a7 62 | unwrapped: b9 d6 81 01 8c 7c 2a 95 98 be 52 19 30 8a 02 71 | unwrapped: e5 10 45 3f ff b8 03 4b 99 1b 83 02 a1 a1 a3 0d | unwrapped: 78 4b e0 be 15 d5 8d d5 1a b3 e7 33 90 2d d9 49 | unwrapped: 62 23 f5 d2 df 0e ca 6e 92 ae 57 a6 8e f6 4a 04 | unwrapped: 88 52 d9 64 6f e8 84 d2 b3 cc 2d 96 db 7b 3d 00 | unwrapped: 41 9a d9 e9 12 bd 96 55 ed b8 dd 9c f6 ed 30 66 | unwrapped: 38 56 fd dc 89 33 75 22 c1 c4 e9 69 43 4f 3e 8c | unwrapped: 74 94 3b 93 eb 52 7f 2a 23 5d 0e 3e bf b2 4a be | unwrapped: 4e fe 70 87 56 db 93 49 6b 82 10 d6 ec 1d b9 45 | unwrapped: 8c 0b ab 55 70 48 c3 d9 75 02 cc 1b 11 a4 29 4a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caa7e8 (length 4) | f1 d8 09 bc | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caa7c8 (length 4) | 2c a6 9e 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c0030a0 (length 32) | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c0030a0 (length 32) | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004190 (length 32) | 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004190 (length 32) | 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x557566cabd20 (length 20) | 73 c2 56 1d f1 75 02 e2 95 4d 67 86 fb 78 9a 4e | 5f ad 2a ce | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x557566cadee0 (length 20) | a1 7e 2b 46 58 10 f5 c5 18 08 49 6c a0 fe 06 0e | f5 a0 a3 ac | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadb60 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cab2f0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cabd20 (length 20) | 73 c2 56 1d f1 75 02 e2 95 4d 67 86 fb 78 9a 4e | 5f ad 2a ce | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cadee0 (length 20) | a1 7e 2b 46 58 10 f5 c5 18 08 49 6c a0 fe 06 0e | f5 a0 a3 ac | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: fffffff1 ffffffaf ffffffac 0c ffffffa2 ffffffc8 ffffff96 47 44 15 ffffffc7 ffffff86 ffffffbc 44 6b fffffffb fffffff8 0a 01 64 ffffffd3 ffffffdb 46 23 ffffffa4 ffffffc5 22 3a 18 fffffff0 09 79 68 00 ffffffcf ffffff8d 2c ffffffc2 0c ffffffba 16 ffffffa8 75 3f 39 50 58 ffffffcf ffffff94 61 53 07 08 ffffffe0 ffffffa1 6b 3b 56 ffffffe8 2e 1d ffffffe1 ffffff94 3e 19 ffffffd8 ffffff8f ffffffe9 2b 2f 7f 0e 77 0b 7a ffffff91 70 ffffffe3 fffffff6 ffffffef 7d 51 ffffffa2 ffffffc2 ffffff82 51 21 ffffffda ffffffc2 ffffffdd 10 ffffffb1 74 ffffff9b 1b 68 0b 2d ffffffd2 05 09 ffffff9e 50 fffffff8 fffffffc ffffffe6 ffffffda ffffff99 56 7e 7e ffffffcf ffffffa1 fffffff8 70 11 ffffff9d 23 25 1a 7e ffffffe6 02 ffffffe3 49 32 ffffffcd 6c ffffffdc 76 fffffff6 ffffffae ffffffb3 4e 1a 60 4f 08 ffffffaf ffffffcc 3d 06 ffffff8a ffffff93 64 ffffffac 52 ffffffc5 46 ffffffe7 ffffffbb ffffffa3 ffffffec 4d 4e ffffff9d 6d ffffffd3 03 75 ffffffc6 ffffffd0 fffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2e20 | unwrapped: 51 a3 00 82 4f 49 4c 37 88 13 69 11 04 75 58 6e | unwrapped: 28 6f 85 ba 57 12 bb 7f 1f c7 88 78 2d 59 42 9f | unwrapped: 47 85 a2 07 9d c9 81 3a 37 16 66 98 34 6b 97 aa | unwrapped: 74 b8 1c a1 59 f2 d2 30 a1 ba 4f 6b 80 f7 90 77 | unwrapped: 4f 24 91 1c 28 82 df 25 f0 bf a4 41 71 1b 5d 53 | unwrapped: 2a f2 ca a6 aa 6b ba c8 a7 1f 7f 0f 3a 7d a7 62 | unwrapped: b9 d6 81 01 8c 7c 2a 95 98 be 52 19 30 8a 02 71 | unwrapped: e5 10 45 3f ff b8 03 4b 99 1b 83 02 a1 a1 a3 0d | unwrapped: 78 4b e0 be 15 d5 8d d5 1a b3 e7 33 90 2d d9 49 | unwrapped: 62 23 f5 d2 df 0e ca 6e 92 ae 57 a6 8e f6 4a 04 | unwrapped: 88 52 d9 64 6f e8 84 d2 b3 cc 2d 96 db 7b 3d 00 | unwrapped: 41 9a d9 e9 12 bd 96 55 ed b8 dd 9c f6 ed 30 66 | unwrapped: 38 56 fd dc 89 33 75 22 c1 c4 e9 69 43 4f 3e 8c | unwrapped: 74 94 3b 93 eb 52 7f 2a 23 5d 0e 3e bf b2 4a be | unwrapped: 4e fe 70 87 56 db 93 49 6b 82 10 d6 ec 1d b9 45 | unwrapped: 8c 0b ab 55 70 48 c3 d9 75 02 cc 1b 11 a4 29 4a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: fffffff1 ffffffaf ffffffac 0c ffffffa2 ffffffc8 ffffff96 47 44 15 ffffffc7 ffffff86 ffffffbc 44 6b fffffffb fffffff8 0a 01 64 ffffffd3 ffffffdb 46 23 ffffffa4 ffffffc5 22 3a 18 fffffff0 09 79 68 00 ffffffcf ffffff8d 2c ffffffc2 0c ffffffba 16 ffffffa8 75 3f 39 50 58 ffffffcf ffffff94 61 53 07 08 ffffffe0 ffffffa1 6b 3b 56 ffffffe8 2e 1d ffffffe1 ffffff94 3e 19 ffffffd8 ffffff8f ffffffe9 2b 2f 7f 0e 77 0b 7a ffffff91 70 ffffffe3 fffffff6 ffffffef 7d 51 ffffffa2 ffffffc2 ffffff82 51 21 ffffffda ffffffc2 ffffffdd 10 ffffffb1 74 ffffff9b 1b 68 0b 2d ffffffd2 05 09 ffffff9e 50 fffffff8 fffffffc ffffffe6 ffffffda ffffff99 56 7e 7e ffffffcf ffffffa1 fffffff8 70 11 ffffff9d 23 25 1a 7e ffffffe6 02 ffffffe3 49 32 ffffffcd 6c ffffffdc 76 fffffff6 ffffffae ffffffb3 4e 1a 60 4f 08 ffffffaf ffffffcc 3d 06 ffffff8a ffffff93 64 ffffffac 52 ffffffc5 46 ffffffe7 ffffffbb ffffffa3 ffffffec 4d 4e ffffff9d 6d ffffffd3 03 75 ffffffc6 ffffffd0 fffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cae020 | unwrapped: 51 a3 00 82 4f 49 4c 37 88 13 69 11 04 75 58 6e | unwrapped: 28 6f 85 ba 57 12 bb 7f 1f c7 88 78 2d 59 42 9f | unwrapped: 47 85 a2 07 9d c9 81 3a 37 16 66 98 34 6b 97 aa | unwrapped: 74 b8 1c a1 59 f2 d2 30 a1 ba 4f 6b 80 f7 90 77 | unwrapped: 4f 24 91 1c 28 82 df 25 f0 bf a4 41 71 1b 5d 53 | unwrapped: 2a f2 ca a6 aa 6b ba c8 a7 1f 7f 0f 3a 7d a7 62 | unwrapped: b9 d6 81 01 8c 7c 2a 95 98 be 52 19 30 8a 02 71 | unwrapped: e5 10 45 3f ff b8 03 4b 99 1b 83 02 a1 a1 a3 0d | unwrapped: 78 4b e0 be 15 d5 8d d5 1a b3 e7 33 90 2d d9 49 | unwrapped: 62 23 f5 d2 df 0e ca 6e 92 ae 57 a6 8e f6 4a 04 | unwrapped: 88 52 d9 64 6f e8 84 d2 b3 cc 2d 96 db 7b 3d 00 | unwrapped: 41 9a d9 e9 12 bd 96 55 ed b8 dd 9c f6 ed 30 66 | unwrapped: 38 56 fd dc 89 33 75 22 c1 c4 e9 69 43 4f 3e 8c | unwrapped: 74 94 3b 93 eb 52 7f 2a 23 5d 0e 3e bf b2 4a be | unwrapped: 4e fe 70 87 56 db 93 49 6b 82 10 d6 ec 1d b9 45 | unwrapped: 8c 0b ab 55 70 48 c3 d9 75 02 cc 1b 11 a4 29 4a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caa7e8 (length 4) | f1 d8 09 bc | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caa7c8 (length 4) | 2c a6 9e 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c0030a0 (length 32) | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c0030a0 (length 32) | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004190 (length 32) | 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004190 (length 32) | 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x557566cabd34 (length 20) | dd da 23 74 c9 65 e6 10 15 45 e5 26 38 e7 d9 4b | 6b ee e8 20 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x557566cadef4 (length 20) | ef 50 98 dc 7b 41 ee d7 21 8b 03 82 79 fa 8e 6a | 40 42 7f db | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x557566caa5e0 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#2 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.2ca69e9a@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.f1d809bc@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 6b 78 99 24 11 b1 59 d0 62 78 ab 04 | encrypting: ad 9c 43 c3 a5 d1 b6 15 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 f1 d8 09 bc | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb | encrypting: 0c 83 44 96 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 | encrypting: 6e 38 43 2c 05 00 01 04 8f eb e2 79 79 4c 5b ad | encrypting: ad 16 39 c5 ef 25 2c 88 c9 0f 68 96 38 1c 47 b3 | encrypting: 89 88 2c 06 e5 84 19 9a cb 66 55 45 df 06 c9 7d | encrypting: e5 ee 21 68 e6 ed c0 34 d6 1b a0 62 0d 34 bd bb | encrypting: 3b a4 f9 c6 c9 45 29 d6 aa 89 0b 8d b8 ed e0 55 | encrypting: dc f1 f5 d5 6f c5 e5 9c 6d 13 e5 23 7f a8 63 01 | encrypting: 94 08 2f 3d b6 32 88 5f 67 86 5b 72 33 9d bc 79 | encrypting: 42 fc b4 14 77 e5 73 93 42 ac 23 b6 6f dc 7c a8 | encrypting: 77 8c a3 21 c6 50 3e e7 6c 8f ab 2a 27 a4 ca bb | encrypting: 26 80 b2 a2 80 1c a7 ed 55 5a 58 57 8e 3c ab 48 | encrypting: ae 20 6c 7f 43 aa f3 06 af 6c 96 99 6e 08 16 0f | encrypting: cc 45 83 99 e2 7d 76 12 44 f6 a9 60 40 d5 4c ab | encrypting: 09 e2 90 93 cb 91 be ce f4 ae 58 3f d7 4e 7c 58 | encrypting: c5 2c 45 df 97 24 3a 1a b2 82 f4 1d dd 54 e5 83 | encrypting: f3 9f 97 2f 7e d5 ed 9d f0 6d 85 c3 9e 69 e2 26 | encrypting: f8 63 1e 9b 6c df 15 cf 3b 8a 65 49 5a 07 d6 81 | encrypting: bb 6f 3a 44 df 90 22 1a 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: 84 28 d5 13 3e 1f 9e a7 2f e8 66 ef 9a 06 4f 2f | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 72 a0 5f 3b 68 d3 50 bf 5c a2 13 65 1b 81 93 b8 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #2 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #2: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #2 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #2) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 20 01 78 14 ef e5 00 00 01 bc a5 99 7d 32 | c1 11 f8 a9 15 7a 64 c7 7f 35 5a d2 73 8a 04 59 | f7 31 84 7d 39 91 5d b6 a7 7c 7c 6a ca ec 65 80 | 4d ac 2c 9b 55 95 f9 e0 6d 49 b4 bc fb fb 14 c1 | bc 7f cd d7 4e 2b cf d2 a7 1c b1 b8 23 c1 66 95 | 8b 7b 8a 5f 59 20 eb 09 98 15 fc 5e e4 a2 e6 ff | 12 08 9f a8 b0 1d e7 4c 1c b5 ca da 9a 7c 69 d3 | f7 97 05 7c 3d 32 12 9d 16 37 87 b8 e8 45 a6 4e | 2c b2 77 d6 dc a0 42 6d f9 86 3f c0 d8 e2 fa 5a | f0 56 57 e7 10 d9 f6 da b4 96 42 55 52 84 81 46 | 4f 44 7c 88 47 01 aa fa 57 56 93 9e 5a a0 4a 13 | 63 8f f6 6f c2 47 87 57 d5 fc aa 80 8a 80 a8 ec | 9b b3 b0 18 ba 74 bc 83 02 2a e8 21 7d 7c 98 e4 | 7e f3 d3 0b f7 43 44 d2 32 75 9a d6 89 d9 35 80 | 8c 60 42 b6 c4 b0 5f b0 6c d1 70 af aa 47 c4 cb | 16 d5 dc c3 24 83 0f ae 38 fb 12 0a 49 51 44 0f | 82 9e e9 aa 89 30 71 18 b5 02 a2 e5 e2 c8 6b b8 | 2b 35 65 02 0e 6a 11 b4 96 f2 fb 92 ec b9 30 50 | 9d a5 d3 b7 de e3 6c b1 d8 79 ec c9 0b 9c 21 6a | 15 b0 dc c8 34 f6 47 b8 f9 5f 58 4e ab 4d be de | 56 2b b8 0b 7a 9f ce 53 30 36 d3 d5 a3 3b c6 57 | ea c1 e9 d9 19 be 2f 9c b0 7f 8b bb 48 21 b8 d3 | 24 7d f9 3e 6e 67 9c 98 a5 e0 2c 04 97 54 66 b2 | 07 e9 52 40 1f 37 0a 5d a9 ec 65 15 c1 f2 01 19 | ec 32 79 2a 5c 25 4a fa 7f 66 bc b4 43 7d 81 27 | f1 81 24 65 ab f3 53 e8 eb 4c d0 d7 72 a0 5f 3b | 68 d3 50 bf 5c a2 13 65 1b 81 93 b8 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 size 128 | #2 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49488.929304 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #2: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x2ca69e9a <0xf1d809bc xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #2 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #2 spent 1.75 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84003590 | spent 0.00269 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 20 01 78 14 ef e5 00 00 00 3c 9f 68 9b 28 | 32 93 9a 91 d1 f3 d8 73 b0 d9 09 72 53 eb 00 20 | d9 68 46 ad 3c 52 fa c7 64 18 8a 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2014638053 (0x7814efe5) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #2 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #2 is idle | #2 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 72 a0 5f 3b 68 d3 50 bf 5c a2 13 65 1b 81 93 b8 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 53 eb 00 20 d9 68 46 ad 3c 52 fa c7 64 18 8a 48 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 20 01 78 14 ef e5 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | c5 80 15 81 56 b1 bf 66 f4 93 0b d5 a5 df 7a 0f | 81 35 dd c6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 78 14 ef e5 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b8c0030a0 (length 32) | 21 d7 48 63 d3 e5 7d 67 96 ef ff ac d7 ad c7 ed | d0 0b b0 d2 47 eb e8 ad 59 eb cb d8 74 5f 6b 6f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7f9b90004190 (length 32) | 48 b9 4b 58 b1 b9 97 97 57 95 1e eb 0c 83 44 96 | 7f 31 42 68 33 bd 6e d9 56 1a dc 02 6e 38 43 2c | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | c5 80 15 81 56 b1 bf 66 f4 93 0b d5 a5 df 7a 0f | 81 35 dd c6 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | c5 80 15 81 56 b1 bf 66 f4 93 0b d5 a5 df 7a 0f | 81 35 dd c6 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #2: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | sr for #2: unrouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:null esr:{(nil)} ro:null rosr:{(nil)} and state: #2 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection add eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI_OUT=0xf1d | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI_OUT=0xf1d809bc ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb prepare | command executing prepare-client | executing prepare-client: PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI | popen cmd is 1025 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_IN: | cmd( 80):TERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@e: | cmd( 160):ast' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLI: | cmd( 240):ENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID=: | cmd( 320):'16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_: | cmd( 400):PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 480):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='': | cmd( 560): PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PF: | cmd( 640):S+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' : | cmd( 720):PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_D: | cmd( 800):NS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' P: | cmd( 880):LUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SH: | cmd( 960):ARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI_OUT=0xf1d809bc ipsec _updown 2>&1: | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb route | command executing route-client | executing route-client: PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI_OUT | popen cmd is 1023 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTE: | cmd( 80):RFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@eas: | cmd( 160):t' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIEN: | cmd( 240):T_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1: | cmd( 320):6388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PE: | cmd( 400):ER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MAS: | cmd( 480):K='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' P: | cmd( 560):LUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+: | cmd( 640):IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PL: | cmd( 720):UTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS: | cmd( 800):_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLU: | cmd( 880):TO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHAR: | cmd( 960):ED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI_OUT=0xf1d809bc ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x557566ca79c0,sr=0x557566ca79c0} to #2 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #1 spent 0.554 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #2 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#2) cloned from #1 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #2 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #2: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #2 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #2 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 size 128 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #2: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x2ca69e9a <0xf1d809bc xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #2 spent 0.629 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.836 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00453 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00259 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00267 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00253 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 05 01 99 9d c9 53 00 00 00 4c 70 20 83 7b | e9 7d da 3b db ee 13 bf 5f 8c 54 91 bc 1b 45 45 | de a7 7f 28 3f 7f 65 58 0b a7 dd 2d 26 76 f2 55 | 78 56 08 6d 64 c0 3e 39 35 f5 01 5a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2577254739 (0x999dc953) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #2; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=7814efe5 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #1; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #1 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | current Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566ca9c90 (length 16) | c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 99 9d c9 53 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566ca9c10 (length 20) | 13 b9 e8 8b 34 f8 9f c0 b7 ea 42 b7 ce af d8 54 | 97 8b f8 27 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 13 b9 e8 8b 34 f8 9f c0 b7 ea 42 b7 ce af d8 54 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 26 76 f2 55 78 56 08 6d 64 c0 3e 39 35 f5 01 5a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 05 01 99 9d c9 53 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | c8 f5 82 95 a6 59 53 4f 93 af ff 7d 1b 19 2b f0 | f0 25 57 b9 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 2c a6 9e 9a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 99 9d c9 53 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c06494 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 2c a6 9e 9a | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | c8 f5 82 95 a6 59 53 4f 93 af ff 7d 1b 19 2b f0 | f0 25 57 b9 | informational HASH(1): | c8 f5 82 95 a6 59 53 4f 93 af ff 7d 1b 19 2b f0 | f0 25 57 b9 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 2c a6 9e 9a | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #1: received Delete SA(0x2ca69e9a) payload: deleting IPsec State #2 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #2: deleting other state #2 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.394s and sending notification | child state #2: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.2ca69e9a@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.f1d809bc@192.1.2.23 "east" #2: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #2 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2556838577 (0x986642b1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload f1 d8 09 bc | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c68 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001230 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d4c (length 4) | 98 66 42 b1 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80f4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 f1 d8 09 bc | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80e0 (length 20) | a8 ee c1 4d bb 4b 54 4c f7 ef c1 89 65 ec 09 26 | 5f 6e 19 42 | send delete HASH(1): | a8 ee c1 4d bb 4b 54 4c f7 ef c1 89 65 ec 09 26 | 5f 6e 19 42 | last Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | current Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566ca9c90 (length 16) | c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d5c (length 4) | 98 66 42 b1 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566ca9c10 (length 20) | e4 a6 4e 79 c3 2d 80 37 2e cb 0e ae d1 3e 7d 9a | 14 39 35 4c | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 a8 ee c1 4d bb 4b 54 4c f7 ef c1 89 | encrypting: 65 ec 09 26 5f 6e 19 42 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 f1 d8 09 bc | IV: e4 a6 4e 79 c3 2d 80 37 2e cb 0e ae d1 3e 7d 9a | IV: 14 39 35 4c | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: b3 d8 f5 61 fa ae d7 c2 43 b0 3e a7 86 ce b2 2f | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 05 01 98 66 42 b1 00 00 00 4c 93 22 5c a0 | ff ee e2 6c e0 a5 06 7a 87 17 05 de c4 3f 6e bd | 7a 38 05 9a fe 67 52 13 bc 16 3d 1e b3 d8 f5 61 | fa ae d7 c2 43 b0 3e a7 86 ce b2 2f | state #2 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b94006900 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b94002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050842' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050842' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2ca69e9a SPI_OUT=0xf1d809bc ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.2ca69e9a@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.2ca69e9a@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.f1d809bc@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.f1d809bc@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #2 in QUICK_R2 | child state #2: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #2 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #1: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.440s and sending notification | parent state #1: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #1 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1477184767 (0x580c0cff) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c08 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cec (length 4) | 58 0c 0c ff | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8094 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 14 f8 99 de | 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8080 (length 20) | 19 f3 b8 9e a3 74 59 ca d1 ef 03 76 4d a1 c7 15 | 40 f6 cf 89 | send delete HASH(1): | 19 f3 b8 9e a3 74 59 ca d1 ef 03 76 4d a1 c7 15 | 40 f6 cf 89 | last Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | current Phase 1 IV: c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566ca9c90 (length 16) | c7 3e 27 5a e1 ef a6 b4 98 b8 bf 2e 29 02 ee 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cfc (length 4) | 58 0c 0c ff | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566ca9c10 (length 20) | 73 af e7 9d 35 34 61 70 61 1e 1f 74 3c 22 27 e8 | 10 0a 22 4b | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 19 f3 b8 9e a3 74 59 ca d1 ef 03 76 | encrypting: 4d a1 c7 15 40 f6 cf 89 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 | encrypting: 47 0d 46 57 | IV: 73 af e7 9d 35 34 61 70 61 1e 1f 74 3c 22 27 e8 | IV: 10 0a 22 4b | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: ef d9 a8 51 91 45 f1 a7 84 ab bb 36 5d d3 0b ae | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 05 01 58 0c 0c ff 00 00 00 5c e9 69 41 09 | 5c aa 6c c8 8c 82 33 a1 d0 b2 c8 54 27 e4 4b de | 40 5f 61 27 0a 94 35 6e 3f db f3 03 bf b6 f8 23 | 89 d2 06 ec 08 3a 0f 09 28 91 01 5c ef d9 a8 51 | 91 45 f1 a7 84 ab bb 36 5d d3 0b ae | state #1 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #1: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.47 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00193 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | 08 10 05 01 90 ea e5 57 00 00 00 5c 4a 75 d3 cb | d5 c8 be de 8e 55 b1 7c d6 f5 da 78 38 19 42 70 | ad f0 b0 20 da 77 ba bd 0f 73 e3 df f1 6e 41 01 | 16 32 3c 68 1a e5 7f af d6 9a 13 9f 5c 69 43 b1 | c0 e7 e0 90 24 e7 99 96 23 35 39 41 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | responder cookie: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2431313239 (0x90eae557) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x90eae557 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 14 f8 99 de 17 f8 4e 3d | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | 7f 08 76 63 47 0d 46 57 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0714 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0044 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00319 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 208 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ed c6 8c cd a9 b9 0c ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 0d 00 00 3c | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 | 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 | af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 | 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f | 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 | 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ed c6 8c cd a9 b9 0c ff | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 208 (0xd0) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 02 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | 66 61 a6 e1 fc 42 ae 6e b4 3b 71 00 90 c3 e6 ed | d7 33 27 bd 03 4d b3 f0 cb bf fb 2f 47 b7 9b 07 | creating state object #3 at 0x557566ca9800 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #3 in UNDEFINED | pstats #3 ikev1.isakmp started | #3 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #3: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: ed c6 8c cd a9 b9 0c ff "east" #3: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ed c6 8c cd a9 b9 0c ff | responder cookie: | 66 61 a6 e1 fc 42 ae 6e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #3: repeated OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute in Oakley Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #3 is idle "east" #3: sending notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ed c6 8c cd a9 b9 0c ff | responder cookie: | 66 61 a6 e1 fc 42 ae 6e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #3) | ed c6 8c cd a9 b9 0c ff 66 61 a6 e1 fc 42 ae 6e | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.6 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0028 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 208 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 64 5d a5 b7 70 5d 1f c4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 0d 00 00 3c | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 | 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 | af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 | 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f | 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 | 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 64 5d a5 b7 70 5d 1f c4 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 208 (0xd0) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 03 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | d6 79 bd 51 2d 90 cd 5b 2a b9 e4 5e 8f 51 05 71 | c5 3d b2 50 21 e7 28 d1 75 0e ef f5 82 4e ba 55 | creating state object #4 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #4 in UNDEFINED | pstats #4 ikev1.isakmp started | #4 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #4: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 64 5d a5 b7 70 5d 1f c4 "east" #4: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 64 5d a5 b7 70 5d 1f c4 | responder cookie: | d6 79 bd 51 2d 90 cd 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #4: repeated OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute in Oakley Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #4 is idle "east" #4: sending notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 64 5d a5 b7 70 5d 1f c4 | responder cookie: | d6 79 bd 51 2d 90 cd 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #4) | 64 5d a5 b7 70 5d 1f c4 d6 79 bd 51 2d 90 cd 5b | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.559 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00308 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 04 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 0a 76 f6 72 ff ec c8 40 | 23 d4 0a dd a1 ac a0 c8 89 49 6a 10 77 4c bf e2 | creating state object #5 at 0x557566cae2b0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #5 in UNDEFINED | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp started | #5 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #5: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 "east" #5: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #5 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #5: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.574 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00193 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | 14 00 00 24 3a 29 d5 dc a1 d5 6a 0e 4b fc e4 1a | ae e1 28 ef 5e c1 2b 8f cb 00 d9 40 fc d8 73 a0 | 90 5b 67 b9 14 00 00 18 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c | d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b d9 61 c1 4e 00 00 00 18 | a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | 0b 43 49 5c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #5 is idle | #5 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cae848 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cae850 (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | d9 61 c1 4e | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | natd_hash: hash= d9 61 c1 4e | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cae848 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cae850 (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | 0b 43 49 5c | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | natd_hash: hash= 0b 43 49 5c | expected NAT-D(me): 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | expected NAT-D(me): d9 61 c1 4e | expected NAT-D(him): | a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | 0b 43 49 5c | received NAT-D: 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | received NAT-D: d9 61 c1 4e | received NAT-D: a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | received NAT-D: 0b 43 49 5c | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 5 for state #5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #5 and saving MD | #5 is busy; has a suspended MD | #5 spent 0.174 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.312 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 5 for state #5 | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 5 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b88000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b88000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | Generated nonce: 3a 1c 35 a5 f9 bc 0d f0 14 82 db 9f 09 14 e7 6c | Generated nonce: 7b 30 1b ec e7 93 8d 35 70 76 78 cc bd 57 ca 48 | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 5 time elapsed 0.001049 seconds | (#5) spent 1.05 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 5: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 5 for state #5 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88006900 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #5 | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 5 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #5: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b88000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #5 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | keyex value 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | keyex value b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | keyex value d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | keyex value 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | keyex value 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | keyex value ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | keyex value 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | keyex value c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | keyex value 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | keyex value a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | keyex value ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | keyex value a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | keyex value 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | keyex value 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | keyex value c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 3a 1c 35 a5 f9 bc 0d f0 14 82 db 9f 09 14 e7 6c | Nr 7b 30 1b ec e7 93 8d 35 70 76 78 cc bd 57 ca 48 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | 0b 43 49 5c | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | natd_hash: hash= 0b 43 49 5c | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 | NAT-D 0b 43 49 5c | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | d9 61 c1 4e | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | natd_hash: hash= d9 61 c1 4e | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | NAT-D d9 61 c1 4e | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b88000d60: transferring ownership from state #5 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 6 for state #5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #5 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #5 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #5: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #5 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | 14 00 00 24 3a 1c 35 a5 f9 bc 0d f0 14 82 db 9f | 09 14 e7 6c 7b 30 1b ec e7 93 8d 35 70 76 78 cc | bd 57 ca 48 14 00 00 18 a3 df 7c a9 ad eb bf 8b | 5e cc 9f 27 71 4a 00 21 0b 43 49 5c 00 00 00 18 | 5b a5 68 ff d3 4d 33 4c d1 36 45 6b 7d fc 67 1b | d9 61 c1 4e | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #5 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49491.095558 "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #5 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #5 spent 0.403 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88006900 | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 6 for state #5 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 6 | peer's g: 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | peer's g: 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | peer's g: 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | peer's g: 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | peer's g: 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | peer's g: 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | peer's g: ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | peer's g: 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | peer's g: 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | peer's g: 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | peer's g: 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | peer's g: 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | peer's g: ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | peer's g: aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | peer's g: 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | peer's g: e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b88000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c8d6a0 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb3f90 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c002090 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb3fb4 (length 32) | 3a 29 d5 dc a1 d5 6a 0e 4b fc e4 1a ae e1 28 ef | 5e c1 2b 8f cb 00 d9 40 fc d8 73 a0 90 5b 67 b9 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb3fd4 (length 32) | 3a 1c 35 a5 f9 bc 0d f0 14 82 db 9f 09 14 e7 6c | 7b 30 1b ec e7 93 8d 35 70 76 78 cc bd 57 ca 48 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001090 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681728: 46 49 22 ffffffcc ffffffbc 11 7c 3b 02 5e ffffff8f 62 ffffffed ffffffa5 0b 4d ffffffc3 14 ffffffc0 0b ffffffdb ffffff9b 66 fffffff5 2b 5a 34 ffffff8c 03 6b ffffffc0 62 ffffffc9 37 40 ffffffc3 0b fffffff1 ffffffc4 0f ffffff90 6b 22 ffffffc4 64 fffffff7 ffffff8b ffffffc0 ffffffad ffffff94 ffffffc7 ffffff82 fffffff8 7e ffffffad 0d ffffff96 5c 6e 43 ffffff86 fffffff9 48 ffffffe9 ffffffff ffffff87 ffffffc2 4f ffffffb8 ffffffd1 ffffffdf 49 fffffff6 fffffff8 02 19 64 77 12 ffffffcc 49 7a 78 ffffffb9 fffffff8 ffffff9b 4b ffffffc8 13 ffffff99 39 ffffffb4 ffffffbc ffffffa1 11 5f ffffffa9 10 ffffffaf ffffffbc 79 fffffff7 ffffffdc 22 ffffff9c 42 44 19 1f 3a ffffff8d 29 70 66 ffffffd5 ffffff8f fffffff7 fffffffc 78 ffffff9a 39 24 2a ffffffd7 ffffffea fffffff0 0e 22 ffffffea ffffffab 57 2f ffffffb9 ffffffd4 1a ffffffab ffffffe6 17 70 ffffff87 0c ffffffed ffffff85 03 66 ffffffa7 5c ffffffde 28 00 ffffffc6 fffffff2 ffffff95 ffffffb1 ffffffbb fffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b7c004db0 | unwrapped: d0 08 86 88 70 03 9f 64 1f 8a bf d3 f9 6a c9 c3 | unwrapped: bb 8f 50 ff 50 57 18 84 ca eb f3 12 09 66 6c 2c | unwrapped: 67 85 64 28 f6 c3 34 4e 31 22 6f c7 08 e9 a7 33 | unwrapped: cf 24 2e a6 d6 32 49 c5 10 14 8f eb ce 21 ca 5d | unwrapped: 97 04 fa 10 ae 1d 10 07 71 0a f5 c5 cf a2 8d 0c | unwrapped: a9 5b f2 cc ef e7 96 7a e6 57 71 c5 79 65 30 f3 | unwrapped: c1 9d 25 3a cc ea 96 e8 86 ba d7 4e 54 50 52 b0 | unwrapped: 05 0f 48 28 ca 69 f3 2d cf 87 f8 e3 42 a0 ff fd | unwrapped: ce e7 a5 42 1b e5 b8 02 bd ca e4 3e 6c 16 23 bf | unwrapped: ee 31 67 74 45 3f c7 36 e1 30 3a 71 8a c3 07 6c | unwrapped: 59 4c 63 90 93 9a 92 bc 80 e3 67 3f 3d c6 42 a7 | unwrapped: 8d 3a 41 e3 54 05 da 38 1c 98 2f f6 3e 07 4c b8 | unwrapped: 51 0c bd a7 ac e8 49 b7 08 89 a6 6a 11 fc 79 dd | unwrapped: ad e6 e8 87 14 bc 98 77 86 8d 8f f7 2b 8b 97 34 | unwrapped: 34 dd 7d 63 8f 2d 26 0b 5a 01 b2 79 c8 1a 0f c7 | unwrapped: b1 e5 2f 6d 4a 7a bd 6c 07 2f b0 da e0 6c 0e 2e | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001ef0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681760: 61 34 4b ffffff86 6d ffffff9c ffffff8e ffffffd9 ffffffe0 fffffff8 04 06 ffffffb4 ffffffc9 ffffff9e ffffff9b ffffffc6 ffffffca ffffff83 0d 6e 25 6b ffffff93 ffffffae 0a 08 ffffffd5 ffffffba 00 55 22 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b7c0020b0 | unwrapped: 5f 74 83 d1 70 32 50 86 4f 83 94 1e d5 cf b4 c7 | unwrapped: 8f 60 73 e2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681760: 46 49 22 ffffffcc ffffffbc 11 7c 3b 02 5e ffffff8f 62 ffffffed ffffffa5 0b 4d ffffffc3 14 ffffffc0 0b ffffffdb ffffff9b 66 fffffff5 2b 5a 34 ffffff8c 03 6b ffffffc0 62 ffffffc9 37 40 ffffffc3 0b fffffff1 ffffffc4 0f ffffff90 6b 22 ffffffc4 64 fffffff7 ffffff8b ffffffc0 ffffffad ffffff94 ffffffc7 ffffff82 fffffff8 7e ffffffad 0d ffffff96 5c 6e 43 ffffff86 fffffff9 48 ffffffe9 ffffffff ffffff87 ffffffc2 4f ffffffb8 ffffffd1 ffffffdf 49 fffffff6 fffffff8 02 19 64 77 12 ffffffcc 49 7a 78 ffffffb9 fffffff8 ffffff9b 4b ffffffc8 13 ffffff99 39 ffffffb4 ffffffbc ffffffa1 11 5f ffffffa9 10 ffffffaf ffffffbc 79 fffffff7 ffffffdc 22 ffffff9c 42 44 19 1f 3a ffffff8d 29 70 66 ffffffd5 ffffff8f fffffff7 fffffffc 78 ffffff9a 39 24 2a ffffffd7 ffffffea fffffff0 0e 22 ffffffea ffffffab 57 2f ffffffb9 ffffffd4 1a ffffffab ffffffe6 17 70 ffffff87 0c ffffffed ffffff85 03 66 ffffffa7 5c ffffffde 28 00 ffffffc6 fffffff2 ffffff95 ffffffb1 ffffffbb fffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b7c003ce0 | unwrapped: d0 08 86 88 70 03 9f 64 1f 8a bf d3 f9 6a c9 c3 | unwrapped: bb 8f 50 ff 50 57 18 84 ca eb f3 12 09 66 6c 2c | unwrapped: 67 85 64 28 f6 c3 34 4e 31 22 6f c7 08 e9 a7 33 | unwrapped: cf 24 2e a6 d6 32 49 c5 10 14 8f eb ce 21 ca 5d | unwrapped: 97 04 fa 10 ae 1d 10 07 71 0a f5 c5 cf a2 8d 0c | unwrapped: a9 5b f2 cc ef e7 96 7a e6 57 71 c5 79 65 30 f3 | unwrapped: c1 9d 25 3a cc ea 96 e8 86 ba d7 4e 54 50 52 b0 | unwrapped: 05 0f 48 28 ca 69 f3 2d cf 87 f8 e3 42 a0 ff fd | unwrapped: ce e7 a5 42 1b e5 b8 02 bd ca e4 3e 6c 16 23 bf | unwrapped: ee 31 67 74 45 3f c7 36 e1 30 3a 71 8a c3 07 6c | unwrapped: 59 4c 63 90 93 9a 92 bc 80 e3 67 3f 3d c6 42 a7 | unwrapped: 8d 3a 41 e3 54 05 da 38 1c 98 2f f6 3e 07 4c b8 | unwrapped: 51 0c bd a7 ac e8 49 b7 08 89 a6 6a 11 fc 79 dd | unwrapped: ad e6 e8 87 14 bc 98 77 86 8d 8f f7 2b 8b 97 34 | unwrapped: 34 dd 7d 63 8f 2d 26 0b 5a 01 b2 79 c8 1a 0f c7 | unwrapped: b1 e5 2f 6d 4a 7a bd 6c 07 2f b0 da e0 6c 0e 2e | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c688 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001160 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681744: ffffffe9 ffffffa3 ffffffdd 64 ffffffd4 24 ffffffae 39 ffffffca 4e 0f ffffff90 0c 1d ffffffd7 66 ffffff83 ffffffd1 5b 49 10 ffffffe3 5c ffffff8b 03 ffffff89 33 72 20 ffffff91 ffffffb7 ffffffed | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b7c0030a0 | unwrapped: 49 8d dd a7 f3 0a ef d6 5d 9f a1 d7 aa d7 be 16 | unwrapped: 86 07 21 ec 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681744: 46 49 22 ffffffcc ffffffbc 11 7c 3b 02 5e ffffff8f 62 ffffffed ffffffa5 0b 4d ffffffc3 14 ffffffc0 0b ffffffdb ffffff9b 66 fffffff5 2b 5a 34 ffffff8c 03 6b ffffffc0 62 ffffffc9 37 40 ffffffc3 0b fffffff1 ffffffc4 0f ffffff90 6b 22 ffffffc4 64 fffffff7 ffffff8b ffffffc0 ffffffad ffffff94 ffffffc7 ffffff82 fffffff8 7e ffffffad 0d ffffff96 5c 6e 43 ffffff86 fffffff9 48 ffffffe9 ffffffff ffffff87 ffffffc2 4f ffffffb8 ffffffd1 ffffffdf 49 fffffff6 fffffff8 02 19 64 77 12 ffffffcc 49 7a 78 ffffffb9 fffffff8 ffffff9b 4b ffffffc8 13 ffffff99 39 ffffffb4 ffffffbc ffffffa1 11 5f ffffffa9 10 ffffffaf ffffffbc 79 fffffff7 ffffffdc 22 ffffff9c 42 44 19 1f 3a ffffff8d 29 70 66 ffffffd5 ffffff8f fffffff7 fffffffc 78 ffffff9a 39 24 2a ffffffd7 ffffffea fffffff0 0e 22 ffffffea ffffffab 57 2f ffffffb9 ffffffd4 1a ffffffab ffffffe6 17 70 ffffff87 0c ffffffed ffffff85 03 66 ffffffa7 5c ffffffde 28 00 ffffffc6 fffffff2 ffffff95 ffffffb1 ffffffbb fffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b7c003bd0 | unwrapped: d0 08 86 88 70 03 9f 64 1f 8a bf d3 f9 6a c9 c3 | unwrapped: bb 8f 50 ff 50 57 18 84 ca eb f3 12 09 66 6c 2c | unwrapped: 67 85 64 28 f6 c3 34 4e 31 22 6f c7 08 e9 a7 33 | unwrapped: cf 24 2e a6 d6 32 49 c5 10 14 8f eb ce 21 ca 5d | unwrapped: 97 04 fa 10 ae 1d 10 07 71 0a f5 c5 cf a2 8d 0c | unwrapped: a9 5b f2 cc ef e7 96 7a e6 57 71 c5 79 65 30 f3 | unwrapped: c1 9d 25 3a cc ea 96 e8 86 ba d7 4e 54 50 52 b0 | unwrapped: 05 0f 48 28 ca 69 f3 2d cf 87 f8 e3 42 a0 ff fd | unwrapped: ce e7 a5 42 1b e5 b8 02 bd ca e4 3e 6c 16 23 bf | unwrapped: ee 31 67 74 45 3f c7 36 e1 30 3a 71 8a c3 07 6c | unwrapped: 59 4c 63 90 93 9a 92 bc 80 e3 67 3f 3d c6 42 a7 | unwrapped: 8d 3a 41 e3 54 05 da 38 1c 98 2f f6 3e 07 4c b8 | unwrapped: 51 0c bd a7 ac e8 49 b7 08 89 a6 6a 11 fc 79 dd | unwrapped: ad e6 e8 87 14 bc 98 77 86 8d 8f f7 2b 8b 97 34 | unwrapped: 34 dd 7d 63 8f 2d 26 0b 5a 01 b2 79 c8 1a 0f c7 | unwrapped: b1 e5 2f 6d 4a 7a bd 6c 07 2f b0 da e0 6c 0e 2e | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c698 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c98060 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_a 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_e 0x557566c963a0, enc_key 0x557566c98060 | DH_i: 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | DH_i: 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | DH_i: 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | DH_i: 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | DH_i: 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | DH_i: 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | DH_i: ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | DH_i: 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | DH_i: 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | DH_i: 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | DH_i: 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | DH_i: 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | DH_i: ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | DH_i: aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | DH_i: 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | DH_i: e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | DH_r: 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | DH_r: 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | DH_r: b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | DH_r: d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | DH_r: 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | DH_r: 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | DH_r: ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | DH_r: 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | DH_r: c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | DH_r: 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | DH_r: a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | DH_r: ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | DH_r: a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | DH_r: 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | DH_r: 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | DH_r: c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb3ff4 (length 256) | 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb40f4 (length 256) | 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b7c001230 (length 20) | db 94 b8 f2 17 aa bf 82 27 75 e2 73 01 48 a3 d8 | 2d 8f e9 a3 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 6 time elapsed 0.00204 seconds | (#5) spent 2.04 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 6: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 6 for state #5 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c003e90 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #5 | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 6 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #5: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b88000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #5 | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #5 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #5 spent 0.0198 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c003e90 | spent 0.00216 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 2e 4f 37 2d | 68 ba 0f 47 c2 b3 69 e5 c8 fe 79 83 cf 9b dc a7 | 9f c7 bc fd dc ea c8 4a 19 6c b6 9a 02 fb 6b 02 | 78 ba 37 d3 ce e3 95 1d 93 18 fe 60 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: db 94 b8 f2 17 aa bf 82 27 75 e2 73 01 48 a3 d8 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 02 fb 6b 02 78 ba 37 d3 ce e3 95 1d 93 18 fe 60 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 ad 9c f8 4a | 2e a9 a4 a2 32 d0 6f f3 d4 f1 07 b4 b6 63 3b 4c | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #5: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90002780 (length 256) | 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b88000b20 (length 256) | 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae848 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae850 (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566c06480 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | ad 9c f8 4a 2e a9 a4 a2 32 d0 6f f3 d4 f1 07 b4 | b6 63 3b 4c | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001230 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b88000b20 (length 256) | 1b e3 a9 ed 79 f1 69 6c c1 69 ad 1d 7d e4 01 d5 | 14 39 0c af 95 1f fd 03 3e 85 15 4d 4c 45 06 aa | b3 81 f1 6d b3 c1 8d 9e 03 f1 34 02 1d be 9d db | d3 aa d7 a8 da 4c 06 90 16 0f 38 95 50 23 ab 66 | 71 27 18 7c f3 ee e8 39 31 3d 09 37 3e 33 a0 70 | 6f da 13 6e b8 56 f7 ea 89 39 24 c9 09 7b 57 1d | ae 3d 83 46 11 0d 22 be 83 f1 85 71 78 bf 38 08 | 51 44 ad 3d 75 3f 9d a1 f1 08 f1 13 ee 78 cf e6 | c7 a9 0a 8d 85 ba ce 7f a2 4a 20 fc f0 5f f3 87 | 4f 05 fc cd 88 a7 27 94 73 09 db 37 c7 44 10 cc | a8 4b 68 07 3a 24 b1 1b f6 24 82 89 41 e3 1e 05 | ba 1a 9d cb 56 3f 76 47 33 a2 c2 0f 9e 5b fc 18 | a9 4b d7 77 51 2f 41 d1 36 d7 dd ce 13 49 79 22 | 8a 4c ac 27 85 2a f8 6c 7d 6b 75 4c 40 bd f6 31 | 2a ea 04 ed 39 b2 49 9c 7c 9c 85 83 f4 05 e9 96 | c7 2b 05 fb 56 3f 02 f9 9b 68 e8 65 67 9a f6 5c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90002780 (length 256) | 14 c4 ab 36 f3 e5 93 9f 46 61 81 40 42 76 dc a0 | 51 91 0d b6 cd 08 21 83 62 4e 69 55 aa d3 d7 d7 | 19 92 63 19 60 25 4a ad 57 f3 24 8b 04 27 50 5c | 61 00 be a8 f5 db 8a 94 5a b6 61 b2 c9 5f dd 7c | 47 6d cf 27 3a a0 d7 63 bb f0 a8 7f 6e f1 f7 55 | 13 14 32 35 1c 91 87 17 67 1b 2e 5f 8f a4 1c 18 | ab e3 5b 1f 38 54 07 9b e2 38 ea 9c 74 1b 72 6f | 76 f9 01 26 cb 43 d1 9f f2 2e 51 8c 2a c0 6d 6b | 6d 00 67 d5 5d fe b2 32 d3 c2 0d 8c 65 2b f8 3e | 36 ec ed f4 28 1e 2e ec ff 92 1d 21 57 cc 28 21 | 96 9b 68 92 d6 71 5d 23 4f 03 d8 49 8b c3 64 b6 | 91 d2 8a 5a 47 0f 95 f8 02 d1 2d 34 8e cb f9 37 | ca 16 d7 b4 53 1b 9f f5 07 7a ef 2a 4c 8c 38 e2 | aa e5 3b b5 97 02 3d 85 65 3c ef a8 f0 15 79 2a | 4a 40 5c 62 45 42 be 14 89 83 38 d2 b6 ae 4a 11 | e4 c8 a6 91 29 20 b5 87 c4 5e 63 0b f6 a9 ac 54 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae850 (length 8) | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae848 (length 8) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | d7 6e 23 ce 3d 1d 91 e1 b6 75 da 64 80 74 0a 6a | 85 e2 c7 67 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R d7 6e 23 ce 3d 1d 91 e1 b6 75 da 64 80 74 0a 6a | HASH_R 85 e2 c7 67 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: d7 6e 23 ce 3d 1d 91 e1 b6 75 da 64 80 74 0a 6a | encrypting: 85 e2 c7 67 | IV: 02 fb 6b 02 78 ba 37 d3 ce e3 95 1d 93 18 fe 60 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #5 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #5: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #5 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #5 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 47 ab 6b dd | cb 37 4b ae 04 6a 58 d9 18 dd b8 7f 01 5e 59 d6 | fb 1d c9 28 c6 eb e9 26 17 27 13 5f 92 2d 54 86 | 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #5 | #5 spent 0.635 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.774 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00285 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 08 10 20 01 87 14 a0 4e 00 00 01 bc 7d 52 d9 e1 | 54 27 ef 48 77 e4 6a 9b 59 0e bc 25 d1 9f 5e 42 | c4 ec 43 b2 c1 83 f0 8c 24 c4 0e 80 d9 72 2b ee | 0c 1b 18 8b 66 c0 4a 23 ad 6b ba 2b 2e c3 c5 4d | ec d7 9d cd f2 11 ea 55 ba 94 2e 51 e2 fc db 63 | e3 51 8c 67 11 04 59 37 1c 91 aa d7 ac a7 b0 cc | 01 d5 0c 00 d1 25 94 e1 80 ea dd 4f a2 3d 53 ad | ce 59 a4 61 00 b1 70 b8 08 75 8f e2 61 dd 02 05 | 10 10 9f d0 77 28 6f ca fa 7b 14 04 2e d7 72 71 | 4d 22 87 58 33 19 6e 02 22 21 9c af 46 9b c0 2c | 07 4a f3 73 8f 41 09 00 07 8c 21 c3 5b 29 8a 2c | d5 53 d1 0d b5 79 03 fd 58 25 c9 a0 38 54 95 55 | f8 27 1d 6e 5f 9d 79 e4 a6 37 40 d5 62 26 fc 40 | c8 50 77 21 57 e2 0c e7 fd 93 cf ee df 6d 83 32 | 81 46 5f 98 96 31 c4 4c e5 e1 7a 37 b2 ca 20 66 | 35 d1 d0 4e 28 f9 db 8d cc 2e 9f 69 b9 fe 6d 0c | c3 bd ad c2 35 be fb 45 be 8f 32 2a a4 8a 24 bf | 2b dc 12 a8 2d 3e 6e e7 a4 d4 94 0b bd b8 7b 89 | 9a cc ed 58 d9 63 f4 b7 0c e0 69 51 cd 76 2d 0c | 4d 11 64 91 77 33 a7 63 91 6d 8e 29 1d 5e 93 d8 | 16 b8 c8 54 b2 71 47 d9 d6 ff 6e ae 55 04 ed 0d | 38 24 a6 4e 43 d6 a8 c1 9b 9a cd 13 a9 77 24 bf | 7b 0b 4f f5 4f 5a 80 8a 31 f1 3b 17 99 23 0e 41 | d9 a5 a2 88 8b 9e 4f 63 42 71 fe 7e bf 62 64 5a | 24 fa 41 33 fa 42 d9 1a 96 10 c3 95 02 7c 8a 71 | eb 76 cd d5 31 f8 37 65 9c 7c 7e 75 a5 e1 aa 34 | eb 2f 5b 59 4f 80 8e d2 3d 06 0a 6f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2266275918 (0x8714a04e) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | current Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cae740 (length 16) | 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 87 14 a0 4e | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cae6c0 (length 20) | e0 e0 22 11 34 f4 dd 13 17 71 6f 20 5d 19 bb 64 | 17 d3 da 13 | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: e0 e0 22 11 34 f4 dd 13 17 71 6f 20 5d 19 bb 64 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: a5 e1 aa 34 eb 2f 5b 59 4f 80 8e d2 3d 06 0a 6f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 08 10 20 01 87 14 a0 4e 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 9e fd ee 20 4d 08 d5 a0 2c 29 a3 3d 16 b6 4a 9b | a3 db ac 41 0a 00 00 3c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 30 00 03 04 01 84 fa 0b 82 00 00 00 24 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 80 06 00 80 | 04 00 00 24 ca 19 28 02 5d 29 1b 27 80 57 8d 0b | bc 00 22 9f c1 eb cc ad 41 de 06 52 7e 25 88 2f | 56 87 b5 31 05 00 01 04 a1 b9 b5 9b d4 94 15 09 | 66 f0 10 8f 3b cf 61 20 03 86 e8 bb f4 fd 2b ff | d5 4a 6c 8e 44 e7 4e 66 59 9d 6b dd cc ef 95 01 | 24 46 38 a3 f4 c1 47 76 d2 bb a9 87 e0 67 3c 6f | 42 f8 a4 24 96 46 ba 2b 26 4c aa 0d a4 63 b7 21 | 44 06 73 30 45 ac a9 c3 09 65 f4 84 87 20 d0 c5 | 4d 29 c7 bf 25 fc d3 01 3c 1f 2f 03 80 ad 58 ae | 91 64 9b 06 0a 97 7f 93 d2 47 2c b5 39 8b 1f 6b | 2a 93 08 c0 ab 33 7a 84 96 cf 6f 60 ed 6b bd eb | 09 03 6d d9 cd 76 29 1f c4 d7 78 e9 1d 30 a5 36 | f7 7f cf 0d 69 99 0a c6 06 f8 bb 7d ad 9f 8d 79 | 99 05 61 92 aa 42 49 fe 37 89 a8 69 22 1d c5 93 | 51 a2 63 d3 18 58 d4 e9 cf af 96 5b ac d3 fc 85 | a3 29 93 f0 31 ef a7 fb f6 82 e8 20 d7 b0 cd 0b | a3 86 e3 a7 65 cc fd d6 61 b1 71 2c cf 7f 0d 57 | fd af e9 75 0c 0e 5b 9d 10 f1 42 54 0d 78 4b 98 | 93 cd 19 19 b3 af d1 44 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 87 14 a0 4e | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cadc54 (length 388) | 0a 00 00 3c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 | 00 03 04 01 84 fa 0b 82 00 00 00 24 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | ca 19 28 02 5d 29 1b 27 80 57 8d 0b bc 00 22 9f | c1 eb cc ad 41 de 06 52 7e 25 88 2f 56 87 b5 31 | 05 00 01 04 a1 b9 b5 9b d4 94 15 09 66 f0 10 8f | 3b cf 61 20 03 86 e8 bb f4 fd 2b ff d5 4a 6c 8e | 44 e7 4e 66 59 9d 6b dd cc ef 95 01 24 46 38 a3 | f4 c1 47 76 d2 bb a9 87 e0 67 3c 6f 42 f8 a4 24 | 96 46 ba 2b 26 4c aa 0d a4 63 b7 21 44 06 73 30 | 45 ac a9 c3 09 65 f4 84 87 20 d0 c5 4d 29 c7 bf | 25 fc d3 01 3c 1f 2f 03 80 ad 58 ae 91 64 9b 06 | 0a 97 7f 93 d2 47 2c b5 39 8b 1f 6b 2a 93 08 c0 | ab 33 7a 84 96 cf 6f 60 ed 6b bd eb 09 03 6d d9 | cd 76 29 1f c4 d7 78 e9 1d 30 a5 36 f7 7f cf 0d | 69 99 0a c6 06 f8 bb 7d ad 9f 8d 79 99 05 61 92 | aa 42 49 fe 37 89 a8 69 22 1d c5 93 51 a2 63 d3 | 18 58 d4 e9 cf af 96 5b ac d3 fc 85 a3 29 93 f0 | 31 ef a7 fb f6 82 e8 20 d7 b0 cd 0b a3 86 e3 a7 | 65 cc fd d6 61 b1 71 2c cf 7f 0d 57 fd af e9 75 | 0c 0e 5b 9d 10 f1 42 54 0d 78 4b 98 93 cd 19 19 | b3 af d1 44 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 9e fd ee 20 4d 08 d5 a0 2c 29 a3 3d 16 b6 4a 9b | a3 db ac 41 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 9e fd ee 20 4d 08 d5 a0 2c 29 a3 3d 16 b6 4a 9b | a3 db ac 41 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #5: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #6 at 0x557566cb3370 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #6 in UNDEFINED | pstats #6 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #5 "east" as #6 for IPSEC SA | #6 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #5.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #6: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 84 fa 0b 82 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #6: repeated KEY_LENGTH attribute in IPsec Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #6 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #6: sending encrypted notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 306086524 (0x123e827c) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9958 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a3c (length 4) | 12 3e 82 7c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9cf4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9ce0 (length 20) | 92 b9 21 57 2a 8b d6 29 cd cc 50 56 bc 7b 2a 4a | 59 22 4f 07 | send notification HASH(1): | 92 b9 21 57 2a 8b d6 29 cd cc 50 56 bc 7b 2a 4a | 59 22 4f 07 | last Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | current Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cae740 (length 16) | 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a4c (length 4) | 12 3e 82 7c | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cae6c0 (length 20) | 05 ab f4 48 4c f7 02 f5 27 e6 4a e2 4d 28 9a e8 | bf 60 de fe | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 92 b9 21 57 2a 8b d6 29 cd cc 50 56 | encrypting: bc 7b 2a 4a 59 22 4f 07 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0f | IV: 05 ab f4 48 4c f7 02 f5 27 e6 4a e2 4d 28 9a e8 | IV: bf 60 de fe | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 7a 57 19 86 2f a3 6c aa bf 61 98 a7 e4 a8 36 26 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #6) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 08 10 05 01 12 3e 82 7c 00 00 00 4c c1 f2 27 d6 | 05 50 f3 43 54 43 e0 a1 94 f5 d2 fa fb 5d f8 8d | 48 88 aa 75 68 6c bb f1 11 85 42 b4 7a 57 19 86 | 2f a3 6c aa bf 61 98 a7 e4 a8 36 26 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | pstats #6 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #6: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #6: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #6: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #6 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #6: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #6 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #5 spent 0.551 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.949 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00248 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 08 10 05 01 c2 9b 60 6d 00 00 00 5c 3a b3 8d 89 | 35 0c d5 56 07 d2 ac 9a 4c e0 38 56 45 5d f9 12 | e6 fd f3 8e 2f ff 45 0c af c3 71 e0 6a a1 f8 7f | 40 6a 53 9a 4f c5 a9 58 9e dd 7c fc 5c ec 18 6a | c6 e4 0d 9f 06 8e 40 72 dc b6 e7 40 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3264962669 (0xc29b606d) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #5; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #5 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | current Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cae740 (length 16) | 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | c2 9b 60 6d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cae6c0 (length 20) | 45 1d 58 46 ff be 96 b0 97 a2 b6 8f d4 05 33 08 | da 2f 5b 02 | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 45 1d 58 46 ff be 96 b0 97 a2 b6 8f d4 05 33 08 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 5c ec 18 6a c6 e4 0d 9f 06 8e 40 72 dc b6 e7 40 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 08 10 05 01 c2 9b 60 6d 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | 87 cc 6c 37 e7 aa 7b 39 09 af bd 86 3f 65 59 87 | 7d 41 9a 53 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | c2 9b 60 6d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c8f104 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 d3 18 b9 66 | fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 87 cc 6c 37 e7 aa 7b 39 09 af bd 86 3f 65 59 87 | 7d 41 9a 53 | informational HASH(1): | 87 cc 6c 37 e7 aa 7b 39 09 af bd 86 3f 65 59 87 | 7d 41 9a 53 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #5: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #5 | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #5: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.538s and sending notification | parent state #5: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #5 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | responder cookie: | bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1349375178 (0x506dd4ca) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cc8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dac (length 4) | 50 6d d4 ca | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8154 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 d3 18 b9 66 | fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8140 (length 20) | 60 b3 04 5a fb 72 04 51 99 85 bb 90 df a2 00 fd | 8e 51 90 af | send delete HASH(1): | 60 b3 04 5a fb 72 04 51 99 85 bb 90 df a2 00 fd | 8e 51 90 af | last Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | current Phase 1 IV: 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cae740 (length 16) | 92 2d 54 86 3e 8c ae 0e d2 42 67 2a f3 e6 fe 41 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dbc (length 4) | 50 6d d4 ca | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cae6c0 (length 20) | 2e 60 a2 70 ea fc fd 28 4c 51 f1 3a b1 69 97 eb | 94 ec 5b 02 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 60 b3 04 5a fb 72 04 51 99 85 bb 90 | encrypting: df a2 00 fd 8e 51 90 af 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d | encrypting: e8 05 1e 56 | IV: 2e 60 a2 70 ea fc fd 28 4c 51 f1 3a b1 69 97 eb | IV: 94 ec 5b 02 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: ba 1b 57 a2 de b8 74 ed 61 d3 ff 51 4b 06 67 c3 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | d3 18 b9 66 fa e4 96 a4 bf 6b 3b 9d e8 05 1e 56 | 08 10 05 01 50 6d d4 ca 00 00 00 5c 03 f7 66 63 | 9e ae a6 22 32 2a ff fd af 5c 74 c1 e9 61 12 ed | fe c0 44 1b ae 5d 2b 9b af 77 06 a9 f6 34 e5 dc | f4 16 d9 61 47 50 4f ed 77 dd a3 95 ba 1b 57 a2 | de b8 74 ed 61 d3 ff 51 4b 06 67 c3 | state #5 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #5: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b88000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #5 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.602 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00315 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 59 c7 3b 67 74 fa ba df 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 59 c7 3b 67 74 fa ba df | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 05 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | b8 24 a3 0d 36 f2 95 0c 49 37 22 24 1c b5 fd d4 | 27 01 ee 09 3c 9d 34 98 21 1c 3e be d6 55 f2 c4 | creating state object #7 at 0x557566cae2b0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #7 in UNDEFINED | pstats #7 ikev1.isakmp started | #7 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #7: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 59 c7 3b 67 74 fa ba df "east" #7: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 59 c7 3b 67 74 fa ba df | responder cookie: | b8 24 a3 0d 36 f2 95 0c | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #7: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #7: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #7 is idle "east" #7: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 59 c7 3b 67 74 fa ba df | responder cookie: | b8 24 a3 0d 36 f2 95 0c | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #7) | 59 c7 3b 67 74 fa ba df b8 24 a3 0d 36 f2 95 0c | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.536 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00281 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 08 eb 4c 0b 74 18 d2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 08 eb 4c 0b 74 18 d2 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 06 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | c2 cd a1 00 8f 62 d0 4e 0d 5f 1b f9 c4 d8 bd 70 | 01 b2 ff 81 1a 2d 93 67 c7 a3 0c 8f 5a 0c fe 87 | creating state object #8 at 0x557566cb3370 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #8 in UNDEFINED | pstats #8 ikev1.isakmp started | #8 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #8: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 92 08 eb 4c 0b 74 18 d2 "east" #8: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 08 eb 4c 0b 74 18 d2 | responder cookie: | c2 cd a1 00 8f 62 d0 4e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #8: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #8: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #8 is idle "east" #8: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 08 eb 4c 0b 74 18 d2 | responder cookie: | c2 cd a1 00 8f 62 d0 4e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #8) | 92 08 eb 4c 0b 74 18 d2 c2 cd a1 00 8f 62 d0 4e | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.561 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0028 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 07 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae c4 a1 ab 76 b1 a2 b6 ed | f9 d4 51 c1 c4 a3 d3 da e9 02 d7 ce 04 01 74 af | creating state object #9 at 0x557566cb3e30 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #9 in UNDEFINED | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp started | #9 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #9: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c "east" #9: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #9 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #9: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.481 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00235 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | 14 00 00 24 51 a7 a2 62 c6 e5 5d fd a9 c8 3c 23 | 75 17 4a 00 92 01 ea c2 74 80 23 d0 86 5a 1c 1e | f6 04 37 f9 14 00 00 18 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e | 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c cb e0 11 8b 00 00 00 18 | 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | 1e 9d e9 ad | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #9 is idle | #9 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | cb e0 11 8b | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | natd_hash: rcookie= e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | natd_hash: hash= cb e0 11 8b | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | 1e 9d e9 ad | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | natd_hash: rcookie= e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | natd_hash: hash= 1e 9d e9 ad | expected NAT-D(me): 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | expected NAT-D(me): cb e0 11 8b | expected NAT-D(him): | 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | 1e 9d e9 ad | received NAT-D: 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | received NAT-D: cb e0 11 8b | received NAT-D: 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | received NAT-D: 1e 9d e9 ad | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 7 for state #9 | state #9 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 7 for state #9 | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | crypto helper 5 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 7 | suspending state #9 and saving MD | #9 is busy; has a suspended MD | #9 spent 0.137 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.246 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b80000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | Generated nonce: 3f f9 7e 10 62 c4 58 ff 71 c8 a8 90 75 05 87 f6 | Generated nonce: c5 6d 9d bb 2d 32 50 03 4d da da 47 b9 84 92 f5 | crypto helper 5 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 7 time elapsed 0.000619 seconds | (#9) spent 0.612 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 7: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 7 for state #9 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b80006900 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #9 | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 7 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #9: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #9 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | keyex value 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | keyex value ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | keyex value c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | keyex value 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | keyex value 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | keyex value 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | keyex value a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | keyex value cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | keyex value 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | keyex value 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | keyex value c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | keyex value 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | keyex value 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | keyex value b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | keyex value b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 3f f9 7e 10 62 c4 58 ff 71 c8 a8 90 75 05 87 f6 | Nr c5 6d 9d bb 2d 32 50 03 4d da da 47 b9 84 92 f5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | 1e 9d e9 ad | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | natd_hash: rcookie= e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | natd_hash: hash= 1e 9d e9 ad | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d | NAT-D 1e 9d e9 ad | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | cb e0 11 8b | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | natd_hash: rcookie= e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | natd_hash: hash= cb e0 11 8b | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | NAT-D cb e0 11 8b | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80000d60: transferring ownership from state #9 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 8 for state #9 | state #9 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #9 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #9 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 8 for state #9 | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 8 | peer's g: 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | peer's g: 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | peer's g: 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | peer's g: fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | peer's g: 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | peer's g: 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | peer's g: 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | peer's g: 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | peer's g: 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | peer's g: 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | peer's g: 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | peer's g: bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | peer's g: 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | peer's g: 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | peer's g: 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | peer's g: 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #9: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #9 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | 14 00 00 24 3f f9 7e 10 62 c4 58 ff 71 c8 a8 90 | 75 05 87 f6 c5 6d 9d bb 2d 32 50 03 4d da da 47 | b9 84 92 f5 14 00 00 18 1f a9 1a 78 4c 73 c4 2c | 15 d8 be 80 b6 dd 40 4d 1e 9d e9 ad 00 00 00 18 | 7f 66 48 b3 c5 b4 c6 8e 6f 15 68 04 d6 9d e9 2c | cb e0 11 8b | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #9 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49493.116447 "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #9 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #9 spent 0.342 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b80006900 | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c98060 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb5510 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b94000d60 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb5534 (length 32) | 51 a7 a2 62 c6 e5 5d fd a9 c8 3c 23 75 17 4a 00 | 92 01 ea c2 74 80 23 d0 86 5a 1c 1e f6 04 37 f9 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb5554 (length 32) | 3f f9 7e 10 62 c4 58 ff 71 c8 a8 90 75 05 87 f6 | c5 6d 9d bb 2d 32 50 03 4d da da 47 b9 84 92 f5 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b94001570 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289024: 37 ffffffc3 fffffff7 75 ffffffd7 fffffff7 ffffffd2 ffffffca ffffff86 31 ffffffc0 ffffff82 ffffff93 ffffff90 ffffffe8 20 1e 42 5f 0f 5d 4a 7b 0e 04 09 ffffff83 5b ffffffaa ffffffcc 6b ffffffd0 fffffff9 1b ffffffbc ffffffbf ffffffc7 ffffffb7 ffffffd9 ffffff8e 4b fffffff9 04 7e 6b ffffffbf 0e ffffffa9 71 ffffffdd ffffffd0 27 ffffffde ffffffc6 24 6a 11 ffffff8c 79 24 05 65 10 12 ffffffb1 68 ffffffb9 68 fffffffc 25 ffffff91 ffffffca fffffff3 ffffffc2 74 6b 1f ffffffc8 ffffffd9 fffffffd 54 1c 22 fffffff9 ffffffe9 ffffffcc ffffffdd ffffffe8 ffffffbc 48 ffffff83 ffffff95 6c 7e 2e fffffff8 ffffffde ffffff92 fffffffa 4b ffffffb3 ffffffc3 ffffff9d ffffffa6 ffffff88 ffffff83 ffffffc6 ffffff9f 3c ffffffd7 ffffffc9 2b ffffffae 2b 12 19 43 29 2e 20 ffffffb4 ffffff84 ffffffc9 6c 7d 66 79 ffffffed ffffff90 ffffffda 5b 5e 6c 22 ffffffd8 12 1e 35 ffffff90 ffffff86 37 02 54 2a ffffff92 ffffffd5 ffffffdb 36 00 fffffff4 28 1d 70 ffffff9a 15 ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b940045f0 | unwrapped: 88 12 bf 29 41 dc 0a 9f e9 0f 8e 58 0d a5 bf 60 | unwrapped: c1 ca 84 94 f8 2a 86 4b 02 ac 21 bf c4 6d 04 01 | unwrapped: 73 8a b1 ef ba bf fa 53 41 2e 48 5b 00 de a0 0a | unwrapped: c9 86 38 91 4a 94 fe 85 75 e5 87 7b 0c 35 2c fe | unwrapped: b0 56 58 93 a5 7d 9e 87 01 5e af 07 f6 7e df c6 | unwrapped: 31 19 9e 5d e1 8b 38 0c ab 84 c4 38 6d 87 c1 c2 | unwrapped: 6f 83 0b 47 a2 94 27 18 b6 8f ab e1 66 05 ca 1d | unwrapped: 8b e8 8c 24 03 ba 76 78 19 c5 db 8f ef 0d e1 c9 | unwrapped: 54 1d 28 10 76 14 3c b7 2c 6b 91 58 a9 43 16 ba | unwrapped: cf 18 04 e3 ff d7 28 cf 27 18 aa 62 8e f1 c6 5b | unwrapped: 93 a4 e7 74 03 38 4e 98 00 c9 40 60 ff d7 3f 03 | unwrapped: fa 72 cd a7 e9 2b 5c a3 a3 1d f3 3f b3 9c a0 e7 | unwrapped: 2f 2d ec 42 c6 62 65 16 8a 3e 12 90 8f 4f e0 d1 | unwrapped: 0f 13 de 10 d2 81 ec 9d d7 6e 81 5c bd ca cd 86 | unwrapped: ae 2d ca cc 28 d2 c8 38 ea ac fc 9c 21 f7 9a 06 | unwrapped: c5 a3 3a a6 79 29 97 bb 80 a0 07 df 2e 79 da e3 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb5774 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb577c (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940010c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289056: 01 6f ffffff9a ffffffe8 0a ffffff89 ffffff9c ffffffd5 79 77 7e ffffffa3 ffffffb7 ffffffd7 36 ffffffc0 71 30 1d ffffffce ffffffc4 ffffffac 2a 5f ffffffd8 1d ffffffa1 44 fffffff8 ffffffc4 2e 46 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b94004b70 | unwrapped: 95 58 e7 6e 2f a5 87 c8 60 b8 65 3d 45 97 ee 32 | unwrapped: 75 e6 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289056: 37 ffffffc3 fffffff7 75 ffffffd7 fffffff7 ffffffd2 ffffffca ffffff86 31 ffffffc0 ffffff82 ffffff93 ffffff90 ffffffe8 20 1e 42 5f 0f 5d 4a 7b 0e 04 09 ffffff83 5b ffffffaa ffffffcc 6b ffffffd0 fffffff9 1b ffffffbc ffffffbf ffffffc7 ffffffb7 ffffffd9 ffffff8e 4b fffffff9 04 7e 6b ffffffbf 0e ffffffa9 71 ffffffdd ffffffd0 27 ffffffde ffffffc6 24 6a 11 ffffff8c 79 24 05 65 10 12 ffffffb1 68 ffffffb9 68 fffffffc 25 ffffff91 ffffffca fffffff3 ffffffc2 74 6b 1f ffffffc8 ffffffd9 fffffffd 54 1c 22 fffffff9 ffffffe9 ffffffcc ffffffdd ffffffe8 ffffffbc 48 ffffff83 ffffff95 6c 7e 2e fffffff8 ffffffde ffffff92 fffffffa 4b ffffffb3 ffffffc3 ffffff9d ffffffa6 ffffff88 ffffff83 ffffffc6 ffffff9f 3c ffffffd7 ffffffc9 2b ffffffae 2b 12 19 43 29 2e 20 ffffffb4 ffffff84 ffffffc9 6c 7d 66 79 ffffffed ffffff90 ffffffda 5b 5e 6c 22 ffffffd8 12 1e 35 ffffff90 ffffff86 37 02 54 2a ffffff92 ffffffd5 ffffffdb 36 00 fffffff4 28 1d 70 ffffff9a 15 ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b94001890 | unwrapped: 88 12 bf 29 41 dc 0a 9f e9 0f 8e 58 0d a5 bf 60 | unwrapped: c1 ca 84 94 f8 2a 86 4b 02 ac 21 bf c4 6d 04 01 | unwrapped: 73 8a b1 ef ba bf fa 53 41 2e 48 5b 00 de a0 0a | unwrapped: c9 86 38 91 4a 94 fe 85 75 e5 87 7b 0c 35 2c fe | unwrapped: b0 56 58 93 a5 7d 9e 87 01 5e af 07 f6 7e df c6 | unwrapped: 31 19 9e 5d e1 8b 38 0c ab 84 c4 38 6d 87 c1 c2 | unwrapped: 6f 83 0b 47 a2 94 27 18 b6 8f ab e1 66 05 ca 1d | unwrapped: 8b e8 8c 24 03 ba 76 78 19 c5 db 8f ef 0d e1 c9 | unwrapped: 54 1d 28 10 76 14 3c b7 2c 6b 91 58 a9 43 16 ba | unwrapped: cf 18 04 e3 ff d7 28 cf 27 18 aa 62 8e f1 c6 5b | unwrapped: 93 a4 e7 74 03 38 4e 98 00 c9 40 60 ff d7 3f 03 | unwrapped: fa 72 cd a7 e9 2b 5c a3 a3 1d f3 3f b3 9c a0 e7 | unwrapped: 2f 2d ec 42 c6 62 65 16 8a 3e 12 90 8f 4f e0 d1 | unwrapped: 0f 13 de 10 d2 81 ec 9d d7 6e 81 5c bd ca cd 86 | unwrapped: ae 2d ca cc 28 d2 c8 38 ea ac fc 9c 21 f7 9a 06 | unwrapped: c5 a3 3a a6 79 29 97 bb 80 a0 07 df 2e 79 da e3 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb5774 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb577c (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d688 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940013a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289040: 6a ffffffb7 ffffffcd ffffffd5 4e 23 55 7d 43 01 4e ffffffb2 7b 5a ffffffe0 14 ffffffdc 70 fffffff2 ffffffea 1d 5a 7e 07 ffffffec 3b ffffffb3 1c ffffff81 ffffffc1 38 ffffff94 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b94002100 | unwrapped: 4f 23 6f ba 41 c9 b9 87 7d c2 b2 45 43 53 39 62 | unwrapped: 45 b2 8c fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289040: 37 ffffffc3 fffffff7 75 ffffffd7 fffffff7 ffffffd2 ffffffca ffffff86 31 ffffffc0 ffffff82 ffffff93 ffffff90 ffffffe8 20 1e 42 5f 0f 5d 4a 7b 0e 04 09 ffffff83 5b ffffffaa ffffffcc 6b ffffffd0 fffffff9 1b ffffffbc ffffffbf ffffffc7 ffffffb7 ffffffd9 ffffff8e 4b fffffff9 04 7e 6b ffffffbf 0e ffffffa9 71 ffffffdd ffffffd0 27 ffffffde ffffffc6 24 6a 11 ffffff8c 79 24 05 65 10 12 ffffffb1 68 ffffffb9 68 fffffffc 25 ffffff91 ffffffca fffffff3 ffffffc2 74 6b 1f ffffffc8 ffffffd9 fffffffd 54 1c 22 fffffff9 ffffffe9 ffffffcc ffffffdd ffffffe8 ffffffbc 48 ffffff83 ffffff95 6c 7e 2e fffffff8 ffffffde ffffff92 fffffffa 4b ffffffb3 ffffffc3 ffffff9d ffffffa6 ffffff88 ffffff83 ffffffc6 ffffff9f 3c ffffffd7 ffffffc9 2b ffffffae 2b 12 19 43 29 2e 20 ffffffb4 ffffff84 ffffffc9 6c 7d 66 79 ffffffed ffffff90 ffffffda 5b 5e 6c 22 ffffffd8 12 1e 35 ffffff90 ffffff86 37 02 54 2a ffffff92 ffffffd5 ffffffdb 36 00 fffffff4 28 1d 70 ffffff9a 15 ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b94001780 | unwrapped: 88 12 bf 29 41 dc 0a 9f e9 0f 8e 58 0d a5 bf 60 | unwrapped: c1 ca 84 94 f8 2a 86 4b 02 ac 21 bf c4 6d 04 01 | unwrapped: 73 8a b1 ef ba bf fa 53 41 2e 48 5b 00 de a0 0a | unwrapped: c9 86 38 91 4a 94 fe 85 75 e5 87 7b 0c 35 2c fe | unwrapped: b0 56 58 93 a5 7d 9e 87 01 5e af 07 f6 7e df c6 | unwrapped: 31 19 9e 5d e1 8b 38 0c ab 84 c4 38 6d 87 c1 c2 | unwrapped: 6f 83 0b 47 a2 94 27 18 b6 8f ab e1 66 05 ca 1d | unwrapped: 8b e8 8c 24 03 ba 76 78 19 c5 db 8f ef 0d e1 c9 | unwrapped: 54 1d 28 10 76 14 3c b7 2c 6b 91 58 a9 43 16 ba | unwrapped: cf 18 04 e3 ff d7 28 cf 27 18 aa 62 8e f1 c6 5b | unwrapped: 93 a4 e7 74 03 38 4e 98 00 c9 40 60 ff d7 3f 03 | unwrapped: fa 72 cd a7 e9 2b 5c a3 a3 1d f3 3f b3 9c a0 e7 | unwrapped: 2f 2d ec 42 c6 62 65 16 8a 3e 12 90 8f 4f e0 d1 | unwrapped: 0f 13 de 10 d2 81 ec 9d d7 6e 81 5c bd ca cd 86 | unwrapped: ae 2d ca cc 28 d2 c8 38 ea ac fc 9c 21 f7 9a 06 | unwrapped: c5 a3 3a a6 79 29 97 bb 80 a0 07 df 2e 79 da e3 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb5774 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb577c (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d698 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_a 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_e 0x557566c999c0, enc_key 0x557566c8d6a0 | DH_i: 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | DH_i: 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | DH_i: 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | DH_i: fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | DH_i: 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | DH_i: 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | DH_i: 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | DH_i: 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | DH_i: 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | DH_i: 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | DH_i: 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | DH_i: bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | DH_i: 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | DH_i: 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | DH_i: 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | DH_i: 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | DH_r: ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | DH_r: 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | DH_r: ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | DH_r: c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | DH_r: 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | DH_r: 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | DH_r: 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | DH_r: a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | DH_r: cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | DH_r: 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | DH_r: 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | DH_r: c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | DH_r: 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | DH_r: 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | DH_r: b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | DH_r: b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb5574 (length 256) | 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb5674 (length 256) | ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b94001640 (length 20) | a3 6c 57 4b b5 da d3 17 77 6d ed 50 b3 74 38 5f | 52 2e bb 66 | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 8 time elapsed 0.002096 seconds | (#9) spent 2.09 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 8: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 8 for state #9 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #9 | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 8 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #9: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #9 | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #9 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #9 spent 0.015 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 | spent 0.00265 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 99 07 da da | 68 fe 3f c9 e1 94 47 28 52 47 e7 8a 72 55 47 0f | 0d 61 48 21 d7 8f 1e e9 44 52 24 cd 2d 7c af 3a | c9 d9 ee 61 8a 2a 8f ac ad b3 98 2a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: a3 6c 57 4b b5 da d3 17 77 6d ed 50 b3 74 38 5f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 2d 7c af 3a c9 d9 ee 61 8a 2a 8f ac ad b3 98 2a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 ea 89 d5 ab | 0d d2 6e e9 b2 09 45 72 19 b5 7a 70 a4 e5 38 0f | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #9: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b88000ea0 (length 256) | 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80000b20 (length 256) | ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566c05900 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | ea 89 d5 ab 0d d2 6e e9 b2 09 45 72 19 b5 7a 70 | a4 e5 38 0f | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b94001640 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80000b20 (length 256) | ad 31 1f 69 82 a4 e2 b5 8f da 6f b8 b3 15 5a 03 | 9f 43 25 d1 25 7a a4 3b 3f 9a f3 55 84 9f c9 bc | ec c2 55 d7 36 73 af 47 2c 26 0e b2 d7 7d ff 62 | c1 4c 79 47 0a c0 a8 76 ff 96 73 07 cc cc cb f4 | 04 53 0b 56 be 3e 96 45 8b 7a 41 d5 b5 a7 e2 60 | 3b 3c 16 f3 7a 8f 38 5e be 0e 3a d1 44 ab a5 6d | 79 60 ee 1e 80 45 f8 1a b0 22 b6 58 72 12 96 a1 | a4 5c a5 18 dc e8 3c 41 36 f8 3a 2d 33 2a 6b 27 | cc 7d f0 73 05 11 4e b9 21 97 55 de 82 1a 8c 69 | 80 8e ea af da c2 03 b5 2c dc d7 16 c3 f9 67 54 | 5a 88 86 3f 05 1d 59 3a 97 ed 01 46 e6 8e 58 48 | c8 fb b4 1f 46 b8 84 96 48 54 69 b4 20 b9 63 9f | 86 28 c4 94 31 93 6d 4b 63 60 da e2 3c 54 10 2d | 5e 90 c0 72 a5 10 0c 43 ca 54 2e 97 68 d9 75 59 | b9 b6 4f 52 24 72 db af a7 1a c7 08 2e 31 37 72 | b3 0b 44 f2 58 42 64 11 1e a6 1e e7 bb da 3a 5d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b88000ea0 (length 256) | 53 83 5d 97 72 fe 27 e1 06 28 69 62 ab f5 04 42 | 23 e4 39 40 72 7e c3 33 80 34 41 c8 40 75 e2 ca | 30 b2 33 ac b7 24 f5 bc 13 f7 a8 f8 04 60 8f 7f | fe 70 f0 dd bd fc 77 d5 68 a1 a9 f6 0b 38 48 d0 | 4b 43 de 92 e9 0a 85 e7 77 6d 83 fe 92 62 a7 e5 | 99 88 7b 74 57 4a 03 7a 5c 90 9f a7 c1 ec d1 47 | 95 99 05 e4 d7 be 65 fb 8b 3e 0e df 46 d4 b3 91 | 17 31 f3 95 ca c5 43 68 52 2c dd e2 29 be a8 6a | 1b a9 13 fd d2 7e 01 24 84 18 13 42 49 7f fc e9 | 4a ec e6 f9 bf 80 83 e9 28 ff a8 5c 46 b6 b6 2e | 08 21 64 30 14 0f 44 4f 46 6a af ad 89 fb de 58 | bc b8 b7 7b d3 a2 2e ee a0 3a a4 ef ed d0 cd 85 | 0f 67 9a 9d 56 a4 6d 4b f2 30 d0 c6 f8 16 5a e3 | 99 97 c1 5f c7 55 ac 0a 94 da 3f c8 3c 30 ed dd | 0d cf 42 81 95 e5 d0 6f 5a c1 54 15 60 c6 60 ea | 8e cf ad ad b2 c9 d0 3f 48 a1 b4 1b 7a 27 4b 91 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | 07 13 9f 06 23 33 80 99 24 f7 a5 04 f6 61 44 a5 | 29 51 3c e8 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 07 13 9f 06 23 33 80 99 24 f7 a5 04 f6 61 44 a5 | HASH_R 29 51 3c e8 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 07 13 9f 06 23 33 80 99 24 f7 a5 04 f6 61 44 a5 | encrypting: 29 51 3c e8 | IV: 2d 7c af 3a c9 d9 ee 61 8a 2a 8f ac ad b3 98 2a | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #9 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #9: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #9 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #9 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 16 3e 7c ba | c7 5b 79 3d bf fe 0b e7 06 9b 64 c1 fc 24 59 70 | e5 c7 25 dc c9 2f 10 a5 cc 34 3c 0c 14 4c 45 42 | e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #9 | #9 spent 0.654 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.776 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00265 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 08 10 20 01 e3 59 0c a2 00 00 01 bc 6e bf 74 74 | a0 9b 57 5a ce 23 66 06 f6 d4 3b b2 a1 29 1f 5b | e8 77 ae 96 90 68 dd 95 af e8 ad 1f b4 83 6a ac | 59 9a 51 d7 99 08 dd 03 d0 2b d8 e0 39 a6 a0 9b | 6f 20 b0 12 4f 90 d6 55 96 e2 5b 3d 63 ba 27 50 | 20 20 f4 2c c0 9e e8 d4 0c a8 d1 20 76 7a 9d e7 | e7 b4 88 f0 ef 40 8e cd 09 20 50 c3 f6 ab 58 4d | 4c d0 96 26 b8 93 b9 7a 9b 86 ec 0b d1 24 00 08 | 34 1f 04 cf af 92 ce de 65 eb 4f 66 17 22 c5 86 | 7a 1a 6b f6 02 eb 43 99 36 09 4c ad fd 68 05 d7 | 1c 8f a8 d5 5b 6b 29 1e 99 b7 db ef f6 8f a0 9a | 13 3e 5f 04 ab 1e 72 ff 6f 71 1c ea de 6f 56 6a | b7 90 91 84 ee b1 8c 49 2e 68 19 d8 9a 53 33 23 | a1 1e d2 66 7e 41 52 85 0b 09 27 a1 92 68 c1 2a | 45 32 b3 ce 2b 97 fc df 1c 80 6d d7 ed 3a 4f c9 | 07 c0 72 7d b6 d3 af a3 b9 4c 46 df 11 1f 2b bd | 56 67 96 5b 6e 63 7b af 58 dd 28 36 1a 1e 56 31 | 92 be bc 35 4b 6c 43 0d 9b c6 f1 55 48 1e 1f a2 | 54 b9 7c 4c fd 8a d7 0b b8 12 19 64 0f 8c d3 30 | 42 63 40 98 b5 8b 1a 3d 50 51 95 1b e1 e0 3d 5e | 15 00 44 ed 11 6c d9 ad 58 fd f3 f2 9a 62 17 3a | df 30 3f 3f 3d fb d1 9c c7 55 21 4d 05 d0 57 f3 | 6d 85 f8 8d f4 06 0d 26 a0 10 00 b6 d9 ba 22 72 | 75 e6 56 aa c7 90 2d dc 17 90 b4 65 2c 03 d1 f6 | f7 dd 8e cf 54 f8 5e 65 2c c0 0a 13 be 8e ba 6d | 84 91 28 a2 e4 f1 e8 ab 3c a7 16 dd 8a 28 ba 52 | 82 61 35 a6 ce 1c 71 bd b0 f6 e3 ed | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3814263970 (0xe3590ca2) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | current Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | e3 59 0c a2 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | 55 d4 c2 d5 f2 75 ba db f0 24 d4 cd 03 63 b5 de | db 6e a3 3c | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 55 d4 c2 d5 f2 75 ba db f0 24 d4 cd 03 63 b5 de | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 8a 28 ba 52 82 61 35 a6 ce 1c 71 bd b0 f6 e3 ed | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 08 10 20 01 e3 59 0c a2 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | a7 a3 eb 34 33 01 e6 1b 7a 33 2e 68 07 a1 02 ac | 01 b8 77 ee 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 82 5c 20 f5 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 00 04 00 00 24 | 7d 02 c3 00 f8 a1 bb a3 2b 2e 5b f8 99 32 77 c5 | 99 15 b1 03 ab a2 e1 96 af c2 74 45 a6 d0 51 10 | 05 00 01 04 48 de b7 ba 8e e3 12 8c 7a a1 9b 5b | 9c 12 61 c3 d5 0f ea 4a 72 b5 a5 c6 59 40 34 de | 54 e8 4d c7 86 a6 ba c0 75 ef 7d 45 26 48 97 9c | 0a 55 ac 1b 03 14 ac cc fe b1 df c8 c0 95 94 f8 | 5e a3 9c 0e 1d 0b e7 85 e5 7f d9 e4 02 7b fb 2f | da a3 ed 0b 70 d7 4f 2c 3f 78 6c 5d 99 38 91 1c | c3 bd c9 16 f9 0f 9f fc 13 56 b0 c0 41 39 d7 47 | 31 72 a1 bf 4f 06 64 89 f0 e7 b6 88 26 1c 09 0b | 9f 5f a6 40 de 24 36 f9 28 0a 7d 65 07 2f 0f fc | 6b 70 9e 11 f4 ca 97 0b 5f 45 8f e5 32 b5 a1 be | 60 33 2d 3d f9 29 81 60 9f 32 74 f2 f9 9e 95 31 | f0 06 c8 74 cf cd 4a b7 d1 e3 e6 ca 88 14 07 5d | 48 fd 49 f1 90 fd be ac d2 aa 39 a3 a8 99 65 ef | 7e 0c ec 43 ae da 61 80 1f 64 c4 65 5c 0b 69 05 | c4 98 5d 5c 2a 1c 49 33 69 6a 3d 06 00 71 de 4c | c7 02 eb 49 39 1c d9 41 d1 c3 da 54 c6 2c b1 11 | a3 df 32 3c 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | e3 59 0c a2 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cadc54 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 82 5c 20 f5 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 00 04 00 00 24 7d 02 c3 00 | f8 a1 bb a3 2b 2e 5b f8 99 32 77 c5 99 15 b1 03 | ab a2 e1 96 af c2 74 45 a6 d0 51 10 05 00 01 04 | 48 de b7 ba 8e e3 12 8c 7a a1 9b 5b 9c 12 61 c3 | d5 0f ea 4a 72 b5 a5 c6 59 40 34 de 54 e8 4d c7 | 86 a6 ba c0 75 ef 7d 45 26 48 97 9c 0a 55 ac 1b | 03 14 ac cc fe b1 df c8 c0 95 94 f8 5e a3 9c 0e | 1d 0b e7 85 e5 7f d9 e4 02 7b fb 2f da a3 ed 0b | 70 d7 4f 2c 3f 78 6c 5d 99 38 91 1c c3 bd c9 16 | f9 0f 9f fc 13 56 b0 c0 41 39 d7 47 31 72 a1 bf | 4f 06 64 89 f0 e7 b6 88 26 1c 09 0b 9f 5f a6 40 | de 24 36 f9 28 0a 7d 65 07 2f 0f fc 6b 70 9e 11 | f4 ca 97 0b 5f 45 8f e5 32 b5 a1 be 60 33 2d 3d | f9 29 81 60 9f 32 74 f2 f9 9e 95 31 f0 06 c8 74 | cf cd 4a b7 d1 e3 e6 ca 88 14 07 5d 48 fd 49 f1 | 90 fd be ac d2 aa 39 a3 a8 99 65 ef 7e 0c ec 43 | ae da 61 80 1f 64 c4 65 5c 0b 69 05 c4 98 5d 5c | 2a 1c 49 33 69 6a 3d 06 00 71 de 4c c7 02 eb 49 | 39 1c d9 41 d1 c3 da 54 c6 2c b1 11 a3 df 32 3c | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | a7 a3 eb 34 33 01 e6 1b 7a 33 2e 68 07 a1 02 ac | 01 b8 77 ee | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | a7 a3 eb 34 33 01 e6 1b 7a 33 2e 68 07 a1 02 ac | 01 b8 77 ee | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #9: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #10 at 0x557566cb48f0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #10 in UNDEFINED | pstats #10 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #9 "east" as #10 for IPSEC SA | #10 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #9.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #10: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 82 5c 20 f5 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #10: IKEv1 key-length attribute without encryption algorithm | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #10 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #10: sending encrypted notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 423137312 (0x19389020) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9958 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a3c (length 4) | 19 38 90 20 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9cf4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9ce0 (length 20) | 15 21 6c 1e 4a c5 5f 96 09 49 fe af df 5d 5c de | 37 10 aa a2 | send notification HASH(1): | 15 21 6c 1e 4a c5 5f 96 09 49 fe af df 5d 5c de | 37 10 aa a2 | last Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | current Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a4c (length 4) | 19 38 90 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | ce 4a ae 1f a1 f6 eb d5 1f cc 52 83 c6 f4 a9 e3 | 97 36 f9 50 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 15 21 6c 1e 4a c5 5f 96 09 49 fe af | encrypting: df 5d 5c de 37 10 aa a2 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0f | IV: ce 4a ae 1f a1 f6 eb d5 1f cc 52 83 c6 f4 a9 e3 | IV: 97 36 f9 50 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 3f a1 d5 b9 32 cb fe e1 5c cc 72 76 6f ce 0d 63 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #10) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 08 10 05 01 19 38 90 20 00 00 00 4c 11 5e e0 ec | 4b 36 90 95 f7 ed 4d 87 58 c0 ae 40 0c 6f a1 ed | 2e b1 36 33 c9 90 c2 f5 b0 86 64 36 3f a1 d5 b9 | 32 cb fe e1 5c cc 72 76 6f ce 0d 63 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | pstats #10 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #10: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #10: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #10: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #10 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #10: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #10 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #9 spent 0.419 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.765 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00293 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 08 10 05 01 e3 1c e0 5b 00 00 00 5c fd 2a 21 ed | 12 2e 4d 37 36 cf dc d9 cd 2f 2f ee d4 d6 50 8d | 41 82 d9 56 3b 94 74 3e 58 22 b1 ea 53 4a e2 eb | 5a bb 13 b0 c6 01 dc 21 62 54 1d 1a 9a 55 ca ff | a1 e9 dd d0 ac 4e c8 a5 6b 13 72 9a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3810320475 (0xe31ce05b) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #9; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #9 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | current Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | e3 1c e0 5b | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | b5 6f 8f 03 f8 72 1e 5c 6f 10 bd b0 c2 02 98 69 | fe e8 07 e8 | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: b5 6f 8f 03 f8 72 1e 5c 6f 10 bd b0 c2 02 98 69 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 9a 55 ca ff a1 e9 dd d0 ac 4e c8 a5 6b 13 72 9a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 08 10 05 01 e3 1c e0 5b 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | 88 e5 ca c9 eb cf 8a a0 be cf dc c2 59 86 0b 8f | 62 a0 ac fd 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | e3 1c e0 5b | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c8f104 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 6c 56 c7 01 | c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 88 e5 ca c9 eb cf 8a a0 be cf dc c2 59 86 0b 8f | 62 a0 ac fd | informational HASH(1): | 88 e5 ca c9 eb cf 8a a0 be cf dc c2 59 86 0b 8f | 62 a0 ac fd | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #9: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #9 | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #9: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.563s and sending notification | parent state #9: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #9 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | responder cookie: | e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1805369693 (0x6b9bc15d) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cc8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dac (length 4) | 6b 9b c1 5d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8154 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 6c 56 c7 01 | c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8140 (length 20) | 5d fd 51 77 fc c9 9e d3 8a b8 42 99 53 36 90 87 | a6 0f 8f 8e | send delete HASH(1): | 5d fd 51 77 fc c9 9e d3 8a b8 42 99 53 36 90 87 | a6 0f 8f 8e | last Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | current Phase 1 IV: 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | 14 4c 45 42 e6 a4 e6 a1 50 42 ca 9c 22 fa 35 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dbc (length 4) | 6b 9b c1 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | 95 7e 41 25 8b 50 fe 0d d6 cb 48 dd b9 63 bb 9e | 45 f9 f1 c5 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 5d fd 51 77 fc c9 9e d3 8a b8 42 99 | encrypting: 53 36 90 87 a6 0f 8f 8e 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe | encrypting: aa a1 16 ae | IV: 95 7e 41 25 8b 50 fe 0d d6 cb 48 dd b9 63 bb 9e | IV: 45 f9 f1 c5 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 52 21 32 97 2d 7e a2 cc 49 9b ec 4e 07 76 f6 ac | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | 6c 56 c7 01 c8 64 7d 8c e0 2d d2 fe aa a1 16 ae | 08 10 05 01 6b 9b c1 5d 00 00 00 5c 7b c7 32 5d | ad dd f5 ea d5 c5 8e 8d 4a a1 66 39 e9 aa c8 70 | 9e 62 b8 4f 8f 9f 49 b5 bb de 92 dd 00 08 59 46 | 04 a6 80 7b 3e 0c cc a8 e7 e9 6e 4e 52 21 32 97 | 2d 7e a2 cc 49 9b ec 4e 07 76 f6 ac | state #9 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #9: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #9 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.616 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00355 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 08 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 01 82 fb c1 ba 30 7d c5 | 3b b3 95 6f 65 ac 98 92 cc 9c 8c 48 fd 21 86 7c | creating state object #11 at 0x557566cb3e30 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #11 in UNDEFINED | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp started | #11 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #11: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b "east" #11: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #11 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #11: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.597 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00232 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | 14 00 00 24 82 8a d2 ec 04 00 c7 67 66 1b 86 0b | 2d 59 88 13 95 d9 6d 01 0c 4c 64 ad ec fe dc cf | 8e dd af fc 14 00 00 18 f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb | 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f 6f 4a 5a 4e 00 00 00 18 | 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | 86 78 e3 8b | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #11 is idle | #11 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | 6f 4a 5a 4e | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | natd_hash: hash= 6f 4a 5a 4e | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | 86 78 e3 8b | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | natd_hash: hash= 86 78 e3 8b | expected NAT-D(me): f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | expected NAT-D(me): 6f 4a 5a 4e | expected NAT-D(him): | 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | 86 78 e3 8b | received NAT-D: f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | received NAT-D: 6f 4a 5a 4e | received NAT-D: 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | received NAT-D: 86 78 e3 8b | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 9 for state #11 | state #11 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #11 and saving MD | #11 is busy; has a suspended MD | #11 spent 0.175 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.302 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 9 for state #11 | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 9 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001fc0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b8c001fc0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | Generated nonce: 29 1b 97 11 74 15 d0 2f ac 9f b3 28 60 96 59 cd | Generated nonce: da 4c 01 09 6e ba 0e f2 b8 f3 ce fa 1d a8 8b ae | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 9 time elapsed 0.000985 seconds | (#11) spent 0.986 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 9: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 9 for state #11 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c00ac40 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #11 | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 9 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #11: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001fc0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #11 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | keyex value 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | keyex value ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | keyex value e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | keyex value f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | keyex value 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | keyex value 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | keyex value 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | keyex value 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | keyex value df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | keyex value f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | keyex value bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | keyex value ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | keyex value 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | keyex value e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | keyex value b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 29 1b 97 11 74 15 d0 2f ac 9f b3 28 60 96 59 cd | Nr da 4c 01 09 6e ba 0e f2 b8 f3 ce fa 1d a8 8b ae | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | 86 78 e3 8b | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | natd_hash: hash= 86 78 e3 8b | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 | NAT-D 86 78 e3 8b | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | 6f 4a 5a 4e | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | natd_hash: hash= 6f 4a 5a 4e | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | NAT-D 6f 4a 5a 4e | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001fc0: transferring ownership from state #11 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 10 for state #11 | state #11 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #11 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 10 for state #11 | crypto helper 4 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 10 | peer's g: e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | peer's g: 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | peer's g: 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | peer's g: d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | peer's g: 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | peer's g: 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | peer's g: 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | peer's g: bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | peer's g: fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | peer's g: 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | peer's g: 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | peer's g: 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | peer's g: 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | peer's g: b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | peer's g: 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | peer's g: 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001fc0: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c8d6a0 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb5510 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b99d896a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d89688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b90005140 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b90005140 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90000d60 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb5534 (length 32) | 82 8a d2 ec 04 00 c7 67 66 1b 86 0b 2d 59 88 13 | 95 d9 6d 01 0c 4c 64 ad ec fe dc cf 8e dd af fc | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb5554 (length 32) | 29 1b 97 11 74 15 d0 2f ac 9f b3 28 60 96 59 cd | da 4c 01 09 6e ba 0e f2 b8 f3 ce fa 1d a8 8b ae | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b99d896c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d896a8 | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #11 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #11: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #11 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | 14 00 00 24 29 1b 97 11 74 15 d0 2f ac 9f b3 28 | 60 96 59 cd da 4c 01 09 6e ba 0e f2 b8 f3 ce fa | 1d a8 8b ae 14 00 00 18 9f f6 84 8b d2 1f ea 30 | 01 f7 15 8e d2 39 21 d9 86 78 e3 8b 00 00 00 18 | f8 0c 2b de ab cc 52 cb 63 4f b1 9e 36 02 c7 6f | 6f 4a 5a 4e | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 size 128 | #11 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49494.23881 "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #11 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #11 spent 0.404 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c00ac40 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d896b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b90005140 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b90005140 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002cc0 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1713859840: fffffff0 ffffffe1 ffffffed ffffffcd ffffffc6 fffffff6 ffffffc5 ffffffd1 10 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffac 60 66 ffffffca ffffffe6 fffffffa ffffff9f ffffff95 fffffffb 47 3e ffffffa1 6e ffffffd1 ffffffd6 36 ffffff8d 0e ffffff88 5f 0b 73 18 59 14 4c 77 ffffffb5 4d fffffffa 3d 37 ffffffe9 ffffffa4 1c 02 ffffffcc ffffffd9 fffffff3 ffffff8d ffffff98 fffffff1 ffffffb6 7d 47 55 ffffff88 0d ffffff9e ffffffa7 67 4f fffffff0 ffffffb9 ffffffb3 ffffffce 44 40 ffffffd5 ffffffc2 ffffffc0 ffffffcf fffffffc ffffffdf ffffffab ffffffae ffffff8e ffffffd9 ffffffbd ffffff8e 23 ffffffd6 fffffffd fffffff4 ffffffc7 ffffff95 78 ffffff93 ffffffa1 28 ffffffeb 46 ffffffd0 4d 17 ffffffd3 ffffffe8 56 ffffffff ffffffe1 ffffff87 ffffffde 0f fffffffd fffffff8 49 ffffffde ffffff87 ffffff9b 60 58 ffffffae 62 05 7b 4e ffffffb7 3f ffffff80 ffffffde ffffffb9 ffffffce ffffff83 25 ffffff98 fffffff6 ffffffbb ffffff82 59 ffffffcf 7e ffffffc6 7f 35 15 0e ffffff97 ffffffd2 fffffffd | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b90005d40 | unwrapped: 49 ac 3e 8e 74 e8 0b 80 f9 2a 80 ef b6 d6 ca c5 | unwrapped: 67 ec bb 0f 4a b1 eb 2d 54 82 3c 24 2e 05 26 e9 | unwrapped: 12 5f 3b e3 87 6e 41 d6 a2 e5 15 db ac 37 bf 9d | unwrapped: 53 17 71 db a5 78 10 72 38 cc 8b 17 74 e0 74 62 | unwrapped: c4 25 3b 91 1c af 3b 37 e0 c0 74 56 e2 6a c3 c3 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 6d 67 41 13 85 eb 7e d9 57 79 47 43 ef 9e | unwrapped: f9 dd cb a2 1a 02 96 0a c4 ed 4f 72 e8 d7 92 43 | unwrapped: 5d 7d 93 70 58 37 77 69 0e f2 96 d1 ce 40 ae c3 | unwrapped: 7b 9e eb ed 9b 18 a3 6f cf f9 23 d4 81 ca c4 b8 | unwrapped: 79 33 9e 75 b0 95 5a c4 8a a2 0c 42 7f 44 20 89 | unwrapped: 91 3a 49 c5 19 bc 71 a5 33 21 c0 7c a3 e9 81 cb | unwrapped: 14 92 f1 f5 19 62 8b 8a 29 ff 67 36 a3 0b f5 88 | unwrapped: 3e a5 33 cc 64 de ab 21 47 ef 01 0f ca bc 89 53 | unwrapped: 3c d3 24 e7 01 c6 cf 54 8c 38 70 31 21 2a 24 75 | unwrapped: 65 ac ed 58 fb 6d 49 59 cd bb 53 35 81 f3 fd 86 | unwrapped: 2f 88 2a 49 8c 21 f0 d1 66 49 f3 66 4a c4 80 9e | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb5774 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb577c (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b99d896c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d896a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d89698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b90005140 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b90005140 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002760 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1713859872: 06 64 fffffffb ffffffb6 ffffffc3 ffffffbf ffffffa7 ffffff97 43 ffffff84 3c ffffff99 ffffffbc ffffffba 19 ffffffb4 ffffff96 ffffffe7 2f fffffff1 3a ffffff90 30 ffffffc5 ffffff84 ffffffa0 5e 51 ffffffe3 fffffffa 5c 2d | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b90007020 | unwrapped: f6 28 2a 3d 5d f1 1f ee 01 17 7e 7b 3c b3 8d 7e | unwrapped: 15 e1 37 3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1713859872: fffffff0 ffffffe1 ffffffed ffffffcd ffffffc6 fffffff6 ffffffc5 ffffffd1 10 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffac 60 66 ffffffca ffffffe6 fffffffa ffffff9f ffffff95 fffffffb 47 3e ffffffa1 6e ffffffd1 ffffffd6 36 ffffff8d 0e ffffff88 5f 0b 73 18 59 14 4c 77 ffffffb5 4d fffffffa 3d 37 ffffffe9 ffffffa4 1c 02 ffffffcc ffffffd9 fffffff3 ffffff8d ffffff98 fffffff1 ffffffb6 7d 47 55 ffffff88 0d ffffff9e ffffffa7 67 4f fffffff0 ffffffb9 ffffffb3 ffffffce 44 40 ffffffd5 ffffffc2 ffffffc0 ffffffcf fffffffc ffffffdf ffffffab ffffffae ffffff8e ffffffd9 ffffffbd ffffff8e 23 ffffffd6 fffffffd fffffff4 ffffffc7 ffffff95 78 ffffff93 ffffffa1 28 ffffffeb 46 ffffffd0 4d 17 ffffffd3 ffffffe8 56 ffffffff ffffffe1 ffffff87 ffffffde 0f fffffffd fffffff8 49 ffffffde ffffff87 ffffff9b 60 58 ffffffae 62 05 7b 4e ffffffb7 3f ffffff80 ffffffde ffffffb9 ffffffce ffffff83 25 ffffff98 fffffff6 ffffffbb ffffff82 59 ffffffcf 7e ffffffc6 7f 35 15 0e ffffff97 ffffffd2 fffffffd | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b90002fe0 | unwrapped: 49 ac 3e 8e 74 e8 0b 80 f9 2a 80 ef b6 d6 ca c5 | unwrapped: 67 ec bb 0f 4a b1 eb 2d 54 82 3c 24 2e 05 26 e9 | unwrapped: 12 5f 3b e3 87 6e 41 d6 a2 e5 15 db ac 37 bf 9d | unwrapped: 53 17 71 db a5 78 10 72 38 cc 8b 17 74 e0 74 62 | unwrapped: c4 25 3b 91 1c af 3b 37 e0 c0 74 56 e2 6a c3 c3 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 6d 67 41 13 85 eb 7e d9 57 79 47 43 ef 9e | unwrapped: f9 dd cb a2 1a 02 96 0a c4 ed 4f 72 e8 d7 92 43 | unwrapped: 5d 7d 93 70 58 37 77 69 0e f2 96 d1 ce 40 ae c3 | unwrapped: 7b 9e eb ed 9b 18 a3 6f cf f9 23 d4 81 ca c4 b8 | unwrapped: 79 33 9e 75 b0 95 5a c4 8a a2 0c 42 7f 44 20 89 | unwrapped: 91 3a 49 c5 19 bc 71 a5 33 21 c0 7c a3 e9 81 cb | unwrapped: 14 92 f1 f5 19 62 8b 8a 29 ff 67 36 a3 0b f5 88 | unwrapped: 3e a5 33 cc 64 de ab 21 47 ef 01 0f ca bc 89 53 | unwrapped: 3c d3 24 e7 01 c6 cf 54 8c 38 70 31 21 2a 24 75 | unwrapped: 65 ac ed 58 fb 6d 49 59 cd bb 53 35 81 f3 fd 86 | unwrapped: 2f 88 2a 49 8c 21 f0 d1 66 49 f3 66 4a c4 80 9e | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb5774 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb577c (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b99d896a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d89688 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d896a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b90005140 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b90005140 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002af0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1713859856: ffffffbc ffffffa6 ffffff93 6b fffffff8 35 56 ffffff9b 7e 54 ffffffa0 31 ffffffcc 1c 7a 02 ffffffc6 42 31 09 61 ffffffca 71 3e 24 24 ffffffcc 62 2c 0e 35 2a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b90007590 | unwrapped: cd dc d4 c5 06 6c db b3 7f 32 97 5d af 67 af 4b | unwrapped: f0 c6 1c 52 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1713859856: fffffff0 ffffffe1 ffffffed ffffffcd ffffffc6 fffffff6 ffffffc5 ffffffd1 10 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffac 60 66 ffffffca ffffffe6 fffffffa ffffff9f ffffff95 fffffffb 47 3e ffffffa1 6e ffffffd1 ffffffd6 36 ffffff8d 0e ffffff88 5f 0b 73 18 59 14 4c 77 ffffffb5 4d fffffffa 3d 37 ffffffe9 ffffffa4 1c 02 ffffffcc ffffffd9 fffffff3 ffffff8d ffffff98 fffffff1 ffffffb6 7d 47 55 ffffff88 0d ffffff9e ffffffa7 67 4f fffffff0 ffffffb9 ffffffb3 ffffffce 44 40 ffffffd5 ffffffc2 ffffffc0 ffffffcf fffffffc ffffffdf ffffffab ffffffae ffffff8e ffffffd9 ffffffbd ffffff8e 23 ffffffd6 fffffffd fffffff4 ffffffc7 ffffff95 78 ffffff93 ffffffa1 28 ffffffeb 46 ffffffd0 4d 17 ffffffd3 ffffffe8 56 ffffffff ffffffe1 ffffff87 ffffffde 0f fffffffd fffffff8 49 ffffffde ffffff87 ffffff9b 60 58 ffffffae 62 05 7b 4e ffffffb7 3f ffffff80 ffffffde ffffffb9 ffffffce ffffff83 25 ffffff98 fffffff6 ffffffbb ffffff82 59 ffffffcf 7e ffffffc6 7f 35 15 0e ffffff97 ffffffd2 fffffffd | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b90002ed0 | unwrapped: 49 ac 3e 8e 74 e8 0b 80 f9 2a 80 ef b6 d6 ca c5 | unwrapped: 67 ec bb 0f 4a b1 eb 2d 54 82 3c 24 2e 05 26 e9 | unwrapped: 12 5f 3b e3 87 6e 41 d6 a2 e5 15 db ac 37 bf 9d | unwrapped: 53 17 71 db a5 78 10 72 38 cc 8b 17 74 e0 74 62 | unwrapped: c4 25 3b 91 1c af 3b 37 e0 c0 74 56 e2 6a c3 c3 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 6d 67 41 13 85 eb 7e d9 57 79 47 43 ef 9e | unwrapped: f9 dd cb a2 1a 02 96 0a c4 ed 4f 72 e8 d7 92 43 | unwrapped: 5d 7d 93 70 58 37 77 69 0e f2 96 d1 ce 40 ae c3 | unwrapped: 7b 9e eb ed 9b 18 a3 6f cf f9 23 d4 81 ca c4 b8 | unwrapped: 79 33 9e 75 b0 95 5a c4 8a a2 0c 42 7f 44 20 89 | unwrapped: 91 3a 49 c5 19 bc 71 a5 33 21 c0 7c a3 e9 81 cb | unwrapped: 14 92 f1 f5 19 62 8b 8a 29 ff 67 36 a3 0b f5 88 | unwrapped: 3e a5 33 cc 64 de ab 21 47 ef 01 0f ca bc 89 53 | unwrapped: 3c d3 24 e7 01 c6 cf 54 8c 38 70 31 21 2a 24 75 | unwrapped: 65 ac ed 58 fb 6d 49 59 cd bb 53 35 81 f3 fd 86 | unwrapped: 2f 88 2a 49 8c 21 f0 d1 66 49 f3 66 4a c4 80 9e | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb5774 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb577c (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b99d896b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d89698 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99d896f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c98060 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_a 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_e 0x557566c963a0, enc_key 0x557566c98060 | DH_i: e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | DH_i: 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | DH_i: 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | DH_i: d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | DH_i: 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | DH_i: 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | DH_i: 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | DH_i: bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | DH_i: fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | DH_i: 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | DH_i: 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | DH_i: 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | DH_i: 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | DH_i: b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | DH_i: 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | DH_i: 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | DH_r: 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | DH_r: 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | DH_r: ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | DH_r: e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | DH_r: f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | DH_r: 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | DH_r: 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | DH_r: 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | DH_r: 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | DH_r: df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | DH_r: f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | DH_r: bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | DH_r: ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | DH_r: 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | DH_r: e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | DH_r: b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb5574 (length 256) | e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb5674 (length 256) | 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b90002d90 (length 20) | 69 16 c5 fb be c9 b6 04 a6 9c 55 36 c9 29 e9 a6 | 87 0c 66 2e | crypto helper 4 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 10 time elapsed 0.002448 seconds | (#11) spent 2.09 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 10: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 10 for state #11 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90005a70 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #11 | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 10 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #11: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001fc0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #11 | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #11 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #11 spent 0.0246 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90005a70 | spent 0.00292 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c f3 2d f4 43 | 84 40 ce a7 ff f0 f3 1c 75 11 26 6b fe 91 2d 31 | 49 05 ff 5d 7d 24 02 db d9 df 11 78 ec c0 fa 3d | 7d 74 63 32 15 b4 08 29 8d 38 8b 43 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 69 16 c5 fb be c9 b6 04 a6 9c 55 36 c9 29 e9 a6 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: ec c0 fa 3d 7d 74 63 32 15 b4 08 29 8d 38 8b 43 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 2c 32 bd 3c | c5 7d 7d 1b 42 3a c9 a6 aa 7b 88 11 c1 96 f3 74 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #11: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80000ea0 (length 256) | e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c003bd0 (length 256) | 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566c0af70 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | 2c 32 bd 3c c5 7d 7d 1b 42 3a c9 a6 aa 7b 88 11 | c1 96 f3 74 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c003bd0 (length 256) | 1c b6 43 4f 27 89 c2 10 76 80 03 f7 ee e7 39 80 | 80 b2 a1 3f 37 62 96 77 3b 87 dc d7 51 f7 72 3e | ea 82 73 f7 0f a3 f8 66 08 99 19 aa ad 5c 61 e7 | e1 7c ba 16 b0 4f 73 f7 45 78 44 17 14 74 f5 7f | f3 89 71 be ef 6f 56 54 10 5a b5 57 db 34 c2 04 | 8e 96 c8 d3 ee c7 86 6e ee 3a bb f6 7a f9 9c 60 | 25 7e 54 91 e4 8e dc 17 9b 85 39 5c 9c 76 8a 9d | 05 1e 06 ab f1 a1 0e 92 4c 36 a0 8c 7e 11 10 d1 | 0b 8b 67 c1 4a cf d5 16 78 3f 9a 7b 63 20 d7 80 | df f9 d0 b4 61 30 ec 73 a8 96 30 e8 f9 4c 13 fd | f9 54 d5 26 be 2b 9a 0b a1 95 4e 83 c2 f3 70 96 | bf d0 a8 fe 76 b9 0c 28 a7 b4 4b 8a cd ac 05 04 | ac 32 0a 76 af 6b 20 70 92 ae f1 bf b6 1d f0 dd | 92 eb b6 e5 61 80 b0 b3 eb e8 21 a3 21 be 74 df | e0 25 98 ee ca 8d 21 97 29 e7 46 43 8d 20 4f 0e | b0 49 ea 2c d5 72 b3 c5 4a 85 30 db 35 28 5c b8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80000ea0 (length 256) | e3 d9 06 6f f6 f7 a6 22 5f fe 06 75 19 10 f6 25 | 58 97 5a 37 99 ec f2 dc 35 db 9c 20 59 c7 70 e6 | 31 7e c0 d2 3d 39 5a 65 d0 2d 98 3c ae 21 68 43 | d2 03 14 e5 89 13 3d d0 52 cc 93 3f 80 52 db fa | 19 1e 1c 81 8a 69 10 9a c1 c6 21 12 93 d4 93 73 | 66 4f c2 74 8e 22 6f 15 69 4d d4 ad cb 0b 15 30 | 7c b5 7b 27 a7 9a cb ce e5 5e f0 45 e7 b4 02 61 | bf ef 1e 05 1a 85 a3 7b 74 1d 86 6a 61 20 24 4e | fd 8c 17 1b 0a f8 38 e7 c8 fe 13 11 98 73 de e6 | 96 7d 9b 91 99 7d 89 61 09 a7 1a 2e 71 4b ea 8c | 8a 01 71 72 67 c1 95 b4 d3 f2 93 ec 43 af 2d 72 | 95 29 ad f4 b9 06 e9 37 1c 89 b8 63 7e 8d 4c 27 | 82 fd 58 61 68 31 6f 93 46 5c ad 74 14 6c c2 4d | b3 eb 34 59 01 3f e0 a8 69 fe f6 29 02 86 27 fb | 13 ca 8c 87 30 54 cb 61 ed dc 43 c5 80 d7 3e a8 | 12 f9 70 fe ed a6 49 8d b9 57 19 b5 4f 61 0c 2f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43d0 (length 8) | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb43c8 (length 8) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | 8b 8e 8e f0 bf 52 09 95 93 bb 90 d6 ca 83 78 67 | 0a fd dd 70 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 8b 8e 8e f0 bf 52 09 95 93 bb 90 d6 ca 83 78 67 | HASH_R 0a fd dd 70 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 8b 8e 8e f0 bf 52 09 95 93 bb 90 d6 ca 83 78 67 | encrypting: 0a fd dd 70 | IV: ec c0 fa 3d 7d 74 63 32 15 b4 08 29 8d 38 8b 43 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #11 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #11: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #11 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #11 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566caa3a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 5b 30 2c 0a | b3 25 41 33 e1 e8 cc 58 4d c0 f8 85 a3 ee 58 b8 | e9 19 d2 ad 87 b8 e6 10 a5 92 6e cb ca 34 e7 07 | 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c00ac40 size 128 | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #11 | #11 spent 0.599 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.744 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00247 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 20 01 bc 5d 94 0e 00 00 01 bc 22 1a 8b ed | 85 21 78 53 a4 17 22 fa 01 cb 4d 84 90 68 82 12 | 81 93 5d 06 c3 8b ee 24 34 ce 48 3a fd d2 0a 75 | d9 85 8d ec 31 c8 df 26 5b fc 8a d7 ef 6e 81 2a | 59 4c 29 82 2b bb b4 d4 41 72 89 34 6b c9 e0 75 | 87 58 7a 14 4b 68 4b e2 96 10 80 0f 0b 64 66 d0 | 17 b3 be b5 ec 03 05 04 3f 22 c2 ad fc c5 c0 d6 | 4f 8e f2 90 c7 bf dd 9f 84 f6 40 f0 45 bd 5e 00 | c0 96 e5 58 cc 2a a6 09 12 cf 6c d1 6a d8 39 5a | f2 34 ee 74 6a b0 f4 47 7e bb 5d d4 22 52 cb bf | 0c 7b c0 c7 71 bd 6e 0c 4d 06 aa 71 b3 f2 2c 0f | 3f 25 fc 18 ab a2 9c 4c cf 73 14 1c 43 a1 7f 2e | 2b 84 c3 ce fb f7 76 b8 69 89 a4 59 17 16 8d 20 | 81 a2 d8 18 bf 89 1b fb f4 ee 65 7a b0 d1 5e 3a | c2 06 f1 a5 80 de ca 95 a1 12 e0 28 dc ea d9 4e | b3 ce 19 a5 d3 29 9f 41 50 36 a0 d9 f7 78 52 92 | f5 61 27 35 21 f2 3b 29 d0 11 6f 26 cc a9 35 9e | aa d8 77 f3 54 18 9f 9a 03 cf 4f 8b e6 f2 de c6 | d0 24 c8 1f 34 cc a1 ab 72 1f 69 f6 50 fc d1 72 | 73 a6 4b 56 f1 2d 9f b6 16 7f f3 6a 58 e3 4d 43 | 0b d5 33 00 4d b1 22 65 57 59 b9 56 01 e8 eb 28 | 91 68 d1 b8 27 69 5b e8 62 7d b7 6b 87 47 4a b0 | 86 26 29 2c 4f d2 78 d7 3f fb 88 13 28 1f b1 64 | ce ea 33 2c 6a aa 76 6d 1d cd 07 d5 be 91 d5 8f | ba b1 25 44 1f 02 b6 33 3b 80 1b 98 d5 dc 9f 9d | f6 62 5e a7 cf 83 34 25 e7 dd b1 f7 26 3e 50 9b | 83 ae 1b d5 bd 2a d8 e8 e2 13 9a e6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3160249358 (0xbc5d940e) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | current Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | bc 5d 94 0e | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | 12 13 38 7e b1 41 00 1d 92 28 29 b0 40 cf c7 ae | cd cd 71 19 | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 12 13 38 7e b1 41 00 1d 92 28 29 b0 40 cf c7 ae | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 26 3e 50 9b 83 ae 1b d5 bd 2a d8 e8 e2 13 9a e6 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 20 01 bc 5d 94 0e 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 99 db b7 f4 46 d3 33 3b bd a5 41 7d d9 fe 93 c4 | 99 44 40 d2 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 33 ab d7 36 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | 05 00 01 04 b3 d8 68 fd c5 15 40 05 db 28 a5 3d | 4f bd 89 cb 2d 60 f5 f5 6f f0 b0 d9 ad 20 03 f3 | 53 c6 8b 42 29 7d 78 98 bb 77 a5 63 a5 8c 27 c1 | e3 32 b3 46 89 b4 89 73 43 3f 0c 47 d2 b5 09 66 | d7 ca d1 83 c2 ce ba 35 d2 07 df 44 fb 96 49 6e | ac fe c7 4c 5e 54 0a 38 af 7c 7b a9 6d 7e c8 1b | e6 ec b8 8b aa ca ce 43 9c 26 ed f0 be 84 62 e6 | 22 5f 1c 72 57 bb 0a 19 e3 84 0c 45 5b 6e 5a b4 | 96 e4 b1 b9 2a 39 21 af 98 83 9f 57 5d 00 4b 52 | aa 4d 65 c8 61 e8 4b 13 b1 ac 9f bc 75 c7 11 1d | 83 26 84 15 7c 7d 04 53 9a 07 e4 76 e2 ff 18 41 | 37 77 9d 8b ce 41 63 25 67 a7 5f 1a ae 5f d5 b5 | fd a9 50 b4 6c 31 dd b1 0e 33 d6 aa 98 f6 f3 e1 | c9 3d 30 fb ad 84 1e 94 f3 2f 23 06 d2 d9 0b 6b | 70 ac 0b b7 f9 21 fd 0e e4 ac 75 26 e2 08 90 e1 | d3 47 29 ae d5 4b 94 f3 9a 4a bb ea 64 90 8f d5 | 54 2e f7 c8 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | bc 5d 94 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cadc54 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 33 ab d7 36 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 e1 2b 8f 3a | 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f 95 6a ce cd | 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff 05 00 01 04 | b3 d8 68 fd c5 15 40 05 db 28 a5 3d 4f bd 89 cb | 2d 60 f5 f5 6f f0 b0 d9 ad 20 03 f3 53 c6 8b 42 | 29 7d 78 98 bb 77 a5 63 a5 8c 27 c1 e3 32 b3 46 | 89 b4 89 73 43 3f 0c 47 d2 b5 09 66 d7 ca d1 83 | c2 ce ba 35 d2 07 df 44 fb 96 49 6e ac fe c7 4c | 5e 54 0a 38 af 7c 7b a9 6d 7e c8 1b e6 ec b8 8b | aa ca ce 43 9c 26 ed f0 be 84 62 e6 22 5f 1c 72 | 57 bb 0a 19 e3 84 0c 45 5b 6e 5a b4 96 e4 b1 b9 | 2a 39 21 af 98 83 9f 57 5d 00 4b 52 aa 4d 65 c8 | 61 e8 4b 13 b1 ac 9f bc 75 c7 11 1d 83 26 84 15 | 7c 7d 04 53 9a 07 e4 76 e2 ff 18 41 37 77 9d 8b | ce 41 63 25 67 a7 5f 1a ae 5f d5 b5 fd a9 50 b4 | 6c 31 dd b1 0e 33 d6 aa 98 f6 f3 e1 c9 3d 30 fb | ad 84 1e 94 f3 2f 23 06 d2 d9 0b 6b 70 ac 0b b7 | f9 21 fd 0e e4 ac 75 26 e2 08 90 e1 d3 47 29 ae | d5 4b 94 f3 9a 4a bb ea 64 90 8f d5 54 2e f7 c8 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 99 db b7 f4 46 d3 33 3b bd a5 41 7d d9 fe 93 c4 | 99 44 40 d2 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 99 db b7 f4 46 d3 33 3b bd a5 41 7d d9 fe 93 c4 | 99 44 40 d2 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #11: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #12 at 0x557566cb48f0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #12 in UNDEFINED | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #11 "east" as #12 for IPSEC SA | #12 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #11.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #12: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 33 ab d7 36 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | b3 d8 68 fd c5 15 40 05 db 28 a5 3d 4f bd 89 cb | 2d 60 f5 f5 6f f0 b0 d9 ad 20 03 f3 53 c6 8b 42 | 29 7d 78 98 bb 77 a5 63 a5 8c 27 c1 e3 32 b3 46 | 89 b4 89 73 43 3f 0c 47 d2 b5 09 66 d7 ca d1 83 | c2 ce ba 35 d2 07 df 44 fb 96 49 6e ac fe c7 4c | 5e 54 0a 38 af 7c 7b a9 6d 7e c8 1b e6 ec b8 8b | aa ca ce 43 9c 26 ed f0 be 84 62 e6 22 5f 1c 72 | 57 bb 0a 19 e3 84 0c 45 5b 6e 5a b4 96 e4 b1 b9 | 2a 39 21 af 98 83 9f 57 5d 00 4b 52 aa 4d 65 c8 | 61 e8 4b 13 b1 ac 9f bc 75 c7 11 1d 83 26 84 15 | 7c 7d 04 53 9a 07 e4 76 e2 ff 18 41 37 77 9d 8b | ce 41 63 25 67 a7 5f 1a ae 5f d5 b5 fd a9 50 b4 | 6c 31 dd b1 0e 33 d6 aa 98 f6 f3 e1 c9 3d 30 fb | ad 84 1e 94 f3 2f 23 06 d2 d9 0b 6b 70 ac 0b b7 | f9 21 fd 0e e4 ac 75 26 e2 08 90 e1 d3 47 29 ae | d5 4b 94 f3 9a 4a bb ea 64 90 8f d5 54 2e f7 c8 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 11 for state #12 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #12 and saving MD | #12 is busy; has a suspended MD | #11 spent 0.24 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.626 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 11 for state #12 | crypto helper 6 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 11 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b84002e70: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b84002e70 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | a4 fb 54 63 ea d1 7b 52 d5 ec 77 bd 92 a7 42 b8 | bd 02 c7 90 8d 16 8e 3d 2a 79 8f 31 72 3f 56 b8 | 84 40 b3 52 73 70 82 31 20 59 ef 33 b4 92 ed 56 | 2a aa 3e fd 79 2f b1 d5 fe fb ee 07 26 e9 1f ca | 83 17 75 d2 42 ad d5 ac f3 2f 7e f6 e1 73 cd 0c | c9 4f 49 36 14 9f b2 a9 7b e6 9e 9f 5e bd 66 a6 | ee bb c2 2b 5d a9 8f 81 ad 53 e2 97 df 90 94 8f | ee 65 02 69 17 f2 80 d0 f6 fd dc 61 da 17 d5 6d | cb 39 d5 a4 fc 44 f3 76 3f cd 45 57 ce b4 70 fd | d9 51 56 73 97 b0 13 aa cc 6c 81 3d 86 02 0c 7b | 98 d3 6b 65 5f 24 df 05 c7 b7 3b e9 90 7b 3a ea | cd 4e ab e1 32 fe 77 e0 8d 99 b4 bb cc 71 4c c4 | ef 0f 20 a0 bc cb 82 40 89 81 7d 92 51 9d 3e 45 | 53 85 04 78 6a a6 8d 8c d3 5a f7 f7 71 3f 46 32 | eb c0 cc 49 b7 83 f7 4e 16 28 18 60 2d 63 fe b7 | c3 27 9f 81 0a a1 9b 1e 49 9e 5e 91 40 c6 02 90 | Generated nonce: 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | Generated nonce: 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | crypto helper 6 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 11 time elapsed 0.001039 seconds | (#12) spent 1.04 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 11: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 11 for state #12 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #12 | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 11 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #12: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b84002e70: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #12 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b84002e70: transferring ownership from state #12 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 12 for state #12 | state #12 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 size 128 | suspending state #12 and saving MD | #12 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #12 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #12 spent 0.0635 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 12 for state #12 | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 12 | peer's g: b3 d8 68 fd c5 15 40 05 db 28 a5 3d 4f bd 89 cb | peer's g: 2d 60 f5 f5 6f f0 b0 d9 ad 20 03 f3 53 c6 8b 42 | peer's g: 29 7d 78 98 bb 77 a5 63 a5 8c 27 c1 e3 32 b3 46 | peer's g: 89 b4 89 73 43 3f 0c 47 d2 b5 09 66 d7 ca d1 83 | peer's g: c2 ce ba 35 d2 07 df 44 fb 96 49 6e ac fe c7 4c | peer's g: 5e 54 0a 38 af 7c 7b a9 6d 7e c8 1b e6 ec b8 8b | peer's g: aa ca ce 43 9c 26 ed f0 be 84 62 e6 22 5f 1c 72 | peer's g: 57 bb 0a 19 e3 84 0c 45 5b 6e 5a b4 96 e4 b1 b9 | peer's g: 2a 39 21 af 98 83 9f 57 5d 00 4b 52 aa 4d 65 c8 | peer's g: 61 e8 4b 13 b1 ac 9f bc 75 c7 11 1d 83 26 84 15 | peer's g: 7c 7d 04 53 9a 07 e4 76 e2 ff 18 41 37 77 9d 8b | peer's g: ce 41 63 25 67 a7 5f 1a ae 5f d5 b5 fd a9 50 b4 | peer's g: 6c 31 dd b1 0e 33 d6 aa 98 f6 f3 e1 c9 3d 30 fb | peer's g: ad 84 1e 94 f3 2f 23 06 d2 d9 0b 6b 70 ac 0b b7 | peer's g: f9 21 fd 0e e4 ac 75 26 e2 08 90 e1 d3 47 29 ae | peer's g: d5 4b 94 f3 9a 4a bb ea 64 90 8f d5 54 2e f7 c8 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b84002e70: computed shared DH secret key@0x7f9b8c008420 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 12 time elapsed 0.001002 seconds | (#12) spent 0.925 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 12: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 12 for state #12 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #12 | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 12 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #12: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3160249358 (0xbc5d940e) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 33 ab d7 36 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xde1832a1 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI de 18 32 a1 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #12: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:bc5d940e} "east" #12: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #12: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | Nr 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value a4 fb 54 63 ea d1 7b 52 d5 ec 77 bd 92 a7 42 b8 | keyex value bd 02 c7 90 8d 16 8e 3d 2a 79 8f 31 72 3f 56 b8 | keyex value 84 40 b3 52 73 70 82 31 20 59 ef 33 b4 92 ed 56 | keyex value 2a aa 3e fd 79 2f b1 d5 fe fb ee 07 26 e9 1f ca | keyex value 83 17 75 d2 42 ad d5 ac f3 2f 7e f6 e1 73 cd 0c | keyex value c9 4f 49 36 14 9f b2 a9 7b e6 9e 9f 5e bd 66 a6 | keyex value ee bb c2 2b 5d a9 8f 81 ad 53 e2 97 df 90 94 8f | keyex value ee 65 02 69 17 f2 80 d0 f6 fd dc 61 da 17 d5 6d | keyex value cb 39 d5 a4 fc 44 f3 76 3f cd 45 57 ce b4 70 fd | keyex value d9 51 56 73 97 b0 13 aa cc 6c 81 3d 86 02 0c 7b | keyex value 98 d3 6b 65 5f 24 df 05 c7 b7 3b e9 90 7b 3a ea | keyex value cd 4e ab e1 32 fe 77 e0 8d 99 b4 bb cc 71 4c c4 | keyex value ef 0f 20 a0 bc cb 82 40 89 81 7d 92 51 9d 3e 45 | keyex value 53 85 04 78 6a a6 8d 8c d3 5a f7 f7 71 3f 46 32 | keyex value eb c0 cc 49 b7 83 f7 4e 16 28 18 60 2d 63 fe b7 | keyex value c3 27 9f 81 0a a1 9b 1e 49 9e 5e 91 40 c6 02 90 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b84002e70: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #12 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadb60 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e9c (length 4) | bc 5d 94 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b8c000c30 (length 32) | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55756517d974 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 de 18 32 a1 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 63 f0 4c 15 | ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 40 01 bf 64 | f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c 05 00 01 04 | a4 fb 54 63 ea d1 7b 52 d5 ec 77 bd 92 a7 42 b8 | bd 02 c7 90 8d 16 8e 3d 2a 79 8f 31 72 3f 56 b8 | 84 40 b3 52 73 70 82 31 20 59 ef 33 b4 92 ed 56 | 2a aa 3e fd 79 2f b1 d5 fe fb ee 07 26 e9 1f ca | 83 17 75 d2 42 ad d5 ac f3 2f 7e f6 e1 73 cd 0c | c9 4f 49 36 14 9f b2 a9 7b e6 9e 9f 5e bd 66 a6 | ee bb c2 2b 5d a9 8f 81 ad 53 e2 97 df 90 94 8f | ee 65 02 69 17 f2 80 d0 f6 fd dc 61 da 17 d5 6d | cb 39 d5 a4 fc 44 f3 76 3f cd 45 57 ce b4 70 fd | d9 51 56 73 97 b0 13 aa cc 6c 81 3d 86 02 0c 7b | 98 d3 6b 65 5f 24 df 05 c7 b7 3b e9 90 7b 3a ea | cd 4e ab e1 32 fe 77 e0 8d 99 b4 bb cc 71 4c c4 | ef 0f 20 a0 bc cb 82 40 89 81 7d 92 51 9d 3e 45 | 53 85 04 78 6a a6 8d 8c d3 5a f7 f7 71 3f 46 32 | eb c0 cc 49 b7 83 f7 4e 16 28 18 60 2d 63 fe b7 | c3 27 9f 81 0a a1 9b 1e 49 9e 5e 91 40 c6 02 90 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 20) | a7 66 96 70 ce 57 82 67 be 2e 01 1b 88 24 ea 28 | f8 69 ba e3 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | a7 66 96 70 ce 57 82 67 be 2e 01 1b 88 24 ea 28 | f8 69 ba e3 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cae290 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 16 ffffff9a 6e ffffffdb 0b ffffffc2 ffffffe6 7a 6c ffffffc7 ffffffd9 ffffffc1 09 52 12 ffffffd8 33 ffffffbb 05 3c 41 ffffff93 46 02 ffffffe0 ffffffe8 12 ffffffbf 6a 0e ffffffd3 ffffff84 ffffffb6 2d ffffff96 fffffff9 67 ffffffc6 7b ffffffaf 00 38 4e fffffffd 5e 65 ffffffaf 79 ffffffc1 17 19 fffffff5 ffffffd3 ffffff85 ffffffb5 ffffffb3 05 24 ffffffe3 ffffffcb 31 45 56 0b ffffffb6 01 2a fffffffb ffffffb9 ffffff84 ffffffc4 73 ffffffd6 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffb3 00 ffffffcc ffffffaa 61 02 02 fffffff0 48 0f 37 07 ffffffcd ffffff8f ffffffd1 09 ffffffda 09 6a 41 ffffffc0 ffffffd0 49 43 ffffff95 0b 43 78 02 ffffffde ffffffec 37 4f fffffffd 6e ffffffae ffffffac ffffff9a 0a ffffff94 0f 5a ffffff86 ffffffd2 65 44 3c ffffffaf 36 fffffff3 7b 31 7d ffffffb4 74 29 04 2c 5f fffffffb 37 7a 14 50 ffffffa3 37 fffffff6 ffffff8c ffffffee ffffffa7 62 5a 20 ffffff9d 61 65 45 ffffffaf ffffffa9 ffffffb2 4c 2c ffffffe2 ffffffdb ffffffc2 0c ffffff8d 38 60 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb3260 | unwrapped: a2 24 4b 01 36 be fc 55 7e 1b 60 24 73 c2 91 3b | unwrapped: cb a5 9d e0 06 7e 17 38 f2 15 57 1d aa f1 24 48 | unwrapped: 13 60 e6 e5 82 b7 a0 e1 3d 6f c9 84 79 50 2e 12 | unwrapped: 43 64 64 5b 0e 3f 00 6a eb ef 95 96 dd 22 8d 96 | unwrapped: 1b 97 71 c9 06 19 89 fd 68 c1 9f 51 f3 de ee 36 | unwrapped: 3b 91 82 e7 dc ec 59 f4 fa 5a de 93 bf a6 cb f0 | unwrapped: bd eb 02 51 cc c7 de 56 58 86 54 39 10 63 da 75 | unwrapped: c9 da 4c 31 42 07 48 60 6f 4a d9 0c b5 2b 20 48 | unwrapped: 55 74 60 5c 6e bb 5f 87 fc 36 21 c8 92 e1 41 98 | unwrapped: 49 6d f2 58 71 b6 b1 ff 80 99 df a8 8a 8f 30 44 | unwrapped: c4 2d 8b 1d a4 a5 54 d2 b2 41 88 f1 6b 4d 3f ff | unwrapped: 21 db b9 a3 d0 3f 35 12 12 3a 2b 40 88 78 92 65 | unwrapped: 87 d7 e6 b0 e2 ca 89 b2 6e 5b f2 70 27 1e bb c5 | unwrapped: e4 ae f2 fa 3b b6 eb da 73 6f 70 3e 33 48 f2 ec | unwrapped: 36 f5 3e 29 a0 70 2e 4d e9 2b c0 96 0d 15 53 a0 | unwrapped: e0 b3 78 14 aa 1e 8c 22 b6 72 5d 3b 17 41 06 a4 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 16 ffffff9a 6e ffffffdb 0b ffffffc2 ffffffe6 7a 6c ffffffc7 ffffffd9 ffffffc1 09 52 12 ffffffd8 33 ffffffbb 05 3c 41 ffffff93 46 02 ffffffe0 ffffffe8 12 ffffffbf 6a 0e ffffffd3 ffffff84 ffffffb6 2d ffffff96 fffffff9 67 ffffffc6 7b ffffffaf 00 38 4e fffffffd 5e 65 ffffffaf 79 ffffffc1 17 19 fffffff5 ffffffd3 ffffff85 ffffffb5 ffffffb3 05 24 ffffffe3 ffffffcb 31 45 56 0b ffffffb6 01 2a fffffffb ffffffb9 ffffff84 ffffffc4 73 ffffffd6 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffb3 00 ffffffcc ffffffaa 61 02 02 fffffff0 48 0f 37 07 ffffffcd ffffff8f ffffffd1 09 ffffffda 09 6a 41 ffffffc0 ffffffd0 49 43 ffffff95 0b 43 78 02 ffffffde ffffffec 37 4f fffffffd 6e ffffffae ffffffac ffffff9a 0a ffffff94 0f 5a ffffff86 ffffffd2 65 44 3c ffffffaf 36 fffffff3 7b 31 7d ffffffb4 74 29 04 2c 5f fffffffb 37 7a 14 50 ffffffa3 37 fffffff6 ffffff8c ffffffee ffffffa7 62 5a 20 ffffff9d 61 65 45 ffffffaf ffffffa9 ffffffb2 4c 2c ffffffe2 ffffffdb ffffffc2 0c ffffff8d 38 60 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2f30 | unwrapped: a2 24 4b 01 36 be fc 55 7e 1b 60 24 73 c2 91 3b | unwrapped: cb a5 9d e0 06 7e 17 38 f2 15 57 1d aa f1 24 48 | unwrapped: 13 60 e6 e5 82 b7 a0 e1 3d 6f c9 84 79 50 2e 12 | unwrapped: 43 64 64 5b 0e 3f 00 6a eb ef 95 96 dd 22 8d 96 | unwrapped: 1b 97 71 c9 06 19 89 fd 68 c1 9f 51 f3 de ee 36 | unwrapped: 3b 91 82 e7 dc ec 59 f4 fa 5a de 93 bf a6 cb f0 | unwrapped: bd eb 02 51 cc c7 de 56 58 86 54 39 10 63 da 75 | unwrapped: c9 da 4c 31 42 07 48 60 6f 4a d9 0c b5 2b 20 48 | unwrapped: 55 74 60 5c 6e bb 5f 87 fc 36 21 c8 92 e1 41 98 | unwrapped: 49 6d f2 58 71 b6 b1 ff 80 99 df a8 8a 8f 30 44 | unwrapped: c4 2d 8b 1d a4 a5 54 d2 b2 41 88 f1 6b 4d 3f ff | unwrapped: 21 db b9 a3 d0 3f 35 12 12 3a 2b 40 88 78 92 65 | unwrapped: 87 d7 e6 b0 e2 ca 89 b2 6e 5b f2 70 27 1e bb c5 | unwrapped: e4 ae f2 fa 3b b6 eb da 73 6f 70 3e 33 48 f2 ec | unwrapped: 36 f5 3e 29 a0 70 2e 4d e9 2b c0 96 0d 15 53 a0 | unwrapped: e0 b3 78 14 aa 1e 8c 22 b6 72 5d 3b 17 41 06 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4af8 (length 4) | de 18 32 a1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4ad8 (length 4) | 33 ab d7 36 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c000c30 (length 32) | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c000c30 (length 32) | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84003750 (length 32) | 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84003750 (length 32) | 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 20) | 25 be 09 96 9e ec 66 ad 38 6f c1 47 50 63 44 a2 | 47 9e 01 4e | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b94002100 (length 20) | d9 85 f9 82 d6 67 cb 77 37 22 16 e3 73 34 f3 0e | 29 74 2f 42 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadb60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 20) | 25 be 09 96 9e ec 66 ad 38 6f c1 47 50 63 44 a2 | 47 9e 01 4e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94002100 (length 20) | d9 85 f9 82 d6 67 cb 77 37 22 16 e3 73 34 f3 0e | 29 74 2f 42 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 16 ffffff9a 6e ffffffdb 0b ffffffc2 ffffffe6 7a 6c ffffffc7 ffffffd9 ffffffc1 09 52 12 ffffffd8 33 ffffffbb 05 3c 41 ffffff93 46 02 ffffffe0 ffffffe8 12 ffffffbf 6a 0e ffffffd3 ffffff84 ffffffb6 2d ffffff96 fffffff9 67 ffffffc6 7b ffffffaf 00 38 4e fffffffd 5e 65 ffffffaf 79 ffffffc1 17 19 fffffff5 ffffffd3 ffffff85 ffffffb5 ffffffb3 05 24 ffffffe3 ffffffcb 31 45 56 0b ffffffb6 01 2a fffffffb ffffffb9 ffffff84 ffffffc4 73 ffffffd6 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffb3 00 ffffffcc ffffffaa 61 02 02 fffffff0 48 0f 37 07 ffffffcd ffffff8f ffffffd1 09 ffffffda 09 6a 41 ffffffc0 ffffffd0 49 43 ffffff95 0b 43 78 02 ffffffde ffffffec 37 4f fffffffd 6e ffffffae ffffffac ffffff9a 0a ffffff94 0f 5a ffffff86 ffffffd2 65 44 3c ffffffaf 36 fffffff3 7b 31 7d ffffffb4 74 29 04 2c 5f fffffffb 37 7a 14 50 ffffffa3 37 fffffff6 ffffff8c ffffffee ffffffa7 62 5a 20 ffffff9d 61 65 45 ffffffaf ffffffa9 ffffffb2 4c 2c ffffffe2 ffffffdb ffffffc2 0c ffffff8d 38 60 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2e20 | unwrapped: a2 24 4b 01 36 be fc 55 7e 1b 60 24 73 c2 91 3b | unwrapped: cb a5 9d e0 06 7e 17 38 f2 15 57 1d aa f1 24 48 | unwrapped: 13 60 e6 e5 82 b7 a0 e1 3d 6f c9 84 79 50 2e 12 | unwrapped: 43 64 64 5b 0e 3f 00 6a eb ef 95 96 dd 22 8d 96 | unwrapped: 1b 97 71 c9 06 19 89 fd 68 c1 9f 51 f3 de ee 36 | unwrapped: 3b 91 82 e7 dc ec 59 f4 fa 5a de 93 bf a6 cb f0 | unwrapped: bd eb 02 51 cc c7 de 56 58 86 54 39 10 63 da 75 | unwrapped: c9 da 4c 31 42 07 48 60 6f 4a d9 0c b5 2b 20 48 | unwrapped: 55 74 60 5c 6e bb 5f 87 fc 36 21 c8 92 e1 41 98 | unwrapped: 49 6d f2 58 71 b6 b1 ff 80 99 df a8 8a 8f 30 44 | unwrapped: c4 2d 8b 1d a4 a5 54 d2 b2 41 88 f1 6b 4d 3f ff | unwrapped: 21 db b9 a3 d0 3f 35 12 12 3a 2b 40 88 78 92 65 | unwrapped: 87 d7 e6 b0 e2 ca 89 b2 6e 5b f2 70 27 1e bb c5 | unwrapped: e4 ae f2 fa 3b b6 eb da 73 6f 70 3e 33 48 f2 ec | unwrapped: 36 f5 3e 29 a0 70 2e 4d e9 2b c0 96 0d 15 53 a0 | unwrapped: e0 b3 78 14 aa 1e 8c 22 b6 72 5d 3b 17 41 06 a4 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 16 ffffff9a 6e ffffffdb 0b ffffffc2 ffffffe6 7a 6c ffffffc7 ffffffd9 ffffffc1 09 52 12 ffffffd8 33 ffffffbb 05 3c 41 ffffff93 46 02 ffffffe0 ffffffe8 12 ffffffbf 6a 0e ffffffd3 ffffff84 ffffffb6 2d ffffff96 fffffff9 67 ffffffc6 7b ffffffaf 00 38 4e fffffffd 5e 65 ffffffaf 79 ffffffc1 17 19 fffffff5 ffffffd3 ffffff85 ffffffb5 ffffffb3 05 24 ffffffe3 ffffffcb 31 45 56 0b ffffffb6 01 2a fffffffb ffffffb9 ffffff84 ffffffc4 73 ffffffd6 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffb3 00 ffffffcc ffffffaa 61 02 02 fffffff0 48 0f 37 07 ffffffcd ffffff8f ffffffd1 09 ffffffda 09 6a 41 ffffffc0 ffffffd0 49 43 ffffff95 0b 43 78 02 ffffffde ffffffec 37 4f fffffffd 6e ffffffae ffffffac ffffff9a 0a ffffff94 0f 5a ffffff86 ffffffd2 65 44 3c ffffffaf 36 fffffff3 7b 31 7d ffffffb4 74 29 04 2c 5f fffffffb 37 7a 14 50 ffffffa3 37 fffffff6 ffffff8c ffffffee ffffffa7 62 5a 20 ffffff9d 61 65 45 ffffffaf ffffffa9 ffffffb2 4c 2c ffffffe2 ffffffdb ffffffc2 0c ffffff8d 38 60 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cae020 | unwrapped: a2 24 4b 01 36 be fc 55 7e 1b 60 24 73 c2 91 3b | unwrapped: cb a5 9d e0 06 7e 17 38 f2 15 57 1d aa f1 24 48 | unwrapped: 13 60 e6 e5 82 b7 a0 e1 3d 6f c9 84 79 50 2e 12 | unwrapped: 43 64 64 5b 0e 3f 00 6a eb ef 95 96 dd 22 8d 96 | unwrapped: 1b 97 71 c9 06 19 89 fd 68 c1 9f 51 f3 de ee 36 | unwrapped: 3b 91 82 e7 dc ec 59 f4 fa 5a de 93 bf a6 cb f0 | unwrapped: bd eb 02 51 cc c7 de 56 58 86 54 39 10 63 da 75 | unwrapped: c9 da 4c 31 42 07 48 60 6f 4a d9 0c b5 2b 20 48 | unwrapped: 55 74 60 5c 6e bb 5f 87 fc 36 21 c8 92 e1 41 98 | unwrapped: 49 6d f2 58 71 b6 b1 ff 80 99 df a8 8a 8f 30 44 | unwrapped: c4 2d 8b 1d a4 a5 54 d2 b2 41 88 f1 6b 4d 3f ff | unwrapped: 21 db b9 a3 d0 3f 35 12 12 3a 2b 40 88 78 92 65 | unwrapped: 87 d7 e6 b0 e2 ca 89 b2 6e 5b f2 70 27 1e bb c5 | unwrapped: e4 ae f2 fa 3b b6 eb da 73 6f 70 3e 33 48 f2 ec | unwrapped: 36 f5 3e 29 a0 70 2e 4d e9 2b c0 96 0d 15 53 a0 | unwrapped: e0 b3 78 14 aa 1e 8c 22 b6 72 5d 3b 17 41 06 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4af8 (length 4) | de 18 32 a1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4ad8 (length 4) | 33 ab d7 36 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c000c30 (length 32) | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c000c30 (length 32) | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84003750 (length 32) | 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84003750 (length 32) | 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b84002f44 (length 20) | 2a b3 1a 32 28 e2 a0 eb b3 96 b4 bc 9c 4b cc 74 | 06 fe f7 df | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b94002114 (length 20) | 29 05 a3 4f 5c 27 96 07 bc fd c3 66 b8 58 3f 40 | 52 63 ec cd | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x557566cb48f0 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#12 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.33abd736@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.de1832a1@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 a7 66 96 70 ce 57 82 67 be 2e 01 1b | encrypting: 88 24 ea 28 f8 69 ba e3 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 de 18 32 a1 | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 | encrypting: ca d6 c0 20 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 | encrypting: 87 89 27 7c 05 00 01 04 a4 fb 54 63 ea d1 7b 52 | encrypting: d5 ec 77 bd 92 a7 42 b8 bd 02 c7 90 8d 16 8e 3d | encrypting: 2a 79 8f 31 72 3f 56 b8 84 40 b3 52 73 70 82 31 | encrypting: 20 59 ef 33 b4 92 ed 56 2a aa 3e fd 79 2f b1 d5 | encrypting: fe fb ee 07 26 e9 1f ca 83 17 75 d2 42 ad d5 ac | encrypting: f3 2f 7e f6 e1 73 cd 0c c9 4f 49 36 14 9f b2 a9 | encrypting: 7b e6 9e 9f 5e bd 66 a6 ee bb c2 2b 5d a9 8f 81 | encrypting: ad 53 e2 97 df 90 94 8f ee 65 02 69 17 f2 80 d0 | encrypting: f6 fd dc 61 da 17 d5 6d cb 39 d5 a4 fc 44 f3 76 | encrypting: 3f cd 45 57 ce b4 70 fd d9 51 56 73 97 b0 13 aa | encrypting: cc 6c 81 3d 86 02 0c 7b 98 d3 6b 65 5f 24 df 05 | encrypting: c7 b7 3b e9 90 7b 3a ea cd 4e ab e1 32 fe 77 e0 | encrypting: 8d 99 b4 bb cc 71 4c c4 ef 0f 20 a0 bc cb 82 40 | encrypting: 89 81 7d 92 51 9d 3e 45 53 85 04 78 6a a6 8d 8c | encrypting: d3 5a f7 f7 71 3f 46 32 eb c0 cc 49 b7 83 f7 4e | encrypting: 16 28 18 60 2d 63 fe b7 c3 27 9f 81 0a a1 9b 1e | encrypting: 49 9e 5e 91 40 c6 02 90 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: 26 3e 50 9b 83 ae 1b d5 bd 2a d8 e8 e2 13 9a e6 | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 3d 3a 61 ea c9 75 e9 29 72 af 0c 9b a1 e1 46 cf | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #12 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #12: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #12 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #12) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 20 01 bc 5d 94 0e 00 00 01 bc 03 3a d8 9a | d3 c4 bd 46 5e 36 50 b6 93 78 66 80 09 89 33 cc | 3d e4 f0 2d 24 4b 1e 72 81 ce 8d 20 cc dd 04 c5 | 61 ce 57 31 c3 62 19 43 ad fd b3 aa 3e 58 68 70 | ec da 31 77 d5 1f fe 63 86 28 e5 8a 2f 56 cc 5c | f5 12 60 fb a2 53 78 ba 6a ae 47 31 45 23 c8 51 | e9 52 a2 0f 48 67 ac 32 95 67 aa e5 da c0 d9 c2 | 6a d0 3d c6 5b 43 4a ce 62 91 6f 9a 39 50 9d d0 | da 5d 25 f3 c1 07 fd 2b d3 b5 b1 7b 8e c6 88 2b | 86 3a 70 d0 7f 43 a0 a2 e1 67 94 c3 91 71 4a 4f | bb 85 da 61 43 30 91 e6 bd 63 91 50 2e d6 6a f9 | 6c b9 6c f4 6d 70 46 b7 9c bf ed 8c 66 e5 12 c9 | f9 b9 af bc f0 ed e6 5e 65 f9 52 d0 8a 8b 2a d6 | 4b 33 38 a8 f9 9b d4 3e 20 f0 65 45 8c 1e d3 17 | 83 e2 26 6f da 54 7b 35 ca 07 71 b8 19 2e 26 fd | 41 f2 d8 c4 f8 59 c9 bc ac 61 99 ac 38 65 a5 e7 | f2 9c 0a 7a 0b 2d b6 a5 26 3c ac 69 a3 6c 17 a6 | 1b ae 05 04 7f e6 77 52 61 0b ab 53 39 2a 15 b0 | d3 7f eb 6e fb 2a 50 30 9f f3 84 29 ab a5 ae ab | 1a c1 5f 84 20 71 da e8 7b b5 b0 b4 68 13 d6 63 | 63 dc 9b b3 aa a4 df 73 eb cf 1a 11 f9 e7 73 9d | a6 de 04 a1 70 05 33 26 e5 bd db d3 12 81 4b 22 | 8d 67 36 11 d5 ce 76 85 75 d4 49 af 87 6d f3 9e | e3 57 50 27 90 80 c9 a8 7c 83 db 6d c1 95 6d 5c | 1a 0b 0c 36 a6 e9 e9 5f 2b 5a 56 e8 dd f8 bd 8b | b9 d8 d1 be 9a 7a 83 8b 5d b7 60 ba 3d 3a 61 ea | c9 75 e9 29 72 af 0c 9b a1 e1 46 cf | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 size 128 | #12 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49494.2535 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #12: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x33abd736 <0xde1832a1 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #12 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #12 spent 1.77 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 | spent 0.00266 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 20 01 bc 5d 94 0e 00 00 00 3c 9a 96 aa f1 | 53 f9 a6 7a 35 bc 5a e9 35 3e bd 92 6b cf 26 c7 | b3 ad 5a 46 d4 32 6b f7 9d cd 60 1c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3160249358 (0xbc5d940e) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #12 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #12 is idle | #12 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 3d 3a 61 ea c9 75 e9 29 72 af 0c 9b a1 e1 46 cf | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 6b cf 26 c7 b3 ad 5a 46 d4 32 6b f7 9d cd 60 1c | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 20 01 bc 5d 94 0e 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | a2 a4 89 58 81 3b 1d 92 ae ef 72 80 2b cf a2 56 | d0 9e 28 bc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | bc 5d 94 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b8c000c30 (length 32) | e1 2b 8f 3a 61 7a 83 57 50 5e e1 5b 6c 66 e1 7f | 95 6a ce cd 3b ed 2e 8f 78 1b e9 c9 7b 8f d8 ff | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7f9b84003750 (length 32) | 63 f0 4c 15 ec fd d5 1d b0 8f 78 74 ca d6 c0 20 | 40 01 bf 64 f1 2d 94 e0 7c 04 e6 c5 87 89 27 7c | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | a2 a4 89 58 81 3b 1d 92 ae ef 72 80 2b cf a2 56 | d0 9e 28 bc | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | a2 a4 89 58 81 3b 1d 92 ae ef 72 80 2b cf a2 56 | d0 9e 28 bc | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #12: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #12: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #12 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x33abd736 SPI_OUT=0xde1 | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x33abd736 SPI_OUT=0xde1832a1 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x557566ca79c0,sr=0x557566ca79c0} to #12 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #11 spent 0.242 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #12 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#12) cloned from #11 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #12 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #12: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #12 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #12 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 size 128 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #12: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x33abd736 <0xde1832a1 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #12 spent 0.308 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.511 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00328 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00335 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 05 01 37 cc a9 f3 00 00 00 4c de c1 1d 3b | 64 54 98 92 c9 f8 b9 1a d6 20 ff 09 d1 7e a9 68 | c5 3b 02 a5 b9 85 82 37 0f 58 18 a7 bd e8 3c 91 | 0f 25 34 66 4f 05 4d df f4 ed b5 2c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 936159731 (0x37cca9f3) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #12; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=bc5d940e st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #11; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #11 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | current Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 37 cc a9 f3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | d4 9a 8b 4e 67 07 d5 2e a0 10 50 43 38 7f ef e0 | 0f 91 df da | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: d4 9a 8b 4e 67 07 d5 2e a0 10 50 43 38 7f ef e0 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: bd e8 3c 91 0f 25 34 66 4f 05 4d df f4 ed b5 2c | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 05 01 37 cc a9 f3 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | b0 e3 c7 53 7e 8c aa ec a1 d9 13 de b2 fc 5a 30 | 32 c0 45 e2 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 33 ab d7 36 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 37 cc a9 f3 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c0af84 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 33 ab d7 36 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | b0 e3 c7 53 7e 8c aa ec a1 d9 13 de b2 fc 5a 30 | 32 c0 45 e2 | informational HASH(1): | b0 e3 c7 53 7e 8c aa ec a1 d9 13 de b2 fc 5a 30 | 32 c0 45 e2 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 33 ab d7 36 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #11: received Delete SA(0x33abd736) payload: deleting IPsec State #12 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #12: deleting other state #12 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.186s and sending notification | child state #12: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.33abd736@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.de1832a1@192.1.2.23 "east" #12: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #12 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1512315605 (0x5a241ad5) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload de 18 32 a1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c68 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d4c (length 4) | 5a 24 1a d5 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80f4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 de 18 32 a1 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80e0 (length 20) | ae 9b 26 94 a6 7a 3a 7f 98 86 b1 94 74 73 e1 05 | 93 33 55 2f | send delete HASH(1): | ae 9b 26 94 a6 7a 3a 7f 98 86 b1 94 74 73 e1 05 | 93 33 55 2f | last Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | current Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d5c (length 4) | 5a 24 1a d5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | 11 45 bb 11 d4 8d c2 d7 1c b7 02 91 50 96 59 8e | 1b 77 0b 3b | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 ae 9b 26 94 a6 7a 3a 7f 98 86 b1 94 | encrypting: 74 73 e1 05 93 33 55 2f 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 de 18 32 a1 | IV: 11 45 bb 11 d4 8d c2 d7 1c b7 02 91 50 96 59 8e | IV: 1b 77 0b 3b | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: fd f4 ac b5 70 52 1b 8f 74 73 26 bd 5c 5a 40 b8 | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 05 01 5a 24 1a d5 00 00 00 4c b5 31 23 81 | 6c 74 5d bf 5a a4 03 14 cd c8 b4 8a 63 ec 6e ca | 38 fc e4 da 29 6a 7d 75 4d 51 f6 77 fd f4 ac b5 | 70 52 1b 8f 74 73 26 bd 5c 5a 40 b8 | state #12 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050847' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x33abd736 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050847' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x33abd736 SPI_OUT=0xde1832a1 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.33abd736@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.33abd736@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.de1832a1@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.de1832a1@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #12 in QUICK_R2 | child state #12: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b84002e70: destroyed | stop processing: state #12 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #11 | state #8 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #8 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #8: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.737s and NOT sending notification | parent state #8: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #8 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #8: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #8 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #7 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #7 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #7: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 2.239s and NOT sending notification | parent state #7: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #7 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #7: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #7 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #4 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #4 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #4: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 3.893s and NOT sending notification | parent state #4: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #4 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #4: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #4 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #3 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #3 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #3: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 4.388s and NOT sending notification | parent state #3: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #3 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #3: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #3 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #11 | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #11: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.212s and sending notification | parent state #11: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #11 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 475339610 (0x1c551b5a) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c08 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cec (length 4) | 1c 55 1b 5a | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8094 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 9e 11 42 fa | f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8080 (length 20) | 91 d1 65 9f e6 dd 6a a0 aa af 8c d9 bf 94 a6 8d | c3 99 6a ac | send delete HASH(1): | 91 d1 65 9f e6 dd 6a a0 aa af 8c d9 bf 94 a6 8d | c3 99 6a ac | last Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | current Phase 1 IV: ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb42c0 (length 16) | ca 34 e7 07 97 a4 36 7b bc 67 7e 67 85 10 8b 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cfc (length 4) | 1c 55 1b 5a | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb4240 (length 20) | e4 49 b3 20 4c e5 b4 b5 d1 85 3c 34 f0 6e b5 27 | 0c f8 79 ea | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 91 d1 65 9f e6 dd 6a a0 aa af 8c d9 | encrypting: bf 94 a6 8d c3 99 6a ac 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c | encrypting: 32 51 ad 84 | IV: e4 49 b3 20 4c e5 b4 b5 d1 85 3c 34 f0 6e b5 27 | IV: 0c f8 79 ea | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 0b ff 01 a6 89 0a 28 dd c4 6d 65 9a a1 85 fc c3 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 05 01 1c 55 1b 5a 00 00 00 5c 4f 8b 2e 8c | a4 83 b4 43 6b 22 48 12 cd 89 95 84 c8 a2 c9 fa | 7d 9c 78 16 6e 48 b5 c5 1f d5 88 dc 33 06 82 7f | 05 90 ad 84 7d 0c ba 0c 94 b4 90 75 0b ff 01 a6 | 89 0a 28 dd c4 6d 65 9a a1 85 fc c3 | state #11 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c00ac40 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #11: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001fc0: destroyed | stop processing: state #11 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.75 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00433 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00257 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | 08 10 05 01 69 53 3b 7d 00 00 00 5c df 08 3b 76 | ae ec 56 18 dc 01 ec 35 71 f3 8e c2 02 40 3e 34 | 86 f0 51 35 80 38 e1 6b fe 77 32 98 ba ad 61 d0 | 91 a6 08 0b 94 17 33 82 45 36 97 e2 01 cb c6 9b | ca 0e 19 cb 05 11 a1 55 42 de c5 68 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | responder cookie: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1767062397 (0x69533b7d) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x69533b7d | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 9e 11 42 fa f9 9d 25 7b | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | be 15 d5 0c 32 51 ad 84 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0748 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00258 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 09 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 5f 9f b8 d8 b7 29 e5 76 | fa ba 4d 5f c5 1b ff 6e ac 35 8e a4 75 ac 9a 93 | creating state object #13 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #13 in UNDEFINED | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp started | #13 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #13: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 "east" #13: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #13 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #13: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 size 128 "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.621 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00253 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | 14 00 00 24 ac 7a 66 e0 82 5b f5 71 3b 74 d6 6b | 46 5b 43 7a 2b 8d c2 8f a6 ad 6e 94 7d c5 c4 ad | 6a 95 f9 f2 14 00 00 18 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 | 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 9b 04 c4 94 00 00 00 18 | dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | 5a b3 a0 b1 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #13 is idle | #13 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | 9b 04 c4 94 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | natd_hash: rcookie= 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | natd_hash: hash= 9b 04 c4 94 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | 5a b3 a0 b1 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | natd_hash: rcookie= 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | natd_hash: hash= 5a b3 a0 b1 | expected NAT-D(me): 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | expected NAT-D(me): 9b 04 c4 94 | expected NAT-D(him): | dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | 5a b3 a0 b1 | received NAT-D: 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | received NAT-D: 9b 04 c4 94 | received NAT-D: dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | received NAT-D: 5a b3 a0 b1 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 13 for state #13 | state #13 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | crypto helper 1 resuming | suspending state #13 and saving MD | #13 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 13 for state #13 | #13 spent 0.134 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 13 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | spent 0.24 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001fc0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b7c001fc0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | Generated nonce: 8e 70 36 58 a1 bf 7f 92 58 40 0c cb 3f df 95 58 | Generated nonce: 8a 5b 52 e1 02 5a 1e 2e 5b 80 f5 4c c8 eb 9b 59 | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 13 time elapsed 0.000714 seconds | (#13) spent 0.711 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 13: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 13 for state #13 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #13 | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 13 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #13: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001fc0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #13 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | keyex value 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | keyex value e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | keyex value 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | keyex value 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | keyex value d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | keyex value d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | keyex value 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | keyex value 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | keyex value 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | keyex value e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | keyex value 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | keyex value 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | keyex value 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | keyex value 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | keyex value 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 8e 70 36 58 a1 bf 7f 92 58 40 0c cb 3f df 95 58 | Nr 8a 5b 52 e1 02 5a 1e 2e 5b 80 f5 4c c8 eb 9b 59 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | 5a b3 a0 b1 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | natd_hash: rcookie= 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | natd_hash: hash= 5a b3 a0 b1 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c | NAT-D 5a b3 a0 b1 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | 9b 04 c4 94 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | natd_hash: rcookie= 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | natd_hash: hash= 9b 04 c4 94 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | NAT-D 9b 04 c4 94 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001fc0: transferring ownership from state #13 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 14 for state #13 | state #13 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 size 128 | #13 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 14 for state #13 | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #13 is idle; has background offloaded task | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 14 | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | peer's g: cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | peer's g: 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | peer's g: 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | peer's g: 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | peer's g: 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | peer's g: e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | peer's g: 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | peer's g: 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | peer's g: 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | peer's g: 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | peer's g: 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | peer's g: cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | peer's g: 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | peer's g: 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | peer's g: 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | peer's g: b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | parent state #13: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #13 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | 14 00 00 24 8e 70 36 58 a1 bf 7f 92 58 40 0c cb | 3f df 95 58 8a 5b 52 e1 02 5a 1e 2e 5b 80 f5 4c | c8 eb 9b 59 14 00 00 18 dc df 97 0d 81 2d a1 03 | 75 b9 a6 cb fb 77 a7 2c 5a b3 a0 b1 00 00 00 18 | 14 23 0e b7 27 3e fb c9 7a 1a fa 8a 40 40 4c 44 | 9b 04 c4 94 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 size 128 | #13 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49495.02247 "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #13 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #13 spent 0.36 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001fc0: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c98060 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb3f90 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b995886a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99588688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b80000d60 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb3fb4 (length 32) | ac 7a 66 e0 82 5b f5 71 3b 74 d6 6b 46 5b 43 7a | 2b 8d c2 8f a6 ad 6e 94 7d c5 c4 ad 6a 95 f9 f2 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb3fd4 (length 32) | 8e 70 36 58 a1 bf 7f 92 58 40 0c cb 3f df 95 58 | 8a 5b 52 e1 02 5a 1e 2e 5b 80 f5 4c c8 eb 9b 59 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b995886c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b995886a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b995886b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b80001570 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1722252544: 50 5c ffffff84 ffffffbf fffffffc 7e ffffffa2 0a 6b 03 ffffffb1 3a ffffff9c ffffffce ffffffcc ffffffc4 fffffffc ffffffd7 ffffffc6 ffffffe6 ffffffa0 5a ffffffc0 ffffffcb 5f ffffff85 ffffff9c 10 fffffff4 fffffffd ffffff83 73 58 1d ffffff90 7a 34 ffffffd5 ffffffdd ffffffe9 56 ffffffd4 77 21 02 7e 16 38 ffffff87 07 4a ffffffe9 7e 7a 4c 46 ffffff99 28 64 54 70 ffffffde 4a 43 ffffffc4 1e 2a 28 50 ffffff8c ffffffa3 ffffffda ffffffdf 4a 2f 13 ffffffec 54 2b ffffffea 05 2a ffffffe5 ffffff86 ffffffdf 03 ffffffb8 2d fffffffa 77 ffffffae 7c ffffff9d 41 fffffff8 ffffffc1 ffffff8d 37 ffffffa3 23 ffffff80 ffffffd1 ffffff97 ffffffcb fffffffa ffffff8d ffffffea 10 ffffffa7 ffffffdd ffffffcb ffffffd1 52 ffffffd4 fffffff7 ffffffae 4b ffffffb0 ffffff9b 7a 30 5b ffffffea fffffff5 ffffffb7 ffffffa0 ffffffda ffffffe5 38 3e 71 1a ffffff9f ffffffdc 16 07 0a ffffffd5 ffffffcd 15 1b 71 40 74 61 ffffff8a ffffff86 21 04 ffffffdf 7a ffffff95 54 ffffffd3 72 fffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b800045f0 | unwrapped: cb 93 ac 17 9e 1a ee a4 2c 5d 40 23 87 0f e8 a7 | unwrapped: 60 b3 84 04 c4 9b 33 dc 92 6d fa 6e 33 57 00 06 | unwrapped: 59 94 44 4e 79 ba 34 d4 c6 c6 b7 a7 fb ab d3 15 | unwrapped: 78 74 b4 c1 23 c9 ea 86 e8 39 c5 7f b4 3b 55 1c | unwrapped: 4e df 74 99 dc d5 4e 68 30 b0 f2 82 08 f4 5e e8 | unwrapped: 4d dd 80 37 57 0b 1b e8 df ff ce d4 7a 28 89 10 | unwrapped: 1f 36 9e f3 ec 6f 18 f6 77 96 da 63 7f 46 0b 4f | unwrapped: 2d 01 a0 7e c1 d8 86 5e a3 f4 ba 6c e5 7f 3a 88 | unwrapped: 48 53 60 b9 25 5a ae 21 74 95 89 a4 da 94 88 5a | unwrapped: 92 d3 46 d4 35 8b 1b 85 35 f2 a1 56 e1 74 f6 0a | unwrapped: 25 59 76 87 3f 32 5e 54 97 8a b3 7f 78 69 9a e1 | unwrapped: dc f3 73 50 c5 63 6c e8 f4 80 7e f4 14 0a 52 1e | unwrapped: 17 71 fa f0 72 62 5a 9d bc 4a ec 23 72 cb 3a eb | unwrapped: 7e 1f 50 a9 18 5a ad 04 24 8b 81 41 c9 84 d4 1a | unwrapped: aa c2 d8 b5 c6 37 6a cd 0a a5 09 fe d5 0a e1 42 | unwrapped: 75 a5 c4 dd 5d 7c a9 b8 14 e6 ae af a5 59 e4 a5 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b995886c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b995886a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99588698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b800010c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1722252576: ffffff96 ffffffd2 ffffff80 55 ffffff91 ffffffd3 40 ffffffd2 ffffffdc ffffffcb ffffffa1 fffffffb ffffffe3 ffffffba fffffffa 62 0c ffffff95 fffffffd ffffffe8 ffffff84 13 5d 29 0a 1f 72 7e 6a ffffff93 ffffffc6 0c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b80004b70 | unwrapped: ef 8b c3 83 f5 2a bf a6 91 16 25 a7 58 b5 00 0c | unwrapped: 62 20 8d 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1722252576: 50 5c ffffff84 ffffffbf fffffffc 7e ffffffa2 0a 6b 03 ffffffb1 3a ffffff9c ffffffce ffffffcc ffffffc4 fffffffc ffffffd7 ffffffc6 ffffffe6 ffffffa0 5a ffffffc0 ffffffcb 5f ffffff85 ffffff9c 10 fffffff4 fffffffd ffffff83 73 58 1d ffffff90 7a 34 ffffffd5 ffffffdd ffffffe9 56 ffffffd4 77 21 02 7e 16 38 ffffff87 07 4a ffffffe9 7e 7a 4c 46 ffffff99 28 64 54 70 ffffffde 4a 43 ffffffc4 1e 2a 28 50 ffffff8c ffffffa3 ffffffda ffffffdf 4a 2f 13 ffffffec 54 2b ffffffea 05 2a ffffffe5 ffffff86 ffffffdf 03 ffffffb8 2d fffffffa 77 ffffffae 7c ffffff9d 41 fffffff8 ffffffc1 ffffff8d 37 ffffffa3 23 ffffff80 ffffffd1 ffffff97 ffffffcb fffffffa ffffff8d ffffffea 10 ffffffa7 ffffffdd ffffffcb ffffffd1 52 ffffffd4 fffffff7 ffffffae 4b ffffffb0 ffffff9b 7a 30 5b ffffffea fffffff5 ffffffb7 ffffffa0 ffffffda ffffffe5 38 3e 71 1a ffffff9f ffffffdc 16 07 0a ffffffd5 ffffffcd 15 1b 71 40 74 61 ffffff8a ffffff86 21 04 ffffffdf 7a ffffff95 54 ffffffd3 72 fffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b80001890 | unwrapped: cb 93 ac 17 9e 1a ee a4 2c 5d 40 23 87 0f e8 a7 | unwrapped: 60 b3 84 04 c4 9b 33 dc 92 6d fa 6e 33 57 00 06 | unwrapped: 59 94 44 4e 79 ba 34 d4 c6 c6 b7 a7 fb ab d3 15 | unwrapped: 78 74 b4 c1 23 c9 ea 86 e8 39 c5 7f b4 3b 55 1c | unwrapped: 4e df 74 99 dc d5 4e 68 30 b0 f2 82 08 f4 5e e8 | unwrapped: 4d dd 80 37 57 0b 1b e8 df ff ce d4 7a 28 89 10 | unwrapped: 1f 36 9e f3 ec 6f 18 f6 77 96 da 63 7f 46 0b 4f | unwrapped: 2d 01 a0 7e c1 d8 86 5e a3 f4 ba 6c e5 7f 3a 88 | unwrapped: 48 53 60 b9 25 5a ae 21 74 95 89 a4 da 94 88 5a | unwrapped: 92 d3 46 d4 35 8b 1b 85 35 f2 a1 56 e1 74 f6 0a | unwrapped: 25 59 76 87 3f 32 5e 54 97 8a b3 7f 78 69 9a e1 | unwrapped: dc f3 73 50 c5 63 6c e8 f4 80 7e f4 14 0a 52 1e | unwrapped: 17 71 fa f0 72 62 5a 9d bc 4a ec 23 72 cb 3a eb | unwrapped: 7e 1f 50 a9 18 5a ad 04 24 8b 81 41 c9 84 d4 1a | unwrapped: aa c2 d8 b5 c6 37 6a cd 0a a5 09 fe d5 0a e1 42 | unwrapped: 75 a5 c4 dd 5d 7c a9 b8 14 e6 ae af a5 59 e4 a5 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b995886a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99588688 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b995886a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b80003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b800013a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1722252560: ffffffad 60 ffffffe6 14 32 ffffffcb ffffffc5 ffffff81 77 ffffffbc ffffffb6 ffffffa3 ffffffe4 22 5c 26 ffffffda 2d ffffffcc 22 ffffff87 41 ffffff85 31 4f 06 ffffffa7 ffffffa3 3c 40 60 ffffffaa | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b80002100 | unwrapped: 94 c3 fc b0 7d cc 29 59 37 d8 b5 8d 81 0f e0 9b | unwrapped: 2a f3 1a 5e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1722252560: 50 5c ffffff84 ffffffbf fffffffc 7e ffffffa2 0a 6b 03 ffffffb1 3a ffffff9c ffffffce ffffffcc ffffffc4 fffffffc ffffffd7 ffffffc6 ffffffe6 ffffffa0 5a ffffffc0 ffffffcb 5f ffffff85 ffffff9c 10 fffffff4 fffffffd ffffff83 73 58 1d ffffff90 7a 34 ffffffd5 ffffffdd ffffffe9 56 ffffffd4 77 21 02 7e 16 38 ffffff87 07 4a ffffffe9 7e 7a 4c 46 ffffff99 28 64 54 70 ffffffde 4a 43 ffffffc4 1e 2a 28 50 ffffff8c ffffffa3 ffffffda ffffffdf 4a 2f 13 ffffffec 54 2b ffffffea 05 2a ffffffe5 ffffff86 ffffffdf 03 ffffffb8 2d fffffffa 77 ffffffae 7c ffffff9d 41 fffffff8 ffffffc1 ffffff8d 37 ffffffa3 23 ffffff80 ffffffd1 ffffff97 ffffffcb fffffffa ffffff8d ffffffea 10 ffffffa7 ffffffdd ffffffcb ffffffd1 52 ffffffd4 fffffff7 ffffffae 4b ffffffb0 ffffff9b 7a 30 5b ffffffea fffffff5 ffffffb7 ffffffa0 ffffffda ffffffe5 38 3e 71 1a ffffff9f ffffffdc 16 07 0a ffffffd5 ffffffcd 15 1b 71 40 74 61 ffffff8a ffffff86 21 04 ffffffdf 7a ffffff95 54 ffffffd3 72 fffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b80001780 | unwrapped: cb 93 ac 17 9e 1a ee a4 2c 5d 40 23 87 0f e8 a7 | unwrapped: 60 b3 84 04 c4 9b 33 dc 92 6d fa 6e 33 57 00 06 | unwrapped: 59 94 44 4e 79 ba 34 d4 c6 c6 b7 a7 fb ab d3 15 | unwrapped: 78 74 b4 c1 23 c9 ea 86 e8 39 c5 7f b4 3b 55 1c | unwrapped: 4e df 74 99 dc d5 4e 68 30 b0 f2 82 08 f4 5e e8 | unwrapped: 4d dd 80 37 57 0b 1b e8 df ff ce d4 7a 28 89 10 | unwrapped: 1f 36 9e f3 ec 6f 18 f6 77 96 da 63 7f 46 0b 4f | unwrapped: 2d 01 a0 7e c1 d8 86 5e a3 f4 ba 6c e5 7f 3a 88 | unwrapped: 48 53 60 b9 25 5a ae 21 74 95 89 a4 da 94 88 5a | unwrapped: 92 d3 46 d4 35 8b 1b 85 35 f2 a1 56 e1 74 f6 0a | unwrapped: 25 59 76 87 3f 32 5e 54 97 8a b3 7f 78 69 9a e1 | unwrapped: dc f3 73 50 c5 63 6c e8 f4 80 7e f4 14 0a 52 1e | unwrapped: 17 71 fa f0 72 62 5a 9d bc 4a ec 23 72 cb 3a eb | unwrapped: 7e 1f 50 a9 18 5a ad 04 24 8b 81 41 c9 84 d4 1a | unwrapped: aa c2 d8 b5 c6 37 6a cd 0a a5 09 fe d5 0a e1 42 | unwrapped: 75 a5 c4 dd 5d 7c a9 b8 14 e6 ae af a5 59 e4 a5 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b995886b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b99588698 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b995886f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_a 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_e 0x557566c999c0, enc_key 0x557566c8d6a0 | DH_i: cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | DH_i: 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | DH_i: 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | DH_i: 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | DH_i: 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | DH_i: e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | DH_i: 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | DH_i: 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | DH_i: 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | DH_i: 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | DH_i: 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | DH_i: cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | DH_i: 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | DH_i: 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | DH_i: 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | DH_i: b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | DH_r: 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | DH_r: 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | DH_r: e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | DH_r: 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | DH_r: 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | DH_r: d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | DH_r: d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | DH_r: 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | DH_r: 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | DH_r: 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | DH_r: e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | DH_r: 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | DH_r: 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | DH_r: 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | DH_r: 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | DH_r: 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb3ff4 (length 256) | cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb40f4 (length 256) | 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b80001640 (length 20) | 03 fa ab 5c 4a 3d 0f 4d bd da 40 c6 fe a1 fb e6 | eb b4 85 c9 | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 14 time elapsed 0.002083 seconds | (#13) spent 2.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 14: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 14 for state #13 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800013c0 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #13 | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 14 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #13: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001fc0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #13 | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #13 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #13 spent 0.0208 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800013c0 | spent 0.00217 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 33 dc b4 bf | 65 6d f9 7e f9 57 2a f9 3b 25 f0 2a 16 1b f0 c9 | 17 17 e8 95 b0 7f a4 39 cb ec 71 e2 92 e1 f5 32 | 3b 54 2c f5 03 36 28 c1 96 3f 14 41 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 03 fa ab 5c 4a 3d 0f 4d bd da 40 c6 fe a1 fb e6 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 92 e1 f5 32 3b 54 2c f5 03 36 28 c1 96 3f 14 41 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 27 2f a6 d3 | 22 e7 7f bf aa 62 e6 4c c8 7a 8b 35 03 fe cd f9 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #13: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b840043c0 (length 256) | cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c003bd0 (length 256) | 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566c06480 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | 27 2f a6 d3 22 e7 7f bf aa 62 e6 4c c8 7a 8b 35 | 03 fe cd f9 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b80001640 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c003bd0 (length 256) | 32 9b 4a 48 05 5d 5a 0b 59 6a 96 a0 d4 c0 1a 26 | 4e 34 f1 da b7 d4 9c f9 23 60 4a 86 2c 2e a1 c9 | e8 81 c7 cd 8c b5 4b f7 58 ea b7 56 7b 07 a0 41 | 74 2e 87 73 00 16 bd e2 cb ea 79 c8 4a b7 b5 26 | 2f 50 79 ae 88 45 18 77 f3 c8 c0 ee 0a 81 7c f4 | d5 a6 de ee 47 9e 56 85 83 cc 76 1c 02 67 4a 04 | d9 d5 4a 28 10 d4 cb 66 88 16 27 77 e1 40 ce f0 | 85 0f 42 c9 72 77 80 3f 97 af c8 c8 d0 87 1f ea | 38 a0 55 43 18 5f b1 68 0e a7 26 a8 c8 6d 23 3a | 3d 06 b5 ac 94 37 e1 f9 c0 39 a2 82 8b fb db 0d | e5 9d ad 0b 91 2b 95 ec 42 d2 b7 21 91 87 f9 89 | 61 3c 29 5f d8 0b 5f 45 bc 05 3d e6 08 a0 65 26 | 85 5f f7 84 75 d6 29 93 5f 32 d9 30 f7 76 28 87 | 3d cb 9d 72 cb d6 a3 1b 44 73 a9 90 ea 4f c3 c3 | 2e d7 03 7b 11 c9 62 e1 0c a0 08 40 a1 53 bd 75 | 4c 50 7e ad 96 09 c1 11 77 3a 23 7a 94 1d a4 96 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b840043c0 (length 256) | cf 0d 08 8c 8a 5b 90 cc 64 b7 f2 c9 4e e1 95 18 | 5f 8e a1 77 34 6f 5b 86 b3 16 de 5d 81 2b 48 57 | 4a 15 e5 44 b2 86 26 7b 54 e1 de 5e 9b 04 d0 aa | 12 66 4f a2 20 57 8d 2d ca da d4 ef 6b 42 eb 63 | 68 dc fe 06 f9 39 b6 c0 20 b7 11 3f ae 56 2b a1 | e3 b4 65 13 d4 36 a4 d6 56 f0 74 d1 09 7d 14 2d | 1c 2d 8c d5 ed 1e 52 2b 79 93 df 0a 97 4d 7c b7 | 26 50 0e 9f 40 19 08 8e 5e ff 12 b4 ca 65 4d a4 | 5f 3e e2 3f 3b e6 e9 09 17 34 c6 1a 40 b2 c5 0d | 17 f4 8c c1 b6 a1 1c c7 13 c7 a6 df 05 d1 92 45 | 25 37 e1 ea dd 7a 69 8e ab ea 22 8e 6a 19 45 7e | cf 0e 18 d5 cb f4 60 89 90 56 d7 cd ae 7a 24 f4 | 66 9b 75 dc 3a 4b 66 d0 57 ab 90 8a cc 28 3b b2 | 1c d5 22 13 6a c2 64 13 69 08 73 eb fc 74 4b 8b | 07 c2 80 08 99 1d ad eb 9a 20 e0 ab 62 e7 28 32 | b6 0b 2b 99 16 21 f6 13 ba 59 fd 01 0b b5 64 7a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | af 12 69 57 53 c9 c3 7a 16 83 04 77 17 7e 8b e5 | 76 31 ac 5b | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R af 12 69 57 53 c9 c3 7a 16 83 04 77 17 7e 8b e5 | HASH_R 76 31 ac 5b | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: af 12 69 57 53 c9 c3 7a 16 83 04 77 17 7e 8b e5 | encrypting: 76 31 ac 5b | IV: 92 e1 f5 32 3b 54 2c f5 03 36 28 c1 96 3f 14 41 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #13 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #13: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #13 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #13 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 94 d3 c2 5c | 3d 63 0b 76 93 2a a3 2c 73 b3 a5 66 1d 45 f3 39 | 47 1d 35 bc 04 9f a4 a4 c7 2c e1 65 98 1e c3 9b | 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 size 128 | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #13 | #13 spent 0.618 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.752 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00304 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 08 10 20 01 a4 f0 b3 5c 00 00 01 bc 10 9f 95 86 | 15 20 9f 36 d3 4c 31 91 0b 46 8d 55 60 bf 9f d2 | 98 93 ca c1 90 a8 ee 07 75 18 80 eb ce d3 f2 b6 | a8 55 be 60 b5 5f 99 ee 19 02 96 36 1e b8 fb 25 | cb 67 b2 dc 86 59 e0 e2 d1 15 30 d4 45 af de b5 | a8 fd c6 37 eb 27 07 7f bf b5 d5 29 cf d7 80 e7 | e3 7f 91 dc 57 02 ec 1c e6 b4 e2 c0 72 fc 4b 6d | 8b 4f 6e 5c 79 e7 6a 76 69 8a 22 6a f6 94 02 d6 | 8f bf ed a2 aa 67 68 f9 0e 4e df ac a1 e0 be 69 | 64 3d 6e 0d e0 65 e3 7f 86 5d 55 b8 b9 5b 29 ff | c8 43 ae cd ec 63 01 0e 14 60 50 3f d5 7e 08 b9 | e8 f3 87 ed 1b f8 08 9f 61 4e 70 48 92 3e 85 76 | fb ac 4c 2c d7 0c a0 dd e5 1c 5a 9a 92 6b c8 cd | b8 c2 78 6f 1b 7a 87 76 2d 59 5f 4d d9 a3 d9 66 | 58 b3 90 fa 2a 08 a7 9e 92 22 a3 06 34 ec 3b 4a | 3f 56 20 c5 a3 69 66 e3 00 9f 12 79 11 bd 9a 4e | db 35 07 e9 a7 80 90 4b d7 f9 28 27 0a c1 18 8a | 72 b6 fb e3 e7 a3 59 75 41 f8 28 d5 20 20 8f ba | 08 69 98 e2 73 7c 3c 7b 82 94 1b 7b eb 14 0f b5 | 24 1e c2 ab 39 53 9a 96 c2 40 7d f1 37 22 aa ec | 29 58 d3 c7 20 b7 3b 8e 6d 95 09 e4 0d de ed 41 | 30 c8 da 81 cc d9 b4 5b 91 93 35 b2 13 c7 86 cc | db 5c d7 d6 2f 8a 9b 6f fe 61 0f b1 ac 3e 1b 38 | b9 f3 30 9b 48 20 4f 89 fe 12 d4 a5 fc 79 e5 65 | b5 f0 a9 90 e7 13 d2 c5 03 3f 36 20 8e eb 4a 46 | fc 73 d5 83 f4 4b 91 0f 4c 13 0c 47 e3 b9 b5 bd | 88 26 65 06 b1 47 92 72 40 bc db 68 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2767237980 (0xa4f0b35c) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | current Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | a4 f0 b3 5c | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 9e 95 b0 9f e1 18 4c 0d a7 69 1e d5 6f 4b 29 fe | f6 56 18 2e | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 9e 95 b0 9f e1 18 4c 0d a7 69 1e d5 6f 4b 29 fe | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: e3 b9 b5 bd 88 26 65 06 b1 47 92 72 40 bc db 68 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 08 10 20 01 a4 f0 b3 5c 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 7a 65 98 f0 dc 91 fc c3 4e ed 6b fa 2a 3e 80 0d | 63 ef 2f e8 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 b5 84 1e b1 00 00 00 1c | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 46 70 4a 56 | 7b 71 aa 0f 56 8c 3d 9a 99 56 c0 dc c0 4b b7 70 | 03 c1 57 68 63 1d 86 71 f5 fe 6a d6 05 00 01 04 | 88 1a fc 69 66 17 5b 90 03 2c e0 34 9e 32 4c 46 | 7f 7d a5 bf 97 e5 5b 37 8f c1 ec 0a 9a c5 5c b3 | 25 c7 da b4 b7 d5 7f bf 38 8a 11 48 9a e6 9b 40 | bc 10 03 49 88 78 a3 fe 6b 43 7a 76 0f c3 37 87 | 6c da 16 33 f3 ba 08 6e 99 0c 2d 1b 71 59 3b c0 | bf bb af d3 7a c8 4b f9 17 0b 1c 63 d7 16 dd 23 | 0a df 9e 7c b5 3f 04 92 a6 40 ae 27 d1 37 ff 9e | f0 c6 07 84 14 7d 1d 09 10 2c 39 e8 17 2a 78 51 | df 9a 46 8e af bd ff ee 9b bc 07 63 f6 7d 52 8a | 71 79 7c a8 4e 43 dd f3 a2 37 5a ec f4 c3 2c ad | 95 11 c5 e4 d9 70 a2 30 98 21 b9 94 19 f3 78 d3 | 8d 49 10 1a c8 1b a6 e3 4e de 2e 64 12 d1 d6 80 | 70 d6 31 22 6c d7 42 e7 25 af 60 75 ae ff 0e 10 | 31 00 a4 f4 b6 a3 55 21 98 dd 98 12 e3 8e f1 3d | 6e 0c 39 0b aa 6f 40 64 42 1b f3 b1 cf 78 47 f3 | 21 db ca f6 e5 05 6d a2 79 5b fd c3 7b 47 3c 3d | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | a4 f0 b3 5c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cab554 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 b5 84 1e b1 00 00 00 1c 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 46 70 4a 56 7b 71 aa 0f | 56 8c 3d 9a 99 56 c0 dc c0 4b b7 70 03 c1 57 68 | 63 1d 86 71 f5 fe 6a d6 05 00 01 04 88 1a fc 69 | 66 17 5b 90 03 2c e0 34 9e 32 4c 46 7f 7d a5 bf | 97 e5 5b 37 8f c1 ec 0a 9a c5 5c b3 25 c7 da b4 | b7 d5 7f bf 38 8a 11 48 9a e6 9b 40 bc 10 03 49 | 88 78 a3 fe 6b 43 7a 76 0f c3 37 87 6c da 16 33 | f3 ba 08 6e 99 0c 2d 1b 71 59 3b c0 bf bb af d3 | 7a c8 4b f9 17 0b 1c 63 d7 16 dd 23 0a df 9e 7c | b5 3f 04 92 a6 40 ae 27 d1 37 ff 9e f0 c6 07 84 | 14 7d 1d 09 10 2c 39 e8 17 2a 78 51 df 9a 46 8e | af bd ff ee 9b bc 07 63 f6 7d 52 8a 71 79 7c a8 | 4e 43 dd f3 a2 37 5a ec f4 c3 2c ad 95 11 c5 e4 | d9 70 a2 30 98 21 b9 94 19 f3 78 d3 8d 49 10 1a | c8 1b a6 e3 4e de 2e 64 12 d1 d6 80 70 d6 31 22 | 6c d7 42 e7 25 af 60 75 ae ff 0e 10 31 00 a4 f4 | b6 a3 55 21 98 dd 98 12 e3 8e f1 3d 6e 0c 39 0b | aa 6f 40 64 42 1b f3 b1 cf 78 47 f3 21 db ca f6 | e5 05 6d a2 79 5b fd c3 7b 47 3c 3d 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 7a 65 98 f0 dc 91 fc c3 4e ed 6b fa 2a 3e 80 0d | 63 ef 2f e8 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 7a 65 98 f0 dc 91 fc c3 4e ed 6b fa 2a 3e 80 0d | 63 ef 2f e8 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #13: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #14 at 0x557566ca9800 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #14 in UNDEFINED | pstats #14 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #13 "east" as #14 for IPSEC SA | #14 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #13.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #14: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI b5 84 1e b1 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 "east" #14: IPsec encryption transform AES_CBC did not specify required KEY_LENGTH attribute | ignoring ESP proposal with NULLed or unknown encryption "east" #14: no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #14 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #14: sending encrypted notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2703582776 (0xa1256638) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9958 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a3c (length 4) | a1 25 66 38 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9cf4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9ce0 (length 20) | a0 da 44 1d 5f 37 79 3a f5 be 92 1c 2d 04 1f 73 | c3 f4 d7 d6 | send notification HASH(1): | a0 da 44 1d 5f 37 79 3a f5 be 92 1c 2d 04 1f 73 | c3 f4 d7 d6 | last Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | current Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a4c (length 4) | a1 25 66 38 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 45 8a 3f 82 4b 7b 56 a5 55 f9 0a 20 fb b3 80 d7 | cc 14 06 96 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 a0 da 44 1d 5f 37 79 3a f5 be 92 1c | encrypting: 2d 04 1f 73 c3 f4 d7 d6 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0e | IV: 45 8a 3f 82 4b 7b 56 a5 55 f9 0a 20 fb b3 80 d7 | IV: cc 14 06 96 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: a7 99 40 4e 02 44 a4 a1 1d fb 17 65 f2 27 02 cc | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #14) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 08 10 05 01 a1 25 66 38 00 00 00 4c 26 b6 f4 5a | 3b 8f 9a 38 5f ef 4e c0 41 94 f2 44 4e 24 42 86 | cc 13 35 32 10 cb 11 17 99 07 83 d2 a7 99 40 4e | 02 44 a4 a1 1d fb 17 65 f2 27 02 cc | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | pstats #14 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #14: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #14: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #14: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #14 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #14: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #14 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #13 spent 0.534 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.924 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00287 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 08 10 05 01 43 e0 77 47 00 00 00 5c 28 a7 f2 ef | e5 78 ac 53 04 72 38 73 93 34 b9 55 7b c1 3b ed | 38 3c d1 a2 1c 6b b5 39 3e 0a 19 f5 b5 cb 71 b1 | c7 78 c5 50 ca 2b 54 1d b3 77 f9 d1 96 57 b1 9d | 7c 3a 79 38 3c 1e ea 6f d4 ad 41 40 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1138784071 (0x43e07747) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #13; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #13 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | current Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 43 e0 77 47 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | f9 67 97 c6 cc 1f 70 a4 4b 1e a8 db e8 ca bc 96 | 35 b0 cc 6a | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: f9 67 97 c6 cc 1f 70 a4 4b 1e a8 db e8 ca bc 96 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 96 57 b1 9d 7c 3a 79 38 3c 1e ea 6f d4 ad 41 40 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 08 10 05 01 43 e0 77 47 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | 5e 04 ce 12 10 dd 9e a7 fb 72 a4 3a 0b ac d2 36 | 90 61 db f7 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 43 e0 77 47 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c8f104 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 a1 c8 0b 1c | 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 5e 04 ce 12 10 dd 9e a7 fb 72 a4 3a 0b ac d2 36 | 90 61 db f7 | informational HASH(1): | 5e 04 ce 12 10 dd 9e a7 fb 72 a4 3a 0b ac d2 36 | 90 61 db f7 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #13: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #13 | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #13: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.582s and sending notification | parent state #13: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #13 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | responder cookie: | 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 963526701 (0x396e402d) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cc8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dac (length 4) | 39 6e 40 2d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8154 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 a1 c8 0b 1c | 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8140 (length 20) | 86 57 6a 32 a2 a3 0e 82 83 a8 d6 5f 2f cd ca ec | 85 74 57 ce | send delete HASH(1): | 86 57 6a 32 a2 a3 0e 82 83 a8 d6 5f 2f cd ca ec | 85 74 57 ce | last Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | current Phase 1 IV: 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 98 1e c3 9b 17 50 49 15 5b ed f6 28 ac fb d1 6f | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dbc (length 4) | 39 6e 40 2d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | af 5c d8 29 62 88 4d 0c 9a 7c 4f 84 1c 1b 4a 7c | f3 4a 0a 2c | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 86 57 6a 32 a2 a3 0e 82 83 a8 d6 5f | encrypting: 2f cd ca ec 85 74 57 ce 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 | encrypting: 26 1b 8b a1 | IV: af 5c d8 29 62 88 4d 0c 9a 7c 4f 84 1c 1b 4a 7c | IV: f3 4a 0a 2c | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 78 b0 08 6b ad 25 7e 17 b5 56 81 f0 1f 07 fc af | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | a1 c8 0b 1c 57 02 72 14 67 36 4e c2 26 1b 8b a1 | 08 10 05 01 39 6e 40 2d 00 00 00 5c c1 b1 f4 1d | 3b 70 05 6e 31 ee 78 35 94 d1 74 1d 1f 3c 2d cb | 2e 16 3f 5d 85 7d 54 a9 ea 44 16 36 5e f2 ce 5e | 48 29 ac 47 eb f4 8f 8e e7 e3 5b ed 78 b0 08 6b | ad 25 7e 17 b5 56 81 f0 1f 07 fc af | state #13 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #13: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001fc0: destroyed | stop processing: state #13 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.593 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00325 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 0a 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 38 87 50 92 49 f6 1a 44 | 9a f1 bc 7a 54 ac f4 9c 0b dc f8 b6 bc 99 50 67 | creating state object #15 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #15 in UNDEFINED | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp started | #15 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #15: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 "east" #15: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #15 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #15: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 size 128 "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.59 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00257 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | 14 00 00 24 f3 65 f2 35 1a f7 23 fe 3a a9 91 5b | dc 1e 8b f1 e6 35 22 84 55 65 1d a9 ed fa 54 8f | 57 5a 07 84 14 00 00 18 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a | 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 61 4d b1 78 00 00 00 18 | 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | b5 20 85 a4 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #15 is idle | #15 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | 61 4d b1 78 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | natd_hash: rcookie= f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | natd_hash: hash= 61 4d b1 78 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | b5 20 85 a4 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | natd_hash: rcookie= f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | natd_hash: hash= b5 20 85 a4 | expected NAT-D(me): 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | expected NAT-D(me): 61 4d b1 78 | expected NAT-D(him): | 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | b5 20 85 a4 | received NAT-D: 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | received NAT-D: 61 4d b1 78 | received NAT-D: 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | received NAT-D: b5 20 85 a4 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 15 for state #15 | state #15 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #15 and saving MD | #15 is busy; has a suspended MD | #15 spent 0.176 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.315 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 15 for state #15 | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 15 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94002a80: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b94002a80 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | Generated nonce: c7 0c de 98 16 e0 56 97 e2 48 aa aa 4b 90 4e ae | Generated nonce: 5d 25 13 02 13 82 82 b5 3d ad a1 5c a3 b9 dc db | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 15 time elapsed 0.001047 seconds | (#15) spent 1.04 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 15: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 15 for state #15 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940081c0 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #15 | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 15 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #15: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94002a80: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #15 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | keyex value c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | keyex value 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | keyex value 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | keyex value d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | keyex value 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | keyex value a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | keyex value d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | keyex value be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | keyex value 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | keyex value 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | keyex value 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | keyex value 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | keyex value 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | keyex value 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | keyex value 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr c7 0c de 98 16 e0 56 97 e2 48 aa aa 4b 90 4e ae | Nr 5d 25 13 02 13 82 82 b5 3d ad a1 5c a3 b9 dc db | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | b5 20 85 a4 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | natd_hash: rcookie= f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | natd_hash: hash= b5 20 85 a4 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa | NAT-D b5 20 85 a4 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | 61 4d b1 78 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | natd_hash: rcookie= f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | natd_hash: hash= 61 4d b1 78 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | NAT-D 61 4d b1 78 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94002a80: transferring ownership from state #15 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 16 for state #15 | state #15 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 size 128 | #15 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 2 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #15 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 16 for state #15 | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 16 | peer's g: f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | peer's g: ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | peer's g: 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | peer's g: 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | peer's g: e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | peer's g: 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | peer's g: 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | peer's g: 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | peer's g: b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | peer's g: dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | peer's g: 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | peer's g: a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | peer's g: dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | peer's g: 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | peer's g: c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | peer's g: fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | parent state #15: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94002a80: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c8d6a0 | state #15 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb3f90 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001250 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb3fb4 (length 32) | f3 65 f2 35 1a f7 23 fe 3a a9 91 5b dc 1e 8b f1 | e6 35 22 84 55 65 1d a9 ed fa 54 8f 57 5a 07 84 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb3fd4 (length 32) | c7 0c de 98 16 e0 56 97 e2 48 aa aa 4b 90 4e ae | 5d 25 13 02 13 82 82 b5 3d ad a1 5c a3 b9 dc db | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001160 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074432: ffffffb1 51 ffffff88 7e 0f 21 64 ffffffb0 2f ffffff84 ffffffb0 ffffffbf ffffffbb 5b 0f ffffffeb ffffffcc 42 ffffff9a 68 ffffff9f ffffff8f ffffffda fffffff6 0c ffffffc0 61 78 24 79 ffffffff ffffffeb ffffffc8 69 0e fffffff3 fffffff7 ffffffc7 22 ffffffbd ffffff85 ffffffcc 7b 72 fffffffa ffffffe4 fffffffe ffffffbd 0d 55 ffffffcf ffffff84 05 ffffffee 0e ffffffa2 ffffffbb ffffff80 ffffffe2 3a ffffffe0 29 60 0e ffffffec ffffffc7 4a ffffffa8 ffffff94 3a 7a 22 ffffffea ffffff9f 0c ffffffe5 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffbe 01 35 0b fffffff7 ffffffc6 01 ffffffaa ffffff91 20 13 ffffffdb 21 10 2c ffffff84 20 ffffffca 39 05 ffffffd0 ffffffd5 25 4a 18 ffffffb3 3f ffffffdf 5c 6f 39 ffffffe3 0e ffffffac ffffffae ffffffc4 ffffffe5 38 ffffffe4 ffffffec 47 21 5f ffffffff ffffffe9 0c 6b ffffff80 ffffffb3 6f fffffff9 0d 6a fffffffd ffffff97 42 ffffffbe fffffff2 ffffffe0 4a ffffffc2 ffffffd6 49 ffffff9c 3b ffffff9e ffffffc6 ffffffa1 ffffffa5 ffffffe5 33 53 7f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b8c008d00 | unwrapped: 1d cf 9a b6 77 ae d3 9c be 37 75 f6 d4 24 dd a2 | unwrapped: 9a 7f 09 4b eb 8f cb d4 60 ef 88 65 66 d4 f2 c9 | unwrapped: 3b 5e 94 fb b0 4b 94 f7 00 61 bc 59 b2 9a a9 96 | unwrapped: 8c d6 4d 23 62 94 9a fc 4c 97 37 9f 9f ae b8 83 | unwrapped: 44 33 e2 b5 e8 8e 4a a0 d7 7d ec 6e 9b 5e 3e 1f | unwrapped: 73 76 43 80 94 86 48 70 20 a0 53 15 b8 96 95 3a | unwrapped: e8 19 99 65 bf ee de cd 28 83 ae f1 86 48 4a 73 | unwrapped: 83 df 60 41 ea 6f 3b fc 58 bf 19 71 f1 a0 e8 4a | unwrapped: cb c8 7e 24 4b 4b 5c 71 23 24 41 27 72 8f 2b b1 | unwrapped: a0 4b 77 27 8d 66 ba 4a 5f f2 b6 59 f9 69 bb 65 | unwrapped: 10 2b 8c 41 33 cd ad 57 67 2b 78 b5 97 4a 88 2c | unwrapped: 73 3d fd bc 83 49 a2 3f 18 4b 36 45 81 7c f6 e7 | unwrapped: ce 07 30 66 ee a2 d2 a5 b6 c0 d9 f2 de 20 9e 1d | unwrapped: c1 45 3c 6c ff 83 69 1f ba 1d 95 5e 1f b6 f0 c2 | unwrapped: ae bf 74 99 0b 81 a6 80 27 db da 1f 3a 71 31 9c | unwrapped: 6a 45 23 10 11 33 48 df 1d 66 b5 bc 73 85 0b fa | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c0084b0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074464: 38 00 ffffff8d ffffffba 63 ffffffb6 00 ffffffb3 ffffffe2 44 ffffffae 1f 4e ffffff9d 56 1a 44 ffffff89 75 3f 1a 37 ffffffba ffffffb9 57 ffffffe6 1d 19 ffffff9f ffffff86 42 ffffffbc | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b8c009130 | unwrapped: 79 38 19 26 80 c9 ca 68 d3 02 40 80 5d f2 bf 43 | unwrapped: 9e 75 59 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074464: ffffffb1 51 ffffff88 7e 0f 21 64 ffffffb0 2f ffffff84 ffffffb0 ffffffbf ffffffbb 5b 0f ffffffeb ffffffcc 42 ffffff9a 68 ffffff9f ffffff8f ffffffda fffffff6 0c ffffffc0 61 78 24 79 ffffffff ffffffeb ffffffc8 69 0e fffffff3 fffffff7 ffffffc7 22 ffffffbd ffffff85 ffffffcc 7b 72 fffffffa ffffffe4 fffffffe ffffffbd 0d 55 ffffffcf ffffff84 05 ffffffee 0e ffffffa2 ffffffbb ffffff80 ffffffe2 3a ffffffe0 29 60 0e ffffffec ffffffc7 4a ffffffa8 ffffff94 3a 7a 22 ffffffea ffffff9f 0c ffffffe5 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffbe 01 35 0b fffffff7 ffffffc6 01 ffffffaa ffffff91 20 13 ffffffdb 21 10 2c ffffff84 20 ffffffca 39 05 ffffffd0 ffffffd5 25 4a 18 ffffffb3 3f ffffffdf 5c 6f 39 ffffffe3 0e ffffffac ffffffae ffffffc4 ffffffe5 38 ffffffe4 ffffffec 47 21 5f ffffffff ffffffe9 0c 6b ffffff80 ffffffb3 6f fffffff9 0d 6a fffffffd ffffff97 42 ffffffbe fffffff2 ffffffe0 4a ffffffc2 ffffffd6 49 ffffff9c 3b ffffff9e ffffffc6 ffffffa1 ffffffa5 ffffffe5 33 53 7f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b8c008bf0 | unwrapped: 1d cf 9a b6 77 ae d3 9c be 37 75 f6 d4 24 dd a2 | unwrapped: 9a 7f 09 4b eb 8f cb d4 60 ef 88 65 66 d4 f2 c9 | unwrapped: 3b 5e 94 fb b0 4b 94 f7 00 61 bc 59 b2 9a a9 96 | unwrapped: 8c d6 4d 23 62 94 9a fc 4c 97 37 9f 9f ae b8 83 | unwrapped: 44 33 e2 b5 e8 8e 4a a0 d7 7d ec 6e 9b 5e 3e 1f | unwrapped: 73 76 43 80 94 86 48 70 20 a0 53 15 b8 96 95 3a | unwrapped: e8 19 99 65 bf ee de cd 28 83 ae f1 86 48 4a 73 | unwrapped: 83 df 60 41 ea 6f 3b fc 58 bf 19 71 f1 a0 e8 4a | unwrapped: cb c8 7e 24 4b 4b 5c 71 23 24 41 27 72 8f 2b b1 | unwrapped: a0 4b 77 27 8d 66 ba 4a 5f f2 b6 59 f9 69 bb 65 | unwrapped: 10 2b 8c 41 33 cd ad 57 67 2b 78 b5 97 4a 88 2c | unwrapped: 73 3d fd bc 83 49 a2 3f 18 4b 36 45 81 7c f6 e7 | unwrapped: ce 07 30 66 ee a2 d2 a5 b6 c0 d9 f2 de 20 9e 1d | unwrapped: c1 45 3c 6c ff 83 69 1f ba 1d 95 5e 1f b6 f0 c2 | unwrapped: ae bf 74 99 0b 81 a6 80 27 db da 1f 3a 71 31 9c | unwrapped: 6a 45 23 10 11 33 48 df 1d 66 b5 bc 73 85 0b fa | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b688 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b8c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c001fc0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074448: 41 5b 66 ffffff91 7b 0b 2f 6f 7e 31 ffffff8f ffffff8b fffffff9 73 4b 60 64 68 ffffffde ffffffd0 18 ffffff9f 3c 32 ffffff9d ffffff9c 5e 62 25 ffffffc1 ffffffa8 38 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b8c009100 | unwrapped: d0 a2 fa 2c ba 94 15 9d e4 07 98 6d 5b 71 07 88 | unwrapped: 31 3d 79 32 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1697074448: ffffffb1 51 ffffff88 7e 0f 21 64 ffffffb0 2f ffffff84 ffffffb0 ffffffbf ffffffbb 5b 0f ffffffeb ffffffcc 42 ffffff9a 68 ffffff9f ffffff8f ffffffda fffffff6 0c ffffffc0 61 78 24 79 ffffffff ffffffeb ffffffc8 69 0e fffffff3 fffffff7 ffffffc7 22 ffffffbd ffffff85 ffffffcc 7b 72 fffffffa ffffffe4 fffffffe ffffffbd 0d 55 ffffffcf ffffff84 05 ffffffee 0e ffffffa2 ffffffbb ffffff80 ffffffe2 3a ffffffe0 29 60 0e ffffffec ffffffc7 4a ffffffa8 ffffff94 3a 7a 22 ffffffea ffffff9f 0c ffffffe5 ffffff98 ffffffd5 ffffffbe 01 35 0b fffffff7 ffffffc6 01 ffffffaa ffffff91 20 13 ffffffdb 21 10 2c ffffff84 20 ffffffca 39 05 ffffffd0 ffffffd5 25 4a 18 ffffffb3 3f ffffffdf 5c 6f 39 ffffffe3 0e ffffffac ffffffae ffffffc4 ffffffe5 38 ffffffe4 ffffffec 47 21 5f ffffffff ffffffe9 0c 6b ffffff80 ffffffb3 6f fffffff9 0d 6a fffffffd ffffff97 42 ffffffbe fffffff2 ffffffe0 4a ffffffc2 ffffffd6 49 ffffff9c 3b ffffff9e ffffffc6 ffffffa1 ffffffa5 ffffffe5 33 53 7f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b8c008ae0 | unwrapped: 1d cf 9a b6 77 ae d3 9c be 37 75 f6 d4 24 dd a2 | unwrapped: 9a 7f 09 4b eb 8f cb d4 60 ef 88 65 66 d4 f2 c9 | unwrapped: 3b 5e 94 fb b0 4b 94 f7 00 61 bc 59 b2 9a a9 96 | unwrapped: 8c d6 4d 23 62 94 9a fc 4c 97 37 9f 9f ae b8 83 | unwrapped: 44 33 e2 b5 e8 8e 4a a0 d7 7d ec 6e 9b 5e 3e 1f | unwrapped: 73 76 43 80 94 86 48 70 20 a0 53 15 b8 96 95 3a | unwrapped: e8 19 99 65 bf ee de cd 28 83 ae f1 86 48 4a 73 | unwrapped: 83 df 60 41 ea 6f 3b fc 58 bf 19 71 f1 a0 e8 4a | unwrapped: cb c8 7e 24 4b 4b 5c 71 23 24 41 27 72 8f 2b b1 | unwrapped: a0 4b 77 27 8d 66 ba 4a 5f f2 b6 59 f9 69 bb 65 | unwrapped: 10 2b 8c 41 33 cd ad 57 67 2b 78 b5 97 4a 88 2c | unwrapped: 73 3d fd bc 83 49 a2 3f 18 4b 36 45 81 7c f6 e7 | unwrapped: ce 07 30 66 ee a2 d2 a5 b6 c0 d9 f2 de 20 9e 1d | unwrapped: c1 45 3c 6c ff 83 69 1f ba 1d 95 5e 1f b6 f0 c2 | unwrapped: ae bf 74 99 0b 81 a6 80 27 db da 1f 3a 71 31 9c | unwrapped: 6a 45 23 10 11 33 48 df 1d 66 b5 bc 73 85 0b fa | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb41f4 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb41fc (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b698 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9ad8b6f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c98060 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_a 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_e 0x557566c963a0, enc_key 0x557566c98060 | DH_i: f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | DH_i: ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | DH_i: 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | DH_i: 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | DH_i: e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | DH_i: 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | DH_i: 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | DH_i: 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | DH_i: b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | DH_i: dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | DH_i: 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | DH_i: a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | DH_i: dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | DH_i: 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | DH_i: c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | DH_i: fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | DH_r: 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | DH_r: c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | DH_r: 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | DH_r: 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | DH_r: d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | DH_r: 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | DH_r: a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | DH_r: d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | DH_r: be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | DH_r: 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | DH_r: 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | DH_r: 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | DH_r: 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | DH_r: 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | DH_r: 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | DH_r: 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb3ff4 (length 256) | f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb40f4 (length 256) | 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b8c002090 (length 20) | 65 6a 08 44 77 1b 19 db 7b f7 41 bf 16 c5 81 03 | b3 27 8e 4a | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 16 time elapsed 0.001844 seconds | (#15) spent 1.84 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 16: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 16 for state #15 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c001090 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | 14 00 00 24 c7 0c de 98 16 e0 56 97 e2 48 aa aa | 4b 90 4e ae 5d 25 13 02 13 82 82 b5 3d ad a1 5c | a3 b9 dc db 14 00 00 18 51 fc c6 1a 37 df f9 13 | f1 3a dd d5 75 ad 5e aa b5 20 85 a4 00 00 00 18 | 1c 99 83 f6 97 e6 0b 7a 5e 3c 4a 3e 11 05 4b 32 | 61 4d b1 78 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 size 128 | #15 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49496.360396 "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #15 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #15 spent 0.45 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940081c0 | processing resume sending helper answer for #15 | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 16 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #15: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94002a80: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #15 | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #15 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #15 spent 0.0191 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c001090 | spent 0.00274 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 9b 39 bf 09 | c8 a1 4c 44 12 cc 3f 75 d9 57 a4 7c 07 a2 e3 1e | 86 18 c8 ae 1a 85 70 7c 68 89 95 45 78 c1 98 a3 | 8e 6f 27 1e 95 95 8d 63 07 0d be 1f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 65 6a 08 44 77 1b 19 db 7b f7 41 bf 16 c5 81 03 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 78 c1 98 a3 8e 6f 27 1e 95 95 8d 63 07 0d be 1f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 79 3f 81 05 | 88 ee a6 b4 ac b1 02 24 d8 f0 9b 1c 5e c0 9d 6b | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #15: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c003ce0 (length 256) | f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94001780 (length 256) | 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c003a70 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | 79 3f 81 05 88 ee a6 b4 ac b1 02 24 d8 f0 9b 1c | 5e c0 9d 6b | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94001780 (length 256) | 59 49 92 34 21 5f 54 d7 ff 50 3c 60 12 c8 48 f7 | c8 98 b0 9d 4e 51 b6 fe dd 97 4b 8a 5f 8b 73 eb | 60 75 ad b0 88 f8 97 15 3e 8f c2 3f a0 72 13 f7 | 51 3e 33 ee 07 51 8f 58 0b 1c 3e 0a 86 da b7 1f | d0 f4 63 c8 3f cd 32 f4 38 87 42 ed 2b 8a ae 2d | 20 42 cd 6d 70 dc b8 de 19 3f ac 9b d4 39 cf 20 | a3 ac 29 70 66 fb 71 e8 1d 07 28 7f fb 33 b5 ba | d1 13 8e 6a e9 b8 67 c5 7a 08 ea 1e a1 1f 43 53 | be 68 ba 29 17 14 3a 52 bf 00 b7 a4 9d 09 0d 47 | 74 c5 d5 17 8f fc a1 df a8 36 1f a9 88 29 e7 6c | 25 bd 1c ae dc a9 72 60 10 03 9d ec 63 e8 53 c6 | 49 b0 85 4f 20 72 65 7e e8 58 7a 97 b5 ff e2 72 | 16 1a 92 88 2b 90 d9 8e 95 ea 7f 78 2a bf cc d9 | 3e d9 fc 06 9a d6 e0 19 b6 da ea 93 3d 9b 26 0e | 5e 6e 1b ba f3 62 fe 6c 8b 2f 9a af e5 f9 f3 4d | 35 44 ee d3 25 8c ba 90 d1 58 3d 4b fd ef fc cf | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c003ce0 (length 256) | f9 71 72 6d d3 03 9f 48 9d 81 2c f0 2b ca 6d dc | ab 1e 60 3a ee 0e 80 fa d7 a7 14 44 79 7d 7b f2 | 70 81 61 57 42 1b ee 75 a4 94 8e bd a0 83 b1 e9 | 64 30 a1 b9 95 ff 24 c6 da f5 4b 9b ec bc 43 49 | e6 2c c0 96 1c 75 72 95 b9 ff bd 3a 91 84 48 49 | 30 d2 ec 20 24 50 0c 1d 9f 2b 11 8b 0d be 32 23 | 44 44 b7 ea 89 90 f2 95 2b 39 ae 58 71 ce c0 91 | 69 ee f9 ec cf bc 1e a4 a5 11 81 d0 2f 3b 35 db | b9 53 22 6f 19 97 7d bc c2 e2 48 2e b8 97 72 63 | dc 84 cf 0a e5 05 73 07 45 aa 02 b4 0c fb d0 b0 | 95 6e f9 56 22 17 03 d5 da 27 c4 cd e2 36 99 f7 | a6 94 fb b8 d4 a2 fe 3b d2 b4 1e b3 1d b2 d5 2b | dc c7 38 c1 6a d8 5e 5d bc f8 a7 af 6c af a7 16 | 77 cf 9c 99 52 70 39 4d 1e c2 24 ea b1 14 65 92 | c0 9c 0a 24 48 01 15 f2 42 b2 12 9d b6 c7 db dc | fc c4 e8 b5 4f ef 4d fe 21 54 5c 63 85 db a8 f6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | 42 c5 6b 59 d4 b2 4d 7e 0b c7 db 67 df 3e 7b a5 | b8 da 0a 92 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 42 c5 6b 59 d4 b2 4d 7e 0b c7 db 67 df 3e 7b a5 | HASH_R b8 da 0a 92 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 42 c5 6b 59 d4 b2 4d 7e 0b c7 db 67 df 3e 7b a5 | encrypting: b8 da 0a 92 | IV: 78 c1 98 a3 8e 6f 27 1e 95 95 8d 63 07 0d be 1f | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #15 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #15: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #15 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #15 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c ea 67 7f 8a | 35 c6 a8 59 90 0c 05 05 9b 44 cd 8d 4b 67 4f a5 | 29 16 2d 8f 13 3c 93 ce fd c5 d4 27 0a aa 77 dc | a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940081c0 size 128 | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #15 | #15 spent 0.63 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.781 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00212 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 20 01 b4 3a cc 6c 00 00 01 bc c6 ff a4 95 | d2 5d 99 24 c2 82 0d a1 a3 13 41 77 f7 3a c8 8d | 72 08 21 fa a3 13 7b 62 c0 e5 28 a7 49 cc 11 2b | ba 87 aa f9 6a 30 04 97 10 03 52 a5 8f ac 90 a3 | c8 25 a1 b8 c7 ac 89 68 1b af 6e 61 47 ca ee 06 | 39 73 c9 9e 73 c1 a9 86 ea ec 85 81 5b 36 b7 63 | 79 bb fb 0c 0f 9f c5 e4 bb d9 68 37 61 ee 3d 8b | 17 2e 8a c5 33 d8 94 67 3d d4 e0 2b 39 f0 3e ba | 28 70 0c 67 6c 02 38 20 01 0a 5e 18 37 a3 7c 10 | ac 8c 75 df 50 3c 28 11 6d cc ed 89 58 aa 4a bf | 24 1f bc ce 78 45 1b e3 f2 9f 53 80 07 55 0e dd | 68 f2 c5 5d f2 73 75 f6 dd c3 95 f7 9f d3 64 70 | 23 5b 71 3f f0 47 f1 f1 57 aa 7a 03 1b af 3e 09 | bf a2 84 ef 81 e9 e0 47 32 7d 8f 2f 04 39 b8 4e | a5 2e 01 a0 b3 d8 83 d2 4f f5 74 61 51 95 0d c6 | 35 de 3d 0a c7 a4 13 10 81 07 c7 12 58 a1 0a 83 | 05 c3 fa e9 46 aa 9d e3 e8 2e df a2 6a e2 9c aa | 0d a8 af 0c ef 52 60 e4 aa 21 3c 15 32 74 d7 3f | ee f2 fc 62 f3 06 4b 0c 75 6f 15 3d e2 dd 1e 77 | ba 1e 2b c8 ed e6 53 0e 56 13 e7 73 d8 c1 4e 24 | 04 78 23 cb b2 92 65 9b d5 4a ac c4 95 6a ce f5 | a2 d2 8f 27 87 74 22 d5 df 0f 84 14 07 80 69 43 | 6c 78 b8 c7 df 4f ec d5 cd b7 37 f1 2a 88 db 16 | c2 a0 95 7c 65 9a bb 2a 2c d7 30 93 2b c8 a3 d4 | 5f a8 3d 85 21 bf 41 bb cc 7e 71 3d 0c a9 1c 6b | 9f ae f8 8c 96 6e 0a c3 b8 37 8f da f8 bc b7 b5 | a2 d8 43 7b 21 1e 9c 5f b6 2e 68 3a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3023752300 (0xb43acc6c) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | current Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | b4 3a cc 6c | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 74 7d ca 55 73 3b ca 7b 0a cc e9 39 83 1b e9 02 | 8b 74 15 b9 | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 74 7d ca 55 73 3b ca 7b 0a cc e9 39 83 1b e9 02 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: f8 bc b7 b5 a2 d8 43 7b 21 1e 9c 5f b6 2e 68 3a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 20 01 b4 3a cc 6c 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | da 3f 6d 0d e2 8b 99 86 cb c2 eb 97 5e fd b6 c6 | 88 43 11 c0 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 4f 1e d4 d5 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | 05 00 01 04 94 11 da c4 3c d3 86 22 0d ab 48 d7 | 99 f8 44 d2 ef 1a 39 b0 3d 68 75 15 bb 2e a6 f4 | 17 b5 a8 13 e9 0b 78 1c 86 99 80 c3 92 90 8b 93 | d1 f0 c2 a0 ca 79 3e 77 5a 5e ae af 1d 4b b2 69 | 3e d3 3b 07 f5 7e 37 19 e0 cd 0e d4 55 14 55 12 | e0 8f 12 21 82 b8 d0 44 71 16 36 b7 fd f4 2c d4 | 5e 33 dc 38 2e 53 4e 81 9e c1 0c 81 5d 66 17 f1 | 9b 71 52 ad bb 0d 1a 65 a5 2e 12 71 20 38 92 e3 | a8 60 10 fa 2d 54 53 77 1e d9 34 cf 47 be c3 79 | fe 52 aa 33 a0 b9 c5 60 37 9f b9 f7 7b c0 37 66 | cd 48 38 74 2f 6f e1 99 87 95 f8 d2 f7 86 59 ee | b7 6a dd f8 c0 2b b6 b1 4c a3 f5 26 45 48 54 57 | 4f 1e ea 2d 76 62 c1 7c 05 d3 fe 11 64 d1 44 d6 | 8e f3 86 00 8e 48 c7 1c 6a de ea 95 79 7b bd fe | f3 22 85 d2 a6 6c 72 54 a6 71 72 d1 3e 07 5b 34 | fe ff 91 7d 6b 64 2f 2f 08 d3 72 c3 d1 3a fd 0d | 08 a4 46 9c 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | b4 3a cc 6c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cab554 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 4f 1e d4 d5 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 68 89 c0 1a | 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba 83 22 d8 63 | f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 05 00 01 04 | 94 11 da c4 3c d3 86 22 0d ab 48 d7 99 f8 44 d2 | ef 1a 39 b0 3d 68 75 15 bb 2e a6 f4 17 b5 a8 13 | e9 0b 78 1c 86 99 80 c3 92 90 8b 93 d1 f0 c2 a0 | ca 79 3e 77 5a 5e ae af 1d 4b b2 69 3e d3 3b 07 | f5 7e 37 19 e0 cd 0e d4 55 14 55 12 e0 8f 12 21 | 82 b8 d0 44 71 16 36 b7 fd f4 2c d4 5e 33 dc 38 | 2e 53 4e 81 9e c1 0c 81 5d 66 17 f1 9b 71 52 ad | bb 0d 1a 65 a5 2e 12 71 20 38 92 e3 a8 60 10 fa | 2d 54 53 77 1e d9 34 cf 47 be c3 79 fe 52 aa 33 | a0 b9 c5 60 37 9f b9 f7 7b c0 37 66 cd 48 38 74 | 2f 6f e1 99 87 95 f8 d2 f7 86 59 ee b7 6a dd f8 | c0 2b b6 b1 4c a3 f5 26 45 48 54 57 4f 1e ea 2d | 76 62 c1 7c 05 d3 fe 11 64 d1 44 d6 8e f3 86 00 | 8e 48 c7 1c 6a de ea 95 79 7b bd fe f3 22 85 d2 | a6 6c 72 54 a6 71 72 d1 3e 07 5b 34 fe ff 91 7d | 6b 64 2f 2f 08 d3 72 c3 d1 3a fd 0d 08 a4 46 9c | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | da 3f 6d 0d e2 8b 99 86 cb c2 eb 97 5e fd b6 c6 | 88 43 11 c0 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | da 3f 6d 0d e2 8b 99 86 cb c2 eb 97 5e fd b6 c6 | 88 43 11 c0 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #15: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #16 at 0x557566ca9800 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #16 in UNDEFINED | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #15 "east" as #16 for IPSEC SA | #16 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #15.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #16: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 4f 1e d4 d5 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 94 11 da c4 3c d3 86 22 0d ab 48 d7 99 f8 44 d2 | ef 1a 39 b0 3d 68 75 15 bb 2e a6 f4 17 b5 a8 13 | e9 0b 78 1c 86 99 80 c3 92 90 8b 93 d1 f0 c2 a0 | ca 79 3e 77 5a 5e ae af 1d 4b b2 69 3e d3 3b 07 | f5 7e 37 19 e0 cd 0e d4 55 14 55 12 e0 8f 12 21 | 82 b8 d0 44 71 16 36 b7 fd f4 2c d4 5e 33 dc 38 | 2e 53 4e 81 9e c1 0c 81 5d 66 17 f1 9b 71 52 ad | bb 0d 1a 65 a5 2e 12 71 20 38 92 e3 a8 60 10 fa | 2d 54 53 77 1e d9 34 cf 47 be c3 79 fe 52 aa 33 | a0 b9 c5 60 37 9f b9 f7 7b c0 37 66 cd 48 38 74 | 2f 6f e1 99 87 95 f8 d2 f7 86 59 ee b7 6a dd f8 | c0 2b b6 b1 4c a3 f5 26 45 48 54 57 4f 1e ea 2d | 76 62 c1 7c 05 d3 fe 11 64 d1 44 d6 8e f3 86 00 | 8e 48 c7 1c 6a de ea 95 79 7b bd fe f3 22 85 d2 | a6 6c 72 54 a6 71 72 d1 3e 07 5b 34 fe ff 91 7d | 6b 64 2f 2f 08 d3 72 c3 d1 3a fd 0d 08 a4 46 9c | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 17 for state #16 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #16 and saving MD | #16 is busy; has a suspended MD | #15 spent 0.236 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.64 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 17 for state #16 | crypto helper 4 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 17 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90004120: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b90004120 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | a7 1c 0b fe 51 cc 42 e1 ba 66 99 af a7 0e 96 75 | 39 83 d3 92 28 e2 35 82 f5 d4 a8 f2 fe 82 3b 27 | 16 57 6c 31 81 b8 3f 86 37 1e 79 2e 50 17 28 10 | 4e 05 13 40 68 c3 26 02 d4 ab 57 2d dc 30 b2 4e | cc 5d 15 d0 34 5f ce 36 64 b8 b0 ae ba 19 72 8f | dc 9d 2c 67 bc 56 27 2f 71 40 22 be f4 2e bf d2 | 72 de f1 ea 78 0c 09 c8 4f b5 d9 ad 7d b9 18 ab | 6c b0 2b 36 e8 d7 74 1a de b5 38 f2 50 1b 8a 4e | 56 90 c6 05 2d 22 ff 8b 5c a0 64 70 c6 11 78 b7 | bb 97 1f 87 e4 e3 d9 35 90 87 6f ab 5c f5 85 e5 | 1c a2 79 19 b5 ef ef 84 88 7f d6 30 7f 9a a0 c2 | 1f a0 ab 6e 8b 41 25 01 0b 03 8a b2 7a 72 ca cb | 27 84 62 b5 54 0f 85 9f 09 07 cb 2b b0 c6 f0 6d | 83 5b e5 dc ed ff ff 80 59 eb 54 2b 90 f8 7f 38 | 20 80 de ca 3f 32 73 46 5d aa 9e cf 3f d7 de 2f | 2d a1 a7 35 1f bd e0 cb 22 b2 85 96 69 09 2a 45 | Generated nonce: 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | Generated nonce: 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | crypto helper 4 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 17 time elapsed 0.001076 seconds | (#16) spent 0.991 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 17: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 17 for state #16 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #16 | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 17 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #16: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90004120: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #16 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90004120: transferring ownership from state #16 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 18 for state #16 | state #16 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | suspending state #16 and saving MD | #16 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #16 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #16 spent 0.0613 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 18 for state #16 | crypto helper 6 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 18 | peer's g: 94 11 da c4 3c d3 86 22 0d ab 48 d7 99 f8 44 d2 | peer's g: ef 1a 39 b0 3d 68 75 15 bb 2e a6 f4 17 b5 a8 13 | peer's g: e9 0b 78 1c 86 99 80 c3 92 90 8b 93 d1 f0 c2 a0 | peer's g: ca 79 3e 77 5a 5e ae af 1d 4b b2 69 3e d3 3b 07 | peer's g: f5 7e 37 19 e0 cd 0e d4 55 14 55 12 e0 8f 12 21 | peer's g: 82 b8 d0 44 71 16 36 b7 fd f4 2c d4 5e 33 dc 38 | peer's g: 2e 53 4e 81 9e c1 0c 81 5d 66 17 f1 9b 71 52 ad | peer's g: bb 0d 1a 65 a5 2e 12 71 20 38 92 e3 a8 60 10 fa | peer's g: 2d 54 53 77 1e d9 34 cf 47 be c3 79 fe 52 aa 33 | peer's g: a0 b9 c5 60 37 9f b9 f7 7b c0 37 66 cd 48 38 74 | peer's g: 2f 6f e1 99 87 95 f8 d2 f7 86 59 ee b7 6a dd f8 | peer's g: c0 2b b6 b1 4c a3 f5 26 45 48 54 57 4f 1e ea 2d | peer's g: 76 62 c1 7c 05 d3 fe 11 64 d1 44 d6 8e f3 86 00 | peer's g: 8e 48 c7 1c 6a de ea 95 79 7b bd fe f3 22 85 d2 | peer's g: a6 6c 72 54 a6 71 72 d1 3e 07 5b 34 fe ff 91 7d | peer's g: 6b 64 2f 2f 08 d3 72 c3 d1 3a fd 0d 08 a4 46 9c | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90004120: computed shared DH secret key@0x7f9b8c008420 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 6 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 18 time elapsed 0.000924 seconds | (#16) spent 0.904 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 18: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 18 for state #16 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84002620 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #16 | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 18 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #16: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3023752300 (0xb43acc6c) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 4f 1e d4 d5 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xac890f66 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI ac 89 0f 66 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #16: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:b43acc6c} "east" #16: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #16: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | Nr 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value a7 1c 0b fe 51 cc 42 e1 ba 66 99 af a7 0e 96 75 | keyex value 39 83 d3 92 28 e2 35 82 f5 d4 a8 f2 fe 82 3b 27 | keyex value 16 57 6c 31 81 b8 3f 86 37 1e 79 2e 50 17 28 10 | keyex value 4e 05 13 40 68 c3 26 02 d4 ab 57 2d dc 30 b2 4e | keyex value cc 5d 15 d0 34 5f ce 36 64 b8 b0 ae ba 19 72 8f | keyex value dc 9d 2c 67 bc 56 27 2f 71 40 22 be f4 2e bf d2 | keyex value 72 de f1 ea 78 0c 09 c8 4f b5 d9 ad 7d b9 18 ab | keyex value 6c b0 2b 36 e8 d7 74 1a de b5 38 f2 50 1b 8a 4e | keyex value 56 90 c6 05 2d 22 ff 8b 5c a0 64 70 c6 11 78 b7 | keyex value bb 97 1f 87 e4 e3 d9 35 90 87 6f ab 5c f5 85 e5 | keyex value 1c a2 79 19 b5 ef ef 84 88 7f d6 30 7f 9a a0 c2 | keyex value 1f a0 ab 6e 8b 41 25 01 0b 03 8a b2 7a 72 ca cb | keyex value 27 84 62 b5 54 0f 85 9f 09 07 cb 2b b0 c6 f0 6d | keyex value 83 5b e5 dc ed ff ff 80 59 eb 54 2b 90 f8 7f 38 | keyex value 20 80 de ca 3f 32 73 46 5d aa 9e cf 3f d7 de 2f | keyex value 2d a1 a7 35 1f bd e0 cb 22 b2 85 96 69 09 2a 45 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90004120: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e9c (length 4) | b4 3a cc 6c | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b94002af0 (length 32) | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55756517d974 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 ac 89 0f 66 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 5a 8f d1 d3 | 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e 1c 25 f1 0b | 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b 05 00 01 04 | a7 1c 0b fe 51 cc 42 e1 ba 66 99 af a7 0e 96 75 | 39 83 d3 92 28 e2 35 82 f5 d4 a8 f2 fe 82 3b 27 | 16 57 6c 31 81 b8 3f 86 37 1e 79 2e 50 17 28 10 | 4e 05 13 40 68 c3 26 02 d4 ab 57 2d dc 30 b2 4e | cc 5d 15 d0 34 5f ce 36 64 b8 b0 ae ba 19 72 8f | dc 9d 2c 67 bc 56 27 2f 71 40 22 be f4 2e bf d2 | 72 de f1 ea 78 0c 09 c8 4f b5 d9 ad 7d b9 18 ab | 6c b0 2b 36 e8 d7 74 1a de b5 38 f2 50 1b 8a 4e | 56 90 c6 05 2d 22 ff 8b 5c a0 64 70 c6 11 78 b7 | bb 97 1f 87 e4 e3 d9 35 90 87 6f ab 5c f5 85 e5 | 1c a2 79 19 b5 ef ef 84 88 7f d6 30 7f 9a a0 c2 | 1f a0 ab 6e 8b 41 25 01 0b 03 8a b2 7a 72 ca cb | 27 84 62 b5 54 0f 85 9f 09 07 cb 2b b0 c6 f0 6d | 83 5b e5 dc ed ff ff 80 59 eb 54 2b 90 f8 7f 38 | 20 80 de ca 3f 32 73 46 5d aa 9e cf 3f d7 de 2f | 2d a1 a7 35 1f bd e0 cb 22 b2 85 96 69 09 2a 45 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 20) | 69 d4 a1 f2 0f 7e 3b cc b6 9f 9f 8e eb 64 23 19 | 17 5f c8 6f | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 69 d4 a1 f2 0f 7e 3b cc b6 9f 9f 8e eb 64 23 19 | 17 5f c8 6f | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566caee20 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 35 1d ffffffee 22 1d 6e 1e 14 51 ffffffd8 ffffffa9 ffffffc9 ffffffe6 36 43 ffffffe5 26 5e 53 05 15 42 ffffffcf ffffffe0 ffffffda 2b ffffffbb 53 22 ffffffc7 ffffffef ffffffe8 4b 78 ffffffe0 4e ffffffcf ffffffe1 ffffffaf ffffffb7 78 17 ffffffc2 ffffff9a ffffffc0 0e 50 56 ffffff82 76 ffffffbf ffffffa9 36 5a ffffffe6 ffffffc4 21 1d ffffff90 49 43 44 29 ffffffc5 0b ffffffdd ffffffc1 61 ffffff8e ffffffd2 58 ffffffc2 fffffffa ffffffa6 ffffffc5 ffffffac 75 ffffffe6 ffffffca ffffffb4 ffffff84 10 7d 51 2f fffffff5 15 ffffff9a 10 5b 34 ffffffa6 4d fffffff3 03 ffffffcf 65 ffffff95 ffffffb2 ffffff90 58 ffffffa9 ffffffab ffffffbf 6c 58 1d ffffffdc 3f ffffffc3 73 ffffffcc 3a 5f 48 ffffffb0 ffffff82 6b 39 ffffffe4 49 ffffffcc 5b ffffffee 0a ffffffd4 fffffff7 79 60 03 0d ffffffea 2d 52 ffffffe0 ffffffb4 ffffffd5 ffffffc3 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffc1 ffffff84 fffffff9 ffffffaa 57 08 ffffff87 ffffff86 28 3f ffffff93 7c 68 ffffff9c ffffff93 ffffff81 ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb3260 | unwrapped: 5e 60 21 cc 6e c6 28 9e d0 f1 90 40 21 70 1b 49 | unwrapped: ed cd be 39 f3 7b e3 eb dc e0 53 49 da 2d 1a 90 | unwrapped: b6 97 3b 63 49 7b 39 c1 6f b0 06 8b fb 44 46 96 | unwrapped: 27 c0 24 80 0c 3e 6d ba ea c3 03 44 ac 6c f6 f9 | unwrapped: 8c e4 99 23 02 8e 0c 4e 6e 2b e9 f7 39 9f 77 d9 | unwrapped: 59 48 63 be 8a e3 f2 0c bd 7c 2f 66 6a 0e 40 0a | unwrapped: 27 28 55 54 d8 6b 77 28 f2 d9 85 89 4f af 37 99 | unwrapped: d8 8b 9d 5f f6 f5 f9 35 c6 31 e1 7e f2 2c cd 3c | unwrapped: a5 c1 71 c6 96 cb 40 c7 83 2a 4e 2f 00 a5 4e 3c | unwrapped: 59 a5 b5 e6 bf 20 d8 6a de b3 f1 ed 6a 96 c3 3a | unwrapped: c2 a8 0a 13 64 26 2c 38 33 9a c3 da 7a 7d f6 f5 | unwrapped: 26 e7 f9 2f 0c f8 04 4e 23 a7 2f eb 95 53 6d 17 | unwrapped: d6 a0 65 a1 a0 3e 76 7a 1a 68 c3 2c a6 38 76 4e | unwrapped: ce 62 c0 7d df d3 0c e1 d6 04 10 49 34 db a4 3e | unwrapped: 29 aa 44 0a fe 12 da 5e a0 77 0a c3 65 c5 73 44 | unwrapped: 4e e8 55 e2 2c 0b 42 98 a2 3c 98 b2 eb f9 81 c0 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 35 1d ffffffee 22 1d 6e 1e 14 51 ffffffd8 ffffffa9 ffffffc9 ffffffe6 36 43 ffffffe5 26 5e 53 05 15 42 ffffffcf ffffffe0 ffffffda 2b ffffffbb 53 22 ffffffc7 ffffffef ffffffe8 4b 78 ffffffe0 4e ffffffcf ffffffe1 ffffffaf ffffffb7 78 17 ffffffc2 ffffff9a ffffffc0 0e 50 56 ffffff82 76 ffffffbf ffffffa9 36 5a ffffffe6 ffffffc4 21 1d ffffff90 49 43 44 29 ffffffc5 0b ffffffdd ffffffc1 61 ffffff8e ffffffd2 58 ffffffc2 fffffffa ffffffa6 ffffffc5 ffffffac 75 ffffffe6 ffffffca ffffffb4 ffffff84 10 7d 51 2f fffffff5 15 ffffff9a 10 5b 34 ffffffa6 4d fffffff3 03 ffffffcf 65 ffffff95 ffffffb2 ffffff90 58 ffffffa9 ffffffab ffffffbf 6c 58 1d ffffffdc 3f ffffffc3 73 ffffffcc 3a 5f 48 ffffffb0 ffffff82 6b 39 ffffffe4 49 ffffffcc 5b ffffffee 0a ffffffd4 fffffff7 79 60 03 0d ffffffea 2d 52 ffffffe0 ffffffb4 ffffffd5 ffffffc3 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffc1 ffffff84 fffffff9 ffffffaa 57 08 ffffff87 ffffff86 28 3f ffffff93 7c 68 ffffff9c ffffff93 ffffff81 ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2f30 | unwrapped: 5e 60 21 cc 6e c6 28 9e d0 f1 90 40 21 70 1b 49 | unwrapped: ed cd be 39 f3 7b e3 eb dc e0 53 49 da 2d 1a 90 | unwrapped: b6 97 3b 63 49 7b 39 c1 6f b0 06 8b fb 44 46 96 | unwrapped: 27 c0 24 80 0c 3e 6d ba ea c3 03 44 ac 6c f6 f9 | unwrapped: 8c e4 99 23 02 8e 0c 4e 6e 2b e9 f7 39 9f 77 d9 | unwrapped: 59 48 63 be 8a e3 f2 0c bd 7c 2f 66 6a 0e 40 0a | unwrapped: 27 28 55 54 d8 6b 77 28 f2 d9 85 89 4f af 37 99 | unwrapped: d8 8b 9d 5f f6 f5 f9 35 c6 31 e1 7e f2 2c cd 3c | unwrapped: a5 c1 71 c6 96 cb 40 c7 83 2a 4e 2f 00 a5 4e 3c | unwrapped: 59 a5 b5 e6 bf 20 d8 6a de b3 f1 ed 6a 96 c3 3a | unwrapped: c2 a8 0a 13 64 26 2c 38 33 9a c3 da 7a 7d f6 f5 | unwrapped: 26 e7 f9 2f 0c f8 04 4e 23 a7 2f eb 95 53 6d 17 | unwrapped: d6 a0 65 a1 a0 3e 76 7a 1a 68 c3 2c a6 38 76 4e | unwrapped: ce 62 c0 7d df d3 0c e1 d6 04 10 49 34 db a4 3e | unwrapped: 29 aa 44 0a fe 12 da 5e a0 77 0a c3 65 c5 73 44 | unwrapped: 4e e8 55 e2 2c 0b 42 98 a2 3c 98 b2 eb f9 81 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9a08 (length 4) | ac 89 0f 66 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca99e8 (length 4) | 4f 1e d4 d5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94002af0 (length 32) | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94002af0 (length 32) | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90007020 (length 32) | 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90007020 (length 32) | 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90004e90 (length 20) | 67 bb 79 9a da 09 ad df 8b b2 77 65 65 ce bd f2 | 49 a0 3e 46 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b7c000c30 (length 20) | a4 21 73 2c 3c 2b d4 e4 64 d1 17 07 07 72 91 94 | 54 2e e9 a6 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004e90 (length 20) | 67 bb 79 9a da 09 ad df 8b b2 77 65 65 ce bd f2 | 49 a0 3e 46 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c000c30 (length 20) | a4 21 73 2c 3c 2b d4 e4 64 d1 17 07 07 72 91 94 | 54 2e e9 a6 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 35 1d ffffffee 22 1d 6e 1e 14 51 ffffffd8 ffffffa9 ffffffc9 ffffffe6 36 43 ffffffe5 26 5e 53 05 15 42 ffffffcf ffffffe0 ffffffda 2b ffffffbb 53 22 ffffffc7 ffffffef ffffffe8 4b 78 ffffffe0 4e ffffffcf ffffffe1 ffffffaf ffffffb7 78 17 ffffffc2 ffffff9a ffffffc0 0e 50 56 ffffff82 76 ffffffbf ffffffa9 36 5a ffffffe6 ffffffc4 21 1d ffffff90 49 43 44 29 ffffffc5 0b ffffffdd ffffffc1 61 ffffff8e ffffffd2 58 ffffffc2 fffffffa ffffffa6 ffffffc5 ffffffac 75 ffffffe6 ffffffca ffffffb4 ffffff84 10 7d 51 2f fffffff5 15 ffffff9a 10 5b 34 ffffffa6 4d fffffff3 03 ffffffcf 65 ffffff95 ffffffb2 ffffff90 58 ffffffa9 ffffffab ffffffbf 6c 58 1d ffffffdc 3f ffffffc3 73 ffffffcc 3a 5f 48 ffffffb0 ffffff82 6b 39 ffffffe4 49 ffffffcc 5b ffffffee 0a ffffffd4 fffffff7 79 60 03 0d ffffffea 2d 52 ffffffe0 ffffffb4 ffffffd5 ffffffc3 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffc1 ffffff84 fffffff9 ffffffaa 57 08 ffffff87 ffffff86 28 3f ffffff93 7c 68 ffffff9c ffffff93 ffffff81 ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2e20 | unwrapped: 5e 60 21 cc 6e c6 28 9e d0 f1 90 40 21 70 1b 49 | unwrapped: ed cd be 39 f3 7b e3 eb dc e0 53 49 da 2d 1a 90 | unwrapped: b6 97 3b 63 49 7b 39 c1 6f b0 06 8b fb 44 46 96 | unwrapped: 27 c0 24 80 0c 3e 6d ba ea c3 03 44 ac 6c f6 f9 | unwrapped: 8c e4 99 23 02 8e 0c 4e 6e 2b e9 f7 39 9f 77 d9 | unwrapped: 59 48 63 be 8a e3 f2 0c bd 7c 2f 66 6a 0e 40 0a | unwrapped: 27 28 55 54 d8 6b 77 28 f2 d9 85 89 4f af 37 99 | unwrapped: d8 8b 9d 5f f6 f5 f9 35 c6 31 e1 7e f2 2c cd 3c | unwrapped: a5 c1 71 c6 96 cb 40 c7 83 2a 4e 2f 00 a5 4e 3c | unwrapped: 59 a5 b5 e6 bf 20 d8 6a de b3 f1 ed 6a 96 c3 3a | unwrapped: c2 a8 0a 13 64 26 2c 38 33 9a c3 da 7a 7d f6 f5 | unwrapped: 26 e7 f9 2f 0c f8 04 4e 23 a7 2f eb 95 53 6d 17 | unwrapped: d6 a0 65 a1 a0 3e 76 7a 1a 68 c3 2c a6 38 76 4e | unwrapped: ce 62 c0 7d df d3 0c e1 d6 04 10 49 34 db a4 3e | unwrapped: 29 aa 44 0a fe 12 da 5e a0 77 0a c3 65 c5 73 44 | unwrapped: 4e e8 55 e2 2c 0b 42 98 a2 3c 98 b2 eb f9 81 c0 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: 35 1d ffffffee 22 1d 6e 1e 14 51 ffffffd8 ffffffa9 ffffffc9 ffffffe6 36 43 ffffffe5 26 5e 53 05 15 42 ffffffcf ffffffe0 ffffffda 2b ffffffbb 53 22 ffffffc7 ffffffef ffffffe8 4b 78 ffffffe0 4e ffffffcf ffffffe1 ffffffaf ffffffb7 78 17 ffffffc2 ffffff9a ffffffc0 0e 50 56 ffffff82 76 ffffffbf ffffffa9 36 5a ffffffe6 ffffffc4 21 1d ffffff90 49 43 44 29 ffffffc5 0b ffffffdd ffffffc1 61 ffffff8e ffffffd2 58 ffffffc2 fffffffa ffffffa6 ffffffc5 ffffffac 75 ffffffe6 ffffffca ffffffb4 ffffff84 10 7d 51 2f fffffff5 15 ffffff9a 10 5b 34 ffffffa6 4d fffffff3 03 ffffffcf 65 ffffff95 ffffffb2 ffffff90 58 ffffffa9 ffffffab ffffffbf 6c 58 1d ffffffdc 3f ffffffc3 73 ffffffcc 3a 5f 48 ffffffb0 ffffff82 6b 39 ffffffe4 49 ffffffcc 5b ffffffee 0a ffffffd4 fffffff7 79 60 03 0d ffffffea 2d 52 ffffffe0 ffffffb4 ffffffd5 ffffffc3 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffc1 ffffff84 fffffff9 ffffffaa 57 08 ffffff87 ffffff86 28 3f ffffff93 7c 68 ffffff9c ffffff93 ffffff81 ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cae020 | unwrapped: 5e 60 21 cc 6e c6 28 9e d0 f1 90 40 21 70 1b 49 | unwrapped: ed cd be 39 f3 7b e3 eb dc e0 53 49 da 2d 1a 90 | unwrapped: b6 97 3b 63 49 7b 39 c1 6f b0 06 8b fb 44 46 96 | unwrapped: 27 c0 24 80 0c 3e 6d ba ea c3 03 44 ac 6c f6 f9 | unwrapped: 8c e4 99 23 02 8e 0c 4e 6e 2b e9 f7 39 9f 77 d9 | unwrapped: 59 48 63 be 8a e3 f2 0c bd 7c 2f 66 6a 0e 40 0a | unwrapped: 27 28 55 54 d8 6b 77 28 f2 d9 85 89 4f af 37 99 | unwrapped: d8 8b 9d 5f f6 f5 f9 35 c6 31 e1 7e f2 2c cd 3c | unwrapped: a5 c1 71 c6 96 cb 40 c7 83 2a 4e 2f 00 a5 4e 3c | unwrapped: 59 a5 b5 e6 bf 20 d8 6a de b3 f1 ed 6a 96 c3 3a | unwrapped: c2 a8 0a 13 64 26 2c 38 33 9a c3 da 7a 7d f6 f5 | unwrapped: 26 e7 f9 2f 0c f8 04 4e 23 a7 2f eb 95 53 6d 17 | unwrapped: d6 a0 65 a1 a0 3e 76 7a 1a 68 c3 2c a6 38 76 4e | unwrapped: ce 62 c0 7d df d3 0c e1 d6 04 10 49 34 db a4 3e | unwrapped: 29 aa 44 0a fe 12 da 5e a0 77 0a c3 65 c5 73 44 | unwrapped: 4e e8 55 e2 2c 0b 42 98 a2 3c 98 b2 eb f9 81 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9a08 (length 4) | ac 89 0f 66 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca99e8 (length 4) | 4f 1e d4 d5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94002af0 (length 32) | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b94002af0 (length 32) | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90007020 (length 32) | 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90007020 (length 32) | 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90004ea4 (length 20) | d8 92 f7 bc a9 41 cc 67 9f c7 f8 a4 be 5b dd 58 | 12 88 b1 a6 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b7c000c44 (length 20) | 29 c0 62 ef af bd cf dd 0b a6 06 a2 67 54 50 13 | a2 a5 41 91 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x557566ca9800 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#16 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.4f1ed4d5@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.ac890f66@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 69 d4 a1 f2 0f 7e 3b cc b6 9f 9f 8e | encrypting: eb 64 23 19 17 5f c8 6f 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 ac 89 0f 66 | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 | encrypting: 3c aa a7 7e 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 | encrypting: 77 fa 9e 7b 05 00 01 04 a7 1c 0b fe 51 cc 42 e1 | encrypting: ba 66 99 af a7 0e 96 75 39 83 d3 92 28 e2 35 82 | encrypting: f5 d4 a8 f2 fe 82 3b 27 16 57 6c 31 81 b8 3f 86 | encrypting: 37 1e 79 2e 50 17 28 10 4e 05 13 40 68 c3 26 02 | encrypting: d4 ab 57 2d dc 30 b2 4e cc 5d 15 d0 34 5f ce 36 | encrypting: 64 b8 b0 ae ba 19 72 8f dc 9d 2c 67 bc 56 27 2f | encrypting: 71 40 22 be f4 2e bf d2 72 de f1 ea 78 0c 09 c8 | encrypting: 4f b5 d9 ad 7d b9 18 ab 6c b0 2b 36 e8 d7 74 1a | encrypting: de b5 38 f2 50 1b 8a 4e 56 90 c6 05 2d 22 ff 8b | encrypting: 5c a0 64 70 c6 11 78 b7 bb 97 1f 87 e4 e3 d9 35 | encrypting: 90 87 6f ab 5c f5 85 e5 1c a2 79 19 b5 ef ef 84 | encrypting: 88 7f d6 30 7f 9a a0 c2 1f a0 ab 6e 8b 41 25 01 | encrypting: 0b 03 8a b2 7a 72 ca cb 27 84 62 b5 54 0f 85 9f | encrypting: 09 07 cb 2b b0 c6 f0 6d 83 5b e5 dc ed ff ff 80 | encrypting: 59 eb 54 2b 90 f8 7f 38 20 80 de ca 3f 32 73 46 | encrypting: 5d aa 9e cf 3f d7 de 2f 2d a1 a7 35 1f bd e0 cb | encrypting: 22 b2 85 96 69 09 2a 45 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: f8 bc b7 b5 a2 d8 43 7b 21 1e 9c 5f b6 2e 68 3a | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 0e 08 c8 38 c7 1e b0 11 3a 86 80 fe c1 66 f5 27 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #16 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #16: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #16 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #16) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 20 01 b4 3a cc 6c 00 00 01 bc e9 e0 1f b8 | e6 19 64 19 67 d3 d5 b2 19 97 1e 0b a0 a7 0d eb | 09 46 ec e1 e3 a2 73 b7 37 a1 85 6b 75 23 ed 61 | 0a 6b 11 30 97 32 41 32 74 16 9d a6 72 c0 77 8c | 6d d8 d6 4d cb e1 06 23 c8 0d 3e ee 1a 02 cd 90 | f7 c9 5b 2e 81 5d 0b e9 2d 1b ff dc e2 35 a0 53 | a1 53 5c a1 ef b5 f0 97 cc e1 c7 42 bb fd 3a 3b | c5 77 6b 4d 29 1b 68 b9 8d 06 cc 24 58 9c 3d c2 | 1a b9 48 fc 04 1b 52 72 4d 27 a9 e7 cd 97 37 c5 | b1 3c 21 3f 95 32 e7 a4 d4 4c cd dd 46 80 a4 52 | 1a da 1a eb 58 4d c0 0d 80 8d b2 b3 c3 1a 88 e3 | f5 dd 65 dc bc 58 64 13 47 4a 0c 06 28 a4 01 06 | 5e 2d e4 b5 fc 82 26 71 f8 ee 42 ad 82 e3 e6 7c | c0 80 ee d1 ab 3a 61 ed 5f 14 e2 12 92 1d 75 0a | cc ac b9 24 fc 82 67 b2 79 44 87 63 dc 31 26 17 | 9e 0b 45 12 1d d0 9c 10 4d f8 4c 45 4d db df 9e | b0 14 a2 fb 21 40 7a 77 d3 7e 8a a6 b2 a9 d4 ef | cf e3 d3 d9 bd 5e e5 ac a2 6f 9c d1 39 af 6f 3a | 0d 1c 03 46 6d e2 fa b6 73 ce cf 47 95 98 ac 82 | 18 f3 af 60 8f 9c 95 71 02 2c 7c 07 97 9b 6d 43 | 4e 62 a7 2c 4c 8b ca 55 0b 5b 62 38 51 59 61 d8 | 09 3e 45 7d 25 80 af 73 26 c4 02 e6 e7 82 08 a2 | 2f 8a a4 d2 69 b3 20 54 80 b0 17 71 7d aa 8c c7 | 8c dc bb 90 c2 5f 8e 43 cc ca 0a 05 c5 56 23 00 | 01 e1 d2 0d 49 2c f9 4d e0 88 dd 75 4c 89 ae e9 | 0e ab 4c 6c bb 60 b4 d5 50 6d a1 40 0e 08 c8 38 | c7 1e b0 11 3a 86 80 fe c1 66 f5 27 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | #16 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49496.372021 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #16: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x4f1ed4d5 <0xac890f66 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #16 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #16 spent 1.82 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84002620 | spent 0.00338 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 20 01 b4 3a cc 6c 00 00 00 3c c0 e3 98 74 | 7d e7 01 92 64 3a 46 cb ed 71 fa 0c 56 65 3b bd | b4 80 a4 62 a1 a9 1e 7e 15 6a b1 96 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3023752300 (0xb43acc6c) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #16 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #16 is idle | #16 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 0e 08 c8 38 c7 1e b0 11 3a 86 80 fe c1 66 f5 27 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 56 65 3b bd b4 80 a4 62 a1 a9 1e 7e 15 6a b1 96 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 20 01 b4 3a cc 6c 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | a5 29 8e 28 f2 7f a9 8f 63 18 c9 7d 49 ec c9 85 | 51 9e a7 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | b4 3a cc 6c | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b94002af0 (length 32) | 68 89 c0 1a 21 49 5b 9e 64 3e b8 40 80 70 de ba | 83 22 d8 63 f5 f3 55 aa fe 9d 99 b6 bb ad 0d d7 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7f9b90007020 (length 32) | 5a 8f d1 d3 94 79 6d 74 09 df 37 13 3c aa a7 7e | 1c 25 f1 0b 04 b7 b3 dc e5 7d d0 98 77 fa 9e 7b | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | a5 29 8e 28 f2 7f a9 8f 63 18 c9 7d 49 ec c9 85 | 51 9e a7 41 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | a5 29 8e 28 f2 7f a9 8f 63 18 c9 7d 49 ec c9 85 | 51 9e a7 41 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #16: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #16: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #16 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x4f1ed4d5 SPI_OUT=0xac8 | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x4f1ed4d5 SPI_OUT=0xac890f66 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x557566ca79c0,sr=0x557566ca79c0} to #16 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #15 spent 0.23 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #16 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#16) cloned from #15 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #16 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #16: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #16 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #16 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #16: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x4f1ed4d5 <0xac890f66 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #16 spent 0.302 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.535 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00406 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00354 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 05 01 31 21 73 ad 00 00 00 4c fc 68 7d 69 | f0 eb 47 7e 6f 62 d3 2d 7d 69 a1 19 62 8c 85 42 | ba 08 74 ec 99 f6 93 1c e6 9c d5 82 70 c0 e0 bd | 4e 97 93 d4 87 fc 37 71 eb 20 c5 17 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 824275885 (0x312173ad) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #16; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=b43acc6c st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #15; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #15 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | current Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 31 21 73 ad | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | b9 ed 61 b7 54 a7 a9 ee ca db c6 84 3c 97 52 81 | c0 2e 70 f2 | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: b9 ed 61 b7 54 a7 a9 ee ca db c6 84 3c 97 52 81 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 70 c0 e0 bd 4e 97 93 d4 87 fc 37 71 eb 20 c5 17 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 05 01 31 21 73 ad 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | ad 31 98 9d f2 d5 37 f6 52 75 e9 34 97 27 98 37 | 0a 28 bb 17 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 4f 1e d4 d5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 31 21 73 ad | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7f9b8c003a84 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 4f 1e d4 d5 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | ad 31 98 9d f2 d5 37 f6 52 75 e9 34 97 27 98 37 | 0a 28 bb 17 | informational HASH(1): | ad 31 98 9d f2 d5 37 f6 52 75 e9 34 97 27 98 37 | 0a 28 bb 17 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 4f 1e d4 d5 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #15: received Delete SA(0x4f1ed4d5) payload: deleting IPsec State #16 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #16: deleting other state #16 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.174s and sending notification | child state #16: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.4f1ed4d5@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.ac890f66@192.1.2.23 "east" #16: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #16 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3817967435 (0xe3918f4b) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload ac 89 0f 66 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c68 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566caee40 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d4c (length 4) | e3 91 8f 4b | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80f4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 ac 89 0f 66 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80e0 (length 20) | e7 e3 36 74 5e d6 fd 96 d3 a2 f3 7e 04 d7 10 f4 | a8 63 81 a2 | send delete HASH(1): | e7 e3 36 74 5e d6 fd 96 d3 a2 f3 7e 04 d7 10 f4 | a8 63 81 a2 | last Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | current Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d5c (length 4) | e3 91 8f 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | c4 fc 39 c6 bc 8e c2 31 e1 8e cb 03 3d 7a 04 dc | d5 a6 73 9b | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 e7 e3 36 74 5e d6 fd 96 d3 a2 f3 7e | encrypting: 04 d7 10 f4 a8 63 81 a2 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 ac 89 0f 66 | IV: c4 fc 39 c6 bc 8e c2 31 e1 8e cb 03 3d 7a 04 dc | IV: d5 a6 73 9b | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 1b 83 cc 48 28 35 e3 e0 7a e4 24 8b 67 b2 72 4d | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 05 01 e3 91 8f 4b 00 00 00 4c 20 25 c7 80 | 44 a9 23 a2 c7 45 3e cc 5c 1c a4 d6 b8 cb 4a c7 | a0 ea 56 23 fa 1e 53 c9 cc cf cf 96 1b 83 cc 48 | 28 35 e3 e0 7a e4 24 8b 67 b2 72 4d | state #16 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b80002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050850' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x4f1ed4d5 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050850' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x4f1ed4d5 SPI_OUT=0xac890f66 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.4f1ed4d5@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.4f1ed4d5@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.ac890f66@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.ac890f66@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #16 in QUICK_R2 | child state #16: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b90004120: destroyed | stop processing: state #16 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #15 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #15 | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #15: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.204s and sending notification | parent state #15: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #15 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1280504300 (0x4c52f1ec) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c08 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cec (length 4) | 4c 52 f1 ec | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8094 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 44 f9 0f 59 | 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8080 (length 20) | 3a 9a 54 81 31 bd 13 ba 9b 8b f7 68 fc b4 ca 83 | 67 0f d2 34 | send delete HASH(1): | 3a 9a 54 81 31 bd 13 ba 9b 8b f7 68 fc b4 ca 83 | 67 0f d2 34 | last Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | current Phase 1 IV: 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 0a aa 77 dc a5 f0 9b e7 a8 0b cf 38 6d df 24 a5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cfc (length 4) | 4c 52 f1 ec | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 54 55 52 da 26 a4 ca 15 c4 7c 11 3f 38 6e 5d 82 | 91 9d bb 78 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 3a 9a 54 81 31 bd 13 ba 9b 8b f7 68 | encrypting: fc b4 ca 83 67 0f d2 34 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec | encrypting: 66 ce df f3 | IV: 54 55 52 da 26 a4 ca 15 c4 7c 11 3f 38 6e 5d 82 | IV: 91 9d bb 78 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 6d 9e c4 87 1b ac 3f 0c 16 17 65 39 7c ea f6 4a | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 05 01 4c 52 f1 ec 00 00 00 5c 79 5c 9d 7b | e3 6b be d9 3a b2 d3 26 1e 7a ca 52 a6 44 20 92 | 51 1c a7 6d bb 7f 39 e0 38 20 8d d1 6a 2c 5b a6 | 2f fa 3d 1f f1 bb 3c 18 88 f2 30 47 6d 9e c4 87 | 1b ac 3f 0c 16 17 65 39 7c ea f6 4a | state #15 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940081c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #15: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b94002a80: destroyed | stop processing: state #15 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.36 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00407 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00233 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | 08 10 05 01 fb 99 aa a4 00 00 00 5c 07 53 33 a7 | dd 1d 4e 3d ce cc 82 22 ca 60 41 85 2a ec 0d bd | 75 0d 34 77 fb 1e 62 1f 3b f7 e8 09 4d 3d 0b 27 | 4c 63 b5 fe cb 50 8e 63 81 51 c5 08 c1 3d 97 ae | 6a 76 c8 51 33 f9 14 6d 59 31 94 6a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | responder cookie: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4221151908 (0xfb99aaa4) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0xfb99aaa4 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 44 f9 0f 59 01 cb 4e 70 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | f3 1b c6 ec 66 ce df f3 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0705 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00271 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 0b 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 8a 7b 33 a0 d0 9d 47 d2 | 9a 56 b4 ab 64 31 cf cd 34 12 2b 92 77 05 79 4c | creating state object #17 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #17 in UNDEFINED | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp started | #17 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #17: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d "east" #17: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #17 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #17: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.569 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00281 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | 14 00 00 24 8d a9 99 fe 20 81 51 99 d8 5b b7 94 | 63 60 01 44 65 fc 72 d6 dd 59 c3 a1 76 1d d5 7e | e0 d3 5d 16 14 00 00 18 bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae | 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d c9 c0 47 a7 00 00 00 18 | 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | 3d 83 ad 08 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #17 is idle | #17 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | c9 c0 47 a7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | natd_hash: hash= c9 c0 47 a7 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | 3d 83 ad 08 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | natd_hash: hash= 3d 83 ad 08 | expected NAT-D(me): bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | expected NAT-D(me): c9 c0 47 a7 | expected NAT-D(him): | 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | 3d 83 ad 08 | received NAT-D: bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | received NAT-D: c9 c0 47 a7 | received NAT-D: 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | received NAT-D: 3d 83 ad 08 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 19 for state #17 | state #17 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 19 for state #17 | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 19 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b880010c0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b880010c0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | Generated nonce: fc 5c 6a a4 9d d8 d2 7e d9 f3 4c 59 13 9e 2a 34 | Generated nonce: a0 02 0e 7e c0 35 a2 ad 19 3e 9b bc c5 0f 1b e1 | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 19 time elapsed 0.001081 seconds | (#17) spent 1.08 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 19: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 19 for state #17 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | suspending state #17 and saving MD | #17 is busy; has a suspended MD | #17 spent 0.202 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.349 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #17 | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 19 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #17: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b880010c0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #17 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | keyex value 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | keyex value 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | keyex value 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | keyex value 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | keyex value f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | keyex value 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | keyex value 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | keyex value 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | keyex value 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | keyex value ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | keyex value 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | keyex value 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | keyex value 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | keyex value 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | keyex value 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr fc 5c 6a a4 9d d8 d2 7e d9 f3 4c 59 13 9e 2a 34 | Nr a0 02 0e 7e c0 35 a2 ad 19 3e 9b bc c5 0f 1b e1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | 3d 83 ad 08 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | natd_hash: hash= 3d 83 ad 08 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 | NAT-D 3d 83 ad 08 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | c9 c0 47 a7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | natd_hash: rcookie= c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | natd_hash: hash= c9 c0 47 a7 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | NAT-D c9 c0 47 a7 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b880010c0: transferring ownership from state #17 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 20 for state #17 | state #17 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | #17 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #17 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #17: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #17 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | 14 00 00 24 fc 5c 6a a4 9d d8 d2 7e d9 f3 4c 59 | 13 9e 2a 34 a0 02 0e 7e c0 35 a2 ad 19 3e 9b bc | c5 0f 1b e1 14 00 00 18 3d bb 95 ae 42 54 7a 72 | 65 83 8b 40 f6 c8 9c 79 3d 83 ad 08 00 00 00 18 | bb 85 82 70 3d e6 e9 ae 9a f9 e8 39 e7 c7 f6 5d | c9 c0 47 a7 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 size 128 | #17 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49497.145076 "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #17 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #17 spent 0.403 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 20 for state #17 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 20 | peer's g: 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | peer's g: 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | peer's g: b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | peer's g: 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | peer's g: c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | peer's g: 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | peer's g: 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | peer's g: 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | peer's g: 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | peer's g: 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | peer's g: 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | peer's g: bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | peer's g: cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | peer's g: 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | peer's g: 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | peer's g: 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b880010c0: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c98060 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb33e0 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001250 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb3404 (length 32) | 8d a9 99 fe 20 81 51 99 d8 5b b7 94 63 60 01 44 | 65 fc 72 d6 dd 59 c3 a1 76 1d d5 7e e0 d3 5d 16 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb3424 (length 32) | fc 5c 6a a4 9d d8 d2 7e d9 f3 4c 59 13 9e 2a 34 | a0 02 0e 7e c0 35 a2 ad 19 3e 9b bc c5 0f 1b e1 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001270 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681728: fffffff1 ffffff8c ffffffbe 19 66 34 56 ffffffe8 7b ffffff9f 5a ffffffe7 ffffff90 ffffff97 0b ffffff80 ffffffd1 57 ffffff99 44 ffffffb0 ffffffff 2c 7d 40 36 ffffff98 ffffffca fffffff5 ffffffb8 fffffffb 51 ffffffe8 76 ffffffd1 23 ffffffd9 ffffffda ffffffde 54 ffffffba ffffffa6 ffffffcf ffffffbb 34 ffffffbb 2f 38 ffffffac 15 ffffffb9 39 fffffffc 39 ffffffa0 ffffff99 ffffffa9 39 ffffffbb 72 ffffffbc 05 ffffffaa ffffffe8 06 6a ffffff90 ffffffee 53 ffffffaa 65 ffffff8c 34 38 ffffff93 3a ffffffa6 ffffffb4 3a fffffffd ffffffd3 ffffffd0 ffffff8e ffffffb3 ffffffad ffffffdb 29 ffffff87 58 ffffff9a ffffffa7 5a 63 02 ffffffa9 fffffff2 ffffffcd 16 ffffff89 32 7f 3f ffffffbd 58 47 3d ffffffb2 2b 6e 70 5d ffffffd9 32 1e ffffffda ffffff93 ffffff81 ffffff82 fffffff7 57 11 fffffff8 5c ffffffaf 61 ffffffb2 ffffffb0 51 ffffffe7 51 6d ffffffd9 62 ffffffd0 ffffffdb 78 ffffffb9 ffffff89 4a ffffffae 1e fffffffa ffffffd0 2a ffffffce 56 fffffffa fffffff6 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b7c005f60 | unwrapped: 62 92 d6 8c b8 29 67 61 1e 63 40 2f 85 bc 07 fa | unwrapped: 2d fc cf 22 2f 56 0b 73 50 3f c3 73 18 0e 64 76 | unwrapped: 0e 6b 96 80 06 f7 e0 6e 52 d1 22 f9 20 dd a4 9e | unwrapped: e3 6f bc 19 ed 1c 21 85 7e 39 04 95 4d f7 e1 0e | unwrapped: f6 56 d5 95 d1 01 ae 13 8d bb 99 8e 2a 43 df 83 | unwrapped: 8b 03 7e 65 ea 8d e5 1e 34 0a 0b 0b aa 77 5d 76 | unwrapped: 93 de c0 ba aa 09 6e 13 88 6a b9 4d c8 0d 40 5b | unwrapped: c7 a6 c1 c9 5a 93 35 bf 9f 32 31 83 02 df a7 ff | unwrapped: 80 b3 e3 e7 d0 83 be 1f f9 fa 0d 87 81 4c a9 82 | unwrapped: f3 e5 47 75 42 0c 04 2b d8 6e 4a 4c bc 17 58 cf | unwrapped: 3c 6d cc 8a 3e ba c3 e9 c5 53 e8 b1 eb d6 55 e7 | unwrapped: b1 1b 25 73 70 4e aa 59 36 52 fc 1e 22 0d 66 11 | unwrapped: d7 9c 2e 5d be 92 43 d1 78 59 9a c8 fe 8f e3 92 | unwrapped: 52 54 08 49 ce a9 7c f5 66 af a2 33 30 62 30 b4 | unwrapped: f9 0b ee 00 e2 3d 3e 34 91 f1 c4 7b c5 35 c7 19 | unwrapped: ca ef c0 60 98 2d de 72 ea 4a 2a a9 3e a8 2f 2f | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb3644 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb364c (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001160 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681760: 48 51 79 22 2c 60 54 ffffffcc ffffff87 ffffffb5 ffffffdb 17 ffffffbc 79 38 6a ffffff82 ffffff8f 12 ffffff84 fffffff8 76 00 55 03 ffffffc5 fffffff2 11 ffffff94 ffffffaf 6d ffffffce | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b7c0030a0 | unwrapped: f9 f1 60 b2 07 a0 10 95 36 01 2e 52 6e e5 c5 e8 | unwrapped: 6c 79 b9 ad 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681760: fffffff1 ffffff8c ffffffbe 19 66 34 56 ffffffe8 7b ffffff9f 5a ffffffe7 ffffff90 ffffff97 0b ffffff80 ffffffd1 57 ffffff99 44 ffffffb0 ffffffff 2c 7d 40 36 ffffff98 ffffffca fffffff5 ffffffb8 fffffffb 51 ffffffe8 76 ffffffd1 23 ffffffd9 ffffffda ffffffde 54 ffffffba ffffffa6 ffffffcf ffffffbb 34 ffffffbb 2f 38 ffffffac 15 ffffffb9 39 fffffffc 39 ffffffa0 ffffff99 ffffffa9 39 ffffffbb 72 ffffffbc 05 ffffffaa ffffffe8 06 6a ffffff90 ffffffee 53 ffffffaa 65 ffffff8c 34 38 ffffff93 3a ffffffa6 ffffffb4 3a fffffffd ffffffd3 ffffffd0 ffffff8e ffffffb3 ffffffad ffffffdb 29 ffffff87 58 ffffff9a ffffffa7 5a 63 02 ffffffa9 fffffff2 ffffffcd 16 ffffff89 32 7f 3f ffffffbd 58 47 3d ffffffb2 2b 6e 70 5d ffffffd9 32 1e ffffffda ffffff93 ffffff81 ffffff82 fffffff7 57 11 fffffff8 5c ffffffaf 61 ffffffb2 ffffffb0 51 ffffffe7 51 6d ffffffd9 62 ffffffd0 ffffffdb 78 ffffffb9 ffffff89 4a ffffffae 1e fffffffa ffffffd0 2a ffffffce 56 fffffffa fffffff6 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b7c005e50 | unwrapped: 62 92 d6 8c b8 29 67 61 1e 63 40 2f 85 bc 07 fa | unwrapped: 2d fc cf 22 2f 56 0b 73 50 3f c3 73 18 0e 64 76 | unwrapped: 0e 6b 96 80 06 f7 e0 6e 52 d1 22 f9 20 dd a4 9e | unwrapped: e3 6f bc 19 ed 1c 21 85 7e 39 04 95 4d f7 e1 0e | unwrapped: f6 56 d5 95 d1 01 ae 13 8d bb 99 8e 2a 43 df 83 | unwrapped: 8b 03 7e 65 ea 8d e5 1e 34 0a 0b 0b aa 77 5d 76 | unwrapped: 93 de c0 ba aa 09 6e 13 88 6a b9 4d c8 0d 40 5b | unwrapped: c7 a6 c1 c9 5a 93 35 bf 9f 32 31 83 02 df a7 ff | unwrapped: 80 b3 e3 e7 d0 83 be 1f f9 fa 0d 87 81 4c a9 82 | unwrapped: f3 e5 47 75 42 0c 04 2b d8 6e 4a 4c bc 17 58 cf | unwrapped: 3c 6d cc 8a 3e ba c3 e9 c5 53 e8 b1 eb d6 55 e7 | unwrapped: b1 1b 25 73 70 4e aa 59 36 52 fc 1e 22 0d 66 11 | unwrapped: d7 9c 2e 5d be 92 43 d1 78 59 9a c8 fe 8f e3 92 | unwrapped: 52 54 08 49 ce a9 7c f5 66 af a2 33 30 62 30 b4 | unwrapped: f9 0b ee 00 e2 3d 3e 34 91 f1 c4 7b c5 35 c7 19 | unwrapped: ca ef c0 60 98 2d de 72 ea 4a 2a a9 3e a8 2f 2f | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb3644 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb364c (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c688 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b7c002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c003f20 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681744: 6b 0d 1d 06 78 76 ffffffd2 ffffff8c 0e ffffffb6 34 61 66 ffffffff ffffffa0 ffffffeb ffffff90 ffffff83 48 ffffff80 34 7c 22 ffffffdd 10 ffffffc9 ffffffb9 24 ffffffcd ffffffc5 42 6f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b7c0064b0 | unwrapped: 53 1b cb 11 08 40 3c c9 d9 ba 4c 80 9e b7 cc f4 | unwrapped: 9b bd 47 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1688681744: fffffff1 ffffff8c ffffffbe 19 66 34 56 ffffffe8 7b ffffff9f 5a ffffffe7 ffffff90 ffffff97 0b ffffff80 ffffffd1 57 ffffff99 44 ffffffb0 ffffffff 2c 7d 40 36 ffffff98 ffffffca fffffff5 ffffffb8 fffffffb 51 ffffffe8 76 ffffffd1 23 ffffffd9 ffffffda ffffffde 54 ffffffba ffffffa6 ffffffcf ffffffbb 34 ffffffbb 2f 38 ffffffac 15 ffffffb9 39 fffffffc 39 ffffffa0 ffffff99 ffffffa9 39 ffffffbb 72 ffffffbc 05 ffffffaa ffffffe8 06 6a ffffff90 ffffffee 53 ffffffaa 65 ffffff8c 34 38 ffffff93 3a ffffffa6 ffffffb4 3a fffffffd ffffffd3 ffffffd0 ffffff8e ffffffb3 ffffffad ffffffdb 29 ffffff87 58 ffffff9a ffffffa7 5a 63 02 ffffffa9 fffffff2 ffffffcd 16 ffffff89 32 7f 3f ffffffbd 58 47 3d ffffffb2 2b 6e 70 5d ffffffd9 32 1e ffffffda ffffff93 ffffff81 ffffff82 fffffff7 57 11 fffffff8 5c ffffffaf 61 ffffffb2 ffffffb0 51 ffffffe7 51 6d ffffffd9 62 ffffffd0 ffffffdb 78 ffffffb9 ffffff89 4a ffffffae 1e fffffffa ffffffd0 2a ffffffce 56 fffffffa fffffff6 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b7c001cd0 | unwrapped: 62 92 d6 8c b8 29 67 61 1e 63 40 2f 85 bc 07 fa | unwrapped: 2d fc cf 22 2f 56 0b 73 50 3f c3 73 18 0e 64 76 | unwrapped: 0e 6b 96 80 06 f7 e0 6e 52 d1 22 f9 20 dd a4 9e | unwrapped: e3 6f bc 19 ed 1c 21 85 7e 39 04 95 4d f7 e1 0e | unwrapped: f6 56 d5 95 d1 01 ae 13 8d bb 99 8e 2a 43 df 83 | unwrapped: 8b 03 7e 65 ea 8d e5 1e 34 0a 0b 0b aa 77 5d 76 | unwrapped: 93 de c0 ba aa 09 6e 13 88 6a b9 4d c8 0d 40 5b | unwrapped: c7 a6 c1 c9 5a 93 35 bf 9f 32 31 83 02 df a7 ff | unwrapped: 80 b3 e3 e7 d0 83 be 1f f9 fa 0d 87 81 4c a9 82 | unwrapped: f3 e5 47 75 42 0c 04 2b d8 6e 4a 4c bc 17 58 cf | unwrapped: 3c 6d cc 8a 3e ba c3 e9 c5 53 e8 b1 eb d6 55 e7 | unwrapped: b1 1b 25 73 70 4e aa 59 36 52 fc 1e 22 0d 66 11 | unwrapped: d7 9c 2e 5d be 92 43 d1 78 59 9a c8 fe 8f e3 92 | unwrapped: 52 54 08 49 ce a9 7c f5 66 af a2 33 30 62 30 b4 | unwrapped: f9 0b ee 00 e2 3d 3e 34 91 f1 c4 7b c5 35 c7 19 | unwrapped: ca ef c0 60 98 2d de 72 ea 4a 2a a9 3e a8 2f 2f | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb3644 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb364c (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c698 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9b58c6f8 | result: keymat-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_a 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_e 0x557566c999c0, enc_key 0x557566c8d6a0 | DH_i: 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | DH_i: 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | DH_i: b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | DH_i: 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | DH_i: c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | DH_i: 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | DH_i: 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | DH_i: 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | DH_i: 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | DH_i: 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | DH_i: 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | DH_i: bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | DH_i: cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | DH_i: 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | DH_i: 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | DH_i: 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | DH_r: 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | DH_r: 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | DH_r: 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | DH_r: 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | DH_r: 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | DH_r: f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | DH_r: 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | DH_r: 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | DH_r: 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | DH_r: 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | DH_r: ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | DH_r: 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | DH_r: 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | DH_r: 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | DH_r: 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | DH_r: 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb3444 (length 256) | 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb3544 (length 256) | 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b7c001fc0 (length 20) | 3a 3b db b4 1a 30 93 3f 5f 18 a7 42 91 c8 5d 62 | ff af d6 e6 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 20 time elapsed 0.002123 seconds | (#17) spent 2.06 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 20: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 20 for state #17 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c001090 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #17 | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 20 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #17: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b880010c0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #17 | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #17 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #17 spent 0.0219 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c001090 | spent 0.00257 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 9b 2e 69 0d | 23 c7 5c 05 21 a9 fc 93 e6 ec 77 d5 0b ed 01 0d | fc b2 4a 4a 0c 31 88 63 ca d3 f0 75 43 97 41 8a | ce 33 61 4c 76 b9 99 57 be 48 94 ec | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 3a 3b db b4 1a 30 93 3f 5f 18 a7 42 91 c8 5d 62 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 43 97 41 8a ce 33 61 4c 76 b9 99 57 be 48 94 ec | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 13 67 7a 67 | 19 73 a8 97 d9 bf 59 83 6b 74 16 2a 28 1c c7 89 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #17: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90000b20 (length 256) | 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b880010e0 (length 256) | 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c003a70 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | 13 67 7a 67 19 73 a8 97 d9 bf 59 83 6b 74 16 2a | 28 1c c7 89 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b7c001fc0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b880010e0 (length 256) | 94 b7 f0 01 01 46 c5 bb 37 f2 5a 31 58 5b 69 7d | 55 12 9b c5 07 86 02 ff 5b 55 fc 6b 49 ac 01 c3 | 2f 51 7f d7 c7 59 b3 24 3b 3c 10 5f 44 26 51 a7 | 89 15 9a 7e 1b 94 41 22 b4 c6 bf 7f a9 15 06 8b | 24 11 23 95 60 0b 58 e6 e4 87 6d 91 8c 53 a2 f2 | f0 7f 38 f3 88 18 e6 e5 07 a3 73 17 89 3d 77 b3 | 8b 92 a9 d8 ab 58 93 49 52 cb bf 08 03 67 bc 9d | 25 5b ce bd 57 22 05 76 65 8d a1 25 dc f2 e1 35 | 3c aa 9c da 69 e2 02 d2 7a 11 8f 46 db 6f 1c cf | 1e 89 b1 32 9b d9 d5 c9 9b 4c a7 89 4a db bb 8d | ac 96 fa fc b3 8d d5 cf 36 7f 98 7d 62 d3 a9 c7 | 84 c0 5d 12 4c cc 7d 7b 60 ad 64 b7 bb e1 37 5a | 6f c1 a3 c9 ff 77 41 ad 66 76 3d 24 31 ab 39 3c | 0e 54 66 d1 dc 52 7c d2 eb e8 e0 73 39 de a0 e4 | 5b d2 3e 3e 2e 27 a9 7d fc 33 6d 8d 7d 64 89 7c | 96 b9 46 e1 3d 53 36 6e e7 22 72 50 d9 6e 8c 35 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90000b20 (length 256) | 26 33 d1 64 9a 48 c2 f3 4d 7f 86 5f 9b ce 29 53 | 50 52 c4 7a 36 c2 d2 c1 fc 06 16 78 40 eb 21 b3 | b1 8d 5d fc f7 22 80 02 84 f5 03 cb da 60 7b 0b | 23 5f 54 18 84 fb 0c d2 bd 5f 56 10 e5 2d 49 f1 | c1 16 b4 29 2b bd ff 71 95 17 e5 bc 75 53 ae 6c | 56 c3 5b f1 2b 7a 35 f7 90 0a 2e 60 26 77 2e 8a | 7d 42 ec f6 c9 00 34 f4 ad 68 31 38 10 55 ff b1 | 2a 9e 84 6e 28 35 03 c5 61 8e bf 70 86 2e d5 6f | 4f ee 14 50 94 15 88 e2 2c e0 1c a6 9c f3 3d d6 | 57 31 a1 18 65 d7 39 1f 22 5a 98 5a 2a f2 88 cf | 40 a0 78 7e 51 eb 84 0e 52 78 e6 1b fc 2f 3e ac | bc 67 40 84 73 2b e7 99 06 74 8a 4a ef 00 7e ce | cc 25 50 50 d4 fd 16 d8 f1 03 51 c6 3b 73 05 df | 48 78 b1 86 ec f4 ab 73 5d 27 e9 c2 a7 40 9e 71 | 38 32 23 57 96 af 52 ae 93 55 3e 81 f5 8a ca 74 | 4c 38 08 ac 26 20 38 89 83 0a bb 81 f0 93 1b 78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | 81 b1 6c fd ff c9 db 34 6d b6 98 15 c0 65 23 0e | 0b 0c 11 af | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 81 b1 6c fd ff c9 db 34 6d b6 98 15 c0 65 23 0e | HASH_R 0b 0c 11 af | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 81 b1 6c fd ff c9 db 34 6d b6 98 15 c0 65 23 0e | encrypting: 0b 0c 11 af | IV: 43 97 41 8a ce 33 61 4c 76 b9 99 57 be 48 94 ec | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #17 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #17: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #17 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #17 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c a4 dd 46 33 | 6d 9b 66 7b 09 e7 4b 8e 45 44 c5 36 24 24 39 7e | 81 44 5d b9 c8 7a f8 ac 9e 9b e3 d8 69 4c e2 68 | 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 size 128 | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #17 | #17 spent 0.639 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.791 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00329 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 08 10 20 01 ed 17 57 64 00 00 01 bc 5a b9 5e b6 | a6 d7 ce 06 27 bc 92 d4 9e 2f 14 ad c3 0e df 2e | e3 88 81 67 87 ae ad 4b 21 62 1a 07 32 5c 1c 13 | 6a 27 c4 df 70 a0 fd 26 b0 a0 7a 04 a1 6f 11 9e | 6b f2 0e 20 44 5e e4 11 07 28 1c be 50 fb bd 9e | d4 b8 4b f7 e4 ac d7 3d 1f 3b 28 62 7a 1c 47 74 | 10 39 2d 29 07 3c 48 9b 7b c4 01 d0 ef e5 18 c7 | e7 be c5 51 81 a9 b8 3e 92 a8 05 fc db ad 49 43 | b4 97 70 fd 5b 75 6d bc fe 8e f6 72 c8 8c 45 e4 | 33 b2 c3 0f 51 01 c1 3d db 00 bc 31 8c a6 4d 07 | 68 88 e8 66 f7 50 d3 f2 8b 6f 18 63 26 a5 a0 55 | f4 58 9a d1 82 bc a0 64 4b ab 7b 96 0b b2 62 fc | b3 c4 4c 39 db a6 b9 9e 6a fb 72 b7 36 f0 dc 64 | 1d 12 de 6a ae 07 4d 7d 08 18 6a 42 34 1e 77 ed | 47 17 90 66 bd eb b6 3d 7f b9 bf 1a 21 d0 3e 8c | 25 ec 59 47 c7 d9 54 97 c3 ad 3b ac 93 c0 b6 d8 | ab 2e 84 19 81 49 6a 56 be 98 6f 9c 15 52 6c ed | c3 df b7 e3 4d 10 0e 37 2d 49 08 d5 cf 9b 3a c0 | f6 8f 2a 5c 41 08 e6 85 ed 20 8d f5 25 12 d1 c9 | af e4 e8 d4 94 78 5c bf ec 7a d7 0b 77 6f 63 d9 | dc 1a 28 2e 5d 2e 46 ea 4b 4b aa de d4 70 78 8a | ea 5c 80 29 ef 5d ee 68 4c 28 ac 10 90 2c d2 02 | dd f9 1c b2 4a 1a 5a a3 46 50 82 25 33 93 7c 84 | b9 49 9c bb 39 57 b7 28 05 59 0b 10 ee 2c 46 63 | 1a 85 14 9e aa d0 2a 87 60 aa 77 14 86 5d a0 7b | 77 7c 87 ce ab fc 84 4a af 25 2c 77 6b 5b 37 50 | e7 b2 83 30 f0 8c 3c f0 5f 35 40 ad | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3977729892 (0xed175764) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | current Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | ed 17 57 64 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 86 ca 21 13 3e 0d 94 02 00 51 09 82 e9 86 72 4c | 1c e8 03 9e | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 86 ca 21 13 3e 0d 94 02 00 51 09 82 e9 86 72 4c | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 6b 5b 37 50 e7 b2 83 30 f0 8c 3c f0 5f 35 40 ad | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 08 10 20 01 ed 17 57 64 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | df 9b 59 e2 40 86 e1 39 97 0c f4 ba a3 16 07 c9 | b3 16 d4 7a 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 41 2e 32 f3 00 00 00 1c | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 e9 30 c2 e0 | 79 eb df 9d bf ae a7 2f 7e cf 21 dd a2 46 27 1e | 96 c3 f7 7c f4 e2 53 ef 58 a8 b3 68 05 00 01 04 | 64 1b 95 9a d2 d5 51 22 4b 46 68 01 e8 1b 4f 36 | 5c e3 6a 30 f9 62 d0 91 25 47 41 9b 7b 25 15 55 | 9f cd 01 c8 d6 e5 78 3e 0e ee 1a 7a 6f c9 9c 09 | c5 1f d5 ec e2 4d 4f 0d 7b 87 f6 f2 97 c4 ce 82 | 62 94 c0 c3 81 a3 d9 0b e6 50 60 a4 e4 2c 48 2d | c3 b1 3c b7 09 5a 34 24 34 06 57 88 e7 ea 2a c9 | f4 67 8f aa f9 ad ae c9 25 6c 20 1d c5 34 09 7e | 7e e4 47 3c a3 d5 a0 23 99 a7 1a ba 3a b4 8b 33 | 92 b2 a7 ad 2c 03 cb 07 7e 14 45 37 33 ac d2 9e | 9c 57 01 20 29 5f 9e 4f a4 22 e6 66 2a 0a e1 9a | b4 77 42 2a c7 df 40 f0 79 07 8f 69 3d df 6f 79 | 57 d9 a7 fe 7d 4b b1 71 2c cc f3 6d 84 9f cd 40 | d5 dd 4c ba f1 79 ba 7d 98 15 2c 3a b8 07 e4 c2 | 2a fe eb e1 d4 f8 e9 44 81 2c b1 eb ad c5 6e 32 | 88 21 85 bb 6f 3c 95 bc 19 9a 2d eb 5d 55 86 67 | bb 04 55 c3 3e c3 2d 52 f6 25 b1 93 63 d6 50 5f | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | ed 17 57 64 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566cadc54 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 41 2e 32 f3 00 00 00 1c 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 e9 30 c2 e0 79 eb df 9d | bf ae a7 2f 7e cf 21 dd a2 46 27 1e 96 c3 f7 7c | f4 e2 53 ef 58 a8 b3 68 05 00 01 04 64 1b 95 9a | d2 d5 51 22 4b 46 68 01 e8 1b 4f 36 5c e3 6a 30 | f9 62 d0 91 25 47 41 9b 7b 25 15 55 9f cd 01 c8 | d6 e5 78 3e 0e ee 1a 7a 6f c9 9c 09 c5 1f d5 ec | e2 4d 4f 0d 7b 87 f6 f2 97 c4 ce 82 62 94 c0 c3 | 81 a3 d9 0b e6 50 60 a4 e4 2c 48 2d c3 b1 3c b7 | 09 5a 34 24 34 06 57 88 e7 ea 2a c9 f4 67 8f aa | f9 ad ae c9 25 6c 20 1d c5 34 09 7e 7e e4 47 3c | a3 d5 a0 23 99 a7 1a ba 3a b4 8b 33 92 b2 a7 ad | 2c 03 cb 07 7e 14 45 37 33 ac d2 9e 9c 57 01 20 | 29 5f 9e 4f a4 22 e6 66 2a 0a e1 9a b4 77 42 2a | c7 df 40 f0 79 07 8f 69 3d df 6f 79 57 d9 a7 fe | 7d 4b b1 71 2c cc f3 6d 84 9f cd 40 d5 dd 4c ba | f1 79 ba 7d 98 15 2c 3a b8 07 e4 c2 2a fe eb e1 | d4 f8 e9 44 81 2c b1 eb ad c5 6e 32 88 21 85 bb | 6f 3c 95 bc 19 9a 2d eb 5d 55 86 67 bb 04 55 c3 | 3e c3 2d 52 f6 25 b1 93 63 d6 50 5f 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | df 9b 59 e2 40 86 e1 39 97 0c f4 ba a3 16 07 c9 | b3 16 d4 7a | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | df 9b 59 e2 40 86 e1 39 97 0c f4 ba a3 16 07 c9 | b3 16 d4 7a | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #17: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #18 at 0x557566ca9800 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #18 in UNDEFINED | pstats #18 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #17 "east" as #18 for IPSEC SA | #18 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #17.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #18: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 41 2e 32 f3 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 "east" #18: IPsec encryption transform AES_CBC did not specify required KEY_LENGTH attribute | ignoring ESP proposal with NULLed or unknown encryption "east" #18: no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #18 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #18: sending encrypted notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1822075311 (0x6c9aa9af) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9958 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a3c (length 4) | 6c 9a a9 af | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9cf4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9ce0 (length 20) | d1 ed 15 fc 1b 9d 97 a7 af b9 a9 21 01 02 c8 df | 9f ab 52 7a | send notification HASH(1): | d1 ed 15 fc 1b 9d 97 a7 af b9 a9 21 01 02 c8 df | 9f ab 52 7a | last Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | current Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a4c (length 4) | 6c 9a a9 af | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 31 9f 3d 44 a0 94 e3 b7 08 1b 8a 5c 3d 08 8a 5d | bc 12 f6 22 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 d1 ed 15 fc 1b 9d 97 a7 af b9 a9 21 | encrypting: 01 02 c8 df 9f ab 52 7a 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0e | IV: 31 9f 3d 44 a0 94 e3 b7 08 1b 8a 5c 3d 08 8a 5d | IV: bc 12 f6 22 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: a1 7f 9f 22 1f f4 d6 99 5e 6e 84 f7 7a 2c 0f c5 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #18) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 08 10 05 01 6c 9a a9 af 00 00 00 4c 53 4c b7 5e | d9 a7 88 f5 44 5f de 2e cc 9d 81 07 89 64 1f 7c | f5 fd 2a c7 d6 b9 9c 9f da 13 62 65 a1 7f 9f 22 | 1f f4 d6 99 5e 6e 84 f7 7a 2c 0f c5 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | pstats #18 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #18: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #18: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #18: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #18 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #18: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #18 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #17 spent 0.651 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.05 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00323 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 08 10 05 01 bc 24 21 ea 00 00 00 5c a4 a7 7c 8c | 7d 32 78 e7 75 9a bc 4e f7 87 8f b5 47 75 4c 62 | c1 a8 74 4e a2 76 38 00 c9 79 84 1e 5e 73 05 2d | c8 1a e7 b3 00 b7 2c 4f 3d 29 44 c2 49 e2 09 33 | c8 54 e4 f0 56 a1 1c 44 5a f1 ed ce | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3156484586 (0xbc2421ea) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #17; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #17 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | current Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | bc 24 21 ea | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | a4 fe ca 28 3c 67 eb 8b 04 b7 72 dc bb d7 9b 04 | e5 4b 37 f7 | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: a4 fe ca 28 3c 67 eb 8b 04 b7 72 dc bb d7 9b 04 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 49 e2 09 33 c8 54 e4 f0 56 a1 1c 44 5a f1 ed ce | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 08 10 05 01 bc 24 21 ea 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | b7 65 c8 00 d2 eb 3b f1 9b 4d a2 74 5b 41 f1 ec | 41 33 0d 89 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | bc 24 21 ea | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c8f104 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 4d 84 c6 5a | 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | b7 65 c8 00 d2 eb 3b f1 9b 4d a2 74 5b 41 f1 ec | 41 33 0d 89 | informational HASH(1): | b7 65 c8 00 d2 eb 3b f1 9b 4d a2 74 5b 41 f1 ec | 41 33 0d 89 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #17: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #17 | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #17: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.544s and sending notification | parent state #17: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #17 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | responder cookie: | c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1651349130 (0x626d968a) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cc8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c9b240 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dac (length 4) | 62 6d 96 8a | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8154 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 4d 84 c6 5a | 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8140 (length 20) | 2e f6 76 38 6d 0f 95 35 06 c6 c8 5e b4 1b dc b2 | 65 db 09 4f | send delete HASH(1): | 2e f6 76 38 6d 0f 95 35 06 c6 c8 5e b4 1b dc b2 | 65 db 09 4f | last Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | current Phase 1 IV: 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 16) | 69 4c e2 68 7f a9 11 35 d4 c8 d8 c3 a1 e3 65 c3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7dbc (length 4) | 62 6d 96 8a | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | 29 74 10 33 f1 06 79 8d 14 56 76 ee 1c c7 cf b9 | d6 95 be e5 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 2e f6 76 38 6d 0f 95 35 06 c6 c8 5e | encrypting: b4 1b dc b2 65 db 09 4f 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 | encrypting: b7 09 8a 39 | IV: 29 74 10 33 f1 06 79 8d 14 56 76 ee 1c c7 cf b9 | IV: d6 95 be e5 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: f3 33 73 a0 38 5b f9 80 b6 7b 96 e5 fa c2 4c f1 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 4d 84 c6 5a 3d fd 24 3d c4 36 a2 a2 b7 09 8a 39 | 08 10 05 01 62 6d 96 8a 00 00 00 5c 54 43 6e 5a | 87 36 32 1f dc 0c ad 0f 95 e0 56 84 b4 86 1d 91 | 5f e1 02 96 bf 92 13 38 fa ce dc 35 2e da e5 98 | 9f 60 5c 35 09 99 4b 22 d7 7c 37 20 f3 33 73 a0 | 38 5b f9 80 b6 7b 96 e5 fa c2 4c f1 | state #17 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #17: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b880010c0: destroyed | stop processing: state #17 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c98060 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.602 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00255 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 0c 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b 4b 2a 4c 45 65 53 2a 71 | a7 66 c4 b6 8e 66 64 b7 64 f8 db ec 85 d0 6c 7e | creating state object #19 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #19 in UNDEFINED | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp started | #19 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #19: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 "east" #19: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #19 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #19: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 size 128 "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.558 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00232 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | 14 00 00 24 29 4d 9a c7 96 13 10 8c e7 34 9c f7 | 5d 6b 8b 47 58 87 e4 f2 12 eb c4 b9 26 de 10 fc | 22 f1 18 f8 14 00 00 18 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 | 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc 80 e8 a6 37 00 00 00 18 | ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | ed 9d 52 2c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #19 is idle | #19 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | 80 e8 a6 37 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | natd_hash: rcookie= f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | natd_hash: hash= 80 e8 a6 37 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | ed 9d 52 2c | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | natd_hash: rcookie= f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | natd_hash: hash= ed 9d 52 2c | expected NAT-D(me): 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | expected NAT-D(me): 80 e8 a6 37 | expected NAT-D(him): | ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | ed 9d 52 2c | received NAT-D: 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | received NAT-D: 80 e8 a6 37 | received NAT-D: ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | received NAT-D: ed 9d 52 2c | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 21 for state #19 | state #19 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #19 and saving MD | #19 is busy; has a suspended MD | #19 spent 0.229 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.397 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 21 for state #19 | crypto helper 5 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 21 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80002a80: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b80002a80 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | Generated nonce: d0 b6 00 34 fd 8b c5 05 e2 e4 d8 f7 42 59 16 61 | Generated nonce: 46 26 62 99 5f bd 38 37 69 01 ac f9 5b 33 f1 5b | crypto helper 5 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 21 time elapsed 0.000993 seconds | (#19) spent 0.993 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 21: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 21 for state #19 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800081c0 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #19 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 21 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #19: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80002a80: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #19 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | keyex value 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | keyex value b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | keyex value af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | keyex value 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | keyex value 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | keyex value 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | keyex value ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | keyex value 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | keyex value be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | keyex value 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | keyex value 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | keyex value ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | keyex value 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | keyex value ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | keyex value aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr d0 b6 00 34 fd 8b c5 05 e2 e4 d8 f7 42 59 16 61 | Nr 46 26 62 99 5f bd 38 37 69 01 ac f9 5b 33 f1 5b | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | ed 9d 52 2c | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | natd_hash: rcookie= f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | natd_hash: hash= ed 9d 52 2c | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 | NAT-D ed 9d 52 2c | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | 80 e8 a6 37 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | natd_hash: rcookie= f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | natd_hash: hash= 80 e8 a6 37 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | NAT-D 80 e8 a6 37 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80002a80: transferring ownership from state #19 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 22 for state #19 | state #19 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 size 128 | #19 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #19 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #19: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #19 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | 14 00 00 24 d0 b6 00 34 fd 8b c5 05 e2 e4 d8 f7 | 42 59 16 61 46 26 62 99 5f bd 38 37 69 01 ac f9 | 5b 33 f1 5b 14 00 00 18 ca 90 66 62 f6 ba 38 33 | 50 e2 b3 5c 80 b0 1b 13 ed 9d 52 2c 00 00 00 18 | 6f 64 c4 14 ad ae fd 05 27 bd 5d 75 20 de 0a bc | 80 e8 a6 37 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 size 128 | #19 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49498.260698 "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #19 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #19 spent 0.379 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800081c0 | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 22 for state #19 | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 22 | peer's g: fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | peer's g: 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | peer's g: e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | peer's g: e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | peer's g: 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | peer's g: 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | peer's g: 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | peer's g: 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | peer's g: 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | peer's g: 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | peer's g: 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | peer's g: 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | peer's g: a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | peer's g: 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | peer's g: 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | peer's g: 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80002a80: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566c8d6a0 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb33e0 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940020e0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb3404 (length 32) | 29 4d 9a c7 96 13 10 8c e7 34 9c f7 5d 6b 8b 47 | 58 87 e4 f2 12 eb c4 b9 26 de 10 fc 22 f1 18 f8 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb3424 (length 32) | d0 b6 00 34 fd 8b c5 05 e2 e4 d8 f7 42 59 16 61 | 46 26 62 99 5f bd 38 37 69 01 ac f9 5b 33 f1 5b | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b94004ba0 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289024: 00 ffffffc7 17 58 6b 19 ffffff8a ffffffb3 ffffff98 ffffffa4 0a ffffffad 2d ffffffdf 45 70 ffffffb9 ffffffbd 3f ffffffcb ffffffd4 ffffffc0 35 ffffffdb 0c fffffff7 36 45 7e fffffffb 7f 12 56 fffffff1 15 ffffffad 7f 04 2a ffffff99 fffffff7 ffffffc2 fffffffb ffffff8a 1a ffffff90 ffffffca 04 ffffffe3 ffffffb0 ffffffae ffffffd4 3f 72 73 ffffffca ffffff8b ffffffd6 ffffffb1 1f 5f 0d ffffff95 5d 15 ffffffca 50 ffffffb9 ffffffb7 4e ffffffef 6e fffffffd 65 ffffffeb 56 24 ffffffb2 2e 67 fffffff7 5e ffffffce ffffffb4 7d ffffffc1 ffffffa3 fffffffc ffffffdd ffffffcf 3e fffffff7 17 ffffffc9 ffffffa8 62 ffffffc2 ffffffbb 0a ffffff8c ffffffec ffffffa3 ffffff82 1e 3b 5f ffffffa4 fffffff9 00 ffffff9c ffffffd6 1e ffffffc8 ffffffe9 ffffffc5 ffffff9f 36 34 ffffffa1 ffffffe7 ffffffea 0e 20 ffffff88 ffffff96 fffffff2 fffffff9 57 ffffffc1 fffffff7 6d 11 ffffffad ffffff8e ffffffbf ffffff9e 21 16 68 48 1c 47 ffffffdd ffffffe6 30 fffffff8 7f 40 ffffffe4 5c fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b940060b0 | unwrapped: 14 83 ad 38 3f 0b 79 38 8c 97 19 fb ec 65 c9 e9 | unwrapped: 27 d2 c7 83 84 92 43 5d 1c 9f 98 4b a4 45 aa 4b | unwrapped: f6 bf 2f f0 52 be d5 11 11 b9 74 a8 06 3d ae dc | unwrapped: 92 8e 32 ae 2e d6 4b 1f 44 5b 7f 46 d1 89 64 0f | unwrapped: 12 37 49 ba f5 6d ea d6 52 1a d7 6e 7f ad a6 63 | unwrapped: 21 6f bd a7 b9 1f 9d 6d 1b f2 88 ce e9 ed 60 2b | unwrapped: c3 24 1a b4 35 68 aa 68 6a 68 8c e2 48 63 af 17 | unwrapped: 8c 8f cf 61 b9 40 c9 4c 5d 01 30 1b f1 f2 f4 2e | unwrapped: 34 7d 9e 2a 77 4a e7 8b 8f 6e 92 48 82 3e ea 7a | unwrapped: 8b f9 e1 e8 10 b3 d1 e9 45 17 19 b6 e5 22 69 74 | unwrapped: 5d c3 01 e3 ec 92 0f be 50 2d 90 47 39 7e 42 99 | unwrapped: ea 34 3b 4a 87 87 34 c4 72 ca 30 be cb 9d 90 7a | unwrapped: 3f 71 22 d7 85 94 2f e3 a8 6a 76 d1 fc 56 83 0f | unwrapped: 11 b8 b1 80 aa 9e f4 bc 73 9f f6 61 da 48 c3 b4 | unwrapped: db 43 9b 86 ea 50 2c 02 ce 3b 50 d9 0e bd d1 a3 | unwrapped: a1 87 de 8d 1b 6f fb 00 6f 61 d6 1e bb 53 9d e1 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb3644 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb364c (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940013a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289056: 66 ffffffd7 79 ffffffe8 1d 64 ffffffc2 18 00 ffffff98 2f 5d 57 ffffffd8 ffffffff 28 36 03 0c ffffffd0 64 ffffffd5 0b ffffffe4 ffffff89 ffffffd8 6a 03 18 ffffffcd ffffffbf ffffffde | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b94004bc0 | unwrapped: 8f ce 43 70 02 1d 24 1b aa a5 df 8b c4 49 30 40 | unwrapped: 56 ec 8d 51 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289056: 00 ffffffc7 17 58 6b 19 ffffff8a ffffffb3 ffffff98 ffffffa4 0a ffffffad 2d ffffffdf 45 70 ffffffb9 ffffffbd 3f ffffffcb ffffffd4 ffffffc0 35 ffffffdb 0c fffffff7 36 45 7e fffffffb 7f 12 56 fffffff1 15 ffffffad 7f 04 2a ffffff99 fffffff7 ffffffc2 fffffffb ffffff8a 1a ffffff90 ffffffca 04 ffffffe3 ffffffb0 ffffffae ffffffd4 3f 72 73 ffffffca ffffff8b ffffffd6 ffffffb1 1f 5f 0d ffffff95 5d 15 ffffffca 50 ffffffb9 ffffffb7 4e ffffffef 6e fffffffd 65 ffffffeb 56 24 ffffffb2 2e 67 fffffff7 5e ffffffce ffffffb4 7d ffffffc1 ffffffa3 fffffffc ffffffdd ffffffcf 3e fffffff7 17 ffffffc9 ffffffa8 62 ffffffc2 ffffffbb 0a ffffff8c ffffffec ffffffa3 ffffff82 1e 3b 5f ffffffa4 fffffff9 00 ffffff9c ffffffd6 1e ffffffc8 ffffffe9 ffffffc5 ffffff9f 36 34 ffffffa1 ffffffe7 ffffffea 0e 20 ffffff88 ffffff96 fffffff2 fffffff9 57 ffffffc1 fffffff7 6d 11 ffffffad ffffff8e ffffffbf ffffff9e 21 16 68 48 1c 47 ffffffdd ffffffe6 30 fffffff8 7f 40 ffffffe4 5c fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b94005fa0 | unwrapped: 14 83 ad 38 3f 0b 79 38 8c 97 19 fb ec 65 c9 e9 | unwrapped: 27 d2 c7 83 84 92 43 5d 1c 9f 98 4b a4 45 aa 4b | unwrapped: f6 bf 2f f0 52 be d5 11 11 b9 74 a8 06 3d ae dc | unwrapped: 92 8e 32 ae 2e d6 4b 1f 44 5b 7f 46 d1 89 64 0f | unwrapped: 12 37 49 ba f5 6d ea d6 52 1a d7 6e 7f ad a6 63 | unwrapped: 21 6f bd a7 b9 1f 9d 6d 1b f2 88 ce e9 ed 60 2b | unwrapped: c3 24 1a b4 35 68 aa 68 6a 68 8c e2 48 63 af 17 | unwrapped: 8c 8f cf 61 b9 40 c9 4c 5d 01 30 1b f1 f2 f4 2e | unwrapped: 34 7d 9e 2a 77 4a e7 8b 8f 6e 92 48 82 3e ea 7a | unwrapped: 8b f9 e1 e8 10 b3 d1 e9 45 17 19 b6 e5 22 69 74 | unwrapped: 5d c3 01 e3 ec 92 0f be 50 2d 90 47 39 7e 42 99 | unwrapped: ea 34 3b 4a 87 87 34 c4 72 ca 30 be cb 9d 90 7a | unwrapped: 3f 71 22 d7 85 94 2f e3 a8 6a 76 d1 fc 56 83 0f | unwrapped: 11 b8 b1 80 aa 9e f4 bc 73 9f f6 61 da 48 c3 b4 | unwrapped: db 43 9b 86 ea 50 2c 02 ce 3b 50 d9 0e bd d1 a3 | unwrapped: a1 87 de 8d 1b 6f fb 00 6f 61 d6 1e bb 53 9d e1 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb3644 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb364c (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d688 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b94000d60 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289040: ffffffb9 ffffffe6 38 ffffffd2 67 ffffffb8 ffffffd1 ffffffe5 1d 49 2f 17 49 ffffffa4 5f fffffff4 6b ffffffb9 52 4e ffffff97 1a 7d 7c ffffffd1 ffffff80 19 0f 75 ffffffbf ffffffdf 4b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b94006600 | unwrapped: 50 08 c1 06 6b d3 0a ae 04 12 de 29 4c a3 83 98 | unwrapped: bc 3c e5 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289040: 00 ffffffc7 17 58 6b 19 ffffff8a ffffffb3 ffffff98 ffffffa4 0a ffffffad 2d ffffffdf 45 70 ffffffb9 ffffffbd 3f ffffffcb ffffffd4 ffffffc0 35 ffffffdb 0c fffffff7 36 45 7e fffffffb 7f 12 56 fffffff1 15 ffffffad 7f 04 2a ffffff99 fffffff7 ffffffc2 fffffffb ffffff8a 1a ffffff90 ffffffca 04 ffffffe3 ffffffb0 ffffffae ffffffd4 3f 72 73 ffffffca ffffff8b ffffffd6 ffffffb1 1f 5f 0d ffffff95 5d 15 ffffffca 50 ffffffb9 ffffffb7 4e ffffffef 6e fffffffd 65 ffffffeb 56 24 ffffffb2 2e 67 fffffff7 5e ffffffce ffffffb4 7d ffffffc1 ffffffa3 fffffffc ffffffdd ffffffcf 3e fffffff7 17 ffffffc9 ffffffa8 62 ffffffc2 ffffffbb 0a ffffff8c ffffffec ffffffa3 ffffff82 1e 3b 5f ffffffa4 fffffff9 00 ffffff9c ffffffd6 1e ffffffc8 ffffffe9 ffffffc5 ffffff9f 36 34 ffffffa1 ffffffe7 ffffffea 0e 20 ffffff88 ffffff96 fffffff2 fffffff9 57 ffffffc1 fffffff7 6d 11 ffffffad ffffff8e ffffffbf ffffff9e 21 16 68 48 1c 47 ffffffdd ffffffe6 30 fffffff8 7f 40 ffffffe4 5c fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b94005e90 | unwrapped: 14 83 ad 38 3f 0b 79 38 8c 97 19 fb ec 65 c9 e9 | unwrapped: 27 d2 c7 83 84 92 43 5d 1c 9f 98 4b a4 45 aa 4b | unwrapped: f6 bf 2f f0 52 be d5 11 11 b9 74 a8 06 3d ae dc | unwrapped: 92 8e 32 ae 2e d6 4b 1f 44 5b 7f 46 d1 89 64 0f | unwrapped: 12 37 49 ba f5 6d ea d6 52 1a d7 6e 7f ad a6 63 | unwrapped: 21 6f bd a7 b9 1f 9d 6d 1b f2 88 ce e9 ed 60 2b | unwrapped: c3 24 1a b4 35 68 aa 68 6a 68 8c e2 48 63 af 17 | unwrapped: 8c 8f cf 61 b9 40 c9 4c 5d 01 30 1b f1 f2 f4 2e | unwrapped: 34 7d 9e 2a 77 4a e7 8b 8f 6e 92 48 82 3e ea 7a | unwrapped: 8b f9 e1 e8 10 b3 d1 e9 45 17 19 b6 e5 22 69 74 | unwrapped: 5d c3 01 e3 ec 92 0f be 50 2d 90 47 39 7e 42 99 | unwrapped: ea 34 3b 4a 87 87 34 c4 72 ca 30 be cb 9d 90 7a | unwrapped: 3f 71 22 d7 85 94 2f e3 a8 6a 76 d1 fc 56 83 0f | unwrapped: 11 b8 b1 80 aa 9e f4 bc 73 9f f6 61 da 48 c3 b4 | unwrapped: db 43 9b 86 ea 50 2c 02 ce 3b 50 d9 0e bd d1 a3 | unwrapped: a1 87 de 8d 1b 6f fb 00 6f 61 d6 1e bb 53 9d e1 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb3644 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb364c (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d698 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c98060 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | appendix_b: SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d678 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | appendix_b prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c98060 | appendix_b prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c98060 | appendix_b: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | appendix_b PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b94002a80 | appendix_b PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d680 | result: final-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d668 | result: final-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | appendix_b PRF sha final-key@0x557566c98060 (size 20) | appendix_b: key-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b_keymat_e: reference old_k#1-key@0x557566c98060 | Kn PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | Kn: SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d678 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | Kn prf: created sha context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | Kn prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b94003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | Kn: release clone-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | Kn PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940013a0 | Kn PRF sha update old_k-key@0x557566c98060 (size 20) | Kn: old_k-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c98060 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1680289088: 72 1b 3c ffffff89 1f 74 ffffffb3 ffffffec 7c fffffff9 46 5c ffffff85 ffffff8a 66 13 62 ffffffd6 fffffffe 38 fffffffa ffffffa3 36 ffffffb6 2a ffffffdb ffffff9c ffffffc7 ffffffe6 ffffffc9 29 1c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b940064e0 | unwrapped: 3e 92 35 31 8d 40 69 eb b8 a2 27 4c 9e 3f 19 3b | unwrapped: ab b5 32 5a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d680 | result: final-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d668 | result: final-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | Kn PRF sha final-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 20) | Kn: key-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6f8 | result: result-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c98060 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#N-key@0x557566c98060 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#final-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: DES3_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9bd8d6f8 | result: cryptkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (24-bytes, DES3_CBC) | appendix_b_keymat_e: release keymat-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_a 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_e 0x557566c963a0, enc_key 0x7f9b8c008420 | DH_i: fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | DH_i: 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | DH_i: e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | DH_i: e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | DH_i: 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | DH_i: 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | DH_i: 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | DH_i: 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | DH_i: 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | DH_i: 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | DH_i: 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | DH_i: 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | DH_i: a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | DH_i: 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | DH_i: 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | DH_i: 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | DH_r: 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | DH_r: 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | DH_r: b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | DH_r: af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | DH_r: 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | DH_r: 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | DH_r: 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | DH_r: ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | DH_r: 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | DH_r: be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | DH_r: 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | DH_r: 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | DH_r: ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | DH_r: 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | DH_r: ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | DH_r: aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb3444 (length 256) | fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb3544 (length 256) | 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b940010c0 (length 20) | 71 46 28 c3 34 95 38 74 20 b7 a0 bb 3b 0d 33 6b | 97 7c 28 37 | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 22 time elapsed 0.002408 seconds | (#19) spent 2.26 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 22: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 22 for state #19 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940012f0 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #19 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 22 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #19: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80002a80: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #19 | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #19 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #19 spent 0.0214 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b940012f0 | spent 0.0022 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 86 f8 d9 9a | 0b 19 ed de fc 3a 78 68 d4 97 1b 69 5c 26 d0 c2 | fe f2 f1 76 c7 fa 72 2e b1 e1 92 66 22 91 fe 69 | f8 e8 ab 89 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 71 46 28 c3 34 95 38 74 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 22 91 fe 69 f8 e8 ab 89 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 a9 24 56 f4 | 2d 48 cf 7b a2 a8 f0 94 e2 77 e7 6f 1b cc 5d 4a | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 4 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #19: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b88001f20 (length 256) | fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80001780 (length 256) | 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90005a90 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9f40 (length 20) | a9 24 56 f4 2d 48 cf 7b a2 a8 f0 94 e2 77 e7 6f | 1b cc 5d 4a | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e58 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940010c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80001780 (length 256) | 16 53 b7 57 2d 9d e2 18 d1 f6 5d d2 2b cb 03 22 | 4e cc 7c 04 82 6d bc d7 fd 4b 75 c5 c2 99 ce 91 | b9 79 7a 1b c3 7d 33 c6 ae b7 98 7a c3 89 a5 c8 | af fd 5e d6 62 83 58 c2 84 c2 57 14 70 df a2 f3 | 82 99 8d aa 93 98 eb 93 9b d3 4d d7 bc ae f9 a6 | 75 d1 92 fe 3f 2c a9 69 94 61 98 33 a5 5a 03 8b | 90 ca d4 1d a9 c4 09 95 92 36 b1 83 50 e0 a9 71 | ad 93 bd 2a 87 6a b5 6f 28 ad 80 b2 e7 52 19 53 | 3f fa da e8 0d 65 f0 f0 2f d1 af 1f ef ad 50 ab | be ae 00 c3 71 eb 2b 22 8f 0a a3 5d 80 c7 c2 04 | 46 53 4e 3b 90 37 b1 f7 e8 49 38 64 35 17 4d aa | 02 b8 a9 ad 15 1d 84 12 15 aa 01 ac 6a cf 21 43 | ec be 9d 4c c8 87 ea 60 32 83 a2 41 21 02 ef 85 | 9e 27 b0 3a f4 ab e5 46 d8 01 3c 8d 04 92 43 07 | ce d8 97 6f 7c a8 c7 5f 05 08 20 f4 41 3b fc d3 | aa 2c 13 a1 cd 5e e2 4e a5 4b 7b 6a 73 c3 5f 00 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b88001f20 (length 256) | fd 53 53 1f 82 4b 8a bd 61 fb 9c f2 9b 65 9a 69 | 16 16 8c dd 9f 59 c8 17 54 0c 36 25 81 32 7a 58 | e7 0e f1 48 9b 11 fd 28 f1 69 eb 04 d2 8b 0b 92 | e9 22 51 4f 76 a7 d4 44 f8 fb c9 d0 6c 8c 50 51 | 0e 3b 7a b4 70 f7 b5 b1 b5 5e c6 77 65 cf e5 65 | 00 9c 5e ea 32 38 d3 ca 10 70 f8 06 44 67 38 a3 | 54 94 80 db 42 89 c7 7f 51 98 e4 53 2c e9 dc 17 | 56 cd 78 ee 46 1b 75 56 3e 2e 2a 16 0b d3 f1 58 | 52 76 bd cb 4a b6 c3 a0 7e 07 5d 34 41 8b 13 9b | 8f ac d1 26 91 4c 2d 76 6f 32 55 2c 11 9e 76 7c | 0c ba 68 04 d4 4b ec 1e 90 88 ba 3b f3 16 e0 8a | 6c 85 f4 2e 35 0e 5e 88 41 28 57 71 95 23 78 cd | a3 8c df 68 52 5e f4 19 bf 5a 78 17 dd 43 7c 2b | 21 88 88 eb 90 94 57 05 a1 16 ef 72 11 74 2e ac | 6a 83 96 b6 00 59 f1 47 a5 9a 06 e1 69 82 93 11 | 15 39 8e 83 79 d6 53 9a 3d 1d 4a d6 a7 2b a2 9d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab80 (length 8) | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566caab78 (length 8) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca180 (length 20) | 29 0d 52 8b b1 60 54 3c b3 2b f6 5c 8a 1d ee ea | 86 48 fa 60 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 29 0d 52 8b b1 60 54 3c b3 2b f6 5c 8a 1d ee ea | HASH_R 86 48 fa 60 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 29 0d 52 8b b1 60 54 3c b3 2b f6 5c 8a 1d ee ea | encrypting: 86 48 fa 60 | IV: 22 91 fe 69 f8 e8 ab 89 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #19 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #19: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #19 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #19 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b880048e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 68 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 a2 1e cf f7 | 29 6d 91 2a f5 1b f8 b7 35 f9 e9 e7 02 4c c5 ab | ab d8 fc d2 1e 19 25 c6 0d c6 ee c8 03 55 df 23 | 9d 2c 86 a8 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800081c0 size 128 | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=3DES_CBC_192 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #19 | #19 spent 0.648 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.801 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00251 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 436 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 20 01 2e c2 10 78 00 00 01 b4 9c eb b4 c9 | b4 df 88 9a c8 e0 00 4b 1f f3 68 47 66 b2 7e 7d | 95 44 5f d9 bd fc ed 5f 11 8d e1 d8 35 b7 08 6a | ae 2d 1d 51 a8 13 d9 68 c5 cc f2 a6 de df fe 2c | bf f6 c9 71 14 37 67 79 68 93 7d 3d ec ab a7 33 | 77 91 42 b5 78 ee 24 9f ae cd 27 33 7c c0 a2 a8 | e6 e0 9a 4b cd e1 60 73 4e cd dd 43 50 6d a8 6f | b8 5f 62 65 14 39 bc f5 e5 5a f4 08 df 6c a6 5e | 43 5f 7a 54 5d 4b e2 67 79 1d fe f4 03 6f dc 1c | 29 44 5f 50 8c 04 99 5f e1 d3 54 b4 bd 00 a8 d4 | a6 d6 48 5e f3 5e 0e f7 cf be cc 79 69 9e ac 3c | ef 74 12 45 e4 ae 30 58 e5 f5 75 a5 a1 9d 9f 4c | f7 f5 eb 04 c4 53 82 ab b2 c5 8e 12 f8 97 6c 62 | 92 f2 0f 15 3a 9f 29 cd 88 4b 81 88 b9 a0 b6 4d | b5 db 15 04 f3 8b 1b 74 c6 e0 4d 59 1d 98 51 d0 | 50 1a 04 7e a5 2e 18 7b c0 72 42 88 50 61 84 7d | 44 6f c4 58 98 d9 6a 89 eb f4 ba 13 53 55 e5 3e | f4 a1 53 30 8d 9c 14 28 c1 dd 23 b5 ba 0b d8 d6 | db f5 08 72 2f 89 6f 75 19 a6 c3 90 d6 c1 a8 16 | 49 ec 12 14 90 0c 78 26 c2 bc db 0f 2c e3 bf dd | cb 05 1f 7c 54 7c 61 29 e7 b0 bf 98 97 bd 6b 50 | dd 7f 02 51 80 9f ee 3a c5 ae 12 59 09 12 7a b8 | 13 6c d7 50 fd 25 4b 43 43 ed 0a 48 15 9c 68 c3 | cd e5 a5 19 97 e4 d7 a0 55 5d 7a e0 c3 35 36 2a | 08 05 44 d0 54 8d 61 25 57 f6 45 65 f6 07 8c d7 | e4 20 d8 6b c0 ee 0f 46 9e 53 98 ce 6d 7b f4 ac | 99 e9 4f cc | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 784470136 (0x2ec21078) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | current Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 8) | 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 2e c2 10 78 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | a3 f0 c7 34 3b c0 56 a5 c2 07 26 e8 8e af a7 4d | bd 86 8c 36 | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 408 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: a3 f0 c7 34 3b c0 56 a5 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 6d 7b f4 ac 99 e9 4f cc | decrypted payload (starts at offset -408): | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 20 01 2e c2 10 78 00 00 01 b4 01 00 00 18 | e7 95 a7 db e7 bb 5e ae 7a 14 0f 85 31 26 de e3 | 92 02 11 a0 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 91 11 64 67 00 00 00 1c | 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 0a ec 6b d4 | f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc 32 59 e9 aa | 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae 05 00 01 04 | a1 92 2b 8c b0 bc 63 ec 37 5f 98 3f 61 4e e0 94 | c4 6f 14 15 2a eb 72 5a d2 0f 06 ce 89 87 22 21 | 46 2d 05 66 67 c4 9b 27 f7 d6 6c 10 21 30 35 24 | 8c 95 3e 00 d4 12 c4 85 cc fc 74 35 d1 65 d7 1a | d7 0b a8 26 ee 47 b6 52 f4 c9 4c 3a 31 fe 5c 3e | b1 76 ec 0e d2 bf 3f 94 34 dd 74 79 84 00 75 4e | f9 40 cf 53 61 de aa ab aa 28 bb 02 79 16 d5 8d | 75 2d d7 df 22 7d 63 e8 d0 78 0e b5 0c fa 9d 6a | a3 b3 93 4b 92 85 36 63 50 1c 08 33 fc 26 2a 4e | eb 89 52 51 03 a4 03 b0 8b ad 40 f2 4f 65 6e 24 | f4 66 3f 8b 94 a0 ac 36 5e be fa 22 a7 57 9c e9 | 96 8a 76 58 d0 a0 d6 7d a1 3a ca 89 83 79 ef 49 | 92 2b 60 95 07 81 2d d4 1d a1 73 94 5e a3 8a 51 | d2 39 16 f7 a3 46 28 77 59 d0 27 d7 75 fe 43 10 | a2 ca 12 e9 3a 1d d8 69 af 87 65 9b 0e 9f 8e b6 | 8c 1d 0e ae 27 a8 ec a4 8c 14 05 00 77 70 58 5c | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 2e c2 10 78 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566c3b2c4 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 91 11 64 67 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b | 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 | 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae 05 00 01 04 a1 92 2b 8c | b0 bc 63 ec 37 5f 98 3f 61 4e e0 94 c4 6f 14 15 | 2a eb 72 5a d2 0f 06 ce 89 87 22 21 46 2d 05 66 | 67 c4 9b 27 f7 d6 6c 10 21 30 35 24 8c 95 3e 00 | d4 12 c4 85 cc fc 74 35 d1 65 d7 1a d7 0b a8 26 | ee 47 b6 52 f4 c9 4c 3a 31 fe 5c 3e b1 76 ec 0e | d2 bf 3f 94 34 dd 74 79 84 00 75 4e f9 40 cf 53 | 61 de aa ab aa 28 bb 02 79 16 d5 8d 75 2d d7 df | 22 7d 63 e8 d0 78 0e b5 0c fa 9d 6a a3 b3 93 4b | 92 85 36 63 50 1c 08 33 fc 26 2a 4e eb 89 52 51 | 03 a4 03 b0 8b ad 40 f2 4f 65 6e 24 f4 66 3f 8b | 94 a0 ac 36 5e be fa 22 a7 57 9c e9 96 8a 76 58 | d0 a0 d6 7d a1 3a ca 89 83 79 ef 49 92 2b 60 95 | 07 81 2d d4 1d a1 73 94 5e a3 8a 51 d2 39 16 f7 | a3 46 28 77 59 d0 27 d7 75 fe 43 10 a2 ca 12 e9 | 3a 1d d8 69 af 87 65 9b 0e 9f 8e b6 8c 1d 0e ae | 27 a8 ec a4 8c 14 05 00 77 70 58 5c 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | e7 95 a7 db e7 bb 5e ae 7a 14 0f 85 31 26 de e3 | 92 02 11 a0 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | e7 95 a7 db e7 bb 5e ae 7a 14 0f 85 31 26 de e3 | 92 02 11 a0 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #19: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #20 at 0x557566cae290 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #20 in UNDEFINED | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #19 "east" as #20 for IPSEC SA | #20 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #19.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #20: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 91 11 64 67 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | a1 92 2b 8c b0 bc 63 ec 37 5f 98 3f 61 4e e0 94 | c4 6f 14 15 2a eb 72 5a d2 0f 06 ce 89 87 22 21 | 46 2d 05 66 67 c4 9b 27 f7 d6 6c 10 21 30 35 24 | 8c 95 3e 00 d4 12 c4 85 cc fc 74 35 d1 65 d7 1a | d7 0b a8 26 ee 47 b6 52 f4 c9 4c 3a 31 fe 5c 3e | b1 76 ec 0e d2 bf 3f 94 34 dd 74 79 84 00 75 4e | f9 40 cf 53 61 de aa ab aa 28 bb 02 79 16 d5 8d | 75 2d d7 df 22 7d 63 e8 d0 78 0e b5 0c fa 9d 6a | a3 b3 93 4b 92 85 36 63 50 1c 08 33 fc 26 2a 4e | eb 89 52 51 03 a4 03 b0 8b ad 40 f2 4f 65 6e 24 | f4 66 3f 8b 94 a0 ac 36 5e be fa 22 a7 57 9c e9 | 96 8a 76 58 d0 a0 d6 7d a1 3a ca 89 83 79 ef 49 | 92 2b 60 95 07 81 2d d4 1d a1 73 94 5e a3 8a 51 | d2 39 16 f7 a3 46 28 77 59 d0 27 d7 75 fe 43 10 | a2 ca 12 e9 3a 1d d8 69 af 87 65 9b 0e 9f 8e b6 | 8c 1d 0e ae 27 a8 ec a4 8c 14 05 00 77 70 58 5c | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 23 for state #20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #20 and saving MD | #20 is busy; has a suspended MD | #19 spent 0.254 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.699 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 23 for state #20 | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 23 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001270: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b8c001270 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | ee 75 ec 23 fc 41 1e c4 cc 25 74 fb d7 20 96 f5 | 28 08 fc 6b fb 4e 6b 06 48 a1 1f 3d cb e8 8f 23 | 41 e3 c5 0e 20 c6 39 a2 02 f3 ae be 40 16 de 28 | 02 09 5c b7 f0 8c 52 2f 3f 48 3a 22 84 c1 d4 57 | 58 ad 99 5c 1f d8 a3 d3 39 c2 a7 98 a4 cc b8 95 | 3e 25 65 57 d1 00 bf e2 dd 45 c2 9e 91 a2 26 2a | 5a a3 6b b1 09 0c d0 5e 05 f3 25 c7 f5 59 87 e1 | aa 84 f3 cc 46 2d 0a c9 b8 ff 0e ab 7f fc 72 4c | 45 81 b0 74 70 38 b8 39 c4 32 23 4b e6 fc bc af | 89 a6 4c 6f 32 bf af c5 89 a6 16 33 45 0d e1 ff | 4e e6 cf 2e ff 1c 64 fa ea e2 3e 7c ab 71 9c a6 | 30 26 8f 84 71 f4 e9 c6 16 68 bc f7 6a f0 b3 f4 | ec f5 4e a6 a5 19 91 6b 81 ad d0 39 1a 20 4c b4 | ca 20 76 a2 c5 7b 7e ef 5b 05 fb ee 42 65 3f a5 | a0 9a 51 ca ed 09 ea 72 42 05 8e ca 82 68 70 0a | 8c 49 2f 51 ad e7 39 6b 13 b1 b8 7e f6 ad a4 4b | Generated nonce: 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | Generated nonce: 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 23 time elapsed 0.001068 seconds | (#20) spent 1.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 23: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 23 for state #20 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c001d80 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #20 | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 23 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #20: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001270: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #20 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001270: transferring ownership from state #20 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 24 for state #20 | state #20 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 size 128 | suspending state #20 and saving MD | #20 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #20 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #20 spent 0.0662 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b8c001d80 | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 24 for state #20 | crypto helper 4 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 24 | peer's g: a1 92 2b 8c b0 bc 63 ec 37 5f 98 3f 61 4e e0 94 | peer's g: c4 6f 14 15 2a eb 72 5a d2 0f 06 ce 89 87 22 21 | peer's g: 46 2d 05 66 67 c4 9b 27 f7 d6 6c 10 21 30 35 24 | peer's g: 8c 95 3e 00 d4 12 c4 85 cc fc 74 35 d1 65 d7 1a | peer's g: d7 0b a8 26 ee 47 b6 52 f4 c9 4c 3a 31 fe 5c 3e | peer's g: b1 76 ec 0e d2 bf 3f 94 34 dd 74 79 84 00 75 4e | peer's g: f9 40 cf 53 61 de aa ab aa 28 bb 02 79 16 d5 8d | peer's g: 75 2d d7 df 22 7d 63 e8 d0 78 0e b5 0c fa 9d 6a | peer's g: a3 b3 93 4b 92 85 36 63 50 1c 08 33 fc 26 2a 4e | peer's g: eb 89 52 51 03 a4 03 b0 8b ad 40 f2 4f 65 6e 24 | peer's g: f4 66 3f 8b 94 a0 ac 36 5e be fa 22 a7 57 9c e9 | peer's g: 96 8a 76 58 d0 a0 d6 7d a1 3a ca 89 83 79 ef 49 | peer's g: 92 2b 60 95 07 81 2d d4 1d a1 73 94 5e a3 8a 51 | peer's g: d2 39 16 f7 a3 46 28 77 59 d0 27 d7 75 fe 43 10 | peer's g: a2 ca 12 e9 3a 1d d8 69 af 87 65 9b 0e 9f 8e b6 | peer's g: 8c 1d 0e ae 27 a8 ec a4 8c 14 05 00 77 70 58 5c | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001270: computed shared DH secret key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 4 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 24 time elapsed 0.001006 seconds | (#20) spent 1.01 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 24: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 24 for state #20 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #20 | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 24 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #20: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 784470136 (0x2ec21078) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 91 11 64 67 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x29262d0d for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 29 26 2d 0d | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 20 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 28 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #20: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:2ec21078} "east" #20: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #20: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | Nr 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value ee 75 ec 23 fc 41 1e c4 cc 25 74 fb d7 20 96 f5 | keyex value 28 08 fc 6b fb 4e 6b 06 48 a1 1f 3d cb e8 8f 23 | keyex value 41 e3 c5 0e 20 c6 39 a2 02 f3 ae be 40 16 de 28 | keyex value 02 09 5c b7 f0 8c 52 2f 3f 48 3a 22 84 c1 d4 57 | keyex value 58 ad 99 5c 1f d8 a3 d3 39 c2 a7 98 a4 cc b8 95 | keyex value 3e 25 65 57 d1 00 bf e2 dd 45 c2 9e 91 a2 26 2a | keyex value 5a a3 6b b1 09 0c d0 5e 05 f3 25 c7 f5 59 87 e1 | keyex value aa 84 f3 cc 46 2d 0a c9 b8 ff 0e ab 7f fc 72 4c | keyex value 45 81 b0 74 70 38 b8 39 c4 32 23 4b e6 fc bc af | keyex value 89 a6 4c 6f 32 bf af c5 89 a6 16 33 45 0d e1 ff | keyex value 4e e6 cf 2e ff 1c 64 fa ea e2 3e 7c ab 71 9c a6 | keyex value 30 26 8f 84 71 f4 e9 c6 16 68 bc f7 6a f0 b3 f4 | keyex value ec f5 4e a6 a5 19 91 6b 81 ad d0 39 1a 20 4c b4 | keyex value ca 20 76 a2 c5 7b 7e ef 5b 05 fb ee 42 65 3f a5 | keyex value a0 9a 51 ca ed 09 ea 72 42 05 8e ca 82 68 70 0a | keyex value 8c 49 2f 51 ad e7 39 6b 13 b1 b8 7e f6 ad a4 4b | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001270: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #20 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e9c (length 4) | 2e c2 10 78 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55756517d974 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 29 26 2d 0d 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 | e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a | 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 05 00 01 04 ee 75 ec 23 | fc 41 1e c4 cc 25 74 fb d7 20 96 f5 28 08 fc 6b | fb 4e 6b 06 48 a1 1f 3d cb e8 8f 23 41 e3 c5 0e | 20 c6 39 a2 02 f3 ae be 40 16 de 28 02 09 5c b7 | f0 8c 52 2f 3f 48 3a 22 84 c1 d4 57 58 ad 99 5c | 1f d8 a3 d3 39 c2 a7 98 a4 cc b8 95 3e 25 65 57 | d1 00 bf e2 dd 45 c2 9e 91 a2 26 2a 5a a3 6b b1 | 09 0c d0 5e 05 f3 25 c7 f5 59 87 e1 aa 84 f3 cc | 46 2d 0a c9 b8 ff 0e ab 7f fc 72 4c 45 81 b0 74 | 70 38 b8 39 c4 32 23 4b e6 fc bc af 89 a6 4c 6f | 32 bf af c5 89 a6 16 33 45 0d e1 ff 4e e6 cf 2e | ff 1c 64 fa ea e2 3e 7c ab 71 9c a6 30 26 8f 84 | 71 f4 e9 c6 16 68 bc f7 6a f0 b3 f4 ec f5 4e a6 | a5 19 91 6b 81 ad d0 39 1a 20 4c b4 ca 20 76 a2 | c5 7b 7e ef 5b 05 fb ee 42 65 3f a5 a0 9a 51 ca | ed 09 ea 72 42 05 8e ca 82 68 70 0a 8c 49 2f 51 | ad e7 39 6b 13 b1 b8 7e f6 ad a4 4b 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 20) | 25 1b 12 87 29 ef 62 0b 28 5c c6 dd f2 7c 4c 42 | 3e 2e 6c 51 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 25 1b 12 87 29 ef 62 0b 28 5c c6 dd f2 7c 4c 42 | 3e 2e 6c 51 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=24 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=44 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadb60 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffad 1b 30 ffffff80 04 ffffff9e 71 ffffffb8 15 1f ffffffea 48 03 7a ffffff97 1b 45 69 6a ffffffe9 ffffffa0 ffffffc7 ffffffbd 63 fffffff0 12 ffffffd4 5d 1f 29 ffffff88 48 ffffff9f 3e 1c fffffff0 ffffffdd 5d ffffff96 0d ffffff80 35 ffffff9d 78 ffffffcb ffffffe4 15 55 6b ffffffb9 4c 63 ffffff92 ffffffae 46 41 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffa2 fffffff6 ffffffdd 67 ffffffb2 7f 16 ffffffd8 6e 1a ffffffa1 05 ffffffbc ffffffc3 43 0c ffffff8c 49 ffffffc7 3d ffffffcf ffffffa5 69 12 ffffffa0 29 fffffff0 79 22 ffffff95 ffffffc8 ffffffe1 ffffff8d ffffffa1 09 25 ffffffb3 4c 62 42 ffffffda ffffffce 1a 44 14 04 ffffffa6 ffffffe1 6f 78 fffffff9 ffffff83 ffffffa3 ffffffbc fffffff1 ffffff8f 3c ffffff8a 54 0d 7b ffffff87 ffffff99 42 ffffffda ffffffa0 ffffffe9 6c ffffffc7 fffffff2 23 1b ffffffe0 3d 42 5a ffffffcb ffffffab fffffff6 44 75 ffffffcc ffffff85 2a 66 6f ffffff9c 78 32 ffffffbd fffffff4 ffffffc0 ffffffef 66 ffffffe0 68 64 04 72 ffffffb9 fffffff9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb3260 | unwrapped: ce 73 42 b8 19 33 12 a7 14 11 40 e2 63 20 58 d8 | unwrapped: 02 f8 87 ef 2e 07 d4 37 58 04 2c 42 db f9 65 7a | unwrapped: 00 04 4e 6b be 29 eb 65 c9 cc fe 13 1d 84 57 65 | unwrapped: 5f d7 f1 1a 49 a9 e7 fc 70 68 49 33 29 e4 c2 51 | unwrapped: 7a 29 49 1d 7d 26 5a df 20 44 b5 62 19 03 e7 41 | unwrapped: 19 62 00 aa 26 f2 d9 d7 5f fc 2f c1 f6 a1 22 9e | unwrapped: 17 22 3c 49 3e e5 0b bc ba 32 0a a1 88 50 aa 97 | unwrapped: e9 4c cb c6 4b 90 8c 30 8b b3 4a ce 46 27 f5 34 | unwrapped: 20 bb 74 b3 d4 c5 bd 73 6e a0 73 3d fb db 54 ac | unwrapped: ae 3c fb f1 69 5b 1b df 52 83 5d e0 4d 21 3d e8 | unwrapped: 1b 1a 18 f3 7a 2e e8 e4 4c 5e a2 f3 5f 08 51 87 | unwrapped: 73 60 16 8d eb 12 4c 7b de 84 83 7c fc 17 ca 74 | unwrapped: af cb d3 53 00 55 75 62 3d 57 5d 90 41 28 94 64 | unwrapped: d4 9e ce a7 6e 70 20 81 41 76 a3 98 2d cc 41 43 | unwrapped: 67 72 0a 6e db 98 02 ff ef 06 3e 4e d5 8c 64 11 | unwrapped: b3 91 c0 d7 5f ed d6 f9 02 ea 1d 54 74 ed 8f 3d | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffad 1b 30 ffffff80 04 ffffff9e 71 ffffffb8 15 1f ffffffea 48 03 7a ffffff97 1b 45 69 6a ffffffe9 ffffffa0 ffffffc7 ffffffbd 63 fffffff0 12 ffffffd4 5d 1f 29 ffffff88 48 ffffff9f 3e 1c fffffff0 ffffffdd 5d ffffff96 0d ffffff80 35 ffffff9d 78 ffffffcb ffffffe4 15 55 6b ffffffb9 4c 63 ffffff92 ffffffae 46 41 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffa2 fffffff6 ffffffdd 67 ffffffb2 7f 16 ffffffd8 6e 1a ffffffa1 05 ffffffbc ffffffc3 43 0c ffffff8c 49 ffffffc7 3d ffffffcf ffffffa5 69 12 ffffffa0 29 fffffff0 79 22 ffffff95 ffffffc8 ffffffe1 ffffff8d ffffffa1 09 25 ffffffb3 4c 62 42 ffffffda ffffffce 1a 44 14 04 ffffffa6 ffffffe1 6f 78 fffffff9 ffffff83 ffffffa3 ffffffbc fffffff1 ffffff8f 3c ffffff8a 54 0d 7b ffffff87 ffffff99 42 ffffffda ffffffa0 ffffffe9 6c ffffffc7 fffffff2 23 1b ffffffe0 3d 42 5a ffffffcb ffffffab fffffff6 44 75 ffffffcc ffffff85 2a 66 6f ffffff9c 78 32 ffffffbd fffffff4 ffffffc0 ffffffef 66 ffffffe0 68 64 04 72 ffffffb9 fffffff9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2f30 | unwrapped: ce 73 42 b8 19 33 12 a7 14 11 40 e2 63 20 58 d8 | unwrapped: 02 f8 87 ef 2e 07 d4 37 58 04 2c 42 db f9 65 7a | unwrapped: 00 04 4e 6b be 29 eb 65 c9 cc fe 13 1d 84 57 65 | unwrapped: 5f d7 f1 1a 49 a9 e7 fc 70 68 49 33 29 e4 c2 51 | unwrapped: 7a 29 49 1d 7d 26 5a df 20 44 b5 62 19 03 e7 41 | unwrapped: 19 62 00 aa 26 f2 d9 d7 5f fc 2f c1 f6 a1 22 9e | unwrapped: 17 22 3c 49 3e e5 0b bc ba 32 0a a1 88 50 aa 97 | unwrapped: e9 4c cb c6 4b 90 8c 30 8b b3 4a ce 46 27 f5 34 | unwrapped: 20 bb 74 b3 d4 c5 bd 73 6e a0 73 3d fb db 54 ac | unwrapped: ae 3c fb f1 69 5b 1b df 52 83 5d e0 4d 21 3d e8 | unwrapped: 1b 1a 18 f3 7a 2e e8 e4 4c 5e a2 f3 5f 08 51 87 | unwrapped: 73 60 16 8d eb 12 4c 7b de 84 83 7c fc 17 ca 74 | unwrapped: af cb d3 53 00 55 75 62 3d 57 5d 90 41 28 94 64 | unwrapped: d4 9e ce a7 6e 70 20 81 41 76 a3 98 2d cc 41 43 | unwrapped: 67 72 0a 6e db 98 02 ff ef 06 3e 4e d5 8c 64 11 | unwrapped: b3 91 c0 d7 5f ed d6 f9 02 ea 1d 54 74 ed 8f 3d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae498 (length 4) | 29 26 2d 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae478 (length 4) | 91 11 64 67 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90005a70 (length 20) | 87 5a d2 ca 2e b7 86 8a 3f 31 4e 21 5d 7a 73 31 | bc ea d7 10 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90004f40 (length 20) | 07 e1 4b c9 fd 6c 90 9d ff 4c 22 07 14 5f 02 42 | 95 c6 ee eb | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90005a70 (length 20) | 87 5a d2 ca 2e b7 86 8a 3f 31 4e 21 5d 7a 73 31 | bc ea d7 10 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004f40 (length 20) | 07 e1 4b c9 fd 6c 90 9d ff 4c 22 07 14 5f 02 42 | 95 c6 ee eb | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffad 1b 30 ffffff80 04 ffffff9e 71 ffffffb8 15 1f ffffffea 48 03 7a ffffff97 1b 45 69 6a ffffffe9 ffffffa0 ffffffc7 ffffffbd 63 fffffff0 12 ffffffd4 5d 1f 29 ffffff88 48 ffffff9f 3e 1c fffffff0 ffffffdd 5d ffffff96 0d ffffff80 35 ffffff9d 78 ffffffcb ffffffe4 15 55 6b ffffffb9 4c 63 ffffff92 ffffffae 46 41 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffa2 fffffff6 ffffffdd 67 ffffffb2 7f 16 ffffffd8 6e 1a ffffffa1 05 ffffffbc ffffffc3 43 0c ffffff8c 49 ffffffc7 3d ffffffcf ffffffa5 69 12 ffffffa0 29 fffffff0 79 22 ffffff95 ffffffc8 ffffffe1 ffffff8d ffffffa1 09 25 ffffffb3 4c 62 42 ffffffda ffffffce 1a 44 14 04 ffffffa6 ffffffe1 6f 78 fffffff9 ffffff83 ffffffa3 ffffffbc fffffff1 ffffff8f 3c ffffff8a 54 0d 7b ffffff87 ffffff99 42 ffffffda ffffffa0 ffffffe9 6c ffffffc7 fffffff2 23 1b ffffffe0 3d 42 5a ffffffcb ffffffab fffffff6 44 75 ffffffcc ffffff85 2a 66 6f ffffff9c 78 32 ffffffbd fffffff4 ffffffc0 ffffffef 66 ffffffe0 68 64 04 72 ffffffb9 fffffff9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2e20 | unwrapped: ce 73 42 b8 19 33 12 a7 14 11 40 e2 63 20 58 d8 | unwrapped: 02 f8 87 ef 2e 07 d4 37 58 04 2c 42 db f9 65 7a | unwrapped: 00 04 4e 6b be 29 eb 65 c9 cc fe 13 1d 84 57 65 | unwrapped: 5f d7 f1 1a 49 a9 e7 fc 70 68 49 33 29 e4 c2 51 | unwrapped: 7a 29 49 1d 7d 26 5a df 20 44 b5 62 19 03 e7 41 | unwrapped: 19 62 00 aa 26 f2 d9 d7 5f fc 2f c1 f6 a1 22 9e | unwrapped: 17 22 3c 49 3e e5 0b bc ba 32 0a a1 88 50 aa 97 | unwrapped: e9 4c cb c6 4b 90 8c 30 8b b3 4a ce 46 27 f5 34 | unwrapped: 20 bb 74 b3 d4 c5 bd 73 6e a0 73 3d fb db 54 ac | unwrapped: ae 3c fb f1 69 5b 1b df 52 83 5d e0 4d 21 3d e8 | unwrapped: 1b 1a 18 f3 7a 2e e8 e4 4c 5e a2 f3 5f 08 51 87 | unwrapped: 73 60 16 8d eb 12 4c 7b de 84 83 7c fc 17 ca 74 | unwrapped: af cb d3 53 00 55 75 62 3d 57 5d 90 41 28 94 64 | unwrapped: d4 9e ce a7 6e 70 20 81 41 76 a3 98 2d cc 41 43 | unwrapped: 67 72 0a 6e db 98 02 ff ef 06 3e 4e d5 8c 64 11 | unwrapped: b3 91 c0 d7 5f ed d6 f9 02 ea 1d 54 74 ed 8f 3d | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffad 1b 30 ffffff80 04 ffffff9e 71 ffffffb8 15 1f ffffffea 48 03 7a ffffff97 1b 45 69 6a ffffffe9 ffffffa0 ffffffc7 ffffffbd 63 fffffff0 12 ffffffd4 5d 1f 29 ffffff88 48 ffffff9f 3e 1c fffffff0 ffffffdd 5d ffffff96 0d ffffff80 35 ffffff9d 78 ffffffcb ffffffe4 15 55 6b ffffffb9 4c 63 ffffff92 ffffffae 46 41 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffa2 fffffff6 ffffffdd 67 ffffffb2 7f 16 ffffffd8 6e 1a ffffffa1 05 ffffffbc ffffffc3 43 0c ffffff8c 49 ffffffc7 3d ffffffcf ffffffa5 69 12 ffffffa0 29 fffffff0 79 22 ffffff95 ffffffc8 ffffffe1 ffffff8d ffffffa1 09 25 ffffffb3 4c 62 42 ffffffda ffffffce 1a 44 14 04 ffffffa6 ffffffe1 6f 78 fffffff9 ffffff83 ffffffa3 ffffffbc fffffff1 ffffff8f 3c ffffff8a 54 0d 7b ffffff87 ffffff99 42 ffffffda ffffffa0 ffffffe9 6c ffffffc7 fffffff2 23 1b ffffffe0 3d 42 5a ffffffcb ffffffab fffffff6 44 75 ffffffcc ffffff85 2a 66 6f ffffff9c 78 32 ffffffbd fffffff4 ffffffc0 ffffffef 66 ffffffe0 68 64 04 72 ffffffb9 fffffff9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cae020 | unwrapped: ce 73 42 b8 19 33 12 a7 14 11 40 e2 63 20 58 d8 | unwrapped: 02 f8 87 ef 2e 07 d4 37 58 04 2c 42 db f9 65 7a | unwrapped: 00 04 4e 6b be 29 eb 65 c9 cc fe 13 1d 84 57 65 | unwrapped: 5f d7 f1 1a 49 a9 e7 fc 70 68 49 33 29 e4 c2 51 | unwrapped: 7a 29 49 1d 7d 26 5a df 20 44 b5 62 19 03 e7 41 | unwrapped: 19 62 00 aa 26 f2 d9 d7 5f fc 2f c1 f6 a1 22 9e | unwrapped: 17 22 3c 49 3e e5 0b bc ba 32 0a a1 88 50 aa 97 | unwrapped: e9 4c cb c6 4b 90 8c 30 8b b3 4a ce 46 27 f5 34 | unwrapped: 20 bb 74 b3 d4 c5 bd 73 6e a0 73 3d fb db 54 ac | unwrapped: ae 3c fb f1 69 5b 1b df 52 83 5d e0 4d 21 3d e8 | unwrapped: 1b 1a 18 f3 7a 2e e8 e4 4c 5e a2 f3 5f 08 51 87 | unwrapped: 73 60 16 8d eb 12 4c 7b de 84 83 7c fc 17 ca 74 | unwrapped: af cb d3 53 00 55 75 62 3d 57 5d 90 41 28 94 64 | unwrapped: d4 9e ce a7 6e 70 20 81 41 76 a3 98 2d cc 41 43 | unwrapped: 67 72 0a 6e db 98 02 ff ef 06 3e 4e d5 8c 64 11 | unwrapped: b3 91 c0 d7 5f ed d6 f9 02 ea 1d 54 74 ed 8f 3d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae498 (length 4) | 29 26 2d 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae478 (length 4) | 91 11 64 67 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90005a84 (length 20) | 88 63 0e d4 04 8d ee bb 6d 2e 9b 48 5c 87 8c 22 | 85 70 2a 99 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90004f54 (length 20) | 26 95 83 42 43 3f dc 19 9a c5 a4 09 ef 0e ae b4 | ee ef fb 96 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadb60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90005a84 (length 20) | 88 63 0e d4 04 8d ee bb 6d 2e 9b 48 5c 87 8c 22 | 85 70 2a 99 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b90004f54 (length 20) | 26 95 83 42 43 3f dc 19 9a c5 a4 09 ef 0e ae b4 | ee ef fb 96 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffad 1b 30 ffffff80 04 ffffff9e 71 ffffffb8 15 1f ffffffea 48 03 7a ffffff97 1b 45 69 6a ffffffe9 ffffffa0 ffffffc7 ffffffbd 63 fffffff0 12 ffffffd4 5d 1f 29 ffffff88 48 ffffff9f 3e 1c fffffff0 ffffffdd 5d ffffff96 0d ffffff80 35 ffffff9d 78 ffffffcb ffffffe4 15 55 6b ffffffb9 4c 63 ffffff92 ffffffae 46 41 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffa2 fffffff6 ffffffdd 67 ffffffb2 7f 16 ffffffd8 6e 1a ffffffa1 05 ffffffbc ffffffc3 43 0c ffffff8c 49 ffffffc7 3d ffffffcf ffffffa5 69 12 ffffffa0 29 fffffff0 79 22 ffffff95 ffffffc8 ffffffe1 ffffff8d ffffffa1 09 25 ffffffb3 4c 62 42 ffffffda ffffffce 1a 44 14 04 ffffffa6 ffffffe1 6f 78 fffffff9 ffffff83 ffffffa3 ffffffbc fffffff1 ffffff8f 3c ffffff8a 54 0d 7b ffffff87 ffffff99 42 ffffffda ffffffa0 ffffffe9 6c ffffffc7 fffffff2 23 1b ffffffe0 3d 42 5a ffffffcb ffffffab fffffff6 44 75 ffffffcc ffffff85 2a 66 6f ffffff9c 78 32 ffffffbd fffffff4 ffffffc0 ffffffef 66 ffffffe0 68 64 04 72 ffffffb9 fffffff9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb3260 | unwrapped: ce 73 42 b8 19 33 12 a7 14 11 40 e2 63 20 58 d8 | unwrapped: 02 f8 87 ef 2e 07 d4 37 58 04 2c 42 db f9 65 7a | unwrapped: 00 04 4e 6b be 29 eb 65 c9 cc fe 13 1d 84 57 65 | unwrapped: 5f d7 f1 1a 49 a9 e7 fc 70 68 49 33 29 e4 c2 51 | unwrapped: 7a 29 49 1d 7d 26 5a df 20 44 b5 62 19 03 e7 41 | unwrapped: 19 62 00 aa 26 f2 d9 d7 5f fc 2f c1 f6 a1 22 9e | unwrapped: 17 22 3c 49 3e e5 0b bc ba 32 0a a1 88 50 aa 97 | unwrapped: e9 4c cb c6 4b 90 8c 30 8b b3 4a ce 46 27 f5 34 | unwrapped: 20 bb 74 b3 d4 c5 bd 73 6e a0 73 3d fb db 54 ac | unwrapped: ae 3c fb f1 69 5b 1b df 52 83 5d e0 4d 21 3d e8 | unwrapped: 1b 1a 18 f3 7a 2e e8 e4 4c 5e a2 f3 5f 08 51 87 | unwrapped: 73 60 16 8d eb 12 4c 7b de 84 83 7c fc 17 ca 74 | unwrapped: af cb d3 53 00 55 75 62 3d 57 5d 90 41 28 94 64 | unwrapped: d4 9e ce a7 6e 70 20 81 41 76 a3 98 2d cc 41 43 | unwrapped: 67 72 0a 6e db 98 02 ff ef 06 3e 4e d5 8c 64 11 | unwrapped: b3 91 c0 d7 5f ed d6 f9 02 ea 1d 54 74 ed 8f 3d | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffad 1b 30 ffffff80 04 ffffff9e 71 ffffffb8 15 1f ffffffea 48 03 7a ffffff97 1b 45 69 6a ffffffe9 ffffffa0 ffffffc7 ffffffbd 63 fffffff0 12 ffffffd4 5d 1f 29 ffffff88 48 ffffff9f 3e 1c fffffff0 ffffffdd 5d ffffff96 0d ffffff80 35 ffffff9d 78 ffffffcb ffffffe4 15 55 6b ffffffb9 4c 63 ffffff92 ffffffae 46 41 ffffff91 ffffffb2 ffffffa2 fffffff6 ffffffdd 67 ffffffb2 7f 16 ffffffd8 6e 1a ffffffa1 05 ffffffbc ffffffc3 43 0c ffffff8c 49 ffffffc7 3d ffffffcf ffffffa5 69 12 ffffffa0 29 fffffff0 79 22 ffffff95 ffffffc8 ffffffe1 ffffff8d ffffffa1 09 25 ffffffb3 4c 62 42 ffffffda ffffffce 1a 44 14 04 ffffffa6 ffffffe1 6f 78 fffffff9 ffffff83 ffffffa3 ffffffbc fffffff1 ffffff8f 3c ffffff8a 54 0d 7b ffffff87 ffffff99 42 ffffffda ffffffa0 ffffffe9 6c ffffffc7 fffffff2 23 1b ffffffe0 3d 42 5a ffffffcb ffffffab fffffff6 44 75 ffffffcc ffffff85 2a 66 6f ffffff9c 78 32 ffffffbd fffffff4 ffffffc0 ffffffef 66 ffffffe0 68 64 04 72 ffffffb9 fffffff9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2f30 | unwrapped: ce 73 42 b8 19 33 12 a7 14 11 40 e2 63 20 58 d8 | unwrapped: 02 f8 87 ef 2e 07 d4 37 58 04 2c 42 db f9 65 7a | unwrapped: 00 04 4e 6b be 29 eb 65 c9 cc fe 13 1d 84 57 65 | unwrapped: 5f d7 f1 1a 49 a9 e7 fc 70 68 49 33 29 e4 c2 51 | unwrapped: 7a 29 49 1d 7d 26 5a df 20 44 b5 62 19 03 e7 41 | unwrapped: 19 62 00 aa 26 f2 d9 d7 5f fc 2f c1 f6 a1 22 9e | unwrapped: 17 22 3c 49 3e e5 0b bc ba 32 0a a1 88 50 aa 97 | unwrapped: e9 4c cb c6 4b 90 8c 30 8b b3 4a ce 46 27 f5 34 | unwrapped: 20 bb 74 b3 d4 c5 bd 73 6e a0 73 3d fb db 54 ac | unwrapped: ae 3c fb f1 69 5b 1b df 52 83 5d e0 4d 21 3d e8 | unwrapped: 1b 1a 18 f3 7a 2e e8 e4 4c 5e a2 f3 5f 08 51 87 | unwrapped: 73 60 16 8d eb 12 4c 7b de 84 83 7c fc 17 ca 74 | unwrapped: af cb d3 53 00 55 75 62 3d 57 5d 90 41 28 94 64 | unwrapped: d4 9e ce a7 6e 70 20 81 41 76 a3 98 2d cc 41 43 | unwrapped: 67 72 0a 6e db 98 02 ff ef 06 3e 4e d5 8c 64 11 | unwrapped: b3 91 c0 d7 5f ed d6 f9 02 ea 1d 54 74 ed 8f 3d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae498 (length 4) | 29 26 2d 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cae478 (length 4) | 91 11 64 67 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90005a98 (length 20) | 30 a2 7b e9 c7 ae cc 67 df 17 6a af ea d2 4c ef | a3 80 bb d3 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b90004f68 (length 20) | 45 ee 63 ab 11 d9 a7 a8 7f 82 b0 1b 20 6a 44 23 | 38 35 8e 05 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x557566cae290 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#20 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.91116467@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.29262d0d@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 25 1b 12 87 29 ef 62 0b 28 5c c6 dd | encrypting: f2 7c 4c 42 3e 2e 6c 51 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 29 26 2d 0d | encrypting: 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 | encrypting: 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | encrypting: 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | encrypting: 05 00 01 04 ee 75 ec 23 fc 41 1e c4 cc 25 74 fb | encrypting: d7 20 96 f5 28 08 fc 6b fb 4e 6b 06 48 a1 1f 3d | encrypting: cb e8 8f 23 41 e3 c5 0e 20 c6 39 a2 02 f3 ae be | encrypting: 40 16 de 28 02 09 5c b7 f0 8c 52 2f 3f 48 3a 22 | encrypting: 84 c1 d4 57 58 ad 99 5c 1f d8 a3 d3 39 c2 a7 98 | encrypting: a4 cc b8 95 3e 25 65 57 d1 00 bf e2 dd 45 c2 9e | encrypting: 91 a2 26 2a 5a a3 6b b1 09 0c d0 5e 05 f3 25 c7 | encrypting: f5 59 87 e1 aa 84 f3 cc 46 2d 0a c9 b8 ff 0e ab | encrypting: 7f fc 72 4c 45 81 b0 74 70 38 b8 39 c4 32 23 4b | encrypting: e6 fc bc af 89 a6 4c 6f 32 bf af c5 89 a6 16 33 | encrypting: 45 0d e1 ff 4e e6 cf 2e ff 1c 64 fa ea e2 3e 7c | encrypting: ab 71 9c a6 30 26 8f 84 71 f4 e9 c6 16 68 bc f7 | encrypting: 6a f0 b3 f4 ec f5 4e a6 a5 19 91 6b 81 ad d0 39 | encrypting: 1a 20 4c b4 ca 20 76 a2 c5 7b 7e ef 5b 05 fb ee | encrypting: 42 65 3f a5 a0 9a 51 ca ed 09 ea 72 42 05 8e ca | encrypting: 82 68 70 0a 8c 49 2f 51 ad e7 39 6b 13 b1 b8 7e | encrypting: f6 ad a4 4b 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 | IV: 6d 7b f4 ac 99 e9 4f cc | unpadded size is: 404 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 408 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 436 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 16 3d aa 70 45 e5 cb 5c | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #20 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #20: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #20 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 436 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #20) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 20 01 2e c2 10 78 00 00 01 b4 5c 4f c6 75 | b7 4d 91 87 4c c6 d0 c6 3b f4 60 b7 ef 7d 41 ee | 12 7a 4b 57 f9 84 94 17 32 bc 5d bb ca 55 86 8a | 32 6b d4 5c 48 82 bb f7 96 f9 20 9e b5 a7 8f d8 | 8b 87 1c fa 89 72 2b f1 3f 59 a4 a3 c8 76 68 68 | d2 8d c0 4b c9 99 32 d4 84 21 6c 7d a3 fd 4d f6 | 7f f0 78 c4 c3 ea dc 48 b5 07 98 78 fa fb 25 76 | d5 a5 ee 9c 25 4d 5e 57 5f c6 24 13 42 e0 5b a7 | 07 3b 5c a5 48 64 64 2e fe c2 ec fb 6b 67 26 55 | 6b fa b0 78 83 ac fd 3f 24 b5 00 65 4a 46 02 84 | b3 41 64 ca 3c 0e bf 7f 31 b5 72 c5 4b 61 c8 eb | 5d fb 3f 46 f6 7f ed 18 6f 39 68 6a 2d 87 cd 41 | 71 31 22 e4 2a 6b 19 c7 83 cb 7f d4 e8 e7 8a 37 | 1a 98 59 f5 f2 da 5b 7f 5d 4f 1c 14 7c d0 03 22 | da b8 c3 f2 c1 bd 04 9f d3 6c 65 0d ce 91 00 54 | 30 5a 0d 1f d5 1b 65 85 92 4e 14 7b fb 68 d0 eb | 0c 2b e7 ac d8 69 a8 26 c4 eb 94 45 62 17 37 bc | e8 78 ca 7a 3c 97 9a 0c d5 12 55 06 58 00 8f b8 | 1c 99 a9 f6 c4 fa 54 93 91 b7 3f 5d bf 6d 83 20 | 4b 4f b7 d7 2f 74 b2 ce e9 22 59 a9 db b5 6b 41 | cb 37 50 df c1 a8 66 d3 de e3 2a 1f 01 86 75 3e | f6 4d e5 40 b6 23 73 84 c8 24 fe 76 40 b1 21 83 | f2 e1 f8 1c e5 2a 16 89 55 2d d3 dc cf 21 11 4a | 4a c8 dd 77 d8 19 25 ec e5 e7 fd 5b f1 f4 ee 38 | 10 07 b9 cd d1 bf 3a 47 93 0d f0 90 70 f2 6b 4b | a3 ff c5 94 ef eb c5 2e 7b 1d 99 4b 16 3d aa 70 | 45 e5 cb 5c | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 size 128 | #20 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49498.296071 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #20: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x91116467 <0x29262d0d xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #20 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #20 spent 2.23 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 | spent 0.00286 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 52 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 20 01 2e c2 10 78 00 00 00 34 74 4d a6 96 | fc 22 29 ab 8c 4f f8 57 f1 e1 88 1f da 1e 87 aa | 1d 2d c2 a7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 784470136 (0x2ec21078) | length: 52 (0x34) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #20 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #20 is idle | #20 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 24 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 16 3d aa 70 45 e5 cb 5c | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: da 1e 87 aa 1d 2d c2 a7 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -24): | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 20 01 2e c2 10 78 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 18 | a5 e7 a3 03 f9 1f 0a 63 9d 97 f7 23 5e 58 ba 0b | a1 e6 8f bd | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 2e c2 10 78 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b80002af0 (length 32) | 0a ec 6b d4 f5 c4 a1 3b 70 44 62 3c 3b 43 67 dc | 32 59 e9 aa 65 33 e4 78 36 b5 26 df be bb 47 ae | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7f9b8c009130 (length 32) | 52 87 c5 8d 5c 29 b0 04 e3 60 f2 05 2a 11 93 98 | 7c f6 7d 1c 4d cf 14 7a 89 00 2a 62 37 cf 95 10 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | a5 e7 a3 03 f9 1f 0a 63 9d 97 f7 23 5e 58 ba 0b | a1 e6 8f bd | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | a5 e7 a3 03 f9 1f 0a 63 9d 97 f7 23 5e 58 ba 0b | a1 e6 8f bd | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #20: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #20: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #20 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x91116467 SPI_OUT=0x292 | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x91116467 SPI_OUT=0x29262d0d ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x557566ca79c0,sr=0x557566ca79c0} to #20 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #19 spent 0.225 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #20 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#20) cloned from #19 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #20 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #20: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #20 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #20 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b90007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 size 128 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #20: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x91116467 <0x29262d0d xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #20 spent 0.299 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.512 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00396 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 05 01 45 43 33 b0 00 00 00 44 7e bc 74 ed | 09 97 8b 4d b9 06 40 71 78 db 83 68 5b c0 55 01 | fe 98 ed df e4 66 f4 00 76 0c e5 6b 12 54 3d 5e | d7 e9 21 35 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1162032048 (0x454333b0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #20; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=2ec21078 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #19; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #19 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | current Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 8) | 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 45 43 33 b0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | b2 3f a3 08 62 ca cd 2d eb 43 e0 25 37 c2 71 68 | 45 b9 8b a3 | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: b2 3f a3 08 62 ca cd 2d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 12 54 3d 5e d7 e9 21 35 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 05 01 45 43 33 b0 00 00 00 44 0c 00 00 18 | cc 35 b4 f8 10 ec 53 54 cf c9 8e 2f 25 16 80 78 | 43 67 23 ae 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 91 11 64 67 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940010c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 45 43 33 b0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7f9b90004e74 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 91 11 64 67 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | cc 35 b4 f8 10 ec 53 54 cf c9 8e 2f 25 16 80 78 | 43 67 23 ae | informational HASH(1): | cc 35 b4 f8 10 ec 53 54 cf c9 8e 2f 25 16 80 78 | 43 67 23 ae | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 91 11 64 67 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #19: received Delete SA(0x91116467) payload: deleting IPsec State #20 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #20: deleting other state #20 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.159s and sending notification | child state #20: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.91116467@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.29262d0d@192.1.2.23 "east" #20: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #20 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1269020770 (0x4ba3b862) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 29 26 2d 0d | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c68 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadec0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d4c (length 4) | 4b a3 b8 62 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80f4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 29 26 2d 0d | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80e0 (length 20) | a1 44 2d 1a 0e 8c 3c cb 09 54 08 95 b8 a9 5d d3 | bd d6 02 d4 | send delete HASH(1): | a1 44 2d 1a 0e 8c 3c cb 09 54 08 95 b8 a9 5d d3 | bd d6 02 d4 | last Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | current Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 8) | 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d5c (length 4) | 4b a3 b8 62 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | de 75 12 4f e8 ef cc b3 89 b1 68 df 28 2e 17 e5 | f7 22 2f 87 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 a1 44 2d 1a 0e 8c 3c cb 09 54 08 95 | encrypting: b8 a9 5d d3 bd d6 02 d4 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 29 26 2d 0d | IV: de 75 12 4f e8 ef cc b3 89 b1 68 df 28 2e 17 e5 | IV: f7 22 2f 87 | unpadded size is: 40 | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 2c 12 e5 25 16 72 5a 56 | sending 68 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 05 01 4b a3 b8 62 00 00 00 44 6a 07 86 43 | 5c 14 ce 05 75 7d b0 db 29 3e 25 7b 8e fb 02 a3 | 55 d5 4f 7e ea 51 d5 1e c7 b3 4c b8 2c 12 e5 25 | 16 72 5a 56 | state #20 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b88003960 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050851' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x91116467 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050851' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x91116467 SPI_OUT=0x29262d0d ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.91116467@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.91116467@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.29262d0d@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.29262d0d@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #20 in QUICK_R2 | child state #20: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b8c001270: destroyed | stop processing: state #20 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #19 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #19 | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #19: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.194s and sending notification | parent state #19: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #19 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 318949283 (0x1302c7a3) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c08 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940010c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cec (length 4) | 13 02 c7 a3 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8094 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 b3 91 2d 11 | 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8080 (length 20) | 29 35 53 20 6d 09 8a 97 3f fb 34 2d f1 cb 6d 15 | 9d 3e ea ff | send delete HASH(1): | 29 35 53 20 6d 09 8a 97 3f fb 34 2d f1 cb 6d 15 | 9d 3e ea ff | last Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | current Phase 1 IV: 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566caaa70 (length 8) | 03 55 df 23 9d 2c 86 a8 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cfc (length 4) | 13 02 c7 a3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566caa9f0 (length 20) | f8 8c 53 8d cb 82 84 ea ed 8c c3 16 0f 44 45 99 | b6 3f 2f d1 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 29 35 53 20 6d 09 8a 97 3f fb 34 2d | encrypting: f1 cb 6d 15 9d 3e ea ff 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 | encrypting: 19 bb 5b 5b | IV: f8 8c 53 8d cb 82 84 ea ed 8c c3 16 0f 44 45 99 | IV: b6 3f 2f d1 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 56 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 30 67 f2 7f 19 b7 42 92 | sending 84 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 05 01 13 02 c7 a3 00 00 00 54 19 70 2b b1 | eb 12 89 b2 a8 85 2c 95 d1 30 12 e5 c5 06 bd 10 | f2 c6 ee b7 47 41 2b ed a6 25 53 d4 9b ab 44 56 | 14 7a b9 f1 49 93 06 ab d5 c7 fd 49 30 67 f2 7f | 19 b7 42 92 | state #19 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800081c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #19: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b80002a80: destroyed | stop processing: state #19 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.2 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00438 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00275 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 84 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | 08 10 05 01 55 88 88 c2 00 00 00 54 a8 78 dc ba | 69 b1 54 d4 03 84 8b dd f6 d6 7f 92 0e 73 cf 46 | 4b 0d f4 de cf 09 4b c2 10 51 2b 15 56 84 68 a1 | 0a 45 bd b0 31 30 31 1d 84 99 0c a1 0d a2 5f 75 | 02 78 b1 62 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | responder cookie: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1435011266 (0x558888c2) | length: 84 (0x54) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x558888c2 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | b3 91 2d 11 83 69 09 47 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | f2 16 0a 12 19 bb 5b 5b | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0704 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00281 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 66 b0 70 03 59 8b d6 e8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 66 b0 70 03 59 8b d6 e8 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 0d 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | 02 76 e8 1d 81 68 90 77 9e 6f 18 75 d4 9b 64 f9 | fd 5c cb db 1a 10 14 41 b0 e7 fc 9c 46 93 5e b3 | creating state object #21 at 0x557566caa5e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #21 in UNDEFINED | pstats #21 ikev1.isakmp started | #21 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #21: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 66 b0 70 03 59 8b d6 e8 "east" #21: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 66 b0 70 03 59 8b d6 e8 | responder cookie: | 02 76 e8 1d 81 68 90 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #21: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #21: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #21 is idle "east" #21: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 66 b0 70 03 59 8b d6 e8 | responder cookie: | 02 76 e8 1d 81 68 90 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #21) | 66 b0 70 03 59 8b d6 e8 02 76 e8 1d 81 68 90 77 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.566 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00323 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c4 f6 6d 68 48 c7 a3 82 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c4 f6 6d 68 48 c7 a3 82 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 0e 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | c7 17 8f 7f 62 a6 ec 64 4a b8 8c 20 47 2e 2f e3 | bb b9 b9 24 18 03 ec da d5 be ae d5 95 fd 60 d6 | creating state object #22 at 0x557566cae290 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #22 in UNDEFINED | pstats #22 ikev1.isakmp started | #22 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #22: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: c4 f6 6d 68 48 c7 a3 82 "east" #22: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c4 f6 6d 68 48 c7 a3 82 | responder cookie: | c7 17 8f 7f 62 a6 ec 64 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #22: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #22: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #22 is idle "east" #22: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c4 f6 6d 68 48 c7 a3 82 | responder cookie: | c7 17 8f 7f 62 a6 ec 64 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #22) | c4 f6 6d 68 48 c7 a3 82 c7 17 8f 7f 62 a6 ec 64 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.558 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00262 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x557566ca8120 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x557565171700 (length 32) | d4 3f ef 7d 91 a3 a0 99 aa ca a5 d5 af ea 37 75 | b6 8c 67 ec 01 36 3f ab 10 b1 8e 51 62 92 0d 23 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x5575651716e0 (length 4) | 0f 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca320 (length 32) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 f7 64 e8 1a 08 ea 05 ec | 0f 7e 84 a0 e2 e3 f6 17 54 1e ce e7 53 5f 01 ab | creating state object #23 at 0x557566cb3370 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #23 in UNDEFINED | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp started | #23 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #23: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c "east" #23: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 192 (0xc0) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 c0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #23 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #23: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 size 128 "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.57 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00177 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | 14 00 00 24 c2 bd b0 ea e7 cd 7b 1f 48 e2 45 4b | 20 31 c4 5c a3 82 bb ac 5e aa 73 6d a8 94 96 11 | 9f 51 eb 76 14 00 00 18 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d | a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 ed 6e aa a8 00 00 00 18 | 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | 83 42 c9 6d | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #23 is idle | #23 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cb3908 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cb3910 (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca510 (length 20) | 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | ed 6e aa a8 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | natd_hash: hash= ed 6e aa a8 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x557566cb3908 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x557566cb3910 (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca474 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca466 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca550 (length 20) | 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | 83 42 c9 6d | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | natd_hash: hash= 83 42 c9 6d | expected NAT-D(me): 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | expected NAT-D(me): ed 6e aa a8 | expected NAT-D(him): | 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | 83 42 c9 6d | received NAT-D: 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | received NAT-D: ed 6e aa a8 | received NAT-D: 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | received NAT-D: 83 42 c9 6d | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 25 for state #23 | state #23 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | crypto helper 6 resuming | suspending state #23 and saving MD | #23 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 25 for state #23 | #23 spent 0.19 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 6 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 25 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.33 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b840028d0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b840028d0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | Generated nonce: 69 7c 80 56 ec df 0f d2 bd 74 4a 53 10 48 f6 2f | Generated nonce: 5d 3c b8 81 b0 50 2c 3f 3d 0a 90 c9 08 c9 3a 36 | crypto helper 6 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 25 time elapsed 0.000689 seconds | (#23) spent 0.687 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 25: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 25 for state #23 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84007070 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #23 | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 25 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #23: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b840028d0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #23 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | keyex value e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | keyex value 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | keyex value 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | keyex value af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | keyex value c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | keyex value f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | keyex value a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | keyex value 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | keyex value c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | keyex value 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | keyex value fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | keyex value 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | keyex value fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | keyex value e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | keyex value 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 69 7c 80 56 ec df 0f d2 bd 74 4a 53 10 48 f6 2f | Nr 5d 3c b8 81 b0 50 2c 3f 3d 0a 90 c9 08 c9 3a 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | 83 42 c9 6d | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | natd_hash: hash= 83 42 c9 6d | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 | NAT-D 83 42 c9 6d | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca150 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca158 (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0d4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca0c6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca1a0 (length 20) | 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | ed 6e aa a8 | natd_hash: hasher=0x5575651547a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | natd_hash: hash= ed 6e aa a8 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | NAT-D ed 6e aa a8 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b840028d0: transferring ownership from state #23 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 26 for state #23 | state #23 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 size 128 | #23 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 3 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #23 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 26 for state #23 | parent state #23: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 26 | state #23 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | peer's g: e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | peer's g: 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | peer's g: 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | peer's g: c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | peer's g: d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | peer's g: f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | peer's g: 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | peer's g: f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | peer's g: b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | peer's g: 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | peer's g: e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | peer's g: e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | peer's g: f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | peer's g: 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | peer's g: 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | peer's g: d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | 14 00 00 24 69 7c 80 56 ec df 0f d2 bd 74 4a 53 | 10 48 f6 2f 5d 3c b8 81 b0 50 2c 3f 3d 0a 90 c9 | 08 c9 3a 36 14 00 00 18 60 5d b5 b7 87 45 0f 3f | 00 0c 40 1e 91 f2 ca 78 83 42 c9 6d 00 00 00 18 | 33 35 2b 9f be 6c 09 7d a9 27 79 90 c0 e5 69 36 | ed 6e aa a8 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 size 128 | #23 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49500.188095 "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #23 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #23 spent 0.493 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84007070 | new : g_ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b840028d0: computed shared DH secret key@0x7f9b8c008420 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x557566cb4a50 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6a0 | result: psk-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a688 | result: psk-key@0x557566c963a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from psk-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x557566c963a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b880010c0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x557566cb4a74 (length 32) | c2 bd b0 ea e7 cd 7b 1f 48 e2 45 4b 20 31 c4 5c | a3 82 bb ac 5e aa 73 6d a8 94 96 11 9f 51 eb 76 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x557566cb4a94 (length 32) | 69 7c 80 56 ec df 0f d2 bd 74 4a 53 10 48 f6 2f | 5d 3c b8 81 b0 50 2c 3f 3d 0a 90 c9 08 c9 3a 36 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6b8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x557566c92f70 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b880044f0 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1705467136: ffffffe3 09 ffffffb8 ffffff8f ffffffba ffffffcb ffffffef ffffffe3 20 7b ffffffad ffffffaa ffffffbc 72 ffffffe9 2b ffffff80 18 4c 0e 7d 54 ffffffd3 0a ffffff9f ffffff91 ffffffa6 13 ffffffd3 2b 0b 4a 24 ffffff8f fffffff3 44 44 ffffff89 04 ffffffb3 23 13 06 fffffffd ffffffb4 51 ffffffbe 49 73 17 63 ffffffe3 25 ffffffe2 5b 4f 41 2f 11 55 4a ffffffd9 ffffff89 4a 09 11 3c ffffff83 0a ffffffe6 fffffff9 33 3a ffffff96 33 ffffff9c ffffffb1 fffffff1 73 58 3e ffffffec 08 ffffffa4 4f ffffff93 71 ffffffa0 ffffff9f ffffff95 ffffffa1 ffffffb5 ffffff9f 4d 79 ffffffa9 37 ffffffb9 28 ffffffad ffffff9c ffffffd3 ffffffb4 70 ffffff84 42 ffffffeb 21 5d ffffffa1 42 0e 61 59 ffffff9f 46 ffffffa8 ffffffbe ffffffef 66 ffffffa7 fffffff8 65 ffffff80 fffffff4 ffffffbf 1a ffffff94 ffffffcc 78 5a ffffffee 63 28 ffffffa9 ffffffa9 fffffff7 1f 60 fffffff6 ffffffd6 ffffff8f fffffff8 4e 5d ffffffdd 4f ffffffb9 68 fffffff2 45 23 6e ffffffa8 0a ffffffcd 56 3d 7b ffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b88001510 | unwrapped: 79 5a 56 c0 fb 32 10 92 d9 35 1b 5d 87 18 bd f0 | unwrapped: 37 b9 5e 9c b4 f1 b3 17 fa db 92 8e b8 eb 67 02 | unwrapped: ad c8 47 de cb 80 17 86 da d5 6a f6 02 f9 10 44 | unwrapped: 59 97 ba 63 eb d0 2c a5 af c3 c4 da 05 20 6c dd | unwrapped: 03 3d 5f 41 9f 25 a2 f6 86 e0 fa 59 a3 d4 1e 3f | unwrapped: a1 d3 3e 3e 21 7f a3 ca a4 cf f5 40 e7 b5 87 59 | unwrapped: 15 7d 61 0d d3 80 80 56 09 83 92 6d 56 66 cf 0a | unwrapped: 32 71 c7 39 be 22 ff 24 a7 bf c4 1c 10 09 ec c9 | unwrapped: ba 9f ca ae 79 56 af 9e f1 a2 6a 75 ae c0 56 fd | unwrapped: 23 74 a7 49 5e 91 5e cc 54 c6 e0 16 3a d4 ef d3 | unwrapped: 49 df c9 00 d1 55 6a 8e 28 c2 3e de 9e 61 1b 43 | unwrapped: 2f 9f 60 4c 84 ae d0 ef 3a 35 10 d9 c2 87 c6 d3 | unwrapped: d0 e1 cd f1 c5 1f e7 c3 97 10 ce 9a 3d d9 5b 25 | unwrapped: 44 3e c8 23 a9 f3 28 8c ed 1e ea 3b b7 b2 89 6e | unwrapped: c3 ed a4 d4 c4 79 8c ed 5a b9 e3 cf bb 4d 0e 80 | unwrapped: c5 a3 d4 7d 02 b4 99 d6 3d 29 58 17 61 b3 ab 17 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb4cb4 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb4cbc (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6c0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6a8 | result: final-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a698 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x557566c8be20 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88002a80 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c92f70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1705467168: 5e 72 3e ffffffd2 ffffff9d ffffff89 2d ffffffa3 fffffff6 ffffffe4 fffffffc ffffff83 58 ffffff88 08 ffffffff 02 ffffffcf 1f 4a ffffff81 ffffffce ffffffa8 ffffffd0 61 ffffffef 16 ffffffaa ffffffe3 37 ffffffe0 6e | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b88004bc0 | unwrapped: 82 86 a7 96 ae 47 95 fc bc 6f e8 7c b4 f7 47 f8 | unwrapped: ac 6a 57 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1705467168: ffffffe3 09 ffffffb8 ffffff8f ffffffba ffffffcb ffffffef ffffffe3 20 7b ffffffad ffffffaa ffffffbc 72 ffffffe9 2b ffffff80 18 4c 0e 7d 54 ffffffd3 0a ffffff9f ffffff91 ffffffa6 13 ffffffd3 2b 0b 4a 24 ffffff8f fffffff3 44 44 ffffff89 04 ffffffb3 23 13 06 fffffffd ffffffb4 51 ffffffbe 49 73 17 63 ffffffe3 25 ffffffe2 5b 4f 41 2f 11 55 4a ffffffd9 ffffff89 4a 09 11 3c ffffff83 0a ffffffe6 fffffff9 33 3a ffffff96 33 ffffff9c ffffffb1 fffffff1 73 58 3e ffffffec 08 ffffffa4 4f ffffff93 71 ffffffa0 ffffff9f ffffff95 ffffffa1 ffffffb5 ffffff9f 4d 79 ffffffa9 37 ffffffb9 28 ffffffad ffffff9c ffffffd3 ffffffb4 70 ffffff84 42 ffffffeb 21 5d ffffffa1 42 0e 61 59 ffffff9f 46 ffffffa8 ffffffbe ffffffef 66 ffffffa7 fffffff8 65 ffffff80 fffffff4 ffffffbf 1a ffffff94 ffffffcc 78 5a ffffffee 63 28 ffffffa9 ffffffa9 fffffff7 1f 60 fffffff6 ffffffd6 ffffff8f fffffff8 4e 5d ffffffdd 4f ffffffb9 68 fffffff2 45 23 6e ffffffa8 0a ffffffcd 56 3d 7b ffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b88004a10 | unwrapped: 79 5a 56 c0 fb 32 10 92 d9 35 1b 5d 87 18 bd f0 | unwrapped: 37 b9 5e 9c b4 f1 b3 17 fa db 92 8e b8 eb 67 02 | unwrapped: ad c8 47 de cb 80 17 86 da d5 6a f6 02 f9 10 44 | unwrapped: 59 97 ba 63 eb d0 2c a5 af c3 c4 da 05 20 6c dd | unwrapped: 03 3d 5f 41 9f 25 a2 f6 86 e0 fa 59 a3 d4 1e 3f | unwrapped: a1 d3 3e 3e 21 7f a3 ca a4 cf f5 40 e7 b5 87 59 | unwrapped: 15 7d 61 0d d3 80 80 56 09 83 92 6d 56 66 cf 0a | unwrapped: 32 71 c7 39 be 22 ff 24 a7 bf c4 1c 10 09 ec c9 | unwrapped: ba 9f ca ae 79 56 af 9e f1 a2 6a 75 ae c0 56 fd | unwrapped: 23 74 a7 49 5e 91 5e cc 54 c6 e0 16 3a d4 ef d3 | unwrapped: 49 df c9 00 d1 55 6a 8e 28 c2 3e de 9e 61 1b 43 | unwrapped: 2f 9f 60 4c 84 ae d0 ef 3a 35 10 d9 c2 87 c6 d3 | unwrapped: d0 e1 cd f1 c5 1f e7 c3 97 10 ce 9a 3d d9 5b 25 | unwrapped: 44 3e c8 23 a9 f3 28 8c ed 1e ea 3b b7 b2 89 6e | unwrapped: c3 ed a4 d4 c4 79 8c ed 5a b9 e3 cf bb 4d 0e 80 | unwrapped: c5 a3 d4 7d 02 b4 99 d6 3d 29 58 17 61 b3 ab 17 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb4cb4 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb4cbc (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6a0 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a688 | result: final-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6a8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x557566c999c0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88002050 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8be20 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1705467152: 52 ffffffbb 70 ffffffda 32 ffffff98 05 2d 76 ffffff87 4d ffffffa9 3c 2c ffffffbb 50 17 2c 67 40 20 ffffffbf ffffffa8 ffffff91 ffffffdf 6f ffffffac ffffffef ffffffd3 ffffffd2 ffffffa6 7a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b88005e90 | unwrapped: c9 b8 09 89 24 6e 1f b6 54 3c 77 06 88 f3 67 ad | unwrapped: c1 16 30 fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7f9b8c008420 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7f9b8c008420 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1705467152: ffffffe3 09 ffffffb8 ffffff8f ffffffba ffffffcb ffffffef ffffffe3 20 7b ffffffad ffffffaa ffffffbc 72 ffffffe9 2b ffffff80 18 4c 0e 7d 54 ffffffd3 0a ffffff9f ffffff91 ffffffa6 13 ffffffd3 2b 0b 4a 24 ffffff8f fffffff3 44 44 ffffff89 04 ffffffb3 23 13 06 fffffffd ffffffb4 51 ffffffbe 49 73 17 63 ffffffe3 25 ffffffe2 5b 4f 41 2f 11 55 4a ffffffd9 ffffff89 4a 09 11 3c ffffff83 0a ffffffe6 fffffff9 33 3a ffffff96 33 ffffff9c ffffffb1 fffffff1 73 58 3e ffffffec 08 ffffffa4 4f ffffff93 71 ffffffa0 ffffff9f ffffff95 ffffffa1 ffffffb5 ffffff9f 4d 79 ffffffa9 37 ffffffb9 28 ffffffad ffffff9c ffffffd3 ffffffb4 70 ffffff84 42 ffffffeb 21 5d ffffffa1 42 0e 61 59 ffffff9f 46 ffffffa8 ffffffbe ffffffef 66 ffffffa7 fffffff8 65 ffffff80 fffffff4 ffffffbf 1a ffffff94 ffffffcc 78 5a ffffffee 63 28 ffffffa9 ffffffa9 fffffff7 1f 60 fffffff6 ffffffd6 ffffff8f fffffff8 4e 5d ffffffdd 4f ffffffb9 68 fffffff2 45 23 6e ffffffa8 0a ffffffcd 56 3d 7b ffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7f9b88004900 | unwrapped: 79 5a 56 c0 fb 32 10 92 d9 35 1b 5d 87 18 bd f0 | unwrapped: 37 b9 5e 9c b4 f1 b3 17 fa db 92 8e b8 eb 67 02 | unwrapped: ad c8 47 de cb 80 17 86 da d5 6a f6 02 f9 10 44 | unwrapped: 59 97 ba 63 eb d0 2c a5 af c3 c4 da 05 20 6c dd | unwrapped: 03 3d 5f 41 9f 25 a2 f6 86 e0 fa 59 a3 d4 1e 3f | unwrapped: a1 d3 3e 3e 21 7f a3 ca a4 cf f5 40 e7 b5 87 59 | unwrapped: 15 7d 61 0d d3 80 80 56 09 83 92 6d 56 66 cf 0a | unwrapped: 32 71 c7 39 be 22 ff 24 a7 bf c4 1c 10 09 ec c9 | unwrapped: ba 9f ca ae 79 56 af 9e f1 a2 6a 75 ae c0 56 fd | unwrapped: 23 74 a7 49 5e 91 5e cc 54 c6 e0 16 3a d4 ef d3 | unwrapped: 49 df c9 00 d1 55 6a 8e 28 c2 3e de 9e 61 1b 43 | unwrapped: 2f 9f 60 4c 84 ae d0 ef 3a 35 10 d9 c2 87 c6 d3 | unwrapped: d0 e1 cd f1 c5 1f e7 c3 97 10 ce 9a 3d d9 5b 25 | unwrapped: 44 3e c8 23 a9 f3 28 8c ed 1e ea 3b b7 b2 89 6e | unwrapped: c3 ed a4 d4 c4 79 8c ed 5a b9 e3 cf bb 4d 0e 80 | unwrapped: c5 a3 d4 7d 02 b4 99 d6 3d 29 58 17 61 b3 ab 17 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x557566cb4cb4 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x557566cb4cbc (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6b0 | result: final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a698 | result: final-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | appendix_b: SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a678 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | appendix_b prf: created sha context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | appendix_b prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | appendix_b: release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | appendix_b PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88004510 | appendix_b PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a680 | result: final-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a668 | result: final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | appendix_b PRF sha final-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 20) | appendix_b: key-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b_keymat_e: reference old_k#1-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | Kn PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c999c0 (size 20) | Kn: SKEYID_e-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c999c0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a678 | result: clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | Kn prf: created sha context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | Kn prf: begin sha with context 0x7f9b88003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | Kn: release clone-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | Kn PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88002a80 | Kn PRF sha update old_k-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (size 20) | Kn: old_k-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x557566c8d6a0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1705467200: 60 ffffffa2 ffffffa3 18 ffffffb3 20 ffffff94 ffffff9c ffffffea 27 01 ffffffe4 45 48 23 20 44 2d 64 ffffffe3 ffffff85 fffffffc 1b 54 ffffffc7 ffffffc6 64 ffffffd8 4d ffffffe7 ffffffce ffffffce | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7f9b88006250 | unwrapped: e9 2d 10 f4 54 ff 0a 35 bb ff 09 d8 bc 01 83 5f | unwrapped: 2e dd 53 53 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a680 | result: final-key@0x557566cad820 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566cad820 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a668 | result: final-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x557566cad820 | Kn PRF sha final-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (size 20) | Kn: key-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6f8 | result: result-key@0x557566cad820 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#N-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#final-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: DES3_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566cad820 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7f9b9a58a6f8 | result: cryptkey-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 (24-bytes, DES3_CBC) | appendix_b_keymat_e: release keymat-key@0x557566cad820 | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x557566c92f70, skeyid_a 0x557566c8be20, skeyid_e 0x557566c999c0, enc_key 0x7f9b90007fa0 | DH_i: e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | DH_i: 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | DH_i: 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | DH_i: c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | DH_i: d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | DH_i: f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | DH_i: 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | DH_i: f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | DH_i: b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | DH_i: 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | DH_i: e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | DH_i: e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | DH_i: f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | DH_i: 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | DH_i: 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | DH_i: d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | DH_r: cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | DH_r: e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | DH_r: 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | DH_r: 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | DH_r: af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | DH_r: c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | DH_r: f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | DH_r: a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | DH_r: 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | DH_r: c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | DH_r: 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | DH_r: fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | DH_r: 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | DH_r: fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | DH_r: e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | DH_r: 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | new IV hash sha init | spent 0.00234 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 e8 55 58 9f | 50 d0 6a 05 c4 42 fd b6 44 07 d7 28 47 93 ab cb | 9d 25 27 30 6e d3 64 47 6e a2 de 62 83 c2 cf 6d | ef 1c ad 3f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #23 is idle; has background offloaded task | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 but exponentiation still in progress | suspending state #23 and saving MD | #23 is busy; has a suspended MD | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0894 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x557566cb4ab4 (length 256) | e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x557566cb4bb4 (length 256) | cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7f9b88000d60 (length 20) | 8f 73 39 4d ab 2a c2 62 18 f0 a0 93 55 b1 f5 fe | 5d 2d fa 21 | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 26 time elapsed 0.002526 seconds | (#23) spent 2.36 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 26: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 26 for state #23 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88001820 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #23 | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 26 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #23: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b840028d0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #23 | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 8f 73 39 4d ab 2a c2 62 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 83 c2 cf 6d ef 1c ad 3f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 5d 44 25 44 | 0f f1 1c 61 94 6b 9c f8 eb 60 6d af cd 69 53 d9 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 4 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #23: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9a08 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c004db0 (length 256) | e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002510 (length 256) | cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb3908 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb3910 (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80004720 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9b90 (length 20) | 5d 44 25 44 0f f1 1c 61 94 6b 9c f8 eb 60 6d af | cd 69 53 d9 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c963a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9aa8 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88000d60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002510 (length 256) | cf bb 0d 62 83 7a 9f 95 71 2a ab 98 fb 93 ef 90 | e9 a2 a6 60 fb d3 9e 6b 12 6c 31 12 97 f6 33 49 | 54 b4 88 b5 c8 03 4c 92 4f ea 7c 67 4e e1 e6 52 | 65 ff f4 4a 08 52 ea 4b b7 dd 5b c9 2a 08 cc 8e | af c8 3e 0b 2b ca 80 25 3e a8 c8 b2 3f 5a 4e 9a | c6 c0 e9 99 94 aa a3 03 23 0b eb 06 c1 6c a8 31 | f2 42 cc 97 c8 88 df d8 c1 ec 06 03 e2 39 62 03 | a7 1a 16 c3 81 e5 e4 1c f9 53 1b 1d 9f c0 c6 0c | 30 5a 82 10 c3 20 42 01 26 7f f9 ee b2 7d 22 b8 | c7 e8 14 b0 fe 21 01 c0 bf 17 e5 d6 6e 9f 22 ce | 2c b8 88 7b 48 b3 60 83 2b a8 af ff 0d f2 0d 8e | fe bd 9e 92 03 08 2b 94 c5 1c 38 50 eb 12 71 60 | 00 f7 36 4e 10 05 2e bb c8 5f fb c3 07 94 bc 1a | fa 27 c5 58 3f e8 55 4a 5e d3 82 3c 4a 5f ca cc | e3 99 38 07 51 c6 db 12 41 9d ac f2 ad bd d8 8b | 5c f7 ca 57 3e 23 16 e1 71 b3 94 28 21 fd 23 eb | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c004db0 (length 256) | e5 69 7a 48 7a 92 c5 59 ee 32 1b 96 27 4f 3c f2 | 06 ec 4b 1a 43 78 2e ad 34 33 c8 28 53 63 10 67 | 19 ba 55 78 b7 eb 8b 05 95 02 b0 d9 30 07 85 e9 | c6 44 67 64 2b 43 15 b5 77 bb e8 b7 b0 36 5d 31 | d9 02 e3 fc 45 07 a2 4b b6 49 20 f7 c9 7e a4 55 | f0 a2 53 6c 26 b7 59 13 4d 55 ef 3e 64 89 1d ac | 55 09 08 50 f9 cf 34 a2 c1 b0 82 58 22 47 e9 39 | f0 87 8b 10 e3 a2 61 0a a9 3b 6b 74 57 72 41 b7 | b5 76 13 af 37 15 b4 ca 36 c1 3a 16 3e 3a 34 1d | 7f 34 4b 06 ff c0 28 24 06 ab 4b 87 b1 90 aa 8c | e0 f5 6d f6 6f a8 94 62 11 1a f6 f1 35 e2 8b 48 | e5 52 6a 63 09 e0 18 26 4f 29 2c 0e 65 3f d2 db | f8 b2 48 9c b7 0d 96 35 57 f5 a6 7f 48 09 d7 df | 61 98 28 2e 0e 81 61 9a fd 5b dd 7d a0 b9 bc a1 | 57 8d e7 74 1c 30 98 26 0b b7 29 e1 19 ce b1 98 | d4 61 e7 9d 70 50 98 18 43 25 c1 42 65 32 d4 6f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb3910 (length 8) | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb3908 (length 8) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566ca9734 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9dd0 (length 20) | 69 a4 65 61 4d 89 ee 5d a8 a2 7e a8 a7 28 4a 2f | 63 04 13 fe | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 69 a4 65 61 4d 89 ee 5d a8 a2 7e a8 a7 28 4a 2f | HASH_R 63 04 13 fe | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 69 a4 65 61 4d 89 ee 5d a8 a2 7e a8 a7 28 4a 2f | encrypting: 63 04 13 fe | IV: 83 c2 cf 6d ef 1c ad 3f | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #23 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #23: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #23 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #23 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b900030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x557566ca9770 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 68 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 39 e5 ce 5a | d6 57 43 39 ba 53 29 43 3e 07 e0 ad 9f 7b 2d ac | 2f 5c a0 08 4d 6d c8 a8 9a 94 e0 92 86 c2 cb 3c | fa 56 2f 36 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84007070 size 128 | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=3DES_CBC_192 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #23 | #23 spent 0.497 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #23 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #23 spent 0.574 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88001820 | spent 0.00234 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 436 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 20 01 0d fa c3 db 00 00 01 b4 6e a2 f9 98 | 31 55 9b 17 57 50 42 3d 7e 63 9c 51 d7 21 30 f4 | b9 10 e3 6d 30 84 c8 ec d1 f0 e4 8b 8f 2d cc 56 | 90 db e0 94 96 f8 2f 67 c2 0f ae ba 8c 4c 94 c9 | 5d 95 30 b7 1a 45 eb a4 33 0c be 67 21 a3 4f ed | 51 c2 8c f8 c9 73 14 0b cd 96 62 a9 ee 9c a3 ea | a3 be bb e7 cb 19 92 54 b1 66 04 b4 10 1f 5f 62 | 11 dc 2d 43 70 aa f9 82 9c a2 75 86 76 dc 84 b9 | 83 ab 4a e8 64 08 b4 c1 a0 eb 72 21 7d fa 87 26 | 28 da 05 0e 71 c0 b4 e8 6e 76 08 b3 b4 a0 01 cc | b0 5b a1 5c 7f 5a c6 1d cf 5a 17 bb 3d 55 5c 9b | fc 75 ca 2f 03 0f a0 1e ed c9 05 ee b0 cd c6 9a | af 7c d8 31 52 cf 0a 9f 70 01 4f 4a 33 7b 1a 29 | 48 0f 52 59 67 12 75 2e 65 63 e1 07 00 bf 49 89 | b9 36 49 0a cd 3c c2 67 52 d5 60 e2 0e 7a 92 dd | 0a 0c 25 ec cf bd da 4b 18 f9 81 61 ad 26 c3 94 | 2b 4a 6b b5 0c 2d 32 4e 00 8b 73 e3 49 76 24 59 | b1 05 37 33 b9 85 3b 1f 87 fe 1b 23 ac 4f b3 cc | 15 39 67 b9 10 b8 02 50 1a ad b6 cf 38 47 9c 23 | b8 88 ff 34 72 46 3f 9d b1 66 06 09 2b 1f 22 1c | b0 48 a5 c1 f8 e9 4d e7 75 60 b8 0d 02 61 e9 bc | bd 38 bd 95 88 da 2a c0 40 b2 cf de 0b 78 41 8d | 5d 4c 1f 52 81 ff 27 c7 bb 48 a3 b5 c4 4d 7b 64 | 0b 56 97 75 e7 08 c2 59 39 b2 8b 34 e3 76 f1 25 | b6 e1 ee 97 bc 45 65 bb 7b e5 20 dd ee 6e 14 78 | f4 5d 3d 43 d6 7b b1 25 b7 b2 44 f5 3c 22 7e 17 | 0d bd 4d 3c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 234537947 (0xdfac3db) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | current Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb3800 (length 8) | 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 0d fa c3 db | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb3780 (length 20) | 95 51 e0 44 af ac bc 48 48 b3 bf b8 6b d2 61 f0 | ac 79 ea ea | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 408 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 95 51 e0 44 af ac bc 48 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 3c 22 7e 17 0d bd 4d 3c | decrypted payload (starts at offset -408): | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 20 01 0d fa c3 db 00 00 01 b4 01 00 00 18 | 2c 42 90 44 d3 f9 00 5b cc 7a d7 1c 27 cf 0e 45 | 25 2c 7b 64 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 5d 46 2a 53 00 00 00 1c | 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 a8 f0 ac 9d | 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d ea 5c 68 d3 | e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 05 00 01 04 | 2b 91 83 43 47 89 7b 58 fb db 40 47 40 c3 dd e0 | cc d0 57 36 f3 c0 a8 4a 14 83 ca 73 8c 32 0b 50 | b4 ff 39 e6 6e 71 e6 d1 60 fa 79 9f 26 43 76 78 | 10 16 fb a6 04 58 7c 94 71 dd 79 df 6b e8 27 f9 | 7b 74 13 14 6f 46 2f c3 ab 40 81 82 6c 7b 73 cd | 14 5e 20 b5 a2 23 f5 07 05 61 8a 73 6b 0f 3c 0b | fe 09 5b af ae 86 ea e5 7c ab 0d ef 65 64 1e cb | ae b8 af eb 0b c3 4f 9a 9f 28 29 33 fb 55 61 c5 | 94 95 3c c1 55 47 d0 d7 56 1a 4f 8c 28 7d 1f 40 | 83 88 3e 68 4c e9 78 af 27 05 9e a1 51 b0 22 9d | 10 61 81 e6 b5 73 3d fb 71 f3 1b a0 3a e4 10 9a | 61 3b 5a 6e 14 43 29 77 3c 6b 20 2a 05 a2 e3 b6 | 5c 31 aa 64 22 4e 21 6a 8f cc 1a 94 4d 3b dd 29 | a9 c8 6d 39 63 0e 34 11 5d e7 1c f0 83 75 68 84 | 59 7c 42 f5 03 ba 50 a6 44 2c 1a f8 9b 12 cf 3a | 32 32 b6 01 76 9e 65 d8 43 49 3e 3c 15 e1 cb 3c | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 0d fa c3 db | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x557566ca99f4 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 5d 46 2a 53 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 | 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f | 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 05 00 01 04 2b 91 83 43 | 47 89 7b 58 fb db 40 47 40 c3 dd e0 cc d0 57 36 | f3 c0 a8 4a 14 83 ca 73 8c 32 0b 50 b4 ff 39 e6 | 6e 71 e6 d1 60 fa 79 9f 26 43 76 78 10 16 fb a6 | 04 58 7c 94 71 dd 79 df 6b e8 27 f9 7b 74 13 14 | 6f 46 2f c3 ab 40 81 82 6c 7b 73 cd 14 5e 20 b5 | a2 23 f5 07 05 61 8a 73 6b 0f 3c 0b fe 09 5b af | ae 86 ea e5 7c ab 0d ef 65 64 1e cb ae b8 af eb | 0b c3 4f 9a 9f 28 29 33 fb 55 61 c5 94 95 3c c1 | 55 47 d0 d7 56 1a 4f 8c 28 7d 1f 40 83 88 3e 68 | 4c e9 78 af 27 05 9e a1 51 b0 22 9d 10 61 81 e6 | b5 73 3d fb 71 f3 1b a0 3a e4 10 9a 61 3b 5a 6e | 14 43 29 77 3c 6b 20 2a 05 a2 e3 b6 5c 31 aa 64 | 22 4e 21 6a 8f cc 1a 94 4d 3b dd 29 a9 c8 6d 39 | 63 0e 34 11 5d e7 1c f0 83 75 68 84 59 7c 42 f5 | 03 ba 50 a6 44 2c 1a f8 9b 12 cf 3a 32 32 b6 01 | 76 9e 65 d8 43 49 3e 3c 15 e1 cb 3c 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 2c 42 90 44 d3 f9 00 5b cc 7a d7 1c 27 cf 0e 45 | 25 2c 7b 64 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 2c 42 90 44 d3 f9 00 5b cc 7a d7 1c 27 cf 0e 45 | 25 2c 7b 64 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #23: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #24 at 0x557566cb3e30 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #24 in UNDEFINED | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #23 "east" as #24 for IPSEC SA | #24 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #23.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #24: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 5d 46 2a 53 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 2b 91 83 43 47 89 7b 58 fb db 40 47 40 c3 dd e0 | cc d0 57 36 f3 c0 a8 4a 14 83 ca 73 8c 32 0b 50 | b4 ff 39 e6 6e 71 e6 d1 60 fa 79 9f 26 43 76 78 | 10 16 fb a6 04 58 7c 94 71 dd 79 df 6b e8 27 f9 | 7b 74 13 14 6f 46 2f c3 ab 40 81 82 6c 7b 73 cd | 14 5e 20 b5 a2 23 f5 07 05 61 8a 73 6b 0f 3c 0b | fe 09 5b af ae 86 ea e5 7c ab 0d ef 65 64 1e cb | ae b8 af eb 0b c3 4f 9a 9f 28 29 33 fb 55 61 c5 | 94 95 3c c1 55 47 d0 d7 56 1a 4f 8c 28 7d 1f 40 | 83 88 3e 68 4c e9 78 af 27 05 9e a1 51 b0 22 9d | 10 61 81 e6 b5 73 3d fb 71 f3 1b a0 3a e4 10 9a | 61 3b 5a 6e 14 43 29 77 3c 6b 20 2a 05 a2 e3 b6 | 5c 31 aa 64 22 4e 21 6a 8f cc 1a 94 4d 3b dd 29 | a9 c8 6d 39 63 0e 34 11 5d e7 1c f0 83 75 68 84 | 59 7c 42 f5 03 ba 50 a6 44 2c 1a f8 9b 12 cf 3a | 32 32 b6 01 76 9e 65 d8 43 49 3e 3c 15 e1 cb 3c | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 27 for state #24 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88001820 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 27 for state #24 | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #24 and saving MD | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 27 | #24 is busy; has a suspended MD | #23 spent 0.226 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.625 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001ef0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7f9b7c001ef0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 0b 5d 95 9e 6e 25 8b 46 7a dc f5 d7 f2 c1 f0 54 | 32 55 57 07 63 28 05 75 a7 f1 b8 61 1f d4 2a c5 | 7b 44 4a ab 87 dd d8 03 eb 2c ea f0 a7 98 86 c5 | bb 70 1e 1b 98 a1 ed 68 df 31 89 26 4e 9f fa d5 | e7 1a 99 bd e8 ac 0e 6a 9c eb 9c 26 ea 54 4e d7 | b3 bf 00 7d fc cd 34 5a ca 49 b7 2c d2 a2 3a 6d | c2 3e 18 7c b3 d7 b8 b8 ff c5 f4 5a 3d 24 c3 db | 7d 43 76 cf aa 43 59 1e 8d 83 2d fb 39 37 9f 37 | 71 6d d4 de ed 4e 4c 07 91 93 f5 6f d1 ab a9 bc | c6 f0 ce 71 cb e0 57 a1 05 57 20 1d 4d 5c f8 18 | 33 cc 19 ee 0f 49 7b 13 5f 3c 51 80 b9 9f 19 4d | 72 3c a2 22 0e 64 fc ab e9 98 02 27 83 42 1f 44 | a4 bd f5 3c e4 bc 87 84 d5 be 8a af 38 33 d5 91 | 3e 90 c2 41 45 56 a9 5a 40 8a 00 64 06 4c 05 5e | f1 fd 63 b8 e4 1a c7 a4 81 04 29 6e 68 bd bc 14 | 2d 93 05 f8 b1 fc b9 8d 3f 23 9c 7b 2a 94 d9 54 | Generated nonce: 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | Generated nonce: 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 27 time elapsed 0.000662 seconds | (#24) spent 0.66 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 27: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 27 for state #24 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c0085b0 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #24 | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 27 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #24: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001ef0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #24 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x557566c9c0f0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x557566c9c0f0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001ef0: transferring ownership from state #24 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 28 for state #24 | state #24 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88001820 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88001820 size 128 | suspending state #24 and saving MD | #24 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #24 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | crypto helper 5 resuming | #24 spent 0.0578 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 28 for state #24 | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 28 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c0085b0 | peer's g: 2b 91 83 43 47 89 7b 58 fb db 40 47 40 c3 dd e0 | peer's g: cc d0 57 36 f3 c0 a8 4a 14 83 ca 73 8c 32 0b 50 | peer's g: b4 ff 39 e6 6e 71 e6 d1 60 fa 79 9f 26 43 76 78 | peer's g: 10 16 fb a6 04 58 7c 94 71 dd 79 df 6b e8 27 f9 | peer's g: 7b 74 13 14 6f 46 2f c3 ab 40 81 82 6c 7b 73 cd | peer's g: 14 5e 20 b5 a2 23 f5 07 05 61 8a 73 6b 0f 3c 0b | peer's g: fe 09 5b af ae 86 ea e5 7c ab 0d ef 65 64 1e cb | peer's g: ae b8 af eb 0b c3 4f 9a 9f 28 29 33 fb 55 61 c5 | peer's g: 94 95 3c c1 55 47 d0 d7 56 1a 4f 8c 28 7d 1f 40 | peer's g: 83 88 3e 68 4c e9 78 af 27 05 9e a1 51 b0 22 9d | peer's g: 10 61 81 e6 b5 73 3d fb 71 f3 1b a0 3a e4 10 9a | peer's g: 61 3b 5a 6e 14 43 29 77 3c 6b 20 2a 05 a2 e3 b6 | peer's g: 5c 31 aa 64 22 4e 21 6a 8f cc 1a 94 4d 3b dd 29 | peer's g: a9 c8 6d 39 63 0e 34 11 5d e7 1c f0 83 75 68 84 | peer's g: 59 7c 42 f5 03 ba 50 a6 44 2c 1a f8 9b 12 cf 3a | peer's g: 32 32 b6 01 76 9e 65 d8 43 49 3e 3c 15 e1 cb 3c | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001ef0: computed shared DH secret key@0x557566cad820 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 28 time elapsed 0.000904 seconds | (#24) spent 0.905 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 28: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 28 for state #24 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800013c0 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #24 | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 28 | calling continuation function 0x55756507e630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #24: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 234537947 (0xdfac3db) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 5d 46 2a 53 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x6fa6ffc5 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 6f a6 ff c5 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 20 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 28 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #24: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:0dfac3db} "east" #24: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #24: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | Nr 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 0b 5d 95 9e 6e 25 8b 46 7a dc f5 d7 f2 c1 f0 54 | keyex value 32 55 57 07 63 28 05 75 a7 f1 b8 61 1f d4 2a c5 | keyex value 7b 44 4a ab 87 dd d8 03 eb 2c ea f0 a7 98 86 c5 | keyex value bb 70 1e 1b 98 a1 ed 68 df 31 89 26 4e 9f fa d5 | keyex value e7 1a 99 bd e8 ac 0e 6a 9c eb 9c 26 ea 54 4e d7 | keyex value b3 bf 00 7d fc cd 34 5a ca 49 b7 2c d2 a2 3a 6d | keyex value c2 3e 18 7c b3 d7 b8 b8 ff c5 f4 5a 3d 24 c3 db | keyex value 7d 43 76 cf aa 43 59 1e 8d 83 2d fb 39 37 9f 37 | keyex value 71 6d d4 de ed 4e 4c 07 91 93 f5 6f d1 ab a9 bc | keyex value c6 f0 ce 71 cb e0 57 a1 05 57 20 1d 4d 5c f8 18 | keyex value 33 cc 19 ee 0f 49 7b 13 5f 3c 51 80 b9 9f 19 4d | keyex value 72 3c a2 22 0e 64 fc ab e9 98 02 27 83 42 1f 44 | keyex value a4 bd f5 3c e4 bc 87 84 d5 be 8a af 38 33 d5 91 | keyex value 3e 90 c2 41 45 56 a9 5a 40 8a 00 64 06 4c 05 5e | keyex value f1 fd 63 b8 e4 1a c7 a4 81 04 29 6e 68 bd bc 14 | keyex value 2d 93 05 f8 b1 fc b9 8d 3f 23 9c 7b 2a 94 d9 54 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001ef0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #24 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9db8 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e9c (length 4) | 0d fa c3 db | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55756517d974 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 6f a6 ff c5 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 | 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 | 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 05 00 01 04 0b 5d 95 9e | 6e 25 8b 46 7a dc f5 d7 f2 c1 f0 54 32 55 57 07 | 63 28 05 75 a7 f1 b8 61 1f d4 2a c5 7b 44 4a ab | 87 dd d8 03 eb 2c ea f0 a7 98 86 c5 bb 70 1e 1b | 98 a1 ed 68 df 31 89 26 4e 9f fa d5 e7 1a 99 bd | e8 ac 0e 6a 9c eb 9c 26 ea 54 4e d7 b3 bf 00 7d | fc cd 34 5a ca 49 b7 2c d2 a2 3a 6d c2 3e 18 7c | b3 d7 b8 b8 ff c5 f4 5a 3d 24 c3 db 7d 43 76 cf | aa 43 59 1e 8d 83 2d fb 39 37 9f 37 71 6d d4 de | ed 4e 4c 07 91 93 f5 6f d1 ab a9 bc c6 f0 ce 71 | cb e0 57 a1 05 57 20 1d 4d 5c f8 18 33 cc 19 ee | 0f 49 7b 13 5f 3c 51 80 b9 9f 19 4d 72 3c a2 22 | 0e 64 fc ab e9 98 02 27 83 42 1f 44 a4 bd f5 3c | e4 bc 87 84 d5 be 8a af 38 33 d5 91 3e 90 c2 41 | 45 56 a9 5a 40 8a 00 64 06 4c 05 5e f1 fd 63 b8 | e4 1a c7 a4 81 04 29 6e 68 bd bc 14 2d 93 05 f8 | b1 fc b9 8d 3f 23 9c 7b 2a 94 d9 54 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55756517d960 (length 20) | 47 75 fd 97 e2 27 6f 7e 03 6d 93 f6 e9 d1 09 cf | cf 93 cd 4b | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 47 75 fd 97 e2 27 6f 7e 03 6d 93 f6 e9 d1 09 cf | cf 93 cd 4b | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=24 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=44 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca95c0 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566cad820 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffdf 47 26 22 20 ffffffcb fffffff3 ffffff95 4d 62 ffffff96 3a ffffffff ffffffc8 ffffffd7 ffffffd9 ffffffae ffffffce 3b fffffff1 ffffffcb ffffff85 0d ffffffd3 ffffffd4 ffffffaf 3d 16 ffffffb5 ffffffa5 34 ffffffd0 69 21 41 09 78 ffffff9a ffffffc5 07 63 11 ffffffbf ffffffbc ffffffa3 1f 4f 70 56 0e ffffff91 ffffff9f 6c 5a ffffffc8 2d ffffffdb ffffffd7 fffffffb 60 ffffffff ffffff95 67 69 fffffff1 74 ffffff81 ffffffa0 22 53 10 07 ffffffd2 0a ffffffb2 ffffff98 ffffff9c ffffffe4 25 61 4d fffffff3 6b ffffffc8 52 fffffff6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff80 ffffff8b 0f ffffffd9 ffffffee 1e 32 08 4b ffffffba ffffffcd 53 2b 4d ffffffc1 ffffff94 6b 1f fffffffd fffffffd ffffffff 38 53 ffffffa6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff9c 4d ffffffaa 1f 3a 68 62 42 ffffffb3 ffffffcf ffffffa3 61 ffffffe9 6a 33 28 6d fffffffa 6e 76 0a ffffffab 26 53 fffffff8 79 39 1b 0c ffffffa5 ffffffa9 fffffffb 39 ffffff81 7a 01 3c 47 1f ffffffc0 6e ffffffa2 4c 48 4f 58 71 74 ffffffc8 ffffffe9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2e20 | unwrapped: 70 19 bf e3 c4 d4 cc ff 8b d7 e4 ff 91 d9 3e 64 | unwrapped: 5f 02 ed 0e 63 40 25 ea fd 05 43 a3 e8 cc 4f e0 | unwrapped: 07 a8 c4 8c 79 05 d6 e8 f0 cb 24 b2 c3 93 88 c6 | unwrapped: 11 07 b6 92 fe 8e 09 f7 b7 c6 ca 11 ea 14 aa 21 | unwrapped: e1 b9 f6 43 62 dd 3e df 6a d1 8d fd 9e 2d 4e 52 | unwrapped: 15 39 60 1a 16 37 13 09 c6 80 85 53 ff d0 fe 05 | unwrapped: 1e 86 55 58 f9 5c 2e c9 00 92 7c 35 14 7a ad 18 | unwrapped: 61 9e 78 18 e4 93 9e 5e 85 59 f0 e9 e5 6e 4b 8f | unwrapped: d5 12 ea a9 ba 38 b7 14 f7 fb 8e 93 ec ab fb 3b | unwrapped: 03 3d 9a 0a be af af 55 f7 93 ca 46 d8 b2 b5 89 | unwrapped: c9 6d ce a7 ea 46 08 2d 35 d1 ad 87 cd a9 24 f0 | unwrapped: 11 7b 31 91 5b e6 51 da 45 9d 7e f2 83 c7 e7 4e | unwrapped: 2b 31 49 8f bf 05 b8 6d ed 90 d3 d1 fa a4 5e d6 | unwrapped: e9 8d 1b 6a fe 65 42 eb d1 1d 21 d8 09 fa be e3 | unwrapped: fd c5 b4 33 42 15 93 0f ea b3 10 da 8b 36 d2 ba | unwrapped: 3d e6 b4 1e 37 5b 93 dc f6 57 eb 4d 97 d4 03 39 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566cad820 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffdf 47 26 22 20 ffffffcb fffffff3 ffffff95 4d 62 ffffff96 3a ffffffff ffffffc8 ffffffd7 ffffffd9 ffffffae ffffffce 3b fffffff1 ffffffcb ffffff85 0d ffffffd3 ffffffd4 ffffffaf 3d 16 ffffffb5 ffffffa5 34 ffffffd0 69 21 41 09 78 ffffff9a ffffffc5 07 63 11 ffffffbf ffffffbc ffffffa3 1f 4f 70 56 0e ffffff91 ffffff9f 6c 5a ffffffc8 2d ffffffdb ffffffd7 fffffffb 60 ffffffff ffffff95 67 69 fffffff1 74 ffffff81 ffffffa0 22 53 10 07 ffffffd2 0a ffffffb2 ffffff98 ffffff9c ffffffe4 25 61 4d fffffff3 6b ffffffc8 52 fffffff6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff80 ffffff8b 0f ffffffd9 ffffffee 1e 32 08 4b ffffffba ffffffcd 53 2b 4d ffffffc1 ffffff94 6b 1f fffffffd fffffffd ffffffff 38 53 ffffffa6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff9c 4d ffffffaa 1f 3a 68 62 42 ffffffb3 ffffffcf ffffffa3 61 ffffffe9 6a 33 28 6d fffffffa 6e 76 0a ffffffab 26 53 fffffff8 79 39 1b 0c ffffffa5 ffffffa9 fffffffb 39 ffffff81 7a 01 3c 47 1f ffffffc0 6e ffffffa2 4c 48 4f 58 71 74 ffffffc8 ffffffe9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cae020 | unwrapped: 70 19 bf e3 c4 d4 cc ff 8b d7 e4 ff 91 d9 3e 64 | unwrapped: 5f 02 ed 0e 63 40 25 ea fd 05 43 a3 e8 cc 4f e0 | unwrapped: 07 a8 c4 8c 79 05 d6 e8 f0 cb 24 b2 c3 93 88 c6 | unwrapped: 11 07 b6 92 fe 8e 09 f7 b7 c6 ca 11 ea 14 aa 21 | unwrapped: e1 b9 f6 43 62 dd 3e df 6a d1 8d fd 9e 2d 4e 52 | unwrapped: 15 39 60 1a 16 37 13 09 c6 80 85 53 ff d0 fe 05 | unwrapped: 1e 86 55 58 f9 5c 2e c9 00 92 7c 35 14 7a ad 18 | unwrapped: 61 9e 78 18 e4 93 9e 5e 85 59 f0 e9 e5 6e 4b 8f | unwrapped: d5 12 ea a9 ba 38 b7 14 f7 fb 8e 93 ec ab fb 3b | unwrapped: 03 3d 9a 0a be af af 55 f7 93 ca 46 d8 b2 b5 89 | unwrapped: c9 6d ce a7 ea 46 08 2d 35 d1 ad 87 cd a9 24 f0 | unwrapped: 11 7b 31 91 5b e6 51 da 45 9d 7e f2 83 c7 e7 4e | unwrapped: 2b 31 49 8f bf 05 b8 6d ed 90 d3 d1 fa a4 5e d6 | unwrapped: e9 8d 1b 6a fe 65 42 eb d1 1d 21 d8 09 fa be e3 | unwrapped: fd c5 b4 33 42 15 93 0f ea b3 10 da 8b 36 d2 ba | unwrapped: 3d e6 b4 1e 37 5b 93 dc f6 57 eb 4d 97 d4 03 39 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4038 (length 4) | 6f a6 ff c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4018 (length 4) | 5d 46 2a 53 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b80004700 (length 20) | 66 6e 67 d3 89 fd 4d b3 50 40 93 b5 e4 ac 28 5b | 9e e2 c4 5a | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b8c009080 (length 20) | 36 be b7 ca f8 4f 6b cb a6 c4 a0 9a f4 c3 27 64 | b5 d2 8c c3 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b8c002090 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadb60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80004700 (length 20) | 66 6e 67 d3 89 fd 4d b3 50 40 93 b5 e4 ac 28 5b | 9e e2 c4 5a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009080 (length 20) | 36 be b7 ca f8 4f 6b cb a6 c4 a0 9a f4 c3 27 64 | b5 d2 8c c3 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566cad820 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffdf 47 26 22 20 ffffffcb fffffff3 ffffff95 4d 62 ffffff96 3a ffffffff ffffffc8 ffffffd7 ffffffd9 ffffffae ffffffce 3b fffffff1 ffffffcb ffffff85 0d ffffffd3 ffffffd4 ffffffaf 3d 16 ffffffb5 ffffffa5 34 ffffffd0 69 21 41 09 78 ffffff9a ffffffc5 07 63 11 ffffffbf ffffffbc ffffffa3 1f 4f 70 56 0e ffffff91 ffffff9f 6c 5a ffffffc8 2d ffffffdb ffffffd7 fffffffb 60 ffffffff ffffff95 67 69 fffffff1 74 ffffff81 ffffffa0 22 53 10 07 ffffffd2 0a ffffffb2 ffffff98 ffffff9c ffffffe4 25 61 4d fffffff3 6b ffffffc8 52 fffffff6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff80 ffffff8b 0f ffffffd9 ffffffee 1e 32 08 4b ffffffba ffffffcd 53 2b 4d ffffffc1 ffffff94 6b 1f fffffffd fffffffd ffffffff 38 53 ffffffa6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff9c 4d ffffffaa 1f 3a 68 62 42 ffffffb3 ffffffcf ffffffa3 61 ffffffe9 6a 33 28 6d fffffffa 6e 76 0a ffffffab 26 53 fffffff8 79 39 1b 0c ffffffa5 ffffffa9 fffffffb 39 ffffff81 7a 01 3c 47 1f ffffffc0 6e ffffffa2 4c 48 4f 58 71 74 ffffffc8 ffffffe9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb3260 | unwrapped: 70 19 bf e3 c4 d4 cc ff 8b d7 e4 ff 91 d9 3e 64 | unwrapped: 5f 02 ed 0e 63 40 25 ea fd 05 43 a3 e8 cc 4f e0 | unwrapped: 07 a8 c4 8c 79 05 d6 e8 f0 cb 24 b2 c3 93 88 c6 | unwrapped: 11 07 b6 92 fe 8e 09 f7 b7 c6 ca 11 ea 14 aa 21 | unwrapped: e1 b9 f6 43 62 dd 3e df 6a d1 8d fd 9e 2d 4e 52 | unwrapped: 15 39 60 1a 16 37 13 09 c6 80 85 53 ff d0 fe 05 | unwrapped: 1e 86 55 58 f9 5c 2e c9 00 92 7c 35 14 7a ad 18 | unwrapped: 61 9e 78 18 e4 93 9e 5e 85 59 f0 e9 e5 6e 4b 8f | unwrapped: d5 12 ea a9 ba 38 b7 14 f7 fb 8e 93 ec ab fb 3b | unwrapped: 03 3d 9a 0a be af af 55 f7 93 ca 46 d8 b2 b5 89 | unwrapped: c9 6d ce a7 ea 46 08 2d 35 d1 ad 87 cd a9 24 f0 | unwrapped: 11 7b 31 91 5b e6 51 da 45 9d 7e f2 83 c7 e7 4e | unwrapped: 2b 31 49 8f bf 05 b8 6d ed 90 d3 d1 fa a4 5e d6 | unwrapped: e9 8d 1b 6a fe 65 42 eb d1 1d 21 d8 09 fa be e3 | unwrapped: fd c5 b4 33 42 15 93 0f ea b3 10 da 8b 36 d2 ba | unwrapped: 3d e6 b4 1e 37 5b 93 dc f6 57 eb 4d 97 d4 03 39 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566cad820 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffdf 47 26 22 20 ffffffcb fffffff3 ffffff95 4d 62 ffffff96 3a ffffffff ffffffc8 ffffffd7 ffffffd9 ffffffae ffffffce 3b fffffff1 ffffffcb ffffff85 0d ffffffd3 ffffffd4 ffffffaf 3d 16 ffffffb5 ffffffa5 34 ffffffd0 69 21 41 09 78 ffffff9a ffffffc5 07 63 11 ffffffbf ffffffbc ffffffa3 1f 4f 70 56 0e ffffff91 ffffff9f 6c 5a ffffffc8 2d ffffffdb ffffffd7 fffffffb 60 ffffffff ffffff95 67 69 fffffff1 74 ffffff81 ffffffa0 22 53 10 07 ffffffd2 0a ffffffb2 ffffff98 ffffff9c ffffffe4 25 61 4d fffffff3 6b ffffffc8 52 fffffff6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff80 ffffff8b 0f ffffffd9 ffffffee 1e 32 08 4b ffffffba ffffffcd 53 2b 4d ffffffc1 ffffff94 6b 1f fffffffd fffffffd ffffffff 38 53 ffffffa6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff9c 4d ffffffaa 1f 3a 68 62 42 ffffffb3 ffffffcf ffffffa3 61 ffffffe9 6a 33 28 6d fffffffa 6e 76 0a ffffffab 26 53 fffffff8 79 39 1b 0c ffffffa5 ffffffa9 fffffffb 39 ffffff81 7a 01 3c 47 1f ffffffc0 6e ffffffa2 4c 48 4f 58 71 74 ffffffc8 ffffffe9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2f30 | unwrapped: 70 19 bf e3 c4 d4 cc ff 8b d7 e4 ff 91 d9 3e 64 | unwrapped: 5f 02 ed 0e 63 40 25 ea fd 05 43 a3 e8 cc 4f e0 | unwrapped: 07 a8 c4 8c 79 05 d6 e8 f0 cb 24 b2 c3 93 88 c6 | unwrapped: 11 07 b6 92 fe 8e 09 f7 b7 c6 ca 11 ea 14 aa 21 | unwrapped: e1 b9 f6 43 62 dd 3e df 6a d1 8d fd 9e 2d 4e 52 | unwrapped: 15 39 60 1a 16 37 13 09 c6 80 85 53 ff d0 fe 05 | unwrapped: 1e 86 55 58 f9 5c 2e c9 00 92 7c 35 14 7a ad 18 | unwrapped: 61 9e 78 18 e4 93 9e 5e 85 59 f0 e9 e5 6e 4b 8f | unwrapped: d5 12 ea a9 ba 38 b7 14 f7 fb 8e 93 ec ab fb 3b | unwrapped: 03 3d 9a 0a be af af 55 f7 93 ca 46 d8 b2 b5 89 | unwrapped: c9 6d ce a7 ea 46 08 2d 35 d1 ad 87 cd a9 24 f0 | unwrapped: 11 7b 31 91 5b e6 51 da 45 9d 7e f2 83 c7 e7 4e | unwrapped: 2b 31 49 8f bf 05 b8 6d ed 90 d3 d1 fa a4 5e d6 | unwrapped: e9 8d 1b 6a fe 65 42 eb d1 1d 21 d8 09 fa be e3 | unwrapped: fd c5 b4 33 42 15 93 0f ea b3 10 da 8b 36 d2 ba | unwrapped: 3d e6 b4 1e 37 5b 93 dc f6 57 eb 4d 97 d4 03 39 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4038 (length 4) | 6f a6 ff c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4018 (length 4) | 5d 46 2a 53 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b80004714 (length 20) | 2e 89 09 b6 4c ef 98 cd 3c 20 19 92 e0 a0 8c 30 | cc 07 7c 44 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b8c009094 (length 20) | 73 37 71 f0 82 2c 88 03 b6 13 13 a6 dc 0d 1c ab | 4d 99 e0 9a | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8ef80 from symkey-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c8d6a0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b940010c0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c92f70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9d38 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from symkey-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac: release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b90002d90 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b80004714 (length 20) | 2e 89 09 b6 4c ef 98 cd 3c 20 19 92 e0 a0 8c 30 | cc 07 7c 44 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b8c009094 (length 20) | 73 37 71 f0 82 2c 88 03 b6 13 13 a6 dc 0d 1c ab | 4d 99 e0 9a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566cad820 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffdf 47 26 22 20 ffffffcb fffffff3 ffffff95 4d 62 ffffff96 3a ffffffff ffffffc8 ffffffd7 ffffffd9 ffffffae ffffffce 3b fffffff1 ffffffcb ffffff85 0d ffffffd3 ffffffd4 ffffffaf 3d 16 ffffffb5 ffffffa5 34 ffffffd0 69 21 41 09 78 ffffff9a ffffffc5 07 63 11 ffffffbf ffffffbc ffffffa3 1f 4f 70 56 0e ffffff91 ffffff9f 6c 5a ffffffc8 2d ffffffdb ffffffd7 fffffffb 60 ffffffff ffffff95 67 69 fffffff1 74 ffffff81 ffffffa0 22 53 10 07 ffffffd2 0a ffffffb2 ffffff98 ffffff9c ffffffe4 25 61 4d fffffff3 6b ffffffc8 52 fffffff6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff80 ffffff8b 0f ffffffd9 ffffffee 1e 32 08 4b ffffffba ffffffcd 53 2b 4d ffffffc1 ffffff94 6b 1f fffffffd fffffffd ffffffff 38 53 ffffffa6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff9c 4d ffffffaa 1f 3a 68 62 42 ffffffb3 ffffffcf ffffffa3 61 ffffffe9 6a 33 28 6d fffffffa 6e 76 0a ffffffab 26 53 fffffff8 79 39 1b 0c ffffffa5 ffffffa9 fffffffb 39 ffffff81 7a 01 3c 47 1f ffffffc0 6e ffffffa2 4c 48 4f 58 71 74 ffffffc8 ffffffe9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cb2e20 | unwrapped: 70 19 bf e3 c4 d4 cc ff 8b d7 e4 ff 91 d9 3e 64 | unwrapped: 5f 02 ed 0e 63 40 25 ea fd 05 43 a3 e8 cc 4f e0 | unwrapped: 07 a8 c4 8c 79 05 d6 e8 f0 cb 24 b2 c3 93 88 c6 | unwrapped: 11 07 b6 92 fe 8e 09 f7 b7 c6 ca 11 ea 14 aa 21 | unwrapped: e1 b9 f6 43 62 dd 3e df 6a d1 8d fd 9e 2d 4e 52 | unwrapped: 15 39 60 1a 16 37 13 09 c6 80 85 53 ff d0 fe 05 | unwrapped: 1e 86 55 58 f9 5c 2e c9 00 92 7c 35 14 7a ad 18 | unwrapped: 61 9e 78 18 e4 93 9e 5e 85 59 f0 e9 e5 6e 4b 8f | unwrapped: d5 12 ea a9 ba 38 b7 14 f7 fb 8e 93 ec ab fb 3b | unwrapped: 03 3d 9a 0a be af af 55 f7 93 ca 46 d8 b2 b5 89 | unwrapped: c9 6d ce a7 ea 46 08 2d 35 d1 ad 87 cd a9 24 f0 | unwrapped: 11 7b 31 91 5b e6 51 da 45 9d 7e f2 83 c7 e7 4e | unwrapped: 2b 31 49 8f bf 05 b8 6d ed 90 d3 d1 fa a4 5e d6 | unwrapped: e9 8d 1b 6a fe 65 42 eb d1 1d 21 d8 09 fa be e3 | unwrapped: fd c5 b4 33 42 15 93 0f ea b3 10 da 8b 36 d2 ba | unwrapped: 3d e6 b4 1e 37 5b 93 dc f6 57 eb 4d 97 d4 03 39 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x557566cad820 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x557566cad820 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x557566c0c080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x557566c8fb70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1803327920: ffffffdf 47 26 22 20 ffffffcb fffffff3 ffffff95 4d 62 ffffff96 3a ffffffff ffffffc8 ffffffd7 ffffffd9 ffffffae ffffffce 3b fffffff1 ffffffcb ffffff85 0d ffffffd3 ffffffd4 ffffffaf 3d 16 ffffffb5 ffffffa5 34 ffffffd0 69 21 41 09 78 ffffff9a ffffffc5 07 63 11 ffffffbf ffffffbc ffffffa3 1f 4f 70 56 0e ffffff91 ffffff9f 6c 5a ffffffc8 2d ffffffdb ffffffd7 fffffffb 60 ffffffff ffffff95 67 69 fffffff1 74 ffffff81 ffffffa0 22 53 10 07 ffffffd2 0a ffffffb2 ffffff98 ffffff9c ffffffe4 25 61 4d fffffff3 6b ffffffc8 52 fffffff6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff80 ffffff8b 0f ffffffd9 ffffffee 1e 32 08 4b ffffffba ffffffcd 53 2b 4d ffffffc1 ffffff94 6b 1f fffffffd fffffffd ffffffff 38 53 ffffffa6 ffffffa3 70 ffffff9c 4d ffffffaa 1f 3a 68 62 42 ffffffb3 ffffffcf ffffffa3 61 ffffffe9 6a 33 28 6d fffffffa 6e 76 0a ffffffab 26 53 fffffff8 79 39 1b 0c ffffffa5 ffffffa9 fffffffb 39 ffffff81 7a 01 3c 47 1f ffffffc0 6e ffffffa2 4c 48 4f 58 71 74 ffffffc8 ffffffe9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x557566c8fb70 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x557566cae020 | unwrapped: 70 19 bf e3 c4 d4 cc ff 8b d7 e4 ff 91 d9 3e 64 | unwrapped: 5f 02 ed 0e 63 40 25 ea fd 05 43 a3 e8 cc 4f e0 | unwrapped: 07 a8 c4 8c 79 05 d6 e8 f0 cb 24 b2 c3 93 88 c6 | unwrapped: 11 07 b6 92 fe 8e 09 f7 b7 c6 ca 11 ea 14 aa 21 | unwrapped: e1 b9 f6 43 62 dd 3e df 6a d1 8d fd 9e 2d 4e 52 | unwrapped: 15 39 60 1a 16 37 13 09 c6 80 85 53 ff d0 fe 05 | unwrapped: 1e 86 55 58 f9 5c 2e c9 00 92 7c 35 14 7a ad 18 | unwrapped: 61 9e 78 18 e4 93 9e 5e 85 59 f0 e9 e5 6e 4b 8f | unwrapped: d5 12 ea a9 ba 38 b7 14 f7 fb 8e 93 ec ab fb 3b | unwrapped: 03 3d 9a 0a be af af 55 f7 93 ca 46 d8 b2 b5 89 | unwrapped: c9 6d ce a7 ea 46 08 2d 35 d1 ad 87 cd a9 24 f0 | unwrapped: 11 7b 31 91 5b e6 51 da 45 9d 7e f2 83 c7 e7 4e | unwrapped: 2b 31 49 8f bf 05 b8 6d ed 90 d3 d1 fa a4 5e d6 | unwrapped: e9 8d 1b 6a fe 65 42 eb d1 1d 21 d8 09 fa be e3 | unwrapped: fd c5 b4 33 42 15 93 0f ea b3 10 da 8b 36 d2 ba | unwrapped: 3d e6 b4 1e 37 5b 93 dc f6 57 eb 4d 97 d4 03 39 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c9e6c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4038 (length 4) | 6f a6 ff c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x557566cb4018 (length 4) | 5d 46 2a 53 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b80004728 (length 20) | 73 86 7d 89 22 c3 32 db 46 c5 20 cc e4 88 3e 0b | bd ad 86 a1 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7f9b8c0090a8 (length 20) | 05 62 7a 5b 31 de d2 f3 42 a1 d8 68 69 01 b2 58 | eb b2 96 aa | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x557566cb3e30 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#24 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.5d462a53@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.6fa6ffc5@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 47 75 fd 97 e2 27 6f 7e 03 6d 93 f6 | encrypting: e9 d1 09 cf cf 93 cd 4b 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 6f a6 ff c5 | encrypting: 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 | encrypting: 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | encrypting: 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | encrypting: 05 00 01 04 0b 5d 95 9e 6e 25 8b 46 7a dc f5 d7 | encrypting: f2 c1 f0 54 32 55 57 07 63 28 05 75 a7 f1 b8 61 | encrypting: 1f d4 2a c5 7b 44 4a ab 87 dd d8 03 eb 2c ea f0 | encrypting: a7 98 86 c5 bb 70 1e 1b 98 a1 ed 68 df 31 89 26 | encrypting: 4e 9f fa d5 e7 1a 99 bd e8 ac 0e 6a 9c eb 9c 26 | encrypting: ea 54 4e d7 b3 bf 00 7d fc cd 34 5a ca 49 b7 2c | encrypting: d2 a2 3a 6d c2 3e 18 7c b3 d7 b8 b8 ff c5 f4 5a | encrypting: 3d 24 c3 db 7d 43 76 cf aa 43 59 1e 8d 83 2d fb | encrypting: 39 37 9f 37 71 6d d4 de ed 4e 4c 07 91 93 f5 6f | encrypting: d1 ab a9 bc c6 f0 ce 71 cb e0 57 a1 05 57 20 1d | encrypting: 4d 5c f8 18 33 cc 19 ee 0f 49 7b 13 5f 3c 51 80 | encrypting: b9 9f 19 4d 72 3c a2 22 0e 64 fc ab e9 98 02 27 | encrypting: 83 42 1f 44 a4 bd f5 3c e4 bc 87 84 d5 be 8a af | encrypting: 38 33 d5 91 3e 90 c2 41 45 56 a9 5a 40 8a 00 64 | encrypting: 06 4c 05 5e f1 fd 63 b8 e4 1a c7 a4 81 04 29 6e | encrypting: 68 bd bc 14 2d 93 05 f8 b1 fc b9 8d 3f 23 9c 7b | encrypting: 2a 94 d9 54 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 | IV: 3c 22 7e 17 0d bd 4d 3c | unpadded size is: 404 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 408 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 436 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 52 16 25 9b b2 5b 23 8f | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #24 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #24: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #24 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b88001820 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 436 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #24) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 20 01 0d fa c3 db 00 00 01 b4 5e 4d dd 4e | e6 e7 22 f6 27 b6 6c da f8 4b 69 e4 75 65 78 16 | 46 3e a5 91 dc 59 d3 be f5 8c 78 6b bd 89 05 67 | e8 27 15 fa 30 42 0b ff 8c 04 96 58 74 a9 db 69 | 60 79 8d 70 34 79 eb 4a f7 0d 33 e6 fa 00 2a 04 | 31 7a 62 59 61 93 d4 41 1e 10 bd f3 72 cc af 3d | 84 31 58 2b d3 46 71 38 3a 06 96 fd 99 9c 95 71 | 46 7b 7e 9f 9a 70 dd cd 6d f0 0e c8 db d9 2f ad | 7f 24 6f c2 97 78 3d 0a 91 45 71 01 8a 37 5f 34 | 9f fb 47 00 82 22 0b 69 18 ed 67 fb 30 5f f9 62 | fb 1a f5 95 29 7a a8 80 1d c9 8b 4f 7a 01 56 8a | 71 f4 ff f9 34 25 17 b6 d2 fd fa 4f 7e b0 7d e8 | c0 d8 80 23 46 28 be c1 6b a2 30 cd 4f 90 dd 5f | 35 bd 86 9a 0a 47 77 bd 15 b7 b0 bc 90 0f 68 e8 | 7f 78 c7 da 55 47 5a 91 e3 b5 dc b4 c2 b8 23 78 | e9 3b 33 e5 b1 28 44 d4 05 0b 97 11 9f 8a 39 93 | 36 9c b7 6c 49 fe c3 2d 32 6f 76 0b ff f3 2b cb | 9b c5 99 bc 5d 14 aa 86 c4 39 43 6e 9a 5f 23 86 | 55 ff fe 68 d2 c9 dd cd f7 8e c6 10 c9 88 fa 8d | 63 f2 a6 88 de e4 cb c2 db ed a5 b4 ed 5e 6a 14 | 41 22 51 a1 a6 2f 86 26 86 b0 32 b6 d9 ad a4 81 | 03 bf a7 3a fc a1 a5 74 ee af 45 83 81 3f eb 88 | 53 31 a9 3a 18 65 fd 77 60 0b 10 e0 4f 63 3a 9a | 03 98 c4 6a 29 dc 31 2a 8e 48 ad 46 24 cb f1 b1 | 2e 9a e3 e5 50 d7 ab 06 78 68 b2 dd 54 70 ff 1c | fc 07 4a 95 ec 33 27 af 9b a7 9e 97 52 16 25 9b | b2 5b 23 8f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c0085b0 size 128 | #24 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 49500.197586 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #24: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x5d462a53 <0x6fa6ffc5 xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #24 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #24 spent 1.9 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800013c0 | spent 0.00281 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 52 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 20 01 0d fa c3 db 00 00 00 34 57 e5 5c 37 | bb 01 c9 63 30 9f 4e 4d ef 87 90 67 42 ab 47 ed | 75 09 54 54 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 234537947 (0xdfac3db) | length: 52 (0x34) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #24 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #24 is idle | #24 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 24 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 52 16 25 9b b2 5b 23 8f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 42 ab 47 ed 75 09 54 54 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -24): | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 20 01 0d fa c3 db 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 18 | 38 97 83 d5 17 e2 9c 57 f3 1e cd cf 9b b1 2c 35 | fb a4 6f 25 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566ca97e0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 0d fa c3 db | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7f9b84002f30 (length 32) | a8 f0 ac 9d 9b a0 82 a7 03 03 ad 8f 58 7d 7a 8d | ea 5c 68 d3 e2 22 cb 7f 35 2f 48 69 16 9a 40 a4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7f9b7c0030a0 (length 32) | 17 8c 1c e5 ad 59 f3 e4 5c 6c 3b 69 3c 00 59 82 | 1e 8f a5 8e 4b 8c 94 c5 12 ed 5d b5 8c 7c 5b 01 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 38 97 83 d5 17 e2 9c 57 f3 1e cd cf 9b b1 2c 35 | fb a4 6f 25 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 38 97 83 d5 17 e2 9c 57 f3 1e cd cf 9b b1 2c 35 | fb a4 6f 25 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #24: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #24: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #24 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x5d462a53 SPI_OUT=0x6fa | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x5d462a53 SPI_OUT=0x6fa6ffc5 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x557566ca79c0,sr=0x557566ca79c0} to #24 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #23 spent 0.239 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #24 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#24) cloned from #23 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #24 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #24: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #24 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #24 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b7c0085b0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800013c0 size 128 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #24: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x5d462a53 <0x6fa6ffc5 xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #24 spent 0.294 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.475 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00321 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00259 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 05 01 42 fe 1d 60 00 00 00 44 32 41 77 e1 | 9b 00 69 d9 e6 ff 0c 84 d2 ed e1 b5 4e eb a9 48 | 2c d0 97 ae 67 83 ad bc 8d 79 66 43 1c 24 e0 27 | f3 f4 f2 91 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1123949920 (0x42fe1d60) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #24; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=0dfac3db st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #23; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #23 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | current Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb3800 (length 8) | 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca6bc (length 4) | 42 fe 1d 60 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb3780 (length 20) | 14 fc 05 19 87 41 89 4e 8d b9 de 5b 78 bd e1 f3 | 72 c6 0b f0 | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 14 fc 05 19 87 41 89 4e | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 1c 24 e0 27 f3 f4 f2 91 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 05 01 42 fe 1d 60 00 00 00 44 0c 00 00 18 | 88 c1 74 a1 a4 4b 6a 5d 71 83 49 3a 5a 09 92 ad | 84 37 2e 10 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 5d 46 2a 53 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca418 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88000d60 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca4fc (length 4) | 42 fe 1d 60 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7f9b8c008f64 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 5d 46 2a 53 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7ca580 (length 20) | 88 c1 74 a1 a4 4b 6a 5d 71 83 49 3a 5a 09 92 ad | 84 37 2e 10 | informational HASH(1): | 88 c1 74 a1 a4 4b 6a 5d 71 83 49 3a 5a 09 92 ad | 84 37 2e 10 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 5d 46 2a 53 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #23: received Delete SA(0x5d462a53) payload: deleting IPsec State #24 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #24: deleting other state #24 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.086s and sending notification | child state #24: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.5d462a53@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.6fa6ffc5@192.1.2.23 "east" #24: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #24 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3554631261 (0xd3df5e5d) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 6f a6 ff c5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c68 | result: clone-key@0x557566c98060 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566c98060 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x557566cadea0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d4c (length 4) | d3 df 5e 5d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80f4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 6f a6 ff c5 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c80e0 (length 20) | 9c 79 3e 03 a0 ce 41 e6 7f 98 73 b7 08 01 d3 2e | d3 60 d7 ef | send delete HASH(1): | 9c 79 3e 03 a0 ce 41 e6 7f 98 73 b7 08 01 d3 2e | d3 60 d7 ef | last Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | current Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb3800 (length 8) | 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7d5c (length 4) | d3 df 5e 5d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb3780 (length 20) | 1a 03 67 bb 45 b5 0a 89 9a c9 57 96 af e5 75 28 | 40 76 64 4b | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 9c 79 3e 03 a0 ce 41 e6 7f 98 73 b7 | encrypting: 08 01 d3 2e d3 60 d7 ef 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 6f a6 ff c5 | IV: 1a 03 67 bb 45 b5 0a 89 9a c9 57 96 af e5 75 28 | IV: 40 76 64 4b | unpadded size is: 40 | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 3d 4f 07 c5 ef 4b 99 78 | sending 68 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 05 01 d3 df 5e 5d 00 00 00 44 9f 5a 53 ff | fd d0 61 2f c3 e1 b6 c1 08 3b d3 d0 09 89 0c a3 | a5 83 62 c1 f2 00 75 28 3c 42 9f 04 3d 4f 07 c5 | ef 4b 99 78 | state #24 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b800013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7f9b88002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050853' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x5d462a53 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050853' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x5d462a53 SPI_OUT=0x6fa6ffc5 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.5d462a53@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.5d462a53@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.6fa6ffc5@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.6fa6ffc5@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #24 in QUICK_R2 | child state #24: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b7c001ef0: destroyed | stop processing: state #24 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x557566cad820 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #23 | state #22 | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #22 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #22: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 0.661s and NOT sending notification | parent state #22: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #22 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #22: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #22 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #21 | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #21 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #21: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.162s and NOT sending notification | parent state #21: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #21 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #21: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #21 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #23 | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #23: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.104s and sending notification | parent state #23: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #23 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 428444777 (0x19898c69) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x557566c8be20 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7c08 | result: clone-key@0x557566cad820 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x557566c8f0d0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x557566cad820 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7f9b88000d60 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cec (length 4) | 19 89 8c 69 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8094 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 95 8d b4 49 | 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c8080 (length 20) | 46 53 a5 cb 40 f3 b7 07 f7 20 8f 95 9a 12 f2 cc | 32 c6 25 c9 | send delete HASH(1): | 46 53 a5 cb 40 f3 b7 07 f7 20 8f 95 9a 12 f2 cc | 32 c6 25 c9 | last Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | current Phase 1 IV: 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x557566cb3800 (length 8) | 86 c2 cb 3c fa 56 2f 36 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffc6b7c7cfc (length 4) | 19 89 8c 69 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x557566cb3780 (length 20) | c2 73 84 a1 34 0d 72 12 41 cd 57 16 67 d1 2d 04 | 35 aa 1a fc | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 46 53 a5 cb 40 f3 b7 07 f7 20 8f 95 | encrypting: 9a 12 f2 cc 32 c6 25 c9 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 | encrypting: dd 6a b5 b1 | IV: c2 73 84 a1 34 0d 72 12 41 cd 57 16 67 d1 2d 04 | IV: 35 aa 1a fc | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 56 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 45 dc 39 bb 59 55 b9 8f | sending 84 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 05 01 19 89 8c 69 00 00 00 54 b5 e8 39 d1 | ea 72 a9 9f c2 76 f2 9d 1e 0a c5 76 15 c2 b3 6a | 50 aa da 4c cb 68 39 a1 db c5 f8 d4 38 b3 81 d3 | bd db 95 4a 58 31 36 1d 33 1f de 28 45 dc 39 bb | 59 55 b9 8f | state #23 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f9b84007070 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x557566ca9770 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #23: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7f9b840028d0: destroyed | stop processing: state #23 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7f9b8c008420 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x557566c963a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x557566c92f70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x557566c8be20 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x557566c999c0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7f9b90007fa0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.44 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00414 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00169 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 84 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | 08 10 05 01 6d 78 f8 dc 00 00 00 54 0b bd 37 55 | 1b 11 b7 8d 18 e1 28 18 2a c7 84 87 d5 b7 a6 fe | d1 a2 02 51 9c 98 43 0d b6 2c da df eb e2 8d 33 | 81 36 56 38 90 80 4c ed 4e 89 6f ab c0 39 f1 1d | 64 79 33 f8 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | responder cookie: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1836644572 (0x6d78f8dc) | length: 84 (0x54) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x6d78f8dc | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 95 8d b4 49 43 f8 09 5c | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | ad 36 91 a5 dd 6a b5 b1 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0667 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.294 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) | pluto_sd: executing action action: stopping(6), status 0 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | start processing: connection "east" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'delete' for rt_kind 'unrouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb unroute | command executing unroute-client | executing unroute-client: PLUTO_VERB='unroute-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x0 SPI_OUT=0 | popen cmd is 1012 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='unroute-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_IN: | cmd( 80):TERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@e: | cmd( 160):ast' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLI: | cmd( 240):ENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID=: | cmd( 320):'16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO: | cmd( 400):_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_: | cmd( 480):MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA=': | cmd( 560):' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+P: | cmd( 640):FS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT': | cmd( 720): PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 800):DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' : | cmd( 880):PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_S: | cmd( 960):HARED='no' SPI_IN=0x0 SPI_OUT=0x0 ipsec _updown 2>&1: "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. | free hp@0x557566c735e0 | flush revival: connection 'east' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "east" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6b70 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6b30 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6c60 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6c20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6d50 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6d10 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6e40 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6e00 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6f30 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6ef0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca7020 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566ca6fe0 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6450 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566c8f090 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c9bfa0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566c8a1c0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c9bf10 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x557566c8f180 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6520 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6600 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca66c0 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c9b1a0 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6780 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c7bd90 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a4d0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566cab0a0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a4f0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca64e0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca65c0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a580 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a7b0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8f210 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca70b0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6fc0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6ed0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6de0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6cf0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6c00 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c0c370 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca66a0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca65e0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6500 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566ca6760 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c0a5b0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a510 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a540 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a230 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c88f70 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c88fa0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x557566c8a200