FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-827-gc9aa82b8a6-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC SYSTEMD_WATCHDOG FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:10076 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective disabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b85f50 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b85f80 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b871e0 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b871a0 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87210 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b874b0 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b78d70 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b874d0 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b874f0 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87520 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b09370 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87560 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b871a0 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87580 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds | encryption algorithm assertion checks | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_16, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 16, IKEv2 id: 16 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 16 enum name: AES_CCM_C | IKEv2 ID id: 16 enum name: AES_CCM_C | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_12, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 15, IKEv2 id: 15 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 15 enum name: AES_CCM_B | IKEv2 ID id: 15 enum name: AES_CCM_B | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_8, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 14, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 14 enum name: AES_CCM_A | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: AES_CCM_A | encryption algorithm 3DES_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 3, IKEv2 id: 3 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: 3DES_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 3 enum name: 3DES | IKEv2 ID id: 3 enum name: 3DES | encryption algorithm CAMELLIA_CTR, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 24, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 24, IKEv2 id: 24 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | IKEv2 ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | encryption algorithm CAMELLIA_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 8, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 22, IKEv2 id: 23 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 8 enum name: CAMELLIA_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 22 enum name: CAMELLIA | IKEv2 ID id: 23 enum name: CAMELLIA_CBC | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_16, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 20, IKEv2 id: 20 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 20 enum name: AES_GCM_C | IKEv2 ID id: 20 enum name: AES_GCM_C | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_12, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 19, IKEv2 id: 19 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 19 enum name: AES_GCM_B | IKEv2 ID id: 19 enum name: AES_GCM_B | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_8, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 18, IKEv2 id: 18 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 18 enum name: AES_GCM_A | IKEv2 ID id: 18 enum name: AES_GCM_A | encryption algorithm AES_CTR, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 13, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 13, IKEv2 id: 13 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | IKEv2 ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | encryption algorithm AES_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 7, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 12, IKEv2 id: 12 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 7 enum name: AES_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 12 enum name: AES | IKEv2 ID id: 12 enum name: AES_CBC | encryption algorithm SERPENT_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65004, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 252, IKEv2 id: 65004 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65004 enum name: SERPENT_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 252 enum name: SERPENT | IKEv2 ID id: 65004 enum name: SERPENT_CBC | encryption algorithm TWOFISH_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65005, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 253, IKEv2 id: 65005 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65005 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 253 enum name: TWOFISH | IKEv2 ID id: 65005 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC | encryption algorithm TWOFISH_SSH, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65289, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 65289 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65289 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC_SSH | IKEv2 ID id: 65289 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC_SSH | encryption algorithm NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 23, IKEv2 id: 21 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 23 enum name: NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC | IKEv2 ID id: 21 enum name: NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC | encryption algorithm NULL, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 11, IKEv2 id: 11 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 11 enum name: NULL | IKEv2 ID id: 11 enum name: NULL | encryption algorithm CHACHA20_POLY1305, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 28 | IKEv2 ID id: 28 enum name: CHACHA20_POLY1305 Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 | hash algorithm assertion checks | hash algorithm MD5, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | hash algorithm SHA1, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | hash algorithm SHA2_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | hash algorithm SHA2_384, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | hash algorithm SHA2_512, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 | PRF algorithm assertion checks | PRF algorithm HMAC_MD5, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | IKEv2 ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA1, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 2 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | IKEv2 ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_384, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 6 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 6 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_512, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 7 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 | IKEv2 ID id: 7 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512 | PRF algorithm AES_XCBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 4 | IKEv2 ID id: 4 enum name: AES128_XCBC PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc | integrity algorithm assertion checks | integrity algorithm HMAC_MD5_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 1, IKEv2 id: 1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5 | IKEv2 ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5_96 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA1_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 2, IKEv2 id: 2 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1 | IKEv2 ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1_96 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_512_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 7, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 7 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512 | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512_256 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_384_192, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 6, IKEv2 id: 13 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 6 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 13 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384_192 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256_128, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 5, IKEv2 id: 12 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 5 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 12 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 252, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 252 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG | integrity algorithm AES_XCBC_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 9, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 9 enum name: AES_XCBC | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: AES_XCBC_96 | integrity algorithm AES_CMAC_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 250, IKEv2 id: 8 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 250 enum name: AES_CMAC_96 | IKEv2 ID id: 8 enum name: AES_CMAC_96 | integrity algorithm NONE, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 0, IKEv2 id: 0 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 0 enum name: NONE | IKEv2 ID id: 0 enum name: NONE Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null | DH algorithm assertion checks | DH algorithm NONE, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 0 | IKEv2 ID id: 0 enum name: NONE | DH algorithm MODP1536, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 5, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | DH algorithm MODP2048, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 14, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 14, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | DH algorithm MODP3072, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 15, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 15, IKEv2 id: 15 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | IKEv2 ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | DH algorithm MODP4096, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 16, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 16, IKEv2 id: 16 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | IKEv2 ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | DH algorithm MODP6144, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 17, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 17, IKEv2 id: 17 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | IKEv2 ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | DH algorithm MODP8192, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 18, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 18, IKEv2 id: 18 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | IKEv2 ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | DH algorithm DH19, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 19, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 19 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 19 enum name: ECP_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 19 enum name: ECP_256 | DH algorithm DH20, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 20, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 20 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 20 enum name: ECP_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 20 enum name: ECP_384 | DH algorithm DH21, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 21, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 21 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 21 enum name: ECP_521 | IKEv2 ID id: 21 enum name: ECP_521 | DH algorithm DH31, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 31, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 31 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 31 enum name: CURVE25519 | IKEv2 ID id: 31 enum name: CURVE25519 DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF FF EE DD CC BB AA 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff | ff ee dd cc bb aa 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key passed testing AES_GCM_16: empty string | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xcf063a34d4a9a76c2c86787d3f96db71" | decode_to_chunk: output: | cf 06 3a 34 d4 a9 a7 6c 2c 86 78 7d 3f 96 db 71 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41810 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f8 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x113b9785971864c83b01c787" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 11 3b 97 85 97 18 64 c8 3b 01 c7 87 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x72ac8493e3a5228b5d130a69d2510e42" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=0 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=0 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_gcm_vector: passed one block | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xe98b72a9881a84ca6b76e0f43e68647a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e9 8b 72 a9 88 1a 84 ca 6b 76 e0 f4 3e 68 64 7a | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41810 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f8 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x8b23299fde174053f3d652ba" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8b 23 29 9f de 17 40 53 f3 d6 52 ba | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0x28286a321293253c3e0aa2704a278032" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0x5a3c1cf1985dbb8bed818036fdd5ab42" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x23c7ab0f952b7091cd324835043b5eb5" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=16 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=16 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_gcm_vector: passed two blocks | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xbfd414a6212958a607a0f5d3ab48471d" | decode_to_chunk: output: | bf d4 14 a6 21 29 58 a6 07 a0 f5 d3 ab 48 47 1d | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41810 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f8 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x86d8ea0ab8e40dcc481cd0e2" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 86 d8 ea 0a b8 e4 0d cc 48 1c d0 e2 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0xa6b76a066e63392c9443e60272ceaeb9d25c991b0f2e55e2804e168c05ea591a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0x62171db33193292d930bf6647347652c1ef33316d7feca99d54f1db4fcf513f8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0xc28280aa5c6c7a8bd366f28c1cfd1f6e" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_gcm_vector: passed two blocks with associated data | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x006c458100fc5f4d62949d2c833b82d1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c 45 81 00 fc 5f 4d 62 94 9d 2c 83 3b 82 d1 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41810 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f8 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0xa4e9c4bc5725a21ff42c82b2" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a4 e9 c4 bc 57 25 a2 1f f4 2c 82 b2 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "0x2efb14fb3657cdd6b9a8ff1a5f5a39b9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 2e fb 14 fb 36 57 cd d6 b9 a8 ff 1a 5f 5a 39 b9 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0xf381d3bfbee0a879f7a4e17b623278cedd6978053dd313530a18f1a836100950" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0xf39b4db3542d8542fb73fd2d66be568f26d7f814b3f87d1eceac3dd09a8d697e" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x39f045cb23b698c925db134d56c5" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=16 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=14 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=16 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=14 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_gcm_vector: passed testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x AE 68 52 F8 12 10 67 CC 4B F7 A5 76 55 77 F3 9E" | decode_to_chunk: output: | ae 68 52 f8 12 10 67 cc 4b f7 a5 76 55 77 f3 9e | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x E4 09 5D 4F B7 A7 B3 79 2D 61 75 A3 26 13 11 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e4 09 5d 4f b7 a7 b3 79 2d 61 75 a3 26 13 11 b8 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x E4 09 5D 4F B7 A7 B3 79 2D 61 75 A3 26 13 11 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e4 09 5d 4f b7 a7 b3 79 2d 61 75 a3 26 13 11 b8 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x 7E 24 06 78 17 FA E0 D7 43 D6 CE 1F 32 53 91 63" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 7e 24 06 78 17 fa e0 d7 43 d6 ce 1f 32 53 91 63 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x51 04 A1 06 16 8A 72 D9 79 0D 41 EE 8E DA D3 88EB 2E 1E FC 46 DA 57 C8 FC E6 30 DF 91 41 BE 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 51 04 a1 06 16 8a 72 d9 79 0d 41 ee 8e da d3 88 | eb 2e 1e fc 46 da 57 c8 fc e6 30 df 91 41 be 28 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x51 04 A1 06 16 8A 72 D9 79 0D 41 EE 8E DA D3 88EB 2E 1E FC 46 DA 57 C8 FC E6 30 DF 91 41 BE 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 51 04 a1 06 16 8a 72 d9 79 0d 41 ee 8e da d3 88 | eb 2e 1e fc 46 da 57 c8 fc e6 30 df 91 41 be 28 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x 76 91 BE 03 5E 50 20 A8 AC 6E 61 85 29 F9 A0 DC" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 76 91 be 03 5e 50 20 a8 ac 6e 61 85 29 f9 a0 dc | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xC1 CF 48 A8 9F 2F FD D9 CF 46 52 E9 EF DB 72 D745 40 A4 2B DE 6D 78 36 D5 9A 5C EA AE F3 10 5325 B2 07 2F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c1 cf 48 a8 9f 2f fd d9 cf 46 52 e9 ef db 72 d7 | 45 40 a4 2b de 6d 78 36 d5 9a 5c ea ae f3 10 53 | 25 b2 07 2f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xC1 CF 48 A8 9F 2F FD D9 CF 46 52 E9 EF DB 72 D745 40 A4 2B DE 6D 78 36 D5 9A 5C EA AE F3 10 5325 B2 07 2F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c1 cf 48 a8 9f 2f fd d9 cf 46 52 e9 ef db 72 d7 | 45 40 a4 2b de 6d 78 36 d5 9a 5c ea ae f3 10 53 | 25 b2 07 2f | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x16 AF 5B 14 5F C9 F5 79 C1 75 F9 3E 3B FB 0E ED86 3D 06 CC FD B7 85 15" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 16 af 5b 14 5f c9 f5 79 c1 75 f9 3e 3b fb 0e ed | 86 3d 06 cc fd b7 85 15 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 4B 55 38 4F E2 59 C9 C8 4E 79 35 A0 03 CB E9 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4b 55 38 4f e2 59 c9 c8 4e 79 35 a0 03 cb e9 28 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 4B 55 38 4F E2 59 C9 C8 4E 79 35 A0 03 CB E9 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4b 55 38 4f e2 59 c9 c8 4e 79 35 a0 03 cb e9 28 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x7C 5C B2 40 1B 3D C3 3C 19 E7 34 08 19 E0 F6 9C67 8C 3D B8 E6 F6 A9 1A" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 7c 5c b2 40 1b 3d c3 3c 19 e7 34 08 19 e0 f6 9c | 67 8c 3d b8 e6 f6 a9 1a | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x45 32 43 FC 60 9B 23 32 7E DF AA FA 71 31 CD 9F84 90 70 1C 5A D4 A7 9C FC 1F E0 FF 42 F4 FB 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 45 32 43 fc 60 9b 23 32 7e df aa fa 71 31 cd 9f | 84 90 70 1c 5a d4 a7 9c fc 1f e0 ff 42 f4 fb 00 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x45 32 43 FC 60 9B 23 32 7E DF AA FA 71 31 CD 9F84 90 70 1C 5A D4 A7 9C FC 1F E0 FF 42 F4 FB 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 45 32 43 fc 60 9b 23 32 7e df aa fa 71 31 cd 9f | 84 90 70 1c 5a d4 a7 9c fc 1f e0 ff 42 f4 fb 00 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x02 BF 39 1E E8 EC B1 59 B9 59 61 7B 09 65 27 9BF5 9B 60 A7 86 D3 E0 FE" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 02 bf 39 1e e8 ec b1 59 b9 59 61 7b 09 65 27 9b | f5 9b 60 a7 86 d3 e0 fe | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x96 89 3F C5 5E 5C 72 2F 54 0B 7D D1 DD F7 E7 58D2 88 BC 95 C6 91 65 88 45 36 C8 11 66 2F 21 88AB EE 09 35" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 96 89 3f c5 5e 5c 72 2f 54 0b 7d d1 dd f7 e7 58 | d2 88 bc 95 c6 91 65 88 45 36 c8 11 66 2f 21 88 | ab ee 09 35 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x96 89 3F C5 5E 5C 72 2F 54 0B 7D D1 DD F7 E7 58D2 88 BC 95 C6 91 65 88 45 36 C8 11 66 2F 21 88AB EE 09 35" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 96 89 3f c5 5e 5c 72 2f 54 0b 7d d1 dd f7 e7 58 | d2 88 bc 95 c6 91 65 88 45 36 c8 11 66 2f 21 88 | ab ee 09 35 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x77 6B EF F2 85 1D B0 6F 4C 8A 05 42 C8 69 6F 6C6A 81 AF 1E EC 96 B4 D3 7F C1 D6 89 E6 C1 C1 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 77 6b ef f2 85 1d b0 6f 4c 8a 05 42 c8 69 6f 6c | 6a 81 af 1e ec 96 b4 d3 7f c1 d6 89 e6 c1 c1 04 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 14 5A D0 1D BF 82 4E C7 56 08 63 DC 71 E3 E0 C0" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 5a d0 1d bf 82 4e c7 56 08 63 dc 71 e3 e0 c0 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 14 5A D0 1D BF 82 4E C7 56 08 63 DC 71 E3 E0 C0" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 5a d0 1d bf 82 4e c7 56 08 63 dc 71 e3 e0 c0 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xF6 D6 6D 6B D5 2D 59 BB 07 96 36 58 79 EF F8 86C6 6D D5 1A 5B 6A 99 74 4B 50 59 0C 87 A2 38 84" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f6 d6 6d 6b d5 2d 59 bb 07 96 36 58 79 ef f8 86 | c6 6d d5 1a 5b 6a 99 74 4b 50 59 0c 87 a2 38 84 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xF0 5E 23 1B 38 94 61 2C 49 EE 00 0B 80 4E B2 A9B8 30 6B 50 8F 83 9D 6A 55 30 83 1D 93 44 AF 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 5e 23 1b 38 94 61 2c 49 ee 00 0b 80 4e b2 a9 | b8 30 6b 50 8f 83 9d 6a 55 30 83 1d 93 44 af 1c | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xF0 5E 23 1B 38 94 61 2C 49 EE 00 0B 80 4E B2 A9B8 30 6B 50 8F 83 9D 6A 55 30 83 1D 93 44 AF 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 5e 23 1b 38 94 61 2c 49 ee 00 0b 80 4e b2 a9 | b8 30 6b 50 8f 83 9d 6a 55 30 83 1d 93 44 af 1c | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xFF 7A 61 7C E6 91 48 E4 F1 72 6E 2F 43 58 1D E2AA 62 D9 F8 05 53 2E DF F1 EE D6 87 FB 54 15 3D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | ff 7a 61 7c e6 91 48 e4 f1 72 6e 2f 43 58 1d e2 | aa 62 d9 f8 05 53 2e df f1 ee d6 87 fb 54 15 3d | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xEB 6C 52 82 1D 0B BB F7 CE 75 94 46 2A CA 4F AAB4 07 DF 86 65 69 FD 07 F4 8C C0 B5 83 D6 07 1F1E C0 E6 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | eb 6c 52 82 1d 0b bb f7 ce 75 94 46 2a ca 4f aa | b4 07 df 86 65 69 fd 07 f4 8c c0 b5 83 d6 07 1f | 1e c0 e6 b8 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xEB 6C 52 82 1D 0B BB F7 CE 75 94 46 2A CA 4F AAB4 07 DF 86 65 69 FD 07 F4 8C C0 B5 83 D6 07 1F1E C0 E6 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | eb 6c 52 82 1d 0b bb f7 ce 75 94 46 2a ca 4f aa | b4 07 df 86 65 69 fd 07 f4 8c c0 b5 83 d6 07 1f | 1e c0 e6 b8 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x06a9214036b8a15b512e03d534120006" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 06 a9 21 40 36 b8 a1 5b 51 2e 03 d5 34 12 00 06 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 3d af ba 42 9d 9e b4 30 b4 22 da 80 2c 9f ac 41 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "Single block msg" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 3d af ba 42 9d 9e b4 30 b4 22 da 80 2c 9f ac 41 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "Single block msg" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xc286696d887c9aa0611bbb3e2025a45a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c2 86 69 6d 88 7c 9a a0 61 1b bb 3e 20 25 a4 5a | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 2e 17 99 6d 09 3d 28 dd b3 ba 69 5a 2e 6f 58 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 2e 17 99 6d 09 3d 28 dd b3 ba 69 5a 2e 6f 58 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x6c3ea0477630ce21a2ce334aa746c2cd" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 6c 3e a0 47 76 30 ce 21 a2 ce 33 4a a7 46 c2 cd | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c7 82 dc 4c 09 8c 66 cb d9 cd 27 d8 25 68 2c 81 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 34 38 2d 62 79 74 | 65 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 28 65 78 61 63 74 | 6c 79 20 33 20 41 45 53 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 29 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c7 82 dc 4c 09 8c 66 cb d9 cd 27 d8 25 68 2c 81 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 34 38 2d 62 79 74 | 65 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 28 65 78 61 63 74 | 6c 79 20 33 20 41 45 53 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 29 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x56e47a38c5598974bc46903dba290349" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 e4 7a 38 c5 59 89 74 bc 46 90 3d ba 29 03 49 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41870 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41858 | result: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c e8 2e ef be a0 da 3c 44 69 9e d7 db 51 b7 d9 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 aa ab ac ad ae af | b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ba bb bc bd be bf | c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf | d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db dc dd de df | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c e8 2e ef be a0 da 3c 44 69 9e d7 db 51 b7 d9 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 aa ab ac ad ae af | b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ba bb bc bd be bf | c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf | d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db dc dd de df | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x75f0251d528ac01c4573dfd584d79f29" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8c120 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8bf20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b875d0 (length 0) | | XCBC: data | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898704016: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c1f0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | Computing E[0] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 41 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8bf40 (length 16) | 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | chunk output 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8bf20 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@(nil) (size 0) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@NULL | symkey message NULL key has no bytes | XCBC: data | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1023: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8cbe0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | Computing E[0] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 41 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: ffffffe4 40 27 ffffffa8 3c ffffffef ffffffac ffffffb8 ffffffd5 59 ffffff97 08 00 44 4b 3b | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c140 | unwrapped: 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@NULL | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x5b376580ae2f19afe7219ceef172756f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8bf20 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c350 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b8c140 (length 3) | 00 01 02 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898704016: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c120 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | Computing E[1] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | c1 a6 a9 21 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8bf00 (length 16) | 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | chunk output 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c1f0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (19-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 3 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 3-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (19-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 3) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b88e00 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 3 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7f ffffff99 54 ffffffac 01 ffffffb8 ffffffee 55 ffffff9f 7e ffffffe6 28 1d ffffffe0 22 50 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8ce70 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c350 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[1] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | c1 a6 a9 21 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: ffffff89 04 17 ffffff9b 02 7a 77 ffffff9f ffffffc4 ffffff97 ffffffb1 ffffff9c ffffffdd 1c 0a ffffffb4 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c350 | unwrapped: 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xd2a246fa349b68a79998a4394ff7a263" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8ce70 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c120 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b8c350 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c140 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | XCBC: Computing E[1] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | bd 87 2d f8 93 a8 29 bf f0 b1 9b fd 0f 22 38 c4 | XCBC: MAC d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8bf00 (length 16) | d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | chunk output d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8bf40 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8bf20 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8cbe0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | XCBC: Computing E[1] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | bd 87 2d f8 93 a8 29 bf f0 b1 9b fd 0f 22 38 c4 | XCBC: MAC d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: fffffff3 ffffffb8 ffffff88 ffffffc1 08 ffffffa6 0d ffffffb8 05 52 ffffffcf 53 ffffffe4 fffffff6 ffffff96 ffffffbc | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8cbe0 | unwrapped: d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8bf20 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c140 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b8cbe0 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c350 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8c1f0 (length 16) | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | chunk output 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c120 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffffb6 ffffffef 30 2f 52 ffffff86 3e 72 28 ffffffb9 ffffffe3 ffffffef 37 ffffff81 ffffffc0 ffffff84 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b8c7b0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b875d0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: 52 3f ffffffbe ffffffe6 28 78 76 fffffff4 08 3d ffffff96 fffffff5 ffffffb7 26 ffffffa8 0f | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b875d0 | unwrapped: 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xf54f0ec8d2b9f3d36807734bd5283fd4" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8c350 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b87790 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b87860 (length 32) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540619040: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b876c0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | XCBC: Computing E[2] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | b0 93 75 12 4c f5 a5 c0 b5 18 18 37 16 b2 15 67 | XCBC: MAC f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8ce70 (length 16) | f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | chunk output f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8bf40 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 32) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 32 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffff83 ffffffc4 50 3f ffffffcf ffffffeb 59 67 ffffff93 ffffffd7 62 fffffffb ffffffb5 42 ffffff8b 31 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b8cc00 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8cbe0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | XCBC: Computing E[2] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | b0 93 75 12 4c f5 a5 c0 b5 18 18 37 16 b2 15 67 | XCBC: MAC f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: fffffffe ffffffce 3e 6a fffffff6 7a fffffffd 26 ffffff8b fffffffa ffffffe0 ffffffb2 ffffff94 ffffffc9 ffffff91 41 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8cbe0 | unwrapped: f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xbecbb3bccdb518a30677d5481fb6b4d8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8bf40 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b876c0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b87890 (length 34) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 20 21 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540619040: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b875d0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | Computing E[3] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 09 02 5e 5a 67 25 20 72 44 14 5c 6b 80 66 85 79 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | e8 84 75 fb c5 1f b4 74 1c 13 fc e7 48 88 55 17 | XCBC: MAC be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8c120 (length 16) | be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | chunk output be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c140 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 34 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 34-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 34) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b88e00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 34 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 48 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffff83 ffffffc4 50 3f ffffffcf ffffffeb 59 67 ffffff93 ffffffd7 62 fffffffb ffffffb5 42 ffffff8b 31 fffffff4 71 ffffffe6 ffffffcb 40 ffffff9c ffffffdd ffffffb6 ffffff90 ffffffb3 ffffff92 40 ffffffa1 ffffffdd ffffff99 ffffffac | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 48 bytes at 0x55e200b8c160 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | unwrapped: 20 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 20 21 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b87790 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[3] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 09 02 5e 5a 67 25 20 72 44 14 5c 6b 80 66 85 79 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | e8 84 75 fb c5 1f b4 74 1c 13 fc e7 48 88 55 17 | XCBC: MAC be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: ffffffcf 3b 04 ffffff89 34 ffffffd1 78 36 2c 4d ffffffdc 59 ffffff8b ffffffdc ffffff9a 4e | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b87790 | unwrapped: be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xf0dafee895db30253761103b5d84528f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8c140 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b875d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b917d0 (length 1000) | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540028960: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8cbe0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | Computing E[63] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 5c 88 af cc 1e 1e 83 fc c4 2c 0c e4 12 12 f5 17 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 9d 2f 04 6d bc 24 17 fa 1c 2b ac 68 da fc 25 79 | XCBC: MAC f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8c1f0 (length 16) | f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | chunk output f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8bf00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (1016-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 1000 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 1000-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (1016-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 1000) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 1000 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 1008 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef 6a 53 7c fffff | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 1008 bytes at 0x55e200b93580 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b876c0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[63] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 5c 88 af cc 1e 1e 83 fc c4 2c 0c e4 12 12 f5 17 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 9d 2f 04 6d bc 24 17 fa 1c 2b ac 68 da fc 25 79 | XCBC: MAC f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: ffffffb8 6b 0c 44 ffffff9e ffffffeb 43 ffffffce ffffff88 fffffff9 24 34 ffffffae ffffffb7 61 49 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b876c0 | unwrapped: f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8bf00 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8bf20 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b876c0 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c1a0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8c350 (length 16) | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | chunk output 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c120 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffffb6 ffffffef 30 2f 52 ffffff86 3e 72 28 ffffffb9 ffffffe3 ffffffef 37 ffffff81 ffffffc0 ffffff84 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b8cc30 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c1f0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: 52 3f ffffffbe ffffffe6 28 78 76 fffffff4 08 3d ffffff96 fffffff5 ffffffb7 26 ffffffa8 0f | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c350 | unwrapped: 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x00010203040506070809" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x0fa087af7d866e7653434e602fdde835" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8c1a0 (length 10) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 10 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 10-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | XCBC: Key 10<16 too small, padding with zeros | xcbc: reference tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41790 | result: tmp+=0-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417b8 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b875d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b8c350 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 4e ffffffff ffffffa2 ffffffc6 2e 13 4b ffffff97 ffffff9c ffffffba 2f ffffffe2 ffffff80 ffffffb5 24 17 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c120 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 50 ca b2 4d 03 34 45 5e 40 7b 25 0f dd 7c f8 d5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8e f7 48 db 56 f1 f7 26 24 72 f2 c5 63 b0 3f 88 | XCBC: E[n-1] fe 1f 63 e9 65 1a 4b bb 3c cc cd 0d cc 83 e4 30 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 60 f9 39 21 b3 eb bc 9d 18 be 3f c8 af 33 db b8 | XCBC: MAC 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8bf40 (length 16) | 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | chunk output 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 10 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 10-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (size 10) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 10<16 too small, padding with zeros | xcbc: reference tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c0 | result: tmp+=0-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: PRF symkey interface-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8cbe0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffffb6 ffffffef 30 2f 52 ffffff86 3e 72 28 ffffffb9 ffffffe3 ffffffef 37 ffffff81 ffffffc0 ffffff84 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b93980 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 4e ffffffff ffffffa2 ffffffc6 2e 13 4b ffffff97 ffffff9c ffffffba 2f ffffffe2 ffffff80 ffffffb5 24 17 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b87790 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 50 ca b2 4d 03 34 45 5e 40 7b 25 0f dd 7c f8 d5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8e f7 48 db 56 f1 f7 26 24 72 f2 c5 63 b0 3f 88 | XCBC: E[n-1] fe 1f 63 e9 65 1a 4b bb 3c cc cd 0d cc 83 e4 30 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 60 f9 39 21 b3 eb bc 9d 18 be 3f c8 af 33 db b8 | XCBC: MAC 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: ffffff8a 0c fffffff6 ffffffde fffffff8 76 ffffff93 fffffff4 fffffffa 2e 7d ffffffa1 76 ffffffdf ffffffb0 ffffffb4 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8bf40 | unwrapped: 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fedcb" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | ed cb | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x8cd3c93ae598a9803006ffb67c40e9e4" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55e200b8c120 (length 18) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | ed cb | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417f0 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 18 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 18-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417d8 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | XCBC: Key 18>16 too big, rehashing to size | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41790 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41778 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | key extracting all 18 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | key: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | key: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1701522796: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffff96 20 78 0a ffffff87 09 40 26 38 6c ffffffc3 ffffffa4 22 06 1f ffffffff | key: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | key extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b8c7b0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: ed cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data ed cb | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8e6d0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8e6d0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)808460336: 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c140 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 e1 4d 5d 0e e2 77 15 df 08 b4 15 2b a2 3d a8 e0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41710 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416f8 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8d 34 ef cb 3b d5 45 ca 06 2a ec df ef 7c 0b fa | XCBC: E[n-1] 0b 72 b2 ae 0a 37 79 81 75 6a d5 9c 79 c0 e6 96 | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 6b 8d dd 65 31 e2 3c 4b 73 40 39 43 96 bc ed 6c | XCBC: MAC 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b88e00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41790 | result: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41778 | result: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b875d0 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55e200b8bf40 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 43 14 65 ffffffb3 78 ffffffab 39 69 7e 0a ffffff80 1c ffffffec ffffff95 2f ffffffb6 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c1f0 | unwrapped: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K1 27 f3 88 2f b7 b9 4b a4 16 36 09 d5 d2 39 c5 7f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 50 9e d8 ae 74 5a 75 4c 93 4d 6c 91 98 fe e2 1b | XCBC: E[n-1] ec 26 f6 dd e8 bb 1b d1 ec 76 c4 91 78 37 ca 4b | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | ac a9 3c 60 1c e1 6e 9d 7f 3b a8 00 e0 c9 28 50 | XCBC: MAC 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55e200b8cbe0 (length 16) | 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | chunk output 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 18 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 18-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8cde0 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 18) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 18>16 too big, rehashing to size | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | key symkey extracting all 18 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | key symkey: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | key symkey: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1701522796: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffff96 20 78 0a ffffff87 09 40 26 38 6c ffffffc3 ffffffa4 22 06 1f ffffffff | key symkey: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | key symkey extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b8c7b0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: ed cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data ed cb | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8cde0 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8cde0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)808460336: 6a 53 7c ffffff9a ffffffb1 ffffffe7 20 ffffffef 44 24 7a fffffffb 5a 78 46 ffffffef | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b87790 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 e1 4d 5d 0e e2 77 15 df 08 b4 15 2b a2 3d a8 e0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41740 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41728 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8d 34 ef cb 3b d5 45 ca 06 2a ec df ef 7c 0b fa | XCBC: E[n-1] 0b 72 b2 ae 0a 37 79 81 75 6a d5 9c 79 c0 e6 96 | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 6b 8d dd 65 31 e2 3c 4b 73 40 39 43 96 bc ed 6c | XCBC: MAC 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b8a680 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c350 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898703808: 7c 65 50 4e 01 62 ffffffbc ffffffb8 ffffff83 71 06 22 43 fffffff8 07 60 ffffffb6 ffffffef 30 2f 52 ffffff86 3e 72 28 ffffffb9 ffffffe3 ffffffef 37 ffffff81 ffffffc0 ffffff84 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55e200b8c7b0 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | K: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 43 14 65 ffffffb3 78 ffffffab 39 69 7e 0a ffffff80 1c ffffffec ffffff95 2f ffffffb6 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b875d0 | unwrapped: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K1 27 f3 88 2f b7 b9 4b a4 16 36 09 d5 d2 39 c5 7f | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: k1-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 50 9e d8 ae 74 5a 75 4c 93 4d 6c 91 98 fe e2 1b | XCBC: E[n-1] ec 26 f6 dd e8 bb 1b d1 ec 76 c4 91 78 37 ca 4b | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | ac a9 3c 60 1c e1 6e 9d 7f 3b a8 00 e0 c9 28 50 | XCBC: MAC 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55e200b93380 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41800 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e8 | result: xcbc-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b93380 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: ffffffdf 6b 73 07 ffffff9e 5a ffffffa9 ffffffa1 7d 4d 41 2a ffffff8e ffffffa9 ffffffda ffffffeb | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c140 | unwrapped: 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b88e00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "Hi There" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 48 69 20 54 68 65 72 65 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x55e200b8c350 (length 16) | 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e0 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c8 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41720 | result: trimed key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b88e00 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41760 | result: result-key@0x55e200b88e00 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55e200b8c1a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x55e200b8c140 (length 8) | 48 69 20 54 68 65 72 65 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41850 | result: message-key@0x55e200b93380 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55e200b93380 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8ce70 (length 16) | 90 1d 23 73 2e dc c0 f1 a1 06 53 2f 6b e5 ec eb | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416e0 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416c8 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x55e200b93380 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: result-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: result-key@0x55e200b8a680 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b93380 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55e200b8a680 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b875d0 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x55e200b875d0 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | chunk output 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41720 | result: trimed key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8a680 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41760 | result: result-key@0x55e200b88e00 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55e200b8cbe0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (24-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 8 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 8-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (24-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (8-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 8) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b93380 (8-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41878 | result: result-key@0x55e200b95040 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55e200b95040 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8bf40 (length 16) | 90 1d 23 73 2e dc c0 f1 a1 06 53 2f 6b e5 ec eb | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41700 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b969a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416e8 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b88e00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x55e200b95040 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: result-key@0x55e200b95040 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: result-key@0x55e200b969a0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b95040 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8ce70 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c0 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417a8 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 | : hashed-outer-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: 30 3e ffffff8e 29 27 04 21 ffffffd5 38 4b 01 ffffff9e fffffffb fffffff1 ffffffba 44 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8bf40 | unwrapped: 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b93380 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b8a680 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "Jefe" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4a 65 66 65 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "what do ya want for nothing?" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 77 68 61 74 20 64 6f 20 79 61 20 77 61 6e 74 20 | 66 6f 72 20 6e 6f 74 68 69 6e 67 3f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x55e200b8cbe0 (length 4) | 4a 65 66 65 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e0 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 4 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 4-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c8 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b8a680 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41720 | result: trimed key-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8a680 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41760 | result: result-key@0x55e200b8a680 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55e200b8ce70 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x55e200b8c7b0 (length 28) | 77 68 61 74 20 64 6f 20 79 61 20 77 61 6e 74 20 | 66 6f 72 20 6e 6f 74 68 69 6e 67 3f | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41850 | result: message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b876c0 (length 16) | c3 db 14 c0 65 f5 52 03 b0 33 c8 1a 69 7b 97 c5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416e0 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b969a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416c8 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: result-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: result-key@0x55e200b969a0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b93380 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b951a0 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x55e200b951a0 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | chunk output 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 4 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 4-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 4) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x55e200b969a0 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41720 | result: trimed key-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b969a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41760 | result: result-key@0x55e200b8a680 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55e200b8ce70 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (44-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 28 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 28-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (44-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (28-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 28) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (28-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41878 | result: result-key@0x55e200b88e00 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55e200b88e00 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8c120 (length 16) | c3 db 14 c0 65 f5 52 03 b0 33 c8 1a 69 7b 97 c5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41700 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416e8 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x55e200b88e00 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: result-key@0x55e200b88e00 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: result-key@0x55e200b95040 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b93380 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55e200b95040 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b87790 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c0 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417a8 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x55e200b95040 | : hashed-outer-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b93380 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: 7c 4b ffffffac 2c 42 65 ffffffe4 ffffffa0 13 ffffff86 fffffffc ffffff95 58 51 ffffffd3 6b | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c120 | unwrapped: 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b969a0 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | decode_to_chunk: output: | aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD" | decode_to_chunk: output: | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x55e200b8ce70 (length 16) | aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417e0 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c8 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55e200b969a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41720 | result: trimed key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b969a0 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41760 | result: result-key@0x55e200b969a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55e200b87790 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x55e200b8c160 (length 50) | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41850 | result: message-key@0x55e200b93380 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55e200b93380 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8c350 (length 16) | 82 0a 6b 33 5d 18 7b 90 dc ba b1 7e f5 b4 26 ff | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416e0 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416c8 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b969a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x55e200b93380 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41750 | result: result-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41738 | result: result-key@0x55e200b95040 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b93380 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55e200b95040 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b876c0 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x55e200b95040 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x55e200b876c0 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | chunk output 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: key symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x55e200b95040 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41720 | result: trimed key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55e200b95040 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41760 | result: result-key@0x55e200b969a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55e200b87790 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41860 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (66-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 50 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 50-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (66-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41848 | result: message symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 50) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55e200b93380 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41878 | result: result-key@0x55e200b8a680 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55e200b8a680 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8c1f0 (length 16) | 82 0a 6b 33 5d 18 7b 90 dc ba b1 7e f5 b4 26 ff | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41700 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed416e8 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55e200b969a0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x55e200b8a680 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41770 | result: result-key@0x55e200b8a680 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed41758 | result: result-key@0x55e200b88e00 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8a680 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55e200b88e00 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55e200b8c140 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417c0 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55e200b969a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed417a8 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x55e200b88e00 | : hashed-outer-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-9973287: 5f 75 ffffffa5 ffffffbf 74 ffffffad ffffffb1 10 63 73 fffffff9 ffffff9f 27 5e ffffffc0 ffffffaa | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55e200b8c1f0 | unwrapped: 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55e200b93380 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55e200b95040 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 started thread for crypto helper 1 started thread for crypto helper 2 started thread for crypto helper 3 started thread for crypto helper 4 started thread for crypto helper 5 started thread for crypto helper 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | starting up helper thread 1 | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 3 | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | starting up helper thread 4 | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.2.11+ | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55e200b8c160 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98ef0 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87790 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x55e200b871a0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98f80 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b8c1f0 size 16 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a146b (length 11) | 4b 41 4d 45 2f 72 61 63 6f 6f 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b8bf40 (length 16) | 70 03 cb c1 09 7d be 9c 26 00 ba 69 83 bc 8b 35 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2260 (length 46) | 4e 4c 42 53 5f 50 52 45 53 45 4e 54 28 4e 4c 42 | 2f 4d 53 43 53 20 66 61 73 74 20 66 61 69 6c 6f | 76 65 72 20 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 29 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b8cbe0 (length 16) | ec 22 62 b5 12 32 63 83 67 12 3b ce 3d 37 3c 5e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2290 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4d 61 6d 69 65 45 78 69 73 74 73 28 41 | 75 74 68 49 50 20 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 29 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b8c120 (length 16) | 6f fe a4 ae ec 37 f4 9a 02 6f 97 cf b5 53 30 6d | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a15ee (length 17) | 49 4b 45 20 43 47 41 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 20 | 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b876c0 (length 16) | e3 a5 96 6a 76 37 9f e7 07 22 82 31 e5 ce 86 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a22b8 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4e 65 67 6f 74 69 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 44 | 69 73 63 6f 76 65 72 79 20 43 61 70 61 62 6c 65 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b8ce70 (length 16) | fb 1d e3 cd f3 41 b7 ea 16 b7 e5 be 08 55 f1 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1600 (length 23) | 4d 69 63 72 6f 73 6f 66 74 20 58 62 6f 78 20 4f | 6e 65 20 32 30 31 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b95180 (length 16) | 8a a3 94 cf 8a 55 77 dc 31 10 c1 13 b0 27 a4 f2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1618 (length 22) | 58 62 6f 78 20 49 4b 45 76 32 20 4e 65 67 6f 74 | 69 61 74 69 6f 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b8c1a0 (length 16) | aa 28 1f cc d6 8c f8 a8 dc b8 5c c0 a7 10 40 2a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a162f (length 28) | 4d 53 46 54 20 49 50 73 65 63 20 53 65 63 75 72 | 69 74 79 20 52 65 61 6c 6d 20 49 64 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b875d0 (length 16) | 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a22e0 (length 39) | 41 20 47 53 53 2d 41 50 49 20 41 75 74 68 65 6e | 74 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 4d 65 74 68 6f 64 20 | 66 6f 72 20 49 4b 45 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b951a0 (length 16) | ad 2c 0d d0 b9 c3 20 83 cc ba 25 b8 86 1e c4 55 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a164c (length 6) | 47 53 53 41 50 49 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99190 (length 16) | 62 1b 04 bb 09 88 2a c1 e1 59 35 fe fa 24 ae ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1653 (length 12) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b991b0 (length 16) | 05 41 82 a0 7c 7a e2 06 f9 d2 cf 9d 24 32 c4 82 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1660 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b991d0 (length 16) | b9 16 23 e6 93 ca 18 a5 4c 6a 27 78 55 23 05 e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1671 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b991f0 (length 16) | 54 30 88 8d e0 1a 31 a6 fa 8f 60 22 4e 44 99 58 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1682 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99210 (length 16) | 7e e5 cb 85 f7 1c e2 59 c9 4a 5c 73 1e e4 e7 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1693 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99230 (length 16) | 63 d9 a1 a7 00 94 91 b5 a0 a6 fd eb 2a 82 84 f0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a16a4 (length 18) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 34 | 2e 31 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99250 (length 16) | eb 4b 0d 96 27 6b 4e 22 0a d1 62 21 a7 b2 a5 e6 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2308 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99270 (length 16) | fb f4 76 14 98 40 31 fa 8e 3b b6 19 80 89 b2 23 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2340 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99290 (length 16) | 19 52 dc 91 ac 20 f6 46 fb 01 cf 42 a3 3a ee 30 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2378 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b992b0 (length 16) | e8 bf fa 64 3e 5c 8f 2c d1 0f da 73 70 b6 eb e5 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a23b0 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b992d0 (length 16) | c1 11 1b 2d ee 8c bc 3d 62 05 73 ec 57 aa b9 cb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a23e8 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b992f0 (length 16) | 09 ec 27 bf bc 09 c7 58 23 cf ec bf fe 56 5a 2e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2420 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99310 (length 16) | 7f 21 a5 96 e4 e3 18 f0 b2 f4 94 4c 23 84 cb 84 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2458 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99330 (length 16) | 28 36 d1 fd 28 07 bc 9e 5a e3 07 86 32 04 51 ec | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2490 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99350 (length 16) | a6 8d e7 56 a9 c5 22 9b ae 66 49 80 40 95 1a d5 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a24c8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99370 (length 16) | 3f 23 72 86 7e 23 7c 1c d8 25 0a 75 55 9c ae 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2500 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 33 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99390 (length 16) | 0e 58 d5 77 4d f6 02 00 7d 0b 02 44 36 60 f7 eb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2538 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 33 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b993b0 (length 16) | f5 ce 31 eb c2 10 f4 43 50 cf 71 26 5b 57 38 0f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2570 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b993d0 (length 16) | f6 42 60 af 2e 27 42 da dd d5 69 87 06 8a 99 a0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a25a8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b993f0 (length 16) | 7a 54 d3 bd b3 b1 e6 d9 23 89 20 64 be 2d 98 1c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a25e0 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99410 (length 16) | 9a a1 f3 b4 34 72 a4 5d 5f 50 6a eb 26 0c f2 14 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2618 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99430 (length 16) | 68 80 c7 d0 26 09 91 14 e4 86 c5 54 30 e7 ab ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2650 (length 41) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 53 | 5f 56 45 4e 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed41950 (length 16) | 44 76 1b d7 6b 80 85 41 74 87 ee 8a 51 cf fc f3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2680 (length 53) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 58 2e 35 30 39 2d 31 2e 33 2e 31 | 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 53 5f 56 45 4e | 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed41950 (length 16) | b7 0e 8a c3 92 b1 6e 05 48 2f c4 dc 36 10 91 68 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a26b8 (length 58) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 58 2e 35 30 39 2d 31 2e 33 2e 31 | 20 4c 44 41 50 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 | 53 5f 56 45 4e 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed41950 (length 16) | 97 1d ea 93 c3 c2 06 74 f9 ae 35 40 83 de 3e 2f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1791 (length 14) | 4f 70 65 6e 73 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed41950 (length 16) | 08 72 0b ee 9e 28 95 3c e0 8f 0a 18 b6 e2 9d da | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2720 (length 37) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 73 74 65 6e 62 65 72 67 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 72 61 76 65 72 73 | 61 6c 2d 30 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99630 (length 16) | 27 ba b5 dc 01 ea 07 60 ea 4e 31 90 ac 27 c0 d0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2748 (length 37) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 73 74 65 6e 62 65 72 67 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 72 61 76 65 72 73 | 61 6c 2d 30 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99650 (length 16) | 61 05 c4 22 e7 68 47 e4 3f 96 84 80 12 92 ae cd | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a17b9 (length 10) | 45 53 50 54 68 72 75 4e 41 54 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99670 (length 16) | 50 76 0f 62 4c 63 e5 c5 3e ea 38 6c 68 5c a0 83 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2770 (length 38) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 68 75 74 74 75 6e 65 6e 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 65 73 70 2d 69 6e 2d 75 64 70 2d | 30 30 2e 74 78 74 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99690 (length 16) | 6a 74 34 c1 9d 7e 36 34 80 90 a0 23 34 c9 c8 05 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a17c4 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b996b0 (length 16) | 44 85 15 2d 18 b6 bb cd 0b e8 a8 46 95 79 dd cc | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a17e2 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b996d0 (length 16) | 16 f6 ca 16 e4 a4 06 6d 83 82 1a 0f 0a ea a8 62 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1800 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b996f0 (length 16) | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a2798 (length 30) | 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bytes@0x55e200b99770 (length 16) | 80 d0 bb 3d ef 54 56 5e e8 46 45 d4 c8 5c e3 ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1878 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b99790 (length 16) | 4d 1e 0e 13 6d ea fa 34 c4 f3 ea 9f 02 ec 72 85 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1896 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b997b0 (length 16) | 43 9b 59 f8 ba 67 6c 4c 77 37 ae 22 ea b8 f5 82 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a18b4 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b997d0 (length 16) | 8f 8d 83 82 6d 24 6b 6f c7 a8 a6 a4 28 c1 1d e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id 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72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a010 (length 16) | 98 2b 7a 06 3a 33 c1 43 a8 ea dc 88 24 9f 6b cc | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d36 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a030 (length 16) | e7 a3 fd 0c 6d 77 1a 8f 1b 8a 86 a4 16 9c 9e a4 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d47 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a050 (length 16) | 75 b0 65 3c b2 81 eb 26 d3 1e de 38 c8 e1 e2 28 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d58 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a070 (length 16) | e8 29 c8 81 49 ba b3 c0 ce e8 5d a6 0e 18 ae 9b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d69 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a090 (length 16) | 42 a4 83 4c 92 ab 9a 77 77 06 3a fa 25 4b cb 69 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d7a (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a0b0 (length 16) | f6 97 c1 af cc 2e c8 dd cd f9 9d c7 af 03 a6 7f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d8b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a0d0 (length 16) | b8 f9 2b 2f a2 d3 fe 5f e1 58 34 4b da 1c c6 ae | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1d9c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a0f0 (length 16) | 99 dc 7c c8 23 37 6b 3b 33 d0 43 57 89 6a e0 7b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1dad (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a110 (length 16) | d9 11 8b 1e 9d e5 ef ce d9 cc 9d 88 3f 21 68 ff | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6a1dbe (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a130 (length 16) | 85 b6 cb ec 48 0d 5c 8c d9 88 2c 82 5a c2 c2 44 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55e1ff6aa707 (length 13) | 46 52 41 47 4d 45 4e 54 41 54 49 4f 4e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55e200b9a150 (length 16) | 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. systemd watchdog not enabled - not sending watchdog keepalives | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x55e200b8c070 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3430 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba34c0 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b075b0 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba34e0 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98180 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3500 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba35a0 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba35c0 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba35e0 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3680 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba36a0 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3740 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98180 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3760 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98180 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | created addconn helper (pid:10237) using fork+execve | forked child 10237 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | pluto_sd: executing action action: reloading(4), status 0 listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3b10 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3b50 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3be0 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3c00 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3c40 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3cd0 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3cf0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3d30 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3dc0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3de0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3e20 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3eb0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3ed0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3f10 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3fa0 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3fc0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba4000 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba4090 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | id type added to secret(0x55e200b990d0) PKK_PSK: @east | id type added to secret(0x55e200b990d0) PKK_PSK: @west | Processing PSK at line 1: passed | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | pluto_sd: executing action action: ready(5), status 0 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.544 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | pluto_sd: executing action action: reloading(4), status 0 listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3b50 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3b10 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3b10 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3b50 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3c40 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3c00 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3c00 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3c40 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3d30 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3cf0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3cf0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3d30 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3e20 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3de0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3de0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3e20 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3f10 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3ed0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3ed0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3f10 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba4000 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3fc0 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55e200ba3fc0 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba4000 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | id type added to secret(0x55e200b990d0) PKK_PSK: @east | id type added to secret(0x55e200b990d0) PKK_PSK: @west | Processing PSK at line 1: passed | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | pluto_sd: executing action action: ready(5), status 0 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.279 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 10237 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0149 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection east with policy PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1-MODP2048, 3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1-MODP2048 | from whack: got --esp=aes128-sha1;modp2048,3des-sha1;modp2048 | ESP/AH string values: AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96-MODP2048, 3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96-MODP2048 | counting wild cards for @west is 0 | counting wild cards for @east is 0 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55e200b705c0 added connection description "east" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east]...192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.142 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.0025 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 01 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd 7a 9b 88 67 f7 d1 32 53 | fb 5b 48 c1 42 3c 5d 09 a7 78 1e 0a 26 33 b6 53 | creating state object #1 at 0x55e200ba67e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp started | #1 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 "east" #1: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #1 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #1: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.608 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00215 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | 14 00 00 24 45 24 d3 13 fb 05 67 e4 12 52 8f 7b | e1 60 d9 99 d2 cb 9d 33 98 a4 11 a8 cc d2 5c 82 | 93 82 30 8f 14 00 00 18 e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 | 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 20 d3 8d 83 00 00 00 18 | 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | 29 c0 92 20 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #1 is idle | #1 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba6d78 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba6d80 (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | 20 d3 8d 83 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | natd_hash: rcookie= e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | natd_hash: hash= 20 d3 8d 83 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba6d78 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba6d80 (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | 29 c0 92 20 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | natd_hash: rcookie= e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | natd_hash: hash= 29 c0 92 20 | expected NAT-D(me): e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | expected NAT-D(me): 20 d3 8d 83 | expected NAT-D(him): | 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | 29 c0 92 20 | received NAT-D: e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | received NAT-D: 20 d3 8d 83 | received NAT-D: 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | received NAT-D: 29 c0 92 20 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE scheduled in 20 seconds | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | #1 spent 0.184 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.322 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 1 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2e4000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | Generated nonce: d3 1c ca aa 5c c4 d5 a8 c2 78 94 f9 2f 2c 70 d2 | Generated nonce: 2c dc b1 25 d5 4a ba c7 c1 eb 9a c0 e1 7d 44 6e | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.001077 seconds | (#1) spent 1.08 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e4006900 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #1 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | keyex value 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | keyex value 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | keyex value 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | keyex value d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | keyex value c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | keyex value 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | keyex value f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | keyex value 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | keyex value 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | keyex value 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | keyex value 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | keyex value 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | keyex value e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | keyex value c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | keyex value fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr d3 1c ca aa 5c c4 d5 a8 c2 78 94 f9 2f 2c 70 d2 | Nr 2c dc b1 25 d5 4a ba c7 c1 eb 9a c0 e1 7d 44 6e | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | 29 c0 92 20 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | natd_hash: rcookie= e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | natd_hash: hash= 29 c0 92 20 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 | NAT-D 29 c0 92 20 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | 20 d3 8d 83 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | natd_hash: rcookie= e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | natd_hash: hash= 20 d3 8d 83 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | NAT-D 20 d3 8d 83 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4000d60: transferring ownership from state #1 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #1 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #1 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #1: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | 14 00 00 24 d3 1c ca aa 5c c4 d5 a8 c2 78 94 f9 | 2f 2c 70 d2 2c dc b1 25 d5 4a ba c7 c1 eb 9a c0 | e1 7d 44 6e 14 00 00 18 8f bb 2b 21 48 25 67 e7 | 70 68 8f 48 26 27 09 b4 29 c0 92 20 00 00 00 18 | e6 f2 6b 09 ca 20 3e 85 4d 57 82 e4 19 9c 8a 92 | 20 d3 8d 83 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #1 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48950.768901 "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.364 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e4006900 | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | crypto helper 4 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 2 | peer's g: 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | peer's g: 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | peer's g: 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | peer's g: e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | peer's g: 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | peer's g: 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | peer's g: 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | peer's g: 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | peer's g: 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | peer's g: 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | peer's g: 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | peer's g: a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | peer's g: 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | peer's g: b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | peer's g: 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | peer's g: d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | spent 0.0017 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 71 09 23 3c | 35 f6 d2 f6 f0 69 fd 57 e6 cd 90 79 80 83 d1 03 | 1c 93 a6 5c c3 0b 02 f3 d0 ae 3d 14 d4 24 52 9e | b7 d0 0a 59 6d 12 e0 87 4c 5b be f8 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #1 is idle; has background offloaded task | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 but exponentiation still in progress | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0751 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b95040 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200ba8360 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200ba8384 (length 32) | 45 24 d3 13 fb 05 67 e4 12 52 8f 7b e1 60 d9 99 | d2 cb 9d 33 98 a4 11 a8 cc d2 5c 82 93 82 30 8f | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200ba83a4 (length 32) | d3 1c ca aa 5c c4 d5 a8 c2 78 94 f9 2f 2c 70 d2 | 2c dc b1 25 d5 4a ba c7 c1 eb 9a c0 e1 7d 44 6e | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001090 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908864: 77 59 61 ffffffb6 4a ffffff9f fffffff1 ffffff87 45 ffffff9a 1f ffffffb5 70 7c 0b 22 40 ffffff95 ffffffaf 3c ffffff85 ffffffcb ffffffeb 63 ffffff99 ffffffee 63 fffffff4 ffffffb1 07 ffffffee ffffffa0 7b ffffffd8 ffffffcd ffffff86 24 ffffff84 3b ffffff82 ffffffa0 ffffffed fffffff8 ffffffb9 37 08 ffffff84 48 20 ffffffff 00 4a fffffff9 73 ffffffd6 fffffffa ffffffc2 27 16 56 6b ffffffd8 3c fffffff6 4c 66 ffffffa5 4c 7c ffffffb6 25 2e 51 0d ffffffbf 01 ffffffdb fffffff2 ffffffc1 77 32 ffffffdb ffffff9a 7f ffffffd5 ffffffa2 ffffffa3 2c 3f ffffff92 2e ffffff8a 7e fffffff0 0d ffffffd4 ffffff83 ffffffa4 20 ffffffae 1e 0f ffffffd1 2d 20 ffffffba 78 ffffffb0 ffffff86 ffffffa0 78 ffffffa2 ffffff99 ffffffef ffffff85 05 16 71 26 7b 1e 58 ffffffe5 ffffff9d 68 58 fffffff4 77 5b ffffffdf 1d fffffffa ffffffe1 11 53 ffffff92 7f 0d 5a 1b 2d 4f 71 19 43 ffffffea fffffffb 7f 5d ffffffd2 53 03 00 51 fffffff1 44 69 ffffffc8 ffffffbf ffffffbd ffffff9f 28 4 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2dc004db0 | unwrapped: 97 85 bc 27 e1 76 d1 98 54 87 9d 2f 69 56 2c af | unwrapped: f2 b4 1e 5a a1 e9 b3 4e 09 f6 3d 51 78 a7 9f bd | unwrapped: 45 17 f4 18 41 a9 56 c3 56 e9 85 42 b7 b9 c5 e7 | unwrapped: 77 37 ef bf 73 d9 3e 39 db e7 d2 9f f9 5b 01 de | unwrapped: 22 46 3e a2 80 9b 2e 25 62 5e 84 ff fe f9 f6 43 | unwrapped: 5f d4 ee 55 0d 71 07 19 44 4f 1e f6 0c c6 66 0a | unwrapped: e7 33 62 55 00 96 a6 bd cc f9 7a 78 14 f3 b3 5d | unwrapped: d8 88 cf 78 18 b4 a5 e5 75 5a 72 ce 6e 48 e2 a9 | unwrapped: 24 58 1a f5 50 a7 fa 3b 9a 72 1c 00 61 e2 63 f1 | unwrapped: 9a 11 5f e5 cb 28 2e 95 b6 1c f4 95 47 34 75 4c | unwrapped: 82 a1 f9 42 94 6b 2b b3 a4 f1 c1 7e 9d f3 af 5a | unwrapped: d6 e8 6f ff 18 de 2b 9e 7a 29 fc 4e 93 e6 68 67 | unwrapped: 3b 9f 5f 1e ca ed 35 3a f3 c5 a4 4c 78 af 2b 62 | unwrapped: b0 71 87 cb 03 51 0a 3b 74 87 26 d2 61 93 8a b1 | unwrapped: 24 50 e1 7b 71 7c 0c b9 10 86 2e 3d 8a 82 9c a3 | unwrapped: 8d f5 02 af 15 7a 27 f8 d1 4d c4 c2 df 43 8d 39 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200ba85c4 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200ba85cc (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001ef0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908896: ffffff8b 74 1d 29 ffffff83 59 55 ffffffe2 67 04 ffffffda fffffffc ffffff8a 67 ffffffbe 56 60 19 ffffff91 ffffffa8 64 46 72 ffffffa3 fffffff8 4a ffffffa1 ffffffad 5e fffffff5 12 ffffffd0 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2dc0020b0 | unwrapped: 55 8c b1 94 0f f1 8b b8 49 28 64 ab 7d b1 8a 71 | unwrapped: e4 d3 b8 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908896: 77 59 61 ffffffb6 4a ffffff9f fffffff1 ffffff87 45 ffffff9a 1f ffffffb5 70 7c 0b 22 40 ffffff95 ffffffaf 3c ffffff85 ffffffcb ffffffeb 63 ffffff99 ffffffee 63 fffffff4 ffffffb1 07 ffffffee ffffffa0 7b ffffffd8 ffffffcd ffffff86 24 ffffff84 3b ffffff82 ffffffa0 ffffffed fffffff8 ffffffb9 37 08 ffffff84 48 20 ffffffff 00 4a fffffff9 73 ffffffd6 fffffffa ffffffc2 27 16 56 6b ffffffd8 3c fffffff6 4c 66 ffffffa5 4c 7c ffffffb6 25 2e 51 0d ffffffbf 01 ffffffdb fffffff2 ffffffc1 77 32 ffffffdb ffffff9a 7f ffffffd5 ffffffa2 ffffffa3 2c 3f ffffff92 2e ffffff8a 7e fffffff0 0d ffffffd4 ffffff83 ffffffa4 20 ffffffae 1e 0f ffffffd1 2d 20 ffffffba 78 ffffffb0 ffffff86 ffffffa0 78 ffffffa2 ffffff99 ffffffef ffffff85 05 16 71 26 7b 1e 58 ffffffe5 ffffff9d 68 58 fffffff4 77 5b ffffffdf 1d fffffffa ffffffe1 11 53 ffffff92 7f 0d 5a 1b 2d 4f 71 19 43 ffffffea fffffffb 7f 5d ffffffd2 53 03 00 51 fffffff1 44 69 ffffffc8 ffffffbf ffffffbd ffffff9f 28 4 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2dc003ce0 | unwrapped: 97 85 bc 27 e1 76 d1 98 54 87 9d 2f 69 56 2c af | unwrapped: f2 b4 1e 5a a1 e9 b3 4e 09 f6 3d 51 78 a7 9f bd | unwrapped: 45 17 f4 18 41 a9 56 c3 56 e9 85 42 b7 b9 c5 e7 | unwrapped: 77 37 ef bf 73 d9 3e 39 db e7 d2 9f f9 5b 01 de | unwrapped: 22 46 3e a2 80 9b 2e 25 62 5e 84 ff fe f9 f6 43 | unwrapped: 5f d4 ee 55 0d 71 07 19 44 4f 1e f6 0c c6 66 0a | unwrapped: e7 33 62 55 00 96 a6 bd cc f9 7a 78 14 f3 b3 5d | unwrapped: d8 88 cf 78 18 b4 a5 e5 75 5a 72 ce 6e 48 e2 a9 | unwrapped: 24 58 1a f5 50 a7 fa 3b 9a 72 1c 00 61 e2 63 f1 | unwrapped: 9a 11 5f e5 cb 28 2e 95 b6 1c f4 95 47 34 75 4c | unwrapped: 82 a1 f9 42 94 6b 2b b3 a4 f1 c1 7e 9d f3 af 5a | unwrapped: d6 e8 6f ff 18 de 2b 9e 7a 29 fc 4e 93 e6 68 67 | unwrapped: 3b 9f 5f 1e ca ed 35 3a f3 c5 a4 4c 78 af 2b 62 | unwrapped: b0 71 87 cb 03 51 0a 3b 74 87 26 d2 61 93 8a b1 | unwrapped: 24 50 e1 7b 71 7c 0c b9 10 86 2e 3d 8a 82 9c a3 | unwrapped: 8d f5 02 af 15 7a 27 f8 d1 4d c4 c2 df 43 8d 39 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200ba85c4 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200ba85cc (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001160 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908880: 33 ffffff81 ffffffc6 ffffffec ffffffa9 35 40 ffffff94 fffffffc 0e 19 ffffffdd ffffffc6 2a 63 ffffffaf ffffffa3 ffffffad 25 4a 1e ffffffc0 fffffff8 46 1c 1e 7c fffffffa 02 ffffffae 02 ffffffaa | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2dc002c90 | unwrapped: e1 45 13 57 bc b1 ff fc 00 84 66 ac 56 6e af 23 | unwrapped: 17 e0 1a b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908880: 77 59 61 ffffffb6 4a ffffff9f fffffff1 ffffff87 45 ffffff9a 1f ffffffb5 70 7c 0b 22 40 ffffff95 ffffffaf 3c ffffff85 ffffffcb ffffffeb 63 ffffff99 ffffffee 63 fffffff4 ffffffb1 07 ffffffee ffffffa0 7b ffffffd8 ffffffcd ffffff86 24 ffffff84 3b ffffff82 ffffffa0 ffffffed fffffff8 ffffffb9 37 08 ffffff84 48 20 ffffffff 00 4a fffffff9 73 ffffffd6 fffffffa ffffffc2 27 16 56 6b ffffffd8 3c fffffff6 4c 66 ffffffa5 4c 7c ffffffb6 25 2e 51 0d ffffffbf 01 ffffffdb fffffff2 ffffffc1 77 32 ffffffdb ffffff9a 7f ffffffd5 ffffffa2 ffffffa3 2c 3f ffffff92 2e ffffff8a 7e fffffff0 0d ffffffd4 ffffff83 ffffffa4 20 ffffffae 1e 0f ffffffd1 2d 20 ffffffba 78 ffffffb0 ffffff86 ffffffa0 78 ffffffa2 ffffff99 ffffffef ffffff85 05 16 71 26 7b 1e 58 ffffffe5 ffffff9d 68 58 fffffff4 77 5b ffffffdf 1d fffffffa ffffffe1 11 53 ffffff92 7f 0d 5a 1b 2d 4f 71 19 43 ffffffea fffffffb 7f 5d ffffffd2 53 03 00 51 fffffff1 44 69 ffffffc8 ffffffbf ffffffbd ffffff9f 28 4 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2dc003bd0 | unwrapped: 97 85 bc 27 e1 76 d1 98 54 87 9d 2f 69 56 2c af | unwrapped: f2 b4 1e 5a a1 e9 b3 4e 09 f6 3d 51 78 a7 9f bd | unwrapped: 45 17 f4 18 41 a9 56 c3 56 e9 85 42 b7 b9 c5 e7 | unwrapped: 77 37 ef bf 73 d9 3e 39 db e7 d2 9f f9 5b 01 de | unwrapped: 22 46 3e a2 80 9b 2e 25 62 5e 84 ff fe f9 f6 43 | unwrapped: 5f d4 ee 55 0d 71 07 19 44 4f 1e f6 0c c6 66 0a | unwrapped: e7 33 62 55 00 96 a6 bd cc f9 7a 78 14 f3 b3 5d | unwrapped: d8 88 cf 78 18 b4 a5 e5 75 5a 72 ce 6e 48 e2 a9 | unwrapped: 24 58 1a f5 50 a7 fa 3b 9a 72 1c 00 61 e2 63 f1 | unwrapped: 9a 11 5f e5 cb 28 2e 95 b6 1c f4 95 47 34 75 4c | unwrapped: 82 a1 f9 42 94 6b 2b b3 a4 f1 c1 7e 9d f3 af 5a | unwrapped: d6 e8 6f ff 18 de 2b 9e 7a 29 fc 4e 93 e6 68 67 | unwrapped: 3b 9f 5f 1e ca ed 35 3a f3 c5 a4 4c 78 af 2b 62 | unwrapped: b0 71 87 cb 03 51 0a 3b 74 87 26 d2 61 93 8a b1 | unwrapped: 24 50 e1 7b 71 7c 0c b9 10 86 2e 3d 8a 82 9c a3 | unwrapped: 8d f5 02 af 15 7a 27 f8 d1 4d c4 c2 df 43 8d 39 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200ba85c4 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200ba85cc (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_a 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_e 0x55e200b969a0, enc_key 0x55e200b8a680 | DH_i: 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | DH_i: 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | DH_i: 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | DH_i: e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | DH_i: 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | DH_i: 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | DH_i: 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | DH_i: 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | DH_i: 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | DH_i: 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | DH_i: 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | DH_i: a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | DH_i: 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | DH_i: b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | DH_i: 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | DH_i: d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | DH_r: 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | DH_r: 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | DH_r: 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | DH_r: 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | DH_r: d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | DH_r: c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | DH_r: 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | DH_r: f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | DH_r: 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | DH_r: 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | DH_r: 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | DH_r: 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | DH_r: 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | DH_r: e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | DH_r: c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | DH_r: fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200ba83c4 (length 256) | 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200ba84c4 (length 256) | 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2dc001230 (length 20) | 8a c7 b2 23 70 63 00 54 15 0d e5 28 74 60 de c6 | b6 29 95 38 | crypto helper 4 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.002595 seconds | (#1) spent 2.29 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #1: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #1 | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 8a c7 b2 23 70 63 00 54 15 0d e5 28 74 60 de c6 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: d4 24 52 9e b7 d0 0a 59 6d 12 e0 87 4c 5b be f8 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 6a c6 f6 63 | e6 39 a7 69 67 50 c9 e9 21 35 c0 23 6a b5 52 c8 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #1: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f988 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba82d0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba7410 (length 256) | 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4000b20 (length 256) | 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6d78 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6d80 (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200b03480 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fb10 (length 20) | 6a c6 f6 63 e6 39 a7 69 67 50 c9 e9 21 35 c0 23 | 6a b5 52 c8 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fa28 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001230 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4000b20 (length 256) | 06 59 a3 4f 9f ca 61 18 99 9c bc 2f 30 66 7d 2a | 25 dd a8 3e 6c f8 0b 4b 5e ce ea b1 c9 22 31 a7 | 52 0e 3e 37 b0 11 54 da 13 b2 0e fc fb f3 c1 1f | 7e 00 48 64 df 98 6a da 97 cf 7a 54 68 5d 0d 0a | d1 93 b7 2e 41 ef b3 79 14 48 10 87 fa 5b d1 c7 | c9 57 bf d7 22 87 1e 81 e0 c2 ae 8b 6e 5b be 7d | 9e 15 0f a2 db ba 77 7d 3b 0b 9c f0 4e e2 0b ac | f8 2c 26 4f 4a 9b f9 f0 99 53 66 d1 d6 af 62 72 | 1e 69 9b 6b c1 e6 d6 5c 08 8b 3e 4e 86 76 7c 2a | 50 25 14 15 39 c7 2d 07 08 ed 96 df c6 39 12 0b | 8c 64 42 50 54 c6 ff 17 28 11 68 21 19 2f 3f 9d | 25 25 68 55 13 8c 55 12 8e b2 cc 53 db 2e 96 92 | 01 b4 f5 c5 21 fc 89 32 c5 d8 66 44 94 4a aa d6 | e6 6a 20 f8 b3 ec b7 95 df 43 cd 7c 14 a6 bd d3 | c1 1a 77 bb 95 21 95 3a a5 25 a0 c9 58 b2 75 51 | fd 42 00 d6 5e 21 d9 05 e9 dd f1 65 79 8d 92 64 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba7410 (length 256) | 45 ef 35 56 b1 f7 24 61 3c 53 00 be 19 55 88 56 | 0e d1 7c 11 f5 ff 58 18 31 0c b5 dd 91 9b 78 9d | 1c c1 72 78 ec 69 b0 b7 ba 71 08 74 ac 02 1c d8 | e4 25 09 09 f5 58 c3 a7 47 18 d9 ff f9 ec fe 1c | 3f 69 b2 dc 8f 94 84 ca 60 e0 73 f6 d8 d7 45 5a | 12 94 dd 97 8a 25 07 f4 81 a7 ed 0b 22 a4 b8 2a | 76 cc 68 1e c7 27 7b 55 f0 09 5d fe 68 6d 2c b8 | 0f 65 78 86 71 e5 44 ec 9e c1 8f a7 f6 58 85 a2 | 55 bd ac 47 60 a6 a7 3c 87 a2 af 27 c8 ed 31 2e | 60 24 7a cd 66 f6 93 2a 34 1a 37 f8 f9 e8 a1 dc | 0b a4 76 ab 79 a1 21 22 9f 05 9a 2d 10 7b bd 1d | a8 21 d8 cb 97 df 9b 8c e9 7d 29 27 9b 32 75 e8 | 48 81 36 e6 ba 1c bd 5e 57 ed 64 e1 64 30 ff 2b | b1 c8 99 63 d2 d8 ae ed b5 83 a6 cd 22 cf d9 a0 | 15 dc a3 20 53 17 bd 66 88 a6 00 72 32 fb 7a 97 | d9 27 dc 58 87 9c 52 d9 6f 38 96 7e 61 f0 74 4e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6d80 (length 8) | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6d78 (length 8) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd50 (length 20) | 77 7c 63 bb f3 cd b5 e3 a3 a2 b9 77 c8 c6 a2 ed | 5a 3c d5 f3 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 77 7c 63 bb f3 cd b5 e3 a3 a2 b9 77 c8 c6 a2 ed | HASH_R 5a 3c d5 f3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 77 7c 63 bb f3 cd b5 e3 a3 a2 b9 77 c8 c6 a2 ed | encrypting: 5a 3c d5 f3 | IV: d4 24 52 9e b7 d0 0a 59 6d 12 e0 87 4c 5b be f8 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #1 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #1: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #1 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #1 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c e2 07 05 45 | c8 be ad 9c 5a 6e ce 4c a0 ee c7 22 d9 31 4f a5 | d6 a1 d6 92 cd c9 40 01 cf d1 40 14 dd 93 86 74 | ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #1 | #1 spent 0.711 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.816 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 | spent 0.00211 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 20 01 e4 79 10 4f 00 00 01 bc 3e 5e 78 1f | ef e0 96 fc 56 ca 27 4c f1 5e 5e d8 56 d6 e0 59 | 5c 7b a3 fc 8d 31 d7 26 84 7c e7 8a ec c3 f8 83 | b4 8a ad 46 ed 0a 96 91 8a 3c ec 2b a2 ed a7 b6 | cc 1f 38 89 11 44 18 59 24 23 48 4d 31 b9 f9 28 | ae 09 eb 2c ec bb a0 32 bf 39 2a a2 0b 74 4e c4 | 2b 57 40 60 61 a4 a0 fe ef d4 1f 1d 40 e9 db f4 | c5 eb 8e 18 5d 69 cb 9f 94 e6 c3 d0 12 40 6b c6 | 98 83 46 a9 04 5e 20 20 6b 95 81 ab 80 51 e3 f8 | 48 90 1f dc e5 b3 a9 95 50 60 ce ba b3 de 0a ef | 9f 7b a0 99 31 5f a7 52 cc 41 86 36 02 a0 c5 5c | ec 8c e3 da d7 47 23 dd bf c8 bf 3d 84 c0 7e dc | 94 76 a5 51 57 e8 ca 7f 03 67 20 8d 4f 67 4c fa | 4b b1 69 2c 13 e8 8f ca 63 68 da dc 28 46 cf 63 | 9c dc d0 9d c8 37 fe 30 0c 28 1a 0a c4 60 37 ce | 10 37 b1 dd 4f ff d3 b2 6a ff 27 ea 63 cd 8c 29 | 8a 80 ec 8d 7d ec b9 23 3a 01 cc ff 6a d0 72 81 | 4e 09 4e 83 bd 71 c5 48 02 f8 a4 27 57 70 67 8f | 77 01 1e 40 a9 9b dc 55 26 64 1e 9e cf e5 4a e5 | 11 8e c7 a8 52 cc 6d 40 7b 7c 3e f1 32 52 c3 bd | e3 18 f0 2d eb da 55 c5 f1 82 0c 8f 67 38 52 64 | 75 80 cc 10 32 c0 1a 03 3a aa 1e 7b ce f8 ad f0 | 5b fa 4c 5c a8 3d 27 e8 6c 3a 33 6e e7 f2 51 61 | cf 4d 84 de 18 eb 84 29 fc ae 36 9a 59 11 fb d4 | 24 b4 7d a8 2a eb f5 4e ff 5c 02 70 79 02 c2 66 | a5 89 3f fb 03 78 49 f8 99 10 83 d8 68 dc 92 25 | 7e 93 dd cd 3b ee 2c 02 e1 ce 58 c6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3833139279 (0xe479104f) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | current Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba6c70 (length 16) | dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | e4 79 10 4f | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba6bf0 (length 20) | c6 5f 0b 17 74 3f 43 0a f1 10 69 77 a6 47 00 35 | 06 12 5f bf | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: c6 5f 0b 17 74 3f 43 0a f1 10 69 77 a6 47 00 35 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 68 dc 92 25 7e 93 dd cd 3b ee 2c 02 e1 ce 58 c6 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 20 01 e4 79 10 4f 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 90 e4 e5 a9 bd 3e 38 db 46 1a 28 7d 82 86 38 7f | 15 46 6f 1d 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 34 c8 6f 56 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | 05 00 01 04 8f ef 86 7b a3 1f d4 7c aa ad a9 9d | 14 63 ab b6 5f 99 2f aa 0b 52 12 d3 d6 ca 22 7d | c1 57 0a 8c e2 14 5d 5c 23 6f ad 17 76 f2 43 73 | 1e e6 bb 03 99 a9 5e 92 05 61 f3 c1 ab f2 13 b8 | 76 bd 8d a9 23 2e be 72 7a 9b df f7 d5 80 79 7b | 69 ea 5a 60 c8 b0 0c 22 22 27 ee b9 b6 de b2 90 | 86 dc 11 59 95 04 d3 f4 23 cf 35 f7 48 1b 52 c2 | 76 3b 7b b2 40 64 34 1e 6b 16 c7 36 64 84 f5 60 | 47 12 fc 14 aa ba fd fe a4 fc 6b 37 85 eb fd a9 | 36 1b 1e ff d6 c0 e9 f2 25 13 15 ec 03 de bc 19 | 8e 23 05 06 7f f5 36 e7 43 0a 68 01 9c 8d 6b 43 | 36 75 20 5e a3 f7 b7 60 11 2e 0c 81 19 27 e4 6a | a5 e8 65 20 8a c2 ae da 9b e9 43 b9 42 98 6a 73 | 85 ba dc 4b da 31 77 a7 be ea f8 da 30 9e 21 da | ff 21 b6 8a fd 2e 8f 10 be ec bb 9d 00 2a ef 86 | 27 0f 07 c0 62 92 49 5d 2e fb e7 02 ac be f5 3e | 23 a6 b6 f7 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | e4 79 10 4f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200ba7824 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 34 c8 6f 56 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 b9 50 6e 63 | 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 37 5a 65 b0 | 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af 05 00 01 04 | 8f ef 86 7b a3 1f d4 7c aa ad a9 9d 14 63 ab b6 | 5f 99 2f aa 0b 52 12 d3 d6 ca 22 7d c1 57 0a 8c | e2 14 5d 5c 23 6f ad 17 76 f2 43 73 1e e6 bb 03 | 99 a9 5e 92 05 61 f3 c1 ab f2 13 b8 76 bd 8d a9 | 23 2e be 72 7a 9b df f7 d5 80 79 7b 69 ea 5a 60 | c8 b0 0c 22 22 27 ee b9 b6 de b2 90 86 dc 11 59 | 95 04 d3 f4 23 cf 35 f7 48 1b 52 c2 76 3b 7b b2 | 40 64 34 1e 6b 16 c7 36 64 84 f5 60 47 12 fc 14 | aa ba fd fe a4 fc 6b 37 85 eb fd a9 36 1b 1e ff | d6 c0 e9 f2 25 13 15 ec 03 de bc 19 8e 23 05 06 | 7f f5 36 e7 43 0a 68 01 9c 8d 6b 43 36 75 20 5e | a3 f7 b7 60 11 2e 0c 81 19 27 e4 6a a5 e8 65 20 | 8a c2 ae da 9b e9 43 b9 42 98 6a 73 85 ba dc 4b | da 31 77 a7 be ea f8 da 30 9e 21 da ff 21 b6 8a | fd 2e 8f 10 be ec bb 9d 00 2a ef 86 27 0f 07 c0 | 62 92 49 5d 2e fb e7 02 ac be f5 3e 23 a6 b6 f7 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 90 e4 e5 a9 bd 3e 38 db 46 1a 28 7d 82 86 38 7f | 15 46 6f 1d | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 90 e4 e5 a9 bd 3e 38 db 46 1a 28 7d 82 86 38 7f | 15 46 6f 1d | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #1: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | fc_try trying east:192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 vs east:192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | fc_try concluding with east [129] | fc_try east gives east | concluding with d = east | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #2 at 0x55e200ba82f0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #2 in UNDEFINED | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #1 "east" as #2 for IPSEC SA | #2 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #1.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #2: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 34 c8 6f 56 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 8f ef 86 7b a3 1f d4 7c aa ad a9 9d 14 63 ab b6 | 5f 99 2f aa 0b 52 12 d3 d6 ca 22 7d c1 57 0a 8c | e2 14 5d 5c 23 6f ad 17 76 f2 43 73 1e e6 bb 03 | 99 a9 5e 92 05 61 f3 c1 ab f2 13 b8 76 bd 8d a9 | 23 2e be 72 7a 9b df f7 d5 80 79 7b 69 ea 5a 60 | c8 b0 0c 22 22 27 ee b9 b6 de b2 90 86 dc 11 59 | 95 04 d3 f4 23 cf 35 f7 48 1b 52 c2 76 3b 7b b2 | 40 64 34 1e 6b 16 c7 36 64 84 f5 60 47 12 fc 14 | aa ba fd fe a4 fc 6b 37 85 eb fd a9 36 1b 1e ff | d6 c0 e9 f2 25 13 15 ec 03 de bc 19 8e 23 05 06 | 7f f5 36 e7 43 0a 68 01 9c 8d 6b 43 36 75 20 5e | a3 f7 b7 60 11 2e 0c 81 19 27 e4 6a a5 e8 65 20 | 8a c2 ae da 9b e9 43 b9 42 98 6a 73 85 ba dc 4b | da 31 77 a7 be ea f8 da 30 9e 21 da ff 21 b6 8a | fd 2e 8f 10 be ec bb 9d 00 2a ef 86 27 0f 07 c0 | 62 92 49 5d 2e fb e7 02 ac be f5 3e 23 a6 b6 f7 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 3 for state #2 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #2 and saving MD | #2 is busy; has a suspended MD | #1 spent 0.29 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.73 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 3 for state #2 | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 3 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2e0000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 71 06 be d0 79 da 43 cb df 1e e8 1e c0 fc eb a3 | ca 73 b2 cb 01 d5 30 5c 6b 79 e8 4f 5f 5b 08 23 | e3 7f 84 6a f4 dd 34 61 a0 65 0d 44 08 a8 39 00 | 69 98 42 3f e6 76 5b fa 73 fd 77 87 0f d5 94 ae | 5a 69 c3 5f 94 97 6a d0 0a d8 82 e5 c5 53 28 32 | eb d7 f6 86 39 c9 ff 07 6b 0e 3c 15 2e 8c 12 22 | 08 68 18 fc 33 b1 ba ca 4b 52 cd 80 62 bb f6 e8 | df 3a 52 4c 65 17 38 5f bb fd 35 f7 b8 8c 48 49 | 80 05 09 d1 0c c3 71 b6 5e 12 9c 7f 3d e5 11 d8 | 5a f1 be b2 64 0b a4 1f 5f d0 8d 88 24 47 2d 00 | d4 62 05 83 b7 67 2d 60 65 cf 27 72 d1 6b 0b 23 | a0 97 56 6d c3 cb cc 4c ad d0 1c 9b f6 1c b5 aa | 58 4b ae 4a cc 5e a1 21 19 75 b6 96 96 10 ef db | 3e 6f 74 e6 a5 01 4c 5b 48 4d d1 d4 54 e5 31 0d | 8b 62 02 a0 cd e3 64 95 82 b1 68 05 e2 b0 b9 96 | c7 62 3d 5e fd c1 29 50 ab 24 b5 21 41 22 eb 6c | Generated nonce: 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | Generated nonce: 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 3 time elapsed 0.001139 seconds | (#2) spent 1.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 3: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 3 for state #2 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007fa0 size 128 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87580 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba8de0 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #2 | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 3 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #2: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #2 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0000d60: transferring ownership from state #2 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 4 for state #2 | state #2 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 size 128 | suspending state #2 and saving MD | #2 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #2 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #2 spent 0.0683 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 4 for state #2 | crypto helper 6 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 4 | peer's g: 8f ef 86 7b a3 1f d4 7c aa ad a9 9d 14 63 ab b6 | peer's g: 5f 99 2f aa 0b 52 12 d3 d6 ca 22 7d c1 57 0a 8c | peer's g: e2 14 5d 5c 23 6f ad 17 76 f2 43 73 1e e6 bb 03 | peer's g: 99 a9 5e 92 05 61 f3 c1 ab f2 13 b8 76 bd 8d a9 | peer's g: 23 2e be 72 7a 9b df f7 d5 80 79 7b 69 ea 5a 60 | peer's g: c8 b0 0c 22 22 27 ee b9 b6 de b2 90 86 dc 11 59 | peer's g: 95 04 d3 f4 23 cf 35 f7 48 1b 52 c2 76 3b 7b b2 | peer's g: 40 64 34 1e 6b 16 c7 36 64 84 f5 60 47 12 fc 14 | peer's g: aa ba fd fe a4 fc 6b 37 85 eb fd a9 36 1b 1e ff | peer's g: d6 c0 e9 f2 25 13 15 ec 03 de bc 19 8e 23 05 06 | peer's g: 7f f5 36 e7 43 0a 68 01 9c 8d 6b 43 36 75 20 5e | peer's g: a3 f7 b7 60 11 2e 0c 81 19 27 e4 6a a5 e8 65 20 | peer's g: 8a c2 ae da 9b e9 43 b9 42 98 6a 73 85 ba dc 4b | peer's g: da 31 77 a7 be ea f8 da 30 9e 21 da ff 21 b6 8a | peer's g: fd 2e 8f 10 be ec bb 9d 00 2a ef 86 27 0f 07 c0 | peer's g: 62 92 49 5d 2e fb e7 02 ac be f5 3e 23 a6 b6 f7 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x7fb2e4006900 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 6 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 4 time elapsed 0.000993 seconds | (#2) spent 0.994 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 4: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 4 for state #2 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4003590 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #2 | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 4 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #2: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3833139279 (0xe479104f) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 34 c8 6f 56 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xae872ba3 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI ae 87 2b a3 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #2: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:e479104f} "east" #2: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #2: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | Nr 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 71 06 be d0 79 da 43 cb df 1e e8 1e c0 fc eb a3 | keyex value ca 73 b2 cb 01 d5 30 5c 6b 79 e8 4f 5f 5b 08 23 | keyex value e3 7f 84 6a f4 dd 34 61 a0 65 0d 44 08 a8 39 00 | keyex value 69 98 42 3f e6 76 5b fa 73 fd 77 87 0f d5 94 ae | keyex value 5a 69 c3 5f 94 97 6a d0 0a d8 82 e5 c5 53 28 32 | keyex value eb d7 f6 86 39 c9 ff 07 6b 0e 3c 15 2e 8c 12 22 | keyex value 08 68 18 fc 33 b1 ba ca 4b 52 cd 80 62 bb f6 e8 | keyex value df 3a 52 4c 65 17 38 5f bb fd 35 f7 b8 8c 48 49 | keyex value 80 05 09 d1 0c c3 71 b6 5e 12 9c 7f 3d e5 11 d8 | keyex value 5a f1 be b2 64 0b a4 1f 5f d0 8d 88 24 47 2d 00 | keyex value d4 62 05 83 b7 67 2d 60 65 cf 27 72 d1 6b 0b 23 | keyex value a0 97 56 6d c3 cb cc 4c ad d0 1c 9b f6 1c b5 aa | keyex value 58 4b ae 4a cc 5e a1 21 19 75 b6 96 96 10 ef db | keyex value 3e 6f 74 e6 a5 01 4c 5b 48 4d d1 d4 54 e5 31 0d | keyex value 8b 62 02 a0 cd e3 64 95 82 b1 68 05 e2 b0 b9 96 | keyex value c7 62 3d 5e fd c1 29 50 ab 24 b5 21 41 22 eb 6c | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #2 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba82d0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fe1c (length 4) | e4 79 10 4f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2dc002c90 (length 32) | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e1ff723974 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 ae 87 2b a3 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 23 f5 d9 88 | f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 24 6d c6 4f | 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a 05 00 01 04 | 71 06 be d0 79 da 43 cb df 1e e8 1e c0 fc eb a3 | ca 73 b2 cb 01 d5 30 5c 6b 79 e8 4f 5f 5b 08 23 | e3 7f 84 6a f4 dd 34 61 a0 65 0d 44 08 a8 39 00 | 69 98 42 3f e6 76 5b fa 73 fd 77 87 0f d5 94 ae | 5a 69 c3 5f 94 97 6a d0 0a d8 82 e5 c5 53 28 32 | eb d7 f6 86 39 c9 ff 07 6b 0e 3c 15 2e 8c 12 22 | 08 68 18 fc 33 b1 ba ca 4b 52 cd 80 62 bb f6 e8 | df 3a 52 4c 65 17 38 5f bb fd 35 f7 b8 8c 48 49 | 80 05 09 d1 0c c3 71 b6 5e 12 9c 7f 3d e5 11 d8 | 5a f1 be b2 64 0b a4 1f 5f d0 8d 88 24 47 2d 00 | d4 62 05 83 b7 67 2d 60 65 cf 27 72 d1 6b 0b 23 | a0 97 56 6d c3 cb cc 4c ad d0 1c 9b f6 1c b5 aa | 58 4b ae 4a cc 5e a1 21 19 75 b6 96 96 10 ef db | 3e 6f 74 e6 a5 01 4c 5b 48 4d d1 d4 54 e5 31 0d | 8b 62 02 a0 cd e3 64 95 82 b1 68 05 e2 b0 b9 96 | c7 62 3d 5e fd c1 29 50 ab 24 b5 21 41 22 eb 6c | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 20) | df 73 a4 11 6f a2 30 73 8a ca ab be c0 35 6e 8e | 3e 3d 19 f5 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | df 73 a4 11 6f a2 30 73 8a ca ab be c0 35 6e 8e | 3e 3d 19 f5 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf50 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 73 08 ffffff88 ffffffd3 ffffffc1 00 1c 03 6e ffffffc8 4f 36 5c ffffff98 0b ffffffdf 0d 66 5e ffffff92 fffffff6 18 ffffffba ffffff93 ffffffb9 27 fffffff2 ffffffac 03 ffffffd5 ffffffc5 5b 10 48 71 18 7c 05 ffffffdf 6b ffffffa5 fffffff9 28 70 ffffffce 3d 2d fffffffa 65 47 1a 72 72 ffffffcd ffffff91 ffffffd5 33 21 ffffffb0 ffffffbb ffffffbc 05 ffffffe4 47 ffffffc6 2f ffffffec 28 ffffffd6 ffffffb9 56 fffffff6 79 fffffff0 ffffffe4 3f 28 43 5a 36 33 ffffffd7 4a ffffffb0 5f 6e 0e fffffff6 ffffffa9 5b ffffff98 61 0c 20 ffffffc8 40 0f ffffffea 24 ffffffc4 3c 74 ffffff98 31 ffffffe8 70 2c 17 ffffffe7 ffffffb8 ffffff9c ffffff89 ffffffb2 25 ffffff8c 21 ffffff82 ffffffcb ffffffb5 7e 55 19 09 ffffffaf 27 ffffffbc ffffffb9 4b 54 78 ffffffe7 56 15 06 2f ffffffe7 ffffffec ffffffc1 5f ffffffd9 74 ffffff81 36 ffffffaf 78 7a 57 3e ffffffcf 49 62 ffffffc1 2f 1c 2d ffffffdf ffffffab 6d ffffffa9 ffffff8d ffffffa2 77 ffffffcf ffffffa5 ffffff93 ffffffde | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bb02f0 | unwrapped: 5d 54 af be 98 4b 1f a3 51 5a bd f9 3c 7e d2 2e | unwrapped: 91 d8 59 92 e3 56 1a 19 20 11 5e 66 f5 19 78 f1 | unwrapped: 83 8d 09 1a dd 56 34 da f9 9a 5b 23 80 18 83 73 | unwrapped: bc 7f 07 2e 98 d2 89 20 0d 5d 00 4d b3 31 94 6e | unwrapped: 2a 80 b8 7e 27 2c 25 e0 62 22 19 d4 5b a0 57 be | unwrapped: ca 27 3a e8 63 45 52 cb 6b 00 63 c2 e5 7c 34 d5 | unwrapped: ab 65 dc 8d da 24 ff d0 fa d9 d0 df 77 bb 98 38 | unwrapped: a1 91 b2 58 c2 36 78 4f 83 99 3d be ac 3c 09 9e | unwrapped: 33 87 63 73 e0 5a 9e d5 09 29 39 8a 1d 82 30 77 | unwrapped: 72 49 9e 0a 60 a7 00 e4 60 04 ae cc 92 66 81 95 | unwrapped: ea 6d 51 f1 ca 0a bc 9e 1f 27 52 c6 45 ba c5 14 | unwrapped: fc 0e d4 31 36 f3 84 cb a3 f7 40 f3 24 06 16 89 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 06 29 cc ed 0f 35 fa 43 71 48 1e 43 59 5c | unwrapped: 39 e2 34 9a 71 4a 2a 96 3a 57 13 9a 7c 0c c3 0f | unwrapped: 6c 29 a7 54 d6 1f df c6 f0 31 d2 aa 14 34 b3 72 | unwrapped: 78 cb 46 cc 88 25 be a4 fb d7 b0 10 86 4d a3 ae | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 73 08 ffffff88 ffffffd3 ffffffc1 00 1c 03 6e ffffffc8 4f 36 5c ffffff98 0b ffffffdf 0d 66 5e ffffff92 fffffff6 18 ffffffba ffffff93 ffffffb9 27 fffffff2 ffffffac 03 ffffffd5 ffffffc5 5b 10 48 71 18 7c 05 ffffffdf 6b ffffffa5 fffffff9 28 70 ffffffce 3d 2d fffffffa 65 47 1a 72 72 ffffffcd ffffff91 ffffffd5 33 21 ffffffb0 ffffffbb ffffffbc 05 ffffffe4 47 ffffffc6 2f ffffffec 28 ffffffd6 ffffffb9 56 fffffff6 79 fffffff0 ffffffe4 3f 28 43 5a 36 33 ffffffd7 4a ffffffb0 5f 6e 0e fffffff6 ffffffa9 5b ffffff98 61 0c 20 ffffffc8 40 0f ffffffea 24 ffffffc4 3c 74 ffffff98 31 ffffffe8 70 2c 17 ffffffe7 ffffffb8 ffffff9c ffffff89 ffffffb2 25 ffffff8c 21 ffffff82 ffffffcb ffffffb5 7e 55 19 09 ffffffaf 27 ffffffbc ffffffb9 4b 54 78 ffffffe7 56 15 06 2f ffffffe7 ffffffec ffffffc1 5f ffffffd9 74 ffffff81 36 ffffffaf 78 7a 57 3e ffffffcf 49 62 ffffffc1 2f 1c 2d ffffffdf ffffffab 6d ffffffa9 ffffff8d ffffffa2 77 ffffffcf ffffffa5 ffffff93 ffffffde | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200baffc0 | unwrapped: 5d 54 af be 98 4b 1f a3 51 5a bd f9 3c 7e d2 2e | unwrapped: 91 d8 59 92 e3 56 1a 19 20 11 5e 66 f5 19 78 f1 | unwrapped: 83 8d 09 1a dd 56 34 da f9 9a 5b 23 80 18 83 73 | unwrapped: bc 7f 07 2e 98 d2 89 20 0d 5d 00 4d b3 31 94 6e | unwrapped: 2a 80 b8 7e 27 2c 25 e0 62 22 19 d4 5b a0 57 be | unwrapped: ca 27 3a e8 63 45 52 cb 6b 00 63 c2 e5 7c 34 d5 | unwrapped: ab 65 dc 8d da 24 ff d0 fa d9 d0 df 77 bb 98 38 | unwrapped: a1 91 b2 58 c2 36 78 4f 83 99 3d be ac 3c 09 9e | unwrapped: 33 87 63 73 e0 5a 9e d5 09 29 39 8a 1d 82 30 77 | unwrapped: 72 49 9e 0a 60 a7 00 e4 60 04 ae cc 92 66 81 95 | unwrapped: ea 6d 51 f1 ca 0a bc 9e 1f 27 52 c6 45 ba c5 14 | unwrapped: fc 0e d4 31 36 f3 84 cb a3 f7 40 f3 24 06 16 89 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 06 29 cc ed 0f 35 fa 43 71 48 1e 43 59 5c | unwrapped: 39 e2 34 9a 71 4a 2a 96 3a 57 13 9a 7c 0c c3 0f | unwrapped: 6c 29 a7 54 d6 1f df c6 f0 31 d2 aa 14 34 b3 72 | unwrapped: 78 cb 46 cc 88 25 be a4 fb d7 b0 10 86 4d a3 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba84f8 (length 4) | ae 87 2b a3 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba84d8 (length 4) | 34 c8 6f 56 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc002c90 (length 32) | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc002c90 (length 32) | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004190 (length 32) | 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004190 (length 32) | 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e200ba8db0 (length 20) | 7c fc 0a 3d 0b 6e 88 f3 05 b4 bb ab 2e 43 fd 4d | f7 09 f0 30 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e200ba8e70 (length 20) | e1 96 90 c7 c2 a7 e4 75 b6 9d ef 5c ae 32 71 5a | 2b d9 10 17 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7670 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba82d0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8db0 (length 20) | 7c fc 0a 3d 0b 6e 88 f3 05 b4 bb ab 2e 43 fd 4d | f7 09 f0 30 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8e70 (length 20) | e1 96 90 c7 c2 a7 e4 75 b6 9d ef 5c ae 32 71 5a | 2b d9 10 17 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 73 08 ffffff88 ffffffd3 ffffffc1 00 1c 03 6e ffffffc8 4f 36 5c ffffff98 0b ffffffdf 0d 66 5e ffffff92 fffffff6 18 ffffffba ffffff93 ffffffb9 27 fffffff2 ffffffac 03 ffffffd5 ffffffc5 5b 10 48 71 18 7c 05 ffffffdf 6b ffffffa5 fffffff9 28 70 ffffffce 3d 2d fffffffa 65 47 1a 72 72 ffffffcd ffffff91 ffffffd5 33 21 ffffffb0 ffffffbb ffffffbc 05 ffffffe4 47 ffffffc6 2f ffffffec 28 ffffffd6 ffffffb9 56 fffffff6 79 fffffff0 ffffffe4 3f 28 43 5a 36 33 ffffffd7 4a ffffffb0 5f 6e 0e fffffff6 ffffffa9 5b ffffff98 61 0c 20 ffffffc8 40 0f ffffffea 24 ffffffc4 3c 74 ffffff98 31 ffffffe8 70 2c 17 ffffffe7 ffffffb8 ffffff9c ffffff89 ffffffb2 25 ffffff8c 21 ffffff82 ffffffcb ffffffb5 7e 55 19 09 ffffffaf 27 ffffffbc ffffffb9 4b 54 78 ffffffe7 56 15 06 2f ffffffe7 ffffffec ffffffc1 5f ffffffd9 74 ffffff81 36 ffffffaf 78 7a 57 3e ffffffcf 49 62 ffffffc1 2f 1c 2d ffffffdf ffffffab 6d ffffffa9 ffffff8d ffffffa2 77 ffffffcf ffffffa5 ffffff93 ffffffde | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bafeb0 | unwrapped: 5d 54 af be 98 4b 1f a3 51 5a bd f9 3c 7e d2 2e | unwrapped: 91 d8 59 92 e3 56 1a 19 20 11 5e 66 f5 19 78 f1 | unwrapped: 83 8d 09 1a dd 56 34 da f9 9a 5b 23 80 18 83 73 | unwrapped: bc 7f 07 2e 98 d2 89 20 0d 5d 00 4d b3 31 94 6e | unwrapped: 2a 80 b8 7e 27 2c 25 e0 62 22 19 d4 5b a0 57 be | unwrapped: ca 27 3a e8 63 45 52 cb 6b 00 63 c2 e5 7c 34 d5 | unwrapped: ab 65 dc 8d da 24 ff d0 fa d9 d0 df 77 bb 98 38 | unwrapped: a1 91 b2 58 c2 36 78 4f 83 99 3d be ac 3c 09 9e | unwrapped: 33 87 63 73 e0 5a 9e d5 09 29 39 8a 1d 82 30 77 | unwrapped: 72 49 9e 0a 60 a7 00 e4 60 04 ae cc 92 66 81 95 | unwrapped: ea 6d 51 f1 ca 0a bc 9e 1f 27 52 c6 45 ba c5 14 | unwrapped: fc 0e d4 31 36 f3 84 cb a3 f7 40 f3 24 06 16 89 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 06 29 cc ed 0f 35 fa 43 71 48 1e 43 59 5c | unwrapped: 39 e2 34 9a 71 4a 2a 96 3a 57 13 9a 7c 0c c3 0f | unwrapped: 6c 29 a7 54 d6 1f df c6 f0 31 d2 aa 14 34 b3 72 | unwrapped: 78 cb 46 cc 88 25 be a4 fb d7 b0 10 86 4d a3 ae | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 73 08 ffffff88 ffffffd3 ffffffc1 00 1c 03 6e ffffffc8 4f 36 5c ffffff98 0b ffffffdf 0d 66 5e ffffff92 fffffff6 18 ffffffba ffffff93 ffffffb9 27 fffffff2 ffffffac 03 ffffffd5 ffffffc5 5b 10 48 71 18 7c 05 ffffffdf 6b ffffffa5 fffffff9 28 70 ffffffce 3d 2d fffffffa 65 47 1a 72 72 ffffffcd ffffff91 ffffffd5 33 21 ffffffb0 ffffffbb ffffffbc 05 ffffffe4 47 ffffffc6 2f ffffffec 28 ffffffd6 ffffffb9 56 fffffff6 79 fffffff0 ffffffe4 3f 28 43 5a 36 33 ffffffd7 4a ffffffb0 5f 6e 0e fffffff6 ffffffa9 5b ffffff98 61 0c 20 ffffffc8 40 0f ffffffea 24 ffffffc4 3c 74 ffffff98 31 ffffffe8 70 2c 17 ffffffe7 ffffffb8 ffffff9c ffffff89 ffffffb2 25 ffffff8c 21 ffffff82 ffffffcb ffffffb5 7e 55 19 09 ffffffaf 27 ffffffbc ffffffb9 4b 54 78 ffffffe7 56 15 06 2f ffffffe7 ffffffec ffffffc1 5f ffffffd9 74 ffffff81 36 ffffffaf 78 7a 57 3e ffffffcf 49 62 ffffffc1 2f 1c 2d ffffffdf ffffffab 6d ffffffa9 ffffff8d ffffffa2 77 ffffffcf ffffffa5 ffffff93 ffffffde | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bab080 | unwrapped: 5d 54 af be 98 4b 1f a3 51 5a bd f9 3c 7e d2 2e | unwrapped: 91 d8 59 92 e3 56 1a 19 20 11 5e 66 f5 19 78 f1 | unwrapped: 83 8d 09 1a dd 56 34 da f9 9a 5b 23 80 18 83 73 | unwrapped: bc 7f 07 2e 98 d2 89 20 0d 5d 00 4d b3 31 94 6e | unwrapped: 2a 80 b8 7e 27 2c 25 e0 62 22 19 d4 5b a0 57 be | unwrapped: ca 27 3a e8 63 45 52 cb 6b 00 63 c2 e5 7c 34 d5 | unwrapped: ab 65 dc 8d da 24 ff d0 fa d9 d0 df 77 bb 98 38 | unwrapped: a1 91 b2 58 c2 36 78 4f 83 99 3d be ac 3c 09 9e | unwrapped: 33 87 63 73 e0 5a 9e d5 09 29 39 8a 1d 82 30 77 | unwrapped: 72 49 9e 0a 60 a7 00 e4 60 04 ae cc 92 66 81 95 | unwrapped: ea 6d 51 f1 ca 0a bc 9e 1f 27 52 c6 45 ba c5 14 | unwrapped: fc 0e d4 31 36 f3 84 cb a3 f7 40 f3 24 06 16 89 | unwrapped: 7c 6a 06 29 cc ed 0f 35 fa 43 71 48 1e 43 59 5c | unwrapped: 39 e2 34 9a 71 4a 2a 96 3a 57 13 9a 7c 0c c3 0f | unwrapped: 6c 29 a7 54 d6 1f df c6 f0 31 d2 aa 14 34 b3 72 | unwrapped: 78 cb 46 cc 88 25 be a4 fb d7 b0 10 86 4d a3 ae | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba84f8 (length 4) | ae 87 2b a3 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba84d8 (length 4) | 34 c8 6f 56 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc002c90 (length 32) | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc002c90 (length 32) | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004190 (length 32) | 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004190 (length 32) | 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e200ba8dc4 (length 20) | b8 fb 65 c7 5d 1b 40 0a b7 d3 51 15 f2 7a 99 5a | bd 31 2f 61 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e200ba8e84 (length 20) | 57 cf d3 c0 d1 cc b3 19 b6 14 f9 03 31 b6 b5 6d | 9d 29 f8 d2 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55e200ba82f0 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#2 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.34c86f56@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.ae872ba3@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 df 73 a4 11 6f a2 30 73 8a ca ab be | encrypting: c0 35 6e 8e 3e 3d 19 f5 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 ae 87 2b a3 | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 | encrypting: 79 02 c5 57 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 | encrypting: 5b a1 3c 4a 05 00 01 04 71 06 be d0 79 da 43 cb | encrypting: df 1e e8 1e c0 fc eb a3 ca 73 b2 cb 01 d5 30 5c | encrypting: 6b 79 e8 4f 5f 5b 08 23 e3 7f 84 6a f4 dd 34 61 | encrypting: a0 65 0d 44 08 a8 39 00 69 98 42 3f e6 76 5b fa | encrypting: 73 fd 77 87 0f d5 94 ae 5a 69 c3 5f 94 97 6a d0 | encrypting: 0a d8 82 e5 c5 53 28 32 eb d7 f6 86 39 c9 ff 07 | encrypting: 6b 0e 3c 15 2e 8c 12 22 08 68 18 fc 33 b1 ba ca | encrypting: 4b 52 cd 80 62 bb f6 e8 df 3a 52 4c 65 17 38 5f | encrypting: bb fd 35 f7 b8 8c 48 49 80 05 09 d1 0c c3 71 b6 | encrypting: 5e 12 9c 7f 3d e5 11 d8 5a f1 be b2 64 0b a4 1f | encrypting: 5f d0 8d 88 24 47 2d 00 d4 62 05 83 b7 67 2d 60 | encrypting: 65 cf 27 72 d1 6b 0b 23 a0 97 56 6d c3 cb cc 4c | encrypting: ad d0 1c 9b f6 1c b5 aa 58 4b ae 4a cc 5e a1 21 | encrypting: 19 75 b6 96 96 10 ef db 3e 6f 74 e6 a5 01 4c 5b | encrypting: 48 4d d1 d4 54 e5 31 0d 8b 62 02 a0 cd e3 64 95 | encrypting: 82 b1 68 05 e2 b0 b9 96 c7 62 3d 5e fd c1 29 50 | encrypting: ab 24 b5 21 41 22 eb 6c 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: 68 dc 92 25 7e 93 dd cd 3b ee 2c 02 e1 ce 58 c6 | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 31 27 d6 71 21 42 2b f4 ea f4 8e ca ad df de 36 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #2 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #2: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #2 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #2) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 20 01 e4 79 10 4f 00 00 01 bc d9 5c 63 1d | 67 5a 59 a1 05 53 eb ab 3c 7a 68 45 2e 20 70 7d | e2 7e 6e 6a 6d 38 3d 40 f6 32 e1 c3 be 9a 07 c9 | 1b 6b 03 e7 19 8e c2 e9 5c 72 a4 fe c9 20 7d e5 | 65 aa 0f 85 b9 83 d7 f9 d3 7f dc 08 a3 c6 9c 06 | 4f 4c c1 91 07 78 b5 7b 43 5d 15 bc 3c 54 70 45 | 28 9e bd 4c 0f 15 d1 4f 56 a5 88 9e 7d 9e 69 53 | 38 8c d3 04 fe 45 d0 b8 f1 f0 0d 5f c8 93 f6 84 | bb 87 99 0d 16 50 ba 94 a8 4a 9f 50 bf 88 49 e5 | 91 f7 0a 47 28 9b 33 ee e6 6b 60 5f e3 36 5c 08 | af 7f f2 cb 4b 2a dc ec 60 96 36 57 f0 16 23 6d | 93 f9 b1 89 63 5a 26 40 95 a5 70 8b 85 25 5d 4b | 20 a9 a0 65 7c ec 29 f4 b4 39 7f c1 0e 28 0f 92 | d5 a0 6e fd a1 59 44 20 07 f8 b8 20 ce 8f 97 95 | c4 0e c8 91 7a a5 ce 23 0a e2 68 9f 2f 02 3f fa | 13 06 69 90 1f b1 0d 2a 4a ec 87 a4 6a fc 0f d4 | 24 de 3e 50 6e 13 2c 82 50 c9 4d 4a 19 7c 01 53 | bf 78 1b 99 c6 84 d5 de 26 d5 47 3d a4 89 81 3f | ea 80 1c 0c 78 06 da 5a 90 20 b6 35 87 45 02 9f | 6c ba eb 0c ca 0e fc 1d 05 e6 dc d0 2b 0b 2b ef | 91 e2 f3 67 94 8f d2 8a 29 23 62 59 9d 00 d5 b2 | 8b 1b b6 c9 a8 99 27 48 ee 02 86 cb 85 25 69 c3 | aa b2 05 9c 80 f1 df 02 9a 64 fb 2b 2a 71 3e b9 | ce 3e 26 09 5a 61 26 57 8b af 29 8f 77 9c 9d a5 | 33 79 71 a6 17 d5 51 bf 8f 55 37 77 e0 56 85 fd | 4d 18 98 a7 ba 66 7b 96 ee 01 a9 fb 31 27 d6 71 | 21 42 2b f4 ea f4 8e ca ad df de 36 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 size 128 | #2 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48950.783769 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #2: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x34c86f56 <0xae872ba3 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #2 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #2 spent 1.93 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4003590 | spent 0.00307 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 20 01 e4 79 10 4f 00 00 00 3c 12 45 68 ae | 8a 08 21 72 41 fa 02 ce b7 0c 73 8b cf a8 9c d2 | 5f d6 6f 2b 60 d9 12 28 42 62 af 05 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3833139279 (0xe479104f) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #2 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #2 is idle | #2 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 31 27 d6 71 21 42 2b f4 ea f4 8e ca ad df de 36 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: cf a8 9c d2 5f d6 6f 2b 60 d9 12 28 42 62 af 05 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 20 01 e4 79 10 4f 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | a2 63 b1 6c 07 36 07 0d 4a 07 1f 53 53 3c 03 e0 | 95 65 ef 59 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | e4 79 10 4f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2dc002c90 (length 32) | b9 50 6e 63 7a ec eb de 29 21 b5 b8 72 49 2b a2 | 37 5a 65 b0 78 8f f7 42 c1 ee ef a3 83 b8 58 af | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fb2e0004190 (length 32) | 23 f5 d9 88 f0 79 c7 94 1f 5c d5 02 79 02 c5 57 | 24 6d c6 4f 3e 7b 64 e4 df a9 95 44 5b a1 3c 4a | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | a2 63 b1 6c 07 36 07 0d 4a 07 1f 53 53 3c 03 e0 | 95 65 ef 59 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | a2 63 b1 6c 07 36 07 0d 4a 07 1f 53 53 3c 03 e0 | 95 65 ef 59 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #2: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | sr for #2: unrouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:null esr:{(nil)} ro:null rosr:{(nil)} and state: #2 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection add eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI_OUT=0xae8 | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI_OUT=0xae872ba3 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb prepare | command executing prepare-client | executing prepare-client: PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI | popen cmd is 1025 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_IN: | cmd( 80):TERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@e: | cmd( 160):ast' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLI: | cmd( 240):ENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID=: | cmd( 320):'16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_: | cmd( 400):PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 480):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='': | cmd( 560): PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PF: | cmd( 640):S+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' : | cmd( 720):PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_D: | cmd( 800):NS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' P: | cmd( 880):LUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SH: | cmd( 960):ARED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI_OUT=0xae872ba3 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb route | command executing route-client | executing route-client: PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI_OUT | popen cmd is 1023 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTE: | cmd( 80):RFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@eas: | cmd( 160):t' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIEN: | cmd( 240):T_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1: | cmd( 320):6388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PE: | cmd( 400):ER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MAS: | cmd( 480):K='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' P: | cmd( 560):LUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+: | cmd( 640):IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PL: | cmd( 720):UTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS: | cmd( 800):_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLU: | cmd( 880):TO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHAR: | cmd( 960):ED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI_OUT=0xae872ba3 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55e200ba49a0,sr=0x55e200ba49a0} to #2 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #1 spent 0.516 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #2 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#2) cloned from #1 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #2 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #2: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #2 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #2 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 size 128 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #2: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x34c86f56 <0xae872ba3 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #2 spent 0.592 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.803 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00408 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0026 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00264 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00285 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 05 01 b2 35 3c 4a 00 00 00 4c 42 1a c5 70 | d5 20 16 ab a9 3b 35 d2 e3 0d 4e d6 8b e3 0a 8c | 64 a2 12 5f 2b 33 b7 9b bf 30 c9 6a 41 7c bd 75 | dd 76 11 7b 0f f5 3d f9 d0 bd 14 94 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2989833290 (0xb2353c4a) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #2; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=e479104f st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #1; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #1 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | current Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba6c70 (length 16) | dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | b2 35 3c 4a | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba6bf0 (length 20) | 19 d1 e5 a5 43 2f 5b 3c e1 61 13 94 a7 30 b9 18 | d9 ed 32 95 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 19 d1 e5 a5 43 2f 5b 3c e1 61 13 94 a7 30 b9 18 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 41 7c bd 75 dd 76 11 7b 0f f5 3d f9 d0 bd 14 94 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 05 01 b2 35 3c 4a 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | 85 2e 78 43 d0 67 49 99 05 3d 8a 76 c4 64 09 6d | 83 36 16 b5 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 34 c8 6f 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | b2 35 3c 4a | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b03494 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 34 c8 6f 56 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 85 2e 78 43 d0 67 49 99 05 3d 8a 76 c4 64 09 6d | 83 36 16 b5 | informational HASH(1): | 85 2e 78 43 d0 67 49 99 05 3d 8a 76 c4 64 09 6d | 83 36 16 b5 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 34 c8 6f 56 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #1: received Delete SA(0x34c86f56) payload: deleting IPsec State #2 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #2: deleting other state #2 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.252s and sending notification | child state #2: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.34c86f56@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.ae872ba3@192.1.2.23 "east" #2: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #2 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1403424185 (0x53a68db9) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload ae 87 2b a3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dbe8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001230 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dccc (length 4) | 53 a6 8d b9 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e074 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 ae 87 2b a3 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e060 (length 20) | 60 8d d5 ac 41 f9 6a e5 e2 87 66 26 b2 04 38 32 | e9 5e f1 d6 | send delete HASH(1): | 60 8d d5 ac 41 f9 6a e5 e2 87 66 26 b2 04 38 32 | e9 5e f1 d6 | last Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | current Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba6c70 (length 16) | dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dcdc (length 4) | 53 a6 8d b9 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba6bf0 (length 20) | f7 a7 27 fe b4 dc 0a 5a c2 9b 77 ab 7d 85 ff 20 | 1e 2b 31 6a | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 60 8d d5 ac 41 f9 6a e5 e2 87 66 26 | encrypting: b2 04 38 32 e9 5e f1 d6 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 ae 87 2b a3 | IV: f7 a7 27 fe b4 dc 0a 5a c2 9b 77 ab 7d 85 ff 20 | IV: 1e 2b 31 6a | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: ef 8e 42 9d 08 2a 4b e0 ee 9f 59 3f 45 83 c1 65 | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 05 01 53 a6 8d b9 00 00 00 4c c0 dc 6e 6a | c7 a6 6c 71 12 4f 5d 4b d9 d5 8d 49 df 96 4d da | 68 99 ed bb cc 79 47 44 7e 12 75 3e ef 8e 42 9d | 08 2a 4b e0 ee 9f 59 3f 45 83 c1 65 | state #2 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc008420 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2e4002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050304' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050304' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x34c86f56 SPI_OUT=0xae872ba3 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.34c86f56@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.34c86f56@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.ae872ba3@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.ae872ba3@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #2 in QUICK_R2 | child state #2: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #2 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #1: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.314s and sending notification | parent state #1: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #1 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1875482186 (0x6fc9964a) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3db88 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc6c (length 4) | 6f c9 96 4a | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e014 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 13 ef 77 1f | 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e000 (length 20) | b6 95 50 da 3d 67 ad 9a fe 8f 15 5a 47 61 b9 36 | 37 72 46 13 | send delete HASH(1): | b6 95 50 da 3d 67 ad 9a fe 8f 15 5a 47 61 b9 36 | 37 72 46 13 | last Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | current Phase 1 IV: dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba6c70 (length 16) | dd 93 86 74 ee 5d 20 0b 68 cd 43 c0 0d 4f f5 00 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc7c (length 4) | 6f c9 96 4a | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba6bf0 (length 20) | f1 7a c7 38 5a b0 7d 49 c0 d6 a4 e2 49 03 0c 03 | 9e 9e 3c 79 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 b6 95 50 da 3d 67 ad 9a fe 8f 15 5a | encrypting: 47 61 b9 36 37 72 46 13 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 | encrypting: 79 cf ac cd | IV: f1 7a c7 38 5a b0 7d 49 c0 d6 a4 e2 49 03 0c 03 | IV: 9e 9e 3c 79 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 88 ae 3b 9d f8 f4 5a 43 d5 b2 56 6d bb cf 29 f5 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 05 01 6f c9 96 4a 00 00 00 5c 77 d6 45 3b | e4 58 17 cd 4b 4f a9 13 64 11 ca 83 bd 61 b5 92 | 06 85 44 dc c3 90 d4 e8 96 ec 98 90 01 67 78 5f | b6 37 b6 a2 28 7e 7a 31 76 af a7 65 88 ae 3b 9d | f8 f4 5a 43 d5 b2 56 6d bb cf 29 f5 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #1: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.38 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00161 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | 08 10 05 01 b9 a3 00 f4 00 00 00 5c 90 b7 7b e7 | 72 99 19 2c 9b 11 6a 31 99 bd 91 dc f8 ee b7 fc | 1e c7 c7 28 7e 26 6f 0e b8 46 ff 68 2a e9 bc 55 | 42 41 cb 9f ac 8f 97 b8 22 38 8c 9e a2 f1 4a a4 | 19 7b a7 66 72 02 da 38 a4 c5 ad a9 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | responder cookie: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3114467572 (0xb9a300f4) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0xb9a300f4 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 13 ef 77 1f 50 b5 66 99 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | e4 fd b7 26 79 cf ac cd | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0674 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00443 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00252 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 208 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 0c 21 1e bf f7 19 78 2f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 0d 00 00 3c | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 | 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 | af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 | 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f | 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 | 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0c 21 1e bf f7 19 78 2f | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 208 (0xd0) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 02 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 99 95 f3 b3 22 a3 a4 df fa aa b3 93 55 de 3f ac | 3b 63 8f 94 c5 c9 de 59 d5 e4 b0 73 09 62 af e4 | creating state object #3 at 0x55e200ba67e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #3 in UNDEFINED | pstats #3 ikev1.isakmp started | #3 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #3: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 0c 21 1e bf f7 19 78 2f "east" #3: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0c 21 1e bf f7 19 78 2f | responder cookie: | 99 95 f3 b3 22 a3 a4 df | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #3: repeated OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute in Oakley Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #3 is idle "east" #3: sending notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0c 21 1e bf f7 19 78 2f | responder cookie: | 99 95 f3 b3 22 a3 a4 df | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #3) | 0c 21 1e bf f7 19 78 2f 99 95 f3 b3 22 a3 a4 df | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.557 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00287 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 208 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 67 55 86 4b 90 93 63 46 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 0d 00 00 3c | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 | 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 | af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 | 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f | 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 | 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 67 55 86 4b 90 93 63 46 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 208 (0xd0) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 03 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 1b e4 0e c5 98 fd a2 92 46 1f a0 00 b4 6b 48 60 | 0e 69 df ff a8 a4 47 6a b5 a5 c6 8c 89 df f7 af | creating state object #4 at 0x55e200ba82d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #4 in UNDEFINED | pstats #4 ikev1.isakmp started | #4 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #4: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 67 55 86 4b 90 93 63 46 "east" #4: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 67 55 86 4b 90 93 63 46 | responder cookie: | 1b e4 0e c5 98 fd a2 92 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #4: repeated OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute in Oakley Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #4 is idle "east" #4: sending notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 67 55 86 4b 90 93 63 46 | responder cookie: | 1b e4 0e c5 98 fd a2 92 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #4) | 67 55 86 4b 90 93 63 46 1b e4 0e c5 98 fd a2 92 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.562 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00254 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 04 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e 58 9a 9f cd cf cf c9 21 | d1 d4 c6 c4 02 c2 ee eb 11 7b d3 fc e9 db 5f 36 | creating state object #5 at 0x55e200bab240 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #5 in UNDEFINED | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp started | #5 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #5: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 "east" #5: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #5 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #5: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.585 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00272 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | 14 00 00 24 96 a7 2b ce 6c d7 2e 3d 17 a5 a7 96 | b7 4d f4 a6 0e 04 80 33 5a 1e cb 1e ec 62 38 fc | 97 c5 6b 69 14 00 00 18 da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e | 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 02 4b 1a 3d 00 00 00 18 | d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | ff e8 33 7f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #5 is idle | #5 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bab7d8 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bab7e0 (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | 02 4b 1a 3d | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | natd_hash: rcookie= a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | natd_hash: hash= 02 4b 1a 3d | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bab7d8 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bab7e0 (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | ff e8 33 7f | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | natd_hash: rcookie= a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | natd_hash: hash= ff e8 33 7f | expected NAT-D(me): da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | expected NAT-D(me): 02 4b 1a 3d | expected NAT-D(him): | d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | ff e8 33 7f | received NAT-D: da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | received NAT-D: 02 4b 1a 3d | received NAT-D: d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | received NAT-D: ff e8 33 7f | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 5 for state #5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #5 and saving MD | #5 is busy; has a suspended MD | #5 spent 0.179 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.319 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 5 for state #5 | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 5 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d8000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2d8000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | Generated nonce: ef 9c 66 68 2d 86 10 03 0c 23 36 af 67 85 e1 ab | Generated nonce: b4 ff b2 46 df 3b 4e 53 c1 13 12 1b ea 08 13 27 | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 5 time elapsed 0.001122 seconds | (#5) spent 1.08 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 5: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 5 for state #5 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8006900 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #5 | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 5 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #5: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d8000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #5 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | keyex value 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | keyex value e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | keyex value 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | keyex value 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | keyex value a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | keyex value 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | keyex value 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | keyex value e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | keyex value fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | keyex value 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | keyex value eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | keyex value 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | keyex value ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | keyex value 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | keyex value 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr ef 9c 66 68 2d 86 10 03 0c 23 36 af 67 85 e1 ab | Nr b4 ff b2 46 df 3b 4e 53 c1 13 12 1b ea 08 13 27 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | ff e8 33 7f | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | natd_hash: rcookie= a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | natd_hash: hash= ff e8 33 7f | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 | NAT-D ff e8 33 7f | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | 02 4b 1a 3d | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | natd_hash: rcookie= a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | natd_hash: hash= 02 4b 1a 3d | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | NAT-D 02 4b 1a 3d | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d8000d60: transferring ownership from state #5 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 6 for state #5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #5 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #5 is idle; has background offloaded task | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 6 for state #5 | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 6 | peer's g: c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | peer's g: 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | peer's g: d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | peer's g: a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | peer's g: 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | peer's g: e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | peer's g: 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | peer's g: a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | peer's g: 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | peer's g: bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | peer's g: 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | peer's g: c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | peer's g: 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | peer's g: eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | peer's g: aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | peer's g: 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d8000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b8a680 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb11f0 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc002090 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb1214 (length 32) | 96 a7 2b ce 6c d7 2e 3d 17 a5 a7 96 b7 4d f4 a6 | 0e 04 80 33 5a 1e cb 1e ec 62 38 fc 97 c5 6b 69 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb1234 (length 32) | ef 9c 66 68 2d 86 10 03 0c 23 36 af 67 85 e1 ab | b4 ff b2 46 df 3b 4e 53 c1 13 12 1b ea 08 13 27 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001090 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338048: 23 6b 12 16 40 ffffffa8 ffffff9e 55 ffffff9a 15 61 ffffffe7 ffffffe6 fffffffa 4e 73 ffffffa2 ffffff8e fffffff9 ffffffaf 36 ffffffa3 ffffffc8 ffffff88 5b ffffffd6 ffffffb5 ffffffe9 ffffffc4 38 ffffffa3 ffffff8f 6b 74 ffffffbf 0a fffffffc 7f ffffffb1 fffffff7 5f ffffffba 3c ffffffd1 ffffff9a ffffffde 11 fffffffb ffffffa3 ffffffea ffffffb1 49 fffffff4 4b 7a 77 0c 43 ffffffd5 ffffffdb ffffff86 3a 3b fffffff4 6b fffffffc 37 2c ffffffc4 fffffffc ffffffff ffffffc5 ffffff84 74 3a 66 ffffffbc ffffffd1 77 10 5e fffffff2 1f ffffffff ffffffa8 ffffff9f ffffff91 5a 71 ffffffcb ffffffb7 25 41 ffffff86 41 59 2e 5a 2f ffffffc7 ffffffba ffffffdb 08 01 ffffffb4 35 79 ffffff97 3d fffffff5 fffffff3 33 76 ffffffea 7b 1e ffffffb0 ffffffb5 02 ffffffe5 36 16 44 ffffffa6 ffffff9e 0e ffffffa3 73 74 ffffffda ffffffde 70 ffffffd4 ffffffcd ffffff81 15 7d 4c ffffffac ffffffcf 47 ffffff83 ffffffb1 1d ffffffbf ffffffd5 4b 55 ffffffee ffffffe8 ffffff85 ffffffdb fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2cc004db0 | unwrapped: 57 24 8e 2f 93 a1 f3 d7 86 27 ef ff 81 7d 17 b5 | unwrapped: d2 0b 5d 86 cd a4 a8 20 20 76 fe 0d 78 92 41 e2 | unwrapped: 1c 9d c6 91 30 50 9f 8e 23 8e 1e 71 6e 08 5e 87 | unwrapped: b0 c8 b5 da 96 7f 67 d7 3f d1 f7 cf 0d 30 ad 42 | unwrapped: d6 cb 7f 43 05 1f 2e 8a 16 8d fe 10 7a 8b 59 92 | unwrapped: 6f 28 84 a1 95 7c 49 59 28 f2 11 4f b5 23 9e f9 | unwrapped: 41 7b 86 51 9a df 45 3f 7a 39 43 6e 00 03 68 31 | unwrapped: 70 6d d8 1b 77 ee b2 05 a3 ad 29 53 e1 33 1d 40 | unwrapped: 90 c8 41 6d b6 23 86 0a 55 8b 72 55 9a 47 fa ea | unwrapped: de 8c 72 ca 50 dd 53 84 fc a3 c3 bf 09 f4 2e 11 | unwrapped: c7 db 25 b2 35 21 d6 23 4e 9c 87 e0 02 13 7a 3c | unwrapped: 3a 15 f6 38 69 13 ca 6a de 53 19 01 04 7b 0f d4 | unwrapped: 5e 0c 54 88 0e 18 c6 f1 34 58 b2 1f 24 0f 24 2e | unwrapped: 59 77 99 f6 40 33 90 73 9b 5f 3a 79 b7 d8 49 b9 | unwrapped: 0e 1f 0a 0b 2d 4c 75 a8 9e 1e 2d 4b eb 18 c6 69 | unwrapped: 09 a3 a5 76 2c 30 7d 49 c7 22 d3 b4 f7 a2 57 83 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb1454 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb145c (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001ef0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338080: fffffff8 ffffffbb ffffffbe 45 ffffffd2 ffffffab fffffff5 fffffff5 0a 02 18 73 ffffff99 7b 54 05 ffffff99 ffffffe3 fffffff1 fffffff1 1f 2d 79 51 ffffffe5 ffffff94 ffffffc8 65 29 ffffff9f 0b ffffff9f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2cc0020b0 | unwrapped: 61 3a 66 21 79 40 82 fd 4a 2f fc e2 fb f4 1f a1 | unwrapped: 36 7f bc ef 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338080: 23 6b 12 16 40 ffffffa8 ffffff9e 55 ffffff9a 15 61 ffffffe7 ffffffe6 fffffffa 4e 73 ffffffa2 ffffff8e fffffff9 ffffffaf 36 ffffffa3 ffffffc8 ffffff88 5b ffffffd6 ffffffb5 ffffffe9 ffffffc4 38 ffffffa3 ffffff8f 6b 74 ffffffbf 0a fffffffc 7f ffffffb1 fffffff7 5f ffffffba 3c ffffffd1 ffffff9a ffffffde 11 fffffffb ffffffa3 ffffffea ffffffb1 49 fffffff4 4b 7a 77 0c 43 ffffffd5 ffffffdb ffffff86 3a 3b fffffff4 6b fffffffc 37 2c ffffffc4 fffffffc ffffffff ffffffc5 ffffff84 74 3a 66 ffffffbc ffffffd1 77 10 5e fffffff2 1f ffffffff ffffffa8 ffffff9f ffffff91 5a 71 ffffffcb ffffffb7 25 41 ffffff86 41 59 2e 5a 2f ffffffc7 ffffffba ffffffdb 08 01 ffffffb4 35 79 ffffff97 3d fffffff5 fffffff3 33 76 ffffffea 7b 1e ffffffb0 ffffffb5 02 ffffffe5 36 16 44 ffffffa6 ffffff9e 0e ffffffa3 73 74 ffffffda ffffffde 70 ffffffd4 ffffffcd ffffff81 15 7d 4c ffffffac ffffffcf 47 ffffff83 ffffffb1 1d ffffffbf ffffffd5 4b 55 ffffffee ffffffe8 ffffff85 ffffffdb fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2cc003ce0 | unwrapped: 57 24 8e 2f 93 a1 f3 d7 86 27 ef ff 81 7d 17 b5 | unwrapped: d2 0b 5d 86 cd a4 a8 20 20 76 fe 0d 78 92 41 e2 | unwrapped: 1c 9d c6 91 30 50 9f 8e 23 8e 1e 71 6e 08 5e 87 | unwrapped: b0 c8 b5 da 96 7f 67 d7 3f d1 f7 cf 0d 30 ad 42 | unwrapped: d6 cb 7f 43 05 1f 2e 8a 16 8d fe 10 7a 8b 59 92 | unwrapped: 6f 28 84 a1 95 7c 49 59 28 f2 11 4f b5 23 9e f9 | unwrapped: 41 7b 86 51 9a df 45 3f 7a 39 43 6e 00 03 68 31 | unwrapped: 70 6d d8 1b 77 ee b2 05 a3 ad 29 53 e1 33 1d 40 | unwrapped: 90 c8 41 6d b6 23 86 0a 55 8b 72 55 9a 47 fa ea | unwrapped: de 8c 72 ca 50 dd 53 84 fc a3 c3 bf 09 f4 2e 11 | unwrapped: c7 db 25 b2 35 21 d6 23 4e 9c 87 e0 02 13 7a 3c | unwrapped: 3a 15 f6 38 69 13 ca 6a de 53 19 01 04 7b 0f d4 | unwrapped: 5e 0c 54 88 0e 18 c6 f1 34 58 b2 1f 24 0f 24 2e | unwrapped: 59 77 99 f6 40 33 90 73 9b 5f 3a 79 b7 d8 49 b9 | unwrapped: 0e 1f 0a 0b 2d 4c 75 a8 9e 1e 2d 4b eb 18 c6 69 | unwrapped: 09 a3 a5 76 2c 30 7d 49 c7 22 d3 b4 f7 a2 57 83 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb1454 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb145c (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001160 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338064: 6c ffffffd7 fffffffe ffffff80 25 ffffff9f fffffff3 ffffffcc 1c 53 3f ffffffec ffffffde 76 ffffffaa ffffffdb 48 65 ffffffcb ffffffa8 ffffffb0 ffffffdb ffffffb9 ffffffa8 13 44 3d ffffff8d ffffffe0 3b ffffff97 17 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2cc0030a0 | unwrapped: 5b e4 ba 74 05 b6 bd 96 d7 70 2e 60 73 0f 0b aa | unwrapped: c4 84 60 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338064: 23 6b 12 16 40 ffffffa8 ffffff9e 55 ffffff9a 15 61 ffffffe7 ffffffe6 fffffffa 4e 73 ffffffa2 ffffff8e fffffff9 ffffffaf 36 ffffffa3 ffffffc8 ffffff88 5b ffffffd6 ffffffb5 ffffffe9 ffffffc4 38 ffffffa3 ffffff8f 6b 74 ffffffbf 0a fffffffc 7f ffffffb1 fffffff7 5f ffffffba 3c ffffffd1 ffffff9a ffffffde 11 fffffffb ffffffa3 ffffffea ffffffb1 49 fffffff4 4b 7a 77 0c 43 ffffffd5 ffffffdb ffffff86 3a 3b fffffff4 6b fffffffc 37 2c ffffffc4 fffffffc ffffffff ffffffc5 ffffff84 74 3a 66 ffffffbc ffffffd1 77 10 5e fffffff2 1f ffffffff ffffffa8 ffffff9f ffffff91 5a 71 ffffffcb ffffffb7 25 41 ffffff86 41 59 2e 5a 2f ffffffc7 ffffffba ffffffdb 08 01 ffffffb4 35 79 ffffff97 3d fffffff5 fffffff3 33 76 ffffffea 7b 1e ffffffb0 ffffffb5 02 ffffffe5 36 16 44 ffffffa6 ffffff9e 0e ffffffa3 73 74 ffffffda ffffffde 70 ffffffd4 ffffffcd ffffff81 15 7d 4c ffffffac ffffffcf 47 ffffff83 ffffffb1 1d ffffffbf ffffffd5 4b 55 ffffffee ffffffe8 ffffff85 ffffffdb fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2cc003bd0 | unwrapped: 57 24 8e 2f 93 a1 f3 d7 86 27 ef ff 81 7d 17 b5 | unwrapped: d2 0b 5d 86 cd a4 a8 20 20 76 fe 0d 78 92 41 e2 | unwrapped: 1c 9d c6 91 30 50 9f 8e 23 8e 1e 71 6e 08 5e 87 | unwrapped: b0 c8 b5 da 96 7f 67 d7 3f d1 f7 cf 0d 30 ad 42 | unwrapped: d6 cb 7f 43 05 1f 2e 8a 16 8d fe 10 7a 8b 59 92 | unwrapped: 6f 28 84 a1 95 7c 49 59 28 f2 11 4f b5 23 9e f9 | unwrapped: 41 7b 86 51 9a df 45 3f 7a 39 43 6e 00 03 68 31 | unwrapped: 70 6d d8 1b 77 ee b2 05 a3 ad 29 53 e1 33 1d 40 | unwrapped: 90 c8 41 6d b6 23 86 0a 55 8b 72 55 9a 47 fa ea | unwrapped: de 8c 72 ca 50 dd 53 84 fc a3 c3 bf 09 f4 2e 11 | unwrapped: c7 db 25 b2 35 21 d6 23 4e 9c 87 e0 02 13 7a 3c | unwrapped: 3a 15 f6 38 69 13 ca 6a de 53 19 01 04 7b 0f d4 | unwrapped: 5e 0c 54 88 0e 18 c6 f1 34 58 b2 1f 24 0f 24 2e | unwrapped: 59 77 99 f6 40 33 90 73 9b 5f 3a 79 b7 d8 49 b9 | unwrapped: 0e 1f 0a 0b 2d 4c 75 a8 9e 1e 2d 4b eb 18 c6 69 | unwrapped: 09 a3 a5 76 2c 30 7d 49 c7 22 d3 b4 f7 a2 57 83 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb1454 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb145c (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b95040 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_a 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_e 0x55e200b93380, enc_key 0x55e200b95040 | DH_i: c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | DH_i: 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | DH_i: d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | DH_i: a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | DH_i: 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | DH_i: e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | DH_i: 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | DH_i: a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | DH_i: 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | DH_i: bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | DH_i: 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | DH_i: c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | DH_i: 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | DH_i: eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | DH_i: aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | DH_i: 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | DH_r: 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | DH_r: 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | DH_r: e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | DH_r: 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | DH_r: 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | DH_r: a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | DH_r: 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | DH_r: 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | DH_r: e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | DH_r: fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | DH_r: 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | DH_r: eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | DH_r: 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | DH_r: ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | DH_r: 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | DH_r: 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb1254 (length 256) | c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb1354 (length 256) | 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2cc001230 (length 20) | 29 de 81 17 69 ad f9 47 93 d6 97 b9 1a 14 b4 47 | cb da c3 19 | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 6 time elapsed 0.002358 seconds | (#5) spent 2.36 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 6: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 6 for state #5 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc003e90 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #5: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #5 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | 14 00 00 24 ef 9c 66 68 2d 86 10 03 0c 23 36 af | 67 85 e1 ab b4 ff b2 46 df 3b 4e 53 c1 13 12 1b | ea 08 13 27 14 00 00 18 d7 88 e0 3f 22 e6 31 35 | cf 90 4b e6 14 2b 8a 55 ff e8 33 7f 00 00 00 18 | da fc 56 54 a7 0a 27 8e 42 28 bd 43 8c 99 1a 34 | 02 4b 1a 3d | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #5 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48953.038099 "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #5 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #5 spent 0.415 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8006900 | processing resume sending helper answer for #5 | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 6 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #5: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d8000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #5 | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #5 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #5 spent 0.0233 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc003e90 | spent 0.00279 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 97 26 54 6b | b9 6a cf 0e 23 b8 8c 5e 2b 89 b1 98 41 60 b7 4f | d1 94 88 ab 1a 79 ca af c1 df d7 b3 a0 96 ea c9 | 15 4b e8 11 4a bf d8 0a e4 a9 73 b7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 29 de 81 17 69 ad f9 47 93 d6 97 b9 1a 14 b4 47 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: a0 96 ea c9 15 4b e8 11 4a bf d8 0a e4 a9 73 b7 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 12 c4 ea b8 | 62 b5 11 00 42 b1 00 d6 2d 92 4a 20 9f a2 6b 98 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #5: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0002780 (length 256) | c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d8000b20 (length 256) | 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab7d8 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab7e0 (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200b03480 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | 12 c4 ea b8 62 b5 11 00 42 b1 00 d6 2d 92 4a 20 | 9f a2 6b 98 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001230 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d8000b20 (length 256) | 6a 36 ba 93 c8 f9 7f 05 7c 0b 4c 7e dd 70 2f 4f | 32 1c bd 22 57 6b 22 43 e5 37 ab a8 11 f3 01 ce | e1 82 a5 98 14 b3 c2 88 f2 f6 05 b3 c9 c1 15 90 | 20 bb b8 2c 4f b1 fd fc d2 1f 3f 9e 83 32 82 d4 | 3d 9c ee e5 3d d8 de 4e 54 c5 53 cc de 61 0d 10 | a2 39 e4 db bf bc ed fd 92 dd 4f d9 33 33 70 7e | 91 a1 04 7c 93 8c a5 36 e6 61 39 7a 9a 2b 8b 46 | 57 d8 2f a2 71 40 64 8b e7 d7 ce 24 94 79 6f d0 | e0 c5 b2 4a 82 50 28 65 b4 7b 0f 3b 1c c2 3e 23 | fc 08 0e 7d dd dc 48 4d 13 1e 04 1e 5d 5f 16 22 | 53 29 94 dd e8 6e de cd 7c aa 7f 72 23 fa 0b ab | eb 26 c3 c8 cb 55 af f1 7f 45 c9 c4 c0 b6 88 cc | 7b aa 3d fb 8b 40 b8 20 13 99 58 45 cb 44 c3 6b | ab 03 e1 b0 75 13 08 91 71 68 70 29 60 15 74 4d | 7d ef 12 8f f9 30 8f 62 47 9c 1c 6f c1 4d 04 b5 | 28 e5 9d c7 75 3a de a8 8c b8 38 5f 79 c7 11 63 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0002780 (length 256) | c4 7b fe 50 2e a4 3b c8 bf 8e 3d c2 95 fa 67 b8 | 94 c2 4f aa fc df f4 a6 97 0a b2 fe 34 7c d1 e0 | d1 0c 2c e2 29 69 3f 35 15 cd 6f 1b 20 01 b3 27 | a3 52 cc 97 61 b9 e2 b1 87 c9 6f 51 49 a0 1b 13 | 74 44 e9 ed d2 4e 4a ec d8 cd 42 77 f8 28 a1 7a | e2 fb f0 a8 92 af a5 41 66 a9 e6 7d 24 db ae 53 | 12 c6 45 39 27 bc 1c f6 10 d9 a0 28 b1 12 a8 90 | a5 f0 13 56 de 95 9c 4c b4 c6 a2 cc 32 d8 a3 f3 | 9e 6c 85 30 ea 99 dd e8 fc 28 2d da 9d 56 b1 f8 | bd 7e e1 b4 2e 54 48 0d aa 93 d9 15 3b ce 9d 5e | 38 89 b2 99 be 82 ea de 06 6e 52 cd 56 d7 69 be | c0 6c 7f 32 52 fb 83 69 e3 c0 65 f5 5a 58 37 c9 | 39 eb 1b 70 c2 13 b7 ac 81 b3 44 1a 09 b0 3e dc | eb 68 8d 7e 5a 23 5c db 95 aa 05 e8 7f b2 33 e1 | aa cf aa 64 ce 3c 7b f7 08 09 f0 28 2a d1 96 d5 | 54 ee e4 7a b2 ef bf 5b eb b1 07 72 f8 ea 73 78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab7e0 (length 8) | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab7d8 (length 8) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | 24 a8 ab 18 01 a1 98 81 c4 c9 a2 1d 7a 4f 55 92 | 69 27 f5 70 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 24 a8 ab 18 01 a1 98 81 c4 c9 a2 1d 7a 4f 55 92 | HASH_R 69 27 f5 70 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 24 a8 ab 18 01 a1 98 81 c4 c9 a2 1d 7a 4f 55 92 | encrypting: 69 27 f5 70 | IV: a0 96 ea c9 15 4b e8 11 4a bf d8 0a e4 a9 73 b7 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #5 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #5: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #5 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #5 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 48 51 fc d8 | 8d 67 8f 5e 55 97 0a cc 49 1b f1 11 61 13 8e 48 | 1f f9 d3 39 6e a3 94 bb 24 e3 4f 70 77 ba e0 02 | ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #5 | #5 spent 0.602 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.751 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00283 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 08 10 20 01 d1 57 53 ab 00 00 01 bc d7 ac fb 4f | 82 b7 ae e4 67 05 79 f5 e9 18 f1 47 3e fe 26 c7 | 5b ac 8f 8e 00 bc 84 a9 08 7a d9 c8 cd 36 16 28 | 27 e2 aa 11 b4 4d 96 d4 c4 cb 2d 80 03 94 0b 1c | 81 7b ba 83 34 20 54 c2 34 c3 cd bd 9e 0f 1f cd | 89 f0 4b 8c 46 c6 ff dd 39 7c c0 ec c4 dd c7 b8 | 0f 64 95 90 de fb f0 0c 50 f6 94 61 30 79 2b 31 | 4c c5 89 1b c2 91 58 4b e6 48 c3 8b 7a 17 f8 86 | 6a b2 c7 8d 5a 49 99 c1 58 60 15 17 ea 14 fa d2 | e5 f4 7f 04 d5 50 05 d0 cf 73 52 0e 1c db b5 92 | ba 32 75 5a d1 be 21 2f 39 5c 14 dd 87 09 5c 5d | dd 1a d6 0a 0f 05 31 27 b5 04 6d b0 f0 2d 39 f4 | 38 b0 cf c6 f4 a2 52 5e 5d 95 cf 7a 96 68 10 19 | ca 42 a2 8a 66 1a 2f 97 62 60 a7 25 33 b9 3f c4 | 4b 1c c8 81 e2 17 0c d3 63 cf bc 6f aa 74 b4 d1 | d4 84 a3 8c 4e 5c 81 4f 14 b0 3b 53 41 5a ab a8 | 25 c9 9c 45 52 4b 92 32 69 b1 46 9a e8 df a4 42 | 20 fc 97 e0 14 d4 61 6d 67 86 ed f2 20 f3 24 10 | 3f 26 6c 04 9a d9 47 43 c1 97 9c 98 5d 6e d8 12 | e6 8d 86 33 61 b4 ed 62 89 a9 b3 99 f7 3d e5 8d | 4a 2e e3 db 7b 74 e9 d6 2b 96 af c8 86 be 8b 36 | eb 15 08 ea f3 f9 3e 00 ad d9 28 53 36 c4 cd 65 | 40 f3 a2 f5 a2 5c 7d 80 eb 91 59 e0 94 6d 52 59 | eb c3 44 99 74 8f d7 7b 7a 20 1d b4 46 3a 04 0b | bb b7 57 86 ed b9 d7 12 a8 53 21 ce 94 c3 24 3a | d0 c9 55 fc 0a 01 a3 0b 53 0b 44 45 f4 c1 00 52 | ca e7 ef bf 06 f7 aa 81 3d d3 a8 f5 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3512161195 (0xd15753ab) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | current Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bab6d0 (length 16) | 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | d1 57 53 ab | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bab650 (length 20) | 09 7b 4b 01 b3 cd 3c 31 9f 96 61 9f f3 85 21 f4 | 19 29 51 16 | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 09 7b 4b 01 b3 cd 3c 31 9f 96 61 9f f3 85 21 f4 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: f4 c1 00 52 ca e7 ef bf 06 f7 aa 81 3d d3 a8 f5 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 08 10 20 01 d1 57 53 ab 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 9b ce 97 3c 3f b3 93 d9 92 c3 0c c8 2f ca 9a ef | 14 48 6d 15 0a 00 00 3c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 30 00 03 04 01 d9 97 da b0 00 00 00 24 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 80 06 00 80 | 04 00 00 24 8b ae f3 2d fb d6 02 0a fc 95 8b e2 | 5e 58 bd 1b 37 88 24 5b bf bb 96 45 d3 a3 1a f2 | 48 72 b5 4f 05 00 01 04 a5 cd 61 ff 49 02 42 9d | 9e 0b 0e 79 c7 ef fa 62 a7 38 e7 de de 77 54 fb | aa e1 c6 5e 11 d9 ce 03 fa 60 a6 9a 86 e1 b1 24 | 68 17 9f f9 70 25 04 fc b6 cc 46 12 c0 67 08 a4 | 41 7c ca b9 ad 94 f8 07 1a d9 80 67 9c 3d c3 5b | b6 22 86 60 ad 95 60 27 cc 84 9b c1 f2 00 c1 4e | e7 36 b5 4e 4a 81 1e ef 98 ca 34 66 50 08 0b ba | 68 2f dc ef 3d 65 fd d5 13 09 25 ce 97 76 c5 a6 | 89 ee 0f 19 fc 0b c2 4f 74 bb 25 be f8 78 09 a4 | c9 94 aa 92 e6 a2 5e 92 79 37 57 e1 13 df a6 54 | 3a c1 e7 1e 7f c5 2a 51 ca 21 a3 2e 21 e1 52 e6 | 97 9b 09 08 8f 5c 7a 79 1b 18 79 85 4a 49 e3 fa | b2 c2 c6 c4 98 03 f7 5e 2f 11 be b8 9e 5e f8 d3 | 4d b2 5a 36 07 3e ec 9b 7c ea c0 20 bf 37 76 8a | f0 e0 96 b7 e1 50 36 9f e5 6d 16 0a 88 a5 48 75 | be e8 16 93 8e 11 1d 7f df 92 72 ef 79 03 be 0f | b8 67 20 30 38 51 e8 df 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | d1 57 53 ab | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200bb0434 (length 388) | 0a 00 00 3c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 | 00 03 04 01 d9 97 da b0 00 00 00 24 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 8b ae f3 2d fb d6 02 0a fc 95 8b e2 5e 58 bd 1b | 37 88 24 5b bf bb 96 45 d3 a3 1a f2 48 72 b5 4f | 05 00 01 04 a5 cd 61 ff 49 02 42 9d 9e 0b 0e 79 | c7 ef fa 62 a7 38 e7 de de 77 54 fb aa e1 c6 5e | 11 d9 ce 03 fa 60 a6 9a 86 e1 b1 24 68 17 9f f9 | 70 25 04 fc b6 cc 46 12 c0 67 08 a4 41 7c ca b9 | ad 94 f8 07 1a d9 80 67 9c 3d c3 5b b6 22 86 60 | ad 95 60 27 cc 84 9b c1 f2 00 c1 4e e7 36 b5 4e | 4a 81 1e ef 98 ca 34 66 50 08 0b ba 68 2f dc ef | 3d 65 fd d5 13 09 25 ce 97 76 c5 a6 89 ee 0f 19 | fc 0b c2 4f 74 bb 25 be f8 78 09 a4 c9 94 aa 92 | e6 a2 5e 92 79 37 57 e1 13 df a6 54 3a c1 e7 1e | 7f c5 2a 51 ca 21 a3 2e 21 e1 52 e6 97 9b 09 08 | 8f 5c 7a 79 1b 18 79 85 4a 49 e3 fa b2 c2 c6 c4 | 98 03 f7 5e 2f 11 be b8 9e 5e f8 d3 4d b2 5a 36 | 07 3e ec 9b 7c ea c0 20 bf 37 76 8a f0 e0 96 b7 | e1 50 36 9f e5 6d 16 0a 88 a5 48 75 be e8 16 93 | 8e 11 1d 7f df 92 72 ef 79 03 be 0f b8 67 20 30 | 38 51 e8 df 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 9b ce 97 3c 3f b3 93 d9 92 c3 0c c8 2f ca 9a ef | 14 48 6d 15 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 9b ce 97 3c 3f b3 93 d9 92 c3 0c c8 2f ca 9a ef | 14 48 6d 15 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #5: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #6 at 0x55e200bb05d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #6 in UNDEFINED | pstats #6 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #5 "east" as #6 for IPSEC SA | #6 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #5.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #6: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI d9 97 da b0 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #6: repeated KEY_LENGTH attribute in IPsec Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #6 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #6: sending encrypted notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4036856798 (0xf09d8bde) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f8d8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9bc (length 4) | f0 9d 8b de | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc74 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc60 (length 20) | 0a 8d 16 12 ef 22 5b 3c 8c 34 f9 e9 a4 f8 d9 ef | 1c 50 c8 a4 | send notification HASH(1): | 0a 8d 16 12 ef 22 5b 3c 8c 34 f9 e9 a4 f8 d9 ef | 1c 50 c8 a4 | last Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | current Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bab6d0 (length 16) | 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9cc (length 4) | f0 9d 8b de | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bab650 (length 20) | 23 1e 9f d5 f2 8f ca f8 1b 0d 6f c2 cd 15 bd df | 96 ca 59 dc | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 0a 8d 16 12 ef 22 5b 3c 8c 34 f9 e9 | encrypting: a4 f8 d9 ef 1c 50 c8 a4 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0f | IV: 23 1e 9f d5 f2 8f ca f8 1b 0d 6f c2 cd 15 bd df | IV: 96 ca 59 dc | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: fd fb 73 9d ed 1e 67 36 c4 1e de f3 49 4f f6 dd | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #6) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 08 10 05 01 f0 9d 8b de 00 00 00 4c 65 fd c0 e1 | 49 a7 a1 1d e1 8f 02 44 61 51 d4 c2 16 54 31 50 | 8b e7 65 1d 8c 55 96 da ec b3 48 72 fd fb 73 9d | ed 1e 67 36 c4 1e de f3 49 4f f6 dd | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | pstats #6 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #6: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #6: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #6: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #6 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #6: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #6 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #5 spent 0.59 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.962 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00299 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 08 10 05 01 76 4a 01 ca 00 00 00 5c a3 8e 37 29 | d5 36 9b 65 67 d5 eb 39 68 52 57 bd 53 90 fd 2b | bb 0c d5 45 a8 f3 86 42 6f 69 8a 1e ee 7a c3 27 | bf de 80 7e 66 05 57 17 03 d9 32 d3 ee ca a6 9b | 26 fd af d9 1f df 0e 55 0d bf 30 bd | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1984561610 (0x764a01ca) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #5; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #5 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | current Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bab6d0 (length 16) | 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 76 4a 01 ca | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bab650 (length 20) | 5b 72 6a 2e 86 d2 86 33 9f 87 a7 53 ee 07 e4 28 | 42 ab d6 9f | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 5b 72 6a 2e 86 d2 86 33 9f 87 a7 53 ee 07 e4 28 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: ee ca a6 9b 26 fd af d9 1f df 0e 55 0d bf 30 bd | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 08 10 05 01 76 4a 01 ca 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | bc c7 94 fb 22 e5 02 9c db e0 aa 1c 20 7f a1 7f | 6b 1d cb 75 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 76 4a 01 ca | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b8c0e4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 6a 34 90 6d | 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | bc c7 94 fb 22 e5 02 9c db e0 aa 1c 20 7f a1 7f | 6b 1d cb 75 | informational HASH(1): | bc c7 94 fb 22 e5 02 9c db e0 aa 1c 20 7f a1 7f | 6b 1d cb 75 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #5: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #5 | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #5: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.595s and sending notification | parent state #5: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #5 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | responder cookie: | a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3925601836 (0xe9fbee2c) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc48 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd2c (length 4) | e9 fb ee 2c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0d4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 6a 34 90 6d | 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0c0 (length 20) | f1 c3 53 16 ca ac 32 1b 39 e6 6b 35 13 a2 e8 4c | 77 91 f2 4b | send delete HASH(1): | f1 c3 53 16 ca ac 32 1b 39 e6 6b 35 13 a2 e8 4c | 77 91 f2 4b | last Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | current Phase 1 IV: 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bab6d0 (length 16) | 77 ba e0 02 ed 3c ce 99 29 90 83 64 75 4d c7 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd3c (length 4) | e9 fb ee 2c | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bab650 (length 20) | 08 d8 82 5b 6d fc 25 77 76 9c c5 f4 53 9a 79 da | e3 2f 17 b1 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 f1 c3 53 16 ca ac 32 1b 39 e6 6b 35 | encrypting: 13 a2 e8 4c 77 91 f2 4b 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d | encrypting: 14 e9 47 9e | IV: 08 d8 82 5b 6d fc 25 77 76 9c c5 f4 53 9a 79 da | IV: e3 2f 17 b1 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 5a 06 25 b7 7f d9 2e 9a 7e 41 30 84 2f ad b7 6c | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | 6a 34 90 6d 35 f5 0f e3 a1 6f 18 5d 14 e9 47 9e | 08 10 05 01 e9 fb ee 2c 00 00 00 5c b1 9d 18 92 | 60 47 f0 57 18 3d 26 9a 17 ad 99 f8 8f ab 29 48 | fa 86 20 8e 5d 72 76 a2 a0 eb 8d d9 6f b2 47 7b | 56 64 93 03 b1 fe 44 e2 4d 26 96 f0 5a 06 25 b7 | 7f d9 2e 9a 7e 41 30 84 2f ad b7 6c | state #5 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #5: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d8000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #5 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.639 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00303 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d9 3a 8d 6d 8c 7e 63 fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d9 3a 8d 6d 8c 7e 63 fa | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 05 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 9b 22 fa 27 83 dd 3c 2f 9d 66 d8 8c f8 06 54 70 | 24 69 bc 56 ea 19 a1 b0 e0 5e 53 47 97 42 2f 25 | creating state object #7 at 0x55e200bab240 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #7 in UNDEFINED | pstats #7 ikev1.isakmp started | #7 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #7: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: d9 3a 8d 6d 8c 7e 63 fa "east" #7: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d9 3a 8d 6d 8c 7e 63 fa | responder cookie: | 9b 22 fa 27 83 dd 3c 2f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #7: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #7: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #7 is idle "east" #7: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d9 3a 8d 6d 8c 7e 63 fa | responder cookie: | 9b 22 fa 27 83 dd 3c 2f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #7) | d9 3a 8d 6d 8c 7e 63 fa 9b 22 fa 27 83 dd 3c 2f | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.543 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00299 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6b 78 a9 f7 71 bd 69 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6b 78 a9 f7 71 bd 69 16 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 06 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 05 46 8c 67 71 ae 98 01 06 22 6f 40 62 4a 3e 66 | f6 94 9a df 4e 5a 68 17 f7 45 8f d0 f4 a5 d4 ec | creating state object #8 at 0x55e200bb05d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #8 in UNDEFINED | pstats #8 ikev1.isakmp started | #8 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #8: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 6b 78 a9 f7 71 bd 69 16 "east" #8: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6b 78 a9 f7 71 bd 69 16 | responder cookie: | 05 46 8c 67 71 ae 98 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #8: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #8: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #8 is idle "east" #8: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6b 78 a9 f7 71 bd 69 16 | responder cookie: | 05 46 8c 67 71 ae 98 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #8) | 6b 78 a9 f7 71 bd 69 16 05 46 8c 67 71 ae 98 01 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.527 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00286 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 07 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa 2d 82 b6 54 1c db 39 2d | 27 aa 4f 78 db c3 a7 ad 76 42 3a ba ab 4d fd ad | creating state object #9 at 0x55e200bb1090 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #9 in UNDEFINED | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp started | #9 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #9: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c "east" #9: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #9 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #9: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.566 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00221 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | 14 00 00 24 7d a5 9e ed 92 bf c5 c1 aa a6 4f c1 | f3 4a e0 a5 3f ff 4b 0b 68 1e cb 7d a3 7c 69 b5 | 96 00 2a a1 14 00 00 18 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b | 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be 58 5b 90 cf 00 00 00 18 | 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | 5b b1 00 33 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #9 is idle | #9 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | 58 5b 90 cf | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | natd_hash: hash= 58 5b 90 cf | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | 5b b1 00 33 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | natd_hash: hash= 5b b1 00 33 | expected NAT-D(me): 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | expected NAT-D(me): 58 5b 90 cf | expected NAT-D(him): | 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | 5b b1 00 33 | received NAT-D: 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | received NAT-D: 58 5b 90 cf | received NAT-D: 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | received NAT-D: 5b b1 00 33 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 7 for state #9 | state #9 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 7 for state #9 | crypto helper 5 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 7 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0000d60: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2d0000d60 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | Generated nonce: eb 51 22 1f 70 00 58 c0 da a5 05 7d 04 62 d1 d7 | Generated nonce: b8 89 ed c6 ac 08 2d 6d 3f a6 de 74 d1 c2 d6 30 | crypto helper 5 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 7 time elapsed 0.001022 seconds | (#9) spent 1.02 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 7: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 7 for state #9 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d0006900 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #9 and saving MD | #9 is busy; has a suspended MD | #9 spent 0.184 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.328 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #9 | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 7 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #9: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0000d60: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #9 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | keyex value 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | keyex value ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | keyex value 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | keyex value 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | keyex value 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | keyex value 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | keyex value 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | keyex value 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | keyex value 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | keyex value 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | keyex value 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | keyex value 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | keyex value c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | keyex value 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | keyex value 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr eb 51 22 1f 70 00 58 c0 da a5 05 7d 04 62 d1 d7 | Nr b8 89 ed c6 ac 08 2d 6d 3f a6 de 74 d1 c2 d6 30 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | 5b b1 00 33 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | natd_hash: hash= 5b b1 00 33 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b | NAT-D 5b b1 00 33 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | 58 5b 90 cf | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | natd_hash: rcookie= 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | natd_hash: hash= 58 5b 90 cf | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | NAT-D 58 5b 90 cf | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0000d60: transferring ownership from state #9 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 8 for state #9 | state #9 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #9 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #9 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #9: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 8 for state #9 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 8 | peer's g: 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | peer's g: b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | peer's g: d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | peer's g: a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | peer's g: 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | peer's g: cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | peer's g: 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | peer's g: 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | peer's g: a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | peer's g: 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | peer's g: dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | peer's g: 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | peer's g: 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | peer's g: 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | peer's g: 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | peer's g: f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | event_already_set, deleting event | state #9 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | 14 00 00 24 eb 51 22 1f 70 00 58 c0 da a5 05 7d | 04 62 d1 d7 b8 89 ed c6 ac 08 2d 6d 3f a6 de 74 | d1 c2 d6 30 14 00 00 18 9d ad 33 05 85 11 ce a2 | c8 7c 06 f7 6f 51 62 3b 5b b1 00 33 00 00 00 18 | 09 2b 7e f0 55 bb 07 2b 0a c0 fb fc 4c 6e 1f be | 58 5b 90 cf | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #9 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48955.268042 "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #9 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #9 spent 0.384 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d0006900 | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0000d60: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b95040 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb2770 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e4000d60 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb2794 (length 32) | 7d a5 9e ed 92 bf c5 c1 aa a6 4f c1 f3 4a e0 a5 | 3f ff 4b 0b 68 1e cb 7d a3 7c 69 b5 96 00 2a a1 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb27b4 (length 32) | eb 51 22 1f 70 00 58 c0 da a5 05 7d 04 62 d1 d7 | b8 89 ed c6 ac 08 2d 6d 3f a6 de 74 d1 c2 d6 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e4001570 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730752: ffffffb0 78 3e ffffffbc 75 fffffffc fffffff4 3f 7e 46 07 ffffff99 fffffff3 01 14 7d ffffffcc ffffff99 30 ffffffc3 ffffffeb 2d ffffffb1 ffffff85 49 73 7b 7f ffffffcf ffffff9a 00 ffffffb9 ffffffcc ffffff95 ffffffa3 7e ffffffcc 51 ffffff83 78 fffffff0 63 21 0e ffffffa0 ffffffa6 ffffffd7 ffffffac fffffff9 ffffffc5 ffffffce 2c 12 2b 7b ffffff93 ffffff82 fffffff9 ffffff82 5e ffffff8f ffffffe6 4f 57 ffffffad ffffffbc 2f ffffffa1 ffffffa6 ffffffb3 5c 2b 28 67 ffffffd2 44 ffffff93 3a fffffff8 6c ffffffcc 33 ffffffdb ffffffee ffffff8d 03 ffffff92 ffffffdb fffffffc ffffffdb ffffffe3 ffffffe4 ffffffe1 5b ffffff8b 5b ffffffa3 ffffff81 ffffffff 05 66 0c ffffffed 49 4e ffffffe9 48 ffffffa6 ffffffcf fffffff0 2e ffffffa1 ffffffac ffffff9a 4a 29 22 ffffffd4 ffffffa2 0f 07 2b ffffff9e 48 ffffffea 5c fffffffb 11 66 19 73 ffffffaa ffffff9a ffffff81 3f 3b 76 ffffff87 ffffffac ffffffaa ffffffa2 fffffff6 50 ffffffcd ffffffc1 00 ffffffbe ffffffd8 fffffff9 f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e40045f0 | unwrapped: 70 86 9d 7d 8d a6 67 f6 02 c5 14 0c 51 08 f1 5b | unwrapped: b4 2f 56 e9 23 3b 5f cf 26 ae 80 95 43 1f 5d 4e | unwrapped: a5 a3 d6 7f fc b8 b0 11 39 7a 1a 30 a1 5f ef af | unwrapped: ff 48 e6 f9 c6 50 db c9 70 5b 5d b1 19 51 64 4d | unwrapped: 85 0b 7a 41 c1 6b 0e d3 2c 13 14 16 aa 1c 81 46 | unwrapped: d1 a1 5b 89 af 1c b5 17 40 b4 8e 39 02 38 73 10 | unwrapped: 72 90 8a bb d8 98 1d 0a e9 8b 67 4f c9 78 37 bd | unwrapped: 26 58 d1 79 fe b4 19 e7 7a 40 88 51 4e 96 ce 57 | unwrapped: 54 eb da 64 d0 b4 7b b6 b6 ef e0 ad b4 1f ad 9d | unwrapped: e3 3c 58 83 e9 53 8b 07 89 fb 4f e0 c5 1f bb 86 | unwrapped: 50 58 29 39 63 32 e1 40 d9 19 b3 12 cc 71 ae af | unwrapped: c0 a0 27 c3 41 7e a2 81 a6 49 b0 34 e1 8b 57 f7 | unwrapped: b4 20 92 d7 6a 52 1d f9 a0 cd 4d 62 f3 50 5b 62 | unwrapped: 0a e7 5d 4b ae 89 5e 5b 3a 7a 4f 92 8f ec 81 47 | unwrapped: e1 c7 d8 bc 4a c3 e5 0c dc b6 26 fe 5a a4 f3 a8 | unwrapped: e8 06 ee 61 99 75 46 c1 6c 44 2f 50 51 41 b7 1a | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb29d4 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb29dc (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40010c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730784: fffffff2 ffffffca ffffffb2 ffffffe5 42 ffffffd9 4c 02 39 fffffff3 1a 19 6f 55 ffffffb7 ffffffef 44 47 fffffffa 7b ffffffe5 24 ffffffca fffffffd 45 35 ffffffbe ffffffda ffffffc4 ffffffc5 ffffffe4 00 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e4004b70 | unwrapped: aa 46 b8 0f 0b 4d 57 94 4e 7c e4 8e 09 6f 94 a1 | unwrapped: 8e 66 01 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730784: ffffffb0 78 3e ffffffbc 75 fffffffc fffffff4 3f 7e 46 07 ffffff99 fffffff3 01 14 7d ffffffcc ffffff99 30 ffffffc3 ffffffeb 2d ffffffb1 ffffff85 49 73 7b 7f ffffffcf ffffff9a 00 ffffffb9 ffffffcc ffffff95 ffffffa3 7e ffffffcc 51 ffffff83 78 fffffff0 63 21 0e ffffffa0 ffffffa6 ffffffd7 ffffffac fffffff9 ffffffc5 ffffffce 2c 12 2b 7b ffffff93 ffffff82 fffffff9 ffffff82 5e ffffff8f ffffffe6 4f 57 ffffffad ffffffbc 2f ffffffa1 ffffffa6 ffffffb3 5c 2b 28 67 ffffffd2 44 ffffff93 3a fffffff8 6c ffffffcc 33 ffffffdb ffffffee ffffff8d 03 ffffff92 ffffffdb fffffffc ffffffdb ffffffe3 ffffffe4 ffffffe1 5b ffffff8b 5b ffffffa3 ffffff81 ffffffff 05 66 0c ffffffed 49 4e ffffffe9 48 ffffffa6 ffffffcf fffffff0 2e ffffffa1 ffffffac ffffff9a 4a 29 22 ffffffd4 ffffffa2 0f 07 2b ffffff9e 48 ffffffea 5c fffffffb 11 66 19 73 ffffffaa ffffff9a ffffff81 3f 3b 76 ffffff87 ffffffac ffffffaa ffffffa2 fffffff6 50 ffffffcd ffffffc1 00 ffffffbe ffffffd8 fffffff9 f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e4001890 | unwrapped: 70 86 9d 7d 8d a6 67 f6 02 c5 14 0c 51 08 f1 5b | unwrapped: b4 2f 56 e9 23 3b 5f cf 26 ae 80 95 43 1f 5d 4e | unwrapped: a5 a3 d6 7f fc b8 b0 11 39 7a 1a 30 a1 5f ef af | unwrapped: ff 48 e6 f9 c6 50 db c9 70 5b 5d b1 19 51 64 4d | unwrapped: 85 0b 7a 41 c1 6b 0e d3 2c 13 14 16 aa 1c 81 46 | unwrapped: d1 a1 5b 89 af 1c b5 17 40 b4 8e 39 02 38 73 10 | unwrapped: 72 90 8a bb d8 98 1d 0a e9 8b 67 4f c9 78 37 bd | unwrapped: 26 58 d1 79 fe b4 19 e7 7a 40 88 51 4e 96 ce 57 | unwrapped: 54 eb da 64 d0 b4 7b b6 b6 ef e0 ad b4 1f ad 9d | unwrapped: e3 3c 58 83 e9 53 8b 07 89 fb 4f e0 c5 1f bb 86 | unwrapped: 50 58 29 39 63 32 e1 40 d9 19 b3 12 cc 71 ae af | unwrapped: c0 a0 27 c3 41 7e a2 81 a6 49 b0 34 e1 8b 57 f7 | unwrapped: b4 20 92 d7 6a 52 1d f9 a0 cd 4d 62 f3 50 5b 62 | unwrapped: 0a e7 5d 4b ae 89 5e 5b 3a 7a 4f 92 8f ec 81 47 | unwrapped: e1 c7 d8 bc 4a c3 e5 0c dc b6 26 fe 5a a4 f3 a8 | unwrapped: e8 06 ee 61 99 75 46 c1 6c 44 2f 50 51 41 b7 1a | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb29d4 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb29dc (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40013a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730768: 23 52 fffffff8 fffffff7 ffffff97 fffffff5 7f ffffffd8 ffffff8b ffffffb1 3f 3f 12 ffffffa5 ffffff96 74 1e ffffff9e ffffff9e ffffffea ffffffcb 00 07 5d 71 ffffffba 33 7e ffffffc1 ffffffdf ffffff98 ffffff9a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e4002100 | unwrapped: 8f d3 9a f3 71 60 e7 47 48 69 6a da 81 66 0d ec | unwrapped: e9 ec 71 ab 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730768: ffffffb0 78 3e ffffffbc 75 fffffffc fffffff4 3f 7e 46 07 ffffff99 fffffff3 01 14 7d ffffffcc ffffff99 30 ffffffc3 ffffffeb 2d ffffffb1 ffffff85 49 73 7b 7f ffffffcf ffffff9a 00 ffffffb9 ffffffcc ffffff95 ffffffa3 7e ffffffcc 51 ffffff83 78 fffffff0 63 21 0e ffffffa0 ffffffa6 ffffffd7 ffffffac fffffff9 ffffffc5 ffffffce 2c 12 2b 7b ffffff93 ffffff82 fffffff9 ffffff82 5e ffffff8f ffffffe6 4f 57 ffffffad ffffffbc 2f ffffffa1 ffffffa6 ffffffb3 5c 2b 28 67 ffffffd2 44 ffffff93 3a fffffff8 6c ffffffcc 33 ffffffdb ffffffee ffffff8d 03 ffffff92 ffffffdb fffffffc ffffffdb ffffffe3 ffffffe4 ffffffe1 5b ffffff8b 5b ffffffa3 ffffff81 ffffffff 05 66 0c ffffffed 49 4e ffffffe9 48 ffffffa6 ffffffcf fffffff0 2e ffffffa1 ffffffac ffffff9a 4a 29 22 ffffffd4 ffffffa2 0f 07 2b ffffff9e 48 ffffffea 5c fffffffb 11 66 19 73 ffffffaa ffffff9a ffffff81 3f 3b 76 ffffff87 ffffffac ffffffaa ffffffa2 fffffff6 50 ffffffcd ffffffc1 00 ffffffbe ffffffd8 fffffff9 f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e4001780 | unwrapped: 70 86 9d 7d 8d a6 67 f6 02 c5 14 0c 51 08 f1 5b | unwrapped: b4 2f 56 e9 23 3b 5f cf 26 ae 80 95 43 1f 5d 4e | unwrapped: a5 a3 d6 7f fc b8 b0 11 39 7a 1a 30 a1 5f ef af | unwrapped: ff 48 e6 f9 c6 50 db c9 70 5b 5d b1 19 51 64 4d | unwrapped: 85 0b 7a 41 c1 6b 0e d3 2c 13 14 16 aa 1c 81 46 | unwrapped: d1 a1 5b 89 af 1c b5 17 40 b4 8e 39 02 38 73 10 | unwrapped: 72 90 8a bb d8 98 1d 0a e9 8b 67 4f c9 78 37 bd | unwrapped: 26 58 d1 79 fe b4 19 e7 7a 40 88 51 4e 96 ce 57 | unwrapped: 54 eb da 64 d0 b4 7b b6 b6 ef e0 ad b4 1f ad 9d | unwrapped: e3 3c 58 83 e9 53 8b 07 89 fb 4f e0 c5 1f bb 86 | unwrapped: 50 58 29 39 63 32 e1 40 d9 19 b3 12 cc 71 ae af | unwrapped: c0 a0 27 c3 41 7e a2 81 a6 49 b0 34 e1 8b 57 f7 | unwrapped: b4 20 92 d7 6a 52 1d f9 a0 cd 4d 62 f3 50 5b 62 | unwrapped: 0a e7 5d 4b ae 89 5e 5b 3a 7a 4f 92 8f ec 81 47 | unwrapped: e1 c7 d8 bc 4a c3 e5 0c dc b6 26 fe 5a a4 f3 a8 | unwrapped: e8 06 ee 61 99 75 46 c1 6c 44 2f 50 51 41 b7 1a | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb29d4 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb29dc (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_a 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_e 0x55e200b969a0, enc_key 0x55e200b8a680 | DH_i: 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | DH_i: b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | DH_i: d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | DH_i: a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | DH_i: 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | DH_i: cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | DH_i: 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | DH_i: 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | DH_i: a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | DH_i: 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | DH_i: dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | DH_i: 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | DH_i: 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | DH_i: 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | DH_i: 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | DH_i: f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | DH_r: 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | DH_r: 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | DH_r: ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | DH_r: 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | DH_r: 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | DH_r: 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | DH_r: 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | DH_r: 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | DH_r: 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | DH_r: 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | DH_r: 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | DH_r: 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | DH_r: 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | DH_r: c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | DH_r: 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | DH_r: 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb27d4 (length 256) | 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb28d4 (length 256) | 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2e4001640 (length 20) | df 7f 24 47 72 4f 3e f8 e8 63 35 c5 61 17 c9 f6 | a9 2f 05 31 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 8 time elapsed 0.002044 seconds | (#9) spent 2.03 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 8: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 8 for state #9 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #9 | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 8 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #9: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0000d60: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #9 | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #9 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #9 spent 0.0203 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 | spent 0.00219 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 85 b5 09 34 | 87 fc 1f fa a4 66 83 a6 f2 68 b9 be 73 fe 28 3c | ea 9d bb 3b 84 f0 eb c3 94 43 7d af bc 87 e9 4d | 2c d2 f2 85 6a bf e6 0c 23 d1 1a b7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: df 7f 24 47 72 4f 3e f8 e8 63 35 c5 61 17 c9 f6 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: bc 87 e9 4d 2c d2 f2 85 6a bf e6 0c 23 d1 1a b7 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 04 a6 85 c5 | 67 e3 6a 50 2c d7 f9 fb c0 a4 5b fe b3 23 70 96 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #9: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d8000ea0 (length 256) | 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0000b20 (length 256) | 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200b02900 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | 04 a6 85 c5 67 e3 6a 50 2c d7 f9 fb c0 a4 5b fe | b3 23 70 96 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e4001640 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0000b20 (length 256) | 09 0c df 29 e4 d8 17 a7 ff 0a 5a f0 45 45 c5 c6 | 24 43 99 f4 80 ff b2 4c 2c eb 88 99 f5 09 fd da | ed c9 ce ea e1 9d 63 00 9f 6d 14 e6 da 4c bc 71 | 32 ee ec 8b 72 14 c6 8b d0 bf 54 68 2a 62 e2 25 | 62 21 c6 e2 fd da e0 9b bf 8b e0 c3 c0 9e c4 32 | 83 cc 68 26 a0 48 91 d5 8e 87 e2 40 54 40 f7 2b | 69 78 16 4b f4 53 25 9f 12 36 a7 55 1a 7a 53 20 | 9c a2 93 42 6d 70 d9 94 df 4c ae 45 d7 3d 78 12 | 66 c3 0a 5b 28 6c 4c a5 08 ea 57 a2 38 98 1b 0a | 74 a0 0d 43 1e 71 c9 d1 61 d2 24 a1 44 dc 1b d4 | 1c 91 9b 1e 6d de e9 7d 3f ec e6 0a c6 3c ca 3a | 40 24 fa c6 b3 62 55 79 a4 a8 4e 52 d1 78 e5 f1 | 3e cb bd 1c 6e 37 2e 80 9d 88 85 24 eb ff f0 bf | c3 2e 4b 86 65 11 2b 9c 58 5d 8e 00 85 16 ea af | 0f c0 97 db 6b 1c d1 9b 6e 28 fd 8d a5 56 02 b5 | 0f 10 1d a1 6f 69 41 ba 1d a0 f6 03 f6 0b 66 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d8000ea0 (length 256) | 2a bf 7c 01 99 85 ab da a9 c3 25 af 42 8a c3 87 | b6 01 fd 74 d1 82 3e bf fa c4 36 42 99 a8 81 84 | d5 7b b6 67 01 8f 9d f8 fa 93 1c 80 5e c6 38 8f | a6 59 bf a5 67 c1 27 fd cf 60 21 e5 55 a2 05 9d | 1f 36 98 2c b7 5e bc 74 c0 01 10 b0 87 8f d0 a0 | cd 3e fc df 00 fa 50 7d a1 48 0d dc 55 4a 30 bc | 4e 65 60 e8 47 89 be 0f 40 c5 10 d7 58 6b ef 52 | 46 5a d1 c9 84 a0 85 e1 4d dd db 4e 67 1a a0 74 | a7 ef 1f 05 32 49 c7 f0 21 eb 22 eb 2a da 51 9e | 76 6f 54 e2 d9 7d c4 23 d2 3e 66 17 fd 3b 29 1c | dc b1 aa 1e 18 86 f4 2a 07 1c b9 74 0e 50 b5 a5 | 28 33 a5 97 61 c3 09 ce 1c f6 5e 17 9b 2b d7 63 | 07 ad f2 0d e8 f2 48 22 10 56 ad 2a bb a5 5a 29 | 0a e3 f4 22 d9 df 57 03 d6 53 e4 6a 4a 48 28 bb | 09 6a a5 5d 82 8e 45 30 8a e5 33 8d bd 72 3c 59 | f6 d2 aa c0 19 42 f5 2d 8d c5 02 56 50 d8 c3 4d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | 16 46 0c 63 41 85 60 e4 30 3b 63 41 3f cd 37 60 | 52 d3 c1 3e | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 16 46 0c 63 41 85 60 e4 30 3b 63 41 3f cd 37 60 | HASH_R 52 d3 c1 3e | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 16 46 0c 63 41 85 60 e4 30 3b 63 41 3f cd 37 60 | encrypting: 52 d3 c1 3e | IV: bc 87 e9 4d 2c d2 f2 85 6a bf e6 0c 23 d1 1a b7 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #9 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #9: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #9 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #9 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c a7 ee 55 e8 | 6b 6e 21 84 4b 4a e0 cb 58 b3 85 87 22 a8 b4 42 | fc cf de aa c8 09 51 07 cc 4e 59 9d a8 c7 22 d7 | 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #9 | #9 spent 0.569 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.702 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00229 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 08 10 20 01 8f 95 fe d9 00 00 01 bc bf 72 0b e2 | db 24 f8 1d 09 b3 68 a4 91 3c 45 ee 9c 10 3a a4 | 3d d9 8f 14 6e fd 7a 61 b2 94 65 a5 07 8f 6c 87 | fb 8b 09 e5 20 f4 58 ca 06 30 ed 81 c8 2b da ca | 98 d3 d5 3a 97 68 ac 0a 46 5b 69 e0 ed c7 8c e3 | 34 b9 5d 99 a6 43 f9 f5 43 b8 b5 94 23 fe 34 4e | d1 66 c6 26 73 41 c1 1c 07 c0 d7 af 78 d7 38 d7 | f7 c8 fd 98 12 11 a8 71 27 fd 1d dd 41 ce 6f 1b | 2d 36 3c 5d ba f5 3d 7f 07 0a 8c c5 dd 24 41 aa | e8 b3 96 be e6 9b cb 78 fa 1e 02 3e c0 03 f2 5a | 33 c8 0c 50 be 15 57 6a 3c c2 7e b6 86 17 ce 73 | 8f 77 12 af c8 db 50 03 e2 90 26 bd 2e 7d 9b 48 | 72 9c 83 a2 ff 92 a1 ed 20 e1 b5 5c c0 a9 3a f3 | ec e3 a1 05 86 08 83 bf de 39 34 1d ef 3f f1 f3 | 54 94 d7 b9 8c 6f dd 5e 54 de e5 6c 41 80 e4 b6 | 92 a8 f8 a0 8d df 88 aa 35 1c 6b 09 8d 74 ba 38 | 3b 7d 3d fa d0 d4 03 d7 e4 f8 83 77 bf 7b 1e 73 | 53 15 73 93 af ef ea 52 d2 a6 b1 7f 54 35 fa b8 | 39 48 23 8e 06 df dd 4b a3 9f e0 9c d5 63 c7 3b | 8f d0 7d f4 ac 2a bb d9 8a 04 59 8b a0 bc 4e 4f | 30 f3 cb 77 c3 4f f7 78 28 4d 5d 02 ed 6d 8c b5 | ef e3 c9 e6 a7 c8 ad ef 7d 04 f1 e3 2d f1 a1 8c | d1 90 7f 95 fe ef 73 c3 a3 dd 0e b4 ed ec 68 0a | 55 f4 21 6e 4c ec 5f d0 c6 53 21 e5 14 47 6b b8 | ad a2 12 2d 7a b3 22 0a 63 ca 65 d3 99 56 ab 22 | d5 4c 56 e0 41 01 ef 9e 0b 55 69 21 ef 3c f4 b2 | 79 6f dc e8 06 0f 9f a3 5f 90 ca 93 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2408971993 (0x8f95fed9) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | current Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 8f 95 fe d9 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | 0f 3b ab 87 f1 7e bb fc d7 6c 9e 68 71 d8 c7 73 | 0c cd 1d 84 | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 0f 3b ab 87 f1 7e bb fc d7 6c 9e 68 71 d8 c7 73 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: ef 3c f4 b2 79 6f dc e8 06 0f 9f a3 5f 90 ca 93 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 08 10 20 01 8f 95 fe d9 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | d1 44 89 84 48 95 3f fc d5 6a 23 8c a7 a7 43 0f | c7 b8 d7 65 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 ad 03 58 19 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 00 04 00 00 24 | 8d 5e f6 1f 0c 79 1c ce 33 b4 f6 ec 7d 10 b6 2d | 84 aa 4b c0 07 33 eb 95 1c 95 68 79 e9 74 b1 77 | 05 00 01 04 cb c1 60 fc 30 45 b1 3b 2f 3b 9b 48 | a4 73 a5 2b 19 27 55 db 62 e8 3a 66 bb 9f 33 d3 | 21 54 f6 ca a6 07 57 77 e0 ed 57 20 1e 80 95 2c | 5d e9 ea 09 a3 00 7c 05 91 ed 31 c7 c8 24 58 62 | 8b 3f c7 61 01 fb da 07 c9 d8 75 72 8a a4 0a f8 | 6f 5f 7b 28 3a 97 88 c4 fd 39 2c fc 5b 10 07 65 | 98 f0 87 bd af 06 6f 58 3d 0d aa 38 58 af 76 0e | 20 5e ab 9e e4 b3 0d 11 a2 69 80 98 85 34 c3 07 | ef 03 04 43 9b 44 8e 7c 21 1b e2 03 28 6e 16 b5 | d7 40 6c 3b 76 16 f9 a7 ee b9 71 4f 6a a0 87 e7 | 77 50 78 c4 6d 82 3e 0e 0e 99 1b b5 94 a7 79 86 | 7e fd 03 ca fd 24 2b 6f e4 6a 23 7e 34 eb af 4b | 71 5d 20 8f c9 96 e7 62 e1 c6 9c 94 65 d6 da 59 | 46 e9 b4 bf 22 d3 78 a2 c4 68 b3 a6 c3 62 f8 d6 | 30 6e 56 cc 23 13 ed 0d 61 55 7a e2 2f b1 3c 30 | fe 51 0d 54 c4 5a a9 32 c4 08 b1 5b 4a 1f 9a a7 | 8b 5b 81 58 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 8f 95 fe d9 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200bb0434 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 ad 03 58 19 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 00 04 00 00 24 8d 5e f6 1f | 0c 79 1c ce 33 b4 f6 ec 7d 10 b6 2d 84 aa 4b c0 | 07 33 eb 95 1c 95 68 79 e9 74 b1 77 05 00 01 04 | cb c1 60 fc 30 45 b1 3b 2f 3b 9b 48 a4 73 a5 2b | 19 27 55 db 62 e8 3a 66 bb 9f 33 d3 21 54 f6 ca | a6 07 57 77 e0 ed 57 20 1e 80 95 2c 5d e9 ea 09 | a3 00 7c 05 91 ed 31 c7 c8 24 58 62 8b 3f c7 61 | 01 fb da 07 c9 d8 75 72 8a a4 0a f8 6f 5f 7b 28 | 3a 97 88 c4 fd 39 2c fc 5b 10 07 65 98 f0 87 bd | af 06 6f 58 3d 0d aa 38 58 af 76 0e 20 5e ab 9e | e4 b3 0d 11 a2 69 80 98 85 34 c3 07 ef 03 04 43 | 9b 44 8e 7c 21 1b e2 03 28 6e 16 b5 d7 40 6c 3b | 76 16 f9 a7 ee b9 71 4f 6a a0 87 e7 77 50 78 c4 | 6d 82 3e 0e 0e 99 1b b5 94 a7 79 86 7e fd 03 ca | fd 24 2b 6f e4 6a 23 7e 34 eb af 4b 71 5d 20 8f | c9 96 e7 62 e1 c6 9c 94 65 d6 da 59 46 e9 b4 bf | 22 d3 78 a2 c4 68 b3 a6 c3 62 f8 d6 30 6e 56 cc | 23 13 ed 0d 61 55 7a e2 2f b1 3c 30 fe 51 0d 54 | c4 5a a9 32 c4 08 b1 5b 4a 1f 9a a7 8b 5b 81 58 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | d1 44 89 84 48 95 3f fc d5 6a 23 8c a7 a7 43 0f | c7 b8 d7 65 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | d1 44 89 84 48 95 3f fc d5 6a 23 8c a7 a7 43 0f | c7 b8 d7 65 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #9: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #10 at 0x55e200bb1b50 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #10 in UNDEFINED | pstats #10 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #9 "east" as #10 for IPSEC SA | #10 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #9.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #10: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI ad 03 58 19 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #10: IKEv1 key-length attribute without encryption algorithm | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #10 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #10: sending encrypted notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2733371069 (0xa2ebeebd) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f8d8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9bc (length 4) | a2 eb ee bd | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc74 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc60 (length 20) | 4f 78 6b 5c 32 87 fc 70 f8 20 5e ea d2 ad 1e ea | 52 0e 62 69 | send notification HASH(1): | 4f 78 6b 5c 32 87 fc 70 f8 20 5e ea d2 ad 1e ea | 52 0e 62 69 | last Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | current Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9cc (length 4) | a2 eb ee bd | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | ef 3d 94 d7 26 27 81 2d de 72 86 72 b3 31 29 23 | 13 4c 2e 7e | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 4f 78 6b 5c 32 87 fc 70 f8 20 5e ea | encrypting: d2 ad 1e ea 52 0e 62 69 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0f | IV: ef 3d 94 d7 26 27 81 2d de 72 86 72 b3 31 29 23 | IV: 13 4c 2e 7e | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: b9 39 67 0f e9 1f ba 29 6e 0d a9 20 64 54 11 80 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #10) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 08 10 05 01 a2 eb ee bd 00 00 00 4c e8 10 ca 10 | b7 0a 03 25 65 5d eb c5 ca 85 6d f7 ed f4 18 2f | 8b cb f2 90 ab d1 7d 75 63 8c b7 37 b9 39 67 0f | e9 1f ba 29 6e 0d a9 20 64 54 11 80 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | pstats #10 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #10: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #10: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #10: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #10 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #10: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #10 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #9 spent 0.563 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.965 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0028 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 08 10 05 01 d7 f5 ee 86 00 00 00 5c eb 5b 79 30 | 78 13 63 60 0f 64 fc c8 82 a9 fa ac 03 64 32 51 | 71 c7 0b 92 fc 9f fa 46 91 14 03 a9 63 a9 b4 23 | d4 7b 35 c2 f2 66 99 23 08 09 4f 3b bf 0d b7 9a | c4 a0 8a 1b a5 42 f2 7d 32 d5 0a d9 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3623218822 (0xd7f5ee86) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #9; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #9 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | current Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | d7 f5 ee 86 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | ec 80 f9 1e 14 d4 fe fe bd 23 d4 91 50 c5 06 09 | 8e bd e4 c1 | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: ec 80 f9 1e 14 d4 fe fe bd 23 d4 91 50 c5 06 09 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: bf 0d b7 9a c4 a0 8a 1b a5 42 f2 7d 32 d5 0a d9 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 08 10 05 01 d7 f5 ee 86 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | f7 d4 3f 72 5f 51 2f 43 52 1c cd a9 94 a1 c0 60 | ca 8e c0 f4 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | d7 f5 ee 86 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b8c0e4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 ac 44 ea a6 | dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | f7 d4 3f 72 5f 51 2f 43 52 1c cd a9 94 a1 c0 60 | ca 8e c0 f4 | informational HASH(1): | f7 d4 3f 72 5f 51 2f 43 52 1c cd a9 94 a1 c0 60 | ca 8e c0 f4 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #9: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #9 | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #9: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.581s and sending notification | parent state #9: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #9 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | responder cookie: | 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 916177124 (0x369bc0e4) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc48 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd2c (length 4) | 36 9b c0 e4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0d4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 ac 44 ea a6 | dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0c0 (length 20) | 98 55 ad 5d da 77 a9 b8 37 2b 57 08 28 5f cc 94 | c2 b4 0f 1a | send delete HASH(1): | 98 55 ad 5d da 77 a9 b8 37 2b 57 08 28 5f cc 94 | c2 b4 0f 1a | last Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | current Phase 1 IV: a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | a8 c7 22 d7 60 87 b1 f5 57 2c dc 48 45 87 d2 15 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd3c (length 4) | 36 9b c0 e4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | ab 72 22 40 76 bd ba 0e a4 83 bb 2e 60 24 7b 26 | a6 3e 53 04 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 98 55 ad 5d da 77 a9 b8 37 2b 57 08 | encrypting: 28 5f cc 94 c2 b4 0f 1a 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 | encrypting: 98 14 81 fa | IV: ab 72 22 40 76 bd ba 0e a4 83 bb 2e 60 24 7b 26 | IV: a6 3e 53 04 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: c9 22 7d fc 01 ae a2 2b 71 3b 27 9c 5a 68 e4 22 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | ac 44 ea a6 dc ef c6 5c 63 97 1a 69 98 14 81 fa | 08 10 05 01 36 9b c0 e4 00 00 00 5c 1a 54 2c 21 | 11 e4 18 b1 6d ac ec 3c bc 1c 5a 2b 39 69 d7 88 | df 01 94 45 e7 12 c2 f1 01 d1 6d 8d 1d a2 9e 48 | ef 18 df 56 57 77 1b bd 83 f7 19 b7 c9 22 7d fc | 01 ae a2 2b 71 3b 27 9c 5a 68 e4 22 | state #9 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #9: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0000d60: destroyed | stop processing: state #9 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.58 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0033 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 08 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 4e 6d af 20 b9 27 fe 93 | 07 6b 9c 15 4e 38 6c 06 8f c9 0e 28 bb d1 de 2e | creating state object #11 at 0x55e200bb1090 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #11 in UNDEFINED | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp started | #11 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #11: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b "east" #11: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #11 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #11: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.581 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00289 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | 14 00 00 24 cc 6b e6 38 d4 3b 9b 62 2f 95 95 2c | 71 41 d6 56 04 fb a6 b3 e5 e0 bc eb f8 36 34 a8 | 1d 66 b5 cc 14 00 00 18 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 | 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e 0b 60 4f 01 00 00 00 18 | d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | 32 79 97 07 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #11 is idle | #11 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | 0b 60 4f 01 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | natd_hash: hash= 0b 60 4f 01 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | 32 79 97 07 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | natd_hash: hash= 32 79 97 07 | expected NAT-D(me): 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | expected NAT-D(me): 0b 60 4f 01 | expected NAT-D(him): | d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | 32 79 97 07 | received NAT-D: 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | received NAT-D: 0b 60 4f 01 | received NAT-D: d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | received NAT-D: 32 79 97 07 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 9 for state #11 | state #11 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #11 and saving MD | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 9 for state #11 | crypto helper 4 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 9 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001fc0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2dc001fc0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | Generated nonce: 66 8b a4 5e ba 52 d8 4a ca 7c 7d b1 43 22 b0 a2 | Generated nonce: 61 a0 7c d1 27 cc 79 de 49 6e 43 98 94 96 f4 6b | crypto helper 4 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 9 time elapsed 0.000885 seconds | (#11) spent 0.886 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 9: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 9 for state #11 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc00ac40 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | #11 is busy; has a suspended MD | #11 spent 0.184 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.327 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #11 | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 9 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #11: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001fc0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #11 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | keyex value b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | keyex value 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | keyex value 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | keyex value 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | keyex value a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | keyex value de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | keyex value 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | keyex value eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | keyex value b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | keyex value 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | keyex value ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | keyex value 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | keyex value 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | keyex value db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | keyex value 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 66 8b a4 5e ba 52 d8 4a ca 7c 7d b1 43 22 b0 a2 | Nr 61 a0 7c d1 27 cc 79 de 49 6e 43 98 94 96 f4 6b | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | 32 79 97 07 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | natd_hash: hash= 32 79 97 07 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 | NAT-D 32 79 97 07 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | 0b 60 4f 01 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | natd_hash: rcookie= b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | natd_hash: hash= 0b 60 4f 01 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | NAT-D 0b 60 4f 01 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001fc0: transferring ownership from state #11 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 10 for state #11 | state #11 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #11 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #11 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #11: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #11 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | 14 00 00 24 66 8b a4 5e ba 52 d8 4a ca 7c 7d b1 | 43 22 b0 a2 61 a0 7c d1 27 cc 79 de 49 6e 43 98 | 94 96 f4 6b 14 00 00 18 d3 58 04 c0 ac 59 6f e1 | f4 db 35 52 c9 33 b3 b6 32 79 97 07 00 00 00 18 | 50 d1 6b 24 4c 60 8b e6 54 4b 80 ac f1 72 e4 2e | 0b 60 4f 01 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 size 128 | #11 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48956.371278 "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #11 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #11 spent 0.389 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc00ac40 | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 10 for state #11 | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 10 | peer's g: 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | peer's g: 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | peer's g: b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | peer's g: bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | peer's g: 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | peer's g: d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | peer's g: 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | peer's g: 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | peer's g: 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | peer's g: e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | peer's g: 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | peer's g: c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | peer's g: 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | peer's g: a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | peer's g: 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | peer's g: fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001fc0: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b8a680 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb2770 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc96688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e0005140 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e0005140 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0000d60 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb2794 (length 32) | cc 6b e6 38 d4 3b 9b 62 2f 95 95 2c 71 41 d6 56 | 04 fb a6 b3 e5 e0 bc eb f8 36 34 a8 1d 66 b5 cc | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb27b4 (length 32) | 66 8b a4 5e ba 52 d8 4a ca 7c 7d b1 43 22 b0 a2 | 61 a0 7c d1 27 cc 79 de 49 6e 43 98 94 96 f4 6b | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e0005140 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e0005140 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002cc0 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-339123456: 3c 3a ffffffa1 ffffffe7 51 ffffffb4 4f 08 49 0e ffffffc9 3f 41 67 ffffff87 ffffff9d ffffffa6 46 ffffffc0 ffffffdb fffffffd 5b fffffffd ffffff82 ffffff9a ffffff8a 47 54 46 ffffffd1 fffffffc ffffffd4 1b 61 ffffff92 ffffffde ffffffc1 ffffffd3 0e fffffff8 2f 4f ffffffa3 05 5f 64 ffffffd5 60 ffffff87 ffffffaf ffffff95 77 ffffff8b ffffffbb fffffffd 1b ffffffff 0e ffffffae ffffffba ffffffee 7d ffffff8e ffffffa0 0b 6d 15 ffffffd2 1a ffffffb2 34 fffffffb 6c fffffff9 36 51 37 5a ffffffe6 0b 35 76 ffffff95 1f 72 ffffff9a 0e 71 ffffff82 33 42 48 1a 11 ffffffbe 6a ffffff93 ffffff81 ffffffb8 fffffff6 ffffffa0 4d ffffffbc 34 0b 19 ffffff83 43 75 ffffffff 12 0c 67 77 79 41 ffffffb4 ffffffad ffffff87 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffa6 fffffff9 ffffffa1 ffffffb1 43 ffffffbb ffffffe2 ffffffe1 5d ffffff94 7b ffffffbd ffffffe0 fffffff3 ffffff81 ffffff97 65 ffffffd2 3d ffffffa1 37 1b 44 7e 5c 21 24 ffffffdd 79 1b fffffffc ffffffda 67 7f 18 ffffffec ffffffed ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e0005d40 | unwrapped: 78 3f a1 97 f2 d0 15 eb 08 a3 d7 45 98 73 3c 2d | unwrapped: 17 f6 2c 90 f1 c8 cb e9 4c a1 0a 0f 1c 4b de de | unwrapped: 43 14 c9 6f b6 4e 48 74 c6 52 20 5a c0 62 53 8c | unwrapped: 08 8a 85 c2 42 61 16 ce 99 ac f0 d2 f7 ce b2 64 | unwrapped: 14 41 8e 37 64 72 4f 63 1d 8c 69 9e 91 05 d0 65 | unwrapped: ba 89 a8 e6 3a fb 20 dc de 59 9f 77 a5 fc a5 ab | unwrapped: 6f 28 b6 95 66 cb 00 87 6c 2c fb 94 4c 40 03 d1 | unwrapped: 67 40 17 0f 8a 70 50 aa 4d ba 5f bb e0 28 d0 ea | unwrapped: 7d 30 7c 33 67 89 93 01 f0 e1 50 70 ec 04 50 bd | unwrapped: a7 e4 36 cc 27 1a 31 8d 3c da 0c fc 97 f2 8a 85 | unwrapped: d9 23 ba a8 b0 eb 7c 6e b9 bf 83 3c 38 49 dc e2 | unwrapped: 60 60 18 bc 75 7f 63 e6 33 35 c8 07 0f 6c b5 1a | unwrapped: 87 c0 91 8a 96 64 13 d3 a9 7a d9 3f e8 e1 f7 16 | unwrapped: 52 17 df a5 cb 9a bc 72 50 06 0e 2d 79 be 34 7b | unwrapped: 40 40 df 3e 4c bf f0 0e d3 1c 4b 6e 7d 29 1a 06 | unwrapped: 0e 12 4f 28 6c 19 98 f7 09 9e fd 01 e1 7f 7b 29 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb29d4 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb29dc (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc96698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e0005140 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e0005140 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002760 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-339123488: 67 06 ffffff94 ffffffb2 ffffffab 1b 21 77 ffffffb1 0b 7f 74 54 6d 48 ffffffdc 53 ffffffd4 34 05 ffffffae 42 ffffffe4 6c ffffffaf 40 ffffffa1 32 ffffffad 33 0f 44 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e0007020 | unwrapped: 24 a9 0e 2d 78 24 3c f1 32 86 98 56 79 54 1f 24 | unwrapped: 59 a5 77 68 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-339123488: 3c 3a ffffffa1 ffffffe7 51 ffffffb4 4f 08 49 0e ffffffc9 3f 41 67 ffffff87 ffffff9d ffffffa6 46 ffffffc0 ffffffdb fffffffd 5b fffffffd ffffff82 ffffff9a ffffff8a 47 54 46 ffffffd1 fffffffc ffffffd4 1b 61 ffffff92 ffffffde ffffffc1 ffffffd3 0e fffffff8 2f 4f ffffffa3 05 5f 64 ffffffd5 60 ffffff87 ffffffaf ffffff95 77 ffffff8b ffffffbb fffffffd 1b ffffffff 0e ffffffae ffffffba ffffffee 7d ffffff8e ffffffa0 0b 6d 15 ffffffd2 1a ffffffb2 34 fffffffb 6c fffffff9 36 51 37 5a ffffffe6 0b 35 76 ffffff95 1f 72 ffffff9a 0e 71 ffffff82 33 42 48 1a 11 ffffffbe 6a ffffff93 ffffff81 ffffffb8 fffffff6 ffffffa0 4d ffffffbc 34 0b 19 ffffff83 43 75 ffffffff 12 0c 67 77 79 41 ffffffb4 ffffffad ffffff87 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffa6 fffffff9 ffffffa1 ffffffb1 43 ffffffbb ffffffe2 ffffffe1 5d ffffff94 7b ffffffbd ffffffe0 fffffff3 ffffff81 ffffff97 65 ffffffd2 3d ffffffa1 37 1b 44 7e 5c 21 24 ffffffdd 79 1b fffffffc ffffffda 67 7f 18 ffffffec ffffffed ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e0002fe0 | unwrapped: 78 3f a1 97 f2 d0 15 eb 08 a3 d7 45 98 73 3c 2d | unwrapped: 17 f6 2c 90 f1 c8 cb e9 4c a1 0a 0f 1c 4b de de | unwrapped: 43 14 c9 6f b6 4e 48 74 c6 52 20 5a c0 62 53 8c | unwrapped: 08 8a 85 c2 42 61 16 ce 99 ac f0 d2 f7 ce b2 64 | unwrapped: 14 41 8e 37 64 72 4f 63 1d 8c 69 9e 91 05 d0 65 | unwrapped: ba 89 a8 e6 3a fb 20 dc de 59 9f 77 a5 fc a5 ab | unwrapped: 6f 28 b6 95 66 cb 00 87 6c 2c fb 94 4c 40 03 d1 | unwrapped: 67 40 17 0f 8a 70 50 aa 4d ba 5f bb e0 28 d0 ea | unwrapped: 7d 30 7c 33 67 89 93 01 f0 e1 50 70 ec 04 50 bd | unwrapped: a7 e4 36 cc 27 1a 31 8d 3c da 0c fc 97 f2 8a 85 | unwrapped: d9 23 ba a8 b0 eb 7c 6e b9 bf 83 3c 38 49 dc e2 | unwrapped: 60 60 18 bc 75 7f 63 e6 33 35 c8 07 0f 6c b5 1a | unwrapped: 87 c0 91 8a 96 64 13 d3 a9 7a d9 3f e8 e1 f7 16 | unwrapped: 52 17 df a5 cb 9a bc 72 50 06 0e 2d 79 be 34 7b | unwrapped: 40 40 df 3e 4c bf f0 0e d3 1c 4b 6e 7d 29 1a 06 | unwrapped: 0e 12 4f 28 6c 19 98 f7 09 9e fd 01 e1 7f 7b 29 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb29d4 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb29dc (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc96688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e0005140 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e0005140 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002af0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-339123472: 71 54 ffffff98 2b fffffff7 51 ffffffbe ffffffef ffffffaa 25 ffffffed 3e 03 ffffff80 75 ffffffbe 23 25 fffffff9 33 ffffffa1 5a 33 07 ffffffee ffffffbb ffffffad 4d 43 7a 1c fffffff7 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e0007590 | unwrapped: 0b 52 77 76 04 91 a1 67 dc f3 fb 31 7a 7b ee 9d | unwrapped: a6 05 b1 9a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-339123472: 3c 3a ffffffa1 ffffffe7 51 ffffffb4 4f 08 49 0e ffffffc9 3f 41 67 ffffff87 ffffff9d ffffffa6 46 ffffffc0 ffffffdb fffffffd 5b fffffffd ffffff82 ffffff9a ffffff8a 47 54 46 ffffffd1 fffffffc ffffffd4 1b 61 ffffff92 ffffffde ffffffc1 ffffffd3 0e fffffff8 2f 4f ffffffa3 05 5f 64 ffffffd5 60 ffffff87 ffffffaf ffffff95 77 ffffff8b ffffffbb fffffffd 1b ffffffff 0e ffffffae ffffffba ffffffee 7d ffffff8e ffffffa0 0b 6d 15 ffffffd2 1a ffffffb2 34 fffffffb 6c fffffff9 36 51 37 5a ffffffe6 0b 35 76 ffffff95 1f 72 ffffff9a 0e 71 ffffff82 33 42 48 1a 11 ffffffbe 6a ffffff93 ffffff81 ffffffb8 fffffff6 ffffffa0 4d ffffffbc 34 0b 19 ffffff83 43 75 ffffffff 12 0c 67 77 79 41 ffffffb4 ffffffad ffffff87 ffffff92 ffffffd4 ffffffa6 fffffff9 ffffffa1 ffffffb1 43 ffffffbb ffffffe2 ffffffe1 5d ffffff94 7b ffffffbd ffffffe0 fffffff3 ffffff81 ffffff97 65 ffffffd2 3d ffffffa1 37 1b 44 7e 5c 21 24 ffffffdd 79 1b fffffffc ffffffda 67 7f 18 ffffffec ffffffed ff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e0002ed0 | unwrapped: 78 3f a1 97 f2 d0 15 eb 08 a3 d7 45 98 73 3c 2d | unwrapped: 17 f6 2c 90 f1 c8 cb e9 4c a1 0a 0f 1c 4b de de | unwrapped: 43 14 c9 6f b6 4e 48 74 c6 52 20 5a c0 62 53 8c | unwrapped: 08 8a 85 c2 42 61 16 ce 99 ac f0 d2 f7 ce b2 64 | unwrapped: 14 41 8e 37 64 72 4f 63 1d 8c 69 9e 91 05 d0 65 | unwrapped: ba 89 a8 e6 3a fb 20 dc de 59 9f 77 a5 fc a5 ab | unwrapped: 6f 28 b6 95 66 cb 00 87 6c 2c fb 94 4c 40 03 d1 | unwrapped: 67 40 17 0f 8a 70 50 aa 4d ba 5f bb e0 28 d0 ea | unwrapped: 7d 30 7c 33 67 89 93 01 f0 e1 50 70 ec 04 50 bd | unwrapped: a7 e4 36 cc 27 1a 31 8d 3c da 0c fc 97 f2 8a 85 | unwrapped: d9 23 ba a8 b0 eb 7c 6e b9 bf 83 3c 38 49 dc e2 | unwrapped: 60 60 18 bc 75 7f 63 e6 33 35 c8 07 0f 6c b5 1a | unwrapped: 87 c0 91 8a 96 64 13 d3 a9 7a d9 3f e8 e1 f7 16 | unwrapped: 52 17 df a5 cb 9a bc 72 50 06 0e 2d 79 be 34 7b | unwrapped: 40 40 df 3e 4c bf f0 0e d3 1c 4b 6e 7d 29 1a 06 | unwrapped: 0e 12 4f 28 6c 19 98 f7 09 9e fd 01 e1 7f 7b 29 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb29d4 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb29dc (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc96698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ebc966f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b95040 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_a 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_e 0x55e200b93380, enc_key 0x55e200b95040 | DH_i: 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | DH_i: 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | DH_i: b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | DH_i: bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | DH_i: 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | DH_i: d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | DH_i: 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | DH_i: 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | DH_i: 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | DH_i: e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | DH_i: 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | DH_i: c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | DH_i: 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | DH_i: a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | DH_i: 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | DH_i: fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | DH_r: 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | DH_r: b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | DH_r: 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | DH_r: 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | DH_r: 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | DH_r: a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | DH_r: de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | DH_r: 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | DH_r: eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | DH_r: b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | DH_r: 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | DH_r: ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | DH_r: 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | DH_r: 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | DH_r: db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | DH_r: 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb27d4 (length 256) | 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb28d4 (length 256) | 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2e0002d90 (length 20) | 4d b9 71 50 6d 63 15 ba 5c 73 10 36 b1 39 93 52 | 2d 54 90 84 | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 10 time elapsed 0.002878 seconds | (#11) spent 2.19 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 10: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 10 for state #11 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0005a70 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #11 | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 10 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #11: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001fc0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #11 | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #11 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #11 spent 0.0304 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0005a70 | spent 0.003 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 0a a3 42 2b | 4a 98 54 ff a0 6b ef 07 05 b2 50 8f 94 a6 ae a2 | e7 8b fa 72 f2 86 6b 1c 63 49 b5 6f 57 f4 96 f8 | 07 d2 8d 1e c9 dc 14 d8 6c 11 4e 2c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 4d b9 71 50 6d 63 15 ba 5c 73 10 36 b1 39 93 52 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 57 f4 96 f8 07 d2 8d 1e c9 dc 14 d8 6c 11 4e 2c | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 25 fa 0a 4e | ce 0d df 20 d9 05 a5 0e 1c d6 10 13 7b af 8b 17 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #11: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0000ea0 (length 256) | 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc003bd0 (length 256) | 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200b07f70 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | 25 fa 0a 4e ce 0d df 20 d9 05 a5 0e 1c d6 10 13 | 7b af 8b 17 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002d90 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc003bd0 (length 256) | 2a 7a 3a b5 05 cf 97 3f 53 b5 e0 60 cf 39 1e 6e | b4 8e c1 ba 27 ed ef b2 88 60 a8 25 d7 38 7a 40 | 2e 8a 7a 38 75 58 57 a8 ca a8 a0 51 14 7d e2 ed | 79 d6 48 56 d2 73 67 bb ac 32 3d 8c bd ce 86 c8 | 2a 8d b3 60 db 35 c0 b8 62 86 7a 25 f3 54 fb b1 | a1 ec 0d 14 e3 75 f1 30 e2 98 f0 73 f7 95 2b 2b | de 45 34 15 eb de 38 2a b6 c3 c3 8f c5 ca ba 2d | 16 ef 3d 8a d8 6e e0 63 02 ea bd 03 14 d4 7e a1 | eb 7f 27 82 19 75 9c 29 03 fc b3 59 6a c0 52 c2 | b7 a4 c4 80 ea 92 4e ee 9e f3 3b dc af f1 af 52 | 7c e0 fb b5 e6 9d 86 bd 29 52 0b ae 8e a3 69 e2 | ec a1 bd 73 a2 76 28 e3 84 dd 89 7f ea 86 a6 7f | 8a 50 2f 99 84 dd 5e 43 97 bf 99 84 17 1c 9b 5b | 91 23 6f 24 67 45 99 6d 1e b6 d6 84 9a 34 cf 78 | db 85 31 c9 97 43 89 85 ac cc 39 12 a0 24 ce e2 | 37 a9 24 7f 35 45 8d cd 04 d2 f6 16 e7 21 27 c1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0000ea0 (length 256) | 6e 93 4b 3c b8 25 44 a7 99 1a 9e 7f 01 f9 dd de | 04 df ab 3a 6e 7c 78 fb 74 80 33 14 91 ef 35 82 | b8 58 44 23 1a e3 25 ab 25 8a 4a 2b a5 16 fd 7d | bd 42 dd e9 40 96 47 95 68 3f 83 b6 9d fd 2c ab | 96 28 4a 62 c5 79 d8 b6 b0 cd 3e c9 7f 2f 2c 02 | d3 69 6b 30 3b 23 58 5c ef 76 de 2c 32 3a 24 47 | 86 47 bd a4 ab 84 93 41 00 48 35 00 45 06 cb e9 | 3a 82 56 8d b3 ff cf 5b 3b e7 d6 c1 f0 e3 6d 9c | 47 a1 ba 54 26 42 79 36 b6 98 0d 5a 35 93 26 3b | e0 f8 36 46 2b 17 eb bf 12 64 8c a1 01 b0 01 f6 | 8c eb 60 22 85 9d b7 dd af ef 4d 4f be 95 62 c1 | c5 4d f1 e4 11 a2 a7 94 0d 1c cf ba c8 7c 90 11 | 92 a0 2c 4d eb d8 0c 02 7c ca 18 80 5b 70 49 2e | a0 4d a4 b9 22 0b 7e 50 f2 4d 2d e1 83 00 b7 71 | 87 40 39 a5 51 e1 5b 16 07 75 57 ec bc 5e a5 e2 | fb 07 2f 3b 48 8b fc c0 dc 3e e0 84 14 29 93 d7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1630 (length 8) | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1628 (length 8) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | 63 89 95 c8 43 71 21 ed f7 b3 80 31 00 1d 8d 68 | f1 54 66 4b | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 63 89 95 c8 43 71 21 ed f7 b3 80 31 00 1d 8d 68 | HASH_R f1 54 66 4b | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 63 89 95 c8 43 71 21 ed f7 b3 80 31 00 1d 8d 68 | encrypting: f1 54 66 4b | IV: 57 f4 96 f8 07 d2 8d 1e c9 dc 14 d8 6c 11 4e 2c | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #11 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #11: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #11 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #11 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba7380 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c e0 12 89 f4 | 8e a6 31 75 4b fd 95 16 11 12 75 80 31 01 29 3c | fb c5 fc f4 04 07 bd 33 84 d0 49 9e 28 fc 73 02 | 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc00ac40 size 128 | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #11 | #11 spent 0.564 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.701 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00209 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 20 01 cc 56 df 0f 00 00 01 bc 37 3c b2 1d | f8 e2 a2 81 c3 8c 44 f3 bf 59 22 91 30 d9 2f 39 | 92 35 09 12 07 f3 f0 f0 ab 07 ca 3e 3e 2d 3d 6e | 07 6b 5d b0 a7 63 d7 e0 93 5a 2c 66 e0 b9 5d 76 | 80 d0 f2 70 29 e5 fa 85 c9 2a cd 98 f9 2f bb 51 | f1 77 25 e7 d4 7a 57 eb 4d 97 3e b8 9b 1c 19 07 | 40 53 df d5 41 ad d7 cc f9 80 32 85 45 74 36 47 | 7e 60 a1 2d 76 0a 90 7b 0b 82 2d d8 bc 96 8c 40 | 78 1e c6 8f 2e db 2c 0a 5e 82 d9 a6 58 c5 66 28 | a6 20 73 42 f1 5d 91 b5 2b f8 d1 d1 cc 0c 13 c8 | f4 6c 59 63 9d 80 5c d2 87 c2 7f 23 ee b9 1c 38 | 02 18 19 66 f9 0b 44 39 33 e7 da d5 75 3c 49 41 | 70 53 81 12 f5 d0 29 cb aa ea 0e d6 53 ee 5d 15 | ce dc f9 1d e2 57 d7 f3 56 d0 bb fe b3 6c b9 01 | 56 e6 19 32 3b 99 10 14 1b 7e 75 83 a0 a1 c4 1c | 23 72 5e d9 8e 9b 53 c1 2f c7 ab 88 35 da c5 1f | 1b 2e 0a 06 97 c1 6e ce 71 62 e7 52 ed f2 c2 96 | 46 ce e1 5d 04 ed 7e 44 0f 04 c7 5a 5c 3c 5a e7 | df 71 a7 40 16 6c aa c9 18 73 0e aa 3f 43 ed ab | 21 c8 bf e9 a3 86 2d 0a c2 42 26 79 da 71 39 21 | ea 88 93 72 74 f4 c0 74 57 05 9d 91 8f 3e f2 35 | 05 7d 6d 71 08 c9 21 7c 8d 08 62 20 52 66 10 4c | 13 94 32 31 3e 73 13 59 ca c5 db 20 74 8f 9a 52 | cf 62 fa 20 e7 ec e1 99 86 a1 27 94 8b 9d 16 bf | e3 ac 9d bb 86 9b 1e 97 3c 6c cf 19 4a 8f 39 40 | 2b 18 9d 0b 80 53 9d 2c 0b e2 7b 0e 5e 6f dc 87 | ce 1a 1c 63 40 f1 7e 9d 5f af c8 4b | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3428245263 (0xcc56df0f) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | current Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | cc 56 df 0f | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | 47 ff 14 4a 7e c3 e1 8e fd cf 01 61 c0 44 7c 68 | c3 b4 fd 42 | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 47 ff 14 4a 7e c3 e1 8e fd cf 01 61 c0 44 7c 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 5e 6f dc 87 ce 1a 1c 63 40 f1 7e 9d 5f af c8 4b | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 20 01 cc 56 df 0f 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 31 75 72 68 59 a1 3c a9 7d 58 bb e0 72 2e ac 18 | d3 ea 59 f0 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 1f 45 25 9a 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | 05 00 01 04 63 3a 10 2d f3 f8 83 80 d1 9d b4 0f | a4 6e dd 12 7d 2f 55 f6 a8 5a c6 5e cb 9e 2f e5 | 93 92 6d 62 00 20 01 47 23 5a c0 0f 40 69 fe ec | 9f 12 18 39 9b 3b de 5b 90 9e e6 5d e5 ac eb c4 | b6 95 ae 2e 9e 97 8a 84 03 32 6f 72 11 0b 1a cb | c1 ec 19 b0 28 6d 0a 2c 70 63 13 f5 7b ac 0a 6b | a2 aa 58 b2 5f 64 3f c0 76 88 1b a0 93 64 38 4e | 2f 97 72 c5 06 bb 08 81 cf e4 a6 8f 2f 4f 89 9c | 8b 5e 9c 12 c0 8e f2 73 64 b8 60 b1 0d 44 4e 1c | ff 69 e9 24 96 52 a5 f3 02 81 b6 4b dd c6 6f 20 | f0 97 96 4d a9 a4 25 80 eb 1a 2b 81 a1 71 9d cc | a3 27 7c 61 aa fb 44 a8 7a e7 e9 02 7c 3f 58 37 | 48 f0 31 8a a7 40 d8 b5 18 fa 69 3e 9c 5c 50 22 | 99 cc c4 44 5c de ad 74 60 ef 10 db c8 2c 3d d6 | 74 d1 c0 ee b1 48 f9 e9 c1 ae 6e 10 f0 34 8e be | 4a 7c 21 bb 27 43 4c 3f e2 a0 21 4d 06 9a 66 ba | c8 74 33 99 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | cc 56 df 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200bb0434 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 1f 45 25 9a 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 fe 63 99 eb | 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 a5 3c b1 1b | a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac 05 00 01 04 | 63 3a 10 2d f3 f8 83 80 d1 9d b4 0f a4 6e dd 12 | 7d 2f 55 f6 a8 5a c6 5e cb 9e 2f e5 93 92 6d 62 | 00 20 01 47 23 5a c0 0f 40 69 fe ec 9f 12 18 39 | 9b 3b de 5b 90 9e e6 5d e5 ac eb c4 b6 95 ae 2e | 9e 97 8a 84 03 32 6f 72 11 0b 1a cb c1 ec 19 b0 | 28 6d 0a 2c 70 63 13 f5 7b ac 0a 6b a2 aa 58 b2 | 5f 64 3f c0 76 88 1b a0 93 64 38 4e 2f 97 72 c5 | 06 bb 08 81 cf e4 a6 8f 2f 4f 89 9c 8b 5e 9c 12 | c0 8e f2 73 64 b8 60 b1 0d 44 4e 1c ff 69 e9 24 | 96 52 a5 f3 02 81 b6 4b dd c6 6f 20 f0 97 96 4d | a9 a4 25 80 eb 1a 2b 81 a1 71 9d cc a3 27 7c 61 | aa fb 44 a8 7a e7 e9 02 7c 3f 58 37 48 f0 31 8a | a7 40 d8 b5 18 fa 69 3e 9c 5c 50 22 99 cc c4 44 | 5c de ad 74 60 ef 10 db c8 2c 3d d6 74 d1 c0 ee | b1 48 f9 e9 c1 ae 6e 10 f0 34 8e be 4a 7c 21 bb | 27 43 4c 3f e2 a0 21 4d 06 9a 66 ba c8 74 33 99 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 31 75 72 68 59 a1 3c a9 7d 58 bb e0 72 2e ac 18 | d3 ea 59 f0 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 31 75 72 68 59 a1 3c a9 7d 58 bb e0 72 2e ac 18 | d3 ea 59 f0 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #11: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #12 at 0x55e200bb1b50 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #12 in UNDEFINED | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #11 "east" as #12 for IPSEC SA | #12 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #11.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #12: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 1f 45 25 9a | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 63 3a 10 2d f3 f8 83 80 d1 9d b4 0f a4 6e dd 12 | 7d 2f 55 f6 a8 5a c6 5e cb 9e 2f e5 93 92 6d 62 | 00 20 01 47 23 5a c0 0f 40 69 fe ec 9f 12 18 39 | 9b 3b de 5b 90 9e e6 5d e5 ac eb c4 b6 95 ae 2e | 9e 97 8a 84 03 32 6f 72 11 0b 1a cb c1 ec 19 b0 | 28 6d 0a 2c 70 63 13 f5 7b ac 0a 6b a2 aa 58 b2 | 5f 64 3f c0 76 88 1b a0 93 64 38 4e 2f 97 72 c5 | 06 bb 08 81 cf e4 a6 8f 2f 4f 89 9c 8b 5e 9c 12 | c0 8e f2 73 64 b8 60 b1 0d 44 4e 1c ff 69 e9 24 | 96 52 a5 f3 02 81 b6 4b dd c6 6f 20 f0 97 96 4d | a9 a4 25 80 eb 1a 2b 81 a1 71 9d cc a3 27 7c 61 | aa fb 44 a8 7a e7 e9 02 7c 3f 58 37 48 f0 31 8a | a7 40 d8 b5 18 fa 69 3e 9c 5c 50 22 99 cc c4 44 | 5c de ad 74 60 ef 10 db c8 2c 3d d6 74 d1 c0 ee | b1 48 f9 e9 c1 ae 6e 10 f0 34 8e be 4a 7c 21 bb | 27 43 4c 3f e2 a0 21 4d 06 9a 66 ba c8 74 33 99 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 11 for state #12 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #12 and saving MD | #12 is busy; has a suspended MD | #11 spent 0.241 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.616 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 11 for state #12 | crypto helper 6 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 11 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d4002e70: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2d4002e70 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | f7 c1 cc 78 37 45 f3 82 89 d1 63 61 e8 48 55 b9 | 15 20 ad 17 d2 9a a7 6f a0 8b 8b a5 bc 51 bd 21 | 91 4f ae 8d 80 75 26 0f 70 ef 70 52 ba 28 d4 fe | 6f a4 67 e2 55 50 5e 74 5b b4 ac ee 7a fd 34 a5 | b2 14 bc 20 95 48 b8 62 d9 66 f4 e9 09 2a cd d2 | 58 56 56 c1 38 1c 6e b3 6b 16 d4 01 16 17 27 2b | 31 f2 71 6b d2 3f 19 8d 0f ae 46 3e 5a ce 15 45 | b9 10 71 b1 bb 16 47 3b fe 74 bb c2 4a 43 dc 8f | 60 80 c9 de 6f ab e5 60 b3 83 75 ca 85 93 c1 88 | 75 59 06 36 52 c1 b3 be 8c f1 9c cf a7 70 4a f9 | 51 f1 f5 75 4a 23 76 23 e2 b2 6d f0 06 75 96 71 | 75 50 b9 02 ca 18 ad 2a cb 41 74 4b 49 d9 c9 fd | cb 67 28 b7 0c 20 db 98 35 32 f2 50 b9 24 56 c4 | 93 03 89 e9 97 32 85 ba a8 2a c4 b4 4c 0d d7 01 | 23 6d fe 68 65 11 ee 97 b0 d1 70 d2 69 40 50 66 | 5a 22 a5 dc a1 55 da 51 8a 37 c2 8d 12 de ad f8 | Generated nonce: 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | Generated nonce: 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | crypto helper 6 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 11 time elapsed 0.000914 seconds | (#12) spent 0.897 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 11: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 11 for state #12 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #12 | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 11 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #12: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d4002e70: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #12 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d4002e70: transferring ownership from state #12 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 12 for state #12 | state #12 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 size 128 | suspending state #12 and saving MD | #12 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #12 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #12 spent 0.0652 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 12 for state #12 | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 12 | peer's g: 63 3a 10 2d f3 f8 83 80 d1 9d b4 0f a4 6e dd 12 | peer's g: 7d 2f 55 f6 a8 5a c6 5e cb 9e 2f e5 93 92 6d 62 | peer's g: 00 20 01 47 23 5a c0 0f 40 69 fe ec 9f 12 18 39 | peer's g: 9b 3b de 5b 90 9e e6 5d e5 ac eb c4 b6 95 ae 2e | peer's g: 9e 97 8a 84 03 32 6f 72 11 0b 1a cb c1 ec 19 b0 | peer's g: 28 6d 0a 2c 70 63 13 f5 7b ac 0a 6b a2 aa 58 b2 | peer's g: 5f 64 3f c0 76 88 1b a0 93 64 38 4e 2f 97 72 c5 | peer's g: 06 bb 08 81 cf e4 a6 8f 2f 4f 89 9c 8b 5e 9c 12 | peer's g: c0 8e f2 73 64 b8 60 b1 0d 44 4e 1c ff 69 e9 24 | peer's g: 96 52 a5 f3 02 81 b6 4b dd c6 6f 20 f0 97 96 4d | peer's g: a9 a4 25 80 eb 1a 2b 81 a1 71 9d cc a3 27 7c 61 | peer's g: aa fb 44 a8 7a e7 e9 02 7c 3f 58 37 48 f0 31 8a | peer's g: a7 40 d8 b5 18 fa 69 3e 9c 5c 50 22 99 cc c4 44 | peer's g: 5c de ad 74 60 ef 10 db c8 2c 3d d6 74 d1 c0 ee | peer's g: b1 48 f9 e9 c1 ae 6e 10 f0 34 8e be 4a 7c 21 bb | peer's g: 27 43 4c 3f e2 a0 21 4d 06 9a 66 ba c8 74 33 99 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d4002e70: computed shared DH secret key@0x7fb2e4006900 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 12 time elapsed 0.000833 seconds | (#12) spent 0.834 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 12: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 12 for state #12 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #12 | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 12 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #12: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3428245263 (0xcc56df0f) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 1f 45 25 9a | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x2fbdd131 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 2f bd d1 31 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #12: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:cc56df0f} "east" #12: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #12: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | Nr 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value f7 c1 cc 78 37 45 f3 82 89 d1 63 61 e8 48 55 b9 | keyex value 15 20 ad 17 d2 9a a7 6f a0 8b 8b a5 bc 51 bd 21 | keyex value 91 4f ae 8d 80 75 26 0f 70 ef 70 52 ba 28 d4 fe | keyex value 6f a4 67 e2 55 50 5e 74 5b b4 ac ee 7a fd 34 a5 | keyex value b2 14 bc 20 95 48 b8 62 d9 66 f4 e9 09 2a cd d2 | keyex value 58 56 56 c1 38 1c 6e b3 6b 16 d4 01 16 17 27 2b | keyex value 31 f2 71 6b d2 3f 19 8d 0f ae 46 3e 5a ce 15 45 | keyex value b9 10 71 b1 bb 16 47 3b fe 74 bb c2 4a 43 dc 8f | keyex value 60 80 c9 de 6f ab e5 60 b3 83 75 ca 85 93 c1 88 | keyex value 75 59 06 36 52 c1 b3 be 8c f1 9c cf a7 70 4a f9 | keyex value 51 f1 f5 75 4a 23 76 23 e2 b2 6d f0 06 75 96 71 | keyex value 75 50 b9 02 ca 18 ad 2a cb 41 74 4b 49 d9 c9 fd | keyex value cb 67 28 b7 0c 20 db 98 35 32 f2 50 b9 24 56 c4 | keyex value 93 03 89 e9 97 32 85 ba a8 2a c4 b4 4c 0d d7 01 | keyex value 23 6d fe 68 65 11 ee 97 b0 d1 70 d2 69 40 50 66 | keyex value 5a 22 a5 dc a1 55 da 51 8a 37 c2 8d 12 de ad f8 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d4002e70: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #12 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7670 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fe1c (length 4) | cc 56 df 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2dc000c30 (length 32) | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e1ff723974 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 2f bd d1 31 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 68 c0 9f 81 | 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 38 74 9a b4 | 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 05 00 01 04 | f7 c1 cc 78 37 45 f3 82 89 d1 63 61 e8 48 55 b9 | 15 20 ad 17 d2 9a a7 6f a0 8b 8b a5 bc 51 bd 21 | 91 4f ae 8d 80 75 26 0f 70 ef 70 52 ba 28 d4 fe | 6f a4 67 e2 55 50 5e 74 5b b4 ac ee 7a fd 34 a5 | b2 14 bc 20 95 48 b8 62 d9 66 f4 e9 09 2a cd d2 | 58 56 56 c1 38 1c 6e b3 6b 16 d4 01 16 17 27 2b | 31 f2 71 6b d2 3f 19 8d 0f ae 46 3e 5a ce 15 45 | b9 10 71 b1 bb 16 47 3b fe 74 bb c2 4a 43 dc 8f | 60 80 c9 de 6f ab e5 60 b3 83 75 ca 85 93 c1 88 | 75 59 06 36 52 c1 b3 be 8c f1 9c cf a7 70 4a f9 | 51 f1 f5 75 4a 23 76 23 e2 b2 6d f0 06 75 96 71 | 75 50 b9 02 ca 18 ad 2a cb 41 74 4b 49 d9 c9 fd | cb 67 28 b7 0c 20 db 98 35 32 f2 50 b9 24 56 c4 | 93 03 89 e9 97 32 85 ba a8 2a c4 b4 4c 0d d7 01 | 23 6d fe 68 65 11 ee 97 b0 d1 70 d2 69 40 50 66 | 5a 22 a5 dc a1 55 da 51 8a 37 c2 8d 12 de ad f8 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 20) | dc 7c 35 92 df 03 07 78 3b b4 b4 f9 e9 85 2c f4 | 1f 06 cf 79 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | dc 7c 35 92 df 03 07 78 3b b4 b4 f9 e9 85 2c f4 | 1f 06 cf 79 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7e00 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: ffffff8b ffffffcc fffffff7 fffffffa 4e ffffffda 12 fffffff2 14 5d 63 ffffff90 ffffffd6 ffffffa9 ffffffa6 ffffff88 3e fffffff0 47 fffffff7 ffffffdf 61 7f 48 ffffffc4 06 ffffff84 4f 54 23 ffffffd2 ffffffed 55 ffffffe9 ffffffd4 03 30 4f 6d 20 25 0e 1a fffffff3 1b ffffff89 36 fffffffc ffffffe2 42 42 4b 26 61 4b ffffffbf 6a ffffffec 29 ffffffac 3f 6f ffffffd7 1f ffffffbe ffffffd7 23 ffffffc2 7c ffffff9e 2a 7e fffffff1 ffffff94 fffffff0 fffffff9 66 ffffff98 ffffff88 4b fffffff2 4a ffffffcd ffffffd1 78 ffffff8b 1e 0e ffffffa0 ffffff82 65 0b 2b 40 7d ffffffe4 ffffff9d 6d 2f 35 fffffff2 4f ffffffdf ffffff8f 7c 30 ffffffa2 ffffffd6 fffffffa 25 1c 31 1e 2e ffffffd2 ffffffc8 27 ffffffd4 55 ffffffec ffffff8a ffffffb2 ffffff8b 04 74 65 68 ffffffae 74 5b fffffffe fffffff2 71 ffffffd7 40 1e 22 ffffff8b 58 ffffffa0 0a 51 ffffffc3 65 ffffffd1 ffffffb4 ffffffb7 ffffff89 4e 0a ffffff8f 08 fffffff3 6f ffffffbb 0c 2f ffffffa6 ffffffcc 56 ffffffb8 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bb02f0 | unwrapped: 37 71 51 5e 84 0d 71 a9 74 06 62 0e 54 b0 30 22 | unwrapped: c2 5c db 37 b7 07 89 dc c3 10 cd 69 e7 92 17 9d | unwrapped: 82 92 d7 37 1f 2b d5 1e 2a e2 ef 76 49 85 57 51 | unwrapped: 90 f7 9f 90 43 4f 1f 95 3d d9 07 11 9a c9 af 37 | unwrapped: d5 0c 75 fa 5b 67 23 1c b0 c7 c1 61 9f 93 cf b1 | unwrapped: 7b b6 1f 44 c7 be bb ba 8b a4 5e 40 94 34 5b 2d | unwrapped: f0 b9 b7 19 50 48 ee 32 d9 e5 85 34 47 68 83 98 | unwrapped: 75 f2 c7 da f3 0c 52 30 fd 92 3f 08 26 b1 55 6b | unwrapped: 8e aa 5f ee fb b5 f9 a7 36 57 03 3c 3c b5 65 e9 | unwrapped: 95 e0 5c 02 7e 76 a9 91 af 32 c9 aa b8 3d 72 f7 | unwrapped: d0 6d 79 ca 2b 50 e2 91 6d 06 26 5d 25 80 70 84 | unwrapped: d4 3d f9 31 c8 30 5d d6 5d 6c c0 59 79 12 85 02 | unwrapped: 0a 79 81 8f 56 8c b8 6d 8c 9a 72 64 16 da 3a e1 | unwrapped: d7 57 c1 ef 26 7c 92 80 85 76 9b d7 0b ac 2c 41 | unwrapped: 03 e8 f2 3f e4 7f 5b 39 64 d3 95 35 bb 98 72 5c | unwrapped: 3f 91 50 d7 5c af 3c a5 6a 0e 79 d3 73 c3 d4 58 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: ffffff8b ffffffcc fffffff7 fffffffa 4e ffffffda 12 fffffff2 14 5d 63 ffffff90 ffffffd6 ffffffa9 ffffffa6 ffffff88 3e fffffff0 47 fffffff7 ffffffdf 61 7f 48 ffffffc4 06 ffffff84 4f 54 23 ffffffd2 ffffffed 55 ffffffe9 ffffffd4 03 30 4f 6d 20 25 0e 1a fffffff3 1b ffffff89 36 fffffffc ffffffe2 42 42 4b 26 61 4b ffffffbf 6a ffffffec 29 ffffffac 3f 6f ffffffd7 1f ffffffbe ffffffd7 23 ffffffc2 7c ffffff9e 2a 7e fffffff1 ffffff94 fffffff0 fffffff9 66 ffffff98 ffffff88 4b fffffff2 4a ffffffcd ffffffd1 78 ffffff8b 1e 0e ffffffa0 ffffff82 65 0b 2b 40 7d ffffffe4 ffffff9d 6d 2f 35 fffffff2 4f ffffffdf ffffff8f 7c 30 ffffffa2 ffffffd6 fffffffa 25 1c 31 1e 2e ffffffd2 ffffffc8 27 ffffffd4 55 ffffffec ffffff8a ffffffb2 ffffff8b 04 74 65 68 ffffffae 74 5b fffffffe fffffff2 71 ffffffd7 40 1e 22 ffffff8b 58 ffffffa0 0a 51 ffffffc3 65 ffffffd1 ffffffb4 ffffffb7 ffffff89 4e 0a ffffff8f 08 fffffff3 6f ffffffbb 0c 2f ffffffa6 ffffffcc 56 ffffffb8 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200baffc0 | unwrapped: 37 71 51 5e 84 0d 71 a9 74 06 62 0e 54 b0 30 22 | unwrapped: c2 5c db 37 b7 07 89 dc c3 10 cd 69 e7 92 17 9d | unwrapped: 82 92 d7 37 1f 2b d5 1e 2a e2 ef 76 49 85 57 51 | unwrapped: 90 f7 9f 90 43 4f 1f 95 3d d9 07 11 9a c9 af 37 | unwrapped: d5 0c 75 fa 5b 67 23 1c b0 c7 c1 61 9f 93 cf b1 | unwrapped: 7b b6 1f 44 c7 be bb ba 8b a4 5e 40 94 34 5b 2d | unwrapped: f0 b9 b7 19 50 48 ee 32 d9 e5 85 34 47 68 83 98 | unwrapped: 75 f2 c7 da f3 0c 52 30 fd 92 3f 08 26 b1 55 6b | unwrapped: 8e aa 5f ee fb b5 f9 a7 36 57 03 3c 3c b5 65 e9 | unwrapped: 95 e0 5c 02 7e 76 a9 91 af 32 c9 aa b8 3d 72 f7 | unwrapped: d0 6d 79 ca 2b 50 e2 91 6d 06 26 5d 25 80 70 84 | unwrapped: d4 3d f9 31 c8 30 5d d6 5d 6c c0 59 79 12 85 02 | unwrapped: 0a 79 81 8f 56 8c b8 6d 8c 9a 72 64 16 da 3a e1 | unwrapped: d7 57 c1 ef 26 7c 92 80 85 76 9b d7 0b ac 2c 41 | unwrapped: 03 e8 f2 3f e4 7f 5b 39 64 d3 95 35 bb 98 72 5c | unwrapped: 3f 91 50 d7 5c af 3c a5 6a 0e 79 d3 73 c3 d4 58 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1d58 (length 4) | 2f bd d1 31 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1d38 (length 4) | 1f 45 25 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc000c30 (length 32) | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc000c30 (length 32) | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4003750 (length 32) | 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4003750 (length 32) | 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 20) | 6d 37 1f dc 33 f1 90 0c 2a 75 14 91 2a a7 6a a7 | 61 04 c3 c5 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e4002100 (length 20) | ed d4 13 e6 b6 06 64 35 85 24 a8 1a 3f 36 86 cd | b7 c3 7d aa | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7e20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 20) | 6d 37 1f dc 33 f1 90 0c 2a 75 14 91 2a a7 6a a7 | 61 04 c3 c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4002100 (length 20) | ed d4 13 e6 b6 06 64 35 85 24 a8 1a 3f 36 86 cd | b7 c3 7d aa | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: ffffff8b ffffffcc fffffff7 fffffffa 4e ffffffda 12 fffffff2 14 5d 63 ffffff90 ffffffd6 ffffffa9 ffffffa6 ffffff88 3e fffffff0 47 fffffff7 ffffffdf 61 7f 48 ffffffc4 06 ffffff84 4f 54 23 ffffffd2 ffffffed 55 ffffffe9 ffffffd4 03 30 4f 6d 20 25 0e 1a fffffff3 1b ffffff89 36 fffffffc ffffffe2 42 42 4b 26 61 4b ffffffbf 6a ffffffec 29 ffffffac 3f 6f ffffffd7 1f ffffffbe ffffffd7 23 ffffffc2 7c ffffff9e 2a 7e fffffff1 ffffff94 fffffff0 fffffff9 66 ffffff98 ffffff88 4b fffffff2 4a ffffffcd ffffffd1 78 ffffff8b 1e 0e ffffffa0 ffffff82 65 0b 2b 40 7d ffffffe4 ffffff9d 6d 2f 35 fffffff2 4f ffffffdf ffffff8f 7c 30 ffffffa2 ffffffd6 fffffffa 25 1c 31 1e 2e ffffffd2 ffffffc8 27 ffffffd4 55 ffffffec ffffff8a ffffffb2 ffffff8b 04 74 65 68 ffffffae 74 5b fffffffe fffffff2 71 ffffffd7 40 1e 22 ffffff8b 58 ffffffa0 0a 51 ffffffc3 65 ffffffd1 ffffffb4 ffffffb7 ffffff89 4e 0a ffffff8f 08 fffffff3 6f ffffffbb 0c 2f ffffffa6 ffffffcc 56 ffffffb8 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bafeb0 | unwrapped: 37 71 51 5e 84 0d 71 a9 74 06 62 0e 54 b0 30 22 | unwrapped: c2 5c db 37 b7 07 89 dc c3 10 cd 69 e7 92 17 9d | unwrapped: 82 92 d7 37 1f 2b d5 1e 2a e2 ef 76 49 85 57 51 | unwrapped: 90 f7 9f 90 43 4f 1f 95 3d d9 07 11 9a c9 af 37 | unwrapped: d5 0c 75 fa 5b 67 23 1c b0 c7 c1 61 9f 93 cf b1 | unwrapped: 7b b6 1f 44 c7 be bb ba 8b a4 5e 40 94 34 5b 2d | unwrapped: f0 b9 b7 19 50 48 ee 32 d9 e5 85 34 47 68 83 98 | unwrapped: 75 f2 c7 da f3 0c 52 30 fd 92 3f 08 26 b1 55 6b | unwrapped: 8e aa 5f ee fb b5 f9 a7 36 57 03 3c 3c b5 65 e9 | unwrapped: 95 e0 5c 02 7e 76 a9 91 af 32 c9 aa b8 3d 72 f7 | unwrapped: d0 6d 79 ca 2b 50 e2 91 6d 06 26 5d 25 80 70 84 | unwrapped: d4 3d f9 31 c8 30 5d d6 5d 6c c0 59 79 12 85 02 | unwrapped: 0a 79 81 8f 56 8c b8 6d 8c 9a 72 64 16 da 3a e1 | unwrapped: d7 57 c1 ef 26 7c 92 80 85 76 9b d7 0b ac 2c 41 | unwrapped: 03 e8 f2 3f e4 7f 5b 39 64 d3 95 35 bb 98 72 5c | unwrapped: 3f 91 50 d7 5c af 3c a5 6a 0e 79 d3 73 c3 d4 58 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: ffffff8b ffffffcc fffffff7 fffffffa 4e ffffffda 12 fffffff2 14 5d 63 ffffff90 ffffffd6 ffffffa9 ffffffa6 ffffff88 3e fffffff0 47 fffffff7 ffffffdf 61 7f 48 ffffffc4 06 ffffff84 4f 54 23 ffffffd2 ffffffed 55 ffffffe9 ffffffd4 03 30 4f 6d 20 25 0e 1a fffffff3 1b ffffff89 36 fffffffc ffffffe2 42 42 4b 26 61 4b ffffffbf 6a ffffffec 29 ffffffac 3f 6f ffffffd7 1f ffffffbe ffffffd7 23 ffffffc2 7c ffffff9e 2a 7e fffffff1 ffffff94 fffffff0 fffffff9 66 ffffff98 ffffff88 4b fffffff2 4a ffffffcd ffffffd1 78 ffffff8b 1e 0e ffffffa0 ffffff82 65 0b 2b 40 7d ffffffe4 ffffff9d 6d 2f 35 fffffff2 4f ffffffdf ffffff8f 7c 30 ffffffa2 ffffffd6 fffffffa 25 1c 31 1e 2e ffffffd2 ffffffc8 27 ffffffd4 55 ffffffec ffffff8a ffffffb2 ffffff8b 04 74 65 68 ffffffae 74 5b fffffffe fffffff2 71 ffffffd7 40 1e 22 ffffff8b 58 ffffffa0 0a 51 ffffffc3 65 ffffffd1 ffffffb4 ffffffb7 ffffff89 4e 0a ffffff8f 08 fffffff3 6f ffffffbb 0c 2f ffffffa6 ffffffcc 56 ffffffb8 fff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bab080 | unwrapped: 37 71 51 5e 84 0d 71 a9 74 06 62 0e 54 b0 30 22 | unwrapped: c2 5c db 37 b7 07 89 dc c3 10 cd 69 e7 92 17 9d | unwrapped: 82 92 d7 37 1f 2b d5 1e 2a e2 ef 76 49 85 57 51 | unwrapped: 90 f7 9f 90 43 4f 1f 95 3d d9 07 11 9a c9 af 37 | unwrapped: d5 0c 75 fa 5b 67 23 1c b0 c7 c1 61 9f 93 cf b1 | unwrapped: 7b b6 1f 44 c7 be bb ba 8b a4 5e 40 94 34 5b 2d | unwrapped: f0 b9 b7 19 50 48 ee 32 d9 e5 85 34 47 68 83 98 | unwrapped: 75 f2 c7 da f3 0c 52 30 fd 92 3f 08 26 b1 55 6b | unwrapped: 8e aa 5f ee fb b5 f9 a7 36 57 03 3c 3c b5 65 e9 | unwrapped: 95 e0 5c 02 7e 76 a9 91 af 32 c9 aa b8 3d 72 f7 | unwrapped: d0 6d 79 ca 2b 50 e2 91 6d 06 26 5d 25 80 70 84 | unwrapped: d4 3d f9 31 c8 30 5d d6 5d 6c c0 59 79 12 85 02 | unwrapped: 0a 79 81 8f 56 8c b8 6d 8c 9a 72 64 16 da 3a e1 | unwrapped: d7 57 c1 ef 26 7c 92 80 85 76 9b d7 0b ac 2c 41 | unwrapped: 03 e8 f2 3f e4 7f 5b 39 64 d3 95 35 bb 98 72 5c | unwrapped: 3f 91 50 d7 5c af 3c a5 6a 0e 79 d3 73 c3 d4 58 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1d58 (length 4) | 2f bd d1 31 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1d38 (length 4) | 1f 45 25 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc000c30 (length 32) | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc000c30 (length 32) | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4003750 (length 32) | 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4003750 (length 32) | 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f44 (length 20) | 01 c9 26 a1 43 2c 9b df 13 19 7a 87 6d 57 1a bf | e3 63 a9 19 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e4002114 (length 20) | d1 93 d3 1b 25 30 9d 0c 85 ed ab ae 7d 0f fc b0 | 7b 65 fb 97 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55e200bb1b50 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#12 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.1f45259a@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.2fbdd131@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 dc 7c 35 92 df 03 07 78 3b b4 b4 f9 | encrypting: e9 85 2c f4 1f 06 cf 79 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 2f bd d1 31 | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 | encrypting: 2a c0 32 b9 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 | encrypting: b9 d8 80 60 05 00 01 04 f7 c1 cc 78 37 45 f3 82 | encrypting: 89 d1 63 61 e8 48 55 b9 15 20 ad 17 d2 9a a7 6f | encrypting: a0 8b 8b a5 bc 51 bd 21 91 4f ae 8d 80 75 26 0f | encrypting: 70 ef 70 52 ba 28 d4 fe 6f a4 67 e2 55 50 5e 74 | encrypting: 5b b4 ac ee 7a fd 34 a5 b2 14 bc 20 95 48 b8 62 | encrypting: d9 66 f4 e9 09 2a cd d2 58 56 56 c1 38 1c 6e b3 | encrypting: 6b 16 d4 01 16 17 27 2b 31 f2 71 6b d2 3f 19 8d | encrypting: 0f ae 46 3e 5a ce 15 45 b9 10 71 b1 bb 16 47 3b | encrypting: fe 74 bb c2 4a 43 dc 8f 60 80 c9 de 6f ab e5 60 | encrypting: b3 83 75 ca 85 93 c1 88 75 59 06 36 52 c1 b3 be | encrypting: 8c f1 9c cf a7 70 4a f9 51 f1 f5 75 4a 23 76 23 | encrypting: e2 b2 6d f0 06 75 96 71 75 50 b9 02 ca 18 ad 2a | encrypting: cb 41 74 4b 49 d9 c9 fd cb 67 28 b7 0c 20 db 98 | encrypting: 35 32 f2 50 b9 24 56 c4 93 03 89 e9 97 32 85 ba | encrypting: a8 2a c4 b4 4c 0d d7 01 23 6d fe 68 65 11 ee 97 | encrypting: b0 d1 70 d2 69 40 50 66 5a 22 a5 dc a1 55 da 51 | encrypting: 8a 37 c2 8d 12 de ad f8 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: 5e 6f dc 87 ce 1a 1c 63 40 f1 7e 9d 5f af c8 4b | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 77 4b 0e 48 bf 3a 99 18 aa 11 3d 67 5a ca ec 69 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #12 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #12: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #12 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #12) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 20 01 cc 56 df 0f 00 00 01 bc 57 f5 df dd | f8 d5 bc 5b 74 d7 bb c1 a5 06 81 5d 67 0e 5b 2f | 48 90 7c 65 a1 e6 0a 06 54 65 dc 27 bf 55 74 ef | 9b bd ea c9 0b 3b e5 14 88 b6 e2 ce 52 a1 c9 e0 | c3 44 ce 30 dc e5 29 a2 b2 57 66 b6 5b 27 01 48 | f0 a0 04 53 d5 b4 e3 0d 6f ef ab 90 36 b3 60 12 | 79 a8 cd 56 70 32 96 48 b1 6b ee 35 48 21 3c 8c | 07 a6 ea c0 d9 d1 0a 7a 44 1a e5 0c c4 0a e0 a9 | 36 c7 96 c6 a5 3b a5 c2 fa 28 ef df 1d 58 98 3a | 6b 6f 23 98 ac 24 f3 10 21 db 2e c4 3e 8e af 35 | 29 09 34 7f 29 40 d8 07 e7 a5 0c 35 64 2b e9 ac | a9 4d cf 72 41 cc 58 d6 7f 46 55 ea 46 4f cd 6e | b8 46 f3 30 2e 83 53 6f 0a 60 23 10 6b 69 30 83 | bc f3 88 2d aa a2 e2 2d d8 8b 3d af cf 59 6d 9d | d7 c8 e1 fc c3 0f cb 4e 58 6e b1 e2 8b 6e d2 1d | 78 65 bb c2 c0 3e 4d 2e be ea 27 2e 4c 76 e6 0b | 69 e6 0c 7c 0b 9a 29 21 0a d8 57 93 a0 54 2a 79 | aa 70 00 04 91 87 65 4d 6c d0 c2 fd e6 a1 a3 74 | 1f 63 d4 9a 61 92 16 cd 1d d4 c7 f9 62 00 1c ca | 13 ef 3c 54 8e 9d 77 19 f8 50 7f 9c 6d 83 94 5a | df 96 62 19 a8 6e 35 95 a4 b0 b3 c7 1b c6 f5 23 | c6 81 66 74 a2 bc 93 85 8d ed ce b0 2e 52 86 f7 | 7e 9b 34 7d 43 aa b6 5f 1e df 5f a2 df 74 a9 94 | 20 bb db d9 6a 97 e7 fe 10 a6 a6 e7 07 fa 71 74 | a0 26 21 cf 1f 91 fe 94 f3 57 fb 2f 8a 82 a1 3d | 90 d5 4a ec f8 b0 99 fb 7a 60 2f 1b 77 4b 0e 48 | bf 3a 99 18 aa 11 3d 67 5a ca ec 69 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 size 128 | #12 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48956.404244 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #12: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x1f45259a <0x2fbdd131 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #12 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #12 spent 1.86 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 | spent 0.00347 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 20 01 cc 56 df 0f 00 00 00 3c 4b eb c1 f1 | 53 d2 8d d6 0a 57 06 57 a3 59 cc d9 8c a6 9b 19 | e4 be bf a5 7a 96 43 23 56 d9 64 8b | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3428245263 (0xcc56df0f) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #12 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #12 is idle | #12 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 77 4b 0e 48 bf 3a 99 18 aa 11 3d 67 5a ca ec 69 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 8c a6 9b 19 e4 be bf a5 7a 96 43 23 56 d9 64 8b | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 20 01 cc 56 df 0f 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | 98 27 75 43 fe 91 ac 17 b1 35 4d b7 b4 b0 3c 48 | a7 bb 7a e6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | cc 56 df 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2dc000c30 (length 32) | fe 63 99 eb 99 d5 eb 01 af bb ea 5f 93 10 52 82 | a5 3c b1 1b a9 e5 32 9f 0a 4a 93 4d bc 45 2c ac | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fb2d4003750 (length 32) | 68 c0 9f 81 40 fb 04 74 78 ad 98 15 2a c0 32 b9 | 38 74 9a b4 45 62 db a2 a1 c6 c0 43 b9 d8 80 60 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 98 27 75 43 fe 91 ac 17 b1 35 4d b7 b4 b0 3c 48 | a7 bb 7a e6 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 98 27 75 43 fe 91 ac 17 b1 35 4d b7 b4 b0 3c 48 | a7 bb 7a e6 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #12: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #12: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #12 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x1f45259a SPI_OUT=0x2fb | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x1f45259a SPI_OUT=0x2fbdd131 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55e200ba49a0,sr=0x55e200ba49a0} to #12 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #11 spent 0.25 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #12 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#12) cloned from #11 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #12 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #12: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #12 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #12 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40013c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 size 128 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #12: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x1f45259a <0x2fbdd131 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #12 spent 0.332 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.57 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00417 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00389 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 05 01 67 8e 25 cf 00 00 00 4c a6 49 6e f7 | 80 8c 61 28 2f d0 64 31 be 60 70 63 aa 61 2a 10 | ea 90 0a da 10 c4 43 42 b8 9b 38 16 8b ed 2f 9d | f9 66 7a 21 74 f5 12 10 10 3e ba a3 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1737369039 (0x678e25cf) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #12; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=cc56df0f st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #11; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #11 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | current Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 67 8e 25 cf | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | b4 1e 00 5f a2 c5 03 14 99 93 77 d7 aa 72 63 2d | 09 bc 40 9e | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: b4 1e 00 5f a2 c5 03 14 99 93 77 d7 aa 72 63 2d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 8b ed 2f 9d f9 66 7a 21 74 f5 12 10 10 3e ba a3 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 05 01 67 8e 25 cf 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | bf 38 00 01 ac 99 3a b0 e0 59 37 df 36 c7 f0 70 | 32 33 22 cd 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 1f 45 25 9a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 67 8e 25 cf | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b07f84 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 1f 45 25 9a | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | bf 38 00 01 ac 99 3a b0 e0 59 37 df 36 c7 f0 70 | 32 33 22 cd | informational HASH(1): | bf 38 00 01 ac 99 3a b0 e0 59 37 df 36 c7 f0 70 | 32 33 22 cd | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 1f 45 25 9a | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #11: received Delete SA(0x1f45259a) payload: deleting IPsec State #12 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #12: deleting other state #12 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.249s and sending notification | child state #12: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.1f45259a@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.2fbdd131@192.1.2.23 "east" #12: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #12 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2080572514 (0x7c030462) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 2f bd d1 31 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dbe8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7670 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dccc (length 4) | 7c 03 04 62 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e074 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 2f bd d1 31 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e060 (length 20) | be 9e 74 d9 96 60 2f 22 92 95 f3 b2 7c 53 d7 d7 | 6a 72 82 e6 | send delete HASH(1): | be 9e 74 d9 96 60 2f 22 92 95 f3 b2 7c 53 d7 d7 | 6a 72 82 e6 | last Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | current Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dcdc (length 4) | 7c 03 04 62 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | 88 d1 d7 6d 78 32 d2 f4 81 81 82 0a 94 c2 57 b2 | 10 d1 a8 01 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 be 9e 74 d9 96 60 2f 22 92 95 f3 b2 | encrypting: 7c 53 d7 d7 6a 72 82 e6 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 2f bd d1 31 | IV: 88 d1 d7 6d 78 32 d2 f4 81 81 82 0a 94 c2 57 b2 | IV: 10 d1 a8 01 | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: fd 89 65 82 18 de 8d d8 b5 b4 9f a0 59 60 dc 00 | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 05 01 7c 03 04 62 00 00 00 4c 1e 61 c8 a0 | a9 66 fc 00 b1 0e 26 30 d3 91 85 77 94 74 67 a8 | e6 f7 53 98 b3 96 5b de 21 ee 88 12 fd 89 65 82 | 18 de 8d d8 b5 b4 9f a0 59 60 dc 00 | state #12 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050310' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x1f45259a | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050310' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x1f45259a SPI_OUT=0x2fbdd131 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.1f45259a@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.1f45259a@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.2fbdd131@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.2fbdd131@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #12 in QUICK_R2 | child state #12: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d4002e70: destroyed | stop processing: state #12 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #11 | state #8 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #8 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #8: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.920s and NOT sending notification | parent state #8: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #8 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #8: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #8 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #7 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #7 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #7: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 2.426s and NOT sending notification | parent state #7: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #7 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #7: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #7 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #4 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #4 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #4: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 4.221s and NOT sending notification | parent state #4: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #4 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #4: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #4 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #3 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #3 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #3: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 4.723s and NOT sending notification | parent state #3: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #3 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #3: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #3 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #11 | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #11: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.310s and sending notification | parent state #11: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #11 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3911410191 (0xe923620f) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3db88 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc6c (length 4) | e9 23 62 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e014 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 dd 49 0b 8f | 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e000 (length 20) | 13 1e e8 76 34 48 b3 fd 5b 74 1b b0 39 94 f7 4c | 4b f0 4b 29 | send delete HASH(1): | 13 1e e8 76 34 48 b3 fd 5b 74 1b b0 39 94 f7 4c | 4b f0 4b 29 | last Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | current Phase 1 IV: 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb1520 (length 16) | 28 fc 73 02 12 52 28 37 77 5c 3e 86 67 15 d6 06 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc7c (length 4) | e9 23 62 0f | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb14a0 (length 20) | d8 1e d6 3b 48 fe 5d 7d 9f a0 e9 bc e3 44 ca 83 | 76 cf 2e 46 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 13 1e e8 76 34 48 b3 fd 5b 74 1b b0 | encrypting: 39 94 f7 4c 4b f0 4b 29 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 | encrypting: e8 fe 63 75 | IV: d8 1e d6 3b 48 fe 5d 7d 9f a0 e9 bc e3 44 ca 83 | IV: 76 cf 2e 46 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 81 3d 81 97 85 f1 a9 4c 1c 0c e4 d2 e0 4c 9a d8 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 05 01 e9 23 62 0f 00 00 00 5c e7 15 cd 8f | 05 7c 5d 48 cb 5a 8e 63 17 d9 a7 3f c3 af 98 2e | 0c 5f 09 91 3c c4 aa 51 2a ce 69 6e c5 e3 22 59 | d1 af 7e 3f 46 ce 07 79 b6 ec 48 10 81 3d 81 97 | 85 f1 a9 4c 1c 0c e4 d2 e0 4c 9a d8 | state #11 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc00ac40 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #11: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001fc0: destroyed | stop processing: state #11 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.9 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00117 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | 08 10 05 01 5e 54 49 c1 00 00 00 5c 05 33 f2 d6 | 9d 57 7e af 5d b6 ea 7a d6 30 bf 0e 13 ae a6 45 | c2 9a 89 f2 7a ba b9 51 f3 b9 00 ae 72 85 77 e0 | bc c8 85 d4 76 b9 5d 49 b1 34 c4 ba 9b d9 01 35 | 0e 19 75 5a 92 88 a0 cd 07 ad ea ad | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | responder cookie: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1582582209 (0x5e5449c1) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x5e5449c1 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | dd 49 0b 8f 1b 56 8a 7b | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | b9 60 dc 45 e8 fe 63 75 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0444 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0032 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00327 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 09 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d 05 32 23 6a 9d c0 b3 94 | 80 27 59 5f 6b 33 6f ec d1 43 8a 55 74 51 30 94 | creating state object #13 at 0x55e200ba82d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #13 in UNDEFINED | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp started | #13 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #13: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 "east" #13: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #13 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #13: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 size 128 "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.661 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00228 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | 14 00 00 24 1b fc 82 11 4a 88 98 3f ab d6 a4 48 | 2a f1 da b0 d4 99 90 33 25 10 09 6a 7d b6 53 01 | 6f 7f 03 de 14 00 00 18 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 | 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b 93 a0 02 12 00 00 00 18 | d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | 8c a5 6f 13 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #13 is idle | #13 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | 93 a0 02 12 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | natd_hash: rcookie= 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | natd_hash: hash= 93 a0 02 12 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | 8c a5 6f 13 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | natd_hash: rcookie= 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | natd_hash: hash= 8c a5 6f 13 | expected NAT-D(me): 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | expected NAT-D(me): 93 a0 02 12 | expected NAT-D(him): | d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | 8c a5 6f 13 | received NAT-D: 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | received NAT-D: 93 a0 02 12 | received NAT-D: d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | received NAT-D: 8c a5 6f 13 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 13 for state #13 | state #13 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #13 and saving MD | #13 is busy; has a suspended MD | #13 spent 0.177 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.316 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 13 for state #13 | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 13 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001fc0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2cc001fc0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | Generated nonce: 2d 15 8f c8 db b3 bc 64 3d 0d 5d b8 85 8d fa 97 | Generated nonce: f4 d3 5f 2d 81 6d a6 a7 ef fb c1 7b 87 ea 16 a9 | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 13 time elapsed 0.001514 seconds | (#13) spent 1.06 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 13: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 13 for state #13 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #13 | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 13 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #13: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001fc0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #13 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | keyex value 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | keyex value 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | keyex value 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | keyex value 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | keyex value ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | keyex value d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | keyex value 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | keyex value 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | keyex value da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | keyex value bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | keyex value b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | keyex value 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | keyex value f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | keyex value fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | keyex value 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 2d 15 8f c8 db b3 bc 64 3d 0d 5d b8 85 8d fa 97 | Nr f4 d3 5f 2d 81 6d a6 a7 ef fb c1 7b 87 ea 16 a9 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | 8c a5 6f 13 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | natd_hash: rcookie= 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | natd_hash: hash= 8c a5 6f 13 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 | NAT-D 8c a5 6f 13 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | 93 a0 02 12 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | natd_hash: rcookie= 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | natd_hash: hash= 93 a0 02 12 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | NAT-D 93 a0 02 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001fc0: transferring ownership from state #13 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 14 for state #13 | state #13 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 size 128 | #13 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #13 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #13: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #13 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | 14 00 00 24 2d 15 8f c8 db b3 bc 64 3d 0d 5d b8 | 85 8d fa 97 f4 d3 5f 2d 81 6d a6 a7 ef fb c1 7b | 87 ea 16 a9 14 00 00 18 d6 2d b9 07 88 b5 04 fe | e0 76 f5 f0 39 8f ec 84 8c a5 6f 13 00 00 00 18 | 5d 72 14 67 da 5f 98 48 46 da 31 f6 11 cb 24 7b | 93 a0 02 12 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 size 128 | #13 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48957.184593 "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #13 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #13 spent 0.37 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 14 for state #13 | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 14 | peer's g: 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | peer's g: f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | peer's g: 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | peer's g: d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | peer's g: 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | peer's g: f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | peer's g: 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | peer's g: b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | peer's g: a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | peer's g: 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | peer's g: 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | peer's g: ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | peer's g: 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | peer's g: 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | peer's g: 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | peer's g: a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001fc0: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b95040 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb0640 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea493688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d0000d60 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb0664 (length 32) | 1b fc 82 11 4a 88 98 3f ab d6 a4 48 2a f1 da b0 | d4 99 90 33 25 10 09 6a 7d b6 53 01 6f 7f 03 de | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb0684 (length 32) | 2d 15 8f c8 db b3 bc 64 3d 0d 5d b8 85 8d fa 97 | f4 d3 5f 2d 81 6d a6 a7 ef fb c1 7b 87 ea 16 a9 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d0001570 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-364301568: ffffffa4 ffffffe0 2e fffffff5 4f 6f 3e ffffffa7 3a 61 26 3e ffffffc7 4f 51 fffffff8 ffffff8b fffffff2 ffffff86 21 66 2f 0f 43 36 ffffffb3 ffffffe6 ffffffcd ffffffaa 48 fffffff5 ffffffb0 ffffff8d ffffffbb ffffffb8 fffffff1 ffffffe3 ffffffc1 ffffff9d 76 ffffffd4 4a 26 2a ffffff88 ffffffb4 44 66 ffffff9f ffffffd4 6f 5a ffffffc5 51 66 ffffff83 ffffff8c ffffffac ffffffad 18 1b 10 ffffffe9 ffffff97 ffffffea ffffffd8 ffffffed 24 ffffffce 49 23 fffffff9 ffffff9b ffffffb0 37 ffffffd5 00 73 ffffffcd 5f fffffff8 ffffff98 ffffff96 ffffffb3 ffffffe5 7a ffffffdd 1a ffffffad ffffffde ffffffd1 51 63 ffffffe3 40 ffffffd6 ffffffd0 fffffff4 4d 5e ffffffa0 ffffff8f ffffff9f 35 ffffffff ffffff94 39 ffffffca 25 3c 49 ffffffc9 ffffffa7 57 47 54 6b ffffff89 06 ffffff88 ffffff8f 29 4f ffffffd2 04 78 28 76 44 50 77 ffffffb0 49 7a 68 33 ffffffd1 38 ffffffb8 ffffffae ffffffc6 ffffffb6 62 ffffffd8 44 6f ffffffaf ffffffe3 ffffffa9 ffffff90 23 ffffff81 10 ffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2d00045f0 | unwrapped: f6 fd 58 1f 01 a2 8c 06 08 b7 7f 63 2f 7b 43 ec | unwrapped: 9e 29 c9 17 09 23 5f b6 60 65 26 2a ac b5 b4 db | unwrapped: c9 5b 67 ea 1e b0 34 ed 56 00 00 e2 66 49 80 f1 | unwrapped: 82 6a ce 1c ab f8 32 7c 78 c7 66 6a ea 08 23 35 | unwrapped: ef 18 f8 c6 56 f5 bb ec 4d 6f 00 1b 65 c5 f0 aa | unwrapped: a2 47 84 55 ec af fc e1 53 36 8b 68 e2 fb 3e 98 | unwrapped: 9f e1 3f bc 12 41 96 53 c3 e3 ef 9e e4 20 5d 40 | unwrapped: fd 6c 2e 90 73 36 09 f7 e2 71 dd be 72 d7 e1 1c | unwrapped: ad 6b 73 8c 17 c2 05 e1 33 80 14 63 02 91 93 d3 | unwrapped: 9e c1 0e e4 0a 25 72 c8 99 e6 1c 3e e7 ea a2 e9 | unwrapped: f6 7e 9d 37 8b c2 14 ad 02 f4 11 f2 be e5 77 32 | unwrapped: 5d 49 f0 2d f6 91 94 c5 3d 6c 16 5b 7d ee f2 58 | unwrapped: 4d 21 d7 45 4e e5 00 42 88 af 2a ee 69 0f cf 94 | unwrapped: 4e 06 53 d5 52 a1 46 66 f0 81 81 90 ca 38 5f 1b | unwrapped: ac 6a ca 2b bd 45 30 34 f7 92 b9 de 0c d3 fd 43 | unwrapped: af d8 f8 c3 b2 3e cb 1d 8b ec 72 b7 f1 62 c0 9e | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea493698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d00010c0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-364301600: 5c 19 fffffffe ffffffe9 ffffffc2 20 4c ffffffd1 ffffff8f ffffff9c fffffffc 78 ffffffb9 ffffffff 49 1d 7d ffffffed ffffffb1 0a 31 ffffffb1 ffffffbc 78 5e 60 ffffffb3 7a 3e ffffff86 fffffff2 4b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2d0004b70 | unwrapped: 44 4b dd 6a 7b de b2 08 5e f9 db 83 3c 4b e1 3e | unwrapped: 9e 23 e7 91 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-364301600: ffffffa4 ffffffe0 2e fffffff5 4f 6f 3e ffffffa7 3a 61 26 3e ffffffc7 4f 51 fffffff8 ffffff8b fffffff2 ffffff86 21 66 2f 0f 43 36 ffffffb3 ffffffe6 ffffffcd ffffffaa 48 fffffff5 ffffffb0 ffffff8d ffffffbb ffffffb8 fffffff1 ffffffe3 ffffffc1 ffffff9d 76 ffffffd4 4a 26 2a ffffff88 ffffffb4 44 66 ffffff9f ffffffd4 6f 5a ffffffc5 51 66 ffffff83 ffffff8c ffffffac ffffffad 18 1b 10 ffffffe9 ffffff97 ffffffea ffffffd8 ffffffed 24 ffffffce 49 23 fffffff9 ffffff9b ffffffb0 37 ffffffd5 00 73 ffffffcd 5f fffffff8 ffffff98 ffffff96 ffffffb3 ffffffe5 7a ffffffdd 1a ffffffad ffffffde ffffffd1 51 63 ffffffe3 40 ffffffd6 ffffffd0 fffffff4 4d 5e ffffffa0 ffffff8f ffffff9f 35 ffffffff ffffff94 39 ffffffca 25 3c 49 ffffffc9 ffffffa7 57 47 54 6b ffffff89 06 ffffff88 ffffff8f 29 4f ffffffd2 04 78 28 76 44 50 77 ffffffb0 49 7a 68 33 ffffffd1 38 ffffffb8 ffffffae ffffffc6 ffffffb6 62 ffffffd8 44 6f ffffffaf ffffffe3 ffffffa9 ffffff90 23 ffffff81 10 ffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2d0001890 | unwrapped: f6 fd 58 1f 01 a2 8c 06 08 b7 7f 63 2f 7b 43 ec | unwrapped: 9e 29 c9 17 09 23 5f b6 60 65 26 2a ac b5 b4 db | unwrapped: c9 5b 67 ea 1e b0 34 ed 56 00 00 e2 66 49 80 f1 | unwrapped: 82 6a ce 1c ab f8 32 7c 78 c7 66 6a ea 08 23 35 | unwrapped: ef 18 f8 c6 56 f5 bb ec 4d 6f 00 1b 65 c5 f0 aa | unwrapped: a2 47 84 55 ec af fc e1 53 36 8b 68 e2 fb 3e 98 | unwrapped: 9f e1 3f bc 12 41 96 53 c3 e3 ef 9e e4 20 5d 40 | unwrapped: fd 6c 2e 90 73 36 09 f7 e2 71 dd be 72 d7 e1 1c | unwrapped: ad 6b 73 8c 17 c2 05 e1 33 80 14 63 02 91 93 d3 | unwrapped: 9e c1 0e e4 0a 25 72 c8 99 e6 1c 3e e7 ea a2 e9 | unwrapped: f6 7e 9d 37 8b c2 14 ad 02 f4 11 f2 be e5 77 32 | unwrapped: 5d 49 f0 2d f6 91 94 c5 3d 6c 16 5b 7d ee f2 58 | unwrapped: 4d 21 d7 45 4e e5 00 42 88 af 2a ee 69 0f cf 94 | unwrapped: 4e 06 53 d5 52 a1 46 66 f0 81 81 90 ca 38 5f 1b | unwrapped: ac 6a ca 2b bd 45 30 34 f7 92 b9 de 0c d3 fd 43 | unwrapped: af d8 f8 c3 b2 3e cb 1d 8b ec 72 b7 f1 62 c0 9e | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea493688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d0003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d00013a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-364301584: fffffffe 41 4b ffffffc6 14 ffffff80 ffffffe0 ffffffe0 63 4a 5e fffffff9 ffffffea 06 ffffff8f ffffffd4 ffffffad 75 26 ffffffe6 ffffff8a ffffffd6 18 ffffffb6 63 ffffffd3 69 ffffffd0 31 68 6e ffffffea | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2d0002100 | unwrapped: 0a d1 70 48 8a cb b4 fa 80 b1 ca f0 61 8c a9 de | unwrapped: 2b 96 d5 92 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-364301584: ffffffa4 ffffffe0 2e fffffff5 4f 6f 3e ffffffa7 3a 61 26 3e ffffffc7 4f 51 fffffff8 ffffff8b fffffff2 ffffff86 21 66 2f 0f 43 36 ffffffb3 ffffffe6 ffffffcd ffffffaa 48 fffffff5 ffffffb0 ffffff8d ffffffbb ffffffb8 fffffff1 ffffffe3 ffffffc1 ffffff9d 76 ffffffd4 4a 26 2a ffffff88 ffffffb4 44 66 ffffff9f ffffffd4 6f 5a ffffffc5 51 66 ffffff83 ffffff8c ffffffac ffffffad 18 1b 10 ffffffe9 ffffff97 ffffffea ffffffd8 ffffffed 24 ffffffce 49 23 fffffff9 ffffff9b ffffffb0 37 ffffffd5 00 73 ffffffcd 5f fffffff8 ffffff98 ffffff96 ffffffb3 ffffffe5 7a ffffffdd 1a ffffffad ffffffde ffffffd1 51 63 ffffffe3 40 ffffffd6 ffffffd0 fffffff4 4d 5e ffffffa0 ffffff8f ffffff9f 35 ffffffff ffffff94 39 ffffffca 25 3c 49 ffffffc9 ffffffa7 57 47 54 6b ffffff89 06 ffffff88 ffffff8f 29 4f ffffffd2 04 78 28 76 44 50 77 ffffffb0 49 7a 68 33 ffffffd1 38 ffffffb8 ffffffae ffffffc6 ffffffb6 62 ffffffd8 44 6f ffffffaf ffffffe3 ffffffa9 ffffff90 23 ffffff81 10 ffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2d0001780 | unwrapped: f6 fd 58 1f 01 a2 8c 06 08 b7 7f 63 2f 7b 43 ec | unwrapped: 9e 29 c9 17 09 23 5f b6 60 65 26 2a ac b5 b4 db | unwrapped: c9 5b 67 ea 1e b0 34 ed 56 00 00 e2 66 49 80 f1 | unwrapped: 82 6a ce 1c ab f8 32 7c 78 c7 66 6a ea 08 23 35 | unwrapped: ef 18 f8 c6 56 f5 bb ec 4d 6f 00 1b 65 c5 f0 aa | unwrapped: a2 47 84 55 ec af fc e1 53 36 8b 68 e2 fb 3e 98 | unwrapped: 9f e1 3f bc 12 41 96 53 c3 e3 ef 9e e4 20 5d 40 | unwrapped: fd 6c 2e 90 73 36 09 f7 e2 71 dd be 72 d7 e1 1c | unwrapped: ad 6b 73 8c 17 c2 05 e1 33 80 14 63 02 91 93 d3 | unwrapped: 9e c1 0e e4 0a 25 72 c8 99 e6 1c 3e e7 ea a2 e9 | unwrapped: f6 7e 9d 37 8b c2 14 ad 02 f4 11 f2 be e5 77 32 | unwrapped: 5d 49 f0 2d f6 91 94 c5 3d 6c 16 5b 7d ee f2 58 | unwrapped: 4d 21 d7 45 4e e5 00 42 88 af 2a ee 69 0f cf 94 | unwrapped: 4e 06 53 d5 52 a1 46 66 f0 81 81 90 ca 38 5f 1b | unwrapped: ac 6a ca 2b bd 45 30 34 f7 92 b9 de 0c d3 fd 43 | unwrapped: af d8 f8 c3 b2 3e cb 1d 8b ec 72 b7 f1 62 c0 9e | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea493698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ea4936f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_a 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_e 0x55e200b969a0, enc_key 0x55e200b8a680 | DH_i: 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | DH_i: f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | DH_i: 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | DH_i: d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | DH_i: 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | DH_i: f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | DH_i: 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | DH_i: b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | DH_i: a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | DH_i: 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | DH_i: 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | DH_i: ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | DH_i: 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | DH_i: 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | DH_i: 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | DH_i: a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | DH_r: d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | DH_r: 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | DH_r: 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | DH_r: 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | DH_r: 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | DH_r: ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | DH_r: d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | DH_r: 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | DH_r: 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | DH_r: da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | DH_r: bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | DH_r: b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | DH_r: 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | DH_r: f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | DH_r: fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | DH_r: 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb06a4 (length 256) | 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb07a4 (length 256) | d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2d0001640 (length 20) | 91 08 a4 85 c5 13 df 48 e0 ab b5 41 46 f4 3a 3e | 60 3f 3b bd | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 14 time elapsed 0.004916 seconds | (#13) spent 2.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 14: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 14 for state #13 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00013c0 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #13 | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 14 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #13: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001fc0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #13 | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #13 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #13 spent 0.0216 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00013c0 | spent 0.002 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 64 9c 74 d4 | 7c 9e c0 4d 86 fe 3d 37 b6 1b a6 be 8e 1c 05 84 | 7b b1 b0 73 01 84 6a 54 dc 86 4d 7f 6d f1 14 51 | a7 a9 83 5d 26 bf 16 4d 51 20 6a f6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 91 08 a4 85 c5 13 df 48 e0 ab b5 41 46 f4 3a 3e | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 6d f1 14 51 a7 a9 83 5d 26 bf 16 4d 51 20 6a f6 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 d8 fe d9 db | 50 17 00 ae ae cc 44 51 b3 01 3f e2 9a 3e c7 b4 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #13: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d40043c0 (length 256) | 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc003bd0 (length 256) | d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200b03480 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | d8 fe d9 db 50 17 00 ae ae cc 44 51 b3 01 3f e2 | 9a 3e c7 b4 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d0001640 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc003bd0 (length 256) | d0 47 da 34 95 c9 91 ad 05 e3 80 20 69 c9 07 f7 | 8a 0f 6d 78 70 c5 2d 6a 3c 8a 9a d4 9e 53 cf 4d | 36 17 11 c4 16 71 4b 8c a1 a2 1e 0a 5b e5 5c d7 | 28 4f 1c 2d 4a da 99 fa 69 96 a5 d7 fd 32 cf 82 | 03 59 31 14 5f 06 88 00 f9 d0 53 5c 91 74 e6 29 | ec 8d 49 f0 bb d9 cf 1c 52 b0 49 ad 51 af 00 94 | d1 29 22 55 dd 3d b2 c4 42 64 c0 05 dd 1c b8 eb | 7b 79 7e e0 d4 de 5c d5 7c 1f fd 4c 04 2e ba 54 | 3e f9 16 f2 b2 ea a7 80 cb a8 14 a6 29 95 a1 b0 | da 5d 30 f9 16 ae 62 60 87 4a c7 0b 5a 98 19 bb | bf 1d b9 1e ee c4 74 24 e0 f2 83 b8 0e 59 75 3d | b0 8d 01 d5 6e 81 95 71 57 06 a7 fd 12 23 14 60 | 39 ef a9 5c 9c 39 9f 95 58 08 a4 3b 2e 96 32 81 | f0 8c eb 34 7e 97 ad 4e 58 ce 30 12 a0 e8 fe 2c | fb 32 21 a4 6a a7 f5 79 42 b4 2f 9d ef 01 27 a4 | 03 a5 dc ec 30 e2 d3 e9 5b 56 ab 52 dd c3 9f 41 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d40043c0 (length 256) | 05 71 0b 4d e4 18 1f b7 65 bd 81 bd 5e ab 97 08 | f9 03 00 ff 4b 1d f9 89 ff 6f ed dd d3 14 e5 14 | 76 38 73 ab c1 37 c9 db 84 c2 bd fc 51 fa 0f 0b | d8 53 53 0b 60 fe 1a 82 54 12 bc cb 33 35 66 00 | 11 ac c5 f9 75 6a 38 60 7e 38 92 2b bf 5f ef a9 | f9 6a d0 31 6d c3 fd 28 7b 4c 2a 95 38 69 6f dd | 3f 27 01 31 f1 65 c4 e7 b2 d2 57 6c 99 7a 8f 1d | b2 47 9a 0c de f2 a8 8e 80 e3 75 cf 85 80 c3 e5 | a0 7c 68 fb 1a b6 f5 ae 92 8a 10 08 6c 85 6c 74 | 11 3e 2a 8f f8 b5 c2 78 fd d3 d3 23 11 40 7d 7f | 3e e9 ad 00 7b 8b ce 81 15 21 7f 6c 55 1f b6 c9 | ef 88 f8 2c 14 11 e6 a6 4d e3 8d b8 d6 62 f5 fc | 8e 2b c0 a4 6c 65 a3 19 a1 50 a8 83 16 91 9f b0 | 02 5d 38 84 ef 46 dc ba a5 8d d2 ec 51 e1 3d b8 | 4d a9 1e 18 c5 a9 91 a3 d9 6f f8 70 39 5f b7 0a | a8 3c f0 36 0d 6d 14 9a 6e 0d 33 1d 75 13 0f f5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | a0 29 7b 14 ec 03 f3 04 c6 9d 69 24 33 6a 62 54 | 3c 10 79 d3 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R a0 29 7b 14 ec 03 f3 04 c6 9d 69 24 33 6a 62 54 | HASH_R 3c 10 79 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: a0 29 7b 14 ec 03 f3 04 c6 9d 69 24 33 6a 62 54 | encrypting: 3c 10 79 d3 | IV: 6d f1 14 51 a7 a9 83 5d 26 bf 16 4d 51 20 6a f6 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #13 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #13: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #13 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #13 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8002030 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 31 fd c0 25 | 7b a4 b0 34 70 f2 cf 0c 42 a4 13 38 cd fb d1 92 | 8f a6 5a af e3 b2 c2 5c 73 35 7e d3 e1 16 6f fd | 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 size 128 | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #13 | #13 spent 0.566 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.701 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00189 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 08 10 20 01 3f fb e2 04 00 00 01 bc 78 39 82 de | 83 60 10 21 37 9a 3a af ee 2b 82 16 56 9d a4 d4 | 4b c5 66 c2 60 48 2c 1d 3f e9 99 fa fe 74 f3 03 | 6b d3 e8 58 ff 84 85 b9 9b c7 8f f1 b5 c1 3b 42 | e2 a2 8d fb be 38 24 31 47 e4 8c eb a9 9e 87 32 | fd 4e c6 66 02 ee 51 7c d2 89 0d b8 5f bc 99 d1 | be a6 77 4f 00 95 91 01 d2 10 36 4f 86 b4 63 3a | 99 a7 7c b9 1e 60 83 f0 33 db b5 b4 a0 63 22 5d | b1 28 d7 8e c9 71 29 ab e3 58 c1 8e 71 46 03 bf | b6 3a a8 a1 26 98 44 01 8c e0 80 7b 96 19 5b b2 | fa 23 95 ee cb 47 70 4c a9 c4 9e 42 e2 d4 0d ee | 9f c4 df 19 a9 82 c0 e5 21 12 f9 a7 ce 8c 7b f6 | ff ff 7a 6f b4 2f cf f9 77 7e 57 fb d3 b5 40 5d | 29 19 14 54 2a 57 80 86 72 ee ef ec d5 e9 8e aa | ce de bf 75 82 2f 2b 19 ba b9 a2 9a 0e 75 1c 85 | 64 91 e3 1c 9d 82 db 2a b6 f9 4e 68 a2 02 ee f3 | 76 42 8a 3a 41 90 ad ca 1d de b0 38 20 a6 1a f0 | 80 1e 4c 0c 10 a6 ed ec 7e bb e1 45 8b c8 91 10 | f7 49 ff 1d 44 0f 27 f5 68 93 f6 c0 0a a5 6e cd | 87 e7 5c 84 9d a1 ee c8 8f a2 30 ee 32 b2 c8 18 | d4 3f 11 1f e0 f2 5f 8c e2 a3 f3 ba be e6 f0 eb | b0 96 fb a7 6b 51 f3 5a 52 f0 6a 9e a2 56 99 76 | 84 61 29 87 05 ad 9d 5b 57 1b df 07 4c 07 72 3a | cb 60 a1 af 6e 42 b2 34 44 99 3a b7 69 91 50 94 | f1 94 c2 d8 4d 17 f6 51 f7 5c cb b1 3b b9 ee 61 | b3 c7 1c 3a 63 ae 54 60 46 89 4c fc 86 cf a7 3b | fb 67 1e cb 6b aa ef 4c 52 61 02 f4 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1073472004 (0x3ffbe204) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | current Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 3f fb e2 04 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | a3 e3 d9 db 7a f7 ca fd 56 d0 65 7b 80 b1 ea a9 | bb 4d e6 74 | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: a3 e3 d9 db 7a f7 ca fd 56 d0 65 7b 80 b1 ea a9 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 86 cf a7 3b fb 67 1e cb 6b aa ef 4c 52 61 02 f4 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 08 10 20 01 3f fb e2 04 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 19 2d b0 54 fb 66 8a 86 f2 69 4e de 8a ef bb a3 | 3f c6 10 7b 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 87 33 c1 ca 00 00 00 1c | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 2e 4e 66 d9 | 66 94 74 79 93 0e c0 fc c2 05 b1 28 46 ca 5e 8f | 78 70 6d b3 67 30 a0 57 89 cf 43 e0 05 00 01 04 | 44 8c 1b 86 4a 5c ed 22 4a dc 49 4f af d3 e1 4e | e6 ab 5f a8 37 77 bc 3f 51 1f 8e fc 8e 12 60 81 | c9 11 bf d6 d2 55 e2 8d a5 35 a1 12 fb 11 6f aa | 32 d6 dd 3a f6 fe 9f 15 1d 75 e1 3e 88 e4 24 c3 | bc 46 8e 2e 87 87 d0 17 ed aa f9 80 81 dc 03 75 | ea 7f 7f 80 0b be f4 03 b2 4e 24 c1 10 6d c8 01 | 46 bd 83 5a 77 9a 84 d7 72 22 b8 c0 12 e2 d4 b0 | 19 1b 25 9b a7 4c 2a f3 6a 8f 59 61 33 5d 7c 46 | b4 06 e7 86 ea a3 72 14 82 36 d2 45 f8 43 cb be | 70 4a f8 3b f7 4a a9 bd c1 5c 74 6b d8 4e e2 37 | c8 e1 f0 49 02 cb 57 f6 b5 0a 90 52 4f d0 ac e6 | 11 54 68 10 50 4c e6 d7 f5 ef 46 e4 b9 64 3a d9 | 1f a5 00 b0 d8 96 ee 73 3b 38 d5 c5 63 ce 07 38 | ed 58 a3 57 d0 ff df 23 72 8a 62 ec b4 a6 4a f2 | ad 92 9a a1 08 a4 fe fa 56 cb 24 d5 11 b1 60 8f | 8a c0 a5 5d ab ba cd ca 59 45 13 08 1c a2 06 f2 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 3f fb e2 04 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200ba7824 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 87 33 c1 ca 00 00 00 1c 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 2e 4e 66 d9 66 94 74 79 | 93 0e c0 fc c2 05 b1 28 46 ca 5e 8f 78 70 6d b3 | 67 30 a0 57 89 cf 43 e0 05 00 01 04 44 8c 1b 86 | 4a 5c ed 22 4a dc 49 4f af d3 e1 4e e6 ab 5f a8 | 37 77 bc 3f 51 1f 8e fc 8e 12 60 81 c9 11 bf d6 | d2 55 e2 8d a5 35 a1 12 fb 11 6f aa 32 d6 dd 3a | f6 fe 9f 15 1d 75 e1 3e 88 e4 24 c3 bc 46 8e 2e | 87 87 d0 17 ed aa f9 80 81 dc 03 75 ea 7f 7f 80 | 0b be f4 03 b2 4e 24 c1 10 6d c8 01 46 bd 83 5a | 77 9a 84 d7 72 22 b8 c0 12 e2 d4 b0 19 1b 25 9b | a7 4c 2a f3 6a 8f 59 61 33 5d 7c 46 b4 06 e7 86 | ea a3 72 14 82 36 d2 45 f8 43 cb be 70 4a f8 3b | f7 4a a9 bd c1 5c 74 6b d8 4e e2 37 c8 e1 f0 49 | 02 cb 57 f6 b5 0a 90 52 4f d0 ac e6 11 54 68 10 | 50 4c e6 d7 f5 ef 46 e4 b9 64 3a d9 1f a5 00 b0 | d8 96 ee 73 3b 38 d5 c5 63 ce 07 38 ed 58 a3 57 | d0 ff df 23 72 8a 62 ec b4 a6 4a f2 ad 92 9a a1 | 08 a4 fe fa 56 cb 24 d5 11 b1 60 8f 8a c0 a5 5d | ab ba cd ca 59 45 13 08 1c a2 06 f2 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 19 2d b0 54 fb 66 8a 86 f2 69 4e de 8a ef bb a3 | 3f c6 10 7b | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 19 2d b0 54 fb 66 8a 86 f2 69 4e de 8a ef bb a3 | 3f c6 10 7b | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #13: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #14 at 0x55e200ba67e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #14 in UNDEFINED | pstats #14 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #13 "east" as #14 for IPSEC SA | #14 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #13.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #14: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 87 33 c1 ca | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 "east" #14: IPsec encryption transform AES_CBC did not specify required KEY_LENGTH attribute | ignoring ESP proposal with NULLed or unknown encryption "east" #14: no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #14 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #14: sending encrypted notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1809690687 (0x6bddb03f) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f8d8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9bc (length 4) | 6b dd b0 3f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc74 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc60 (length 20) | a9 26 92 35 4a 3a 3b a5 17 4e b7 e8 28 bc 5f 7e | dc c5 24 60 | send notification HASH(1): | a9 26 92 35 4a 3a 3b a5 17 4e b7 e8 28 bc 5f 7e | dc c5 24 60 | last Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | current Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9cc (length 4) | 6b dd b0 3f | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 73 35 06 ac 60 16 48 38 85 9c b0 21 03 19 53 5a | 9d 9e f3 bf | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 a9 26 92 35 4a 3a 3b a5 17 4e b7 e8 | encrypting: 28 bc 5f 7e dc c5 24 60 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0e | IV: 73 35 06 ac 60 16 48 38 85 9c b0 21 03 19 53 5a | IV: 9d 9e f3 bf | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 5a 9e 41 9a 2b e3 76 b6 e7 37 19 61 93 08 00 7c | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #14) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 08 10 05 01 6b dd b0 3f 00 00 00 4c 47 33 9a 79 | 09 d1 3a ae 7f ea 98 97 06 c6 32 92 e4 d6 ae 70 | 0d 42 21 31 6c a0 eb 95 88 d4 d8 1c 5a 9e 41 9a | 2b e3 76 b6 e7 37 19 61 93 08 00 7c | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | pstats #14 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #14: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #14: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #14: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #14 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #14: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #14 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #13 spent 0.521 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.891 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00318 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 08 10 05 01 22 47 33 b4 00 00 00 5c 7f 6d 27 fd | dc 1b 09 97 d9 fd 3f a1 8f 4f 69 60 82 08 d2 14 | c5 64 15 8e ff 3d 1e e9 4b 71 68 83 53 16 8b 93 | d9 9b af 18 e3 29 a4 f7 23 30 6e 90 e8 ab 0c b6 | d5 1b bd 2c 2e 13 1a d8 0b 0a 5e 9f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 575091636 (0x224733b4) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #13; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #13 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | current Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 22 47 33 b4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 56 61 23 ab 90 d2 b6 5a e0 a6 54 07 52 a0 d0 57 | 52 2c ad 25 | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 56 61 23 ab 90 d2 b6 5a e0 a6 54 07 52 a0 d0 57 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: e8 ab 0c b6 d5 1b bd 2c 2e 13 1a d8 0b 0a 5e 9f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 08 10 05 01 22 47 33 b4 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | c3 05 f3 8d f5 03 a9 03 02 28 da 29 e7 13 43 c0 | 0f b5 f0 af 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 22 47 33 b4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b8c0e4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 28 7e 70 3d | 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | c3 05 f3 8d f5 03 a9 03 02 28 da 29 e7 13 43 c0 | 0f b5 f0 af | informational HASH(1): | c3 05 f3 8d f5 03 a9 03 02 28 da 29 e7 13 43 c0 | 0f b5 f0 af | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #13: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #13 | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #13: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.538s and sending notification | parent state #13: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #13 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | responder cookie: | 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2330849282 (0x8aedf002) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc48 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd2c (length 4) | 8a ed f0 02 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0d4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 28 7e 70 3d | 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0c0 (length 20) | 57 8e 9e e1 0f 9f f1 0c b8 16 c9 93 20 d0 cf ff | e8 ad c7 09 | send delete HASH(1): | 57 8e 9e e1 0f 9f f1 0c b8 16 c9 93 20 d0 cf ff | e8 ad c7 09 | last Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | current Phase 1 IV: e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | e1 16 6f fd 88 8c 34 39 26 11 34 75 e1 d8 31 20 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd3c (length 4) | 8a ed f0 02 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | ae cb b3 a5 05 96 2f 02 0e 04 fd d8 54 a9 a1 a9 | 26 8c ed 3c | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 57 8e 9e e1 0f 9f f1 0c b8 16 c9 93 | encrypting: 20 d0 cf ff e8 ad c7 09 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe | encrypting: c4 22 a4 7d | IV: ae cb b3 a5 05 96 2f 02 0e 04 fd d8 54 a9 a1 a9 | IV: 26 8c ed 3c | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: b5 46 f9 a8 af ea 7d db 94 40 43 61 7b 85 41 6a | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 28 7e 70 3d 50 bf 44 78 59 c4 4f fe c4 22 a4 7d | 08 10 05 01 8a ed f0 02 00 00 00 5c 10 24 2b 9e | 48 59 b4 e7 e6 3b 0c 3b 31 44 82 d3 a1 f4 b4 6b | 55 54 e2 07 1e 16 6b 1c 57 df 3b 06 2d 13 cd f2 | 7b e0 b9 61 06 c6 ba 67 4c ef f0 d3 b5 46 f9 a8 | af ea 7d db 94 40 43 61 7b 85 41 6a | state #13 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #13: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001fc0: destroyed | stop processing: state #13 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.58 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00319 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 0a 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 54 19 3a 8d e2 81 16 66 | 86 ea b1 0e 7d 01 5d fc 52 c0 d3 ab 70 74 0c 54 | creating state object #15 at 0x55e200ba82d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #15 in UNDEFINED | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp started | #15 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #15: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 "east" #15: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #15 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #15: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 size 128 "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.584 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00234 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | 14 00 00 24 d5 61 1e 0a 2d c7 24 48 ea d6 ea 41 | 70 6c a4 65 84 6b 58 84 c0 49 3d aa 04 21 a1 21 | 65 53 21 7f 14 00 00 18 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 | 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 55 a2 94 75 00 00 00 18 | d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | 9d 51 8b e7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #15 is idle | #15 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | 55 a2 94 75 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | natd_hash: rcookie= ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | natd_hash: hash= 55 a2 94 75 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | 9d 51 8b e7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | natd_hash: rcookie= ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | natd_hash: hash= 9d 51 8b e7 | expected NAT-D(me): 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | expected NAT-D(me): 55 a2 94 75 | expected NAT-D(him): | d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | 9d 51 8b e7 | received NAT-D: 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | received NAT-D: 55 a2 94 75 | received NAT-D: d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | received NAT-D: 9d 51 8b e7 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 15 for state #15 | state #15 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #15 and saving MD | #15 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 1 resuming | #15 spent 0.183 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 15 for state #15 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 15 | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.329 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4002a80: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2e4002a80 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | Generated nonce: 62 e5 79 c0 76 1e 34 0b e9 af 3a 14 b2 2e 0f c4 | Generated nonce: 32 b6 62 c5 c5 55 bc d5 30 10 69 58 8f 7e 61 46 | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 15 time elapsed 0.000591 seconds | (#15) spent 0.591 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 15: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 15 for state #15 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40081c0 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #15 | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 15 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #15: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4002a80: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #15 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | keyex value 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | keyex value 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | keyex value b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | keyex value 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | keyex value bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | keyex value 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | keyex value 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | keyex value 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | keyex value e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | keyex value 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | keyex value 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | keyex value bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | keyex value 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | keyex value 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | keyex value 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 62 e5 79 c0 76 1e 34 0b e9 af 3a 14 b2 2e 0f c4 | Nr 32 b6 62 c5 c5 55 bc d5 30 10 69 58 8f 7e 61 46 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | 9d 51 8b e7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | natd_hash: rcookie= ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | natd_hash: hash= 9d 51 8b e7 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a | NAT-D 9d 51 8b e7 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | 55 a2 94 75 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | natd_hash: rcookie= ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | natd_hash: hash= 55 a2 94 75 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | NAT-D 55 a2 94 75 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4002a80: transferring ownership from state #15 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 16 for state #15 | state #15 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 size 128 | #15 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 4 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #15 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 16 for state #15 | parent state #15: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | crypto helper 4 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 16 | event_already_set, deleting event | state #15 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 | peer's g: 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | peer's g: 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | peer's g: fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | peer's g: 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | peer's g: 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | peer's g: 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | peer's g: a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | peer's g: f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | peer's g: eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | peer's g: d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | peer's g: f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | peer's g: 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | peer's g: be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | peer's g: 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | peer's g: be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | peer's g: 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | 14 00 00 24 62 e5 79 c0 76 1e 34 0b e9 af 3a 14 | b2 2e 0f c4 32 b6 62 c5 c5 55 bc d5 30 10 69 58 | 8f 7e 61 46 14 00 00 18 d7 7b 56 1b 2c 2a 38 8f | 61 2d 6b 65 79 03 54 4a 9d 51 8b e7 00 00 00 18 | 65 41 d6 d9 50 cb 1b 89 91 0b 6a 22 57 54 13 44 | 55 a2 94 75 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 size 128 | #15 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48958.277041 "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #15 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #15 spent 0.421 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40081c0 | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4002a80: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b8a680 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb0640 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001250 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb0664 (length 32) | d5 61 1e 0a 2d c7 24 48 ea d6 ea 41 70 6c a4 65 | 84 6b 58 84 c0 49 3d aa 04 21 a1 21 65 53 21 7f | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb0684 (length 32) | 62 e5 79 c0 76 1e 34 0b e9 af 3a 14 b2 2e 0f c4 | 32 b6 62 c5 c5 55 bc d5 30 10 69 58 8f 7e 61 46 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001160 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908864: 22 ffffff86 03 ffffff87 77 3e 66 ffffff91 2f ffffffd0 ffffffeb ffffffb8 51 3f 12 ffffffd9 ffffffc7 ffffffbf 13 76 fffffff2 ffffffdf ffffff9a 07 4b 0e ffffffce ffffffe2 ffffffd3 ffffff9f 64 ffffffb9 ffffff89 42 ffffffc9 fffffffb ffffffbc 59 4f ffffffed ffffff85 ffffffbd 10 23 ffffffb8 54 ffffffa9 7b 13 fffffff3 ffffffbf 65 65 6a ffffffce ffffffa4 75 ffffffe5 67 67 48 00 ffffffa8 47 62 22 74 5d 3d ffffffe1 54 ffffff9c 75 74 4a fffffff6 27 ffffffe7 36 ffffffc2 ffffffee ffffffb4 ffffffd3 ffffffea 35 15 0e 0a 20 ffffffee ffffffe4 49 ffffffe4 20 7d 12 1d fffffffa ffffffc0 78 71 ffffffe6 53 21 27 ffffff95 ffffffb1 ffffff9e 0a 00 ffffffd4 30 77 ffffffec 6b fffffffa ffffff80 ffffffc6 46 26 ffffffcb fffffff0 16 39 ffffff96 1c 71 ffffffc8 3e ffffffcc 7a 46 39 1e ffffffe8 ffffffef 77 34 ffffffd2 ffffff9b 50 ffffff8d 4e 1a ffffffce ffffff83 ffffff80 ffffffe5 34 7b fffffffc ffffff8f ffffff9b 05 50 78 5b 5a ffffffed 67 51 06 fffffff3 ffffffa9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2dc008ca0 | unwrapped: 74 ff 6d a8 27 aa 27 54 b5 60 45 97 04 33 d7 77 | unwrapped: cf c4 ac 7d 4a 18 02 ee 2f 5b 70 0f e8 4a d9 ba | unwrapped: 83 16 3b f9 cf bd 75 c6 2c 3f 75 aa 76 0f a0 8f | unwrapped: c6 1f ba e0 ea b8 b6 3c d8 c4 6e a4 78 de 57 df | unwrapped: 7c 77 0f 1e 5d 13 a1 58 ee f8 0c e6 51 92 91 b9 | unwrapped: 12 d9 d6 ad c7 33 31 07 e0 13 ec 17 c2 4b bb 27 | unwrapped: 0b dd 64 62 86 88 78 14 94 b6 a7 3d ef 56 ca d8 | unwrapped: ce 88 82 11 a8 0b 02 ec ec 94 16 35 6d e1 41 4c | unwrapped: 11 0d 3b 20 2d 65 35 20 5d 5c cf 96 c0 d8 0b 1a | unwrapped: 08 b7 28 18 1f 54 7d cc 9d fc 39 1f 2d 12 bc 7d | unwrapped: 8d cb 54 3c ee 06 17 38 8c 31 76 be 7e d7 36 be | unwrapped: 96 97 74 4b 47 c2 30 e7 2b cd a5 82 f0 54 1f c0 | unwrapped: ea 56 1c 33 d7 ce 90 ed 03 8d 64 0a 8f 59 a6 90 | unwrapped: f0 c2 cc 5c 72 a1 c1 33 82 f6 37 0d 06 ac a2 f8 | unwrapped: 47 55 f6 c8 ea cd 0a de e3 44 9b 90 79 2c 95 d5 | unwrapped: 18 c9 e2 fd 76 57 16 f3 f0 36 55 7b 7e bc da a2 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc0084b0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908896: 1d ffffffc1 fffffff1 4d ffffffe9 ffffff98 ffffff94 6e 0f 54 ffffff83 fffffff5 5b 35 ffffffe3 17 06 7c 10 ffffff9d ffffffb2 11 ffffffe2 ffffff80 fffffff2 ffffff91 20 ffffffd2 39 ffffffc6 10 ffffffac | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2dc0090d0 | unwrapped: f6 41 71 ae bf 6d c6 26 9e 7e 75 5c e9 ba 1b 5d | unwrapped: d1 74 e0 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908896: 22 ffffff86 03 ffffff87 77 3e 66 ffffff91 2f ffffffd0 ffffffeb ffffffb8 51 3f 12 ffffffd9 ffffffc7 ffffffbf 13 76 fffffff2 ffffffdf ffffff9a 07 4b 0e ffffffce ffffffe2 ffffffd3 ffffff9f 64 ffffffb9 ffffff89 42 ffffffc9 fffffffb ffffffbc 59 4f ffffffed ffffff85 ffffffbd 10 23 ffffffb8 54 ffffffa9 7b 13 fffffff3 ffffffbf 65 65 6a ffffffce ffffffa4 75 ffffffe5 67 67 48 00 ffffffa8 47 62 22 74 5d 3d ffffffe1 54 ffffff9c 75 74 4a fffffff6 27 ffffffe7 36 ffffffc2 ffffffee ffffffb4 ffffffd3 ffffffea 35 15 0e 0a 20 ffffffee ffffffe4 49 ffffffe4 20 7d 12 1d fffffffa ffffffc0 78 71 ffffffe6 53 21 27 ffffff95 ffffffb1 ffffff9e 0a 00 ffffffd4 30 77 ffffffec 6b fffffffa ffffff80 ffffffc6 46 26 ffffffcb fffffff0 16 39 ffffff96 1c 71 ffffffc8 3e ffffffcc 7a 46 39 1e ffffffe8 ffffffef 77 34 ffffffd2 ffffff9b 50 ffffff8d 4e 1a ffffffce ffffff83 ffffff80 ffffffe5 34 7b fffffffc ffffff8f ffffff9b 05 50 78 5b 5a ffffffed 67 51 06 fffffff3 ffffffa9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2dc008b90 | unwrapped: 74 ff 6d a8 27 aa 27 54 b5 60 45 97 04 33 d7 77 | unwrapped: cf c4 ac 7d 4a 18 02 ee 2f 5b 70 0f e8 4a d9 ba | unwrapped: 83 16 3b f9 cf bd 75 c6 2c 3f 75 aa 76 0f a0 8f | unwrapped: c6 1f ba e0 ea b8 b6 3c d8 c4 6e a4 78 de 57 df | unwrapped: 7c 77 0f 1e 5d 13 a1 58 ee f8 0c e6 51 92 91 b9 | unwrapped: 12 d9 d6 ad c7 33 31 07 e0 13 ec 17 c2 4b bb 27 | unwrapped: 0b dd 64 62 86 88 78 14 94 b6 a7 3d ef 56 ca d8 | unwrapped: ce 88 82 11 a8 0b 02 ec ec 94 16 35 6d e1 41 4c | unwrapped: 11 0d 3b 20 2d 65 35 20 5d 5c cf 96 c0 d8 0b 1a | unwrapped: 08 b7 28 18 1f 54 7d cc 9d fc 39 1f 2d 12 bc 7d | unwrapped: 8d cb 54 3c ee 06 17 38 8c 31 76 be 7e d7 36 be | unwrapped: 96 97 74 4b 47 c2 30 e7 2b cd a5 82 f0 54 1f c0 | unwrapped: ea 56 1c 33 d7 ce 90 ed 03 8d 64 0a 8f 59 a6 90 | unwrapped: f0 c2 cc 5c 72 a1 c1 33 82 f6 37 0d 06 ac a2 f8 | unwrapped: 47 55 f6 c8 ea cd 0a de e3 44 9b 90 79 2c 95 d5 | unwrapped: 18 c9 e2 fd 76 57 16 f3 f0 36 55 7b 7e bc da a2 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2dc002950 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc001fc0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908880: ffffffaf 6e 7b ffffff90 ffffffb0 70 4b ffffffe3 27 2b ffffff88 0e 51 ffffffe6 ffffff87 ffffff9c ffffffef ffffffdf 6f 19 ffffffbc ffffff8b ffffff87 ffffffc1 ffffffc0 7e 5e 64 ffffff99 1d 3e 37 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2dc0090a0 | unwrapped: b1 2a 74 74 f8 25 0f c5 7c 99 83 e0 bb 2e 7b 13 | unwrapped: 82 6f 89 6a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-355908880: 22 ffffff86 03 ffffff87 77 3e 66 ffffff91 2f ffffffd0 ffffffeb ffffffb8 51 3f 12 ffffffd9 ffffffc7 ffffffbf 13 76 fffffff2 ffffffdf ffffff9a 07 4b 0e ffffffce ffffffe2 ffffffd3 ffffff9f 64 ffffffb9 ffffff89 42 ffffffc9 fffffffb ffffffbc 59 4f ffffffed ffffff85 ffffffbd 10 23 ffffffb8 54 ffffffa9 7b 13 fffffff3 ffffffbf 65 65 6a ffffffce ffffffa4 75 ffffffe5 67 67 48 00 ffffffa8 47 62 22 74 5d 3d ffffffe1 54 ffffff9c 75 74 4a fffffff6 27 ffffffe7 36 ffffffc2 ffffffee ffffffb4 ffffffd3 ffffffea 35 15 0e 0a 20 ffffffee ffffffe4 49 ffffffe4 20 7d 12 1d fffffffa ffffffc0 78 71 ffffffe6 53 21 27 ffffff95 ffffffb1 ffffff9e 0a 00 ffffffd4 30 77 ffffffec 6b fffffffa ffffff80 ffffffc6 46 26 ffffffcb fffffff0 16 39 ffffff96 1c 71 ffffffc8 3e ffffffcc 7a 46 39 1e ffffffe8 ffffffef 77 34 ffffffd2 ffffff9b 50 ffffff8d 4e 1a ffffffce ffffff83 ffffff80 ffffffe5 34 7b fffffffc ffffff8f ffffff9b 05 50 78 5b 5a ffffffed 67 51 06 fffffff3 ffffffa9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2dc001cd0 | unwrapped: 74 ff 6d a8 27 aa 27 54 b5 60 45 97 04 33 d7 77 | unwrapped: cf c4 ac 7d 4a 18 02 ee 2f 5b 70 0f e8 4a d9 ba | unwrapped: 83 16 3b f9 cf bd 75 c6 2c 3f 75 aa 76 0f a0 8f | unwrapped: c6 1f ba e0 ea b8 b6 3c d8 c4 6e a4 78 de 57 df | unwrapped: 7c 77 0f 1e 5d 13 a1 58 ee f8 0c e6 51 92 91 b9 | unwrapped: 12 d9 d6 ad c7 33 31 07 e0 13 ec 17 c2 4b bb 27 | unwrapped: 0b dd 64 62 86 88 78 14 94 b6 a7 3d ef 56 ca d8 | unwrapped: ce 88 82 11 a8 0b 02 ec ec 94 16 35 6d e1 41 4c | unwrapped: 11 0d 3b 20 2d 65 35 20 5d 5c cf 96 c0 d8 0b 1a | unwrapped: 08 b7 28 18 1f 54 7d cc 9d fc 39 1f 2d 12 bc 7d | unwrapped: 8d cb 54 3c ee 06 17 38 8c 31 76 be 7e d7 36 be | unwrapped: 96 97 74 4b 47 c2 30 e7 2b cd a5 82 f0 54 1f c0 | unwrapped: ea 56 1c 33 d7 ce 90 ed 03 8d 64 0a 8f 59 a6 90 | unwrapped: f0 c2 cc 5c 72 a1 c1 33 82 f6 37 0d 06 ac a2 f8 | unwrapped: 47 55 f6 c8 ea cd 0a de e3 44 9b 90 79 2c 95 d5 | unwrapped: 18 c9 e2 fd 76 57 16 f3 f0 36 55 7b 7e bc da a2 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eac946b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac94698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eac946f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b95040 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_a 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_e 0x55e200b93380, enc_key 0x55e200b95040 | DH_i: 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | DH_i: 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | DH_i: fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | DH_i: 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | DH_i: 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | DH_i: 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | DH_i: a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | DH_i: f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | DH_i: eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | DH_i: d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | DH_i: f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | DH_i: 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | DH_i: be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | DH_i: 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | DH_i: be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | DH_i: 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | DH_r: 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | DH_r: 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | DH_r: 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | DH_r: b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | DH_r: 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | DH_r: bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | DH_r: 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | DH_r: 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | DH_r: 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | DH_r: e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | DH_r: 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | DH_r: 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | DH_r: bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | DH_r: 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | DH_r: 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | DH_r: 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb06a4 (length 256) | 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb07a4 (length 256) | 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2dc002090 (length 20) | 06 f1 dd 4a c4 99 50 65 f4 df 93 d0 c7 16 5b ec | a7 1e 4b 4c | crypto helper 4 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 16 time elapsed 0.002081 seconds | (#15) spent 2.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 16: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 16 for state #15 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc0088a0 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #15 | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 16 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #15: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4002a80: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #15 | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #15 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #15 spent 0.0145 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc0088a0 | spent 0.00195 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 21 9a f8 95 | cc 6a a4 27 78 38 6a 34 17 2b ea 76 70 f7 cc fb | 2f 2b c3 d7 d6 21 74 64 01 20 01 0b 98 48 75 ca | fb 0c 7e d0 0a 56 3a ad d7 75 ac 5a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 06 f1 dd 4a c4 99 50 65 f4 df 93 d0 c7 16 5b ec | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 98 48 75 ca fb 0c 7e d0 0a 56 3a ad d7 75 ac 5a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 07 8c 95 0f | f5 c1 3a 92 29 82 c9 e5 a7 13 fd ad 67 21 b2 57 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #15: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc003ce0 (length 256) | 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4001780 (length 256) | 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc003a70 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | 07 8c 95 0f f5 c1 3a 92 29 82 c9 e5 a7 13 fd ad | 67 21 b2 57 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4001780 (length 256) | 20 53 72 ad 03 d8 84 c2 cf 46 3c 7e ba 56 f0 52 | 39 02 24 81 77 bf 5c e6 b0 1b 5a 9c 03 1c 64 87 | 6a 30 51 f6 52 2e 92 16 f6 73 22 5b 3a d2 4a dc | b4 47 45 04 07 39 56 f7 a4 00 f6 fc b3 e6 07 ea | 7f 2c 75 a3 b7 eb 29 82 16 31 16 fa 78 4d 33 1d | bc 22 81 78 92 be 2f fb cd cc 53 69 e4 ee 70 9b | 7f dd e5 7e 36 ac fa a3 61 a8 7d 51 27 1a 9a c5 | 1b a9 0f 68 91 83 96 ce 04 cc 87 21 92 5f 86 52 | 4f aa 41 5e d5 cb b5 a7 8a d0 a6 38 dd 8d 59 c0 | e6 6b dc 03 0a a0 d1 4b b5 8e 04 19 af 6f 49 78 | 67 65 5a 64 30 10 14 82 74 49 8c b1 ca b1 dd e8 | 96 bb e2 1f 76 2d 8b a9 a0 96 40 2a 7c c1 d1 94 | bd bb bd 84 a4 26 e8 94 70 68 7c 99 85 a1 16 4a | 47 e3 b1 08 0d 7d a5 3a a1 86 6c 7b a5 4b a7 98 | 7f 8f c1 34 50 d0 26 8c 83 d5 3d 5a 68 43 ba 89 | 07 b4 db 2a be cb 44 a8 49 17 41 39 a5 9c c8 23 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc003ce0 (length 256) | 8c 3b 06 36 d2 05 1c f0 57 35 0c 2a ca 03 26 6e | 53 a4 fb 3b 97 a6 79 64 74 9a 4a 7b 9e 74 89 28 | fd bb 58 41 7a 01 0a 0b c7 01 a5 bd 4f 27 46 2d | 17 25 08 96 36 49 f9 c0 a7 0a c9 a1 96 06 29 46 | 20 23 fe f8 fe 61 93 8e 96 15 aa 7c 5a 0c be 97 | 4f d4 17 f6 6a e3 fa 67 da d0 a9 6e a3 0b 2d 64 | a5 10 62 12 af 0c f3 ab d3 8e 4c e0 d0 16 ea 6d | f9 cd 64 d9 8f 48 62 c4 79 66 e2 91 6c 85 65 0b | eb 5b 2e 8b 38 26 24 71 51 0a 7b da f0 9a 32 e2 | d0 fd 0f 2e 48 31 31 74 d5 3d ee 61 6a ed f9 e8 | f1 9d 05 02 cd 7b 93 a8 86 1b b9 66 1e 24 de ac | 52 7e 5c 93 4e eb 5d f3 81 5e 88 12 e8 be d9 2b | be 34 82 76 01 e2 13 6b d5 d3 57 08 88 ec 51 f6 | 1e b2 e0 61 93 04 35 85 92 df a3 fd 72 b7 7e a3 | be 27 9c 21 3d c9 5e b6 11 20 a2 88 7c d9 18 1d | 47 d6 ce 62 7d 81 ed 4a d1 4e 6d 2b 26 c9 e0 00 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | 89 cf d7 8f ee 77 df b2 07 5a 98 45 58 0f 33 d3 | 23 73 99 e5 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 89 cf d7 8f ee 77 df b2 07 5a 98 45 58 0f 33 d3 | HASH_R 23 73 99 e5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 89 cf d7 8f ee 77 df b2 07 5a 98 45 58 0f 33 d3 | encrypting: 23 73 99 e5 | IV: 98 48 75 ca fb 0c 7e d0 0a 56 3a ad d7 75 ac 5a | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #15 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #15: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #15 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #15 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc007f00 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 00 ca 4c fe | 29 5e 7b 19 80 ac 79 3f 2f 78 4d ad af 39 b3 a6 | 65 6e 6d 40 6e a2 f2 b2 32 57 6e 19 d7 45 18 16 | 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40081c0 size 128 | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #15 | #15 spent 0.618 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.746 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00261 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 20 01 0d 49 9e 43 00 00 01 bc 4e 9c 3a 72 | 5e 37 ec e3 b8 93 59 97 d1 05 6b 11 c8 e8 81 26 | f8 1a 96 44 24 da 08 1f cf 81 7d c0 e2 10 06 e7 | 26 00 b9 30 3c 94 2d 59 66 75 73 d0 1c 6d 1d 4c | 96 7c 59 67 c0 e3 3e ab d2 29 36 aa e9 66 e5 2e | 28 8b 77 cd cd ab 77 13 e5 55 ee 59 f6 63 d4 90 | 81 97 d2 d2 21 bc 17 ae 45 8a 3a 87 64 62 ee 06 | 67 2f e5 0f ca 66 f4 eb 5b f2 94 02 cb 11 c8 5e | 42 34 4d 8f c6 d5 c2 28 85 62 9a ea 2c 26 e1 c4 | 76 b1 e0 59 9e 46 93 36 a4 00 78 8e da ad b5 b3 | 7c 0e a0 bc a2 92 6c 7f c8 b4 30 7c 62 bd bd 4e | b5 39 6b 30 bb 98 7a 7c 41 5e 51 24 76 8d 4f 7a | 44 63 f7 18 fa 8f 1e ee 61 7f 1f 5e 7f da 61 64 | 27 d6 f8 dc f3 4e ad ef 7e 75 67 e6 bd 75 54 96 | 0f dd 61 ad 09 17 f0 95 11 df 11 fb 7c 0e ca 84 | 46 0a a0 22 80 37 55 d1 54 f3 af b0 49 bb 97 7a | 47 e0 38 27 fa 84 01 12 c6 60 66 c2 5c 83 72 4a | 68 d8 89 05 b6 13 84 75 42 07 1f b5 a6 7f 55 a6 | 82 0f da 3d 72 c9 f1 10 af 31 05 63 cb ed 05 f2 | 91 10 fc ed d6 ad ca e3 6f 15 42 f8 dc fe e1 b4 | 20 33 00 79 c3 27 6d 7c 4e e7 4e 40 e9 49 d3 0d | 47 6b b0 98 e2 84 e4 71 b2 04 47 14 54 1f a9 19 | 1c 81 52 ae 20 c8 2a 26 8d e3 7a 43 6f 38 60 57 | 0b 89 52 af 53 da a5 48 f0 8a 68 71 38 da 10 45 | 6f 5a af c6 18 bb 43 db bf ac 70 ab 8c 11 a3 d9 | fe 9b 5d 51 16 b5 a8 e0 1e b3 6c f9 1f d6 a9 9d | 62 c5 3c 92 25 d2 9f 44 96 bd f1 67 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 222928451 (0xd499e43) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | current Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 0d 49 9e 43 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 70 10 1d 42 70 52 f7 a6 48 4d 20 49 02 ed 40 47 | d7 33 c7 db | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 70 10 1d 42 70 52 f7 a6 48 4d 20 49 02 ed 40 47 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 1f d6 a9 9d 62 c5 3c 92 25 d2 9f 44 96 bd f1 67 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 20 01 0d 49 9e 43 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 03 8a 35 77 bc 51 c1 be ce 18 c7 df eb 50 14 ba | cf fb eb d7 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 51 73 2c fe 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | 05 00 01 04 73 06 aa ef c9 ff ce 41 ae 50 cd 18 | 0d 04 f1 fa 91 ea 7d ba b2 8d fc 7b 6e 72 69 05 | 12 96 cc 2b a2 42 e8 af 9d 58 5d 92 f5 45 04 ed | fb 9b 48 3f f4 1d 32 ab e1 49 9e a9 a9 b4 59 8c | 03 1a bd 7a 97 74 d0 ff 89 d4 85 dc d0 d5 14 d5 | 24 9e 23 f0 4c ab 74 a3 32 a1 37 96 03 90 d1 78 | 5f d4 cf 65 62 89 07 b7 8f 8a 70 10 74 29 3a 33 | c1 e4 8f ac d5 32 38 3f 58 e8 5c 49 3b ad 56 34 | dc 4e 67 7e 53 56 28 f7 5b bc 60 4e 23 0d cb f8 | 68 86 e7 62 c1 76 e5 8f 72 24 b3 a0 23 f0 c4 32 | be 48 ba 1f 26 73 64 b2 da 03 69 dc ed d2 5c 7e | 60 09 a5 85 ae 34 ef 12 1d 32 0a 21 f4 a3 9c ec | 8d 80 5a bb 13 68 44 06 cf 7c b2 78 a4 7b b4 a8 | 73 1c f1 ca 8a 93 91 8c 9c 7e 97 c7 dc 3b 30 c4 | 3c 80 4d 75 e5 86 ff 3d 4c 3d 07 b0 f6 a0 5c af | c5 8d 52 56 e0 fc 9a 10 c5 64 62 d6 16 4c 2b 53 | 3b 8e 89 f8 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 0d 49 9e 43 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200ba7824 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 51 73 2c fe 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 0c d7 5f ee | b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f 63 38 a9 a3 | f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f 05 00 01 04 | 73 06 aa ef c9 ff ce 41 ae 50 cd 18 0d 04 f1 fa | 91 ea 7d ba b2 8d fc 7b 6e 72 69 05 12 96 cc 2b | a2 42 e8 af 9d 58 5d 92 f5 45 04 ed fb 9b 48 3f | f4 1d 32 ab e1 49 9e a9 a9 b4 59 8c 03 1a bd 7a | 97 74 d0 ff 89 d4 85 dc d0 d5 14 d5 24 9e 23 f0 | 4c ab 74 a3 32 a1 37 96 03 90 d1 78 5f d4 cf 65 | 62 89 07 b7 8f 8a 70 10 74 29 3a 33 c1 e4 8f ac | d5 32 38 3f 58 e8 5c 49 3b ad 56 34 dc 4e 67 7e | 53 56 28 f7 5b bc 60 4e 23 0d cb f8 68 86 e7 62 | c1 76 e5 8f 72 24 b3 a0 23 f0 c4 32 be 48 ba 1f | 26 73 64 b2 da 03 69 dc ed d2 5c 7e 60 09 a5 85 | ae 34 ef 12 1d 32 0a 21 f4 a3 9c ec 8d 80 5a bb | 13 68 44 06 cf 7c b2 78 a4 7b b4 a8 73 1c f1 ca | 8a 93 91 8c 9c 7e 97 c7 dc 3b 30 c4 3c 80 4d 75 | e5 86 ff 3d 4c 3d 07 b0 f6 a0 5c af c5 8d 52 56 | e0 fc 9a 10 c5 64 62 d6 16 4c 2b 53 3b 8e 89 f8 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 03 8a 35 77 bc 51 c1 be ce 18 c7 df eb 50 14 ba | cf fb eb d7 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 03 8a 35 77 bc 51 c1 be ce 18 c7 df eb 50 14 ba | cf fb eb d7 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #15: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #16 at 0x55e200ba67e0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #16 in UNDEFINED | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #15 "east" as #16 for IPSEC SA | #16 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #15.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #16: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 51 73 2c fe | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 73 06 aa ef c9 ff ce 41 ae 50 cd 18 0d 04 f1 fa | 91 ea 7d ba b2 8d fc 7b 6e 72 69 05 12 96 cc 2b | a2 42 e8 af 9d 58 5d 92 f5 45 04 ed fb 9b 48 3f | f4 1d 32 ab e1 49 9e a9 a9 b4 59 8c 03 1a bd 7a | 97 74 d0 ff 89 d4 85 dc d0 d5 14 d5 24 9e 23 f0 | 4c ab 74 a3 32 a1 37 96 03 90 d1 78 5f d4 cf 65 | 62 89 07 b7 8f 8a 70 10 74 29 3a 33 c1 e4 8f ac | d5 32 38 3f 58 e8 5c 49 3b ad 56 34 dc 4e 67 7e | 53 56 28 f7 5b bc 60 4e 23 0d cb f8 68 86 e7 62 | c1 76 e5 8f 72 24 b3 a0 23 f0 c4 32 be 48 ba 1f | 26 73 64 b2 da 03 69 dc ed d2 5c 7e 60 09 a5 85 | ae 34 ef 12 1d 32 0a 21 f4 a3 9c ec 8d 80 5a bb | 13 68 44 06 cf 7c b2 78 a4 7b b4 a8 73 1c f1 ca | 8a 93 91 8c 9c 7e 97 c7 dc 3b 30 c4 3c 80 4d 75 | e5 86 ff 3d 4c 3d 07 b0 f6 a0 5c af c5 8d 52 56 | e0 fc 9a 10 c5 64 62 d6 16 4c 2b 53 3b 8e 89 f8 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 17 for state #16 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | crypto helper 2 resuming | suspending state #16 and saving MD | #16 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 17 for state #16 | #15 spent 0.234 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 17 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | spent 0.572 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0004120: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2e0004120 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | a7 55 58 27 ee c9 ae b4 6e bd 81 3a 23 43 25 e4 | 82 03 eb ce dd 1b 42 9b 0e 84 2d 4e 00 4c f2 57 | 9d 2a ac 7f 2e 28 6a f7 c7 81 f2 51 68 a3 d5 8d | 45 70 a3 09 8d 02 a9 96 c7 ff 62 e6 68 84 2b 54 | cb fd 8b 08 f6 a3 ba 53 2f 92 2d 07 74 f4 c7 aa | 47 38 13 6d d7 fb b0 ec f8 30 83 09 8c 99 0b 31 | 2f 72 45 6f ae 3d 20 98 82 59 1f 71 7c 74 63 12 | f2 4f 56 f1 63 8e 59 02 0e ea 67 18 ad c5 d0 16 | ef 58 c2 39 41 53 ac d5 e0 9e c0 14 ce 1b c8 dc | 14 28 22 64 8b 1d bf 8d 22 58 2f 36 40 2d 7b 37 | ad 09 bc e6 fd f0 a0 20 2a 62 86 f0 52 07 b0 17 | 30 44 57 c4 c3 68 20 a0 67 71 dc 2f bb fe fd f0 | ed b8 fb 01 5d 8d e9 f3 06 b2 2b 33 6e b3 99 68 | 54 b8 d6 96 02 cf e7 b8 4d 56 d9 87 3f a9 f8 d3 | 18 dd 15 ae d7 8e 58 23 30 22 5d e9 5b 4c 4d 91 | c4 28 8c c6 09 d2 4e 2e 4d eb ae 1d 95 84 1a e8 | Generated nonce: d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | Generated nonce: c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 17 time elapsed 0.000775 seconds | (#16) spent 0.769 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 17: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 17 for state #16 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #16 | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 17 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #16: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0004120: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #16 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0004120: transferring ownership from state #16 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 18 for state #16 | state #16 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | suspending state #16 and saving MD | crypto helper 6 resuming | #16 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 18 for state #16 | resume sending helper answer for #16 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | crypto helper 6 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 18 | peer's g: 73 06 aa ef c9 ff ce 41 ae 50 cd 18 0d 04 f1 fa | peer's g: 91 ea 7d ba b2 8d fc 7b 6e 72 69 05 12 96 cc 2b | peer's g: a2 42 e8 af 9d 58 5d 92 f5 45 04 ed fb 9b 48 3f | #16 spent 0.0782 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | peer's g: f4 1d 32 ab e1 49 9e a9 a9 b4 59 8c 03 1a bd 7a | peer's g: 97 74 d0 ff 89 d4 85 dc d0 d5 14 d5 24 9e 23 f0 | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | peer's g: 4c ab 74 a3 32 a1 37 96 03 90 d1 78 5f d4 cf 65 | peer's g: 62 89 07 b7 8f 8a 70 10 74 29 3a 33 c1 e4 8f ac | peer's g: d5 32 38 3f 58 e8 5c 49 3b ad 56 34 dc 4e 67 7e | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | peer's g: 53 56 28 f7 5b bc 60 4e 23 0d cb f8 68 86 e7 62 | peer's g: c1 76 e5 8f 72 24 b3 a0 23 f0 c4 32 be 48 ba 1f | peer's g: 26 73 64 b2 da 03 69 dc ed d2 5c 7e 60 09 a5 85 | peer's g: ae 34 ef 12 1d 32 0a 21 f4 a3 9c ec 8d 80 5a bb | peer's g: 13 68 44 06 cf 7c b2 78 a4 7b b4 a8 73 1c f1 ca | peer's g: 8a 93 91 8c 9c 7e 97 c7 dc 3b 30 c4 3c 80 4d 75 | peer's g: e5 86 ff 3d 4c 3d 07 b0 f6 a0 5c af c5 8d 52 56 | peer's g: e0 fc 9a 10 c5 64 62 d6 16 4c 2b 53 3b 8e 89 f8 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0004120: computed shared DH secret key@0x7fb2e4006900 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 6 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 18 time elapsed 0.000638 seconds | (#16) spent 0.615 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 18: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 18 for state #16 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4002620 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #16 | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 18 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #16: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 222928451 (0xd499e43) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 51 73 2c fe | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xd8284ca4 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI d8 28 4c a4 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #16: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:0d499e43} "east" #16: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #16: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | Nr c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value a7 55 58 27 ee c9 ae b4 6e bd 81 3a 23 43 25 e4 | keyex value 82 03 eb ce dd 1b 42 9b 0e 84 2d 4e 00 4c f2 57 | keyex value 9d 2a ac 7f 2e 28 6a f7 c7 81 f2 51 68 a3 d5 8d | keyex value 45 70 a3 09 8d 02 a9 96 c7 ff 62 e6 68 84 2b 54 | keyex value cb fd 8b 08 f6 a3 ba 53 2f 92 2d 07 74 f4 c7 aa | keyex value 47 38 13 6d d7 fb b0 ec f8 30 83 09 8c 99 0b 31 | keyex value 2f 72 45 6f ae 3d 20 98 82 59 1f 71 7c 74 63 12 | keyex value f2 4f 56 f1 63 8e 59 02 0e ea 67 18 ad c5 d0 16 | keyex value ef 58 c2 39 41 53 ac d5 e0 9e c0 14 ce 1b c8 dc | keyex value 14 28 22 64 8b 1d bf 8d 22 58 2f 36 40 2d 7b 37 | keyex value ad 09 bc e6 fd f0 a0 20 2a 62 86 f0 52 07 b0 17 | keyex value 30 44 57 c4 c3 68 20 a0 67 71 dc 2f bb fe fd f0 | keyex value ed b8 fb 01 5d 8d e9 f3 06 b2 2b 33 6e b3 99 68 | keyex value 54 b8 d6 96 02 cf e7 b8 4d 56 d9 87 3f a9 f8 d3 | keyex value 18 dd 15 ae d7 8e 58 23 30 22 5d e9 5b 4c 4d 91 | keyex value c4 28 8c c6 09 d2 4e 2e 4d eb ae 1d 95 84 1a e8 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0004120: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fe1c (length 4) | 0d 49 9e 43 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2e4002af0 (length 32) | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e1ff723974 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 d8 28 4c a4 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 d7 d8 e6 ab | d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 c9 22 19 ab | 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 05 00 01 04 | a7 55 58 27 ee c9 ae b4 6e bd 81 3a 23 43 25 e4 | 82 03 eb ce dd 1b 42 9b 0e 84 2d 4e 00 4c f2 57 | 9d 2a ac 7f 2e 28 6a f7 c7 81 f2 51 68 a3 d5 8d | 45 70 a3 09 8d 02 a9 96 c7 ff 62 e6 68 84 2b 54 | cb fd 8b 08 f6 a3 ba 53 2f 92 2d 07 74 f4 c7 aa | 47 38 13 6d d7 fb b0 ec f8 30 83 09 8c 99 0b 31 | 2f 72 45 6f ae 3d 20 98 82 59 1f 71 7c 74 63 12 | f2 4f 56 f1 63 8e 59 02 0e ea 67 18 ad c5 d0 16 | ef 58 c2 39 41 53 ac d5 e0 9e c0 14 ce 1b c8 dc | 14 28 22 64 8b 1d bf 8d 22 58 2f 36 40 2d 7b 37 | ad 09 bc e6 fd f0 a0 20 2a 62 86 f0 52 07 b0 17 | 30 44 57 c4 c3 68 20 a0 67 71 dc 2f bb fe fd f0 | ed b8 fb 01 5d 8d e9 f3 06 b2 2b 33 6e b3 99 68 | 54 b8 d6 96 02 cf e7 b8 4d 56 d9 87 3f a9 f8 d3 | 18 dd 15 ae d7 8e 58 23 30 22 5d e9 5b 4c 4d 91 | c4 28 8c c6 09 d2 4e 2e 4d eb ae 1d 95 84 1a e8 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 20) | ee 71 24 49 35 e7 a9 46 be 38 5d 26 48 e1 da 9c | c2 e6 1d 09 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | ee 71 24 49 35 e7 a9 46 be 38 5d 26 48 e1 da 9c | c2 e6 1d 09 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba8d90 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 24 6f ffffff8a 55 65 fffffffa ffffff94 7f ffffffca 5f 1b 4f 07 19 55 ffffff98 ffffffeb 47 ffffff92 11 25 01 fffffff0 34 ffffffef ffffffe2 6c 57 ffffffb1 fffffffb 67 ffffffee ffffffdc ffffffcb 61 ffffffdd 14 ffffff89 ffffff94 ffffffa6 2c 4d 2a fffffffe ffffffa1 ffffffbe ffffff83 33 1b ffffffa2 4a ffffff9d 0c 24 ffffffe8 60 4c ffffffab 68 53 ffffffa0 72 ffffffe4 3c 57 ffffff89 ffffff8b 77 fffffff3 ffffffb2 1d ffffffeb 4b ffffff90 fffffff4 0a ffffffae ffffffc5 4c ffffffa4 ffffff9c ffffffce ffffff93 63 ffffff89 36 3c ffffff8c ffffffc8 ffffffe9 18 41 ffffffef 28 ffffffc4 ffffffbc ffffffb5 2e 34 0a 48 2a 7c ffffffed ffffffc6 ffffffd7 ffffff94 05 ffffffe5 ffffffa4 ffffffc8 6f 29 2b ffffffd5 ffffff9c 51 ffffffae ffffff96 ffffffa3 fffffff1 ffffff93 1e ffffffb5 56 2b 7f 65 ffffffe4 4c ffffff81 68 05 01 ffffffe9 0b ffffffff 1c ffffffb5 ffffffb5 57 ffffffba fffffff5 fffffff4 41 25 ffffffed 28 4c ffffffa0 ffffffb0 2f ffffffab ffffffb2 24 73 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bb02f0 | unwrapped: 35 b6 d8 bf 79 0f 1f 42 18 8c c9 a3 21 6e da 40 | unwrapped: ef 77 c4 f1 f6 a7 cb e6 a2 18 a9 74 24 c3 ea 2c | unwrapped: a7 36 f1 b5 f3 26 63 8a 5a 50 4a 0b a9 9a 2d c9 | unwrapped: 11 78 fd 7d dc ce f8 41 f0 62 55 a1 d4 18 b0 6c | unwrapped: 4d 82 1e 4f 0e b3 12 0a fc 18 f3 c1 a6 56 a0 03 | unwrapped: 5d 41 ac 08 cb 6c d2 30 5e 69 b3 3d cc ec bc 97 | unwrapped: b7 54 30 74 ff c8 92 8e 1c ed 62 26 91 23 a1 33 | unwrapped: 80 12 6f d4 46 7e 23 77 57 48 33 4d 86 75 24 38 | unwrapped: 8a 85 86 d4 a6 ea f6 07 41 0b 54 bc 4d 9f 0f e7 | unwrapped: 92 54 9a 8b d9 61 d9 38 b8 14 2f 32 f4 a7 3b de | unwrapped: d2 c1 2e c3 a7 8f f9 ab 06 6a 41 9b 08 e6 52 4a | unwrapped: 80 8e 8c af 14 46 33 94 36 9f e2 b6 70 99 f5 97 | unwrapped: 51 23 ae f6 fb ed 1a b8 74 ec 1c d0 01 b7 af 9d | unwrapped: c3 55 4b a3 a0 dd 80 03 7c 1c c8 bb 4a 68 58 70 | unwrapped: 7d 02 c8 10 2d da 8d 52 85 53 d4 53 15 2d a8 dd | unwrapped: 99 37 c6 1d fd 21 1f f0 3b e3 9a da 42 47 f7 9a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 24 6f ffffff8a 55 65 fffffffa ffffff94 7f ffffffca 5f 1b 4f 07 19 55 ffffff98 ffffffeb 47 ffffff92 11 25 01 fffffff0 34 ffffffef ffffffe2 6c 57 ffffffb1 fffffffb 67 ffffffee ffffffdc ffffffcb 61 ffffffdd 14 ffffff89 ffffff94 ffffffa6 2c 4d 2a fffffffe ffffffa1 ffffffbe ffffff83 33 1b ffffffa2 4a ffffff9d 0c 24 ffffffe8 60 4c ffffffab 68 53 ffffffa0 72 ffffffe4 3c 57 ffffff89 ffffff8b 77 fffffff3 ffffffb2 1d ffffffeb 4b ffffff90 fffffff4 0a ffffffae ffffffc5 4c ffffffa4 ffffff9c ffffffce ffffff93 63 ffffff89 36 3c ffffff8c ffffffc8 ffffffe9 18 41 ffffffef 28 ffffffc4 ffffffbc ffffffb5 2e 34 0a 48 2a 7c ffffffed ffffffc6 ffffffd7 ffffff94 05 ffffffe5 ffffffa4 ffffffc8 6f 29 2b ffffffd5 ffffff9c 51 ffffffae ffffff96 ffffffa3 fffffff1 ffffff93 1e ffffffb5 56 2b 7f 65 ffffffe4 4c ffffff81 68 05 01 ffffffe9 0b ffffffff 1c ffffffb5 ffffffb5 57 ffffffba fffffff5 fffffff4 41 25 ffffffed 28 4c ffffffa0 ffffffb0 2f ffffffab ffffffb2 24 73 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200baffc0 | unwrapped: 35 b6 d8 bf 79 0f 1f 42 18 8c c9 a3 21 6e da 40 | unwrapped: ef 77 c4 f1 f6 a7 cb e6 a2 18 a9 74 24 c3 ea 2c | unwrapped: a7 36 f1 b5 f3 26 63 8a 5a 50 4a 0b a9 9a 2d c9 | unwrapped: 11 78 fd 7d dc ce f8 41 f0 62 55 a1 d4 18 b0 6c | unwrapped: 4d 82 1e 4f 0e b3 12 0a fc 18 f3 c1 a6 56 a0 03 | unwrapped: 5d 41 ac 08 cb 6c d2 30 5e 69 b3 3d cc ec bc 97 | unwrapped: b7 54 30 74 ff c8 92 8e 1c ed 62 26 91 23 a1 33 | unwrapped: 80 12 6f d4 46 7e 23 77 57 48 33 4d 86 75 24 38 | unwrapped: 8a 85 86 d4 a6 ea f6 07 41 0b 54 bc 4d 9f 0f e7 | unwrapped: 92 54 9a 8b d9 61 d9 38 b8 14 2f 32 f4 a7 3b de | unwrapped: d2 c1 2e c3 a7 8f f9 ab 06 6a 41 9b 08 e6 52 4a | unwrapped: 80 8e 8c af 14 46 33 94 36 9f e2 b6 70 99 f5 97 | unwrapped: 51 23 ae f6 fb ed 1a b8 74 ec 1c d0 01 b7 af 9d | unwrapped: c3 55 4b a3 a0 dd 80 03 7c 1c c8 bb 4a 68 58 70 | unwrapped: 7d 02 c8 10 2d da 8d 52 85 53 d4 53 15 2d a8 dd | unwrapped: 99 37 c6 1d fd 21 1f f0 3b e3 9a da 42 47 f7 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba69e8 (length 4) | d8 28 4c a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba69c8 (length 4) | 51 73 2c fe | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4002af0 (length 32) | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4002af0 (length 32) | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0007020 (length 32) | d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0007020 (length 32) | d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0004e90 (length 20) | 56 7d 82 1a 2f 66 65 6c 2c 6d 53 03 bf b6 1d ed | 40 df 76 05 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2cc000c30 (length 20) | 98 0c fb 82 a2 22 46 a7 09 8b a3 be 25 dd dd 02 | 7a da d5 1f | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf30 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba67c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004e90 (length 20) | 56 7d 82 1a 2f 66 65 6c 2c 6d 53 03 bf b6 1d ed | 40 df 76 05 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc000c30 (length 20) | 98 0c fb 82 a2 22 46 a7 09 8b a3 be 25 dd dd 02 | 7a da d5 1f | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 24 6f ffffff8a 55 65 fffffffa ffffff94 7f ffffffca 5f 1b 4f 07 19 55 ffffff98 ffffffeb 47 ffffff92 11 25 01 fffffff0 34 ffffffef ffffffe2 6c 57 ffffffb1 fffffffb 67 ffffffee ffffffdc ffffffcb 61 ffffffdd 14 ffffff89 ffffff94 ffffffa6 2c 4d 2a fffffffe ffffffa1 ffffffbe ffffff83 33 1b ffffffa2 4a ffffff9d 0c 24 ffffffe8 60 4c ffffffab 68 53 ffffffa0 72 ffffffe4 3c 57 ffffff89 ffffff8b 77 fffffff3 ffffffb2 1d ffffffeb 4b ffffff90 fffffff4 0a ffffffae ffffffc5 4c ffffffa4 ffffff9c ffffffce ffffff93 63 ffffff89 36 3c ffffff8c ffffffc8 ffffffe9 18 41 ffffffef 28 ffffffc4 ffffffbc ffffffb5 2e 34 0a 48 2a 7c ffffffed ffffffc6 ffffffd7 ffffff94 05 ffffffe5 ffffffa4 ffffffc8 6f 29 2b ffffffd5 ffffff9c 51 ffffffae ffffff96 ffffffa3 fffffff1 ffffff93 1e ffffffb5 56 2b 7f 65 ffffffe4 4c ffffff81 68 05 01 ffffffe9 0b ffffffff 1c ffffffb5 ffffffb5 57 ffffffba fffffff5 fffffff4 41 25 ffffffed 28 4c ffffffa0 ffffffb0 2f ffffffab ffffffb2 24 73 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bafeb0 | unwrapped: 35 b6 d8 bf 79 0f 1f 42 18 8c c9 a3 21 6e da 40 | unwrapped: ef 77 c4 f1 f6 a7 cb e6 a2 18 a9 74 24 c3 ea 2c | unwrapped: a7 36 f1 b5 f3 26 63 8a 5a 50 4a 0b a9 9a 2d c9 | unwrapped: 11 78 fd 7d dc ce f8 41 f0 62 55 a1 d4 18 b0 6c | unwrapped: 4d 82 1e 4f 0e b3 12 0a fc 18 f3 c1 a6 56 a0 03 | unwrapped: 5d 41 ac 08 cb 6c d2 30 5e 69 b3 3d cc ec bc 97 | unwrapped: b7 54 30 74 ff c8 92 8e 1c ed 62 26 91 23 a1 33 | unwrapped: 80 12 6f d4 46 7e 23 77 57 48 33 4d 86 75 24 38 | unwrapped: 8a 85 86 d4 a6 ea f6 07 41 0b 54 bc 4d 9f 0f e7 | unwrapped: 92 54 9a 8b d9 61 d9 38 b8 14 2f 32 f4 a7 3b de | unwrapped: d2 c1 2e c3 a7 8f f9 ab 06 6a 41 9b 08 e6 52 4a | unwrapped: 80 8e 8c af 14 46 33 94 36 9f e2 b6 70 99 f5 97 | unwrapped: 51 23 ae f6 fb ed 1a b8 74 ec 1c d0 01 b7 af 9d | unwrapped: c3 55 4b a3 a0 dd 80 03 7c 1c c8 bb 4a 68 58 70 | unwrapped: 7d 02 c8 10 2d da 8d 52 85 53 d4 53 15 2d a8 dd | unwrapped: 99 37 c6 1d fd 21 1f f0 3b e3 9a da 42 47 f7 9a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 24 6f ffffff8a 55 65 fffffffa ffffff94 7f ffffffca 5f 1b 4f 07 19 55 ffffff98 ffffffeb 47 ffffff92 11 25 01 fffffff0 34 ffffffef ffffffe2 6c 57 ffffffb1 fffffffb 67 ffffffee ffffffdc ffffffcb 61 ffffffdd 14 ffffff89 ffffff94 ffffffa6 2c 4d 2a fffffffe ffffffa1 ffffffbe ffffff83 33 1b ffffffa2 4a ffffff9d 0c 24 ffffffe8 60 4c ffffffab 68 53 ffffffa0 72 ffffffe4 3c 57 ffffff89 ffffff8b 77 fffffff3 ffffffb2 1d ffffffeb 4b ffffff90 fffffff4 0a ffffffae ffffffc5 4c ffffffa4 ffffff9c ffffffce ffffff93 63 ffffff89 36 3c ffffff8c ffffffc8 ffffffe9 18 41 ffffffef 28 ffffffc4 ffffffbc ffffffb5 2e 34 0a 48 2a 7c ffffffed ffffffc6 ffffffd7 ffffff94 05 ffffffe5 ffffffa4 ffffffc8 6f 29 2b ffffffd5 ffffff9c 51 ffffffae ffffff96 ffffffa3 fffffff1 ffffff93 1e ffffffb5 56 2b 7f 65 ffffffe4 4c ffffff81 68 05 01 ffffffe9 0b ffffffff 1c ffffffb5 ffffffb5 57 ffffffba fffffff5 fffffff4 41 25 ffffffed 28 4c ffffffa0 ffffffb0 2f ffffffab ffffffb2 24 73 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bab080 | unwrapped: 35 b6 d8 bf 79 0f 1f 42 18 8c c9 a3 21 6e da 40 | unwrapped: ef 77 c4 f1 f6 a7 cb e6 a2 18 a9 74 24 c3 ea 2c | unwrapped: a7 36 f1 b5 f3 26 63 8a 5a 50 4a 0b a9 9a 2d c9 | unwrapped: 11 78 fd 7d dc ce f8 41 f0 62 55 a1 d4 18 b0 6c | unwrapped: 4d 82 1e 4f 0e b3 12 0a fc 18 f3 c1 a6 56 a0 03 | unwrapped: 5d 41 ac 08 cb 6c d2 30 5e 69 b3 3d cc ec bc 97 | unwrapped: b7 54 30 74 ff c8 92 8e 1c ed 62 26 91 23 a1 33 | unwrapped: 80 12 6f d4 46 7e 23 77 57 48 33 4d 86 75 24 38 | unwrapped: 8a 85 86 d4 a6 ea f6 07 41 0b 54 bc 4d 9f 0f e7 | unwrapped: 92 54 9a 8b d9 61 d9 38 b8 14 2f 32 f4 a7 3b de | unwrapped: d2 c1 2e c3 a7 8f f9 ab 06 6a 41 9b 08 e6 52 4a | unwrapped: 80 8e 8c af 14 46 33 94 36 9f e2 b6 70 99 f5 97 | unwrapped: 51 23 ae f6 fb ed 1a b8 74 ec 1c d0 01 b7 af 9d | unwrapped: c3 55 4b a3 a0 dd 80 03 7c 1c c8 bb 4a 68 58 70 | unwrapped: 7d 02 c8 10 2d da 8d 52 85 53 d4 53 15 2d a8 dd | unwrapped: 99 37 c6 1d fd 21 1f f0 3b e3 9a da 42 47 f7 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba69e8 (length 4) | d8 28 4c a4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba69c8 (length 4) | 51 73 2c fe | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4002af0 (length 32) | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e4002af0 (length 32) | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0007020 (length 32) | d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0007020 (length 32) | d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0004ea4 (length 20) | 0d 4d 63 8f 44 52 dd 2a 47 1f 3a b6 67 c1 2a 77 | e2 30 35 9a | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2cc000c44 (length 20) | 5a 20 b0 f2 bf bd 49 bc 09 ac 66 fa 8f ae 6e 9c | 36 6b c9 83 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55e200ba67e0 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#16 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.51732cfe@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.d8284ca4@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 ee 71 24 49 35 e7 a9 46 be 38 5d 26 | encrypting: 48 e1 da 9c c2 e6 1d 09 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 d8 28 4c a4 | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a | encrypting: f4 97 77 95 c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d | encrypting: 2b 55 f0 47 05 00 01 04 a7 55 58 27 ee c9 ae b4 | encrypting: 6e bd 81 3a 23 43 25 e4 82 03 eb ce dd 1b 42 9b | encrypting: 0e 84 2d 4e 00 4c f2 57 9d 2a ac 7f 2e 28 6a f7 | encrypting: c7 81 f2 51 68 a3 d5 8d 45 70 a3 09 8d 02 a9 96 | encrypting: c7 ff 62 e6 68 84 2b 54 cb fd 8b 08 f6 a3 ba 53 | encrypting: 2f 92 2d 07 74 f4 c7 aa 47 38 13 6d d7 fb b0 ec | encrypting: f8 30 83 09 8c 99 0b 31 2f 72 45 6f ae 3d 20 98 | encrypting: 82 59 1f 71 7c 74 63 12 f2 4f 56 f1 63 8e 59 02 | encrypting: 0e ea 67 18 ad c5 d0 16 ef 58 c2 39 41 53 ac d5 | encrypting: e0 9e c0 14 ce 1b c8 dc 14 28 22 64 8b 1d bf 8d | encrypting: 22 58 2f 36 40 2d 7b 37 ad 09 bc e6 fd f0 a0 20 | encrypting: 2a 62 86 f0 52 07 b0 17 30 44 57 c4 c3 68 20 a0 | encrypting: 67 71 dc 2f bb fe fd f0 ed b8 fb 01 5d 8d e9 f3 | encrypting: 06 b2 2b 33 6e b3 99 68 54 b8 d6 96 02 cf e7 b8 | encrypting: 4d 56 d9 87 3f a9 f8 d3 18 dd 15 ae d7 8e 58 23 | encrypting: 30 22 5d e9 5b 4c 4d 91 c4 28 8c c6 09 d2 4e 2e | encrypting: 4d eb ae 1d 95 84 1a e8 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: 1f d6 a9 9d 62 c5 3c 92 25 d2 9f 44 96 bd f1 67 | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: bc 98 cc f0 e5 35 e6 59 c5 5e 45 a0 11 d2 10 25 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #16 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #16: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #16 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #16) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 20 01 0d 49 9e 43 00 00 01 bc 77 da 7a 2c | bf 30 ae f3 37 9f 73 b8 a4 fe ad 9c 29 22 34 ab | d9 ca 4b 2f 0a 40 55 08 c4 69 4b 24 ae b4 c7 5e | 1f 49 8b 72 3f ed 46 29 6f 4c c4 d8 31 f1 6d d3 | 18 57 7d e0 a9 42 02 de 39 c4 f8 66 ad 54 3e 47 | fe 4e 47 72 85 07 0d 50 f4 03 dc 1a d6 31 51 b2 | 7a a9 3c ea bb 75 78 2e 32 81 f9 82 2a 47 91 de | 75 3f cb d6 72 8f c1 8d 07 00 9b 94 45 88 87 38 | 1a 28 f4 7c 32 f6 2a b9 6f 03 41 ce 2e 7a 5a ba | 33 3e 36 74 90 a0 5c 18 21 15 74 f0 fc 1b 0e 51 | a0 7d 88 fd 68 1d 08 d8 0a 9f 86 a4 60 19 a0 a6 | ae 41 1d 25 24 2a b3 f2 e6 00 7c 83 28 f8 c4 9e | 92 c6 42 c5 03 5a 76 5d 86 4e bc d9 76 93 21 18 | 22 06 13 29 38 d7 1c 78 5e cb 3e 36 58 3d ab 4d | 43 43 fd 28 11 92 09 30 06 de 91 50 a9 4b 9a 03 | 83 08 57 08 06 7a 8b 60 a1 c3 cb e4 36 44 21 65 | 9c bb cf bc 72 58 d0 fe a0 a4 62 3f 34 e8 c5 fc | 87 f4 ac 48 d8 7b 24 21 dd e6 0d 42 4d 89 d6 3b | 5c 01 0c b9 91 0f 21 d0 3d 80 f4 92 36 c3 bb 38 | 74 fb 17 4d 93 92 7e 21 af 98 5c 1f df c6 b6 5e | 63 fd 39 f1 d5 53 ad 05 49 ed 79 fb 4e 7b 94 cf | b9 b1 c0 52 7f f0 e5 82 48 62 35 cb b3 2c 86 52 | 40 b2 de 44 71 0c 38 0f f3 c0 e0 6b ef b0 f2 43 | 58 75 e0 95 95 97 db 25 65 10 4a fc 2d 9a 89 ca | 62 77 6a 0f da 8f 7d 5f 4a 3e 86 ce 59 80 d0 dc | 81 c5 c0 69 21 81 e1 9a c3 17 30 45 bc 98 cc f0 | e5 35 e6 59 c5 5e 45 a0 11 d2 10 25 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | #16 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48958.285905 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #16: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x51732cfe <0xd8284ca4 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #16 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #16 spent 1.34 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4002620 | spent 0.00336 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 20 01 0d 49 9e 43 00 00 00 3c 0d 7b 4c db | 52 bd e2 31 7e 89 2c 2b 38 96 6b 25 7f ce e9 a1 | 7d db af 1d 49 30 f8 a5 de db ff 81 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 222928451 (0xd499e43) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #16 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #16 is idle | #16 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: bc 98 cc f0 e5 35 e6 59 c5 5e 45 a0 11 d2 10 25 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 7f ce e9 a1 7d db af 1d 49 30 f8 a5 de db ff 81 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 20 01 0d 49 9e 43 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | ec 5f 48 b0 05 9d 36 1b 8a 34 d2 2d 06 1d 2d 74 | b1 32 f7 ac 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 0d 49 9e 43 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2e4002af0 (length 32) | 0c d7 5f ee b7 78 32 94 31 37 45 ea 55 bc 37 3f | 63 38 a9 a3 f3 e6 ee 33 79 e6 6c 80 4e cb 09 8f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fb2e0007020 (length 32) | d7 d8 e6 ab d3 62 9b 36 83 b6 22 2a f4 97 77 95 | c9 22 19 ab 5e 96 28 c2 db 4e d5 3d 2b 55 f0 47 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | ec 5f 48 b0 05 9d 36 1b 8a 34 d2 2d 06 1d 2d 74 | b1 32 f7 ac | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | ec 5f 48 b0 05 9d 36 1b 8a 34 d2 2d 06 1d 2d 74 | b1 32 f7 ac | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #16: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #16: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #16 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x51732cfe SPI_OUT=0xd82 | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x51732cfe SPI_OUT=0xd8284ca4 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55e200ba49a0,sr=0x55e200ba49a0} to #16 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #15 spent 0.259 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #16 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#16) cloned from #15 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #16 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #16: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #16 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #16 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #16: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x51732cfe <0xd8284ca4 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #16 spent 0.342 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.587 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00466 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00304 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 05 01 6e dc 17 f2 00 00 00 4c 5a 03 8e 5b | 02 76 04 4b 92 be 1e 92 00 34 dd 05 a5 3e 5f 8d | 7b 37 81 95 e1 8c 36 b3 0b 09 b5 f4 28 ae 65 da | a5 8e 4c 79 2e 0c 88 42 49 a8 b8 d6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1859917810 (0x6edc17f2) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #16; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=0d499e43 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #15; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #15 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | current Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 6e dc 17 f2 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 89 be b4 f2 5d 0f 24 19 e7 20 d5 b1 6a 87 7c 97 | 21 89 17 3f | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 89 be b4 f2 5d 0f 24 19 e7 20 d5 b1 6a 87 7c 97 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 28 ae 65 da a5 8e 4c 79 2e 0c 88 42 49 a8 b8 d6 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 05 01 6e dc 17 f2 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | 3a 7e 17 ca 14 3d e0 c5 1d 85 06 44 5d 50 12 ec | 6d cb 62 07 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 51 73 2c fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 6e dc 17 f2 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7fb2dc003a84 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 51 73 2c fe | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 3a 7e 17 ca 14 3d e0 c5 1d 85 06 44 5d 50 12 ec | 6d cb 62 07 | informational HASH(1): | 3a 7e 17 ca 14 3d e0 c5 1d 85 06 44 5d 50 12 ec | 6d cb 62 07 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 51 73 2c fe | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #15: received Delete SA(0x51732cfe) payload: deleting IPsec State #16 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #16: deleting other state #16 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.104s and sending notification | child state #16: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.51732cfe@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.d8284ca4@192.1.2.23 "east" #16: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #16 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3512138536 (0xd156fb28) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload d8 28 4c a4 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dbe8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e0002d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dccc (length 4) | d1 56 fb 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e074 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 d8 28 4c a4 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e060 (length 20) | 2a 77 1c 43 81 16 b1 65 97 53 bf b6 1f 5b bb 65 | 41 33 e7 4f | send delete HASH(1): | 2a 77 1c 43 81 16 b1 65 97 53 bf b6 1f 5b bb 65 | 41 33 e7 4f | last Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | current Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dcdc (length 4) | d1 56 fb 28 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 93 60 54 f3 c3 5a b2 99 44 96 c8 61 91 53 47 d8 | b1 07 8b 6f | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 2a 77 1c 43 81 16 b1 65 97 53 bf b6 | encrypting: 1f 5b bb 65 41 33 e7 4f 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 d8 28 4c a4 | IV: 93 60 54 f3 c3 5a b2 99 44 96 c8 61 91 53 47 d8 | IV: b1 07 8b 6f | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 6a 97 73 fb 49 92 dc ba 83 a6 17 e6 68 6c 09 1f | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 05 01 d1 56 fb 28 00 00 00 4c 4a f2 ca 3b | 08 58 df f4 37 85 c5 3c 89 f3 9e 40 78 b8 e1 c6 | 74 5c 24 ef d7 f0 e7 7b a4 64 fc 95 6a 97 73 fb | 49 92 dc ba 83 a6 17 e6 68 6c 09 1f | state #16 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d0002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050311' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x51732cfe | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050311' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x51732cfe SPI_OUT=0xd8284ca4 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.51732cfe@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.51732cfe@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.d8284ca4@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.d8284ca4@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #16 in QUICK_R2 | child state #16: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e0004120: destroyed | stop processing: state #16 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #15 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #15 | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #15: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.134s and sending notification | parent state #15: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #15 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1641448933 (0x61d685e5) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3db88 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc6c (length 4) | 61 d6 85 e5 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e014 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 92 55 ad 91 | 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e000 (length 20) | e7 1f 7e 21 7e c9 71 cb 61 cf 52 4f 24 f7 03 06 | 46 ab a5 6f | send delete HASH(1): | e7 1f 7e 21 7e c9 71 cb 61 cf 52 4f 24 f7 03 06 | 46 ab a5 6f | last Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | current Phase 1 IV: d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | d7 45 18 16 9f b1 35 a5 99 1f b8 52 fc 1f 2c 23 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc7c (length 4) | 61 d6 85 e5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | cf 33 b6 73 74 31 0c 3a f6 af cf d2 47 f4 fc 65 | a6 93 b0 0c | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 e7 1f 7e 21 7e c9 71 cb 61 cf 52 4f | encrypting: 24 f7 03 06 46 ab a5 6f 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 | encrypting: 3b 31 36 02 | IV: cf 33 b6 73 74 31 0c 3a f6 af cf d2 47 f4 fc 65 | IV: a6 93 b0 0c | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 6c 57 fa 75 f6 eb 60 dd fc 25 10 f6 bf 31 f8 8e | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 05 01 61 d6 85 e5 00 00 00 5c 8e 39 e7 ae | a9 ee 8d 16 82 bf 12 a8 0a 25 ce 78 6f a8 31 28 | 79 f2 5c 92 ab 17 31 5d 86 a5 f4 b5 76 35 5a 6e | a7 b8 2d 3e e1 e4 42 25 75 94 c8 f2 6c 57 fa 75 | f6 eb 60 dd fc 25 10 f6 bf 31 f8 8e | state #15 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40081c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #15: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2e4002a80: destroyed | stop processing: state #15 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.42 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00175 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | 08 10 05 01 7c 12 ef 12 00 00 00 5c 4b 35 4b b2 | b0 8c 51 5b a2 f6 28 e6 f9 27 ce f9 69 9b 17 a1 | 66 f6 be 2a 01 b8 79 57 61 2b b9 c3 59 95 c6 f0 | 4f 6e 71 ed d3 95 b0 bd ce ad 75 26 52 bc fd b9 | eb 74 c6 7a 58 86 56 85 63 ea f4 9e | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | responder cookie: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2081615634 (0x7c12ef12) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x7c12ef12 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 92 55 ad 91 85 d3 19 b4 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | ee 2d 95 51 3b 31 36 02 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0703 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00513 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00284 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 0b 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 ff 35 7d b3 48 94 ca f9 | 45 54 17 3c 25 74 fd bb 99 48 d1 74 07 9e c4 9a | creating state object #17 at 0x55e200ba82d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #17 in UNDEFINED | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp started | #17 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #17: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe "east" #17: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #17 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #17: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.565 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00221 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | 14 00 00 24 39 8b cf d6 ba 73 a3 9d 49 c5 97 36 | a3 8a 11 8c 93 9a 9a e2 96 2d 1d 97 3a bc 51 5b | de a9 5d ad 14 00 00 18 d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 | 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d 37 90 c9 f8 00 00 00 18 | 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | e4 40 09 73 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #17 is idle | #17 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | 37 90 c9 f8 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | natd_hash: hash= 37 90 c9 f8 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | e4 40 09 73 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | natd_hash: hash= e4 40 09 73 | expected NAT-D(me): d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | expected NAT-D(me): 37 90 c9 f8 | expected NAT-D(him): | 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | e4 40 09 73 | received NAT-D: d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | received NAT-D: 37 90 c9 f8 | received NAT-D: 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | received NAT-D: e4 40 09 73 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 19 for state #17 | state #17 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #17 and saving MD | #17 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 19 for state #17 | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 19 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d80010c0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2d80010c0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | Generated nonce: b5 8e bb 4a c9 e6 7b 51 fd b5 4f 6a 9b fc 07 8f | Generated nonce: ac 1c 32 53 e6 88 45 44 0c 3c 1a 5d b6 b5 85 1a | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 19 time elapsed 0.001053 seconds | (#17) spent 1.05 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 19: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 19 for state #17 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d80048e0 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | #17 spent 0.192 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.341 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #17 | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 19 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #17: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d80010c0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #17 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | keyex value 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | keyex value 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | keyex value 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | keyex value 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | keyex value 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | keyex value 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | keyex value 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | keyex value cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | keyex value bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | keyex value c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | keyex value 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | keyex value c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | keyex value 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | keyex value ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | keyex value b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr b5 8e bb 4a c9 e6 7b 51 fd b5 4f 6a 9b fc 07 8f | Nr ac 1c 32 53 e6 88 45 44 0c 3c 1a 5d b6 b5 85 1a | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | e4 40 09 73 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | natd_hash: hash= e4 40 09 73 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c | NAT-D e4 40 09 73 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | 37 90 c9 f8 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | natd_hash: hash= 37 90 c9 f8 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | NAT-D 37 90 c9 f8 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d80010c0: transferring ownership from state #17 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 20 for state #17 | state #17 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | #17 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 0 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #17 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 20 for state #17 | parent state #17: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 20 | event_already_set, deleting event | state #17 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | peer's g: 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | peer's g: 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | peer's g: 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | 14 00 00 24 b5 8e bb 4a c9 e6 7b 51 fd b5 4f 6a | 9b fc 07 8f ac 1c 32 53 e6 88 45 44 0c 3c 1a 5d | b6 b5 85 1a 14 00 00 18 31 5b 62 05 6b d7 22 13 | 06 db 02 f7 0b 20 1d 0c e4 40 09 73 00 00 00 18 | d5 08 11 58 2a ef f9 29 28 d0 62 51 2e fb aa 3d | 37 90 c9 f8 | peer's g: f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | peer's g: e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | peer's g: 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | peer's g: 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | peer's g: c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | peer's g: 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | peer's g: 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | peer's g: e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | peer's g: f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | peer's g: ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | peer's g: ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | !event_already_set at reschedule | peer's g: 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | peer's g: 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 size 128 | #17 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48958.957862 "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #17 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #17 spent 0.473 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d80048e0 | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d80010c0: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b95040 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb0640 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001250 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb0664 (length 32) | 39 8b cf d6 ba 73 a3 9d 49 c5 97 36 a3 8a 11 8c | 93 9a 9a e2 96 2d 1d 97 3a bc 51 5b de a9 5d ad | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb0684 (length 32) | b5 8e bb 4a c9 e6 7b 51 fd b5 4f 6a 9b fc 07 8f | ac 1c 32 53 e6 88 45 44 0c 3c 1a 5d b6 b5 85 1a | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001270 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338048: ffffffe6 43 15 62 5d ffffffa4 ffffff9e fffffff3 ffffffc1 ffffffea ffffff95 ffffffea 21 ffffffcd fffffffa 4c fffffff6 ffffffd6 4b ffffffec ffffff9d ffffff96 4e 0d 10 ffffff8f ffffffc7 ffffffaa 67 32 07 ffffff8a 5a ffffffcc 7a ffffffe6 41 6b 21 ffffffaa 1d ffffffe4 ffffffc9 5a 37 49 ffffffed ffffff93 ffffffe2 ffffffa0 5a ffffffa3 ffffffba 31 04 ffffffd5 55 4f 10 02 00 5e ffffffd6 ffffffd9 68 24 ffffffe2 33 ffffffe6 26 ffffffd3 ffffffdc 2a ffffffb6 ffffffba 3b 61 14 fffffffe ffffffc1 ffffff81 55 7e ffffff83 ffffffd5 ffffff8b 34 ffffffd1 ffffffcf ffffff80 ffffffcd 15 ffffffcc ffffffd5 7b ffffffb3 ffffff98 03 2f 31 ffffff85 ffffffc9 ffffffaf ffffffb6 ffffffb3 78 ffffffd5 5c 24 ffffffd5 ffffff8f ffffffa1 ffffff82 ffffff89 19 15 ffffffbe 38 09 ffffffdd fffffffe ffffffa6 ffffff95 2b fffffff8 51 ffffffd8 13 23 11 ffffffc8 4e 1f ffffffb7 7b 01 ffffffd6 ffffffe1 ffffffa1 ffffffaf ffffff9a 2f 7b ffffffdb 36 78 60 ffffffe8 ffffff90 fffffff8 36 2 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2cc005f60 | unwrapped: b2 da dc 03 04 32 a2 61 5c 02 ea 1e 7e e8 c1 07 | unwrapped: 0e 21 46 7f 9a c5 76 eb c1 43 67 67 81 39 a3 17 | unwrapped: 48 6a ac 34 7e 75 7d 3a 1b 41 d8 19 8e fb 71 85 | unwrapped: 86 83 f9 17 e1 ac 47 ea 0f 89 b7 b6 36 34 f9 b6 | unwrapped: d1 fe f4 fd f9 2b e5 cb 06 4b 42 ec 1c 89 3d 37 | unwrapped: 4b 63 52 68 5f c8 51 be 04 f7 0d ca 52 47 67 d2 | unwrapped: c1 67 35 77 57 b7 b3 6e 3b cb 6f 59 ce a7 aa 61 | unwrapped: 12 48 a0 a0 e2 52 f6 4b ac 26 90 46 43 d1 1f 41 | unwrapped: 96 7c ad e8 f0 32 26 50 5a 8e fd 28 90 22 4c 39 | unwrapped: 13 97 10 a0 a1 83 18 75 0b 3d c5 62 21 32 5c 18 | unwrapped: 3b d9 66 6b 7a 64 e8 f7 8f c1 42 e9 ff 9e 12 33 | unwrapped: 30 f4 58 81 49 d9 bf aa 66 60 6b 2a ac a1 1f 45 | unwrapped: 4b 23 7b ee cb 94 30 a8 b0 8c a1 5f d1 31 6d 74 | unwrapped: 4f 25 d7 4c d4 6d 12 f3 78 1f 4e 94 d6 94 a7 57 | unwrapped: dd 77 32 29 04 01 c7 c3 27 b5 33 f2 e8 84 a0 fd | unwrapped: dd 47 b6 3c 6c 54 6c 36 1d 40 4d 4a b5 50 96 81 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001160 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338080: 10 05 ffffffdd ffffffab 27 ffffffad ffffffb4 ffffffd0 ffffff8b 39 ffffff96 ffffff8f ffffff84 3a 5d 29 1b ffffffdf fffffffc ffffff80 fffffff6 2f 51 ffffffe5 58 06 06 7b ffffffb2 ffffff80 ffffffcd ffffffbb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2cc0030a0 | unwrapped: 1b 03 2d 27 e5 64 c9 ef 74 2e 2a 6f cd 2f fd d9 | unwrapped: 58 79 99 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338080: ffffffe6 43 15 62 5d ffffffa4 ffffff9e fffffff3 ffffffc1 ffffffea ffffff95 ffffffea 21 ffffffcd fffffffa 4c fffffff6 ffffffd6 4b ffffffec ffffff9d ffffff96 4e 0d 10 ffffff8f ffffffc7 ffffffaa 67 32 07 ffffff8a 5a ffffffcc 7a ffffffe6 41 6b 21 ffffffaa 1d ffffffe4 ffffffc9 5a 37 49 ffffffed ffffff93 ffffffe2 ffffffa0 5a ffffffa3 ffffffba 31 04 ffffffd5 55 4f 10 02 00 5e ffffffd6 ffffffd9 68 24 ffffffe2 33 ffffffe6 26 ffffffd3 ffffffdc 2a ffffffb6 ffffffba 3b 61 14 fffffffe ffffffc1 ffffff81 55 7e ffffff83 ffffffd5 ffffff8b 34 ffffffd1 ffffffcf ffffff80 ffffffcd 15 ffffffcc ffffffd5 7b ffffffb3 ffffff98 03 2f 31 ffffff85 ffffffc9 ffffffaf ffffffb6 ffffffb3 78 ffffffd5 5c 24 ffffffd5 ffffff8f ffffffa1 ffffff82 ffffff89 19 15 ffffffbe 38 09 ffffffdd fffffffe ffffffa6 ffffff95 2b fffffff8 51 ffffffd8 13 23 11 ffffffc8 4e 1f ffffffb7 7b 01 ffffffd6 ffffffe1 ffffffa1 ffffffaf ffffff9a 2f 7b ffffffdb 36 78 60 ffffffe8 ffffff90 fffffff8 36 2 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2cc005e50 | unwrapped: b2 da dc 03 04 32 a2 61 5c 02 ea 1e 7e e8 c1 07 | unwrapped: 0e 21 46 7f 9a c5 76 eb c1 43 67 67 81 39 a3 17 | unwrapped: 48 6a ac 34 7e 75 7d 3a 1b 41 d8 19 8e fb 71 85 | unwrapped: 86 83 f9 17 e1 ac 47 ea 0f 89 b7 b6 36 34 f9 b6 | unwrapped: d1 fe f4 fd f9 2b e5 cb 06 4b 42 ec 1c 89 3d 37 | unwrapped: 4b 63 52 68 5f c8 51 be 04 f7 0d ca 52 47 67 d2 | unwrapped: c1 67 35 77 57 b7 b3 6e 3b cb 6f 59 ce a7 aa 61 | unwrapped: 12 48 a0 a0 e2 52 f6 4b ac 26 90 46 43 d1 1f 41 | unwrapped: 96 7c ad e8 f0 32 26 50 5a 8e fd 28 90 22 4c 39 | unwrapped: 13 97 10 a0 a1 83 18 75 0b 3d c5 62 21 32 5c 18 | unwrapped: 3b d9 66 6b 7a 64 e8 f7 8f c1 42 e9 ff 9e 12 33 | unwrapped: 30 f4 58 81 49 d9 bf aa 66 60 6b 2a ac a1 1f 45 | unwrapped: 4b 23 7b ee cb 94 30 a8 b0 8c a1 5f d1 31 6d 74 | unwrapped: 4f 25 d7 4c d4 6d 12 f3 78 1f 4e 94 d6 94 a7 57 | unwrapped: dd 77 32 29 04 01 c7 c3 27 b5 33 f2 e8 84 a0 fd | unwrapped: dd 47 b6 3c 6c 54 6c 36 1d 40 4d 4a b5 50 96 81 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2cc002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc003f20 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338064: ffffffc0 22 3a ffffffc4 3f ffffff80 ffffffc2 1e ffffffee 1c 2c ffffffc9 1a 6f 1b 24 ffffffb0 1c ffffffb5 68 ffffff92 ffffffa7 47 ffffffc5 10 fffffff9 fffffff1 08 ffffffc3 2b ffffff98 3c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2cc0064b0 | unwrapped: ae d1 32 49 91 4a 99 4e e1 a4 0f 08 5c ce ff cc | unwrapped: cb e4 6d 96 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | spent 0.00251 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c fa ef 21 2f | 12 8d 26 bb 93 f4 92 f3 cd fe f0 9e 66 02 db 99 | ce c1 54 a3 85 bf de 8d 97 63 b9 b8 2c 1d 75 4f | 6f 6f 5e bb 5a 29 91 7f 1c 7b bd 00 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #17 is idle; has background offloaded task | #17 idle | wrapper: (SECItemType)-322338064: ffffffe6 43 15 62 5d ffffffa4 ffffff9e fffffff3 ffffffc1 ffffffea ffffff95 ffffffea 21 ffffffcd fffffffa 4c fffffff6 ffffffd6 4b ffffffec ffffff9d ffffff96 4e 0d 10 ffffff8f ffffffc7 ffffffaa 67 32 07 ffffff8a 5a ffffffcc 7a ffffffe6 41 6b 21 ffffffaa 1d ffffffe4 ffffffc9 5a 37 49 ffffffed ffffff93 ffffffe2 ffffffa0 5a ffffffa3 ffffffba 31 04 ffffffd5 55 4f 10 02 00 5e ffffffd6 ffffffd9 68 24 ffffffe2 33 ffffffe6 26 ffffffd3 ffffffdc 2a ffffffb6 ffffffba 3b 61 14 fffffffe ffffffc1 ffffff81 55 7e ffffff83 ffffffd5 ffffff8b 34 ffffffd1 ffffffcf ffffff80 ffffffcd 15 ffffffcc ffffffd5 7b ffffffb3 ffffff98 03 2f 31 ffffff85 ffffffc9 ffffffaf ffffffb6 ffffffb3 78 ffffffd5 5c 24 ffffffd5 ffffff8f ffffffa1 ffffff82 ffffff89 19 15 ffffffbe 38 09 ffffffdd fffffffe ffffffa6 ffffff95 2b fffffff8 51 ffffffd8 13 23 11 ffffffc8 4e 1f ffffffb7 7b 01 ffffffd6 ffffffe1 ffffffa1 ffffffaf ffffff9a 2f 7b ffffffdb 36 78 60 ffffffe8 ffffff90 fffffff8 36 2 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2cc001cd0 | unwrapped: b2 da dc 03 04 32 a2 61 5c 02 ea 1e 7e e8 c1 07 | unwrapped: 0e 21 46 7f 9a c5 76 eb c1 43 67 67 81 39 a3 17 | unwrapped: 48 6a ac 34 7e 75 7d 3a 1b 41 d8 19 8e fb 71 85 | unwrapped: 86 83 f9 17 e1 ac 47 ea 0f 89 b7 b6 36 34 f9 b6 | unwrapped: d1 fe f4 fd f9 2b e5 cb 06 4b 42 ec 1c 89 3d 37 | unwrapped: 4b 63 52 68 5f c8 51 be 04 f7 0d ca 52 47 67 d2 | unwrapped: c1 67 35 77 57 b7 b3 6e 3b cb 6f 59 ce a7 aa 61 | unwrapped: 12 48 a0 a0 e2 52 f6 4b ac 26 90 46 43 d1 1f 41 | unwrapped: 96 7c ad e8 f0 32 26 50 5a 8e fd 28 90 22 4c 39 | unwrapped: 13 97 10 a0 a1 83 18 75 0b 3d c5 62 21 32 5c 18 | unwrapped: 3b d9 66 6b 7a 64 e8 f7 8f c1 42 e9 ff 9e 12 33 | unwrapped: 30 f4 58 81 49 d9 bf aa 66 60 6b 2a ac a1 1f 45 | unwrapped: 4b 23 7b ee cb 94 30 a8 b0 8c a1 5f d1 31 6d 74 | unwrapped: 4f 25 d7 4c d4 6d 12 f3 78 1f 4e 94 d6 94 a7 57 | unwrapped: dd 77 32 29 04 01 c7 c3 27 b5 33 f2 e8 84 a0 fd | unwrapped: dd 47 b6 3c 6c 54 6c 36 1d 40 4d 4a b5 50 96 81 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc98698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ecc986f8 | result: keymat-key@0x55e200b8a680 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_a 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_e 0x55e200b969a0, enc_key 0x55e200b8a680 | DH_i: 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | DH_i: 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | DH_i: 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | DH_i: f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | DH_i: e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | DH_i: 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | DH_i: 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | DH_i: c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | DH_i: 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | DH_i: 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | DH_i: e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | DH_i: f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | DH_i: ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | DH_i: ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | DH_i: 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | DH_i: 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | DH_r: fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | DH_r: 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | DH_r: 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | DH_r: 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | DH_r: 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | DH_r: 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | DH_r: 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | DH_r: 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | DH_r: cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | DH_r: bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | DH_r: c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | DH_r: 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | DH_r: c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | DH_r: 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | DH_r: ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | DH_r: b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb06a4 (length 256) | 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb07a4 (length 256) | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 but exponentiation still in progress | suspending state #17 and saving MD | #17 is busy; has a suspended MD | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0969 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2cc001fc0 (length 20) | 25 d3 af 99 ae 05 6f 45 3e 32 37 94 98 c0 d4 32 | 77 a8 f0 a8 | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 20 time elapsed 0.004858 seconds | (#17) spent 2.34 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 20: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 20 for state #17 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #17 | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 20 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #17: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d80010c0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #17 | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 25 d3 af 99 ae 05 6f 45 3e 32 37 94 98 c0 d4 32 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 2c 1d 75 4f 6f 6f 5e bb 5a 29 91 7f 1c 7b bd 00 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 66 11 9b 97 | 34 d3 23 07 8d 6f 99 af e0 ba dc ba 20 a7 82 b5 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #17: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f988 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0000b20 (length 256) | 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d80010e0 (length 256) | fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc003a70 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fb10 (length 20) | 66 11 9b 97 34 d3 23 07 8d 6f 99 af e0 ba dc ba | 20 a7 82 b5 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fa28 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2cc001fc0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d80010e0 (length 256) | fc 88 fd 0c b0 0d d0 99 b7 0d 2b 23 e1 9a da b2 | 35 cd de 5d 17 96 3a fe 8d 4b 94 3c 3d 5b 42 89 | 10 c5 06 da dd b5 fb 69 41 09 7c 0c 43 be 46 f9 | 62 93 94 fa 71 90 9d bf 18 ee 25 1c ec 9b ec 9e | 72 0a aa f2 a8 b3 3f d5 74 fd c5 ff 63 4e af 79 | 80 99 7f af ea d2 5e 33 f7 bf 12 86 07 3f 57 66 | 9e 32 42 50 0c bc c5 ba 92 e5 a7 43 2b ce ed 18 | 57 3f 89 4a d1 34 04 c6 7b 05 91 8e 63 55 ab 35 | cb 9d 52 2b 17 57 be e5 f7 19 a6 91 01 38 6a e8 | bf a2 90 a6 95 f3 b1 46 ed ca 56 c6 cd 76 30 02 | c9 75 48 6b 97 17 5d e1 51 6c 44 08 f7 17 39 4e | 00 45 21 d5 03 89 47 95 de 86 fb 11 71 9c ce 69 | c7 4e ba cb d3 10 2b ed 81 fa 2d df 89 1d 8a 84 | 5f be a6 92 f0 76 9a 6f 72 4f 0e 20 fe cc 79 83 | ca c7 20 86 59 9a 5c d6 a6 2f 70 47 3e 65 33 e8 | b0 32 ba 3e 8d dd 21 c8 f9 74 b2 fe b6 46 43 18 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0000b20 (length 256) | 04 20 3a 9f 30 3e 49 98 cc 63 00 ca 73 1b 48 82 | 5e 2e 5f e0 92 42 e3 f2 2e d7 2f 54 8d f6 43 83 | 2e a0 38 f9 bb ec f7 c0 a9 d0 18 63 5a e8 30 19 | f1 39 4c 2c cf 82 01 d8 de e9 e5 b9 96 ee 5d 68 | e7 f0 ee 2d fa 58 26 52 c1 b7 cd 06 a7 8f b2 84 | 83 05 86 14 1b 06 da d8 36 09 ed ea eb 95 c7 8f | 69 88 03 00 fd e3 e1 6b 44 42 4d a6 42 7e 01 5b | c7 4b 6e c5 89 bb ea 0c c1 55 e5 e7 81 d6 8e d1 | 18 3b a4 8e 57 da 36 60 36 19 0f ed 70 6f 02 5a | 6f 56 30 5f ff fb d8 ef eb 22 52 75 59 40 65 9e | e4 82 d7 6a 93 4c d5 1c 7b 73 70 69 33 3b 9b cb | f6 67 e1 8c d9 76 55 69 5b ea 2c a8 ef 32 4f 3f | ac 63 75 06 e7 7e d3 42 cb 0b db f7 13 28 22 4c | ca e5 4e d3 5b 33 7f 94 78 1f 11 15 d6 58 8e 1e | 05 50 c2 a0 94 46 ed be 1f 12 b3 70 3b f2 f5 9d | 0d 44 93 2c b9 ec ca a1 7e 4c cd b4 71 07 ad 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd50 (length 20) | 47 2c 95 aa 8e 17 2d 2b 5b 6f 96 58 35 a6 8d cd | e4 17 60 d5 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 47 2c 95 aa 8e 17 2d 2b 5b 6f 96 58 35 a6 8d cd | HASH_R e4 17 60 d5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 47 2c 95 aa 8e 17 2d 2b 5b 6f 96 58 35 a6 8d cd | encrypting: e4 17 60 d5 | IV: 2c 1d 75 4f 6f 6f 5e bb 5a 29 91 7f 1c 7b bd 00 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #17 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #17: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #17 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #17 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4008060 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c dd 7f ad 04 | a4 cf 0a 3b b1 11 f2 79 99 76 96 9e 4b 32 b9 19 | 5e a5 95 90 d3 10 72 b3 65 ef d2 fd 38 cf 17 d6 | 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d80048e0 size 128 | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #17 | #17 spent 0.69 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #17 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #17 spent 0.789 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 | spent 0.00248 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 08 10 20 01 18 1f fc e3 00 00 01 bc 80 41 00 73 | af 29 51 f1 87 55 86 99 b1 35 fa 33 d9 ce 4d 35 | 95 d2 63 91 a3 54 a4 62 06 18 99 7c d5 0f 49 e4 | cd 47 10 1f f4 71 86 17 36 cd af 10 63 53 e1 9b | 38 e2 35 27 8d ef ec 8b 3b eb 06 4f b5 27 75 90 | d0 8b e0 28 d2 6d 87 2b 6a 69 d1 13 31 ad e3 96 | ed 77 1f b8 6a 83 b6 b0 33 b1 f9 fb 8b 66 f6 af | 94 12 a7 f7 48 29 83 9a a6 2c 80 f7 36 56 5b dd | 36 cf 50 19 8a 64 b5 e1 83 35 90 bd 36 d2 a0 a0 | 4e 2f f5 dd 73 28 ad 7a c4 96 0b 0a 1a a3 e3 72 | ef 4d d4 b7 6f fe 56 39 5a ce bd 26 12 ee 5b 54 | 44 0c 21 b2 43 a9 76 c0 58 21 37 63 6c 5c 35 19 | 49 45 11 b0 17 c5 06 a4 e7 81 f8 49 90 0a a0 5b | ec 8a a2 db fc 66 87 45 44 b6 e5 01 9c 4c 46 03 | ef 50 2c fd c9 29 fe 2e 45 39 84 2f 59 05 02 12 | ef c4 8a 70 3b 1d 63 41 39 0f a7 bc 76 c0 79 81 | ed 91 d0 1d 95 28 30 72 ee 6f c9 d5 6c a9 5a 7d | f8 02 ee 08 9e 31 2a 82 2b e8 9a c0 5f 7d cb fc | 46 da f7 f2 b4 65 6a 17 55 20 2a f0 07 49 02 2f | 0c cf 19 cf 45 ad 78 69 77 5f ac f7 37 da de 4a | c4 3b b6 24 e4 92 1d 44 32 c1 81 2e 4c f5 e6 83 | c4 2d 4a 7e de 54 9f 24 f6 c6 5c 9e a7 48 02 8c | 16 8c d8 04 6a 6a 20 6f 90 30 ef bb 04 2a e7 83 | 75 d0 84 07 80 b7 80 02 14 c5 b1 e2 c3 34 bb 10 | a6 7b cc 90 fe 9d 81 98 60 1a d6 ca 65 11 16 ac | 61 6d 55 71 9c fd 32 18 cd 41 2a ab d6 40 5a 8d | 63 df df a9 06 50 41 cf 4b d4 72 33 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 404749539 (0x181ffce3) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | current Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 18 1f fc e3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 09 83 02 70 25 63 92 2c 3b ad 04 ec d5 6b c3 07 | 99 27 33 32 | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 09 83 02 70 25 63 92 2c 3b ad 04 ec d5 6b c3 07 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: d6 40 5a 8d 63 df df a9 06 50 41 cf 4b d4 72 33 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 08 10 20 01 18 1f fc e3 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | b5 0f 71 fc 6e a1 9e 75 41 fe 9a 22 03 d2 e2 f8 | 8a c8 13 2b 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 99 5d a8 54 00 00 00 1c | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 5f 9b b7 01 | ca ac 6b cd 87 3b f4 b9 f1 f8 a5 b2 44 54 fa eb | 3d b8 f4 bb d5 07 cf ec ba e9 9c 63 05 00 01 04 | 60 52 da 1b b4 68 af 06 67 3f 0e 06 3b a6 93 92 | fe 72 28 bc b2 77 25 67 a1 4f e7 e6 0b 04 b6 d2 | d9 30 c4 d7 f9 f8 d9 32 77 df e9 e5 7c d2 0c 7a | 06 ef 54 9c cb 2f ad 51 73 fe 35 24 f8 e1 ba c6 | c6 f1 48 a8 a4 76 aa 8e 74 05 86 99 62 d7 c3 85 | d0 e0 e9 76 14 d5 a6 c9 a6 98 77 43 91 17 55 52 | b5 5a 02 76 be e2 bc 3a 83 f9 6d 23 40 11 70 5a | 0c c5 9e 67 43 62 d4 3f c8 16 c2 7c cb a2 75 2b | d3 a5 e0 03 89 ab 5a 82 40 65 50 ca 85 a5 6d ea | 2d 2c c6 94 8b b3 3a 6c e1 29 eb 90 5b fe 78 22 | d6 06 64 d0 0a 34 53 ae 70 bf 83 12 f0 da 20 ca | d6 c6 5a af 74 43 fa d3 21 a6 bf 54 dc dc fd 12 | b4 1e ce 29 4d a2 2f 15 24 93 fe 35 93 cb 9e 54 | be 62 2d 76 dc d5 18 4f 76 72 43 7a 86 e3 76 d6 | c9 d6 ce 79 e0 0e 10 f6 14 46 66 34 a1 09 89 2d | b5 5e b8 cf 7e ec 6b 11 bb 6d 06 0d 1c cd 38 d1 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 18 1f fc e3 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200bb0434 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 99 5d a8 54 00 00 00 1c 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 5f 9b b7 01 ca ac 6b cd | 87 3b f4 b9 f1 f8 a5 b2 44 54 fa eb 3d b8 f4 bb | d5 07 cf ec ba e9 9c 63 05 00 01 04 60 52 da 1b | b4 68 af 06 67 3f 0e 06 3b a6 93 92 fe 72 28 bc | b2 77 25 67 a1 4f e7 e6 0b 04 b6 d2 d9 30 c4 d7 | f9 f8 d9 32 77 df e9 e5 7c d2 0c 7a 06 ef 54 9c | cb 2f ad 51 73 fe 35 24 f8 e1 ba c6 c6 f1 48 a8 | a4 76 aa 8e 74 05 86 99 62 d7 c3 85 d0 e0 e9 76 | 14 d5 a6 c9 a6 98 77 43 91 17 55 52 b5 5a 02 76 | be e2 bc 3a 83 f9 6d 23 40 11 70 5a 0c c5 9e 67 | 43 62 d4 3f c8 16 c2 7c cb a2 75 2b d3 a5 e0 03 | 89 ab 5a 82 40 65 50 ca 85 a5 6d ea 2d 2c c6 94 | 8b b3 3a 6c e1 29 eb 90 5b fe 78 22 d6 06 64 d0 | 0a 34 53 ae 70 bf 83 12 f0 da 20 ca d6 c6 5a af | 74 43 fa d3 21 a6 bf 54 dc dc fd 12 b4 1e ce 29 | 4d a2 2f 15 24 93 fe 35 93 cb 9e 54 be 62 2d 76 | dc d5 18 4f 76 72 43 7a 86 e3 76 d6 c9 d6 ce 79 | e0 0e 10 f6 14 46 66 34 a1 09 89 2d b5 5e b8 cf | 7e ec 6b 11 bb 6d 06 0d 1c cd 38 d1 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | b5 0f 71 fc 6e a1 9e 75 41 fe 9a 22 03 d2 e2 f8 | 8a c8 13 2b | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | b5 0f 71 fc 6e a1 9e 75 41 fe 9a 22 03 d2 e2 f8 | 8a c8 13 2b | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #17: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #18 at 0x55e200ba6790 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #18 in UNDEFINED | pstats #18 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #17 "east" as #18 for IPSEC SA | #18 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #17.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #18: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 99 5d a8 54 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 "east" #18: IPsec encryption transform AES_CBC did not specify required KEY_LENGTH attribute | ignoring ESP proposal with NULLed or unknown encryption "east" #18: no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #18 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #18: sending encrypted notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3321754076 (0xc5fdf1dc) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f8d8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9bc (length 4) | c5 fd f1 dc | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc74 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fc60 (length 20) | 66 6d 9e 90 c4 0a c9 94 04 eb ff 33 7e b0 d2 6b | ce d8 d7 df | send notification HASH(1): | 66 6d 9e 90 c4 0a c9 94 04 eb ff 33 7e b0 d2 6b | ce d8 d7 df | last Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | current Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3f9cc (length 4) | c5 fd f1 dc | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 3d 0e f7 c0 00 42 be dd 98 0b 53 de 57 b3 b3 6d | fd 95 65 6e | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 66 6d 9e 90 c4 0a c9 94 04 eb ff 33 | encrypting: 7e b0 d2 6b ce d8 d7 df 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0e | IV: 3d 0e f7 c0 00 42 be dd 98 0b 53 de 57 b3 b3 6d | IV: fd 95 65 6e | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 79 35 50 9d c6 ff 02 29 38 3b 8a ff 65 e8 6b a6 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #18) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 08 10 05 01 c5 fd f1 dc 00 00 00 4c a4 88 1c b8 | 3e 24 47 fa dd 17 8a 83 bd 3e 6a c8 93 8b 7a aa | 63 26 c3 9f fb 60 36 f9 14 f3 3c b8 79 35 50 9d | c6 ff 02 29 38 3b 8a ff 65 e8 6b a6 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | pstats #18 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #18: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #18: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #18: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #18 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #18: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #18 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #17 spent 0.632 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.12 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0029 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 08 10 05 01 9b 7e fb 8d 00 00 00 5c fb 0a 4e 32 | 29 8c 1a dd 07 df 9d ca 77 19 94 5f 5a 06 ba 43 | 6c bd 8b ac a1 88 c3 fa 71 6f 17 ee fd f5 1f a9 | b4 7c ce 56 f2 de 62 76 4d 47 a6 9a 35 a4 12 e2 | 3c 49 4a 71 b5 4f 3e 7f 1c d1 88 df | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2608790413 (0x9b7efb8d) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #17; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #17 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | current Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 9b 7e fb 8d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 0a 73 cf ae f4 21 5d 65 10 29 17 ca 9e b7 c5 b2 | 29 92 28 1d | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 0a 73 cf ae f4 21 5d 65 10 29 17 ca 9e b7 c5 b2 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 35 a4 12 e2 3c 49 4a 71 b5 4f 3e 7f 1c d1 88 df | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 08 10 05 01 9b 7e fb 8d 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | d3 41 cf 86 02 da 63 c2 a6 ae 2f d9 a8 60 64 a3 | de d0 35 76 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 9b 7e fb 8d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b8c0e4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 49 59 68 fc | af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | d3 41 cf 86 02 da 63 c2 a6 ae 2f d9 a8 60 64 a3 | de d0 35 76 | informational HASH(1): | d3 41 cf 86 02 da 63 c2 a6 ae 2f d9 a8 60 64 a3 | de d0 35 76 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #17: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #17 | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #17: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.536s and sending notification | parent state #17: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #17 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | responder cookie: | fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2248243107 (0x860177a3) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc48 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b98220 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd2c (length 4) | 86 01 77 a3 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0d4 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 49 59 68 fc | af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e0c0 (length 20) | a1 f3 df 31 98 9c 96 33 a8 29 51 97 3f ac 4a d6 | 6b 8a a1 6f | send delete HASH(1): | a1 f3 df 31 98 9c 96 33 a8 29 51 97 3f ac 4a d6 | 6b 8a a1 6f | last Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | current Phase 1 IV: 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 16) | 38 cf 17 d6 31 2a f6 4b 76 ff 2e dd 06 6f 00 c0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dd3c (length 4) | 86 01 77 a3 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | c0 0e 41 94 e5 4e f4 18 a1 52 45 63 de 44 82 98 | 77 30 f6 ee | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 a1 f3 df 31 98 9c 96 33 a8 29 51 97 | encrypting: 3f ac 4a d6 6b 8a a1 6f 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 | encrypting: c2 07 41 02 | IV: c0 0e 41 94 e5 4e f4 18 a1 52 45 63 de 44 82 98 | IV: 77 30 f6 ee | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 36 10 01 02 19 09 ad 32 10 a8 93 ea e3 5e 8c b2 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | 49 59 68 fc af 7e f4 fe fb 54 76 c8 c2 07 41 02 | 08 10 05 01 86 01 77 a3 00 00 00 5c fd 72 07 98 | b1 8e c7 28 f8 e7 af 96 1d 4f 64 b9 b2 ff 33 25 | 6f cc cc c0 cd d7 68 de 0f 36 b6 0a 04 32 df f8 | 0f ff 8d 7c 16 2c 1f 4b a3 58 ab dc 36 10 01 02 | 19 09 ad 32 10 a8 93 ea e3 5e 8c b2 | state #17 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d80048e0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #17: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d80010c0: destroyed | stop processing: state #17 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b95040 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.618 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00256 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 0c 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 ab b5 5b 43 9f b3 5a 06 | 50 73 9f fd 04 ef b9 70 c7 83 a2 19 ad 27 ce f9 | creating state object #19 at 0x55e200ba82d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #19 in UNDEFINED | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp started | #19 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #19: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 "east" #19: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #19 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #19: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 size 128 "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.569 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00223 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | 14 00 00 24 fb fd dc 99 95 d8 c1 1f d9 4a b8 9b | 49 de 2a 90 bf c3 ab cf 80 b3 95 ca 9b e3 f4 b4 | 91 72 7c 7e 14 00 00 18 cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 | 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 8b 8c b7 aa 00 00 00 18 | f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | 3b 02 bd e5 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #19 is idle | #19 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | 8b 8c b7 aa | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | natd_hash: rcookie= cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | natd_hash: hash= 8b 8c b7 aa | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | 3b 02 bd e5 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | natd_hash: rcookie= cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | natd_hash: hash= 3b 02 bd e5 | expected NAT-D(me): cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | expected NAT-D(me): 8b 8c b7 aa | expected NAT-D(him): | f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | 3b 02 bd e5 | received NAT-D: cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | received NAT-D: 8b 8c b7 aa | received NAT-D: f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | received NAT-D: 3b 02 bd e5 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 21 for state #19 | state #19 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #19 and saving MD | #19 is busy; has a suspended MD | #19 spent 0.177 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.314 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 21 for state #19 | crypto helper 5 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 21 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0002a80: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2d0002a80 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | Generated nonce: 1e ee 9d c7 4d 2e bf 1b c8 86 31 95 8e 01 45 4e | Generated nonce: 57 5e 3b 3c 85 57 31 f8 54 c4 95 37 1d 81 19 f4 | crypto helper 5 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 21 time elapsed 0.002958 seconds | (#19) spent 1.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 21: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 21 for state #19 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00081c0 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #19 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 21 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #19: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0002a80: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #19 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | keyex value 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | keyex value 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | keyex value ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | keyex value e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | keyex value 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | keyex value 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | keyex value f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | keyex value b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | keyex value 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | keyex value 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | keyex value 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | keyex value e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | keyex value 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | keyex value c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | keyex value c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 1e ee 9d c7 4d 2e bf 1b c8 86 31 95 8e 01 45 4e | Nr 57 5e 3b 3c 85 57 31 f8 54 c4 95 37 1d 81 19 f4 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | 3b 02 bd e5 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | natd_hash: rcookie= cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | natd_hash: hash= 3b 02 bd e5 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 | NAT-D 3b 02 bd e5 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | 8b 8c b7 aa | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | natd_hash: rcookie= cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | natd_hash: hash= 8b 8c b7 aa | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | NAT-D 8b 8c b7 aa | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0002a80: transferring ownership from state #19 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 22 for state #19 | state #19 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 size 128 | #19 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #19 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #19: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #19 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | 14 00 00 24 1e ee 9d c7 4d 2e bf 1b c8 86 31 95 | 8e 01 45 4e 57 5e 3b 3c 85 57 31 f8 54 c4 95 37 | 1d 81 19 f4 14 00 00 18 f2 14 73 3c 42 e8 16 3b | 2b fe 28 d7 d3 dd 8f 59 3b 02 bd e5 00 00 00 18 | cb e6 7f 41 68 7d 1f 91 37 ef d2 56 11 28 0e 96 | 8b 8c b7 aa | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 size 128 | #19 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48960.263997 "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #19 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #19 spent 0.364 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00081c0 | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 22 for state #19 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 22 | peer's g: 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | peer's g: ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | peer's g: 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | peer's g: 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | peer's g: 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | peer's g: 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | peer's g: df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | peer's g: 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | peer's g: 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | peer's g: b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | peer's g: 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | peer's g: bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | peer's g: e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | peer's g: 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | peer's g: f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | peer's g: 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0002a80: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200b8a680 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb0640 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from psk-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40020e0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb0664 (length 32) | fb fd dc 99 95 d8 c1 1f d9 4a b8 9b 49 de 2a 90 | bf c3 ab cf 80 b3 95 ca 9b e3 f4 b4 91 72 7c 7e | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb0684 (length 32) | 1e ee 9d c7 4d 2e bf 1b c8 86 31 95 8e 01 45 4e | 57 5e 3b 3c 85 57 31 f8 54 c4 95 37 1d 81 19 f4 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e4004ba0 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730752: ffffffa5 15 ffffffe6 63 0c ffffffc8 fffffff7 ffffff84 3e 15 fffffff0 3c 79 72 ffffffd7 ffffff97 1e 06 68 ffffff88 ffffffd2 5f 4d 38 ffffffaa 73 21 0f 14 78 3b 4c 78 7e ffffffbd 38 77 2e 0c 18 46 ffffffba 62 14 ffffffb8 fffffff1 03 2a ffffff9f ffffffa1 3b 66 42 ffffffd2 60 22 ffffffdf 3b 10 ffffffbc 0b 6d 14 16 52 02 ffffffdd 7a ffffffe3 29 ffffffb6 ffffffde 35 ffffffc2 67 41 ffffffd5 ffffffc8 04 ffffffb8 ffffff94 ffffffb9 ffffffda ffffffa2 fffffff7 ffffff88 ffffff95 03 43 20 7c 09 ffffff92 ffffff84 6f 5e 20 66 11 5a 78 4d ffffffdd 63 ffffffdd ffffffe1 57 fffffffe ffffffc9 76 ffffff96 19 ffffffc9 ffffffa6 54 ffffff81 4e ffffffaa 63 ffffffe3 56 1b 00 32 ffffffd4 ffffff89 fffffff5 ffffffd7 3d 76 2b 32 ffffffe9 ffffffd3 fffffffa 59 ffffffab 5c fffffff9 ffffffd4 2b ffffffdf ffffffa6 ffffffe7 ffffff8b ffffff8e ffffffa8 0f 5c 7b 16 26 1e ffffffed 27 ffffffd9 ffffffc3 54 19 ffffffb1 ffffffef 46 ffffffbb 6a ffffff98 ffffff93 fffffff7 52 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e40060b0 | unwrapped: 20 f7 89 6f 99 14 1e aa 92 14 d5 e8 63 77 5e b7 | unwrapped: ab 20 09 2c 75 86 de b4 58 ea d9 6c a6 c5 66 f6 | unwrapped: 9c 19 59 17 aa 41 70 ec bd a9 66 8d 3a 15 a2 e7 | unwrapped: 09 b4 51 ad 51 b4 70 23 3b 97 10 2a 08 d6 9f ad | unwrapped: 4d 68 1a a4 f8 aa 7d 80 e4 94 c8 74 f7 7f 6b 30 | unwrapped: 8a 47 67 aa c1 22 6c 09 a5 f8 67 7a 16 5a c6 f1 | unwrapped: 96 b3 b5 95 7a 79 32 33 aa c7 df 4a 77 34 8f a1 | unwrapped: 94 08 c1 c6 60 cd 14 8b b1 c0 51 70 03 bf 54 ed | unwrapped: e1 8b 62 c2 20 08 0b a2 ed 8f df 4c aa da d0 a0 | unwrapped: d8 f5 76 2d 05 42 e6 0d d2 b7 33 fb b0 0e 01 30 | unwrapped: 96 d2 b1 70 98 38 a8 be 25 f9 00 3d 0c 35 8f 38 | unwrapped: 60 3c 33 31 cc 0b 20 2e 69 94 4c 86 c4 f6 90 15 | unwrapped: 5b 4b 1d bd fe 9d 04 db 98 ac a0 1c 4d 0a f6 08 | unwrapped: b0 1c 12 34 df c3 5f 9d dd 48 33 36 61 08 ef 58 | unwrapped: 13 a8 2f 13 22 16 d2 72 5c 62 1f 73 03 1d f6 1b | unwrapped: e8 ec bc 9e ce b0 3d 25 29 b6 36 a7 1b 30 28 b4 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40013a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730784: 71 5f ffffffe9 fffffff3 30 ffffffac ffffffc0 ffffffae ffffff96 ffffffde 36 ffffffec 6c 12 32 6c ffffffd2 ffffffb9 ffffffa7 ffffff8b 27 77 05 ffffffd6 55 3b ffffffdf 6e ffffff8d ffffff81 ffffff9a ffffffd4 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e4004bc0 | unwrapped: 47 95 2b 1c 08 8c 13 fd 3b a6 9c 8c 79 7c 47 45 | unwrapped: 4f ef 1f eb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730784: ffffffa5 15 ffffffe6 63 0c ffffffc8 fffffff7 ffffff84 3e 15 fffffff0 3c 79 72 ffffffd7 ffffff97 1e 06 68 ffffff88 ffffffd2 5f 4d 38 ffffffaa 73 21 0f 14 78 3b 4c 78 7e ffffffbd 38 77 2e 0c 18 46 ffffffba 62 14 ffffffb8 fffffff1 03 2a ffffff9f ffffffa1 3b 66 42 ffffffd2 60 22 ffffffdf 3b 10 ffffffbc 0b 6d 14 16 52 02 ffffffdd 7a ffffffe3 29 ffffffb6 ffffffde 35 ffffffc2 67 41 ffffffd5 ffffffc8 04 ffffffb8 ffffff94 ffffffb9 ffffffda ffffffa2 fffffff7 ffffff88 ffffff95 03 43 20 7c 09 ffffff92 ffffff84 6f 5e 20 66 11 5a 78 4d ffffffdd 63 ffffffdd ffffffe1 57 fffffffe ffffffc9 76 ffffff96 19 ffffffc9 ffffffa6 54 ffffff81 4e ffffffaa 63 ffffffe3 56 1b 00 32 ffffffd4 ffffff89 fffffff5 ffffffd7 3d 76 2b 32 ffffffe9 ffffffd3 fffffffa 59 ffffffab 5c fffffff9 ffffffd4 2b ffffffdf ffffffa6 ffffffe7 ffffff8b ffffff8e ffffffa8 0f 5c 7b 16 26 1e ffffffed 27 ffffffd9 ffffffc3 54 19 ffffffb1 ffffffef 46 ffffffbb 6a ffffff98 ffffff93 fffffff7 52 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e4005fa0 | unwrapped: 20 f7 89 6f 99 14 1e aa 92 14 d5 e8 63 77 5e b7 | unwrapped: ab 20 09 2c 75 86 de b4 58 ea d9 6c a6 c5 66 f6 | unwrapped: 9c 19 59 17 aa 41 70 ec bd a9 66 8d 3a 15 a2 e7 | unwrapped: 09 b4 51 ad 51 b4 70 23 3b 97 10 2a 08 d6 9f ad | unwrapped: 4d 68 1a a4 f8 aa 7d 80 e4 94 c8 74 f7 7f 6b 30 | unwrapped: 8a 47 67 aa c1 22 6c 09 a5 f8 67 7a 16 5a c6 f1 | unwrapped: 96 b3 b5 95 7a 79 32 33 aa c7 df 4a 77 34 8f a1 | unwrapped: 94 08 c1 c6 60 cd 14 8b b1 c0 51 70 03 bf 54 ed | unwrapped: e1 8b 62 c2 20 08 0b a2 ed 8f df 4c aa da d0 a0 | unwrapped: d8 f5 76 2d 05 42 e6 0d d2 b7 33 fb b0 0e 01 30 | unwrapped: 96 d2 b1 70 98 38 a8 be 25 f9 00 3d 0c 35 8f 38 | unwrapped: 60 3c 33 31 cc 0b 20 2e 69 94 4c 86 c4 f6 90 15 | unwrapped: 5b 4b 1d bd fe 9d 04 db 98 ac a0 1c 4d 0a f6 08 | unwrapped: b0 1c 12 34 df c3 5f 9d dd 48 33 36 61 08 ef 58 | unwrapped: 13 a8 2f 13 22 16 d2 72 5c 62 1f 73 03 1d f6 1b | unwrapped: e8 ec bc 9e ce b0 3d 25 29 b6 36 a7 1b 30 28 b4 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e4000d60 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730768: ffffffa3 6c 39 ffffffed 13 ffffffd0 61 ffffffe1 ffffffea ffffffcf 18 1a 31 0c ffffffaf ffffffad 31 30 06 1a 3c ffffffff 54 61 ffffffb5 ffffffef ffffffa7 fffffffd ffffffe1 ffffffe8 14 70 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e4006600 | unwrapped: 4f f8 6c b3 a1 b6 01 98 33 0c 76 d0 b1 b4 e2 c6 | unwrapped: fc f0 b9 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730768: ffffffa5 15 ffffffe6 63 0c ffffffc8 fffffff7 ffffff84 3e 15 fffffff0 3c 79 72 ffffffd7 ffffff97 1e 06 68 ffffff88 ffffffd2 5f 4d 38 ffffffaa 73 21 0f 14 78 3b 4c 78 7e ffffffbd 38 77 2e 0c 18 46 ffffffba 62 14 ffffffb8 fffffff1 03 2a ffffff9f ffffffa1 3b 66 42 ffffffd2 60 22 ffffffdf 3b 10 ffffffbc 0b 6d 14 16 52 02 ffffffdd 7a ffffffe3 29 ffffffb6 ffffffde 35 ffffffc2 67 41 ffffffd5 ffffffc8 04 ffffffb8 ffffff94 ffffffb9 ffffffda ffffffa2 fffffff7 ffffff88 ffffff95 03 43 20 7c 09 ffffff92 ffffff84 6f 5e 20 66 11 5a 78 4d ffffffdd 63 ffffffdd ffffffe1 57 fffffffe ffffffc9 76 ffffff96 19 ffffffc9 ffffffa6 54 ffffff81 4e ffffffaa 63 ffffffe3 56 1b 00 32 ffffffd4 ffffff89 fffffff5 ffffffd7 3d 76 2b 32 ffffffe9 ffffffd3 fffffffa 59 ffffffab 5c fffffff9 ffffffd4 2b ffffffdf ffffffa6 ffffffe7 ffffff8b ffffff8e ffffffa8 0f 5c 7b 16 26 1e ffffffed 27 ffffffd9 ffffffc3 54 19 ffffffb1 ffffffef 46 ffffffbb 6a ffffff98 ffffff93 fffffff7 52 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2e4005e90 | unwrapped: 20 f7 89 6f 99 14 1e aa 92 14 d5 e8 63 77 5e b7 | unwrapped: ab 20 09 2c 75 86 de b4 58 ea d9 6c a6 c5 66 f6 | unwrapped: 9c 19 59 17 aa 41 70 ec bd a9 66 8d 3a 15 a2 e7 | unwrapped: 09 b4 51 ad 51 b4 70 23 3b 97 10 2a 08 d6 9f ad | unwrapped: 4d 68 1a a4 f8 aa 7d 80 e4 94 c8 74 f7 7f 6b 30 | unwrapped: 8a 47 67 aa c1 22 6c 09 a5 f8 67 7a 16 5a c6 f1 | unwrapped: 96 b3 b5 95 7a 79 32 33 aa c7 df 4a 77 34 8f a1 | unwrapped: 94 08 c1 c6 60 cd 14 8b b1 c0 51 70 03 bf 54 ed | unwrapped: e1 8b 62 c2 20 08 0b a2 ed 8f df 4c aa da d0 a0 | unwrapped: d8 f5 76 2d 05 42 e6 0d d2 b7 33 fb b0 0e 01 30 | unwrapped: 96 d2 b1 70 98 38 a8 be 25 f9 00 3d 0c 35 8f 38 | unwrapped: 60 3c 33 31 cc 0b 20 2e 69 94 4c 86 c4 f6 90 15 | unwrapped: 5b 4b 1d bd fe 9d 04 db 98 ac a0 1c 4d 0a f6 08 | unwrapped: b0 1c 12 34 df c3 5f 9d dd 48 33 36 61 08 ef 58 | unwrapped: 13 a8 2f 13 22 16 d2 72 5c 62 1f 73 03 1d f6 1b | unwrapped: e8 ec bc 9e ce b0 3d 25 29 b6 36 a7 1b 30 28 b4 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb08a4 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb08ac (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b95040 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | appendix_b: SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497678 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | appendix_b prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b95040 | appendix_b prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b95040 | appendix_b: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | appendix_b PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e4002a80 | appendix_b PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec497680 | result: final-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497668 | result: final-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | appendix_b PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 20) | appendix_b: key-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b_keymat_e: reference old_k#1-key@0x55e200b95040 | Kn PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | Kn: SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497678 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | Kn prf: created sha context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | Kn prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2e4003690 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | Kn: release clone-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | Kn PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40013a0 | Kn PRF sha update old_k-key@0x55e200b95040 (size 20) | Kn: old_k-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b95040 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-330730816: ffffffe4 ffffffc9 fffffff8 74 59 ffffffd3 52 24 47 ffffff83 ffffffd0 ffffffbe ffffffb5 75 77 ffffff86 64 14 ffffff84 37 60 7b 5e ffffffef ffffffea 6f 07 ffffffb4 4a ffffffa5 ffffffc0 24 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2e40064e0 | unwrapped: 78 e9 50 68 7c 7d 32 4f dc 70 be e8 ce 47 2b 04 | unwrapped: 07 a5 d6 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2ec497680 | result: final-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec497668 | result: final-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | Kn PRF sha final-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 20) | Kn: key-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976f8 | result: result-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b95040 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#N-key@0x55e200b95040 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#final-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: DES3_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2ec4976f8 | result: cryptkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (24-bytes, DES3_CBC) | appendix_b_keymat_e: release keymat-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_a 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_e 0x55e200b93380, enc_key 0x7fb2e4006900 | DH_i: 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | DH_i: ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | DH_i: 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | DH_i: 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | DH_i: 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | DH_i: 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | DH_i: df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | DH_i: 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | DH_i: 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | DH_i: b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | DH_i: 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | DH_i: bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | DH_i: e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | DH_i: 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | DH_i: f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | DH_i: 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | DH_r: 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | DH_r: 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | DH_r: 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | DH_r: ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | DH_r: e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | DH_r: 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | DH_r: 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | DH_r: f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | DH_r: b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | DH_r: 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | DH_r: 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | DH_r: 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | DH_r: e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | DH_r: 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | DH_r: c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | DH_r: c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb06a4 (length 256) | 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb07a4 (length 256) | 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2e40010c0 (length 20) | 9f d0 0c 1d 1b 24 69 54 61 fb f0 6b 71 01 38 dd | f7 e7 ff 92 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 22 time elapsed 0.002265 seconds | (#19) spent 2.25 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 22: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 22 for state #19 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40012f0 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #19 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 22 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #19: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0002a80: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #19 | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #19 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #19 spent 0.0226 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e40012f0 | spent 0.00206 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 05 b1 53 0e | d1 43 55 dc 0a e8 71 b4 40 f8 c9 2c e6 e4 8a 3a | 74 1c af 75 38 85 a0 4c 51 cf 58 06 3b 81 88 62 | 04 a0 36 9a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 9f d0 0c 1d 1b 24 69 54 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 3b 81 88 62 04 a0 36 9a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 04 46 2f b9 | d3 d7 a4 22 6b 67 08 c3 85 ae 37 cb dd 18 03 32 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 4 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #19: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d8001f20 (length 256) | 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0001780 (length 256) | 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a90 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | 04 46 2f b9 d3 d7 a4 22 6b 67 08 c3 85 ae 37 cb | dd 18 03 32 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40010c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0001780 (length 256) | 2d 8c 77 13 77 9a 83 16 07 db b1 06 86 b9 54 20 | 7c 2d 1c 2d 7f 96 4a 1b db 20 03 18 8f 24 f1 d5 | 1a 8a 46 9f ce 58 41 90 36 23 36 af 75 44 62 79 | ca 28 d4 9b 63 73 6c 96 c9 99 41 0f 9f 95 34 3a | e5 a2 c6 22 15 37 bb b3 f3 f0 8f ec b6 01 88 9c | 79 21 82 71 21 2a f1 5f 70 ea fe 4c 6b 4a 54 55 | 0f b1 f6 be d5 4f 17 f3 4d 83 24 84 c6 22 ef 47 | f0 5e 4e 29 a1 24 d7 69 e4 2e 07 be b5 7d 2f 58 | b5 02 b9 fd 15 b9 52 d1 c9 69 20 98 33 1d 81 2c | 7c 30 8e 32 e2 29 4c 5e b7 43 ec 02 34 16 a7 e6 | 1e ad 5e 1e 69 66 aa 98 1f 56 be 4c 22 83 c9 26 | 97 d8 88 09 96 38 2c 5b 8e ee 80 8e 6e 09 ae 13 | e7 f6 de 1a cb be 05 6e fa 35 d0 53 c9 82 39 57 | 36 28 a1 93 2f 82 8c 68 f7 84 dd c6 03 34 29 8a | c1 8d 5f aa 04 d5 9a df cb 37 6c 03 09 de 8d fe | c3 a5 d7 f4 ff 3f 62 3c fc a4 80 f2 b9 a4 7f 68 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d8001f20 (length 256) | 87 7c 16 99 af cc 02 63 c4 87 b0 45 c5 f0 8a 86 | ba 74 2c 53 77 3a 1b dc 7e 1c a3 fc 27 95 8b fb | 43 fd 69 a7 8d 8c 1a 68 c5 85 fa ce 0c c9 aa da | 89 1e 5b 09 8d 1c 99 e2 15 83 4a 40 ee 42 eb 9b | 20 34 27 fe 70 68 a2 f6 e5 43 a1 9c 8c d6 ec 3f | 9e 4a 6e 10 1e 40 10 75 79 37 fc 51 75 82 16 8e | df 20 0a 7e cf 73 60 f9 c6 79 dd f3 a0 6d 51 45 | 46 0e c6 46 d7 4a 78 11 31 d9 cd df 6b 28 30 43 | 2d 4a c8 4c 4f 53 9b 36 c0 e6 c7 06 4d 17 32 9e | b7 59 02 4c 41 cf 3a a4 01 a3 4e ef ef 5b 63 74 | 9b 6f 6d 81 be 9e a6 a2 08 c5 e1 2c 29 ef dd 90 | bb 33 77 81 76 07 97 85 f9 ad 51 45 a8 9b 36 1a | e8 e6 77 d0 f4 d2 4e cd 0b d6 fa 81 4c d1 a0 95 | 72 18 b3 9d 22 5e 78 b0 16 17 a0 5d 1b 09 aa e5 | f2 f5 98 5b c7 79 80 54 4e 8b 1e dd cd 53 31 4a | 4a 91 37 86 6b 0f af ad 6e ca 48 10 45 75 71 d0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8870 (length 8) | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba8868 (length 8) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | ef 95 cb 01 6e 83 18 e4 ed a5 e4 f6 be 35 6b a4 | cb cb 3b 9d | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R ef 95 cb 01 6e 83 18 e4 ed a5 e4 f6 be 35 6b a4 | HASH_R cb cb 3b 9d | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: ef 95 cb 01 6e 83 18 e4 ed a5 e4 f6 be 35 6b a4 | encrypting: cb cb 3b 9d | IV: 3b 81 88 62 04 a0 36 9a | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #19 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #19: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #19 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #19 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc001090 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 68 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 5e 6a fa b2 | 52 34 c1 19 8f d6 91 63 c0 3a b2 ca 2c d9 72 8e | e7 62 f0 d8 f3 5f 45 52 36 aa 71 da e9 d3 a0 51 | 6b 37 1a f7 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00081c0 size 128 | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=3DES_CBC_192 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #19 | #19 spent 0.56 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.695 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00191 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 436 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 20 01 fb f8 ce b4 00 00 01 b4 63 f8 06 2f | 88 db cf 85 72 a2 98 07 ec f7 d9 fc 1b a0 a6 a1 | 37 66 86 e9 43 16 ad 52 8c 4b 68 7c f1 3f 4b 3a | 06 f6 10 3f 31 34 22 03 72 97 c9 7e be 8c ec 7d | f0 8e eb 0a a5 6e 72 79 d1 91 6f d5 06 22 0a c0 | 68 48 3e 04 3c d7 8d 87 ee e2 68 f6 51 97 e7 fc | 20 a7 38 ea d1 10 54 a6 87 87 4d 96 16 40 73 91 | ab fe 48 4e 37 2c 55 1a f4 04 12 9f 1c 5f c1 c3 | d8 a0 ae 4f 11 d1 d4 e4 d2 c7 55 1a 85 f4 d9 78 | 85 6b 8e c7 bf b7 91 aa 38 49 2e 34 7c 94 2c 63 | 2a e8 38 5c fd 4e ee 0d 21 ea 13 28 85 30 36 02 | 0b bb 90 f7 b2 df bf 75 17 ea 7d 49 4f e8 50 e2 | 93 71 a7 94 58 23 75 4e ec ba 4e 6d f9 aa e5 56 | ac 58 d5 dd fd a8 6d 0c 74 b1 42 6c e9 fc 76 11 | ce 0e 78 1a 8e 33 fd cf 33 fa b8 b5 7a a6 29 a2 | 7a a1 a1 e6 61 1f 5d 7e c1 78 c4 7a 0d f6 09 e2 | e2 d9 d6 ca 97 92 29 4a b1 81 c6 d3 74 eb 5f 02 | 52 59 ba 83 5b 26 23 43 2a 95 4b 44 51 e4 35 b2 | c9 14 73 29 66 42 a0 84 cf a4 ad eb 4b 98 fb 62 | 0a eb 8d 89 cf 22 50 3c 62 f1 8e b3 b6 5d ad be | 19 42 99 0e f7 43 27 90 fc 34 49 f3 66 7c fa ad | ea 11 ac 20 22 2c 38 e1 ec 8c b2 77 20 e0 79 22 | 29 01 18 9e 1a 5f aa 34 f8 33 e8 76 d5 f3 26 6f | a4 fc 8d 84 fe 6e bd 6e a2 70 92 a2 7d bc 24 71 | e5 a2 2d a7 bc 96 fc a5 0d 65 68 3f bd 24 63 46 | 28 c8 82 c0 4a d2 9b 7c d9 43 eb f8 65 c2 e6 36 | ef fa 3c a6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4227387060 (0xfbf8ceb4) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | current Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 8) | e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | fb f8 ce b4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 04 ff 64 2b 23 9d 4a 85 98 27 af 7c 35 64 71 03 | b5 bd 18 a4 | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 408 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 04 ff 64 2b 23 9d 4a 85 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 65 c2 e6 36 ef fa 3c a6 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -408): | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 20 01 fb f8 ce b4 00 00 01 b4 01 00 00 18 | a9 0e ac d2 b2 03 60 54 8d ee f7 99 e0 3b fe ba | ba ae 0e 6e 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 08 82 5b 29 00 00 00 1c | 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 37 40 af a7 | 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 ff 68 b3 30 | c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 05 00 01 04 | 88 b1 a7 11 27 dd 06 fd ee 37 9a 18 3c ea 43 1d | 2f 23 c0 df e6 6c 80 bc 3a 26 d5 89 ea fa 6c ae | 2e 50 ce 61 bf 3a 48 20 5d ae dc 84 10 ef a2 39 | 60 b2 2a 3b 3f 38 fb ca 36 be 0d 4d 6f 8f 2e a4 | 2c 79 e1 20 d2 87 79 07 2f 23 51 a6 db 6f 64 90 | 10 00 8f 81 e7 db 37 34 20 0b b7 1b 09 a2 e2 ce | 8b 99 b7 ed 10 43 52 ee 01 08 7f c6 10 46 b6 48 | a8 4d 7f 87 20 68 d8 14 6d 5c 5b d6 b0 55 3f 67 | dd 68 05 a2 94 59 cf 8d 33 f8 58 4b df 7b c5 cf | 6d 93 e7 b9 19 26 79 cd 21 b0 dd 08 ab a4 f9 36 | fb 0c 70 45 64 d7 a1 1a a3 75 a5 73 ea 8c 3f 84 | 10 2d 15 56 ef 5d bb 8e 49 96 c0 60 92 d5 55 d1 | 36 f8 ec a4 7f 5b 19 f0 3b ef aa eb b8 db 74 bc | 52 89 20 dc e4 3b 7b 62 1f 20 af 3c 14 b9 fa 0b | e4 5d ee 8c ba 7c 12 6f 05 6d f6 40 a2 44 07 3a | 72 18 ff de 3d 7c 46 74 d1 5d e3 cb 3c ec d4 53 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | fb f8 ce b4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200b382a4 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 08 82 5b 29 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef | 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 | 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 05 00 01 04 88 b1 a7 11 | 27 dd 06 fd ee 37 9a 18 3c ea 43 1d 2f 23 c0 df | e6 6c 80 bc 3a 26 d5 89 ea fa 6c ae 2e 50 ce 61 | bf 3a 48 20 5d ae dc 84 10 ef a2 39 60 b2 2a 3b | 3f 38 fb ca 36 be 0d 4d 6f 8f 2e a4 2c 79 e1 20 | d2 87 79 07 2f 23 51 a6 db 6f 64 90 10 00 8f 81 | e7 db 37 34 20 0b b7 1b 09 a2 e2 ce 8b 99 b7 ed | 10 43 52 ee 01 08 7f c6 10 46 b6 48 a8 4d 7f 87 | 20 68 d8 14 6d 5c 5b d6 b0 55 3f 67 dd 68 05 a2 | 94 59 cf 8d 33 f8 58 4b df 7b c5 cf 6d 93 e7 b9 | 19 26 79 cd 21 b0 dd 08 ab a4 f9 36 fb 0c 70 45 | 64 d7 a1 1a a3 75 a5 73 ea 8c 3f 84 10 2d 15 56 | ef 5d bb 8e 49 96 c0 60 92 d5 55 d1 36 f8 ec a4 | 7f 5b 19 f0 3b ef aa eb b8 db 74 bc 52 89 20 dc | e4 3b 7b 62 1f 20 af 3c 14 b9 fa 0b e4 5d ee 8c | ba 7c 12 6f 05 6d f6 40 a2 44 07 3a 72 18 ff de | 3d 7c 46 74 d1 5d e3 cb 3c ec d4 53 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | a9 0e ac d2 b2 03 60 54 8d ee f7 99 e0 3b fe ba | ba ae 0e 6e | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | a9 0e ac d2 b2 03 60 54 8d ee f7 99 e0 3b fe ba | ba ae 0e 6e | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #19: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #20 at 0x55e200bab240 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #20 in UNDEFINED | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #19 "east" as #20 for IPSEC SA | #20 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #19.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #20: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 08 82 5b 29 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 88 b1 a7 11 27 dd 06 fd ee 37 9a 18 3c ea 43 1d | 2f 23 c0 df e6 6c 80 bc 3a 26 d5 89 ea fa 6c ae | 2e 50 ce 61 bf 3a 48 20 5d ae dc 84 10 ef a2 39 | 60 b2 2a 3b 3f 38 fb ca 36 be 0d 4d 6f 8f 2e a4 | 2c 79 e1 20 d2 87 79 07 2f 23 51 a6 db 6f 64 90 | 10 00 8f 81 e7 db 37 34 20 0b b7 1b 09 a2 e2 ce | 8b 99 b7 ed 10 43 52 ee 01 08 7f c6 10 46 b6 48 | a8 4d 7f 87 20 68 d8 14 6d 5c 5b d6 b0 55 3f 67 | dd 68 05 a2 94 59 cf 8d 33 f8 58 4b df 7b c5 cf | 6d 93 e7 b9 19 26 79 cd 21 b0 dd 08 ab a4 f9 36 | fb 0c 70 45 64 d7 a1 1a a3 75 a5 73 ea 8c 3f 84 | 10 2d 15 56 ef 5d bb 8e 49 96 c0 60 92 d5 55 d1 | 36 f8 ec a4 7f 5b 19 f0 3b ef aa eb b8 db 74 bc | 52 89 20 dc e4 3b 7b 62 1f 20 af 3c 14 b9 fa 0b | e4 5d ee 8c ba 7c 12 6f 05 6d f6 40 a2 44 07 3a | 72 18 ff de 3d 7c 46 74 d1 5d e3 cb 3c ec d4 53 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 23 for state #20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #20 and saving MD | #20 is busy; has a suspended MD | #19 spent 0.301 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.801 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 23 for state #20 | crypto helper 4 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 23 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001270: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2dc001270 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 65 bd d6 be d8 a7 1d 9b 2a 74 eb 92 29 fc c7 cc | 58 aa a9 69 f2 62 1a 90 38 29 d6 06 fc c9 c6 55 | 38 bd ea 16 1b 14 e5 35 75 48 a6 0c 31 57 bf bf | 60 90 74 82 a5 5a f5 5d f1 cb a8 bf 52 aa 97 44 | 6c c9 ba c6 db 52 2f 8f 30 8f b2 74 8a 12 c6 f0 | 3d 21 c2 0b b7 f2 12 85 0f 83 ab 97 7f c1 0d dd | 10 cc 6b 62 fc cd e0 17 dc 0d 07 fd 64 43 64 4e | e6 d8 2a d1 82 1a 4f a1 53 29 b0 53 30 ca e2 ee | 2b 6e 27 58 77 50 36 8e 56 c4 e1 b0 40 a2 ca 4a | fb ae d1 8f 2f 84 21 a9 ae c9 3c 1c 04 4e 90 e8 | ec a0 4f a0 6a 91 a0 7b c6 e9 86 a0 dc a7 19 f5 | e3 f1 8e 97 89 0d 33 43 90 62 19 48 fd 73 09 62 | 9a a5 6c 0f 37 0b 26 02 9e 78 23 a9 1c 74 30 0c | d9 f6 74 58 a9 e3 94 75 0b c8 d9 a6 14 e7 9a 3a | 18 b6 db 19 bf 74 d1 e5 7e 8e 9a 71 7b f2 ce 08 | 6a 54 fe 52 42 73 35 c7 20 9e de 30 16 85 ff f7 | Generated nonce: d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | Generated nonce: 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | crypto helper 4 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 23 time elapsed 0.001018 seconds | (#20) spent 1.02 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 23: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 23 for state #20 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc0010e0 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #20 | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 23 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #20: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001270: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #20 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001270: transferring ownership from state #20 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 24 for state #20 | state #20 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | suspending state #20 and saving MD | #20 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 24 for state #20 | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 24 | peer's g: 88 b1 a7 11 27 dd 06 fd ee 37 9a 18 3c ea 43 1d | peer's g: 2f 23 c0 df e6 6c 80 bc 3a 26 d5 89 ea fa 6c ae | peer's g: 2e 50 ce 61 bf 3a 48 20 5d ae dc 84 10 ef a2 39 | peer's g: 60 b2 2a 3b 3f 38 fb ca 36 be 0d 4d 6f 8f 2e a4 | peer's g: 2c 79 e1 20 d2 87 79 07 2f 23 51 a6 db 6f 64 90 | peer's g: 10 00 8f 81 e7 db 37 34 20 0b b7 1b 09 a2 e2 ce | peer's g: 8b 99 b7 ed 10 43 52 ee 01 08 7f c6 10 46 b6 48 | peer's g: a8 4d 7f 87 20 68 d8 14 6d 5c 5b d6 b0 55 3f 67 | peer's g: dd 68 05 a2 94 59 cf 8d 33 f8 58 4b df 7b c5 cf | peer's g: 6d 93 e7 b9 19 26 79 cd 21 b0 dd 08 ab a4 f9 36 | peer's g: fb 0c 70 45 64 d7 a1 1a a3 75 a5 73 ea 8c 3f 84 | peer's g: 10 2d 15 56 ef 5d bb 8e 49 96 c0 60 92 d5 55 d1 | peer's g: 36 f8 ec a4 7f 5b 19 f0 3b ef aa eb b8 db 74 bc | peer's g: 52 89 20 dc e4 3b 7b 62 1f 20 af 3c 14 b9 fa 0b | peer's g: e4 5d ee 8c ba 7c 12 6f 05 6d f6 40 a2 44 07 3a | peer's g: 72 18 ff de 3d 7c 46 74 d1 5d e3 cb 3c ec d4 53 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001270: computed shared DH secret key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 24 time elapsed 0.000946 seconds | (#20) spent 0.947 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 24: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 24 for state #20 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | resume sending helper answer for #20 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #20 spent 0.0719 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2dc0010e0 | processing resume sending helper answer for #20 | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 24 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #20: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4227387060 (0xfbf8ceb4) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 08 82 5b 29 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x2bdb1cde for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 2b db 1c de | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 20 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 28 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #20: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:fbf8ceb4} "east" #20: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #20: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | Nr 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 65 bd d6 be d8 a7 1d 9b 2a 74 eb 92 29 fc c7 cc | keyex value 58 aa a9 69 f2 62 1a 90 38 29 d6 06 fc c9 c6 55 | keyex value 38 bd ea 16 1b 14 e5 35 75 48 a6 0c 31 57 bf bf | keyex value 60 90 74 82 a5 5a f5 5d f1 cb a8 bf 52 aa 97 44 | keyex value 6c c9 ba c6 db 52 2f 8f 30 8f b2 74 8a 12 c6 f0 | keyex value 3d 21 c2 0b b7 f2 12 85 0f 83 ab 97 7f c1 0d dd | keyex value 10 cc 6b 62 fc cd e0 17 dc 0d 07 fd 64 43 64 4e | keyex value e6 d8 2a d1 82 1a 4f a1 53 29 b0 53 30 ca e2 ee | keyex value 2b 6e 27 58 77 50 36 8e 56 c4 e1 b0 40 a2 ca 4a | keyex value fb ae d1 8f 2f 84 21 a9 ae c9 3c 1c 04 4e 90 e8 | keyex value ec a0 4f a0 6a 91 a0 7b c6 e9 86 a0 dc a7 19 f5 | keyex value e3 f1 8e 97 89 0d 33 43 90 62 19 48 fd 73 09 62 | keyex value 9a a5 6c 0f 37 0b 26 02 9e 78 23 a9 1c 74 30 0c | keyex value d9 f6 74 58 a9 e3 94 75 0b c8 d9 a6 14 e7 9a 3a | keyex value 18 b6 db 19 bf 74 d1 e5 7e 8e 9a 71 7b f2 ce 08 | keyex value 6a 54 fe 52 42 73 35 c7 20 9e de 30 16 85 ff f7 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001270: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #20 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf30 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fe1c (length 4) | fb f8 ce b4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e1ff723974 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 2b db 1c de 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 | d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e | d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 05 00 01 04 65 bd d6 be | d8 a7 1d 9b 2a 74 eb 92 29 fc c7 cc 58 aa a9 69 | f2 62 1a 90 38 29 d6 06 fc c9 c6 55 38 bd ea 16 | 1b 14 e5 35 75 48 a6 0c 31 57 bf bf 60 90 74 82 | a5 5a f5 5d f1 cb a8 bf 52 aa 97 44 6c c9 ba c6 | db 52 2f 8f 30 8f b2 74 8a 12 c6 f0 3d 21 c2 0b | b7 f2 12 85 0f 83 ab 97 7f c1 0d dd 10 cc 6b 62 | fc cd e0 17 dc 0d 07 fd 64 43 64 4e e6 d8 2a d1 | 82 1a 4f a1 53 29 b0 53 30 ca e2 ee 2b 6e 27 58 | 77 50 36 8e 56 c4 e1 b0 40 a2 ca 4a fb ae d1 8f | 2f 84 21 a9 ae c9 3c 1c 04 4e 90 e8 ec a0 4f a0 | 6a 91 a0 7b c6 e9 86 a0 dc a7 19 f5 e3 f1 8e 97 | 89 0d 33 43 90 62 19 48 fd 73 09 62 9a a5 6c 0f | 37 0b 26 02 9e 78 23 a9 1c 74 30 0c d9 f6 74 58 | a9 e3 94 75 0b c8 d9 a6 14 e7 9a 3a 18 b6 db 19 | bf 74 d1 e5 7e 8e 9a 71 7b f2 ce 08 6a 54 fe 52 | 42 73 35 c7 20 9e de 30 16 85 ff f7 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 20) | bb 65 11 76 b5 7d c7 9d fc 40 3f 66 fa 81 7b 8f | 69 97 91 44 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | bb 65 11 76 b5 7d c7 9d fc 40 3f 66 fa 81 7b 8f | 69 97 91 44 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=24 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=44 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7670 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 06 ffffffcd fffffff6 4e ffffffab 16 70 2e 3e ffffffaa 37 ffffffc0 63 ffffff83 7a ffffff89 6a ffffffb1 38 ffffffca 71 56 46 ffffffec ffffff94 62 ffffffe2 59 ffffffb1 3e 29 0f ffffff95 ffffffd3 ffffffc5 ffffff8f ffffffad 67 ffffff83 ffffffcc 5d 6b 48 ffffffad 57 ffffffad ffffffd9 ffffff83 32 ffffffb8 ffffffb1 2e 58 ffffffeb ffffffc2 5d 08 ffffff9b 56 ffffff91 57 ffffffd7 43 ffffffe3 ffffffa3 10 27 fffffff9 48 ffffffc2 ffffff85 ffffffb1 0c 4d 1d ffffffc4 36 ffffffda ffffff8e ffffff97 17 ffffffc5 0e 06 11 79 ffffffa5 3f 52 25 58 fffffff2 ffffff80 33 5c 76 ffffff9f 23 fffffffd ffffff87 ffffff86 22 70 ffffffaa 3d 2a 78 ffffff8d 62 1c ffffff83 1c fffffff6 ffffffea 4d 68 fffffff8 ffffffc7 ffffffae fffffff5 61 66 ffffffc6 ffffff98 44 7c 19 ffffffe6 76 17 1a 56 0c ffffff83 ffffffb6 13 ffffffca ffffff89 ffffffc0 21 ffffff9a 23 13 ffffff9b 79 fffffff0 ffffffe5 32 ffffffe3 59 1a ffffffa2 fffffff5 ffffffc8 fffffff2 ffffffcf ffffffdf ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bb02f0 | unwrapped: 00 06 a6 58 9a dd 45 af 70 72 c0 a8 36 58 b8 bb | unwrapped: 6d 7b 54 42 10 5f ad e8 97 47 86 85 b4 5b a9 2f | unwrapped: d4 24 ab 16 00 8c a5 5e 3a 7c 02 95 f2 3a 8c 5a | unwrapped: ac e2 3e cc 36 40 8c 51 d7 72 28 90 e4 3a 7d 1e | unwrapped: 21 37 c2 5d d1 31 45 a5 d3 32 aa d0 27 37 74 bd | unwrapped: 57 1b 62 0e b7 37 9e 7a ff 59 98 fd 5f 01 d8 02 | unwrapped: b8 a1 32 88 29 9d e7 0c 23 e2 27 f7 b3 86 3d 42 | unwrapped: fe d6 37 55 40 b7 91 f1 64 3a c9 93 e1 83 cb cd | unwrapped: e6 d9 88 04 b2 b3 72 78 d0 03 cc 7e 54 41 ee b5 | unwrapped: 00 44 6e 4b d3 b5 fb 66 32 fb 45 7a d0 ea 02 9d | unwrapped: 17 b7 ee 9c 5c 05 8b 5f dc ed d6 a7 58 e6 9e c5 | unwrapped: 53 0d 59 1f c6 a0 08 2c 7f 40 18 34 d7 99 2c 9c | unwrapped: 75 09 a3 7e 67 4c 4d 59 24 84 d4 e8 52 ca bc a6 | unwrapped: 8d 81 81 2e 33 66 18 16 29 94 17 ed fe 2a f6 a9 | unwrapped: 96 1b 0e c3 19 33 4e c3 a4 7d 1e 5f be 76 bb 63 | unwrapped: 13 8d 09 af de 03 41 23 ab df 8e 5e 98 18 7e c6 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 06 ffffffcd fffffff6 4e ffffffab 16 70 2e 3e ffffffaa 37 ffffffc0 63 ffffff83 7a ffffff89 6a ffffffb1 38 ffffffca 71 56 46 ffffffec ffffff94 62 ffffffe2 59 ffffffb1 3e 29 0f ffffff95 ffffffd3 ffffffc5 ffffff8f ffffffad 67 ffffff83 ffffffcc 5d 6b 48 ffffffad 57 ffffffad ffffffd9 ffffff83 32 ffffffb8 ffffffb1 2e 58 ffffffeb ffffffc2 5d 08 ffffff9b 56 ffffff91 57 ffffffd7 43 ffffffe3 ffffffa3 10 27 fffffff9 48 ffffffc2 ffffff85 ffffffb1 0c 4d 1d ffffffc4 36 ffffffda ffffff8e ffffff97 17 ffffffc5 0e 06 11 79 ffffffa5 3f 52 25 58 fffffff2 ffffff80 33 5c 76 ffffff9f 23 fffffffd ffffff87 ffffff86 22 70 ffffffaa 3d 2a 78 ffffff8d 62 1c ffffff83 1c fffffff6 ffffffea 4d 68 fffffff8 ffffffc7 ffffffae fffffff5 61 66 ffffffc6 ffffff98 44 7c 19 ffffffe6 76 17 1a 56 0c ffffff83 ffffffb6 13 ffffffca ffffff89 ffffffc0 21 ffffff9a 23 13 ffffff9b 79 fffffff0 ffffffe5 32 ffffffe3 59 1a ffffffa2 fffffff5 ffffffc8 fffffff2 ffffffcf ffffffdf ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200baffc0 | unwrapped: 00 06 a6 58 9a dd 45 af 70 72 c0 a8 36 58 b8 bb | unwrapped: 6d 7b 54 42 10 5f ad e8 97 47 86 85 b4 5b a9 2f | unwrapped: d4 24 ab 16 00 8c a5 5e 3a 7c 02 95 f2 3a 8c 5a | unwrapped: ac e2 3e cc 36 40 8c 51 d7 72 28 90 e4 3a 7d 1e | unwrapped: 21 37 c2 5d d1 31 45 a5 d3 32 aa d0 27 37 74 bd | unwrapped: 57 1b 62 0e b7 37 9e 7a ff 59 98 fd 5f 01 d8 02 | unwrapped: b8 a1 32 88 29 9d e7 0c 23 e2 27 f7 b3 86 3d 42 | unwrapped: fe d6 37 55 40 b7 91 f1 64 3a c9 93 e1 83 cb cd | unwrapped: e6 d9 88 04 b2 b3 72 78 d0 03 cc 7e 54 41 ee b5 | unwrapped: 00 44 6e 4b d3 b5 fb 66 32 fb 45 7a d0 ea 02 9d | unwrapped: 17 b7 ee 9c 5c 05 8b 5f dc ed d6 a7 58 e6 9e c5 | unwrapped: 53 0d 59 1f c6 a0 08 2c 7f 40 18 34 d7 99 2c 9c | unwrapped: 75 09 a3 7e 67 4c 4d 59 24 84 d4 e8 52 ca bc a6 | unwrapped: 8d 81 81 2e 33 66 18 16 29 94 17 ed fe 2a f6 a9 | unwrapped: 96 1b 0e c3 19 33 4e c3 a4 7d 1e 5f be 76 bb 63 | unwrapped: 13 8d 09 af de 03 41 23 ab df 8e 5e 98 18 7e c6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab448 (length 4) | 2b db 1c de | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab428 (length 4) | 08 82 5b 29 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a70 (length 20) | fa 1b 69 6d 1d 5f 1e 97 0b 8e 3d 57 ed a0 52 06 | fa 89 8a ec | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0004f40 (length 20) | 49 41 ad 11 85 a8 25 2d a5 23 34 bc c5 e2 39 49 | 81 1c 1f 30 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf50 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf30 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a70 (length 20) | fa 1b 69 6d 1d 5f 1e 97 0b 8e 3d 57 ed a0 52 06 | fa 89 8a ec | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004f40 (length 20) | 49 41 ad 11 85 a8 25 2d a5 23 34 bc c5 e2 39 49 | 81 1c 1f 30 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 06 ffffffcd fffffff6 4e ffffffab 16 70 2e 3e ffffffaa 37 ffffffc0 63 ffffff83 7a ffffff89 6a ffffffb1 38 ffffffca 71 56 46 ffffffec ffffff94 62 ffffffe2 59 ffffffb1 3e 29 0f ffffff95 ffffffd3 ffffffc5 ffffff8f ffffffad 67 ffffff83 ffffffcc 5d 6b 48 ffffffad 57 ffffffad ffffffd9 ffffff83 32 ffffffb8 ffffffb1 2e 58 ffffffeb ffffffc2 5d 08 ffffff9b 56 ffffff91 57 ffffffd7 43 ffffffe3 ffffffa3 10 27 fffffff9 48 ffffffc2 ffffff85 ffffffb1 0c 4d 1d ffffffc4 36 ffffffda ffffff8e ffffff97 17 ffffffc5 0e 06 11 79 ffffffa5 3f 52 25 58 fffffff2 ffffff80 33 5c 76 ffffff9f 23 fffffffd ffffff87 ffffff86 22 70 ffffffaa 3d 2a 78 ffffff8d 62 1c ffffff83 1c fffffff6 ffffffea 4d 68 fffffff8 ffffffc7 ffffffae fffffff5 61 66 ffffffc6 ffffff98 44 7c 19 ffffffe6 76 17 1a 56 0c ffffff83 ffffffb6 13 ffffffca ffffff89 ffffffc0 21 ffffff9a 23 13 ffffff9b 79 fffffff0 ffffffe5 32 ffffffe3 59 1a ffffffa2 fffffff5 ffffffc8 fffffff2 ffffffcf ffffffdf ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bafeb0 | unwrapped: 00 06 a6 58 9a dd 45 af 70 72 c0 a8 36 58 b8 bb | unwrapped: 6d 7b 54 42 10 5f ad e8 97 47 86 85 b4 5b a9 2f | unwrapped: d4 24 ab 16 00 8c a5 5e 3a 7c 02 95 f2 3a 8c 5a | unwrapped: ac e2 3e cc 36 40 8c 51 d7 72 28 90 e4 3a 7d 1e | unwrapped: 21 37 c2 5d d1 31 45 a5 d3 32 aa d0 27 37 74 bd | unwrapped: 57 1b 62 0e b7 37 9e 7a ff 59 98 fd 5f 01 d8 02 | unwrapped: b8 a1 32 88 29 9d e7 0c 23 e2 27 f7 b3 86 3d 42 | unwrapped: fe d6 37 55 40 b7 91 f1 64 3a c9 93 e1 83 cb cd | unwrapped: e6 d9 88 04 b2 b3 72 78 d0 03 cc 7e 54 41 ee b5 | unwrapped: 00 44 6e 4b d3 b5 fb 66 32 fb 45 7a d0 ea 02 9d | unwrapped: 17 b7 ee 9c 5c 05 8b 5f dc ed d6 a7 58 e6 9e c5 | unwrapped: 53 0d 59 1f c6 a0 08 2c 7f 40 18 34 d7 99 2c 9c | unwrapped: 75 09 a3 7e 67 4c 4d 59 24 84 d4 e8 52 ca bc a6 | unwrapped: 8d 81 81 2e 33 66 18 16 29 94 17 ed fe 2a f6 a9 | unwrapped: 96 1b 0e c3 19 33 4e c3 a4 7d 1e 5f be 76 bb 63 | unwrapped: 13 8d 09 af de 03 41 23 ab df 8e 5e 98 18 7e c6 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 06 ffffffcd fffffff6 4e ffffffab 16 70 2e 3e ffffffaa 37 ffffffc0 63 ffffff83 7a ffffff89 6a ffffffb1 38 ffffffca 71 56 46 ffffffec ffffff94 62 ffffffe2 59 ffffffb1 3e 29 0f ffffff95 ffffffd3 ffffffc5 ffffff8f ffffffad 67 ffffff83 ffffffcc 5d 6b 48 ffffffad 57 ffffffad ffffffd9 ffffff83 32 ffffffb8 ffffffb1 2e 58 ffffffeb ffffffc2 5d 08 ffffff9b 56 ffffff91 57 ffffffd7 43 ffffffe3 ffffffa3 10 27 fffffff9 48 ffffffc2 ffffff85 ffffffb1 0c 4d 1d ffffffc4 36 ffffffda ffffff8e ffffff97 17 ffffffc5 0e 06 11 79 ffffffa5 3f 52 25 58 fffffff2 ffffff80 33 5c 76 ffffff9f 23 fffffffd ffffff87 ffffff86 22 70 ffffffaa 3d 2a 78 ffffff8d 62 1c ffffff83 1c fffffff6 ffffffea 4d 68 fffffff8 ffffffc7 ffffffae fffffff5 61 66 ffffffc6 ffffff98 44 7c 19 ffffffe6 76 17 1a 56 0c ffffff83 ffffffb6 13 ffffffca ffffff89 ffffffc0 21 ffffff9a 23 13 ffffff9b 79 fffffff0 ffffffe5 32 ffffffe3 59 1a ffffffa2 fffffff5 ffffffc8 fffffff2 ffffffcf ffffffdf ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bab080 | unwrapped: 00 06 a6 58 9a dd 45 af 70 72 c0 a8 36 58 b8 bb | unwrapped: 6d 7b 54 42 10 5f ad e8 97 47 86 85 b4 5b a9 2f | unwrapped: d4 24 ab 16 00 8c a5 5e 3a 7c 02 95 f2 3a 8c 5a | unwrapped: ac e2 3e cc 36 40 8c 51 d7 72 28 90 e4 3a 7d 1e | unwrapped: 21 37 c2 5d d1 31 45 a5 d3 32 aa d0 27 37 74 bd | unwrapped: 57 1b 62 0e b7 37 9e 7a ff 59 98 fd 5f 01 d8 02 | unwrapped: b8 a1 32 88 29 9d e7 0c 23 e2 27 f7 b3 86 3d 42 | unwrapped: fe d6 37 55 40 b7 91 f1 64 3a c9 93 e1 83 cb cd | unwrapped: e6 d9 88 04 b2 b3 72 78 d0 03 cc 7e 54 41 ee b5 | unwrapped: 00 44 6e 4b d3 b5 fb 66 32 fb 45 7a d0 ea 02 9d | unwrapped: 17 b7 ee 9c 5c 05 8b 5f dc ed d6 a7 58 e6 9e c5 | unwrapped: 53 0d 59 1f c6 a0 08 2c 7f 40 18 34 d7 99 2c 9c | unwrapped: 75 09 a3 7e 67 4c 4d 59 24 84 d4 e8 52 ca bc a6 | unwrapped: 8d 81 81 2e 33 66 18 16 29 94 17 ed fe 2a f6 a9 | unwrapped: 96 1b 0e c3 19 33 4e c3 a4 7d 1e 5f be 76 bb 63 | unwrapped: 13 8d 09 af de 03 41 23 ab df 8e 5e 98 18 7e c6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab448 (length 4) | 2b db 1c de | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab428 (length 4) | 08 82 5b 29 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a84 (length 20) | 3d 19 2c ba e4 79 d7 7c aa 7a 7f b1 89 16 ce 99 | e9 f7 b9 28 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0004f54 (length 20) | ba a0 9b 98 ee 58 fa 36 84 4f b7 47 f3 86 07 2a | 12 ce a5 ab | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7670 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a84 (length 20) | 3d 19 2c ba e4 79 d7 7c aa 7a 7f b1 89 16 ce 99 | e9 f7 b9 28 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0004f54 (length 20) | ba a0 9b 98 ee 58 fa 36 84 4f b7 47 f3 86 07 2a | 12 ce a5 ab | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 06 ffffffcd fffffff6 4e ffffffab 16 70 2e 3e ffffffaa 37 ffffffc0 63 ffffff83 7a ffffff89 6a ffffffb1 38 ffffffca 71 56 46 ffffffec ffffff94 62 ffffffe2 59 ffffffb1 3e 29 0f ffffff95 ffffffd3 ffffffc5 ffffff8f ffffffad 67 ffffff83 ffffffcc 5d 6b 48 ffffffad 57 ffffffad ffffffd9 ffffff83 32 ffffffb8 ffffffb1 2e 58 ffffffeb ffffffc2 5d 08 ffffff9b 56 ffffff91 57 ffffffd7 43 ffffffe3 ffffffa3 10 27 fffffff9 48 ffffffc2 ffffff85 ffffffb1 0c 4d 1d ffffffc4 36 ffffffda ffffff8e ffffff97 17 ffffffc5 0e 06 11 79 ffffffa5 3f 52 25 58 fffffff2 ffffff80 33 5c 76 ffffff9f 23 fffffffd ffffff87 ffffff86 22 70 ffffffaa 3d 2a 78 ffffff8d 62 1c ffffff83 1c fffffff6 ffffffea 4d 68 fffffff8 ffffffc7 ffffffae fffffff5 61 66 ffffffc6 ffffff98 44 7c 19 ffffffe6 76 17 1a 56 0c ffffff83 ffffffb6 13 ffffffca ffffff89 ffffffc0 21 ffffff9a 23 13 ffffff9b 79 fffffff0 ffffffe5 32 ffffffe3 59 1a ffffffa2 fffffff5 ffffffc8 fffffff2 ffffffcf ffffffdf ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bb02f0 | unwrapped: 00 06 a6 58 9a dd 45 af 70 72 c0 a8 36 58 b8 bb | unwrapped: 6d 7b 54 42 10 5f ad e8 97 47 86 85 b4 5b a9 2f | unwrapped: d4 24 ab 16 00 8c a5 5e 3a 7c 02 95 f2 3a 8c 5a | unwrapped: ac e2 3e cc 36 40 8c 51 d7 72 28 90 e4 3a 7d 1e | unwrapped: 21 37 c2 5d d1 31 45 a5 d3 32 aa d0 27 37 74 bd | unwrapped: 57 1b 62 0e b7 37 9e 7a ff 59 98 fd 5f 01 d8 02 | unwrapped: b8 a1 32 88 29 9d e7 0c 23 e2 27 f7 b3 86 3d 42 | unwrapped: fe d6 37 55 40 b7 91 f1 64 3a c9 93 e1 83 cb cd | unwrapped: e6 d9 88 04 b2 b3 72 78 d0 03 cc 7e 54 41 ee b5 | unwrapped: 00 44 6e 4b d3 b5 fb 66 32 fb 45 7a d0 ea 02 9d | unwrapped: 17 b7 ee 9c 5c 05 8b 5f dc ed d6 a7 58 e6 9e c5 | unwrapped: 53 0d 59 1f c6 a0 08 2c 7f 40 18 34 d7 99 2c 9c | unwrapped: 75 09 a3 7e 67 4c 4d 59 24 84 d4 e8 52 ca bc a6 | unwrapped: 8d 81 81 2e 33 66 18 16 29 94 17 ed fe 2a f6 a9 | unwrapped: 96 1b 0e c3 19 33 4e c3 a4 7d 1e 5f be 76 bb 63 | unwrapped: 13 8d 09 af de 03 41 23 ab df 8e 5e 98 18 7e c6 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 06 ffffffcd fffffff6 4e ffffffab 16 70 2e 3e ffffffaa 37 ffffffc0 63 ffffff83 7a ffffff89 6a ffffffb1 38 ffffffca 71 56 46 ffffffec ffffff94 62 ffffffe2 59 ffffffb1 3e 29 0f ffffff95 ffffffd3 ffffffc5 ffffff8f ffffffad 67 ffffff83 ffffffcc 5d 6b 48 ffffffad 57 ffffffad ffffffd9 ffffff83 32 ffffffb8 ffffffb1 2e 58 ffffffeb ffffffc2 5d 08 ffffff9b 56 ffffff91 57 ffffffd7 43 ffffffe3 ffffffa3 10 27 fffffff9 48 ffffffc2 ffffff85 ffffffb1 0c 4d 1d ffffffc4 36 ffffffda ffffff8e ffffff97 17 ffffffc5 0e 06 11 79 ffffffa5 3f 52 25 58 fffffff2 ffffff80 33 5c 76 ffffff9f 23 fffffffd ffffff87 ffffff86 22 70 ffffffaa 3d 2a 78 ffffff8d 62 1c ffffff83 1c fffffff6 ffffffea 4d 68 fffffff8 ffffffc7 ffffffae fffffff5 61 66 ffffffc6 ffffff98 44 7c 19 ffffffe6 76 17 1a 56 0c ffffff83 ffffffb6 13 ffffffca ffffff89 ffffffc0 21 ffffff9a 23 13 ffffff9b 79 fffffff0 ffffffe5 32 ffffffe3 59 1a ffffffa2 fffffff5 ffffffc8 fffffff2 ffffffcf ffffffdf ffffff97 3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200baffc0 | unwrapped: 00 06 a6 58 9a dd 45 af 70 72 c0 a8 36 58 b8 bb | unwrapped: 6d 7b 54 42 10 5f ad e8 97 47 86 85 b4 5b a9 2f | unwrapped: d4 24 ab 16 00 8c a5 5e 3a 7c 02 95 f2 3a 8c 5a | unwrapped: ac e2 3e cc 36 40 8c 51 d7 72 28 90 e4 3a 7d 1e | unwrapped: 21 37 c2 5d d1 31 45 a5 d3 32 aa d0 27 37 74 bd | unwrapped: 57 1b 62 0e b7 37 9e 7a ff 59 98 fd 5f 01 d8 02 | unwrapped: b8 a1 32 88 29 9d e7 0c 23 e2 27 f7 b3 86 3d 42 | unwrapped: fe d6 37 55 40 b7 91 f1 64 3a c9 93 e1 83 cb cd | unwrapped: e6 d9 88 04 b2 b3 72 78 d0 03 cc 7e 54 41 ee b5 | unwrapped: 00 44 6e 4b d3 b5 fb 66 32 fb 45 7a d0 ea 02 9d | unwrapped: 17 b7 ee 9c 5c 05 8b 5f dc ed d6 a7 58 e6 9e c5 | unwrapped: 53 0d 59 1f c6 a0 08 2c 7f 40 18 34 d7 99 2c 9c | unwrapped: 75 09 a3 7e 67 4c 4d 59 24 84 d4 e8 52 ca bc a6 | unwrapped: 8d 81 81 2e 33 66 18 16 29 94 17 ed fe 2a f6 a9 | unwrapped: 96 1b 0e c3 19 33 4e c3 a4 7d 1e 5f be 76 bb 63 | unwrapped: 13 8d 09 af de 03 41 23 ab df 8e 5e 98 18 7e c6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab448 (length 4) | 2b db 1c de | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bab428 (length 4) | 08 82 5b 29 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a98 (length 20) | 17 41 19 f6 8a ef f4 b8 82 58 56 82 cc fb 98 a1 | 70 95 c9 c8 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0004f68 (length 20) | 50 2a 75 0c 7a b8 99 0d 85 e0 d3 86 3a 35 5a 77 | ca 78 dd 4c | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55e200bab240 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#20 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.8825b29@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.2bdb1cde@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 bb 65 11 76 b5 7d c7 9d fc 40 3f 66 | encrypting: fa 81 7b 8f 69 97 91 44 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 2b db 1c de | encrypting: 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 | encrypting: d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | encrypting: 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | encrypting: 05 00 01 04 65 bd d6 be d8 a7 1d 9b 2a 74 eb 92 | encrypting: 29 fc c7 cc 58 aa a9 69 f2 62 1a 90 38 29 d6 06 | encrypting: fc c9 c6 55 38 bd ea 16 1b 14 e5 35 75 48 a6 0c | encrypting: 31 57 bf bf 60 90 74 82 a5 5a f5 5d f1 cb a8 bf | encrypting: 52 aa 97 44 6c c9 ba c6 db 52 2f 8f 30 8f b2 74 | encrypting: 8a 12 c6 f0 3d 21 c2 0b b7 f2 12 85 0f 83 ab 97 | encrypting: 7f c1 0d dd 10 cc 6b 62 fc cd e0 17 dc 0d 07 fd | encrypting: 64 43 64 4e e6 d8 2a d1 82 1a 4f a1 53 29 b0 53 | encrypting: 30 ca e2 ee 2b 6e 27 58 77 50 36 8e 56 c4 e1 b0 | encrypting: 40 a2 ca 4a fb ae d1 8f 2f 84 21 a9 ae c9 3c 1c | encrypting: 04 4e 90 e8 ec a0 4f a0 6a 91 a0 7b c6 e9 86 a0 | encrypting: dc a7 19 f5 e3 f1 8e 97 89 0d 33 43 90 62 19 48 | encrypting: fd 73 09 62 9a a5 6c 0f 37 0b 26 02 9e 78 23 a9 | encrypting: 1c 74 30 0c d9 f6 74 58 a9 e3 94 75 0b c8 d9 a6 | encrypting: 14 e7 9a 3a 18 b6 db 19 bf 74 d1 e5 7e 8e 9a 71 | encrypting: 7b f2 ce 08 6a 54 fe 52 42 73 35 c7 20 9e de 30 | encrypting: 16 85 ff f7 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 | IV: 65 c2 e6 36 ef fa 3c a6 | unpadded size is: 404 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 408 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 436 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 8b 10 3e 86 10 9b 9a 91 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #20 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #20: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #20 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 436 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #20) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 20 01 fb f8 ce b4 00 00 01 b4 bf 09 42 14 | b5 e9 03 53 05 68 ac 25 74 f4 a4 34 4b fc 00 0d | f4 c9 8b 3d 69 19 41 49 bd 77 9c 91 ee bc 10 fd | 75 3a 7e 3b 6a f2 16 29 93 4e 2a 14 f8 b4 74 e9 | e6 d7 06 d5 a4 25 4a e9 5c 87 5c 58 b0 2d 6f 13 | f2 90 44 02 eb 17 10 36 4a 07 20 c0 38 c5 46 5a | e4 77 80 81 d5 43 8f 54 1d f2 52 d9 e8 04 89 16 | 6e 69 b1 44 7d 27 0c 9f f7 1b d6 4c 44 a9 93 53 | cf 29 1f 08 ac 39 ac 8e 83 7e c8 35 35 cc 66 f7 | 10 30 fd 5d 4b cc 93 50 66 5e a3 58 e1 b4 6d 7e | 75 5b 92 8f d6 1e 62 40 a5 7d 12 db db b6 2c 37 | 1e f9 74 b0 88 0f 80 c9 44 79 ce 66 b4 c1 59 20 | ca eb c0 c6 53 dc 27 cb d3 26 aa 54 9c 33 57 aa | de 7e 3d 1a 10 32 b1 0f 25 43 d2 af 43 b5 12 30 | cd 49 ee 11 fc fc b5 84 51 41 ef 80 2c 3f 08 17 | 6b ec ea 70 3e b7 18 af 7f 98 b6 8b 90 5e b1 da | ff 4b eb 1b 23 4a b0 29 44 6a c9 cf f3 d4 db 92 | a3 74 c6 b7 07 69 bb a9 e4 ab 28 36 8f 0e 5f 42 | 97 5a ab df 11 01 8f e4 9e 97 0b 98 3d cf a5 20 | 95 5a 59 34 ad a6 ea 16 2a dd b8 e1 4e 18 fc d4 | 09 99 d2 d0 cb 0c e7 20 04 b9 5c 3d 18 1d 27 17 | 65 5b 93 ee a0 98 5e 7d 5f b7 4d 10 48 11 d1 11 | 5f ac 0d 43 95 b9 a5 eb 5a be 05 e6 1b 2b 65 ee | 71 9d 57 41 98 8f 05 34 df a5 27 8d a9 75 4e 02 | 87 bc 2e d4 56 8b 04 34 45 72 8b 5d 7d 11 cd c0 | a2 ac 38 bb 40 9a 7a d1 6d 8b 9b 81 8b 10 3e 86 | 10 9b 9a 91 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | #20 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48960.287658 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #20: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x08825b29 <0x2bdb1cde xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #20 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #20 spent 2.24 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 | spent 0.00285 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 52 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 20 01 fb f8 ce b4 00 00 00 34 24 3d c5 7f | 7e 8b 48 76 bf 3f 17 a9 be e3 b6 71 66 5d 32 c5 | 3e f0 a3 e9 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4227387060 (0xfbf8ceb4) | length: 52 (0x34) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #20 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #20 is idle | #20 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 24 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 8b 10 3e 86 10 9b 9a 91 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 66 5d 32 c5 3e f0 a3 e9 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -24): | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 20 01 fb f8 ce b4 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 18 | 74 e8 71 92 9f 31 91 cb 33 4e 0b 60 85 3e ec 13 | b7 fd 9d 1d | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | fb f8 ce b4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2d0002af0 (length 32) | 37 40 af a7 8e 9d bf ef 72 ca 7f a4 8a 87 92 b4 | ff 68 b3 30 c7 98 f2 a4 16 1f 78 a8 84 ed 6c f9 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fb2dc0090d0 (length 32) | d5 68 8a e0 fa b4 e2 46 d5 1c 79 92 a6 ca 43 12 | 3f 73 a6 db 81 03 0b 1e d0 33 b8 b4 0f f5 68 d5 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 74 e8 71 92 9f 31 91 cb 33 4e 0b 60 85 3e ec 13 | b7 fd 9d 1d | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 74 e8 71 92 9f 31 91 cb 33 4e 0b 60 85 3e ec 13 | b7 fd 9d 1d | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #20: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #20: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #20 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x8825b29 SPI_OUT=0x2bdb | popen cmd is 1019 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x8825b29 SPI_OUT=0x2bdb1cde ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55e200ba49a0,sr=0x55e200ba49a0} to #20 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #19 spent 0.264 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #20 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#20) cloned from #19 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #20 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #20: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #20 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #20 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #20: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x08825b29 <0x2bdb1cde xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #20 spent 0.337 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.569 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0042 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00261 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 05 01 9f ad 39 ab 00 00 00 44 42 52 2f e9 | 39 63 dc a8 37 55 32 93 c9 fe 5d d6 ec 3f 7d cc | 16 c7 ec 1b 25 23 67 8f 10 f2 af c4 6d 9e 72 91 | 7c 49 9b 02 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2678929835 (0x9fad39ab) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #20; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=fbf8ceb4 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #19; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #19 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | current Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 8) | e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 9f ad 39 ab | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 50 c8 76 ea 2f 42 15 18 0c 7d 36 78 0c 25 01 04 | 26 24 b3 5a | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 50 c8 76 ea 2f 42 15 18 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 6d 9e 72 91 7c 49 9b 02 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 05 01 9f ad 39 ab 00 00 00 44 0c 00 00 18 | a4 9d 52 e7 74 03 41 c8 8f d9 94 55 bf ff d5 40 | 98 8c b4 e3 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 08 82 5b 29 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40010c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 9f ad 39 ab | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7fb2e0004e74 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 08 82 5b 29 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | a4 9d 52 e7 74 03 41 c8 8f d9 94 55 bf ff d5 40 | 98 8c b4 e3 | informational HASH(1): | a4 9d 52 e7 74 03 41 c8 8f d9 94 55 bf ff d5 40 | 98 8c b4 e3 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 08 82 5b 29 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #19: received Delete SA(0x08825b29) payload: deleting IPsec State #20 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #20: deleting other state #20 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.278s and sending notification | child state #20: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.8825b29@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.2bdb1cde@192.1.2.23 "east" #20: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #20 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2975701093 (0xb15d9865) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 2b db 1c de | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dbe8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba8d90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dccc (length 4) | b1 5d 98 65 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e074 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 2b db 1c de | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e060 (length 20) | 63 7d 1f 38 a5 7a 62 13 53 0f 87 2a 75 14 c1 a4 | 24 cd 06 4a | send delete HASH(1): | 63 7d 1f 38 a5 7a 62 13 53 0f 87 2a 75 14 c1 a4 | 24 cd 06 4a | last Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | current Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 8) | e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dcdc (length 4) | b1 5d 98 65 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 37 a6 80 1e d9 74 bf d7 94 e7 7e 6c 23 66 48 85 | 8a 24 30 a5 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 63 7d 1f 38 a5 7a 62 13 53 0f 87 2a | encrypting: 75 14 c1 a4 24 cd 06 4a 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 2b db 1c de | IV: 37 a6 80 1e d9 74 bf d7 94 e7 7e 6c 23 66 48 85 | IV: 8a 24 30 a5 | unpadded size is: 40 | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 2a ed 57 2d fe 0a 72 15 | sending 68 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 05 01 b1 5d 98 65 00 00 00 44 d3 c9 9c 0e | 70 1e 42 03 8d f1 47 bf 7b 94 2f da 35 e9 3c 03 | b1 b7 48 b9 e3 47 e8 e1 a7 e9 3b 60 2a ed 57 2d | fe 0a 72 15 | state #20 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d8003960 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050313' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x8825b29 S | popen cmd is 1030 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050313' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x8825b29 SPI_OUT=0x2bdb1cde ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.8825b29@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.8825b29@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.2bdb1cde@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.2bdb1cde@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #20 in QUICK_R2 | child state #20: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2dc001270: destroyed | stop processing: state #20 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #19 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #19 | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #19: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.371s and sending notification | parent state #19: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #19 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1662313484 (0x6314e40c) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3db88 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40010c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc6c (length 4) | 63 14 e4 0c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e014 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 f2 69 cc 85 | af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e000 (length 20) | 1b 9e 0f f5 dd 1f 83 ed ff 19 f6 31 87 ef 50 d5 | 2a cf 43 87 | send delete HASH(1): | 1b 9e 0f f5 dd 1f 83 ed ff 19 f6 31 87 ef 50 d5 | 2a cf 43 87 | last Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | current Phase 1 IV: e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200ba8760 (length 8) | e9 d3 a0 51 6b 37 1a f7 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc7c (length 4) | 63 14 e4 0c | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200ba86e0 (length 20) | 80 2c 53 df e8 b7 8f 77 80 ef e2 7c 05 d8 0a 87 | 11 d7 98 ba | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 1b 9e 0f f5 dd 1f 83 ed ff 19 f6 31 | encrypting: 87 ef 50 d5 2a cf 43 87 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e | encrypting: f8 e9 a0 26 | IV: 80 2c 53 df e8 b7 8f 77 80 ef e2 7c 05 d8 0a 87 | IV: 11 d7 98 ba | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 56 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 9b 4b 06 bd 4c da 21 59 | sending 84 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 05 01 63 14 e4 0c 00 00 00 54 27 a0 72 b6 | 88 89 64 66 fd f5 ac 90 ff 89 b9 b6 e6 a1 9e e1 | e1 01 ca 0d 7f bc 1a 91 da 6e e6 5d 98 c0 8b 5d | f4 a7 e0 72 26 90 db 2b 63 29 c3 40 9b 4b 06 bd | 4c da 21 59 | state #19 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00081c0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #19: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d0002a80: destroyed | stop processing: state #19 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200b8a680 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.42 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00142 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 84 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | 08 10 05 01 1b e7 39 44 00 00 00 54 30 3e fb 73 | 93 c1 23 a5 be dd 68 63 8b da b5 83 63 f3 f4 74 | c9 b4 7c 86 3f 1a 44 9c a4 5e c8 32 8d d3 9f 71 | 7a 80 50 a0 cc 8d 6a e8 18 61 d0 b1 b0 97 97 db | f7 25 b3 b7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | responder cookie: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 468138308 (0x1be73944) | length: 84 (0x54) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x1be73944 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | f2 69 cc 85 af f2 d9 a8 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | cd e1 be 8e f8 e9 a0 26 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0663 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0047 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00309 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 80 45 41 6f 90 69 f9 ca 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 45 41 6f 90 69 f9 ca | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 0d 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | a2 24 fd 6f f2 df 15 01 37 92 68 fe cf 9b ef 80 | 92 25 dd 9a 6b db d7 dd 4c 3f cf 37 8e 44 07 fe | creating state object #21 at 0x55e200ba82d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #21 in UNDEFINED | pstats #21 ikev1.isakmp started | #21 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #21: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 80 45 41 6f 90 69 f9 ca "east" #21: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 45 41 6f 90 69 f9 ca | responder cookie: | a2 24 fd 6f f2 df 15 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #21: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #21: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #21 is idle "east" #21: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 45 41 6f 90 69 f9 ca | responder cookie: | a2 24 fd 6f f2 df 15 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #21) | 80 45 41 6f 90 69 f9 ca a2 24 fd 6f f2 df 15 01 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.552 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00302 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6c 95 b1 f9 bc 4d e9 9a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 95 b1 f9 bc 4d e9 9a | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 0e 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | 9e 68 32 5a 5b 45 c7 e1 11 fd 14 f0 db 5c 7d 97 | e5 67 14 85 65 eb f5 9b a5 77 be f4 8a 92 4d 15 | creating state object #22 at 0x55e200bab240 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #22 in UNDEFINED | pstats #22 ikev1.isakmp started | #22 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #22: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 6c 95 b1 f9 bc 4d e9 9a "east" #22: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 95 b1 f9 bc 4d e9 9a | responder cookie: | 9e 68 32 5a 5b 45 c7 e1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #22: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #22: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #22 is idle "east" #22: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6c 95 b1 f9 bc 4d e9 9a | responder cookie: | 9e 68 32 5a 5b 45 c7 e1 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #22) | 6c 95 b1 f9 bc 4d e9 9a 9e 68 32 5a 5b 45 c7 e1 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.568 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00286 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55e200ba5100 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55e1ff717700 (length 32) | b5 1d 9f c0 11 6f d8 9e bc 21 eb 42 64 05 14 08 | ce 29 6f 2d e2 29 36 c8 3d 53 4c 19 8d e9 86 fb | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55e1ff7176e0 (length 4) | 0f 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffd8ed402a0 (length 32) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a 57 c5 58 64 1d 61 29 d4 | 2f 90 69 b3 e2 1c f5 1e 18 b1 bb 49 84 c1 dc 49 | creating state object #23 at 0x55e200bb05d0 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #23 in UNDEFINED | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp started | #23 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2668) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #23: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | ICOOKIE-DUMP: 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 "east" #23: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 192 (0xc0) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 c0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #23 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #23: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.578 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00201 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | 14 00 00 24 7e e7 95 9b ec de b9 3d 02 6b d1 09 | 5c 67 2d 55 52 e2 dc 5d 1c dc be 45 c3 c0 05 f4 | 39 79 46 70 14 00 00 18 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 | c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 10 de 39 59 00 00 00 18 | c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | f9 aa 16 93 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #23 is idle | #23 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bb0b68 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bb0b70 (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40490 (length 20) | 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | 10 de 39 59 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | natd_hash: hash= 10 de 39 59 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55e200bb0b68 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55e200bb0b70 (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403f4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed403e6 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed404d0 (length 20) | c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | f9 aa 16 93 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | natd_hash: hash= f9 aa 16 93 | expected NAT-D(me): 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | expected NAT-D(me): 10 de 39 59 | expected NAT-D(him): | c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | f9 aa 16 93 | received NAT-D: 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | received NAT-D: 10 de 39 59 | received NAT-D: c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | received NAT-D: f9 aa 16 93 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 25 for state #23 | state #23 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #23 and saving MD | #23 is busy; has a suspended MD | #23 spent 0.174 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.312 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 25 for state #23 | crypto helper 6 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 25 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d40028d0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2d40028d0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | Generated nonce: 2d 9d 67 e6 20 6d 48 e5 42 af 76 06 e1 37 7c ac | Generated nonce: 3a 43 95 c1 d6 6d 58 6e a2 7f fc c0 d7 3e bd 40 | crypto helper 6 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 25 time elapsed 0.000928 seconds | (#23) spent 0.93 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 25: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 25 for state #23 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4007070 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #23 | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 25 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #23: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d40028d0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #23 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | keyex value f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | keyex value f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | keyex value b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | keyex value 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | keyex value e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | keyex value b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | keyex value 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | keyex value af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | keyex value ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | keyex value 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | keyex value a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | keyex value 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | keyex value e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | keyex value cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | keyex value d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 2d 9d 67 e6 20 6d 48 e5 42 af 76 06 e1 37 7c ac | Nr 3a 43 95 c1 d6 6d 58 6e a2 7f fc c0 d7 3e bd 40 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | f9 aa 16 93 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | natd_hash: hash= f9 aa 16 93 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 | NAT-D f9 aa 16 93 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d0 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed400d8 (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40054 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40046 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffd8ed40120 (length 20) | 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | 10 de 39 59 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55e1ff6fa7a0(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port= 01 f4 | natd_hash: hash= 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | natd_hash: hash= 10 de 39 59 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | NAT-D 10 de 39 59 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d40028d0: transferring ownership from state #23 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 26 for state #23 | state #23 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | #23 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1158 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #23 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #23: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #23 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | 14 00 00 24 2d 9d 67 e6 20 6d 48 e5 42 af 76 06 | e1 37 7c ac 3a 43 95 c1 d6 6d 58 6e a2 7f fc c0 | d7 3e bd 40 14 00 00 18 c4 42 a7 57 7c 4e 57 66 | a1 f5 b9 7f 21 b5 6e f9 f9 aa 16 93 00 00 00 18 | 89 32 3c e1 97 8c 73 e5 c4 52 68 b1 8f bd 34 90 | 10 de 39 59 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 size 128 | #23 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48962.599077 "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #23 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #23 spent 0.366 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4007070 | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 26 for state #23 | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 26 | peer's g: ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | peer's g: 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | peer's g: 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | peer's g: 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | peer's g: 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | peer's g: e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | peer's g: eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | peer's g: f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | peer's g: ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | peer's g: 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | peer's g: 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | peer's g: 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | peer's g: c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | peer's g: be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | peer's g: 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | peer's g: 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d40028d0: computed shared DH secret key@0x7fb2e4006900 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55e200bb1cb0 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956a0 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495688 | result: psk-key@0x55e200b93380 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from psk-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55e200b93380 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d80010c0 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55e200bb1cd4 (length 32) | 7e e7 95 9b ec de b9 3d 02 6b d1 09 5c 67 2d 55 | 52 e2 dc 5d 1c dc be 45 c3 c0 05 f4 39 79 46 70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55e200bb1cf4 (length 32) | 2d 9d 67 e6 20 6d 48 e5 42 af 76 06 e1 37 7c ac | 3a 43 95 c1 d6 6d 58 6e a2 7f fc c0 d7 3e bd 40 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956b8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d80044f0 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-347516160: 68 11 29 2e 0e 25 65 5b 21 38 ffffffdc ffffffbf 3b 06 41 5a 34 55 ffffffd9 30 ffffff9a ffffffb6 ffffffd5 ffffffa8 6b 00 7b 6f 10 02 2f ffffffd0 ffffffae ffffffbb ffffffb6 24 49 44 3f ffffffd3 ffffff90 60 27 4e 39 68 ffffff8d 5a ffffff8f 0e ffffffd7 1e 59 52 ffffffa3 ffffffa3 ffffffe0 ffffffa6 6a 70 fffffff4 41 14 ffffff9d 63 ffffff96 35 ffffffda 1b ffffffc8 0f ffffffe0 ffffff92 ffffff97 12 fffffffd 58 ffffffda 0a ffffffbb 78 ffffffec 48 ffffffe8 ffffffe2 ffffffa7 ffffffd8 ffffffc3 63 ffffff9c 72 ffffff82 35 0f ffffffd8 03 ffffffda 28 28 ffffffca 49 ffffff93 ffffffed 53 46 5a ffffffd3 fffffff0 ffffffa8 7f 76 23 13 02 ffffffc4 ffffff9b 07 71 fffffff6 05 ffffffb2 61 ffffffee fffffff3 fffffff8 ffffffb6 ffffff8d 05 fffffff3 36 fffffff9 14 0d ffffffbc ffffffa0 ffffffe9 ffffff90 6c ffffffe8 43 ffffffa4 46 49 1e 0a ffffffb1 ffffffb0 fffffff8 3e 6e 09 3b 65 7c 0d 3a ffffffae 5c ffffffb8 ffffff85 ffffff8b 27 ffffffbe ffffff8e 2b 36 ffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2d8001510 | unwrapped: 40 8e 10 97 b6 89 5e 02 22 33 25 ca b1 af c5 81 | unwrapped: a5 14 a3 9e 9e f4 87 be bf 39 3d c8 69 c0 aa e5 | unwrapped: 2f 60 bf bb 1d 1d a8 6e fa b1 30 d1 c6 92 21 dd | unwrapped: f7 28 95 0c c3 bd ed 9a 28 a2 ee b7 04 4d c1 8a | unwrapped: 7e 1d 1c c4 4f ff 59 6c bc 0f 11 14 e8 26 ec 32 | unwrapped: 9f ad 98 91 60 51 59 8e 4a 40 d2 49 c4 48 fb a7 | unwrapped: fd 14 23 8f 35 a8 d8 dd 44 71 8c 07 3e 0c 6f bf | unwrapped: cb 3d 1f 65 63 5c e0 e1 c7 90 ec 18 18 bf c9 71 | unwrapped: c9 c9 99 89 77 96 4e 60 42 c3 60 cc 2d 0e c2 15 | unwrapped: 27 e6 3a f4 3e 84 8d 92 dd a9 7e ce 91 0e fe 39 | unwrapped: f6 f1 37 0e 1f 73 48 a6 0a c0 e4 6f 51 69 e2 3a | unwrapped: a2 4f 3a 15 70 59 a2 90 f2 c2 60 f8 4d da 8f db | unwrapped: 3e 45 2a cf d5 e6 65 2a 24 70 c2 22 5d 0c 51 33 | unwrapped: 36 87 d2 53 19 21 c0 12 e0 f2 da 58 b7 b4 a8 b0 | unwrapped: 12 6e 5e d2 0c b1 eb d4 f0 bd 3b e1 3a 52 cb b8 | unwrapped: 19 77 22 b1 03 f4 79 4b b2 aa 46 ac eb b6 cb eb | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb1f14 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb1f1c (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956c0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956a8 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495698 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55e200b88e00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8002a80 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8ff50 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-347516192: 4c fffffff6 40 ffffff9d 67 74 71 ffffffcd 14 73 ffffffc7 4e 23 ffffffc7 7e ffffffea ffffffaa 47 47 21 ffffffa7 ffffff82 ffffff98 6b 38 09 ffffffe5 20 58 ffffffb1 65 3a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2d8004bc0 | unwrapped: ba d9 0d c2 e6 08 f7 e2 19 a4 f2 3e 72 79 15 4d | unwrapped: 82 b1 fc 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-347516192: 68 11 29 2e 0e 25 65 5b 21 38 ffffffdc ffffffbf 3b 06 41 5a 34 55 ffffffd9 30 ffffff9a ffffffb6 ffffffd5 ffffffa8 6b 00 7b 6f 10 02 2f ffffffd0 ffffffae ffffffbb ffffffb6 24 49 44 3f ffffffd3 ffffff90 60 27 4e 39 68 ffffff8d 5a ffffff8f 0e ffffffd7 1e 59 52 ffffffa3 ffffffa3 ffffffe0 ffffffa6 6a 70 fffffff4 41 14 ffffff9d 63 ffffff96 35 ffffffda 1b ffffffc8 0f ffffffe0 ffffff92 ffffff97 12 fffffffd 58 ffffffda 0a ffffffbb 78 ffffffec 48 ffffffe8 ffffffe2 ffffffa7 ffffffd8 ffffffc3 63 ffffff9c 72 ffffff82 35 0f ffffffd8 03 ffffffda 28 28 ffffffca 49 ffffff93 ffffffed 53 46 5a ffffffd3 fffffff0 ffffffa8 7f 76 23 13 02 ffffffc4 ffffff9b 07 71 fffffff6 05 ffffffb2 61 ffffffee fffffff3 fffffff8 ffffffb6 ffffff8d 05 fffffff3 36 fffffff9 14 0d ffffffbc ffffffa0 ffffffe9 ffffff90 6c ffffffe8 43 ffffffa4 46 49 1e 0a ffffffb1 ffffffb0 fffffff8 3e 6e 09 3b 65 7c 0d 3a ffffffae 5c ffffffb8 ffffff85 ffffff8b 27 ffffffbe ffffff8e 2b 36 ffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2d8004a10 | unwrapped: 40 8e 10 97 b6 89 5e 02 22 33 25 ca b1 af c5 81 | unwrapped: a5 14 a3 9e 9e f4 87 be bf 39 3d c8 69 c0 aa e5 | unwrapped: 2f 60 bf bb 1d 1d a8 6e fa b1 30 d1 c6 92 21 dd | unwrapped: f7 28 95 0c c3 bd ed 9a 28 a2 ee b7 04 4d c1 8a | unwrapped: 7e 1d 1c c4 4f ff 59 6c bc 0f 11 14 e8 26 ec 32 | unwrapped: 9f ad 98 91 60 51 59 8e 4a 40 d2 49 c4 48 fb a7 | unwrapped: fd 14 23 8f 35 a8 d8 dd 44 71 8c 07 3e 0c 6f bf | unwrapped: cb 3d 1f 65 63 5c e0 e1 c7 90 ec 18 18 bf c9 71 | unwrapped: c9 c9 99 89 77 96 4e 60 42 c3 60 cc 2d 0e c2 15 | unwrapped: 27 e6 3a f4 3e 84 8d 92 dd a9 7e ce 91 0e fe 39 | unwrapped: f6 f1 37 0e 1f 73 48 a6 0a c0 e4 6f 51 69 e2 3a | unwrapped: a2 4f 3a 15 70 59 a2 90 f2 c2 60 f8 4d da 8f db | unwrapped: 3e 45 2a cf d5 e6 65 2a 24 70 c2 22 5d 0c 51 33 | unwrapped: 36 87 d2 53 19 21 c0 12 e0 f2 da 58 b7 b4 a8 b0 | unwrapped: 12 6e 5e d2 0c b1 eb d4 f0 bd 3b e1 3a 52 cb b8 | unwrapped: 19 77 22 b1 03 f4 79 4b b2 aa 46 ac eb b6 cb eb | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb1f14 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb1f1c (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956a0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495688 | result: final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956a8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55e200b969a0 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8002050 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b88e00 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-347516176: ffffffb0 ffffff93 ffffffda ffffff8f ffffffb8 69 2a ffffffe2 53 30 ffffffc5 40 ffffff91 ffffffa0 1a 2f ffffffd5 ffffff94 12 69 29 ffffffac 3a 17 ffffff8c 32 2e 36 7a ffffff9a ffffffe8 2a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2d8005e90 | unwrapped: 0c b2 86 9f 8b b4 93 6b c0 c0 1b 5c ad 26 5d ce | unwrapped: 73 16 e6 fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x7fb2e4006900 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x7fb2e4006900 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-347516176: 68 11 29 2e 0e 25 65 5b 21 38 ffffffdc ffffffbf 3b 06 41 5a 34 55 ffffffd9 30 ffffff9a ffffffb6 ffffffd5 ffffffa8 6b 00 7b 6f 10 02 2f ffffffd0 ffffffae ffffffbb ffffffb6 24 49 44 3f ffffffd3 ffffff90 60 27 4e 39 68 ffffff8d 5a ffffff8f 0e ffffffd7 1e 59 52 ffffffa3 ffffffa3 ffffffe0 ffffffa6 6a 70 fffffff4 41 14 ffffff9d 63 ffffff96 35 ffffffda 1b ffffffc8 0f ffffffe0 ffffff92 ffffff97 12 fffffffd 58 ffffffda 0a ffffffbb 78 ffffffec 48 ffffffe8 ffffffe2 ffffffa7 ffffffd8 ffffffc3 63 ffffff9c 72 ffffff82 35 0f ffffffd8 03 ffffffda 28 28 ffffffca 49 ffffff93 ffffffed 53 46 5a ffffffd3 fffffff0 ffffffa8 7f 76 23 13 02 ffffffc4 ffffff9b 07 71 fffffff6 05 ffffffb2 61 ffffffee fffffff3 fffffff8 ffffffb6 ffffff8d 05 fffffff3 36 fffffff9 14 0d ffffffbc ffffffa0 ffffffe9 ffffff90 6c ffffffe8 43 ffffffa4 46 49 1e 0a ffffffb1 ffffffb0 fffffff8 3e 6e 09 3b 65 7c 0d 3a ffffffae 5c ffffffb8 ffffff85 ffffff8b 27 ffffffbe ffffff8e 2b 36 ffffff | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fb2d8004900 | unwrapped: 40 8e 10 97 b6 89 5e 02 22 33 25 ca b1 af c5 81 | unwrapped: a5 14 a3 9e 9e f4 87 be bf 39 3d c8 69 c0 aa e5 | unwrapped: 2f 60 bf bb 1d 1d a8 6e fa b1 30 d1 c6 92 21 dd | unwrapped: f7 28 95 0c c3 bd ed 9a 28 a2 ee b7 04 4d c1 8a | unwrapped: 7e 1d 1c c4 4f ff 59 6c bc 0f 11 14 e8 26 ec 32 | unwrapped: 9f ad 98 91 60 51 59 8e 4a 40 d2 49 c4 48 fb a7 | unwrapped: fd 14 23 8f 35 a8 d8 dd 44 71 8c 07 3e 0c 6f bf | unwrapped: cb 3d 1f 65 63 5c e0 e1 c7 90 ec 18 18 bf c9 71 | unwrapped: c9 c9 99 89 77 96 4e 60 42 c3 60 cc 2d 0e c2 15 | unwrapped: 27 e6 3a f4 3e 84 8d 92 dd a9 7e ce 91 0e fe 39 | unwrapped: f6 f1 37 0e 1f 73 48 a6 0a c0 e4 6f 51 69 e2 3a | unwrapped: a2 4f 3a 15 70 59 a2 90 f2 c2 60 f8 4d da 8f db | unwrapped: 3e 45 2a cf d5 e6 65 2a 24 70 c2 22 5d 0c 51 33 | unwrapped: 36 87 d2 53 19 21 c0 12 e0 f2 da 58 b7 b4 a8 b0 | unwrapped: 12 6e 5e d2 0c b1 eb d4 f0 bd 3b e1 3a 52 cb b8 | unwrapped: 19 77 22 b1 03 f4 79 4b b2 aa 46 ac eb b6 cb eb | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55e200bb1f14 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55e200bb1f1c (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956b0 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495698 | result: final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200b8a680 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | appendix_b: SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495678 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | appendix_b prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b8a680 | appendix_b prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b8a680 | appendix_b: release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | appendix_b PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8004510 | appendix_b PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb495680 | result: final-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495668 | result: final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | appendix_b PRF sha final-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 20) | appendix_b: key-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b_keymat_e: reference old_k#1-key@0x55e200b8a680 | Kn PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b969a0 (size 20) | Kn: SKEYID_e-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b969a0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495678 | result: clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | Kn prf: created sha context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | Kn prf: begin sha with context 0x7fb2d8003aa0 from SKEYID_e-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | Kn: release clone-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | Kn PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8002a80 | Kn PRF sha update old_k-key@0x55e200b8a680 (size 20) | Kn: old_k-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55e200b8a680 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-347516224: ffffffd3 fffffffc 1f 77 ffffffd4 5f ffffffcd 28 ffffffa6 ffffffd2 ffffff9f 13 7e ffffffbc 21 2c ffffffe3 44 ffffffe0 66 ffffffad ffffffcb ffffffe3 5d ffffff9a ffffff8a 49 ffffffa4 1b ffffffa4 0d ffffffdb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fb2d8006250 | unwrapped: 23 42 95 d0 b6 3c dd 68 9a 07 72 23 16 2d 29 aa | unwrapped: 44 e7 60 cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fb2eb495680 | result: final-key@0x55e200baa800 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200baa800 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb495668 | result: final-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55e200baa800 | Kn PRF sha final-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (size 20) | Kn: key-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956f8 | result: result-key@0x55e200baa800 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55e200b8a680 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#N-key@0x55e200b8a680 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#final-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: DES3_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200baa800 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fb2eb4956f8 | result: cryptkey-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 (24-bytes, DES3_CBC) | appendix_b_keymat_e: release keymat-key@0x55e200baa800 | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55e200b8ff50, skeyid_a 0x55e200b88e00, skeyid_e 0x55e200b969a0, enc_key 0x7fb2e0007fa0 | DH_i: ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | DH_i: 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | DH_i: 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | DH_i: 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | DH_i: 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | DH_i: e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | DH_i: eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | DH_i: f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | DH_i: ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | DH_i: 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | DH_i: 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | DH_i: 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | DH_i: c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | DH_i: be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | DH_i: 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | DH_i: 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | DH_r: f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | DH_r: f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | DH_r: f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | DH_r: b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | DH_r: 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | DH_r: e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | DH_r: b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | DH_r: 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | DH_r: af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | DH_r: ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | DH_r: 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | DH_r: a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | DH_r: 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | DH_r: e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | DH_r: cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | DH_r: d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55e200bb1d14 (length 256) | ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55e200bb1e14 (length 256) | f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fb2d8000d60 (length 20) | fa 40 97 f1 f9 83 54 19 3a b1 44 fe 21 cf 9b 3b | 56 57 55 22 | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 26 time elapsed 0.002239 seconds | (#23) spent 2.24 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 26: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 26 for state #23 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8001820 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #23 | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 26 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #23: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1008) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d40028d0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #23 | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1021) | resume sending helper answer for #23 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #23 spent 0.0224 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d8001820 | spent 0.00299 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 fb 79 98 bd | 26 ce 00 44 8b dc 8b 82 0d e2 16 05 95 d9 fd 4d | d6 b6 f0 5a 99 c5 0f 90 f7 30 6b 9f 74 d9 3b a8 | 00 70 57 f9 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1435) | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: fa 40 97 f1 f9 83 54 19 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 74 d9 3b a8 00 70 57 f9 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 5f c0 96 04 | 94 be ca 12 07 35 cd a9 8b e1 c0 bb 00 14 eb 0e | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 4 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #23: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc004db0 (length 256) | ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002510 (length 256) | f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb0b68 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb0b70 (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d00013e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fec0 (length 20) | 5f c0 96 04 94 be ca 12 07 35 cd a9 8b e1 c0 bb | 00 14 eb 0e | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b93380 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdd8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8000d60 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002510 (length 256) | f2 b9 d1 e9 5b d4 07 a4 df d8 26 2f 2c 0d aa 8e | f9 01 5e 49 22 48 ed 1a d5 f4 31 b9 ca db a4 f5 | f2 bc 0c e2 f6 af 51 f5 7f 43 ab a1 95 c8 28 70 | b2 ba 92 be 4f 98 78 08 c3 63 00 01 a3 cd 56 70 | 82 34 4c 7b 98 36 3b a2 d6 f2 85 52 ba 05 32 4e | e5 fa 10 a5 25 c4 28 ae b1 7e eb 05 79 9f 98 4d | b0 cb 9f b9 f8 74 7f 88 a9 3d 55 23 4e db bf e7 | 0a 45 9d 54 82 b2 97 f8 e3 32 e3 86 cc fd d1 b3 | af d4 11 03 24 c3 e6 94 19 23 1b 31 96 ea 9c a5 | ea 49 73 9e 86 3a 05 b4 ae c0 80 a5 5a dd a5 69 | 5a 4c 18 62 f9 b2 60 81 b0 fa 31 85 e9 40 d3 24 | a4 f6 84 7e 1e 88 33 5d e5 2f 66 5f 54 31 b7 8c | 1d 22 92 25 e0 f5 58 7f ae 09 df e2 da 9a 07 70 | e2 8d e1 ab d8 95 15 ac b6 50 c4 89 e5 78 da b0 | cc d7 02 35 05 19 b2 fd 7e 18 b6 38 61 96 52 23 | d4 b1 9e 33 b0 0c 90 e4 44 c2 18 54 2d 35 11 3a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2dc004db0 (length 256) | ee 18 c7 2b 4c 4d a8 83 cd 2b 7d b8 06 ba f6 fd | 92 08 cf 9e 20 48 e9 a7 f4 ff a0 d9 4f e3 a8 2f | 6b f3 cd 8d ca 4f d0 a4 67 b4 1c 24 fe 1e a1 65 | 8a 69 cd 72 3a 89 85 ee 37 10 d4 c7 ed d9 75 89 | 27 9d 33 9d 78 6a c9 44 0f a7 68 02 fe 8f a3 4e | e1 c0 42 04 f8 c8 31 61 1f 17 af 00 45 4e 00 47 | eb 9f 8e 63 99 37 3c f9 f0 61 32 c3 61 51 d0 7f | f2 9c 58 cb 07 46 2d f7 5f f1 13 b9 4d f0 d6 b0 | ed 84 5b e5 59 80 77 00 4f c5 ac 5a 96 62 64 19 | 88 a6 1e b1 19 03 fd c4 8e 94 bc bf 94 b7 25 8b | 84 42 d4 e8 46 c1 65 a7 43 f6 40 d8 ed 57 2d d5 | 98 cb 75 5f e7 4a 60 cb d1 77 7f 3e ae a7 a2 29 | c7 71 14 29 ff 08 fa 8b 88 9c 80 89 4d 63 cd e4 | be ab 3e 0f fb 12 e6 cb 60 4b 11 86 8b 41 9e 46 | 1e 2f fb 88 c4 af 32 e4 ec 9a 80 a3 10 3c cd d4 | 83 da 6f 35 84 bd 13 9f c3 ac 88 63 bf 53 88 d2 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb0b70 (length 8) | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb0b68 (length 8) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200ba6714 (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40100 (length 20) | 89 19 93 e5 77 1a df 7f 8f 2b 73 a9 be 12 09 be | 32 ff cd 38 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 89 19 93 e5 77 1a df 7f 8f 2b 73 a9 be 12 09 be | HASH_R 32 ff cd 38 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 89 19 93 e5 77 1a df 7f 8f 2b 73 a9 be 12 09 be | encrypting: 32 ff cd 38 | IV: 74 d9 3b a8 00 70 57 f9 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #23 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #23: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #23 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #23 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e0007ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 68 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 66 13 63 99 | c6 d9 75 13 d7 21 b3 29 b3 5b f1 c6 b9 76 81 7b | 3b c1 37 6f e5 31 c8 e7 61 62 fd 4d 6a f8 38 6e | cb 14 12 33 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4007070 size 128 | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=3DES_CBC_192 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #23 | #23 spent 0.576 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.702 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00227 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 436 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 20 01 ea a2 14 8e 00 00 01 b4 6c 29 bc 1d | 56 ab 8d 64 36 47 fb 90 49 7f 1e b4 e3 75 58 ab | 49 85 db 6a 48 c0 61 fd 90 a0 56 4d 52 85 ba a4 | d8 2f 5c 88 c8 db a8 90 b6 d0 81 bc da 15 c2 11 | 80 df 69 ab eb 6d d7 bd 79 72 1d 27 43 f5 d4 8d | fd fd a5 fd 76 c4 02 ec 42 5b f2 6c 81 7d 37 8b | bb 58 6d 2c f8 28 a0 e4 5a 07 fe b8 9c 01 7e 85 | 50 d3 a9 80 19 d7 ba 85 75 88 f6 e4 45 6f 9d dd | 77 05 26 7f 16 ba 39 f3 aa 7c 26 ae 71 81 95 71 | 4b 3f a6 db da f8 8b 75 1e ed 54 75 17 1a e7 ee | ee 20 4a 65 8d 8b 84 89 99 53 a0 52 a3 8a c3 cd | fa 3e 3c d7 4b 96 91 19 02 3c 54 11 69 26 73 55 | 3c 16 be 54 66 44 1c 10 14 2c fe 0d 07 79 fd dd | 3f e6 48 2c d4 a4 5f fc 2b 71 84 1c f3 5e 3c c2 | 6d 43 d6 c6 3c 35 52 58 50 bb 1f 65 3a d0 d9 de | ab c4 27 91 0f 57 e5 91 b6 e9 48 0f 3a 64 1f 45 | 0c 9c c1 be 44 88 07 3a ca 3d 66 dd c4 20 e3 e3 | d8 34 7b 74 b5 4b be bf 57 a1 b4 05 79 20 68 1b | f1 aa 6d 57 83 2f 0f 74 08 35 fc d3 71 3e 02 c6 | bd 2d ad cb 24 3d 26 de 50 d4 6c 8b 0d 02 2f 5a | 09 1a 10 05 17 84 8a cb 0a 0a 95 9e 62 e7 d7 55 | 96 da db 67 0e 9f b4 42 97 0a fb 0d 15 ae ec 95 | ff 86 f8 9d 7d a8 65 77 0a 2e d9 4d 42 49 31 78 | f2 64 f5 0c e3 6b 42 c5 e8 43 30 a1 cb f0 9b 8e | 53 3f d8 ba 2a 15 77 97 a4 5f ae 91 ea 56 58 f7 | ce 98 42 a1 89 05 a3 7b d1 81 75 a6 1e 83 35 2e | d3 47 43 ea | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3936490638 (0xeaa2148e) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1583) | last Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | current Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb0a60 (length 8) | 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | ea a2 14 8e | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb09e0 (length 20) | 99 a3 d4 12 43 52 f0 a7 99 e5 6c 30 54 68 81 da | b8 0a 8f 53 | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 408 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 99 a3 d4 12 43 52 f0 a7 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 1e 83 35 2e d3 47 43 ea | decrypted payload (starts at offset -408): | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 20 01 ea a2 14 8e 00 00 01 b4 01 00 00 18 | 6d 82 54 de c6 a8 a8 57 2d fe e8 d8 09 fc c6 5c | c7 ca cc 02 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 76 34 22 bd 00 00 00 1c | 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 10 31 86 a6 | 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee 13 5c ee b3 | 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d 05 00 01 04 | 66 50 4f 23 0b 04 c3 51 78 31 fc 75 ee 89 f5 c7 | 8b 13 85 22 b2 ee 71 6c d9 7b 68 ac 26 8e 31 42 | 3e 03 19 cd c3 0f 46 62 ea 46 54 39 34 03 77 b3 | aa 8c 28 f5 9f c5 b0 2d e2 21 31 ad 26 76 46 f0 | a1 58 d4 cd 45 cb 29 5a e6 b4 25 4e 3d 36 13 0b | 05 2e ba b0 c7 62 32 79 52 7b 4e d3 54 be 3c 8d | 20 58 60 e5 53 40 47 f4 85 49 69 00 4a 64 09 a7 | 30 c0 62 ca 23 5d ef 7f 20 ac 96 08 89 5e 96 53 | 5e 3f bf 1a 6a 9e 51 a3 f6 6d 10 01 53 78 a4 f3 | 6e 46 02 df 95 c1 66 96 d2 59 f6 45 35 da 95 80 | 25 5a 3f f6 aa 94 ba 10 ff e4 1f 1c f6 84 7f 8b | b1 28 1d 2c ce b1 4f 05 fa 5d f3 e6 76 59 57 5f | e7 af 75 59 82 c7 35 65 ca 89 19 66 b1 79 f8 37 | fd d4 85 79 b7 71 3e a3 23 ca 2e 45 51 a0 cf 3a | dc af c9 19 e2 c8 99 d3 a4 5a 46 9b fd 6e 04 0b | 25 91 56 0d 38 2f 45 62 e1 fd 71 8d aa bf 2b 08 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | ea a2 14 8e | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e200ba6984 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 76 34 22 bd 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 | c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe | 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d 05 00 01 04 66 50 4f 23 | 0b 04 c3 51 78 31 fc 75 ee 89 f5 c7 8b 13 85 22 | b2 ee 71 6c d9 7b 68 ac 26 8e 31 42 3e 03 19 cd | c3 0f 46 62 ea 46 54 39 34 03 77 b3 aa 8c 28 f5 | 9f c5 b0 2d e2 21 31 ad 26 76 46 f0 a1 58 d4 cd | 45 cb 29 5a e6 b4 25 4e 3d 36 13 0b 05 2e ba b0 | c7 62 32 79 52 7b 4e d3 54 be 3c 8d 20 58 60 e5 | 53 40 47 f4 85 49 69 00 4a 64 09 a7 30 c0 62 ca | 23 5d ef 7f 20 ac 96 08 89 5e 96 53 5e 3f bf 1a | 6a 9e 51 a3 f6 6d 10 01 53 78 a4 f3 6e 46 02 df | 95 c1 66 96 d2 59 f6 45 35 da 95 80 25 5a 3f f6 | aa 94 ba 10 ff e4 1f 1c f6 84 7f 8b b1 28 1d 2c | ce b1 4f 05 fa 5d f3 e6 76 59 57 5f e7 af 75 59 | 82 c7 35 65 ca 89 19 66 b1 79 f8 37 fd d4 85 79 | b7 71 3e a3 23 ca 2e 45 51 a0 cf 3a dc af c9 19 | e2 c8 99 d3 a4 5a 46 9b fd 6e 04 0b 25 91 56 0d | 38 2f 45 62 e1 fd 71 8d aa bf 2b 08 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 6d 82 54 de c6 a8 a8 57 2d fe e8 d8 09 fc c6 5c | c7 ca cc 02 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 6d 82 54 de c6 a8 a8 57 2d fe e8 d8 09 fc c6 5c | c7 ca cc 02 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #23: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24:0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #24 at 0x55e200bb1090 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #24 in UNDEFINED | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #23 "east" as #24 for IPSEC SA | #24 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #23.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1481) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1294) | child state #24: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 76 34 22 bd | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 66 50 4f 23 0b 04 c3 51 78 31 fc 75 ee 89 f5 c7 | 8b 13 85 22 b2 ee 71 6c d9 7b 68 ac 26 8e 31 42 | 3e 03 19 cd c3 0f 46 62 ea 46 54 39 34 03 77 b3 | aa 8c 28 f5 9f c5 b0 2d e2 21 31 ad 26 76 46 f0 | a1 58 d4 cd 45 cb 29 5a e6 b4 25 4e 3d 36 13 0b | 05 2e ba b0 c7 62 32 79 52 7b 4e d3 54 be 3c 8d | 20 58 60 e5 53 40 47 f4 85 49 69 00 4a 64 09 a7 | 30 c0 62 ca 23 5d ef 7f 20 ac 96 08 89 5e 96 53 | 5e 3f bf 1a 6a 9e 51 a3 f6 6d 10 01 53 78 a4 f3 | 6e 46 02 df 95 c1 66 96 d2 59 f6 45 35 da 95 80 | 25 5a 3f f6 aa 94 ba 10 ff e4 1f 1c f6 84 7f 8b | b1 28 1d 2c ce b1 4f 05 fa 5d f3 e6 76 59 57 5f | e7 af 75 59 82 c7 35 65 ca 89 19 66 b1 79 f8 37 | fd d4 85 79 b7 71 3e a3 23 ca 2e 45 51 a0 cf 3a | dc af c9 19 e2 c8 99 d3 a4 5a 46 9b fd 6e 04 0b | 25 91 56 0d 38 2f 45 62 e1 fd 71 8d aa bf 2b 08 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 27 for state #24 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2624) | suspending state #24 and saving MD | #24 is busy; has a suspended MD | #23 spent 0.232 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.641 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 27 for state #24 | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 27 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001ef0: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fb2cc001ef0 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 21 62 ee 53 46 f1 ca bd ad 77 9e 15 04 b9 4d e0 | a7 32 4d dc 2a aa c9 dd 3b 2f 3c 68 fe 44 83 75 | e9 48 86 a9 f4 8c e4 7f 39 63 2d 85 c0 ca 7f a6 | 80 ea fa 08 a4 4e 9f 4d 52 7d 72 4f 49 2a 0a 9b | 4c da b2 77 d7 87 78 a8 e2 14 a1 67 09 15 4e 08 | d4 d0 a8 ab 5a f2 db d6 68 6c db ce 0e 40 75 2d | 91 01 35 4f 57 9f c1 81 34 b1 f9 dc a4 41 55 24 | a8 03 65 b0 dd 31 8c 90 44 f3 62 a0 63 24 00 bd | cf 43 1b 88 88 a0 d8 c8 57 1b 8c 54 be 92 c4 be | 75 7b 6d 50 90 09 66 cb f9 86 91 b2 3a a2 05 0f | a7 21 6e cd 36 ac 29 b1 e5 6c f1 a9 7a 8b cc e2 | f2 b5 0c ea ef 2e d0 11 17 a3 ea 5a dc a8 cf ec | 5e ba 38 35 39 b5 c5 f2 2b 25 55 5a 96 f6 ef 37 | 70 1a de 2c 64 e3 72 dc 4d c7 9b 01 c2 57 81 84 | 5c 19 e8 58 8d c6 a3 ff 1f f7 b4 2d fd 05 fc 12 | 3c 18 d6 22 71 22 b7 1a d8 e2 2e 9d b6 12 43 b3 | Generated nonce: 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | Generated nonce: 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 27 time elapsed 0.001035 seconds | (#24) spent 1.04 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 27: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 27 for state #24 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc0085b0 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #24 | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 27 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #24: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001ef0: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #24 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55e200b990d0 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55e200b990d0 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001ef0: transferring ownership from state #24 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 28 for state #24 | state #24 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 size 128 | suspending state #24 and saving MD | #24 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 5 resuming | resume sending helper answer for #24 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 28 for state #24 | #24 spent 0.0706 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 28 | peer's g: 66 50 4f 23 0b 04 c3 51 78 31 fc 75 ee 89 f5 c7 | peer's g: 8b 13 85 22 b2 ee 71 6c d9 7b 68 ac 26 8e 31 42 | peer's g: 3e 03 19 cd c3 0f 46 62 ea 46 54 39 34 03 77 b3 | peer's g: aa 8c 28 f5 9f c5 b0 2d e2 21 31 ad 26 76 46 f0 | peer's g: a1 58 d4 cd 45 cb 29 5a e6 b4 25 4e 3d 36 13 0b | peer's g: 05 2e ba b0 c7 62 32 79 52 7b 4e d3 54 be 3c 8d | peer's g: 20 58 60 e5 53 40 47 f4 85 49 69 00 4a 64 09 a7 | peer's g: 30 c0 62 ca 23 5d ef 7f 20 ac 96 08 89 5e 96 53 | peer's g: 5e 3f bf 1a 6a 9e 51 a3 f6 6d 10 01 53 78 a4 f3 | peer's g: 6e 46 02 df 95 c1 66 96 d2 59 f6 45 35 da 95 80 | peer's g: 25 5a 3f f6 aa 94 ba 10 ff e4 1f 1c f6 84 7f 8b | peer's g: b1 28 1d 2c ce b1 4f 05 fa 5d f3 e6 76 59 57 5f | peer's g: e7 af 75 59 82 c7 35 65 ca 89 19 66 b1 79 f8 37 | peer's g: fd d4 85 79 b7 71 3e a3 23 ca 2e 45 51 a0 cf 3a | peer's g: dc af c9 19 e2 c8 99 d3 a4 5a 46 9b fd 6e 04 0b | peer's g: 25 91 56 0d 38 2f 45 62 e1 fd 71 8d aa bf 2b 08 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2cc0085b0 | new : g_ir-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001ef0: computed shared DH secret key@0x55e200baa800 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 28 time elapsed 0.000981 seconds | (#24) spent 0.981 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 28: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 28 for state #24 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00012f0 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #24 | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 28 | calling continuation function 0x55e1ff624630 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #24: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3936490638 (0xeaa2148e) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 76 34 22 bd | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xaddb20c0 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI ad db 20 c0 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 20 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 28 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #24: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:eaa2148e} "east" #24: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #24: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | Nr 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 21 62 ee 53 46 f1 ca bd ad 77 9e 15 04 b9 4d e0 | keyex value a7 32 4d dc 2a aa c9 dd 3b 2f 3c 68 fe 44 83 75 | keyex value e9 48 86 a9 f4 8c e4 7f 39 63 2d 85 c0 ca 7f a6 | keyex value 80 ea fa 08 a4 4e 9f 4d 52 7d 72 4f 49 2a 0a 9b | keyex value 4c da b2 77 d7 87 78 a8 e2 14 a1 67 09 15 4e 08 | keyex value d4 d0 a8 ab 5a f2 db d6 68 6c db ce 0e 40 75 2d | keyex value 91 01 35 4f 57 9f c1 81 34 b1 f9 dc a4 41 55 24 | keyex value a8 03 65 b0 dd 31 8c 90 44 f3 62 a0 63 24 00 bd | keyex value cf 43 1b 88 88 a0 d8 c8 57 1b 8c 54 be 92 c4 be | keyex value 75 7b 6d 50 90 09 66 cb f9 86 91 b2 3a a2 05 0f | keyex value a7 21 6e cd 36 ac 29 b1 e5 6c f1 a9 7a 8b cc e2 | keyex value f2 b5 0c ea ef 2e d0 11 17 a3 ea 5a dc a8 cf ec | keyex value 5e ba 38 35 39 b5 c5 f2 2b 25 55 5a 96 f6 ef 37 | keyex value 70 1a de 2c 64 e3 72 dc 4d c7 9b 01 c2 57 81 84 | keyex value 5c 19 e8 58 8d c6 a3 ff 1f f7 b4 2d fd 05 fc 12 | keyex value 3c 18 d6 22 71 22 b7 1a d8 e2 2e 9d b6 12 43 b3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001ef0: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #24 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fd38 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8a680 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b8a680 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf50 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fe1c (length 4) | ea a2 14 8e | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55e1ff723974 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 ad db 20 c0 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 | 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 | fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 05 00 01 04 21 62 ee 53 | 46 f1 ca bd ad 77 9e 15 04 b9 4d e0 a7 32 4d dc | 2a aa c9 dd 3b 2f 3c 68 fe 44 83 75 e9 48 86 a9 | f4 8c e4 7f 39 63 2d 85 c0 ca 7f a6 80 ea fa 08 | a4 4e 9f 4d 52 7d 72 4f 49 2a 0a 9b 4c da b2 77 | d7 87 78 a8 e2 14 a1 67 09 15 4e 08 d4 d0 a8 ab | 5a f2 db d6 68 6c db ce 0e 40 75 2d 91 01 35 4f | 57 9f c1 81 34 b1 f9 dc a4 41 55 24 a8 03 65 b0 | dd 31 8c 90 44 f3 62 a0 63 24 00 bd cf 43 1b 88 | 88 a0 d8 c8 57 1b 8c 54 be 92 c4 be 75 7b 6d 50 | 90 09 66 cb f9 86 91 b2 3a a2 05 0f a7 21 6e cd | 36 ac 29 b1 e5 6c f1 a9 7a 8b cc e2 f2 b5 0c ea | ef 2e d0 11 17 a3 ea 5a dc a8 cf ec 5e ba 38 35 | 39 b5 c5 f2 2b 25 55 5a 96 f6 ef 37 70 1a de 2c | 64 e3 72 dc 4d c7 9b 01 c2 57 81 84 5c 19 e8 58 | 8d c6 a3 ff 1f f7 b4 2d fd 05 fc 12 3c 18 d6 22 | 71 22 b7 1a d8 e2 2e 9d b6 12 43 b3 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55e1ff723960 (length 20) | ef 54 98 7e c1 aa c0 8b b6 dd 72 27 74 79 ec 37 | e2 48 43 75 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | ef 54 98 7e c1 aa c0 8b b6 dd 72 27 74 79 ec 37 | e2 48 43 75 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=24 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=44 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200babe20 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200baa800 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 48 2b 78 52 02 3a 4c ffffffd1 ffffffb3 54 ffffff81 ffffff94 0d 50 1b 20 0a 46 4b 7f ffffffc8 fffffff5 ffffff91 ffffff8e 58 0b ffffffd7 6b ffffffd2 ffffffb4 ffffffbc 52 4f ffffffa1 ffffffb3 5b ffffff89 66 1c ffffffdd 7c 52 ffffffd4 36 1e ffffff95 33 ffffff91 11 6a ffffffb8 ffffff83 5c 48 ffffffdc 55 62 5b ffffff91 ffffffb5 61 6c ffffffee 19 10 02 2b ffffffba 6a 6d ffffffc3 35 5e 63 13 7d ffffffd2 7a 37 ffffff9c 2c ffffffd6 4f fffffffc 71 ffffff87 42 ffffffdf 77 ffffffbf 6a 58 5a 48 20 ffffffcf 14 fffffff6 ffffff88 57 5e 1e ffffffa2 ffffffe8 0e 7c 1a ffffffeb 59 ffffff8c 65 73 49 ffffffc4 20 05 49 fffffff6 43 ffffffa1 69 15 09 ffffffc4 79 ffffffb3 5c 33 ffffffdf 49 38 ffffffe6 ffffffa1 fffffff8 5e 26 31 fffffff7 ffffff97 ffffffdd ffffffe5 ffffff8e ffffff84 3d ffffffae 20 ffffffe7 ffffffcf 7b 15 4d 6a 5b ffffffd2 0e ffffff98 69 1d 12 ffffff8b ffffffa4 66 09 ffffffea 43 50 4a 0a 37 64 ffffff94 49 7f 7d ffffffb7 49 5e ffffffce 0f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bafeb0 | unwrapped: 67 6e 7e aa 77 51 27 2d 2f 79 fd 38 f4 dc f3 92 | unwrapped: be 13 51 48 0b cf 19 da b9 d5 5d 9b 2c 8d 9e cc | unwrapped: a1 8e 3b 2e 3a 45 93 2d 44 ef 98 41 09 20 cc cb | unwrapped: 45 8d 4c 06 17 d8 57 f2 07 71 58 bd 1e ac f6 72 | unwrapped: 28 4c 52 12 f5 36 ce 17 cf 09 39 ab c9 2f a1 e7 | unwrapped: 5a 33 b6 6b 89 a5 80 05 81 ed 36 9c 9c 63 19 31 | unwrapped: b5 23 35 0b 52 51 e1 ce b3 08 ec 6f 29 2c 9d f3 | unwrapped: 9b eb a2 a1 b3 77 68 78 7e 79 91 21 6f 53 3c 2f | unwrapped: 94 e8 aa 3f 21 50 98 bb b2 bf b4 84 fd 78 1f dc | unwrapped: 91 1f 29 14 e9 a9 81 df 4f ac 7a db 88 bc db 5c | unwrapped: bb 49 01 78 89 a8 c6 62 61 c2 c2 3d 67 56 fd d1 | unwrapped: 9b c5 0c 94 5a 7b 61 aa f5 38 dd ce 54 eb f9 b8 | unwrapped: 52 f4 a3 e6 92 45 a7 ed f2 3b 67 ac fd 17 0b 03 | unwrapped: d1 a0 27 a8 5b 02 f0 78 70 12 cd 4d af a1 3f 23 | unwrapped: 78 f9 f0 1e 7f 4b 82 48 91 da 9c d8 d9 03 c0 a7 | unwrapped: 89 bb 06 d1 26 1f 18 4e d6 59 51 a2 98 71 0b 04 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200baa800 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 48 2b 78 52 02 3a 4c ffffffd1 ffffffb3 54 ffffff81 ffffff94 0d 50 1b 20 0a 46 4b 7f ffffffc8 fffffff5 ffffff91 ffffff8e 58 0b ffffffd7 6b ffffffd2 ffffffb4 ffffffbc 52 4f ffffffa1 ffffffb3 5b ffffff89 66 1c ffffffdd 7c 52 ffffffd4 36 1e ffffff95 33 ffffff91 11 6a ffffffb8 ffffff83 5c 48 ffffffdc 55 62 5b ffffff91 ffffffb5 61 6c ffffffee 19 10 02 2b ffffffba 6a 6d ffffffc3 35 5e 63 13 7d ffffffd2 7a 37 ffffff9c 2c ffffffd6 4f fffffffc 71 ffffff87 42 ffffffdf 77 ffffffbf 6a 58 5a 48 20 ffffffcf 14 fffffff6 ffffff88 57 5e 1e ffffffa2 ffffffe8 0e 7c 1a ffffffeb 59 ffffff8c 65 73 49 ffffffc4 20 05 49 fffffff6 43 ffffffa1 69 15 09 ffffffc4 79 ffffffb3 5c 33 ffffffdf 49 38 ffffffe6 ffffffa1 fffffff8 5e 26 31 fffffff7 ffffff97 ffffffdd ffffffe5 ffffff8e ffffff84 3d ffffffae 20 ffffffe7 ffffffcf 7b 15 4d 6a 5b ffffffd2 0e ffffff98 69 1d 12 ffffff8b ffffffa4 66 09 ffffffea 43 50 4a 0a 37 64 ffffff94 49 7f 7d ffffffb7 49 5e ffffffce 0f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bab080 | unwrapped: 67 6e 7e aa 77 51 27 2d 2f 79 fd 38 f4 dc f3 92 | unwrapped: be 13 51 48 0b cf 19 da b9 d5 5d 9b 2c 8d 9e cc | unwrapped: a1 8e 3b 2e 3a 45 93 2d 44 ef 98 41 09 20 cc cb | unwrapped: 45 8d 4c 06 17 d8 57 f2 07 71 58 bd 1e ac f6 72 | unwrapped: 28 4c 52 12 f5 36 ce 17 cf 09 39 ab c9 2f a1 e7 | unwrapped: 5a 33 b6 6b 89 a5 80 05 81 ed 36 9c 9c 63 19 31 | unwrapped: b5 23 35 0b 52 51 e1 ce b3 08 ec 6f 29 2c 9d f3 | unwrapped: 9b eb a2 a1 b3 77 68 78 7e 79 91 21 6f 53 3c 2f | unwrapped: 94 e8 aa 3f 21 50 98 bb b2 bf b4 84 fd 78 1f dc | unwrapped: 91 1f 29 14 e9 a9 81 df 4f ac 7a db 88 bc db 5c | unwrapped: bb 49 01 78 89 a8 c6 62 61 c2 c2 3d 67 56 fd d1 | unwrapped: 9b c5 0c 94 5a 7b 61 aa f5 38 dd ce 54 eb f9 b8 | unwrapped: 52 f4 a3 e6 92 45 a7 ed f2 3b 67 ac fd 17 0b 03 | unwrapped: d1 a0 27 a8 5b 02 f0 78 70 12 cd 4d af a1 3f 23 | unwrapped: 78 f9 f0 1e 7f 4b 82 48 91 da 9c d8 d9 03 c0 a7 | unwrapped: 89 bb 06 d1 26 1f 18 4e d6 59 51 a2 98 71 0b 04 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1298 (length 4) | ad db 20 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1278 (length 4) | 76 34 22 bd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2d00013c0 (length 20) | d3 56 88 03 4d b0 56 22 23 98 6a 4f c4 5c 68 bc | 59 f2 fd 22 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a70 (length 20) | f4 3f 41 50 3b c9 29 b9 48 b8 0b 54 c6 1e cb 17 | 20 57 d9 ff | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2dc002090 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba7670 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d00013c0 (length 20) | d3 56 88 03 4d b0 56 22 23 98 6a 4f c4 5c 68 bc | 59 f2 fd 22 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a70 (length 20) | f4 3f 41 50 3b c9 29 b9 48 b8 0b 54 c6 1e cb 17 | 20 57 d9 ff | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200baa800 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 48 2b 78 52 02 3a 4c ffffffd1 ffffffb3 54 ffffff81 ffffff94 0d 50 1b 20 0a 46 4b 7f ffffffc8 fffffff5 ffffff91 ffffff8e 58 0b ffffffd7 6b ffffffd2 ffffffb4 ffffffbc 52 4f ffffffa1 ffffffb3 5b ffffff89 66 1c ffffffdd 7c 52 ffffffd4 36 1e ffffff95 33 ffffff91 11 6a ffffffb8 ffffff83 5c 48 ffffffdc 55 62 5b ffffff91 ffffffb5 61 6c ffffffee 19 10 02 2b ffffffba 6a 6d ffffffc3 35 5e 63 13 7d ffffffd2 7a 37 ffffff9c 2c ffffffd6 4f fffffffc 71 ffffff87 42 ffffffdf 77 ffffffbf 6a 58 5a 48 20 ffffffcf 14 fffffff6 ffffff88 57 5e 1e ffffffa2 ffffffe8 0e 7c 1a ffffffeb 59 ffffff8c 65 73 49 ffffffc4 20 05 49 fffffff6 43 ffffffa1 69 15 09 ffffffc4 79 ffffffb3 5c 33 ffffffdf 49 38 ffffffe6 ffffffa1 fffffff8 5e 26 31 fffffff7 ffffff97 ffffffdd ffffffe5 ffffff8e ffffff84 3d ffffffae 20 ffffffe7 ffffffcf 7b 15 4d 6a 5b ffffffd2 0e ffffff98 69 1d 12 ffffff8b ffffffa4 66 09 ffffffea 43 50 4a 0a 37 64 ffffff94 49 7f 7d ffffffb7 49 5e ffffffce 0f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bb02f0 | unwrapped: 67 6e 7e aa 77 51 27 2d 2f 79 fd 38 f4 dc f3 92 | unwrapped: be 13 51 48 0b cf 19 da b9 d5 5d 9b 2c 8d 9e cc | unwrapped: a1 8e 3b 2e 3a 45 93 2d 44 ef 98 41 09 20 cc cb | unwrapped: 45 8d 4c 06 17 d8 57 f2 07 71 58 bd 1e ac f6 72 | unwrapped: 28 4c 52 12 f5 36 ce 17 cf 09 39 ab c9 2f a1 e7 | unwrapped: 5a 33 b6 6b 89 a5 80 05 81 ed 36 9c 9c 63 19 31 | unwrapped: b5 23 35 0b 52 51 e1 ce b3 08 ec 6f 29 2c 9d f3 | unwrapped: 9b eb a2 a1 b3 77 68 78 7e 79 91 21 6f 53 3c 2f | unwrapped: 94 e8 aa 3f 21 50 98 bb b2 bf b4 84 fd 78 1f dc | unwrapped: 91 1f 29 14 e9 a9 81 df 4f ac 7a db 88 bc db 5c | unwrapped: bb 49 01 78 89 a8 c6 62 61 c2 c2 3d 67 56 fd d1 | unwrapped: 9b c5 0c 94 5a 7b 61 aa f5 38 dd ce 54 eb f9 b8 | unwrapped: 52 f4 a3 e6 92 45 a7 ed f2 3b 67 ac fd 17 0b 03 | unwrapped: d1 a0 27 a8 5b 02 f0 78 70 12 cd 4d af a1 3f 23 | unwrapped: 78 f9 f0 1e 7f 4b 82 48 91 da 9c d8 d9 03 c0 a7 | unwrapped: 89 bb 06 d1 26 1f 18 4e d6 59 51 a2 98 71 0b 04 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200baa800 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 48 2b 78 52 02 3a 4c ffffffd1 ffffffb3 54 ffffff81 ffffff94 0d 50 1b 20 0a 46 4b 7f ffffffc8 fffffff5 ffffff91 ffffff8e 58 0b ffffffd7 6b ffffffd2 ffffffb4 ffffffbc 52 4f ffffffa1 ffffffb3 5b ffffff89 66 1c ffffffdd 7c 52 ffffffd4 36 1e ffffff95 33 ffffff91 11 6a ffffffb8 ffffff83 5c 48 ffffffdc 55 62 5b ffffff91 ffffffb5 61 6c ffffffee 19 10 02 2b ffffffba 6a 6d ffffffc3 35 5e 63 13 7d ffffffd2 7a 37 ffffff9c 2c ffffffd6 4f fffffffc 71 ffffff87 42 ffffffdf 77 ffffffbf 6a 58 5a 48 20 ffffffcf 14 fffffff6 ffffff88 57 5e 1e ffffffa2 ffffffe8 0e 7c 1a ffffffeb 59 ffffff8c 65 73 49 ffffffc4 20 05 49 fffffff6 43 ffffffa1 69 15 09 ffffffc4 79 ffffffb3 5c 33 ffffffdf 49 38 ffffffe6 ffffffa1 fffffff8 5e 26 31 fffffff7 ffffff97 ffffffdd ffffffe5 ffffff8e ffffff84 3d ffffffae 20 ffffffe7 ffffffcf 7b 15 4d 6a 5b ffffffd2 0e ffffff98 69 1d 12 ffffff8b ffffffa4 66 09 ffffffea 43 50 4a 0a 37 64 ffffff94 49 7f 7d ffffffb7 49 5e ffffffce 0f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200baffc0 | unwrapped: 67 6e 7e aa 77 51 27 2d 2f 79 fd 38 f4 dc f3 92 | unwrapped: be 13 51 48 0b cf 19 da b9 d5 5d 9b 2c 8d 9e cc | unwrapped: a1 8e 3b 2e 3a 45 93 2d 44 ef 98 41 09 20 cc cb | unwrapped: 45 8d 4c 06 17 d8 57 f2 07 71 58 bd 1e ac f6 72 | unwrapped: 28 4c 52 12 f5 36 ce 17 cf 09 39 ab c9 2f a1 e7 | unwrapped: 5a 33 b6 6b 89 a5 80 05 81 ed 36 9c 9c 63 19 31 | unwrapped: b5 23 35 0b 52 51 e1 ce b3 08 ec 6f 29 2c 9d f3 | unwrapped: 9b eb a2 a1 b3 77 68 78 7e 79 91 21 6f 53 3c 2f | unwrapped: 94 e8 aa 3f 21 50 98 bb b2 bf b4 84 fd 78 1f dc | unwrapped: 91 1f 29 14 e9 a9 81 df 4f ac 7a db 88 bc db 5c | unwrapped: bb 49 01 78 89 a8 c6 62 61 c2 c2 3d 67 56 fd d1 | unwrapped: 9b c5 0c 94 5a 7b 61 aa f5 38 dd ce 54 eb f9 b8 | unwrapped: 52 f4 a3 e6 92 45 a7 ed f2 3b 67 ac fd 17 0b 03 | unwrapped: d1 a0 27 a8 5b 02 f0 78 70 12 cd 4d af a1 3f 23 | unwrapped: 78 f9 f0 1e 7f 4b 82 48 91 da 9c d8 d9 03 c0 a7 | unwrapped: 89 bb 06 d1 26 1f 18 4e d6 59 51 a2 98 71 0b 04 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1298 (length 4) | ad db 20 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1278 (length 4) | 76 34 22 bd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2d00013d4 (length 20) | 04 09 55 38 1b 04 9d fe 8c f8 b2 35 f5 c3 ec 8d | 20 58 ec 45 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a84 (length 20) | ac e8 57 9c 5e ec 43 3d 22 5b cc 48 ea 1d c3 cf | 02 b8 47 0b | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8bf60 from symkey-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b8a680 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2e40010c0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b8ff50 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fcb8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from symkey-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf30 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d00013d4 (length 20) | 04 09 55 38 1b 04 9d fe 8c f8 b2 35 f5 c3 ec 8d | 20 58 ec 45 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a84 (length 20) | ac e8 57 9c 5e ec 43 3d 22 5b cc 48 ea 1d c3 cf | 02 b8 47 0b | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200baa800 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 48 2b 78 52 02 3a 4c ffffffd1 ffffffb3 54 ffffff81 ffffff94 0d 50 1b 20 0a 46 4b 7f ffffffc8 fffffff5 ffffff91 ffffff8e 58 0b ffffffd7 6b ffffffd2 ffffffb4 ffffffbc 52 4f ffffffa1 ffffffb3 5b ffffff89 66 1c ffffffdd 7c 52 ffffffd4 36 1e ffffff95 33 ffffff91 11 6a ffffffb8 ffffff83 5c 48 ffffffdc 55 62 5b ffffff91 ffffffb5 61 6c ffffffee 19 10 02 2b ffffffba 6a 6d ffffffc3 35 5e 63 13 7d ffffffd2 7a 37 ffffff9c 2c ffffffd6 4f fffffffc 71 ffffff87 42 ffffffdf 77 ffffffbf 6a 58 5a 48 20 ffffffcf 14 fffffff6 ffffff88 57 5e 1e ffffffa2 ffffffe8 0e 7c 1a ffffffeb 59 ffffff8c 65 73 49 ffffffc4 20 05 49 fffffff6 43 ffffffa1 69 15 09 ffffffc4 79 ffffffb3 5c 33 ffffffdf 49 38 ffffffe6 ffffffa1 fffffff8 5e 26 31 fffffff7 ffffff97 ffffffdd ffffffe5 ffffff8e ffffff84 3d ffffffae 20 ffffffe7 ffffffcf 7b 15 4d 6a 5b ffffffd2 0e ffffff98 69 1d 12 ffffff8b ffffffa4 66 09 ffffffea 43 50 4a 0a 37 64 ffffff94 49 7f 7d ffffffb7 49 5e ffffffce 0f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bafeb0 | unwrapped: 67 6e 7e aa 77 51 27 2d 2f 79 fd 38 f4 dc f3 92 | unwrapped: be 13 51 48 0b cf 19 da b9 d5 5d 9b 2c 8d 9e cc | unwrapped: a1 8e 3b 2e 3a 45 93 2d 44 ef 98 41 09 20 cc cb | unwrapped: 45 8d 4c 06 17 d8 57 f2 07 71 58 bd 1e ac f6 72 | unwrapped: 28 4c 52 12 f5 36 ce 17 cf 09 39 ab c9 2f a1 e7 | unwrapped: 5a 33 b6 6b 89 a5 80 05 81 ed 36 9c 9c 63 19 31 | unwrapped: b5 23 35 0b 52 51 e1 ce b3 08 ec 6f 29 2c 9d f3 | unwrapped: 9b eb a2 a1 b3 77 68 78 7e 79 91 21 6f 53 3c 2f | unwrapped: 94 e8 aa 3f 21 50 98 bb b2 bf b4 84 fd 78 1f dc | unwrapped: 91 1f 29 14 e9 a9 81 df 4f ac 7a db 88 bc db 5c | unwrapped: bb 49 01 78 89 a8 c6 62 61 c2 c2 3d 67 56 fd d1 | unwrapped: 9b c5 0c 94 5a 7b 61 aa f5 38 dd ce 54 eb f9 b8 | unwrapped: 52 f4 a3 e6 92 45 a7 ed f2 3b 67 ac fd 17 0b 03 | unwrapped: d1 a0 27 a8 5b 02 f0 78 70 12 cd 4d af a1 3f 23 | unwrapped: 78 f9 f0 1e 7f 4b 82 48 91 da 9c d8 d9 03 c0 a7 | unwrapped: 89 bb 06 d1 26 1f 18 4e d6 59 51 a2 98 71 0b 04 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55e200baa800 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55e200baa800 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55e200b09080 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55e200b8cb50 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)-1898710736: 48 2b 78 52 02 3a 4c ffffffd1 ffffffb3 54 ffffff81 ffffff94 0d 50 1b 20 0a 46 4b 7f ffffffc8 fffffff5 ffffff91 ffffff8e 58 0b ffffffd7 6b ffffffd2 ffffffb4 ffffffbc 52 4f ffffffa1 ffffffb3 5b ffffff89 66 1c ffffffdd 7c 52 ffffffd4 36 1e ffffff95 33 ffffff91 11 6a ffffffb8 ffffff83 5c 48 ffffffdc 55 62 5b ffffff91 ffffffb5 61 6c ffffffee 19 10 02 2b ffffffba 6a 6d ffffffc3 35 5e 63 13 7d ffffffd2 7a 37 ffffff9c 2c ffffffd6 4f fffffffc 71 ffffff87 42 ffffffdf 77 ffffffbf 6a 58 5a 48 20 ffffffcf 14 fffffff6 ffffff88 57 5e 1e ffffffa2 ffffffe8 0e 7c 1a ffffffeb 59 ffffff8c 65 73 49 ffffffc4 20 05 49 fffffff6 43 ffffffa1 69 15 09 ffffffc4 79 ffffffb3 5c 33 ffffffdf 49 38 ffffffe6 ffffffa1 fffffff8 5e 26 31 fffffff7 ffffff97 ffffffdd ffffffe5 ffffff8e ffffff84 3d ffffffae 20 ffffffe7 ffffffcf 7b 15 4d 6a 5b ffffffd2 0e ffffff98 69 1d 12 ffffff8b ffffffa4 66 09 ffffffea 43 50 4a 0a 37 64 ffffff94 49 7f 7d ffffffb7 49 5e ffffffce 0f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55e200b8cb50 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55e200bab080 | unwrapped: 67 6e 7e aa 77 51 27 2d 2f 79 fd 38 f4 dc f3 92 | unwrapped: be 13 51 48 0b cf 19 da b9 d5 5d 9b 2c 8d 9e cc | unwrapped: a1 8e 3b 2e 3a 45 93 2d 44 ef 98 41 09 20 cc cb | unwrapped: 45 8d 4c 06 17 d8 57 f2 07 71 58 bd 1e ac f6 72 | unwrapped: 28 4c 52 12 f5 36 ce 17 cf 09 39 ab c9 2f a1 e7 | unwrapped: 5a 33 b6 6b 89 a5 80 05 81 ed 36 9c 9c 63 19 31 | unwrapped: b5 23 35 0b 52 51 e1 ce b3 08 ec 6f 29 2c 9d f3 | unwrapped: 9b eb a2 a1 b3 77 68 78 7e 79 91 21 6f 53 3c 2f | unwrapped: 94 e8 aa 3f 21 50 98 bb b2 bf b4 84 fd 78 1f dc | unwrapped: 91 1f 29 14 e9 a9 81 df 4f ac 7a db 88 bc db 5c | unwrapped: bb 49 01 78 89 a8 c6 62 61 c2 c2 3d 67 56 fd d1 | unwrapped: 9b c5 0c 94 5a 7b 61 aa f5 38 dd ce 54 eb f9 b8 | unwrapped: 52 f4 a3 e6 92 45 a7 ed f2 3b 67 ac fd 17 0b 03 | unwrapped: d1 a0 27 a8 5b 02 f0 78 70 12 cd 4d af a1 3f 23 | unwrapped: 78 f9 f0 1e 7f 4b 82 48 91 da 9c d8 d9 03 c0 a7 | unwrapped: 89 bb 06 d1 26 1f 18 4e d6 59 51 a2 98 71 0b 04 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3fdec (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1298 (length 4) | ad db 20 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55e200bb1278 (length 4) | 76 34 22 bd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2d00013e8 (length 20) | be 48 d7 98 c4 08 cc e1 df 0c 00 02 75 3d c2 ca | 63 ad f5 87 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fb2e0005a98 (length 20) | 34 0e 59 34 c2 7c f7 4e cd 60 f7 14 59 c9 87 7a | f0 9e e0 64 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55e200bb1090 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#24 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.763422bd@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.addb20c0@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 ef 54 98 7e c1 aa c0 8b b6 dd 72 27 | encrypting: 74 79 ec 37 e2 48 43 75 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 ad db 20 c0 | encrypting: 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 | encrypting: 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | encrypting: 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | encrypting: 05 00 01 04 21 62 ee 53 46 f1 ca bd ad 77 9e 15 | encrypting: 04 b9 4d e0 a7 32 4d dc 2a aa c9 dd 3b 2f 3c 68 | encrypting: fe 44 83 75 e9 48 86 a9 f4 8c e4 7f 39 63 2d 85 | encrypting: c0 ca 7f a6 80 ea fa 08 a4 4e 9f 4d 52 7d 72 4f | encrypting: 49 2a 0a 9b 4c da b2 77 d7 87 78 a8 e2 14 a1 67 | encrypting: 09 15 4e 08 d4 d0 a8 ab 5a f2 db d6 68 6c db ce | encrypting: 0e 40 75 2d 91 01 35 4f 57 9f c1 81 34 b1 f9 dc | encrypting: a4 41 55 24 a8 03 65 b0 dd 31 8c 90 44 f3 62 a0 | encrypting: 63 24 00 bd cf 43 1b 88 88 a0 d8 c8 57 1b 8c 54 | encrypting: be 92 c4 be 75 7b 6d 50 90 09 66 cb f9 86 91 b2 | encrypting: 3a a2 05 0f a7 21 6e cd 36 ac 29 b1 e5 6c f1 a9 | encrypting: 7a 8b cc e2 f2 b5 0c ea ef 2e d0 11 17 a3 ea 5a | encrypting: dc a8 cf ec 5e ba 38 35 39 b5 c5 f2 2b 25 55 5a | encrypting: 96 f6 ef 37 70 1a de 2c 64 e3 72 dc 4d c7 9b 01 | encrypting: c2 57 81 84 5c 19 e8 58 8d c6 a3 ff 1f f7 b4 2d | encrypting: fd 05 fc 12 3c 18 d6 22 71 22 b7 1a d8 e2 2e 9d | encrypting: b6 12 43 b3 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 | IV: 1e 83 35 2e d3 47 43 ea | unpadded size is: 404 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 408 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 436 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: a3 f5 a4 f7 52 7d 0c ef | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #24 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #24: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #24 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 436 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #24) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 20 01 ea a2 14 8e 00 00 01 b4 d1 0e 01 2f | cc 4d 6e 28 3c 69 de ee e8 37 47 d9 ef 78 e4 e1 | b5 a1 1d ad a1 25 72 0f 12 78 90 71 46 8d e8 a9 | 6e f5 fc 4c a2 19 a9 51 83 29 4d af 71 8a 55 4e | 57 8c 5e 3b 0b c2 2c 27 43 e9 0e d4 8a ce 66 ae | a7 cd 56 93 45 70 d8 e0 83 9c 1c a4 0d f6 82 a8 | 9a d7 7d d0 dd 1c a8 94 7d 9c 2a 1d 49 4f a7 c0 | 06 19 25 73 6b 8a fe c0 7a 2d e9 38 3e ed ea 36 | d2 2e 3f 3d 52 ef 6a f4 32 ea 80 f2 62 ab 36 7c | 40 fc 93 12 c7 d2 96 b3 f7 d4 62 e4 d7 22 46 97 | 70 c6 55 c8 7d 58 f8 9d f9 5d fd 64 8e 48 29 20 | 03 4a bf 5f f9 00 18 0d ae 63 b7 bc 8b 80 53 82 | 88 52 5a ea 0e e3 5d c4 ec 3d 50 db af de 04 f6 | c7 7d 41 ea f0 e7 77 76 af 46 d2 08 fe d2 7c a6 | 7f 2b 3a 69 2e f8 22 38 74 96 c0 2b b5 d4 6f 85 | 8e 90 a0 9c ab 64 b9 ae 95 e3 a4 93 4e f3 e0 c2 | 50 c0 0a e6 a3 3d 2a 27 2c 41 9c 93 aa f3 e9 b7 | 0d 44 7f 87 c2 3d 2a 7e 2f 27 e7 be b9 dd aa 46 | c8 b0 ee 0d b7 23 e7 25 11 3e 66 c6 e9 4e b3 47 | 1f 8e cd 0a 8f 96 43 90 03 8b bf fc 9a b2 f5 8d | ae e2 42 49 30 65 8e ab 51 99 16 c5 a7 b1 ca ac | 27 7c 36 f0 49 99 5f eb 69 90 40 de 77 33 b6 9c | fd b8 7c 7d 4c 9e 40 d6 df 42 ae b5 50 fa cd 2f | c9 b1 41 5d 5c 65 36 98 48 39 da 65 53 73 c1 39 | ef 1a 37 46 9e 9a 32 89 40 d3 d5 a9 48 08 b6 5d | 48 54 72 5a c8 66 26 6a 84 40 11 9f a3 f5 a4 f7 | 52 7d 0c ef | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 size 128 | #24 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 48962.627519 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #24: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x763422bd <0xaddb20c0 xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #24 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #24 spent 2.11 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00012f0 | spent 0.00291 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 52 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 20 01 ea a2 14 8e 00 00 00 34 10 dc 83 52 | 5e a2 2e 24 c4 e1 b7 9a e0 0f 1a b4 dc 5f e3 9e | 48 49 17 4f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3936490638 (0xeaa2148e) | length: 52 (0x34) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #24 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1609) | #24 is idle | #24 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 24 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: a3 f5 a4 f7 52 7d 0c ef | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: dc 5f e3 9e 48 49 17 4f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -24): | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 20 01 ea a2 14 8e 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 18 | 33 ee 89 11 a2 70 a3 36 26 1b fe 6b c3 0f 1b b5 | 54 de 5d 52 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200baaf50 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | ea a2 14 8e | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fb2d4002f30 (length 32) | 10 31 86 a6 3b ab 50 99 c4 8c 97 f4 74 5b a5 ee | 13 5c ee b3 67 57 46 fe 75 bc 1f b2 32 c0 dc 0d | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fb2cc0030a0 (length 32) | 01 74 b9 ae 29 56 6a 32 40 da e9 d8 0d fb 7c e8 | 2c 90 a1 b1 f3 b6 f2 31 fb 81 13 67 ab da d5 20 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | 33 ee 89 11 a2 70 a3 36 26 1b fe 6b c3 0f 1b b5 | 54 de 5d 52 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 33 ee 89 11 a2 70 a3 36 26 1b fe 6b c3 0f 1b b5 | 54 de 5d 52 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #24: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #24: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #24 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x763422bd SPI_OUT=0xadd | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x763422bd SPI_OUT=0xaddb20c0 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55e200ba49a0,sr=0x55e200ba49a0} to #24 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #23 spent 0.266 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #24 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#24) cloned from #23 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2649) | #24 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #24: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #24 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #24 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2e00030f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00012f0 size 128 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #24: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x763422bd <0xaddb20c0 xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #24 spent 0.337 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.564 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00342 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00293 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 05 01 51 08 d6 17 00 00 00 44 91 ce 61 3b | 0d 16 c6 bf 91 37 e4 81 8a fa 86 9f 48 92 34 8d | 43 27 1f 52 ce a3 d6 83 57 04 b4 75 e8 23 94 b1 | ef 33 cf d6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1359533591 (0x5108d617) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #24; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=eaa2148e st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #23; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #23 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1455) | last Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | current Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb0a60 (length 8) | 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4063c (length 4) | 51 08 d6 17 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb09e0 (length 20) | 1c 9c 19 7b 03 87 88 3c a9 f9 5f f0 f6 4e 6a 7d | 37 3b 93 19 | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 1c 9c 19 7b 03 87 88 3c | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: e8 23 94 b1 ef 33 cf d6 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 05 01 51 08 d6 17 00 00 00 44 0c 00 00 18 | f8 48 c2 e1 f1 0f ba 06 6b 6b b4 68 38 bf 72 da | ea 59 88 08 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 76 34 22 bd | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40398 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8000d60 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed4047c (length 4) | 51 08 d6 17 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7fb2dc001ec4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 76 34 22 bd | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed40500 (length 20) | f8 48 c2 e1 f1 0f ba 06 6b 6b b4 68 38 bf 72 da | ea 59 88 08 | informational HASH(1): | f8 48 c2 e1 f1 0f ba 06 6b 6b b4 68 38 bf 72 da | ea 59 88 08 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 76 34 22 bd | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2506) "east" #23: received Delete SA(0x763422bd) payload: deleting IPsec State #24 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #24: deleting other state #24 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.320s and sending notification | child state #24: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.763422bd@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.addb20c0@192.1.2.23 "east" #24: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #24 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1633097423 (0x615716cf) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload ad db 20 c0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dbe8 | result: clone-key@0x55e200b95040 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200b95040 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55e200ba65a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dccc (length 4) | 61 57 16 cf | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e074 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 ad db 20 c0 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e060 (length 20) | 97 14 f0 87 88 94 10 ce 0b 30 5e 2c 84 4e c7 8b | 4d a5 24 40 | send delete HASH(1): | 97 14 f0 87 88 94 10 ce 0b 30 5e 2c 84 4e c7 8b | 4d a5 24 40 | last Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | current Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb0a60 (length 8) | 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dcdc (length 4) | 61 57 16 cf | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb09e0 (length 20) | bf e9 0c 6f 24 65 5d 8a 38 11 d6 2e 1a e4 4b a0 | c6 95 7b eb | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 97 14 f0 87 88 94 10 ce 0b 30 5e 2c | encrypting: 84 4e c7 8b 4d a5 24 40 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 ad db 20 c0 | IV: bf e9 0c 6f 24 65 5d 8a 38 11 d6 2e 1a e4 4b a0 | IV: c6 95 7b eb | unpadded size is: 40 | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 97 e9 7a 08 bd 0b d1 65 | sending 68 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 05 01 61 57 16 cf 00 00 00 44 d9 c7 19 93 | e1 90 3e 95 2c 8f 90 48 f1 33 39 2a 08 8f ca 30 | 9f 38 b6 f7 45 12 23 81 4e ef b3 38 97 e9 7a 08 | bd 0b d1 65 | state #24 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d00012f0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fb2d8002b20 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050316' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x763422bd | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1569050316' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x763422bd SPI_OUT=0xaddb20c0 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.763422bd@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.763422bd@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.addb20c0@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.addb20c0@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4037) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4038) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #24 in QUICK_R2 | child state #24: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2cc001ef0: destroyed | stop processing: state #24 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55e200baa800 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #23 | state #22 | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #22 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #22: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.096s and NOT sending notification | parent state #22: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #22 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #22: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #22 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #21 | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #21 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #21: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.598s and NOT sending notification | parent state #21: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #21 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #21: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #21 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #23 | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #23: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.397s and sending notification | parent state #23: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #23 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3339667048 (0xc70f4668) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55e200b88e00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3db88 | result: clone-key@0x55e200baa800 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55e200b8c0b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55e200baa800 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fb2d8000d60 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc6c (length 4) | c7 0f 46 68 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e014 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 6e 97 6f f3 | 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3e000 (length 20) | 7d 79 71 0c fa b6 50 39 92 c4 6a 0a a6 95 15 98 | 5a 58 2e b8 | send delete HASH(1): | 7d 79 71 0c fa b6 50 39 92 c4 6a 0a a6 95 15 98 | 5a 58 2e b8 | last Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | current Phase 1 IV: 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55e200bb0a60 (length 8) | 6a f8 38 6e cb 14 12 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffd8ed3dc7c (length 4) | c7 0f 46 68 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55e200bb09e0 (length 20) | 1a d6 7b 8d 38 3c 1d 88 66 1e 0c ea d6 f4 14 53 | 41 5a 63 25 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 7d 79 71 0c fa b6 50 39 92 c4 6a 0a | encrypting: a6 95 15 98 5a 58 2e b8 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 | encrypting: 21 93 bd 9a | IV: 1a d6 7b 8d 38 3c 1d 88 66 1e 0c ea d6 f4 14 53 | IV: 41 5a 63 25 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 56 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: e5 42 4e 78 9c 45 5f 66 | sending 84 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 05 01 c7 0f 46 68 00 00 00 54 8b 8c fa f2 | c5 2e a9 de 74 d2 99 bc 56 4e 30 47 e2 32 d2 53 | b2 6d 3b 65 61 3c 80 45 f8 39 75 d5 77 de f7 0a | d8 d3 4d 56 70 23 ab fb 2d f2 0c 77 e5 42 4e 78 | 9c 45 5f 66 | state #23 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fb2d4007070 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55e200ba6750 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #23: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fb2d40028d0: destroyed | stop processing: state #23 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x7fb2e4006900 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55e200b93380 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55e200b8ff50 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55e200b88e00 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55e200b969a0 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x7fb2e0007fa0 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2547) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2550) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.64 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00142 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 84 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | 08 10 05 01 45 41 8d 2e 00 00 00 54 45 ab 7a f4 | be 47 2b b5 b2 76 eb 76 f4 d6 a9 5b 9c 5e b5 d3 | 3d 72 b0 a8 1a de a1 d0 b4 e9 a3 26 15 66 66 09 | 81 bd 33 73 ed f8 6e 7e 4d ff e7 a2 84 c5 0f 08 | 89 c5 fa 80 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | responder cookie: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1161923886 (0x45418d2e) | length: 84 (0x54) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x45418d2e | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 6e 97 6f f3 68 24 bd 42 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | a5 e3 14 70 21 93 bd 9a | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0765 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00471 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.285 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:721) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) | pluto_sd: executing action action: stopping(6), status 0 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | start processing: connection "east" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'delete' for rt_kind 'unrouted' using protoports 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0->- 192.0.1.0/24:0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source 192.0.2.0/24:0 dest 192.0.1.0/24:0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb unroute | command executing unroute-client | executing unroute-client: PLUTO_VERB='unroute-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x0 SPI_OUT=0 | popen cmd is 1012 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='unroute-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_IN: | cmd( 80):TERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@e: | cmd( 160):ast' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLI: | cmd( 240):ENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID=: | cmd( 320):'16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO: | cmd( 400):_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_: | cmd( 480):MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA=': | cmd( 560):' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+P: | cmd( 640):FS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT': | cmd( 720): PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 800):DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' : | cmd( 880):PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_S: | cmd( 960):HARED='no' SPI_IN=0x0 SPI_OUT=0x0 ipsec _updown 2>&1: "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. | free hp@0x55e200b705c0 | flush revival: connection 'east' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "east" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3b50 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3b10 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3c40 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3c00 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3d30 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3cf0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3e20 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3de0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3f10 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3ed0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba4000 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200ba3fc0 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3430 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200b8c070 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98f80 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200b871a0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98ef0 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55e200b8c160 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3500 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba35e0 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba36a0 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b98180 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3760 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b78d70 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b874b0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba8de0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b874d0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba34c0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba35a0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87560 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87790 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b8c1f0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba4090 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3fa0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3eb0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3dc0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3cd0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3be0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b09370 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3680 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba35c0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba34e0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200ba3740 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b075b0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b874f0 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87520 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b87210 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b85f50 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b85f80 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55e200b871e0