FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-827-gc9aa82b8a6-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC SYSTEMD_WATCHDOG FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:5428 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective disabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473b1f0 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473b220 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473c980 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473c940 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473c9b0 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473cc50 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8946f61e0 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473cc70 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473cc90 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473ccc0 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473cd00 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473ce10 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f89473c940 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473ce30 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 started thread for crypto helper 1 started thread for crypto helper 2 | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 3 started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 started thread for crypto helper 5 started thread for crypto helper 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.2.11+ | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55f894747620 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89474e660 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894742860 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x55f894741aa0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89474e6f0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89473d040 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) systemd watchdog not enabled - not sending watchdog keepalives | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x55f894742920 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758c80 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758d10 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758d30 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758e40 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89474d960 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758e60 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758f00 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758f20 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758f40 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894758fe0 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759000 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947590a0 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55f89474d960 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947590c0 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89474d960 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:5597) using fork+execve | forked child 5597 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | pluto_sd: executing action action: reloading(4), status 0 listening for IKE messages | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f8947594a0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947594e0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759570 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759590 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947595d0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759660 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759680 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947596c0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759750 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759770 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947597b0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759840 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759860 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947598a0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759930 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759950 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759990 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759a20 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | pluto_sd: executing action action: ready(5), status 0 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.2 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | pluto_sd: executing action action: reloading(4), status 0 listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f8947594e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55f8947594a0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f8947594a0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947594e0 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f8947595d0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55f894759590 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759590 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947595d0 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f8947596c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55f894759680 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759680 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947596c0 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f8947597b0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55f894759770 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759770 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947597b0 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f8947598a0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55f894759860 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759860 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f8947598a0 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f894759990 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55f894759950 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55f894759950 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894759990 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | pluto_sd: executing action action: ready(5), status 0 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.352 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 5597 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0182 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection rw with policy RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | counting wild cards for %fromcert is 0 | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89475bf10 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89475be50 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89475be20 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89475bd30 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89475c560 | unreference key: 0x55f89475baf0 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55f894760940 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for @east.testing.libreswan.org is 0 | add new addresspool to global pools 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 size 10 ptr 0x55f894702360 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | reference addresspool of conn rw[0] kind CK_TEMPLATE refcnt 0 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55f89473b140 added connection description "rw" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east.testing.libreswan.org,MS+S=C]...%any[%fromcert,+MC+S=C] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.35 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.0027 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.254:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 19 a1 5c e8 05 86 3a 22 | 65 10 43 70 5a 21 97 c9 97 7b f9 cb b1 4a 11 b0 | fd 34 42 c8 ac 6c 78 21 18 09 72 d0 2b 1d 8a 3d | 43 7f 2a 6d 20 42 94 a5 c2 e6 90 26 7a 08 43 d7 | 09 d7 fd 71 5e e5 46 b3 56 64 99 02 aa 3a 47 1c | ee c4 54 6d cb 7d 31 80 9c ef 00 0a ce d6 f5 00 | 6f 02 2d 67 fd e6 07 5e fa 83 7e c2 70 2b a7 c0 | df a8 11 12 1c 6f 33 eb cf 45 d9 17 05 1e cc 83 | 2e 9f 31 01 79 cc 29 6e 8d 31 cd 2b 54 67 24 94 | 2c d0 b1 60 12 39 66 3e 75 68 bb 10 46 ce 2d 13 | e9 16 30 36 79 cc d3 6d 26 5c c6 23 b0 c7 e4 6c | d5 44 70 b9 4a 64 98 74 52 90 64 7d 15 88 a8 fa | 67 df 09 e1 12 44 49 d1 71 c0 ca 78 0b 9a 27 7e | 6c 73 87 d0 bb ea a1 95 74 fb 1d 23 33 42 d6 dd | bc a0 c2 83 ae f3 7f 6a 28 c6 40 d3 4d a1 18 6d | 52 00 72 81 95 c9 f2 fa 79 7a be 72 e3 40 c5 d8 | 65 f5 85 9d 24 02 f6 39 29 00 00 24 8a 6b 41 5b | b7 0c ea 9c 69 cc d4 8d f5 c8 bc b1 95 60 1e 95 | 38 54 bb 10 cb 01 27 3a 4c 10 a4 cb 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 fd 76 7d 85 | a9 6b 91 65 1a 63 e2 31 27 2b 19 51 a2 65 04 9e | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 79 70 22 16 91 17 af 92 | 37 ea e1 e3 59 d6 a9 75 af b2 71 3b | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns rw | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | rw_instantiate | reference addresspool of conn rw[1] kind CK_TEMPLATE refcnt 1 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.254:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55f8946f4aa0 | rw_instantiate() instantiated "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 for 192.1.2.254 | found connection: rw[1] 192.1.2.254 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #1 at 0x55f894762a40 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | constructing local IKE proposals for rw (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254: constructed local IKE proposals for rw (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 79 70 22 16 91 17 af 92 37 ea e1 e3 59 d6 a9 75 | natd_hash: hash= af b2 71 3b | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= ab 49 13 b8 73 b3 53 0a a2 55 1d 26 bf 0f 61 b4 | natd_hash: hash= 43 2c 2a 5d | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is behind NAT 192.1.2.254 | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.254 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89475bd60 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 size 128 | #1 spent 0.505 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3266) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3448 | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.855 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.863 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.001059 seconds | (#1) spent 1.06 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8ec0006900 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55f893823630 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x c4 85 5a 72 ff f1 78 e3 3a 9c 08 eb 58 c5 70 b1 | ikev2 g^x 71 74 e5 cc 21 1d 1a 54 53 5e a2 db ff e3 1f dc | ikev2 g^x ab 12 37 7b 99 a1 14 1b 43 8e ba 44 61 fe 4b 91 | ikev2 g^x 44 a5 46 85 17 f2 a6 23 cc de cd 27 1b 4e 5f 40 | ikev2 g^x de 4f df d7 ed ea 25 3d 1a 24 17 2d 3b ad 85 ea | ikev2 g^x 97 8b a5 ec 5c 76 4a 24 1e 72 e0 87 60 92 5b fa | ikev2 g^x 61 3c f2 38 4b d6 43 b7 97 7a 6d 6b 18 60 d1 f6 | ikev2 g^x b0 ee 86 45 76 82 2f 3c 81 13 ea 68 6f 81 91 9a | ikev2 g^x f2 b8 91 2a 45 f1 1c c4 30 b3 e5 6c 67 1f 05 88 | ikev2 g^x f5 a2 da 63 bf 9a 17 0e 19 ea 38 d9 fb 2b 23 2a | ikev2 g^x 98 2b d7 ad c1 47 54 c8 4b 28 3a 5a b8 b2 56 a9 | ikev2 g^x 3f 0d c8 41 80 6d ff 2c 87 8a 8b ed eb 20 4b da | ikev2 g^x bb 6d 09 0c 78 33 22 a5 49 f3 46 75 2d 0c d5 08 | ikev2 g^x 9a 26 d7 f2 87 3b 35 3b fb 22 5a ca 87 07 52 05 | ikev2 g^x 97 26 43 17 ae d2 7d 19 cd 03 29 e5 d2 88 54 38 | ikev2 g^x ca 5e 28 1c 42 0c af 48 29 43 05 51 a1 f0 0f e3 | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 01 86 63 a4 1d e9 f8 31 be d1 48 fe 13 32 d4 f8 | IKEv2 nonce 6e 0f 18 4d 55 f5 15 90 42 cc 57 de 2e c2 2a 4d | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | natd_hash: rcookie= 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 48 ca 77 0f bd fe 66 6b 07 8a 93 53 eb 92 8f 91 | natd_hash: hash= 4d 20 cc f9 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 48 ca 77 0f bd fe 66 6b 07 8a 93 53 eb 92 8f 91 | Notify data 4d 20 cc f9 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | natd_hash: rcookie= 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 1a 4e 17 9b 2a f0 d3 63 8d a6 44 2d b9 97 60 dd | natd_hash: hash= b2 8d b3 75 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 1a 4e 17 9b 2a f0 d3 63 8d a6 44 2d b9 97 60 dd | Notify data b2 8d b3 75 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:500 (using #1) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 c4 85 5a 72 | ff f1 78 e3 3a 9c 08 eb 58 c5 70 b1 71 74 e5 cc | 21 1d 1a 54 53 5e a2 db ff e3 1f dc ab 12 37 7b | 99 a1 14 1b 43 8e ba 44 61 fe 4b 91 44 a5 46 85 | 17 f2 a6 23 cc de cd 27 1b 4e 5f 40 de 4f df d7 | ed ea 25 3d 1a 24 17 2d 3b ad 85 ea 97 8b a5 ec | 5c 76 4a 24 1e 72 e0 87 60 92 5b fa 61 3c f2 38 | 4b d6 43 b7 97 7a 6d 6b 18 60 d1 f6 b0 ee 86 45 | 76 82 2f 3c 81 13 ea 68 6f 81 91 9a f2 b8 91 2a | 45 f1 1c c4 30 b3 e5 6c 67 1f 05 88 f5 a2 da 63 | bf 9a 17 0e 19 ea 38 d9 fb 2b 23 2a 98 2b d7 ad | c1 47 54 c8 4b 28 3a 5a b8 b2 56 a9 3f 0d c8 41 | 80 6d ff 2c 87 8a 8b ed eb 20 4b da bb 6d 09 0c | 78 33 22 a5 49 f3 46 75 2d 0c d5 08 9a 26 d7 f2 | 87 3b 35 3b fb 22 5a ca 87 07 52 05 97 26 43 17 | ae d2 7d 19 cd 03 29 e5 d2 88 54 38 ca 5e 28 1c | 42 0c af 48 29 43 05 51 a1 f0 0f e3 29 00 00 24 | 01 86 63 a4 1d e9 f8 31 be d1 48 fe 13 32 d4 f8 | 6e 0f 18 4d 55 f5 15 90 42 cc 57 de 2e c2 2a 4d | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | 48 ca 77 0f bd fe 66 6b 07 8a 93 53 eb 92 8f 91 | 4d 20 cc f9 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 1a 4e 17 9b | 2a f0 d3 63 8d a6 44 2d b9 97 60 dd b2 8d b3 75 | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89475bd60 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55f89475bd60 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.515 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8ec0006900 | spent 0 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 23 00 01 fb | 00 01 00 05 67 4c d2 dc 08 00 b8 1f 1d 14 68 f5 | fc c3 e6 93 8c da a2 a8 43 49 1f 04 32 ea 2c b1 | e5 19 3b 6b fd 42 87 1b 07 2f 1f 4d 95 03 88 93 | 16 49 41 6f 54 84 18 7c cf b0 41 8a 0f c3 5e 36 | 17 31 96 53 3f f3 40 fe 8e ff a6 e7 65 e1 82 00 | 61 39 af 6c 68 ea 6a 29 a9 f2 08 9f ea 8e 33 c1 | 82 c4 1e c6 53 4e 4e 32 2b a8 3e 77 e1 57 b8 a7 | fe c1 10 80 67 67 f5 5c dd 43 13 1d 9e ff 06 45 | 68 3c 1d ba 25 d8 05 fd d7 07 d5 2b 09 f7 53 93 | 4b 9b aa 05 75 c2 d0 90 4e 4b 31 3e 6a 42 fe 28 | 76 52 d5 13 eb 0c 9f 26 6f d9 ca f8 61 62 ae a7 | b4 b4 9a b2 1a b2 ce 88 a7 85 65 db 91 17 41 fa | ac 74 4e 3e 93 ab 83 4f 03 ad 70 1f d9 dd b0 3a | b5 d5 b6 fc 78 6f 96 53 ee 1b f1 e9 09 78 21 20 | 24 83 1c 83 b8 a3 9c e6 29 fb 36 b6 02 95 0f 37 | f8 64 84 4a d4 ea 07 c4 5b 07 46 37 8c 3e e6 51 | 2c c7 8b ab 91 84 30 17 5d 16 42 61 78 17 70 2f | 16 2c 28 41 5a 07 b9 53 17 bd 1b c2 1a 42 3c 4e | 6d cc 1e 93 0e 2c 17 dd f6 a5 2f 39 22 8d c3 a5 | 5c d2 35 6c 44 9e 7b 49 34 4e 8e e2 53 ac 83 94 | 93 c8 7f fe 9d 82 39 b6 d2 37 40 b8 df 3d 80 0d | ec 3d e5 ec 0e 50 fa 3d f4 c4 2b 3f 98 5c 60 6b | 98 ff 56 7b 0f b8 29 9d 3d 82 e4 4a 57 c8 75 89 | 5c 53 bc 1b 50 da 68 d1 f4 fa 7a a0 7f 67 e1 56 | 57 f9 2e 32 ac bd 6b 0d 31 63 79 f7 c4 e3 33 7a | 7d db 57 93 f3 98 71 c2 36 2f 4f 28 03 c8 cb a9 | 70 ca 17 53 92 25 1f c3 67 d0 15 58 77 47 92 44 | 9b 9b 36 2b 30 bd 7e 6d de 8e 27 36 e9 43 2f e2 | 7b 74 d4 dd 6c dc 52 01 5d 4b 6f 9b 32 2b 7f 4f | bc d1 1a 4d 3a 80 17 2f 7c c1 ca da 54 1e d0 6a | 88 3a 13 fb df ac c7 26 64 98 dc 05 c8 e2 b0 da | 21 6f f6 08 d9 23 5a | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.146 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.158 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 02 00 05 0b 70 b4 e3 7e 7d 05 4f 9e c7 0d 35 | e3 27 82 90 0d 9b 28 4c 61 aa 1a 52 ab 67 d9 7d | b8 9e df 1a 32 05 50 e0 af 2b 7f 71 9d f5 50 12 | bd 77 1b d9 1e 4b 88 60 ad da a4 ea 1d d2 0d 6c | 71 df fb 7e 3e be 79 6d 4e 9d bc c3 bd 7b ec 31 | 74 25 8d 7d d9 83 1b b4 4f 7e 8a cd e9 6c 33 d1 | 13 8a ce c7 46 d7 20 57 29 40 ef 5a 43 41 7a e2 | 40 b4 fa 68 43 80 dc 60 bc bf f9 49 f0 38 a1 23 | 0b 3b 3e a3 d3 23 67 3c e4 26 3a b2 28 1f a0 fe | b8 c7 08 5f 50 80 fd f3 4d b9 99 68 92 a5 35 2f | 5e 6e d8 38 89 32 10 b1 b2 d6 26 37 81 07 7d a3 | c4 c9 2f 72 71 78 03 e0 f8 bd f8 9d db 29 b3 05 | 18 30 d4 c5 41 c7 cf 4b c3 db cd e5 30 42 86 63 | 7b bc 4a b5 3c cc 73 52 76 9b ea 5e 54 2a e4 d0 | be 69 2f c0 e7 92 41 5e 84 d2 cc b9 0c 65 4d ff | 2b 20 1e 7a 5a d7 39 d6 b7 76 c0 dd a7 1b e3 9f | 59 ff ac ca 06 3e 62 9b bb d8 41 59 3e 91 d3 98 | 34 73 12 a4 d7 d1 6c 9b 86 99 34 a8 b4 4a 0b bb | 36 ea 70 d2 ce 07 bc 41 fe 96 fe c8 bf b3 d9 16 | fb 36 df dd bf b3 bf d8 87 d2 7c f2 22 5a c4 06 | 03 fd cd 21 c2 7a 20 ad fc 76 9b e1 a7 2d bb 52 | 61 76 f0 dd e4 dd 03 b6 0b 7f 86 76 4b f7 ea 3e | 61 3d 54 a5 bc a5 59 e2 9a 48 cb 88 d1 c9 47 11 | 37 d7 4d c7 ba ba c9 8f bd c2 e7 bd c6 cf 16 86 | 87 fa 7c 17 dd 77 28 7e c2 b8 d7 f1 e3 15 fd 98 | 1f 98 75 e6 32 df e5 e3 bd c5 ba 82 1e 20 e2 05 | d5 9f 1a 8d 1c 84 23 b2 5b 14 a8 5e ad 68 22 07 | cc b2 a6 ea 09 72 9a 03 35 e5 1a 73 6a 2b 6c f4 | fe 9a 4e 42 0f 28 f1 26 0f f4 52 ab 3e d9 6f b4 | 04 28 19 1d a4 4d 58 32 50 09 02 4b f7 16 c3 a3 | b0 bb 95 8e bb 9a 16 21 13 b7 d7 d4 ff 67 98 c3 | 74 f9 46 7a 6a 3e 7b | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.143 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.154 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 03 00 05 f4 aa 6b a6 01 61 09 23 46 4c f0 1d | 46 e0 06 d7 fd 0f db fb 9f d5 92 ab cb 52 88 bd | cc df 10 2b 53 c3 16 92 52 99 93 f6 a7 23 7a d8 | 70 6c ea ee 1f 88 6d 45 92 3e 20 31 6f 5b 7d bf | 0f 69 a7 60 2d 63 53 51 34 12 54 d5 f6 74 15 62 | 17 9d d3 80 c0 76 42 5f 6b fa 4f 7b 99 58 bb ac | 14 b9 98 bd 77 67 29 ba 4f d2 37 a9 2d 4b d8 54 | 33 9d 85 45 57 15 1a a2 bd 18 c3 b3 05 da b5 5f | 0d f1 af f6 07 ab 0a a4 9a a2 30 f5 fe e8 ea 2e | df d1 9c b0 3d 21 55 07 b2 3f 3c 0c 64 b5 de 7e | de c5 bc 51 58 d1 7b 7a e6 22 36 36 56 59 c2 01 | 8e a9 1d 97 91 94 ba f6 ab f6 62 c3 7c 7a 86 fd | 18 95 0d c3 c4 5a 35 6b 61 54 07 e4 d3 a7 e9 d8 | f4 d7 05 b1 86 a4 28 2e a6 8f 18 ad 79 3f 9f b4 | ab d2 50 f6 8f e7 58 3a ba b9 60 03 a0 8c 9c 73 | bf 3a 35 09 d4 9c 52 32 f0 b7 ea 23 8e f7 0b 8e | 01 92 35 cb 19 92 87 e7 10 73 9f 94 9b 42 12 9c | f2 b0 fd 98 c4 62 88 c4 a7 a3 24 8f e1 7a f1 ae | bf 87 12 59 af 22 66 e6 de de 4b 67 d8 39 7f a4 | 92 8c 84 30 c9 99 6d 73 77 48 df e0 b6 0c 72 e1 | 81 45 6f 91 6d 4f 04 f0 ae 0d 1e 80 71 85 4b fe | aa 43 38 07 96 20 28 03 cc a6 4a aa 7d 0a 9a 0d | 40 a6 ce c8 d2 39 8a 5f 2f 90 84 c7 24 32 49 b8 | 89 5f e3 74 56 79 a2 e6 e5 c4 1f 7f 29 8a b8 c6 | a4 2a a5 f7 4a c6 39 01 f3 2c 2b 26 f2 78 a7 46 | 66 9c 5c 2e f0 4f 8f d2 e5 85 57 ab 4a ec 27 99 | 6b 3d 9c 9e 57 ca 4c a7 cc a2 02 c2 79 61 18 26 | d3 d3 1c 18 03 16 63 1a 41 88 e8 ef 4f 61 43 58 | 42 6b 1b 27 28 3a a0 24 43 97 c0 e2 8e 9d a0 cf | 4a b2 03 54 5c 92 a4 f1 cb cf 61 3a 46 ff d9 72 | f1 d0 de 6b 7e 0d 0c 20 b4 30 fd c2 99 e5 2e c8 | ce 6c 35 49 bb ce e9 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.14 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.151 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 04 00 05 7a 14 cd e2 03 38 c2 83 15 5a 80 46 | c9 6c 6a 91 60 9a 9b 25 79 ed 86 2d f5 83 c5 d3 | b3 94 4c 52 23 9a 34 db d8 23 03 68 0e a9 32 7f | 80 8f 3d d2 cb 19 f2 fa 65 59 29 b5 a8 bb ee 1b | db 05 c0 a7 a4 19 ae 11 53 23 5b cf 07 ba 13 ad | ef 11 6b d9 e4 21 ae 8b 0e 5c 06 7d 84 d3 f2 fa | 7b e8 94 b2 34 a2 2d 1f 43 1e 27 44 95 33 35 7c | d1 eb c8 1b 8e 2d 13 99 48 10 40 88 e0 8b de 9d | e5 22 8b 54 07 85 ac da 5a 47 b0 2a ab 1a 53 20 | 00 16 36 6d 68 4d df 99 8c 4f 11 98 a0 c7 a7 5b | a1 6a 18 0d 32 35 57 32 61 de f2 9c 35 d9 64 0c | 50 ba 63 e3 e4 28 ca 18 c3 3c 76 51 45 ec 21 0f | 1d f9 9a 7d 5a d9 03 56 87 94 7b 7d 53 16 f1 22 | 2b fa a0 89 c9 bf d4 12 28 95 da 7d 73 97 5b 38 | 16 71 a9 bb 6e c6 8e 0a 83 4b 30 59 47 5a 85 0e | 1d e8 1f b2 22 8f a8 e4 c5 93 f8 03 4c 59 48 1b | 50 26 bd d8 1f a4 b0 d6 15 1d da 3c 42 65 c3 0c | 3d 8d 4b 55 6a 74 5f 25 f3 16 b0 59 16 5a df 29 | fc 6f 19 0b 4f fb b6 b6 5a 85 0e fa eb bf c3 7b | dd cb 12 ad ac b1 5f a6 c8 c4 66 64 50 00 07 88 | eb b5 27 bf 1c 10 a9 d9 3b 9a f7 44 c1 9b 7e 8f | 7e e0 1f b8 7d 71 1d 11 d6 d5 43 f3 0b 81 04 d0 | 8f 0c ea b5 28 23 43 a3 21 20 3b e2 dd 4a 5d 58 | d7 9a 4d f5 94 6a 7e b5 bb 5b b7 1e 23 b3 63 32 | 9e 9f 7a d8 6a 83 0a 08 4b ee f2 a4 4f cf b0 7c | b1 64 1a 1e 2d 00 50 3f 05 71 10 36 75 66 7c 9c | d1 f9 ae e9 8b b5 73 7c 20 4c fd 55 5a 48 80 af | 11 6f ed 47 c1 9c 31 c6 46 97 fc a5 52 3d b5 d4 | 21 3a 89 be 25 ab 95 c0 d7 a8 e4 24 5c bb e5 c3 | 59 70 88 2b 4b 8f 0e 06 d2 8c b8 ab 6e 2a 43 3c | a1 33 5c 0b 22 f5 1d be 7e 67 c3 65 d1 eb bc e3 | a7 31 47 90 44 6a e3 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.138 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.148 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 251 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fb 00 00 00 df | 00 05 00 05 93 b8 65 13 1e 16 71 ca f1 37 4c 8f | ea 4e ab 5f 49 3b 39 e5 c1 cd 75 0e 2f b2 4d da | 3f 3d 57 49 eb 5f cd 0f ae 24 8e 3b f8 5d 22 ef | 39 a0 cf a3 07 1f 2b eb eb c0 41 3a 78 a4 06 3d | 05 07 a4 f7 51 90 30 ac 27 7b 1b ad d9 bf ce c6 | 40 4d c3 c5 a0 93 a8 1f 2c 7f 79 f4 ee ea 79 2f | 15 91 8f c5 49 d3 4a cf ca 78 21 51 40 06 4d 14 | 60 a7 06 03 84 99 2f d0 24 5b 82 01 b4 82 78 a3 | ab c5 f7 ae 1a e4 f8 e7 fb 44 bc 8b 4e 8e 8b 75 | 5f c4 ee 7f 01 ff 33 cb 9b 07 ea 29 60 2c 05 41 | bd 13 f8 88 fc 27 af 9c 11 16 87 fe ac de c3 77 | 2c 7a bd 9f 5a 8f 79 47 c1 b0 79 39 1e 43 3d 9d | 68 00 57 99 22 40 f1 30 6a 83 30 40 34 2e dd 1d | b7 2f 80 e1 0a a4 cf 83 9a 16 11 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 251 (0xfb) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 223 (0xdf) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=215) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55f89475bd60 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89475bd60 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 size 128 | #1 spent 0.0331 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3266) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3448 | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.177 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.187 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.001407 seconds | (#1) spent 1.41 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55f893823630 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1229 (0x4cd) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1224) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 34 (0x22) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (len=26) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | **parse IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REQUEST (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,IDr,AUTH,CP,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:4500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 3.88 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.033 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 3.95 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.596 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.0376 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec | certificate is valid (profile IPsec) | #1 spent 0.118 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: certificate verified OK: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f894769380 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f8947685b0 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f894760780 | unreference key: 0x55f89476b290 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | #1 spent 0.222 milliseconds in decode_certs() calling add_pubkey_from_nss_cert() | #1 spent 4.96 milliseconds in decode_certs() | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | received IDr payload - extracting our alleged ID | ID_DER_ASN1_DN '%fromcert' does not need further ID verification | stomping on peer_id | X509: CERT and ID matches current connection | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw[1] 192.1.2.254, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn | refine_host_connection: picking new best "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 (wild=0, peer_pathlen=7/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=%fromcert | results fail | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw", best=rw with match=0(id=0(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->%fromcert of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn | returning since no better match than original best_found | offered CA: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | RSA key issuer CA is 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | an RSA Sig check passed with *AwEAAaqjE [remote certificates] | #1 spent 0.178 milliseconds in try_all_keys() trying a pubkey "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: Authenticated using RSA | #1 spent 0.232 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R2(established IKE SA) | #1 will start re-keying in 3330 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89475bd60 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x55f89476b4c0 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 3330 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89475be80 size 128 | pstats #1 ikev2.ike established | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | IKEv2 CERT: send a certificate? | IKEv2 CERT: OK to send a certificate (always) | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | ****emit IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload (36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 26 raw bytes of my identity into IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload | my identity 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | my identity 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | emitting length of IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: 34 | assembled IDr payload | Sending [CERT] of certificate: E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org,CN=east.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | ****emit IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Payload (37:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 1260 raw bytes of CERT into IKEv2 Certificate Payload | CERT 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 | CERT 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 | CERT 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 | CERT 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 | CERT 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f | CERT 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 | CERT 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b | CERT 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e | CERT 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f | CERT 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 | CERT 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 | CERT 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 | CERT 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 39 31 35 31 39 34 34 35 39 | CERT 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 39 31 34 31 39 34 34 35 | CERT 39 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 | CERT 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 | CERT 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 | CERT 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c | CERT 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 | CERT 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 | CERT 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a | CERT 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 | CERT 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 | CERT 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f | CERT 00 30 82 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b0 0d 9e ca 2d 55 | CERT 24 59 06 37 09 58 0d 06 ab 90 5e 98 7c 00 0b 66 | CERT 73 f4 12 27 69 75 6e d4 8d 13 e9 c6 e9 4f c4 b1 | CERT 19 1a 1a 4f e6 4e 06 da 29 ec cf 8d 4c c3 c3 57 | CERT c0 24 57 83 7a 1b 7f 96 a3 21 66 67 52 68 8e 77 | CERT b9 bb f6 9b d2 43 11 57 c9 d6 ca e2 39 73 93 ea | CERT 99 99 f7 52 38 4d 58 69 7f a5 18 9b ff 66 72 6c | CERT df 6d df 18 50 cf 10 98 a3 f5 f9 69 27 5b 3f bd | CERT 0f 34 18 93 99 1a be 8a 46 84 37 69 71 7f a7 df | CERT d0 9d b2 9d ad 80 0f d0 1a 40 cb ff 37 20 ac ac | CERT 3d a9 8e 56 56 cf 25 c0 5e 55 52 86 5a c5 b4 ce | CERT a8 dd 95 cf ab 38 91 f6 1f 9f 83 36 d5 3f 8c d3 | CERT 1d f5 3f 23 3c d2 5c 87 23 bc 6a 67 f7 00 c3 96 | CERT 3f 76 5c b9 8e 6f 2b 16 90 2c 00 c0 05 a0 e2 8d | CERT 57 d5 76 34 7f 6f be e8 48 79 08 91 a8 17 72 1f | CERT c0 1c 8a 52 a8 18 aa 32 3c 9a e4 d9 90 58 25 5e | CERT 4c 49 8e cb 7a 33 19 d2 87 1a 2a 8e b5 04 f7 f9 | CERT cd 80 8c 59 ae 34 61 c5 1d de 53 65 fe 4f f3 f4 | CERT 09 f2 b4 21 7a 2b eb 1f 4a f2 5f 85 3a f0 f8 2b | CERT 3b 42 5b da 89 c1 ef b2 81 18 2a 4b 57 a2 ca 63 | CERT 8b a7 60 8e 54 95 c3 20 5c e5 53 f0 4a 57 df 41 | CERT fa 06 e6 ab 4e 0b 46 49 14 0d db b0 dc 10 2e 6d | CERT 5f 52 cb 75 36 1b e2 1d 9d 77 0f 73 9d 0a 64 07 | CERT 84 f4 0e 0a 98 97 58 c4 40 f6 1b ac a3 be 21 aa | CERT 67 3a 2b b1 0e b7 9a 36 ff 67 02 03 01 00 01 a3 | CERT 82 01 06 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 | CERT 30 00 30 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 73 74 40 | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b 06 03 55 | CERT 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 | CERT 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 06 08 2b | CERT 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 03 55 1d | CERT 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c 68 74 74 | CERT 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | CERT 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 2f 72 65 | CERT 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 | CERT 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 bf 3c 12 c5 | CERT 00 3e 71 2a 2b 2b 60 83 b9 b9 f2 4d b1 ca 0e fd | CERT b4 e0 0b 6a ad 54 d7 c9 98 57 e0 5c 26 4d bf 11 | CERT 23 20 79 05 b6 1b 9b 09 ed 4f 2e fd 7e da 55 53 | CERT b6 8c 88 fa f3 9b ce ec ef 95 37 11 70 ce 1c 98 | CERT d3 d5 cf f6 30 71 44 78 fb 45 03 69 50 d5 a5 c3 | CERT de 00 4c f7 0a 7d 00 cb 3a ab 11 74 6b 57 67 4d | CERT e7 c0 3a 97 98 44 e2 15 9d f2 6f 1b c7 b1 15 d0 | CERT 88 c4 dc 32 b7 72 1d 9c ac 1b 37 63 | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Payload: 1265 | CHILD SA proposals received | going to assemble AUTH payload | ****emit IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' value 47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Authentication Payload (39:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn | #1 spent 9.54 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() calling sign_hash_RSA() | emitting 384 raw bytes of rsa signature into IKEv2 Authentication Payload | rsa signature a1 47 2f 65 4c fc d6 46 a4 5d f7 81 ef 47 c7 3c | rsa signature a9 58 10 32 38 32 dd 17 62 62 63 e5 75 29 71 d7 | rsa signature ed 2d e3 c9 67 3e 72 a0 f0 33 06 d7 7b 72 38 e9 | rsa signature 9d 10 a1 b2 aa df 7e 2e 8f 2c d8 ec 24 e8 a1 d0 | rsa signature ac 94 b0 ab c8 bc bb f3 d8 2c af ee 0b 6f d5 7e | rsa signature a7 99 bc c1 02 c5 59 0c 7b 3b c8 a0 d8 2f 2d e2 | rsa signature a3 23 09 c0 0a d2 1a 6d c9 15 29 1e 95 8c fe 99 | rsa signature 30 1e 65 a3 c3 2a 57 9c 29 90 31 5e f3 3e 5d 4c | rsa signature 0f f9 16 e6 47 14 21 5b 98 19 8e 79 ae ed 72 d1 | rsa signature b3 b3 d4 5a ab 28 bb 1e e2 c9 77 b4 f7 2e 73 dd | rsa signature 38 32 35 71 13 c2 1d b2 23 41 02 29 19 d8 77 80 | rsa signature bb d8 5d 5a 2b 35 73 98 17 57 e9 d3 cf 65 b3 ba | rsa signature f7 51 f4 df 9f 3f d2 84 74 4d 02 ea c0 e0 fd 39 | rsa signature e9 db fe 31 ce da 92 63 61 e9 13 65 68 3e dd f7 | rsa signature 01 6a 78 f9 7e aa d0 b0 c6 09 e0 0e 2d 38 a6 74 | rsa signature 51 de 2f c1 65 e1 dc 8d 3e b4 d0 0b 3c 0e 81 d3 | rsa signature 9d 79 a4 d7 53 97 ca 76 d4 1f 0a 80 3f ac c0 31 | rsa signature bf 58 4a 1f 2f 0c 84 c3 30 4b 4c 0d 6b 70 fd 15 | rsa signature 8a 91 ab 2f ed 9a 16 99 71 2e cb a6 de bf 34 65 | rsa signature 7b de 22 95 01 e6 3c 50 9c aa 47 9d 65 ed 23 26 | rsa signature 2a 79 f9 5c b6 db be b1 5d 0d d3 2c 7c d5 c8 45 | rsa signature 19 18 06 57 af 99 63 d4 59 e8 ec 6c 14 db a8 4f | rsa signature 6f 8f f7 f1 1f 91 0c b4 15 20 81 6e 27 68 94 62 | rsa signature 92 5b ef e5 8a b2 92 79 de fa 9e 57 8a cc e0 0b | #1 spent 9.68 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() | emitting length of IKEv2 Authentication Payload: 392 | request lease from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 reference count 2 thatid '' that.client 192.1.2.254/32:0 | cannot share a lease, find a new lease IP | New lease from addresspool index 0 | new lease 100.64.0.1 from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 to that.client 192.1.2.254/32:0 thatid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | creating state object #2 at 0x55f894775a80 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #2 in UNDEFINED | pstats #2 ikev2.child started | duplicating state object #1 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 as #2 for IPSEC SA | #2 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:4500 from #1.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | Message ID: init_child #1.#2; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: switch-from #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: switch-to #1.#2 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | Send Configuration Payload reply | ****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REPLY (0x2) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' value 33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Configuration Payload (47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS (0x1) | emitting 4 raw bytes of Internal IP Address into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | Internal IP Address 64 40 00 01 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (0x3) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP4_DNS into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | IP4_DNS 01 02 03 04 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (0x3) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP4_DNS into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | IP4_DNS 08 08 08 08 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload: 32 | constructing ESP/AH proposals with all DH removed for rw (IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals) | converting proposal AES_GCM_16_256-NONE to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal AES_GCM_16_128-NONE to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254: constructed local ESP/AH proposals for rw (IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals): 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | Comparing remote proposals against IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 12 44 47 63 | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 1 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 2 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 3 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 4 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: ENCR+ESN; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+ESN transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH; matched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 12 44 47 63 | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 12 44 47 63 | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 12 44 47 63 | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: proposal 1:ESP:SPI=12444763;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED chosen from remote proposals 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED[first-match] 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED | IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals ikev2_proposal: 1:ESP:SPI=12444763;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x79579 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ****emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | emitting 4 raw bytes of our spi into IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload | our spi 00 07 95 79 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | *******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 32 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload (44:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP start 64 40 00 01 | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP end 64 40 00 01 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: 24 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload (45:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP start c0 00 02 00 | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP end c0 00 02 ff | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: 24 | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | integ=none: .key_size=0 encrypt=aes_gcm_16: .key_size=32 .salt_size=4 keymat_len=36 | uniqueIDs disabled, not contemplating releasing older self | install_ipsec_sa() for #2: inbound and outbound | could_route called for rw (kind=CK_INSTANCE) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.12444763@192.1.2.254 included non-error error | set up outgoing SA, ref=0/0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.79579@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "rw" is 0xfe7df | add inbound eroute 100.64.0.1/32:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042399 | raw_eroute result=success | set up incoming SA, ref=0/0 | sr for #2: unrouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | route_and_eroute with c: rw (next: none) ero:null esr:{(nil)} ro:null rosr:{(nil)} and state: #2 | priority calculation of connection "rw" is 0xfe7df | eroute_connection add eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 100.64.0.1/32:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.254 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042399 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_I | popen cmd is 1188 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE: | cmd( 80):='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.te: | cmd( 160):sting.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2: | cmd( 240):.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0': | cmd( 320): PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testin: | cmd( 480):g.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.: | cmd( 560):1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255: | cmd( 640):' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netk: | cmd( 720):ey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+I: | cmd( 800):KEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INST: | cmd( 880):ANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 960):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd(1040):='1' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd(1120):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x12444763 SPI_OUT=0x79579 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb prepare | command executing prepare-client | executing prepare-client: PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEE | popen cmd is 1193 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTE: | cmd( 80):RFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@ea: | cmd( 160):st.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='19: | cmd( 240):2.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCO: | cmd( 320):L='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_: | cmd( 400):PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.t: | cmd( 480):esting.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.: | cmd( 560):64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.25: | cmd( 640):5.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK=: | cmd( 720):'netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_AL: | cmd( 800):LOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK: | cmd( 880):_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' P: | cmd( 960):LUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_S: | cmd(1040):ERVER='1' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING=: | cmd(1120):'no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x12444763 SPI_OUT=0x79579 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb route | command executing route-client | executing route-client: PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DO | popen cmd is 1191 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERF: | cmd( 80):ACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.: | cmd( 240):0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL=: | cmd( 320):'0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PE: | cmd( 400):ER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.tes: | cmd( 480):ting.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64: | cmd( 560):.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.: | cmd( 640):255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='n: | cmd( 720):etkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLO: | cmd( 800):W+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_I: | cmd( 880):NSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLU: | cmd( 960):TO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SER: | cmd(1040):VER='1' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='n: | cmd(1120):o' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x12444763 SPI_OUT=0x79579 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: instance "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55f89475f390,sr=0x55f89475f390} to #2 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #1 spent 0.98 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH: instance rw[1], setting IKEv2 newest_ipsec_sa to #2 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#2) cloned from #1 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 1836 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 1864 | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK (0x2e) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 1864 (0x748) | **parse IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1836 (0x72c) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 25 00 00 22 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f | cleartext fragment 72 67 27 00 04 f1 04 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 | cleartext fragment 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 | cleartext fragment 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c | cleartext fragment 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 | cleartext fragment 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 | cleartext fragment 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 | cleartext fragment 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 | cleartext fragment 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 | cleartext fragment 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 39 31 | cleartext fragment 35 31 39 34 34 35 39 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 39 | cleartext fragment 31 34 31 39 34 34 35 39 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 | cleartext fragment 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 | cleartext fragment 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 | cleartext fragment 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f 00 30 82 | cleartext fragment 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b0 0d 9e ca 2d 55 24 59 06 | cleartext fragment 37 09 58 0d 06 ab 90 5e 98 7c 00 0b 66 73 f4 12 | cleartext fragment 27 69 75 6e d4 8d 13 e9 c6 e9 4f c4 b1 19 1a 1a | cleartext fragment 4f e6 4e 06 da 29 ec cf 8d 4c c3 c3 57 c0 24 57 | cleartext fragment 83 7a 1b 7f 96 a3 21 66 67 52 68 8e 77 b9 bb f6 | cleartext fragment 9b d2 43 11 57 c9 d6 ca e2 39 73 93 ea 99 99 f7 | cleartext fragment 52 38 4d 58 69 7f a5 18 9b ff 66 72 6c df 6d df | cleartext fragment 18 50 cf 10 98 a3 f5 f9 69 27 5b 3f bd 0f 34 18 | cleartext fragment 93 99 1a be 8a 46 84 37 69 71 7f a7 df d0 9d b2 | cleartext fragment 9d ad 80 0f d0 1a 40 cb ff 37 20 ac ac 3d a9 8e | cleartext fragment 56 56 cf 25 c0 5e 55 52 86 5a c5 b4 ce a8 dd 95 | cleartext fragment cf ab 38 91 f6 1f 9f 83 36 d5 3f 8c d3 1d f5 3f | cleartext fragment 23 3c d2 5c 87 23 bc 6a 67 f7 00 c3 96 3f 76 5c | cleartext fragment b9 8e 6f 2b 16 90 2c 00 c0 05 a0 e2 8d 57 d5 76 | cleartext fragment 34 7f 6f be e8 48 79 08 91 a8 17 72 1f c0 1c 8a | cleartext fragment 52 a8 18 aa 32 3c 9a e4 d9 90 58 25 5e 4c 49 8e | cleartext fragment cb 7a 33 19 d2 87 1a 2a 8e b5 04 f7 f9 cd 80 8c | cleartext fragment 59 ae 34 61 c5 1d de 53 65 fe 4f f3 f4 09 f2 b4 | cleartext fragment 21 7a 2b eb 1f 4a f2 5f 85 3a f0 f8 2b 3b 42 5b | cleartext fragment da 89 c1 ef b2 81 18 2a 4b 57 a2 ca 63 8b a7 60 | cleartext fragment 8e 54 95 c3 20 5c e5 53 f0 4a 57 df 41 fa 06 e6 | cleartext fragment ab 4e 0b 46 49 14 0d db b0 dc 10 2e 6d 5f 52 cb | cleartext fragment 75 36 1b e2 1d 9d 77 0f 73 9d 0a 64 07 84 f4 0e | cleartext fragment 0a 98 97 58 c4 40 f6 1b ac a3 be 21 aa 67 3a 2b | cleartext fragment b1 0e b7 9a 36 ff 67 02 03 01 00 01 a3 82 01 06 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 30 00 30 | cleartext fragment 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 61 73 74 | cleartext fragment 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 | cleartext fragment 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 | cleartext fragment 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e | cleartext fragment 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 1d 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c | cleartext fragment 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 2f 72 65 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 | cleartext fragment 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 bf | cleartext fragment 3c 12 c5 00 3e 71 2a 2b 2b 60 83 b9 b9 f2 4d b1 | cleartext fragment ca 0e fd b4 e0 0b 6a ad 54 d7 c9 98 57 e0 5c 26 | cleartext fragment 4d bf 11 23 20 79 05 b6 1b 9b 09 ed 4f 2e fd 7e | cleartext fragment da 55 53 b6 8c 88 fa f3 9b ce ec ef 95 37 11 70 | cleartext fragment ce 1c 98 d3 d5 cf f6 30 71 44 78 fb 45 03 69 50 | cleartext fragment d5 a5 c3 de 00 4c f7 0a 7d 00 cb 3a ab 11 74 6b | cleartext fragment 57 67 4d e7 c0 3a 97 98 44 e2 15 9d f2 6f 1b c7 | cleartext fragment b1 15 d0 88 c4 dc 32 b7 72 1d 9c ac 1b 37 63 2f | cleartext fragment 00 01 88 01 00 00 00 a1 47 2f 65 4c fc d6 46 a4 | cleartext fragment 5d f7 81 ef 47 c7 3c a9 58 10 32 38 32 dd 17 62 | cleartext fragment 62 63 e5 75 29 71 d7 ed 2d e3 c9 67 3e 72 a0 f0 | cleartext fragment 33 06 d7 7b 72 38 e9 9d 10 a1 b2 aa df 7e 2e 8f | cleartext fragment 2c d8 ec 24 e8 a1 d0 ac 94 b0 ab c8 bc bb f3 d8 | cleartext fragment 2c af ee 0b 6f d5 7e a7 99 bc c1 02 c5 59 0c 7b | cleartext fragment 3b c8 a0 d8 2f 2d e2 a3 23 09 c0 0a d2 1a 6d c9 | cleartext fragment 15 29 1e 95 8c fe 99 30 1e 65 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 | responder cookie: | 9f e8 ec d2 c5 2e 45 03 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 385 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment a3 c3 2a 57 9c 29 90 31 5e f3 3e 5d 4c 0f f9 16 | cleartext fragment e6 47 14 21 5b 98 19 8e 79 ae ed 72 d1 b3 b3 d4 | cleartext fragment 5a ab 28 bb 1e e2 c9 77 b4 f7 2e 73 dd 38 32 35 | cleartext fragment 71 13 c2 1d b2 23 41 02 29 19 d8 77 80 bb d8 5d | cleartext fragment 5a 2b 35 73 98 17 57 e9 d3 cf 65 b3 ba f7 51 f4 | cleartext fragment df 9f 3f d2 84 74 4d 02 ea c0 e0 fd 39 e9 db fe | cleartext fragment 31 ce da 92 63 61 e9 13 65 68 3e dd f7 01 6a 78 | cleartext fragment f9 7e aa d0 b0 c6 09 e0 0e 2d 38 a6 74 51 de 2f | cleartext fragment c1 65 e1 dc 8d 3e b4 d0 0b 3c 0e 81 d3 9d 79 a4 | cleartext fragment d7 53 97 ca 76 d4 1f 0a 80 3f ac c0 31 bf 58 4a | cleartext fragment 1f 2f 0c 84 c3 30 4b 4c 0d 6b 70 fd 15 8a 91 ab | cleartext fragment 2f ed 9a 16 99 71 2e cb a6 de bf 34 65 7b de 22 | cleartext fragment 95 01 e6 3c 50 9c aa 47 9d 65 ed 23 26 2a 79 f9 | cleartext fragment 5c b6 db be b1 5d 0d d3 2c 7c d5 c8 45 19 18 06 | cleartext fragment 57 af 99 63 d4 59 e8 ec 6c 14 db a8 4f 6f 8f f7 | cleartext fragment f1 1f 91 0c b4 15 20 81 6e 27 68 94 62 92 5b ef | cleartext fragment e5 8a b2 92 79 de fa 9e 57 8a cc e0 0b 21 00 00 | cleartext fragment 20 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 64 40 00 01 00 03 00 | cleartext fragment 04 01 02 03 04 00 03 00 04 08 08 08 08 2c 00 00 | cleartext fragment 24 00 00 00 20 01 03 04 02 00 07 95 79 03 00 00 | cleartext fragment 0c 01 00 00 14 80 0e 01 00 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 | cleartext fragment 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff | cleartext fragment ff 64 40 00 01 64 40 00 01 00 00 00 18 01 00 00 | cleartext fragment 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff c0 00 02 00 c0 00 02 | cleartext fragment ff | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 418 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 446 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_OK | #1 spent 17.8 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | suspend processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | start processing: state #2 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | #2 complete_v2_state_transition() md.from_state=PARENT_R1 md.svm.state[from]=PARENT_R1 UNDEFINED->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R1 to state STATE_V2_IPSEC_R | child state #2: UNDEFINED(ignore) => V2_IPSEC_R(established CHILD SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #2 to 1 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1.#2 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0->1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: sent #1.#2 response 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0->1 responder.recv=1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 | pstats #2 ikev2.child established "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #2: negotiated connection [192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255:0-65535 0] -> [100.64.0.1-100.64.0.1:0-65535 0] | NAT-T: NAT Traversal detected - their IKE port is '500' | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #2: STATE_V2_IPSEC_R: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP/NAT=>0x12444763 <0x00079579 xfrm=AES_GCM_16_256-NONE NATOA=none NATD=192.1.2.254:4500 DPD=passive} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:4500 (from 192.1.2.23:4500) | sending fragments ... | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 | c5 2e 45 03 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 24 00 01 fb 00 01 00 04 18 6d 0d 7c a3 29 11 8d | 79 cd ce d8 93 46 28 d6 40 23 ab fe 96 af de a3 | b9 2e 18 2d 00 29 ae 01 af 20 04 1b c3 fd ac c7 | f0 2f 04 72 6b df 19 32 12 3f ce 23 fa b1 d8 06 | c5 7f f9 bb 5c 53 34 0f 10 cb 2f 33 4a 3f fa 1e | 7d 77 f9 ef b3 26 d2 64 25 1f 86 4f ca 9d c5 10 | fc de 07 77 7d d1 ba 7e f0 47 44 fc a7 6a 11 35 | c1 7c 02 30 99 a7 60 91 ff b2 3a 7e 3f 0a da 4f | fb 17 e4 d3 11 11 6b cf b1 86 c5 3f 53 e5 b8 28 | 0e e2 ab ad a9 37 67 47 59 43 cf 1c 08 e6 65 ad | 35 51 3b cd 60 1b b7 0b 84 2f 4d 2b 28 27 33 d7 | ea ca cf a6 b5 a5 29 a1 52 88 44 dc bc ef 03 b9 | 6c b0 d9 f1 57 b7 78 db cd 50 78 43 00 dd b5 c7 | 6d 47 56 12 a5 62 77 fc 25 76 52 01 18 56 8d 91 | 8a e1 28 23 18 84 5a 83 c9 71 d7 45 cb b0 6f ac | 84 db 89 c5 7b bb 5a 1e b9 e8 32 31 56 89 e5 a5 | 30 a7 c4 c2 74 a6 27 33 a4 e4 33 92 68 3b 47 3a | a6 0e 5b 7f 79 3f b4 f6 f5 18 ac 7d 69 8f f3 45 | 63 a4 9c b3 49 62 e9 52 87 c5 4d 15 c9 a6 6a 93 | 35 cf 30 91 81 f7 61 97 8f ac f5 e0 6d 7a 2d 12 | 21 0d 5d 67 4b fa 95 78 fc 8c 36 dd ab fb d9 36 | c3 1a 6a 86 ac 54 7c c9 ef 01 35 b1 d7 3d 39 9b | 89 85 bf 65 e3 f9 51 7a 92 70 e8 b3 ef 3c fe 9b | ce a7 c0 ed aa 58 69 12 c2 fe ed 9f 54 e2 f1 34 | 7e 03 9e bd d9 3c ae 20 ed e3 67 d0 0d 76 d6 b3 | 9a 7b ba c0 c8 46 2f da 5a 2a 3a e1 be 14 98 52 | ca 69 26 4e 38 77 d6 aa e8 f9 4d cc 5a 5c 64 86 | e1 82 08 23 e2 f8 a7 7e 62 da ad f0 0a 47 0e 99 | fb 95 8e 1d 1b 4f 4d 52 52 32 8f ef d1 91 f3 51 | 5a 45 d7 43 87 e2 89 9b fc 85 0f 32 d2 46 4b e7 | ff e0 ee 5c b2 2f 31 d9 4a f8 7b 7e e2 d5 7f 17 | 53 9f 60 fb 67 b6 ce 27 f1 42 7e | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 | c5 2e 45 03 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 02 00 04 2c 3b 3c ae b6 1a 4f ae | 4a 72 d5 0f 83 67 61 3c 52 bc b3 8c 9c 63 8b 71 | ed 55 d6 64 82 6b 25 af d5 02 99 10 d4 41 1c 0a | 44 4c a4 39 ba cc 27 c4 c1 7b aa 62 c5 5c 1c cc | 35 ad 3d 43 b7 f3 95 56 78 6b f5 a6 02 24 03 c0 | e5 0d 50 08 04 bd 10 1f 23 6e 7c 30 42 47 4b fa | f2 c3 25 88 5d 13 80 e7 b2 00 40 48 18 14 bb 6e | 4a 60 ff 2b ae 08 44 5a 6d ff d3 65 ae bf 1c 2a | 7b b0 a2 e0 c7 e3 10 8f eb e6 7d a0 ca 4f d2 e2 | 4f 6f 2f f9 e5 7e aa 44 d2 23 29 72 9b 97 71 73 | df 2f 91 35 2d 9b d9 49 5c b5 cd 62 54 46 8a 75 | 8a 10 92 3c bc 78 a9 47 41 7b b7 0e c9 66 ef 51 | 82 8a 96 c3 f6 02 f0 35 ca 40 39 2e dd c3 d1 b9 | 2a 5f 94 bb 0c 95 a0 34 d1 f5 c4 20 59 24 81 c7 | 9e d8 57 1a 89 52 40 24 66 d4 15 c9 5a a5 a8 05 | db bf 61 f4 b2 ee 94 cc f4 b7 25 e0 b8 9d ed dd | f8 60 21 99 0b d5 97 4e 2c 27 fd 1c 85 9f 5e 41 | e2 90 94 c2 62 20 14 ca 6e 95 4c ed 6d 87 38 64 | 53 3e 9b c5 2f 97 ca d1 b7 d0 4d 27 f2 d4 23 5f | 20 c0 18 9b 63 e1 14 f9 fb aa cc b1 62 e1 b7 42 | 67 05 61 c0 6a 4c a0 f5 49 8e 43 fc e0 9e 31 93 | dd 9c 5d ee a5 16 8e bd 97 4d d6 2b 26 95 70 6b | 5f 73 21 ab ef bb bb ef 3f 6f cd c4 61 2d bb 0d | 4d e4 81 43 b1 e0 90 53 d0 1a f4 65 ac 1e db f1 | 01 68 c5 b1 4b 12 5e 56 40 55 a9 0a d0 b2 c9 fe | 89 b3 4b 7a 5a ad 2d a6 23 79 2d 2b 65 7b d7 ee | 40 e4 89 bd b4 8a 62 b9 16 44 36 a0 73 65 18 39 | cd d2 0c ab 20 43 03 83 f4 c3 6a 8b b1 ce 26 31 | 9a 93 72 88 4d 45 b8 50 3e f2 85 01 b5 60 2f b6 | 78 ac b0 a1 72 41 f8 0f c2 32 53 4a c0 16 22 ec | 6c 3b 3d 24 86 06 3e a1 cf cc 63 8a 35 83 b4 43 | a4 57 79 2b a3 90 07 8a ba 17 3c | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 | c5 2e 45 03 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 03 00 04 e4 30 66 7e 77 54 60 8e | d8 8d c8 c0 a7 36 bb 96 e1 fb 90 1f 0e c5 fe d5 | 65 58 3b ca a1 6c ee ae 54 54 b7 80 b6 6b 41 fe | e7 22 0b 0f fa 53 93 f2 9c 3b 9a 0a 93 95 4f a9 | 18 36 20 fb 5d c9 33 77 d9 3e 28 55 91 9a 70 82 | 37 d3 d0 cf 4e f0 c9 4f 77 fa 48 1a 1a 15 e7 f9 | ed cd 2a 46 dc 3b 52 71 2c 9e 27 da dc 53 f0 19 | c9 c4 c5 09 c0 4d 2b 72 00 82 38 2f e9 cd 86 a7 | 8f ac 34 49 c5 4d 97 16 94 3d 9f 43 0b bc 1a c0 | be e8 7c c7 da e1 03 3d ee 0f db f5 62 ad 4c 09 | 24 de 9c 96 46 62 d7 5f ec 4c 7c da 6c 3f af 1f | 54 99 bc 1c 6c 9d dd a9 81 a5 1a 53 09 af cd 46 | f7 d4 9a 8a 1a fd 7f 28 e2 7f 9d 84 d9 b1 c2 83 | b4 f7 41 8d cc 28 f0 2c aa 14 a7 ae 5d d3 1c 46 | a0 96 05 7d 0b f1 02 46 03 af 13 87 3a 29 47 2b | 63 83 24 4a 66 7a 37 1a 65 13 c7 33 f8 71 9c 4f | e8 d9 92 76 c1 93 4c d1 18 2d fe c8 38 0a 2a 1d | c8 ad f6 db be 16 57 57 ec 7f 15 71 6c 65 cf e4 | 18 85 00 42 e0 df a2 69 85 92 4e 9a 68 db a9 ed | 5e 48 fa fc b7 54 ab cb ed 22 34 4b fa 12 ec 34 | 31 af 2c 04 79 ce e7 cd a3 ff c7 7f 98 ce 9f 6c | c8 5f 03 13 15 78 30 2c 87 ab a6 0a 47 ea 0e fd | 64 8e c9 92 1e 88 40 66 23 f1 99 a4 9e 3c aa 9f | cf 5f 82 b5 b6 fa cb 63 c9 63 2f 99 f8 25 f1 26 | 9e dc 02 f4 c7 4e b6 c2 89 27 05 6a d7 50 f9 db | fc 5a c7 69 18 19 7e 4c db b9 df cc 83 c1 e7 85 | dc 39 f9 7e 13 35 90 16 8f f4 09 72 09 fb ef 2a | b3 67 27 f9 a0 f1 9c 58 88 49 64 0b 6a aa ec b7 | 68 00 77 8d 92 2c dd 6c ca 97 a7 49 67 30 4e d8 | ba 00 32 28 e4 33 ce 96 7e 4b 5a ac b0 ae 95 64 | 1f f4 ae 63 59 50 ef e3 86 75 e2 1e 49 6b 55 c9 | 76 a5 ef dd f2 dc d5 08 19 6c 38 | sending 450 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 61 72 53 37 e6 d1 ad 59 9f e8 ec d2 | c5 2e 45 03 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 be | 00 00 01 a2 00 04 00 04 a8 27 d8 04 82 ab d7 ec | f7 56 d4 e5 f9 17 5b d2 32 39 c3 a1 ac d4 60 7d | ce a5 8c 76 18 7b 80 68 c4 50 c1 7c af 63 bc 7f | 72 65 36 9e 2b d2 fb 80 ce f0 c5 a3 61 a1 30 39 | 9a 8a 4e fa 31 7e 99 5f 90 13 40 99 c4 ab 01 d3 | c9 ff 7d 05 40 8b 89 6b c2 27 ba 87 fb 2a 80 00 | b8 25 4c 93 5a 66 6b 64 52 9a 83 30 a7 ec d0 bf | b3 7a 2c d3 82 d9 90 01 fb 11 52 74 e2 f1 11 8e | 92 16 15 dc b0 36 05 b8 03 1a 31 ca 7e dd 9d 0f | 57 09 07 59 62 c7 e4 ef 21 66 3b bc be 15 49 9c | 14 15 cd d0 cc e8 a9 bc eb 57 5b 46 0d 2d 21 ac | 57 3e 78 d6 7b 92 f9 ae e4 23 11 ba 1c 24 b0 dc | 39 a1 06 98 c7 89 7e 7a df 0d d8 95 f6 ae 46 86 | c4 52 da 16 40 e5 76 6d 1d ef 0a 5e 66 d1 45 c4 | da a4 f9 d1 f6 2f a7 f0 bf d1 e1 52 e8 cc de 0d | 89 ad 9b 32 05 dc d4 0b 26 e0 ab ff 2a 23 e2 2e | ec b8 9b d3 31 a3 1d d5 05 9d 6c 24 0e 96 ea 01 | 12 e9 d7 41 c8 ee 1b fe 9e a1 49 30 13 23 57 74 | 63 cd dc 00 5d 2c 23 00 cd b1 8c f3 ec 91 6d da | a7 15 85 62 ee c2 a2 6b 42 88 65 e7 3a 96 56 85 | ea c6 41 df 3d 0b d6 46 7e 8c b7 3d b6 fa 41 20 | 09 26 c8 bb d4 ae 1c 35 69 a1 c2 38 64 cb 0a 68 | f3 b7 cf 59 93 7d 79 ec fa bc 98 08 4c 01 6f 68 | 88 66 a2 66 f4 74 10 24 58 67 3d 5b a4 14 8b ee | 80 a0 c4 6c 7f e4 60 46 fd 73 9a 94 04 b3 9c 68 | c8 c0 a1 cf 55 fd 71 28 4f 4f 65 97 91 c1 54 5d | bd 7f | sent 4 fragments | releasing whack for #2 (sock=fd@-1) | releasing whack and unpending for parent #1 | unpending state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | #2 will start re-keying in 28530 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x55f89476dcf0 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 28530 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894774e60 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 18.3 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00488 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00312 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00322 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00293 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.254:337 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 dd aa c5 35 46 06 02 d4 | 99 f7 21 2f c2 73 06 01 4e 0d bd 78 22 94 dd 85 | ab bc 30 fc fe 25 f7 89 8e d2 5a dc d7 af 33 87 | 28 7e ca 2f ff cf 9d 09 a6 c8 63 71 b5 11 36 fd | db 0e 42 cc 2e de b8 f6 2c 49 ce 69 94 5f 0d 17 | 0a 2a 39 8b 86 3f 14 56 d4 00 aa ef 89 fd de 01 | 0b 61 47 af 4d 80 e2 97 1c a6 80 67 04 09 a1 f5 | 69 73 97 61 ef 8e d2 6d 00 ec 5f 43 3a 32 bf b7 | 8b 38 38 f2 0d 1b 9c 3f 7f 64 f5 18 06 2d 2c d9 | d5 46 18 2f 47 fb ff e0 58 2e c7 6e 91 2c cc bb | 8a 94 e6 8f d3 99 02 fd 49 1b 67 0e df 4d 0c 62 | 6e 47 61 9c bd 12 3e 7e 0d eb b3 28 05 7a 69 4d | 65 5a 01 55 b1 19 90 59 5c b7 eb d1 29 a9 b3 ff | c4 a3 cd 6e 86 a3 1d 43 14 80 f3 80 be f5 82 47 | 34 9e e9 bc 62 39 2e ca ea e9 51 01 20 c8 d1 68 | 09 b9 b7 3c 9d 9e bb 0c 98 c7 a0 b9 bd 80 f4 52 | 4e 9f 44 ff 69 46 b0 09 29 00 00 24 82 13 08 37 | 5d 37 ad 42 3b 48 a1 59 66 98 c8 55 85 a6 73 10 | fa 67 33 37 27 cd e4 3f b7 a9 59 30 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 a1 b9 3d 56 | 30 0f a3 02 f8 59 5a 4e 97 b4 22 f0 c8 89 74 4e | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 e5 5f de 53 8e 32 0e 51 | 02 df 0d b5 5a dd cc 3c 52 66 8b 9e | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:337 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:337 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:337 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns rw[1] 192.1.2.254 | found connection: rw[1] 192.1.2.254 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #3 at 0x55f8947655c0 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #3 in UNDEFINED | pstats #3 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #3: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #3: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #3; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #3 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #3 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #3 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | using existing local IKE proposals for connection rw (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= e5 5f de 53 8e 32 0e 51 02 df 0d b5 5a dd cc 3c | natd_hash: hash= 52 66 8b 9e | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port= 01 51 | natd_hash: hash= b3 a6 29 de fb 33 69 7b e8 2c 84 a5 fb 18 b1 fb | natd_hash: hash= 82 04 be 90 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is behind NAT 192.1.2.254 | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.254 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 3 for state #3 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 size 128 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55f89473ce30 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f894766080 size 128 | #3 spent 0.554 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | crypto helper 3 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 3 for state #3 | #3 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #3 and saving MD | #3 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 3 | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3266) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3448 | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.874 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:337 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.886 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 3 time elapsed 0.000585 seconds | (#3) spent 0.587 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 3: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 3 for state #3 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8ebc006900 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #3 | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 3 | calling continuation function 0x55f893823630 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #3: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x a8 8f c9 15 6f a2 e8 c9 2e 24 93 44 42 58 f7 cf | ikev2 g^x 53 c9 f3 74 f8 a4 78 60 ac c5 d9 50 df 8b 87 3c | ikev2 g^x b9 6f 17 d4 39 3a 19 c8 16 71 88 da 54 51 28 20 | ikev2 g^x 92 e0 56 40 cf fc ec 36 06 a8 e5 00 12 51 fa 26 | ikev2 g^x 6f e9 80 58 8d fc d1 57 06 e6 ef 66 6b 76 f8 ec | ikev2 g^x 5d 18 a7 fb ab cf 37 3c 3c f4 fe 5a ad cc 2a 20 | ikev2 g^x c4 14 25 d9 63 9e e7 e0 48 e9 9c d1 50 4a 7e 9c | ikev2 g^x b1 cd 9e 07 a4 3c 97 54 5f a3 49 0d f3 d4 d5 40 | ikev2 g^x a6 7a 42 e1 a1 24 3e 69 24 9e 87 d0 bb 02 7d 6b | ikev2 g^x 46 f3 7c 30 f4 03 5a 5f 77 c0 3a 9c ae 2c 08 1c | ikev2 g^x 72 62 20 0f 2c ef f3 54 6a 41 8b cb d9 b8 61 98 | ikev2 g^x 83 4b b7 04 27 d6 8b 67 00 97 3c b6 a7 e0 40 36 | ikev2 g^x ab 6f cc ea ea f2 d2 e8 88 36 75 4b 54 2e 08 27 | ikev2 g^x da 42 f7 7e 13 da fb b2 37 21 55 26 58 a3 b1 d5 | ikev2 g^x e6 36 a5 80 54 d6 02 c7 c3 46 b8 17 83 4b ff 0b | ikev2 g^x ef 4b 3e 1e 53 65 22 57 32 58 81 7a fe 8e 75 6b | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 6b c5 d4 25 50 1f 89 bc 3e f6 8c a7 c2 3e 56 83 | IKEv2 nonce 08 66 af c0 7f 2c fc ff b0 24 1a 7a ea 7c 86 3c | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | natd_hash: rcookie= 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= c3 15 ac 35 b0 38 8b 61 39 4e 8e ec cb af 8a a3 | natd_hash: hash= 57 77 0f de | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data c3 15 ac 35 b0 38 8b 61 39 4e 8e ec cb af 8a a3 | Notify data 57 77 0f de | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55f8938f97a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | natd_hash: rcookie= 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port= 01 51 | natd_hash: hash= b1 c7 d1 08 d2 89 b6 9a 65 c6 3c b0 0b c7 99 f7 | natd_hash: hash= 6d fe 6d cd | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data b1 c7 d1 08 d2 89 b6 9a 65 c6 3c b0 0b c7 99 f7 | Notify data 6d fe 6d cd | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | #3 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #3: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #3 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #3 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #3 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:337 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:337 (using #3) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 a8 8f c9 15 | 6f a2 e8 c9 2e 24 93 44 42 58 f7 cf 53 c9 f3 74 | f8 a4 78 60 ac c5 d9 50 df 8b 87 3c b9 6f 17 d4 | 39 3a 19 c8 16 71 88 da 54 51 28 20 92 e0 56 40 | cf fc ec 36 06 a8 e5 00 12 51 fa 26 6f e9 80 58 | 8d fc d1 57 06 e6 ef 66 6b 76 f8 ec 5d 18 a7 fb | ab cf 37 3c 3c f4 fe 5a ad cc 2a 20 c4 14 25 d9 | 63 9e e7 e0 48 e9 9c d1 50 4a 7e 9c b1 cd 9e 07 | a4 3c 97 54 5f a3 49 0d f3 d4 d5 40 a6 7a 42 e1 | a1 24 3e 69 24 9e 87 d0 bb 02 7d 6b 46 f3 7c 30 | f4 03 5a 5f 77 c0 3a 9c ae 2c 08 1c 72 62 20 0f | 2c ef f3 54 6a 41 8b cb d9 b8 61 98 83 4b b7 04 | 27 d6 8b 67 00 97 3c b6 a7 e0 40 36 ab 6f cc ea | ea f2 d2 e8 88 36 75 4b 54 2e 08 27 da 42 f7 7e | 13 da fb b2 37 21 55 26 58 a3 b1 d5 e6 36 a5 80 | 54 d6 02 c7 c3 46 b8 17 83 4b ff 0b ef 4b 3e 1e | 53 65 22 57 32 58 81 7a fe 8e 75 6b 29 00 00 24 | 6b c5 d4 25 50 1f 89 bc 3e f6 8c a7 c2 3e 56 83 | 08 66 af c0 7f 2c fc ff b0 24 1a 7a ea 7c 86 3c | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | c3 15 ac 35 b0 38 8b 61 39 4e 8e ec cb af 8a a3 | 57 77 0f de 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 b1 c7 d1 08 | d2 89 b6 9a 65 c6 3c b0 0b c7 99 f7 6d fe 6d cd | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #3 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #3 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #3 spent 0.299 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8ebc006900 | spent 0.00282 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:29667 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 23 00 01 fb | 00 01 00 05 d5 f1 5f c2 00 b5 ca d8 81 fd c4 5e | 61 b5 7d 4a c6 bc 7f 1c 63 af f2 11 fb 63 f6 69 | c5 d5 65 a6 c9 b0 7c d6 1b 81 cc b9 b8 a0 27 1e | 39 73 7b 11 37 3a 53 a7 43 f6 fe d0 7b a6 f9 3f | 90 2d ce 50 d4 5c 9a 59 cd 7c 9f 08 2b ba 3d 6a | e5 26 ff 16 a9 14 a8 9b 19 0a 9b 4b d0 bd 36 f5 | 42 9b c6 95 cf d0 29 80 6f d4 b2 aa 14 f3 d4 1a | b4 aa 5a 26 65 6f 73 44 3a 50 53 1b 40 e0 3e 01 | bb a4 93 da 00 7c 1e 01 83 2a 62 aa cd fd 7c 50 | da 97 ee 2d cd 58 ee 72 6b 83 f0 55 8e 7c 99 5f | e1 68 a3 99 57 1f ad 23 5b 0b 17 e4 0c 8f 65 ea | 20 43 b9 a5 72 4b 2f d7 82 30 63 a1 cb f7 55 2c | 97 da ab 2f 2a 86 a4 73 73 12 99 28 64 4a ab ad | 1b 39 5d 02 33 92 6c 92 a5 0d 3d 94 67 e9 23 7d | 49 8a eb 47 1b 26 cf b5 ed cd c7 45 9d f8 86 64 | 88 a9 e7 ee 12 52 3a e9 dc c3 d7 51 dd f2 bf 15 | 8d e3 40 e7 c0 c1 3a 91 02 ad 76 a4 8c ae 29 dc | 42 e2 8b 0d 04 b1 43 e7 44 18 df 8e b9 3f e7 6e | 05 ff 23 47 dd 4c b3 48 2a 77 0f 2d b7 98 b9 ff | f2 9c d9 03 40 6a da cc b1 d9 57 b4 1b f0 f0 2b | 41 b8 e9 a3 ab 10 a7 13 cf 3f 0d 99 d9 8d 66 e6 | 52 38 8b b7 77 44 cd b1 0b 51 9a f2 cd 0b 01 24 | 23 90 6d 41 f6 33 43 ff 24 99 80 31 fb bb c7 0b | a3 8c b0 54 a5 b1 6a da bc c8 12 ea 9e fd 7e 4f | 2c 5b dd 9e bf 00 be f9 ad 52 c7 4f f9 86 75 77 | ed 90 a4 bf cd 7d e7 4c d5 c5 f0 03 0b 2d 73 74 | ad 30 d6 0f 66 83 d2 63 9c 8e a5 33 dc 02 1c d2 | 54 c5 2e 2d d3 63 14 08 83 75 77 b5 92 40 23 63 | 09 2f 22 4c 4b 5e b9 35 54 14 55 7c 2a 0d 0e 04 | 99 cf 48 20 68 c2 94 d3 5a 37 b1 b9 d1 67 cf d2 | dc 66 bb f8 e5 89 66 59 94 f7 7f 7a 70 3a ea 17 | 2d 2b af 86 b0 87 3d | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | Message ID: start-responder #3 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.127 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.135 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00124 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:29667 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 02 00 05 fc 4d 0e 40 1f dc e8 3c 4d c2 bf 5a | be 95 27 38 93 f1 6e 63 e1 4b 97 8a 94 39 b2 76 | 43 b0 81 ca 0b 8d 84 e9 89 34 71 4b 42 26 dc ff | 39 03 5b aa 87 80 01 fa 46 99 b3 ec 63 04 38 8e | c8 df 40 1b 85 0a 02 40 39 45 4d 64 da b4 90 75 | 06 82 12 d6 97 0f 9d b5 25 52 ba 2a a7 9b b0 ce | 0e b7 0b ea ad 79 de 5b cc 32 17 15 85 93 70 12 | 02 b5 11 e4 11 af 40 b1 46 1e 9c f0 04 be 25 0a | 12 a8 f3 11 ae fc f4 01 8a df 6a bd 0f d8 09 c4 | 3e 37 41 ee b6 d4 e0 e2 7d 70 33 3a 48 7a d1 02 | b7 70 87 36 25 6d 15 db aa 12 e4 2e ae c6 c5 24 | 42 24 f3 70 9a fc b4 e8 32 00 32 ac 2c 74 58 5e | a6 2c 2a 5e a9 4b 42 08 ec 01 5d 8b f9 26 55 91 | 28 64 f0 aa d6 8f da 4d 5b b4 28 5c da b2 bf 83 | 6f 65 6d 6e 9c 57 3e 89 9f f3 d8 8d c5 38 eb 97 | cc fa fe af c3 37 37 95 4c 9b b0 26 69 6a 35 41 | d6 6d 02 89 38 c4 58 d1 8f a9 73 fb 0b 19 85 78 | b5 bf 84 08 55 a4 94 3a ed 0d fb 4a a9 89 c6 bb | 90 54 5e 8c 0c 35 c6 5f 24 40 81 ab eb b9 2a 9b | 0e ee 85 e5 01 aa 04 eb 0d 60 be cd ae 6e 59 99 | 51 a2 a8 5f 63 71 af 37 d2 2a 5a b9 43 0d 55 29 | ee fd 5b 2c 3c fd 3a 85 37 09 77 bb 7d 8a 1c 7f | ce 80 8d 81 fd 13 41 03 9d d5 e3 c8 fc da 57 10 | 8b 37 07 a6 ff b1 1e fc ce a5 92 34 af 24 b6 1b | b4 6c 51 07 79 9d 0f 73 01 5b bf 8e 6d 89 50 58 | fa d2 2a 68 13 db f7 d4 01 e2 d4 88 4c 12 3b e8 | 4b 95 bd 34 43 80 e5 37 0c cb 13 eb 34 4e 35 58 | 3f 46 be 6d 92 41 c5 29 67 97 b7 fd c8 40 bb 3d | 6b 37 7f b0 dd af 5c 52 75 d8 00 2c f8 ed c4 87 | 93 2c 0c 01 00 cf ae 9d 25 ef 07 2a 03 ec 92 67 | 40 68 f6 f4 13 04 d3 a7 3d 9e 26 d5 15 27 e6 d7 | 63 bf b1 f6 5d a0 c6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.0934 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.101 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00107 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:29667 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 03 00 05 47 9c ed cb 2d c8 48 a5 39 55 9d 92 | 56 1a 07 85 e8 f9 b5 1e c5 e3 60 84 5b f5 8f 0f | f8 e2 06 35 73 b9 e5 99 fc dd d8 6e 6c ac 58 07 | 9a 69 70 31 5e 80 a1 cb 19 7a ab a5 4e 7c e4 6b | 09 fd f0 91 98 c4 0f 38 c1 29 ef c4 53 bc 44 34 | 08 1a cf 8f 6d 61 29 66 2a e0 46 5e 17 bd b2 2b | 42 7c b4 df 82 d4 76 4a eb 13 15 7b f9 29 52 76 | 85 9d d8 f5 7f 6a d6 65 a8 20 ea 6f cb a0 3e 1e | 98 b8 f6 20 45 c8 75 a3 42 8f 7f f7 9e 97 0d 97 | 34 17 90 ae 95 2f a4 4f b2 08 4c df 49 2d 46 7e | 14 33 0a 7a 18 9b fd 29 4b 00 66 a1 01 83 16 7a | 5e f3 cd f1 61 26 bd b0 3f bb 0e 0e 6d 7a 26 1d | 00 d2 28 a8 62 d4 d9 ae 0c 89 5a 5d b6 56 5a 2d | c1 4f d5 a7 33 9f 91 b6 4c 54 84 32 5d 0d 03 99 | 61 bd 96 42 e2 35 3d a6 28 53 ab 70 ae 39 2a 82 | f7 e0 83 73 3e 20 51 a4 d0 8f 29 95 de 56 09 98 | bf c4 4c ed ba 46 09 c4 75 e0 7f 9e 07 35 c0 4e | 0b 9e 7a a7 8c 88 88 d9 8f 90 63 d0 c0 23 b6 c4 | 24 0f 72 0e de 64 ec 1a 5e 97 8b d1 e5 70 e3 54 | 58 8b 8d ef 6d 1e a6 1a 5a 5c 47 a7 03 83 92 71 | 7b 4e 06 5e 29 a6 c7 52 92 2d 3c bd 68 30 26 a2 | 02 a5 ef ef 4e 51 16 3b e5 ec 5c 2a 23 32 e9 7e | e1 3f 09 11 6f 90 5c bb da df 03 58 f4 9c 35 ac | 6d ee 81 af 1b c2 dc f5 d0 e3 f2 54 6a 47 d0 64 | b2 84 e0 cb 6b 31 c7 1f c9 de fd 87 20 42 89 c1 | bb 4a 7d 44 8f f9 d8 da ab 78 94 46 57 88 78 b0 | 54 e9 a3 2a cc d7 0f db 54 62 2b c5 15 4c 09 a8 | 3c df 06 c6 44 42 f3 db df 88 32 50 61 9a d2 7e | d9 bc 38 81 19 00 2b 5d 36 50 99 01 f9 0e 76 5a | 08 79 91 4d ca 02 e0 10 8d d0 29 d7 c2 8e 6f 37 | c1 c4 b7 d1 f6 fd fd 9b 01 3f 61 92 03 5d fd 07 | ca 24 ba d0 53 54 09 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.141 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.152 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00145 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:29667 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 04 00 05 c9 b0 92 32 82 93 23 c4 e8 f1 15 48 | d5 60 9a 10 d1 a5 f1 be 4e e7 53 d7 68 e4 85 93 | 29 b0 22 d6 5d fb 77 b6 0e eb 4a b5 1c 6a ac 31 | 0d 6d f5 d1 37 ad 08 f1 31 b0 23 83 19 cd 7d 73 | 06 c0 8c 86 9a cd 95 3b 90 1c b3 e3 0e 0e 4c 60 | 3d 58 d8 85 78 4d 4e 88 bd 58 de c9 19 d9 d1 e0 | 31 b7 78 ea a7 3d 33 38 31 3e 2c 62 d0 6d 69 dc | e8 35 54 0b 87 48 df 62 3b 81 b4 64 4d 00 a9 59 | 91 2a 17 9d 3b d8 f3 e6 60 54 8f b8 74 7c 29 64 | f7 16 9d 09 d2 54 1c 55 f0 85 05 b3 a0 be 8f 19 | e6 0f 3e 8f 8a f1 84 a7 5b 69 96 5a 6b c4 90 2a | be 40 7b e9 1b 28 f0 f7 5f 9e ed 5c cf 67 18 69 | c4 65 f6 53 2a a5 08 82 64 e1 c8 dc 6e ca b0 70 | 1c df f1 71 72 36 d5 06 c7 d1 56 0c e0 35 78 91 | c3 39 65 c1 85 c6 87 21 f0 07 ba 3f 89 e1 23 54 | d1 0d ba c3 c2 eb af 1b bf 3c fd 15 85 b0 b5 c0 | 96 ab 0f 41 cf e7 18 9a 51 47 ca 7a 30 16 d9 42 | 55 bd e2 2a c0 65 18 a8 69 24 bb cf 3e 6b d1 aa | b8 7d b5 da 59 b3 f0 fc 6c 23 b9 15 da 2b bf 84 | 5b 18 49 a0 ae a4 17 37 e7 c0 76 35 75 60 0c 8c | 5e 61 50 2f 51 42 3f f2 aa 2b fc 1e 7d 06 b8 64 | 3d a9 58 a0 88 2f 8a b4 64 33 35 70 b7 18 20 45 | 61 47 83 e2 15 5c 26 5c be 98 62 9f 9b 9d 5a 2f | 58 4d de 60 5d 77 5c 61 50 1b b6 64 04 77 fe 95 | ae 8d 56 cd a6 2f 8b 2d 23 0c 71 15 82 47 82 b4 | ed e1 fa fd 2f b5 4f bf 6b f1 9c 36 14 68 ee c5 | 25 7f b8 98 a6 12 12 07 e4 b0 97 7e aa 92 44 71 | c9 00 ed 62 20 35 5c 57 20 89 99 b7 c6 37 65 a2 | 0c 3c 44 66 a5 15 84 f6 cc fa d5 6c 2b 4d 0d eb | 73 43 a2 40 f6 28 76 e1 55 42 62 25 01 d9 6a 0a | 65 fc bb 9f 19 b2 5b 5f 79 16 29 53 30 14 58 d6 | c9 0c 3e 44 79 aa af | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.145 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.157 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00155 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 251 bytes from 192.1.2.254:29667 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fb 00 00 00 df | 00 05 00 05 fe 3e 76 0c c4 ed 72 88 0f cd 18 6a | 97 d1 db d9 da 1b 52 15 40 11 85 61 bb 5e 6f 72 | 89 13 6e f1 27 93 20 0e e0 72 8b 52 21 67 69 01 | b9 fb d2 2e c6 b5 5a 08 9e 72 57 bc 97 20 31 bd | a1 11 6e df 37 e3 fc 63 4b e8 50 29 db 79 48 d0 | d4 25 7c 2f 9a 50 86 ba 87 e8 3f a4 af 1e 9e 07 | 79 53 e3 de 0c 9b 29 d0 65 15 3a 4e c8 87 46 c4 | 88 c0 1d ca d7 a2 a1 d1 90 e2 ce 0d 26 7e e0 3a | f5 44 ea 84 d2 d6 a1 9e f5 46 0d f2 45 26 33 0c | 06 55 4d 00 70 72 f2 91 62 dd 59 9e 09 66 a0 8f | 76 fb 36 48 6a f9 14 e1 cf 8f 7a 54 12 64 2c 29 | 27 93 a2 c7 1d f1 18 ac 65 40 01 6f 8a aa a4 08 | 46 47 2f 02 99 90 4c ac ff 4e e2 f3 1f af e6 15 | fe 84 a2 de e8 11 70 6d 0d dc 92 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 251 (0xfb) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 223 (0xdf) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=215) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 4 for state #3 | state #3 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 size 128 | #3 spent 0.032 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | crypto helper 5 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | #3 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 4 for state #3 | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 4 | suspending state #3 and saving MD | #3 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3266) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3448 | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.19 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.202 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 4 time elapsed 0.001351 seconds | (#3) spent 1.35 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 4: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 4 for state #3 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb000b690 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #3 | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:337 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 4 | calling continuation function 0x55f893823630 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #3: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #3 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1229 (0x4cd) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1224) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 34 (0x22) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (len=26) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | **parse IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REQUEST (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,IDr,AUTH,CP,SA,TSi,TSr} | #3 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:4500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds | #3 spent 0.00516 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #3 spent 0.0602 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #3 spent 0.108 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec | certificate is valid (profile IPsec) | #3 spent 0.104 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: certificate verified OK: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89476a370 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f894769180 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55f89475be20 | unreference key: 0x55f89477ac30 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | #3 spent 0.254 milliseconds in decode_certs() calling add_pubkey_from_nss_cert() | #3 spent 0.581 milliseconds in decode_certs() | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | received IDr payload - extracting our alleged ID | ID_DER_ASN1_DN 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' needs further ID comparison against 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | ID_DER_ASN1_DN 'E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA' matched our ID 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | X509: CERT and ID matches current connection | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw[1] 192.1.2.254, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn | refine_host_connection: picking new best "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 (wild=0, peer_pathlen=7/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=%fromcert | results fail | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw", best=rw with match=0(id=0(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->%fromcert of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn | returning since no better match than original best_found | offered CA: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | RSA key issuer CA is 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | an RSA Sig check passed with *AwEAAaqjE [remote certificates] | #3 spent 0.168 milliseconds in try_all_keys() trying a pubkey "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: Authenticated using RSA | #3 spent 0.223 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() | parent state #3: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R2(established IKE SA) | #3 will start re-keying in 3330 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | state #3 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x55f89476aee0 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 3330 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb8006b90 size 128 | pstats #3 ikev2.ike established | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | IKEv2 CERT: send a certificate? | IKEv2 CERT: OK to send a certificate (always) | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | ****emit IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload (36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 26 raw bytes of my identity into IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload | my identity 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | my identity 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | emitting length of IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: 34 | assembled IDr payload | Sending [CERT] of certificate: E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org,CN=east.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | ****emit IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Payload (37:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 1260 raw bytes of CERT into IKEv2 Certificate Payload | CERT 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 | CERT 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 | CERT 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 | CERT 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 | CERT 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f | CERT 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 | CERT 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b | CERT 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e | CERT 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f | CERT 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 | CERT 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 | CERT 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 | CERT 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 39 31 35 31 39 34 34 35 39 | CERT 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 39 31 34 31 39 34 34 35 | CERT 39 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 | CERT 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 | CERT 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 | CERT 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c | CERT 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 | CERT 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 | CERT 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a | CERT 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 | CERT 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 | CERT 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f | CERT 00 30 82 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b0 0d 9e ca 2d 55 | CERT 24 59 06 37 09 58 0d 06 ab 90 5e 98 7c 00 0b 66 | CERT 73 f4 12 27 69 75 6e d4 8d 13 e9 c6 e9 4f c4 b1 | CERT 19 1a 1a 4f e6 4e 06 da 29 ec cf 8d 4c c3 c3 57 | CERT c0 24 57 83 7a 1b 7f 96 a3 21 66 67 52 68 8e 77 | CERT b9 bb f6 9b d2 43 11 57 c9 d6 ca e2 39 73 93 ea | CERT 99 99 f7 52 38 4d 58 69 7f a5 18 9b ff 66 72 6c | CERT df 6d df 18 50 cf 10 98 a3 f5 f9 69 27 5b 3f bd | CERT 0f 34 18 93 99 1a be 8a 46 84 37 69 71 7f a7 df | CERT d0 9d b2 9d ad 80 0f d0 1a 40 cb ff 37 20 ac ac | CERT 3d a9 8e 56 56 cf 25 c0 5e 55 52 86 5a c5 b4 ce | CERT a8 dd 95 cf ab 38 91 f6 1f 9f 83 36 d5 3f 8c d3 | CERT 1d f5 3f 23 3c d2 5c 87 23 bc 6a 67 f7 00 c3 96 | CERT 3f 76 5c b9 8e 6f 2b 16 90 2c 00 c0 05 a0 e2 8d | CERT 57 d5 76 34 7f 6f be e8 48 79 08 91 a8 17 72 1f | CERT c0 1c 8a 52 a8 18 aa 32 3c 9a e4 d9 90 58 25 5e | CERT 4c 49 8e cb 7a 33 19 d2 87 1a 2a 8e b5 04 f7 f9 | CERT cd 80 8c 59 ae 34 61 c5 1d de 53 65 fe 4f f3 f4 | CERT 09 f2 b4 21 7a 2b eb 1f 4a f2 5f 85 3a f0 f8 2b | CERT 3b 42 5b da 89 c1 ef b2 81 18 2a 4b 57 a2 ca 63 | CERT 8b a7 60 8e 54 95 c3 20 5c e5 53 f0 4a 57 df 41 | CERT fa 06 e6 ab 4e 0b 46 49 14 0d db b0 dc 10 2e 6d | CERT 5f 52 cb 75 36 1b e2 1d 9d 77 0f 73 9d 0a 64 07 | CERT 84 f4 0e 0a 98 97 58 c4 40 f6 1b ac a3 be 21 aa | CERT 67 3a 2b b1 0e b7 9a 36 ff 67 02 03 01 00 01 a3 | CERT 82 01 06 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 | CERT 30 00 30 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 73 74 40 | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b 06 03 55 | CERT 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 | CERT 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 06 08 2b | CERT 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 03 55 1d | CERT 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c 68 74 74 | CERT 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | CERT 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 2f 72 65 | CERT 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 | CERT 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 bf 3c 12 c5 | CERT 00 3e 71 2a 2b 2b 60 83 b9 b9 f2 4d b1 ca 0e fd | CERT b4 e0 0b 6a ad 54 d7 c9 98 57 e0 5c 26 4d bf 11 | CERT 23 20 79 05 b6 1b 9b 09 ed 4f 2e fd 7e da 55 53 | CERT b6 8c 88 fa f3 9b ce ec ef 95 37 11 70 ce 1c 98 | CERT d3 d5 cf f6 30 71 44 78 fb 45 03 69 50 d5 a5 c3 | CERT de 00 4c f7 0a 7d 00 cb 3a ab 11 74 6b 57 67 4d | CERT e7 c0 3a 97 98 44 e2 15 9d f2 6f 1b c7 b1 15 d0 | CERT 88 c4 dc 32 b7 72 1d 9c ac 1b 37 63 | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Payload: 1265 | CHILD SA proposals received | going to assemble AUTH payload | ****emit IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' value 47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Authentication Payload (39:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbANn | #3 spent 5.56 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() calling sign_hash_RSA() | emitting 384 raw bytes of rsa signature into IKEv2 Authentication Payload | rsa signature 73 91 26 41 32 27 fa 27 d2 f5 5b 36 24 33 e8 9e | rsa signature e5 73 99 29 e7 3a 38 73 bc d3 3e 1f e0 fa 02 49 | rsa signature 36 d5 fc b0 e7 8f d5 fd 36 57 7d b5 67 5b 00 3e | rsa signature e6 fa 24 80 8c d0 ba 45 e8 7b e7 b3 44 ca 48 93 | rsa signature 9f 60 35 34 4b 72 c5 85 79 22 c0 63 94 b7 c9 6a | rsa signature f2 55 38 fb 25 19 05 44 5b 49 3b 3c 28 27 a9 42 | rsa signature 13 a3 0f fc e1 f6 8e 65 42 bc f5 41 36 15 42 2d | rsa signature 61 45 f3 51 8d 9f 11 f5 e3 7e 53 f2 37 0d 02 01 | rsa signature 07 2b cc 86 80 a2 ea 61 5f 00 a1 22 27 7b bb 57 | rsa signature 3a eb 73 25 55 04 fd d1 6a 8a 9a 5e d4 2a fe e6 | rsa signature b0 ed 2d 87 19 be f9 a4 27 c2 3c 01 8a 10 48 9e | rsa signature 9b 9a f2 4e 15 ab 66 e4 03 1e 92 af 23 67 2b 88 | rsa signature e3 ed 83 26 0f 24 bd 38 de 9f 1d b9 4a 3b 3c 59 | rsa signature d9 66 99 c8 b4 7f bd 95 ce 72 20 a6 93 c5 7a 32 | rsa signature ec a1 7c e2 0c 4a c6 9b c3 9e 5e 42 85 b0 0b 2a | rsa signature 14 a3 31 b4 1d 01 4b bf 24 4b 54 d2 c4 4b 15 ab | rsa signature 33 f1 30 a9 d0 58 82 8d 51 90 d7 69 1b 03 28 bf | rsa signature 33 73 12 62 0c 8a 8a 7c bc 1a 10 e1 dc d6 e8 44 | rsa signature a8 1c 0c de c5 85 3c 35 f6 8a e4 7d 25 a4 8e e2 | rsa signature e9 53 27 d3 69 d6 f9 14 c6 ea d6 88 b4 c5 cd 1a | rsa signature 2c 9b 5b c9 82 2f 4c 90 5a be 14 d3 01 c8 9d 7c | rsa signature 3e 88 ff a5 28 d6 4f 1b fe 0e 54 a1 4b 77 89 f7 | rsa signature 1b 0f 2d 41 ed f7 a6 39 50 bd a7 ef 22 c6 f9 f9 | rsa signature f5 e0 a1 58 aa 20 ed 18 34 90 99 80 ca 61 2a e0 | #3 spent 5.69 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() | emitting length of IKEv2 Authentication Payload: 392 | request lease from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 reference count 2 thatid '' that.client 100.64.0.1/32:0 | cannot share a lease, find a new lease IP | New lease from addresspool index 1 | new lease 100.64.0.2 from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 to that.client 100.64.0.1/32:0 thatid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | creating state object #4 at 0x55f89477e2b0 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #4 in UNDEFINED | pstats #4 ikev2.child started | duplicating state object #3 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 as #4 for IPSEC SA | #4 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:4500 from #3.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | Message ID: init_child #3.#4; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: switch-from #3 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: switch-to #3.#4 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | Send Configuration Payload reply | ****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REPLY (0x2) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' value 33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Configuration Payload (47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS (0x1) | emitting 4 raw bytes of Internal IP Address into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | Internal IP Address 64 40 00 02 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (0x3) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP4_DNS into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | IP4_DNS 01 02 03 04 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload: 24 | using existing local ESP/AH proposals for rw (IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals): 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | Comparing remote proposals against IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI da b5 db 57 | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 1 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 2 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 3 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 4 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: ENCR+ESN; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+ESN transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH; matched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI da b5 db 57 | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI da b5 db 57 | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI da b5 db 57 | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: proposal 1:ESP:SPI=dab5db57;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED chosen from remote proposals 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED[first-match] 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED | IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals ikev2_proposal: 1:ESP:SPI=dab5db57;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x3fe4e1d6 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ****emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | emitting 4 raw bytes of our spi into IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload | our spi 3f e4 e1 d6 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | *******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 32 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload (44:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP start 64 40 00 02 | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP end 64 40 00 02 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: 24 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload (45:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP start c0 00 02 00 | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | IP end c0 00 02 ff | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: 24 | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | integ=none: .key_size=0 encrypt=aes_gcm_16: .key_size=32 .salt_size=4 keymat_len=36 | uniqueIDs disabled, not contemplating releasing older self | install_ipsec_sa() for #4: inbound and outbound | could_route called for rw (kind=CK_INSTANCE) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 erouted: self; eroute owner: self | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.dab5db57@192.1.2.254 included non-error error | set up outgoing SA, ref=0/0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.3fe4e1d6@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | set up incoming SA, ref=0/0 | sr for #4: erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: rw (next: none) ero:rw esr:{(nil)} ro:rw rosr:{(nil)} and state: #4 | priority calculation of connection "rw" is 0xfe7df | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 100.64.0.2/32:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.254>tun.0@192.1.2.254 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042399 | raw_eroute result=success | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55f89475f390,sr=0x55f89475f390} to #4 (was #2) (newest_ipsec_sa=#2) | #3 spent 0.269 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH: instance rw[1], setting IKEv2 newest_ipsec_sa to #4 (was #2) (spd.eroute=#4) cloned from #3 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 1828 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 1856 | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK (0x2e) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 1856 (0x740) | **parse IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1828 (0x724) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 25 00 00 22 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f | cleartext fragment 72 67 27 00 04 f1 04 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 | cleartext fragment 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 | cleartext fragment 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c | cleartext fragment 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 | cleartext fragment 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 | cleartext fragment 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 | cleartext fragment 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 | cleartext fragment 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 | cleartext fragment 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 39 31 | cleartext fragment 35 31 39 34 34 35 39 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 39 | cleartext fragment 31 34 31 39 34 34 35 39 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 | cleartext fragment 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 | cleartext fragment 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 | cleartext fragment 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f 00 30 82 | cleartext fragment 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b0 0d 9e ca 2d 55 24 59 06 | cleartext fragment 37 09 58 0d 06 ab 90 5e 98 7c 00 0b 66 73 f4 12 | cleartext fragment 27 69 75 6e d4 8d 13 e9 c6 e9 4f c4 b1 19 1a 1a | cleartext fragment 4f e6 4e 06 da 29 ec cf 8d 4c c3 c3 57 c0 24 57 | cleartext fragment 83 7a 1b 7f 96 a3 21 66 67 52 68 8e 77 b9 bb f6 | cleartext fragment 9b d2 43 11 57 c9 d6 ca e2 39 73 93 ea 99 99 f7 | cleartext fragment 52 38 4d 58 69 7f a5 18 9b ff 66 72 6c df 6d df | cleartext fragment 18 50 cf 10 98 a3 f5 f9 69 27 5b 3f bd 0f 34 18 | cleartext fragment 93 99 1a be 8a 46 84 37 69 71 7f a7 df d0 9d b2 | cleartext fragment 9d ad 80 0f d0 1a 40 cb ff 37 20 ac ac 3d a9 8e | cleartext fragment 56 56 cf 25 c0 5e 55 52 86 5a c5 b4 ce a8 dd 95 | cleartext fragment cf ab 38 91 f6 1f 9f 83 36 d5 3f 8c d3 1d f5 3f | cleartext fragment 23 3c d2 5c 87 23 bc 6a 67 f7 00 c3 96 3f 76 5c | cleartext fragment b9 8e 6f 2b 16 90 2c 00 c0 05 a0 e2 8d 57 d5 76 | cleartext fragment 34 7f 6f be e8 48 79 08 91 a8 17 72 1f c0 1c 8a | cleartext fragment 52 a8 18 aa 32 3c 9a e4 d9 90 58 25 5e 4c 49 8e | cleartext fragment cb 7a 33 19 d2 87 1a 2a 8e b5 04 f7 f9 cd 80 8c | cleartext fragment 59 ae 34 61 c5 1d de 53 65 fe 4f f3 f4 09 f2 b4 | cleartext fragment 21 7a 2b eb 1f 4a f2 5f 85 3a f0 f8 2b 3b 42 5b | cleartext fragment da 89 c1 ef b2 81 18 2a 4b 57 a2 ca 63 8b a7 60 | cleartext fragment 8e 54 95 c3 20 5c e5 53 f0 4a 57 df 41 fa 06 e6 | cleartext fragment ab 4e 0b 46 49 14 0d db b0 dc 10 2e 6d 5f 52 cb | cleartext fragment 75 36 1b e2 1d 9d 77 0f 73 9d 0a 64 07 84 f4 0e | cleartext fragment 0a 98 97 58 c4 40 f6 1b ac a3 be 21 aa 67 3a 2b | cleartext fragment b1 0e b7 9a 36 ff 67 02 03 01 00 01 a3 82 01 06 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 30 00 30 | cleartext fragment 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 61 73 74 | cleartext fragment 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 | cleartext fragment 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 | cleartext fragment 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e | cleartext fragment 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 1d 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c | cleartext fragment 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 2f 72 65 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 | cleartext fragment 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 bf | cleartext fragment 3c 12 c5 00 3e 71 2a 2b 2b 60 83 b9 b9 f2 4d b1 | cleartext fragment ca 0e fd b4 e0 0b 6a ad 54 d7 c9 98 57 e0 5c 26 | cleartext fragment 4d bf 11 23 20 79 05 b6 1b 9b 09 ed 4f 2e fd 7e | cleartext fragment da 55 53 b6 8c 88 fa f3 9b ce ec ef 95 37 11 70 | cleartext fragment ce 1c 98 d3 d5 cf f6 30 71 44 78 fb 45 03 69 50 | cleartext fragment d5 a5 c3 de 00 4c f7 0a 7d 00 cb 3a ab 11 74 6b | cleartext fragment 57 67 4d e7 c0 3a 97 98 44 e2 15 9d f2 6f 1b c7 | cleartext fragment b1 15 d0 88 c4 dc 32 b7 72 1d 9c ac 1b 37 63 2f | cleartext fragment 00 01 88 01 00 00 00 73 91 26 41 32 27 fa 27 d2 | cleartext fragment f5 5b 36 24 33 e8 9e e5 73 99 29 e7 3a 38 73 bc | cleartext fragment d3 3e 1f e0 fa 02 49 36 d5 fc b0 e7 8f d5 fd 36 | cleartext fragment 57 7d b5 67 5b 00 3e e6 fa 24 80 8c d0 ba 45 e8 | cleartext fragment 7b e7 b3 44 ca 48 93 9f 60 35 34 4b 72 c5 85 79 | cleartext fragment 22 c0 63 94 b7 c9 6a f2 55 38 fb 25 19 05 44 5b | cleartext fragment 49 3b 3c 28 27 a9 42 13 a3 0f fc e1 f6 8e 65 42 | cleartext fragment bc f5 41 36 15 42 2d 61 45 f3 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 | responder cookie: | 4b c3 96 ad 21 40 3a c5 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 377 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 51 8d 9f 11 f5 e3 7e 53 f2 37 0d 02 01 07 2b cc | cleartext fragment 86 80 a2 ea 61 5f 00 a1 22 27 7b bb 57 3a eb 73 | cleartext fragment 25 55 04 fd d1 6a 8a 9a 5e d4 2a fe e6 b0 ed 2d | cleartext fragment 87 19 be f9 a4 27 c2 3c 01 8a 10 48 9e 9b 9a f2 | cleartext fragment 4e 15 ab 66 e4 03 1e 92 af 23 67 2b 88 e3 ed 83 | cleartext fragment 26 0f 24 bd 38 de 9f 1d b9 4a 3b 3c 59 d9 66 99 | cleartext fragment c8 b4 7f bd 95 ce 72 20 a6 93 c5 7a 32 ec a1 7c | cleartext fragment e2 0c 4a c6 9b c3 9e 5e 42 85 b0 0b 2a 14 a3 31 | cleartext fragment b4 1d 01 4b bf 24 4b 54 d2 c4 4b 15 ab 33 f1 30 | cleartext fragment a9 d0 58 82 8d 51 90 d7 69 1b 03 28 bf 33 73 12 | cleartext fragment 62 0c 8a 8a 7c bc 1a 10 e1 dc d6 e8 44 a8 1c 0c | cleartext fragment de c5 85 3c 35 f6 8a e4 7d 25 a4 8e e2 e9 53 27 | cleartext fragment d3 69 d6 f9 14 c6 ea d6 88 b4 c5 cd 1a 2c 9b 5b | cleartext fragment c9 82 2f 4c 90 5a be 14 d3 01 c8 9d 7c 3e 88 ff | cleartext fragment a5 28 d6 4f 1b fe 0e 54 a1 4b 77 89 f7 1b 0f 2d | cleartext fragment 41 ed f7 a6 39 50 bd a7 ef 22 c6 f9 f9 f5 e0 a1 | cleartext fragment 58 aa 20 ed 18 34 90 99 80 ca 61 2a e0 21 00 00 | cleartext fragment 18 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 64 40 00 02 00 03 00 | cleartext fragment 04 01 02 03 04 2c 00 00 24 00 00 00 20 01 03 04 | cleartext fragment 02 3f e4 e1 d6 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 80 0e 01 | cleartext fragment 00 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 | cleartext fragment 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 64 40 00 02 64 40 00 | cleartext fragment 02 00 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff | cleartext fragment ff c0 00 02 00 c0 00 02 ff | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 410 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 438 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_OK | #3 spent 8.51 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | suspend processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | start processing: state #4 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3376) | #4 complete_v2_state_transition() md.from_state=PARENT_R1 md.svm.state[from]=PARENT_R1 UNDEFINED->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R1 to state STATE_V2_IPSEC_R | child state #4: UNDEFINED(ignore) => V2_IPSEC_R(established CHILD SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #4 to 1 after switching state | Message ID: recv #3.#4 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0->1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: sent #3.#4 response 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0->1 responder.recv=1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 | pstats #4 ikev2.child established "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #4: negotiated connection [192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255:0-65535 0] -> [100.64.0.2-100.64.0.2:0-65535 0] | NAT-T: NAT Traversal detected - their IKE port is '500' | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #4: STATE_V2_IPSEC_R: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP/NAT=>0xdab5db57 <0x3fe4e1d6 xfrm=AES_GCM_16_256-NONE NATOA=none NATD=192.1.2.254:29667 DPD=passive} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:29667 (from 192.1.2.23:4500) | sending fragments ... | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:29667 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad | 21 40 3a c5 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 24 00 01 fb 00 01 00 04 c8 2b 84 ef d8 0c ab 93 | 70 68 59 15 97 90 3b 6c a7 1b 81 3f 12 55 d7 c0 | a9 72 57 3f 87 4d e7 e5 d9 d0 4e b2 6a 5f 00 91 | eb 0f f6 7b 66 3f 9f 97 7f 73 2f 13 0e ec 0b c8 | 16 d7 83 15 d1 c1 f3 d9 97 fd 51 b2 4d f9 36 9b | 70 c1 80 ac 0d 6f a6 9c 05 aa bf 15 fd 4b b0 bb | 12 e1 3c ca 15 8f 69 d9 b0 ab f0 39 e7 98 c3 f3 | 5b de 98 e7 62 b9 57 af d4 8b 4f 2c c6 1e 5d b6 | ca 9e ef 73 96 f8 1d e4 18 2d 28 c3 6b 7e c6 41 | b2 b1 04 3b fb c3 d3 ef d0 47 d8 c5 80 c4 74 30 | 73 29 86 80 c6 5f 35 47 33 92 72 9e f4 ae 3c 81 | 19 27 a4 15 ca 1b 02 6e f8 c5 d5 78 69 19 d9 04 | 4c 9a 27 0e 75 d0 05 cc 73 a0 da e2 46 ef 87 1c | ca 42 bc 51 08 ee 58 a0 e2 a4 12 b9 25 7c e8 7e | 58 25 19 13 fa dc 25 70 dc 86 c6 42 e9 63 43 5c | d4 14 26 72 b7 ad e6 48 4c e1 05 68 05 50 52 11 | 01 be c6 00 b7 58 2a 9b 10 e2 8a a1 4d 01 1b ed | 6d 32 3b 6b 32 3e ed 28 96 23 f8 6c 15 ba f9 e6 | c9 79 a6 d7 5c 6c 21 4c 33 df ab 0d b2 92 b1 ae | 6b 20 b8 f9 f6 83 78 16 32 a0 e6 d4 84 8d 78 57 | 10 2d a9 59 c1 ef ca 0f 32 1b 30 a9 70 fc 79 5d | 47 dc 9a b3 8b cd 54 86 73 03 0c d1 5d b5 4f 39 | dd 55 c0 5d 0d 77 44 31 b3 1d 75 06 6b 21 86 04 | d6 7f 07 55 12 3c 93 6f 4a a2 5f db bf ca d9 cf | 55 1f 5a 31 74 ed 6a f3 fb 54 3d 6f 7d 07 49 4c | 6e d1 6d e8 50 3f 6d e6 e1 f0 d0 e6 43 e8 98 46 | 92 f4 18 44 c9 80 05 b5 eb 26 6b d9 57 a3 da 81 | b5 cb 6a 33 1e e4 df a5 1a c1 99 50 11 c2 c4 3a | 79 45 f8 d1 09 32 11 06 a2 5e ce 69 7a 2d d7 97 | 34 e1 cd 76 49 62 42 41 19 a1 c2 0e 88 d8 56 a3 | 4f d3 a3 d8 4a 08 2e 78 84 d7 6d 01 42 fc 81 4e | 40 38 2a 18 85 02 d3 3b c3 42 77 | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:29667 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad | 21 40 3a c5 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 02 00 04 a4 6a 4e b3 7a bf 19 12 | 25 fc 71 89 83 24 73 28 4c b5 a5 25 f4 fd af c9 | fb 05 cc cb bd 9c 13 69 d5 33 e5 73 ae 68 bf e5 | 1e 46 80 52 4c 6e 58 4d 37 58 3a 0c 42 94 a5 2c | 4f ef a8 66 5c 7b c2 68 d5 41 55 e8 90 99 9c cd | 51 29 86 e8 fb 2f e7 dc 0e 7b 2f d0 89 98 ec d8 | 96 d2 a2 7d 4e ae 80 7a ba cd f7 48 f7 0b 64 05 | f4 1e 32 12 08 5b cc 84 73 ec cf 71 ae 57 b6 4f | ee fb 85 57 84 e7 c5 54 3e aa cd c2 b3 d6 de a0 | 6d e2 6a 04 ba 2e aa 17 7e 95 8c 3a 63 79 4a 03 | 80 8b 31 73 7f 1e 17 d9 41 e5 6e 68 f1 f0 94 d1 | f7 98 5b 6f 99 59 19 fa e9 87 11 8d 16 16 11 61 | 5b e7 14 33 b6 2c fa 07 fd 6c bf d9 38 f2 aa bc | 43 be 12 60 6c 12 f6 3a d6 17 36 80 44 e9 a0 79 | 90 90 a9 6e 4b bd 0d 4d a9 55 c2 59 8d 06 bc b4 | 21 eb fb 00 62 a2 00 22 69 ea 53 24 d4 4d bb 31 | 32 64 ce a8 50 e2 64 af cc e8 cb c6 b4 36 26 b1 | b6 cd 2d c9 6a 1c 02 25 c3 4d 33 41 ec 6b 75 28 | 44 47 b4 b9 bc 21 fd 15 a9 ce 69 d5 00 b9 a5 4f | e7 5f 3d 31 ec a0 b3 bf e0 35 64 c4 b6 f8 0a 62 | 62 e6 25 b4 8c f5 8b ba 0f 13 b7 75 10 f7 5c ab | 07 03 48 dc 42 37 0a d1 0a 44 24 d3 20 47 ed 8e | 57 3f 9e db a7 1c bd ba 29 f5 21 fa 98 29 41 67 | a4 bf f1 ba d0 ff 10 cd d0 60 14 23 2a 95 e2 88 | c2 75 60 5d b0 21 3c 81 6c 28 94 be 08 fe de 09 | 36 23 e3 ee 4c 16 d6 7f 0c 1f 74 36 7d 32 08 78 | 2e 8d 7d 9b ca de 91 ba bb be 49 f0 87 05 4f 50 | 23 32 e9 2e be 3a 2a fc 63 dc 1e b9 2c 57 4b cb | a2 3c 8e 04 2c 8a dd 0c 2e 92 ad de 0b 81 c8 5b | 16 f8 53 2f 18 d7 53 81 3b 85 a3 37 17 d6 e5 6a | 71 a4 e0 dd e5 49 c6 c5 6d 56 70 41 28 26 b0 8f | cc ce 98 3d c8 27 30 2e 28 16 5c | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:29667 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad | 21 40 3a c5 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 03 00 04 04 ab 2b 91 83 9d 8b 3c | 3b b1 00 dd 3d 28 a7 c2 a7 58 24 7f 1d 48 47 8d | 38 6d d6 27 b7 e0 a0 16 bb 1a 20 2b b4 b9 f9 39 | 32 de 67 38 32 9d 5c f9 f1 e6 b4 6e af 8e f1 91 | 44 04 cf d0 7f 78 7c 5b b6 f4 97 a5 ef c6 d7 3a | 6f fd 3b bd aa 97 a6 1a 1e 63 33 8e cd 4f f5 12 | 5a 9b 84 b9 3a 00 e6 be c0 6a d4 a6 e2 3a 24 42 | ff 93 1b 46 de 00 ff 3a 2d a1 1d f0 ec 9e 44 a9 | 7d 8d 0e da 74 03 e9 a2 9f fc 9d 80 39 53 66 22 | ae cd 97 4f ab 6d 55 ec c1 1e 41 cf 07 1d 42 0f | 29 28 f0 19 e7 ed 4e 24 30 ef 99 bf 64 2c d4 e8 | 6a 32 8c ec 9c 80 52 5e 74 39 a7 9f 9e 35 07 d9 | be 3d b0 98 ff 2d fb 16 8e d5 2e 85 13 08 a6 95 | 99 51 7d 62 b6 d0 01 73 b6 90 26 cc 78 df 42 e1 | eb 2d 56 ac 13 c6 45 3f 38 29 1f c2 c6 0a 25 ab | de 89 65 c8 0a ca c3 0b d3 0f e9 58 40 5f f7 29 | 6a a7 ce b3 92 f7 c9 31 8c 33 59 05 e2 86 db 60 | ec e3 45 ae af 66 de a0 4b 86 60 f8 4a 7d d8 fe | a3 18 2a d0 a8 66 0d 55 a1 95 16 14 f4 6f 16 45 | 4b 0a 7e f3 76 7b f6 ed 19 e2 e8 92 fb 36 97 56 | f6 19 69 f3 b3 0b 34 c1 ef 3b a7 e7 f9 78 68 47 | 38 00 b1 86 9b 3c ac 1e 2b ec 0b 35 a5 cf 14 68 | 80 6f bf 0f 87 f5 49 80 b3 86 22 0b bf 05 2e e3 | 14 f4 15 d1 b0 6c 45 04 21 b2 92 e4 8a 32 31 2a | b8 b0 ea e2 05 6e 92 6a 90 9f f1 84 e0 a1 13 6b | 86 c0 7d 66 3e 8a c7 a9 cc ab 56 c5 58 51 4a 3e | 8e 42 fc 9b 05 70 54 69 2e c2 4d e4 7c 71 f9 43 | 5a 1f 14 95 eb 6e d3 e8 b9 c2 b5 1f ae 9b 5b 90 | d9 10 49 9a be 84 bc a1 85 b9 3e 43 36 12 2a 25 | 80 1c 7a 1e e0 d5 a8 d2 f8 3c f2 c0 18 21 eb a5 | 48 d6 72 5d fa 39 f3 6d 51 b5 74 a5 b5 5c bd db | 8d 44 37 a2 3e ff 31 4a 5a ba 3f | sending 442 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:29667 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 df b0 d9 65 0a 32 ee e7 4b c3 96 ad | 21 40 3a c5 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 b6 | 00 00 01 9a 00 04 00 04 93 e1 6e 4d 0e ce bd 17 | 7f 5c 51 d7 80 1a 3f 9f b5 50 21 3a 3b 0a 64 86 | 54 47 1a d1 e8 9b 37 34 cf c6 f1 da 84 81 e6 9a | eb 23 c2 b3 dc d5 c8 93 26 e1 1f ff 1f b1 cb ea | 3d 71 15 18 e8 61 d2 4d d3 64 cb 08 d3 93 dd bd | f0 b7 2b 03 cd 1c be ed 4a ed e7 e5 20 fc 3a 1e | 40 c9 5c 4e a9 b8 be a8 82 ca ad 49 3f c6 46 20 | 3e 5a 45 3d de 53 b6 93 4d ad 1f 99 51 ef f5 6c | 05 3a ee ac 0d df 83 a8 6c 04 b6 1b 3b d5 9e e5 | 27 28 92 05 ea 62 7a de 64 7c e5 27 a4 11 fa 68 | 25 6a ab 36 ac 57 8f d0 73 71 63 7c 22 e4 3d 71 | 63 0b 96 a8 90 a0 8b 54 05 50 82 6c 90 9a c4 4c | e0 fb e8 fa 08 0e ac 3e 35 ca 38 a3 58 b1 98 40 | 7e d4 92 3f d5 fe 41 4f 41 6f 90 63 9e ce 2a 28 | 44 b4 a2 be b8 32 8b ee db 72 ba 3f 9f 98 17 94 | 75 b6 f8 3e fb cc 63 2a b5 09 b7 47 e4 4c 52 30 | 1a fa 1b 1e 0a 6a d2 34 aa 8d fc fd 9b 86 cb b8 | 43 31 6e fa d6 19 94 df 76 9c 48 ab 64 de e0 58 | 35 ef 43 ff a2 b3 ea 71 3b cd 1a a8 27 f2 19 a7 | 14 97 a1 b2 a9 f7 24 35 d4 44 21 24 38 80 39 da | 89 6b b9 00 e1 ad c6 1a 62 30 33 5e 26 67 03 df | 47 09 a6 0a f8 90 6d 64 9b d0 de be 80 0e 1d 2a | ac 68 e3 b6 8e 97 72 a7 b5 ad 59 99 b2 d9 7b 86 | 7d 80 40 3c 2c 30 32 60 2c fe 58 52 d0 56 b8 80 | b5 5f 12 56 a6 e3 fe 3a d2 53 26 4c b7 21 4a 3d | c1 a3 58 3f a1 e2 2d 17 ac a0 | sent 4 fragments | releasing whack for #4 (sock=fd@-1) | releasing whack and unpending for parent #3 | unpending state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | #4 will start re-keying in 28530 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x55f894702260 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 28530 seconds for #4 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55f89477fe20 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #3 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #3 spent 8.97 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #4 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:29667 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f8eb000b690