FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:26386 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b5d8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b558 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b4d8 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d108 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3da6d58 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65bf8 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65c48 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65bb8 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b458 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b3d8 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3da69e8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65df8 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d108 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d108 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 1 started thread for crypto helper 2 | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 5 | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55d5e3e252f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e64368 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e6b3f8 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x55d5e3e6b388 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1ddb8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e6b058 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x55d5e3e6b828 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e77708 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e829f8 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82a38 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82b68 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82ba8 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e298c8 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82c68 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82ca8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3da7738 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82ce8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82d28 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82df8 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82ba8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82e38 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82f68 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:26576) using fork+execve | forked child 26576 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e83548 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e77658 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e835b8 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e835f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1de68 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83668 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e836a8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d788 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83718 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e83758 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25048 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e837c8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e83808 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25148 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83878 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e838b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25248 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83928 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.77 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e77658 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e83548 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e83548 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e77658 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1de68 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e835f8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e835f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1de68 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d788 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e836a8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e836a8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d788 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25048 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e83758 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e83758 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25048 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25148 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e83808 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e83808 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25148 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25248 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e838b8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d5e3e838b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25248 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.469 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 26576 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0161 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection x509 with policy ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | No AUTH policy was set - defaulting to RSASIG | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | ASCII to DN <= "C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org" | ASCII to DN => 30 81 ba 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | ASCII to DN => 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | ASCII to DN => 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | ASCII to DN => 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | ASCII to DN => 6e 74 31 26 30 24 06 03 55 04 03 13 1d 6b 65 79 | ASCII to DN => 34 30 39 36 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | ASCII to DN => 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 31 30 2f 06 09 | ASCII to DN => 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 22 75 73 65 72 2d | ASCII to DN => 6b 65 79 34 30 39 36 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | ASCII to DN => 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | ASCII to DN <= "C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org" | ASCII to DN => 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | ASCII to DN => 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | ASCII to DN => 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | ASCII to DN => 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | ASCII to DN => 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 13 1a 65 61 73 | ASCII to DN => 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | ASCII to DN => 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | ASCII to DN => 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 | ASCII to DN => 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | ASCII to DN => 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d5e3e87108 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d5e3e870b8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d5e3e87068 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d5e3e86db8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d5e3e86d68 | unreference key: 0x55d5e3e87158 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55d5e3e87068 added connection description "x509" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org]...%any[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.38 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00234 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 488 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 e8 22 00 00 60 | 00 00 00 5c 01 01 00 0a 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 28 00 01 08 | 00 0e 00 00 9c 5e df 1e 9c f7 77 50 e7 79 2d ff | b4 0b 20 30 be bd de 8f 20 3e 22 5a 1a 02 29 47 | a8 e2 5d bc dd 0a 1f 21 a6 5a f6 9c 2b e0 79 cb | 06 80 25 cc 37 97 61 7a e6 85 3b 11 a6 bd 60 9c | 61 50 1e 72 e4 ae 0c 12 8f 84 43 e5 cd 13 b7 f1 | 9c f3 9f 3d 78 1f de d3 c5 ca 4e 99 cf 72 6a f8 | 73 36 93 5e 3d 46 20 6b 9d c6 a9 88 15 b9 c5 ed | 1b df 18 3e e7 c1 85 0a 11 7b cc 86 5b eb 8f 39 | 2d 69 7b 3e bb d9 b6 7a 4b 97 07 f6 d7 b6 68 4c | ff 05 cf 82 6f c0 f0 cf be 37 f8 9b 1c f7 3d ed | c3 e8 5d 22 dd 44 5c 85 6a 88 13 49 8c c8 4a ca | 02 6c aa 02 7c 8b d2 7e 06 d2 37 1f 8a 5f 66 34 | 97 a9 31 70 6e 9a 98 35 5f 51 00 02 92 c9 a2 09 | 95 73 bb 9a 08 56 76 95 41 d7 98 21 c7 c1 4e 43 | 31 ef d9 55 d0 17 2d b0 6c 7b e4 f0 1c 0c 01 e4 | de 60 9d db 27 ea ef 29 3d be e4 aa 83 f1 c4 bd | 89 a3 d4 03 29 00 00 24 5b d7 25 13 06 32 03 ea | 1a b6 be 2f a3 40 0c 2e 55 22 f3 5b e0 c8 7b bc | c4 64 73 b3 39 14 d0 65 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e | 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 40 be 4f 8a 58 af 24 11 | 05 49 24 bc ea 15 4a 0e 0d a3 0b 23 00 00 00 1c | 00 00 40 05 23 01 18 46 c2 1f c4 90 06 1c fb ee | c7 36 78 45 34 8e dd 2a | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 488 (0x1e8) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 96 (0x60) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=92) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.3.209:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (x509) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.3.209:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (x509) | find_next_host_connection returns x509 | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | rw_instantiate | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.3.209:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55d5e3e8b0a8 | rw_instantiate() instantiated "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 for 192.1.3.209 | found connection: x509[1] 192.1.3.209 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #1 at 0x55d5e3e8e268 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | constructing local IKE proposals for x509 (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209: constructed local IKE proposals for x509 (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 92 (0x5c) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 10 (0xa) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 10 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d5e31a7800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 23 01 18 46 c2 1f c4 90 06 1c fb ee c7 36 78 45 | natd_hash: hash= 34 8e dd 2a | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d5e31a7800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 03 d1 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 40 be 4f 8a 58 af 24 11 05 49 24 bc ea 15 4a 0e | natd_hash: hash= 0d a3 0b 23 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.3.209 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d5e3e8b188 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e86cb8 size 128 | #1 spent 0.212 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.513 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.52 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.000584 seconds | (#1) spent 0.588 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7ff0c8002888 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55d5e30d2b50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x f5 b5 f4 0d 46 79 01 83 72 a1 02 bd 2f 8d c2 3b | ikev2 g^x a8 ef d8 2a 2a 46 e4 0e 4e 3e f7 31 b6 69 6c 14 | ikev2 g^x 86 4f e2 46 b0 26 ce cb 16 fe 55 6a d2 fa b4 d8 | ikev2 g^x 29 35 7f 5e 0e d7 ee fe 7c c5 9a 76 c1 29 24 a8 | ikev2 g^x 1c 34 ce b4 80 3a 8e 29 b4 6b 15 52 f7 79 80 8e | ikev2 g^x 57 06 cd 3c 7d 0b d9 26 84 da 37 59 6d 96 e1 37 | ikev2 g^x 6b 0c b9 aa 47 e2 9c da d3 f9 82 06 4c 5e 9b 62 | ikev2 g^x ea cb 2a f8 73 bd a2 c2 13 03 cf 65 57 89 0e 14 | ikev2 g^x 06 da d8 71 60 79 fe 57 01 c5 d2 f7 e2 0e 24 07 | ikev2 g^x 52 45 f0 b8 e9 88 5d a4 97 8c ce e0 a4 87 90 89 | ikev2 g^x 78 df ca 9c 72 43 06 91 e1 fd ac 12 74 58 1e 97 | ikev2 g^x 30 38 9b 5d 27 e2 12 bd 2e 60 cc 27 c7 7a fb 3b | ikev2 g^x 41 ef fb f5 6a 76 d4 96 15 ea c6 12 bf 56 7b b9 | ikev2 g^x b6 c6 f9 eb d4 6f 65 6c db 8f a4 38 2c b9 40 2f | ikev2 g^x fc 4c 7c 4d dd 68 06 fc 93 3e 1f 2b 2e 50 29 0c | ikev2 g^x c5 04 1f ec f4 3a a7 b0 26 12 da 8a b1 93 40 c4 | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce ac 0f ee 76 5c 26 82 23 30 a1 52 81 57 b9 9c 7d | IKEv2 nonce 5e 25 f0 a3 52 54 aa 29 40 4e 93 8c b9 f6 b1 ab | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d5e31a7800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | natd_hash: rcookie= d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 9e f4 82 ff e1 37 3a 7e cc fc f1 9c 28 54 cd 9b | natd_hash: hash= 5f de df 4f | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 9e f4 82 ff e1 37 3a 7e cc fc f1 9c 28 54 cd 9b | Notify data 5f de df 4f | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d5e31a7800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | natd_hash: rcookie= d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 03 d1 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 32 ba 42 43 99 d7 2d 93 e1 8b 07 09 25 d1 99 b9 | natd_hash: hash= 06 4d 3f 6d | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 32 ba 42 43 99 d7 2d 93 e1 8b 07 09 25 d1 99 b9 | Notify data 06 4d 3f 6d | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_256 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.3.209:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.3.209:500 (using #1) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 f5 b5 f4 0d | 46 79 01 83 72 a1 02 bd 2f 8d c2 3b a8 ef d8 2a | 2a 46 e4 0e 4e 3e f7 31 b6 69 6c 14 86 4f e2 46 | b0 26 ce cb 16 fe 55 6a d2 fa b4 d8 29 35 7f 5e | 0e d7 ee fe 7c c5 9a 76 c1 29 24 a8 1c 34 ce b4 | 80 3a 8e 29 b4 6b 15 52 f7 79 80 8e 57 06 cd 3c | 7d 0b d9 26 84 da 37 59 6d 96 e1 37 6b 0c b9 aa | 47 e2 9c da d3 f9 82 06 4c 5e 9b 62 ea cb 2a f8 | 73 bd a2 c2 13 03 cf 65 57 89 0e 14 06 da d8 71 | 60 79 fe 57 01 c5 d2 f7 e2 0e 24 07 52 45 f0 b8 | e9 88 5d a4 97 8c ce e0 a4 87 90 89 78 df ca 9c | 72 43 06 91 e1 fd ac 12 74 58 1e 97 30 38 9b 5d | 27 e2 12 bd 2e 60 cc 27 c7 7a fb 3b 41 ef fb f5 | 6a 76 d4 96 15 ea c6 12 bf 56 7b b9 b6 c6 f9 eb | d4 6f 65 6c db 8f a4 38 2c b9 40 2f fc 4c 7c 4d | dd 68 06 fc 93 3e 1f 2b 2e 50 29 0c c5 04 1f ec | f4 3a a7 b0 26 12 da 8a b1 93 40 c4 29 00 00 24 | ac 0f ee 76 5c 26 82 23 30 a1 52 81 57 b9 9c 7d | 5e 25 f0 a3 52 54 aa 29 40 4e 93 8c b9 f6 b1 ab | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | 9e f4 82 ff e1 37 3a 7e cc fc f1 9c 28 54 cd 9b | 5f de df 4f 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 32 ba 42 43 | 99 d7 2d 93 e1 8b 07 09 25 d1 99 b9 06 4d 3f 6d | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e86cb8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d5e3e8b188 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55d5e3e8b188 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e8b268 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.302 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7ff0c8002888 | spent 0.00302 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 23 00 01 ff | 00 01 00 06 cf 10 a1 fc 23 26 ac 95 d1 60 5b 5f | af 43 09 57 46 60 d6 48 20 57 7b 71 ca 53 1c 51 | d7 29 2a 1a 4a 07 96 4c 0f 75 d1 52 5d 2e 3f 2a | dc e8 a9 6d ab 44 08 de 84 84 95 1e b4 4e 00 7c | 9d c2 78 92 73 ce b1 d7 df 3d 49 b9 ab 40 10 4f | f5 76 2e e1 1d 2f 25 46 3b f5 eb 09 75 27 86 5a | 52 d1 cf 69 c5 b3 d5 01 40 46 6c 9b c1 f0 0c 2e | 4b b3 32 65 e0 3c 0a ba f5 b5 dd ee 64 34 b5 83 | 6a 33 f4 6d b8 bd e9 44 24 6e 31 88 a3 ef ab 52 | 04 3f ff 3f 30 e2 38 5a 62 10 e4 51 20 7c 2d 84 | b0 60 db ce 53 3e 68 fb 94 8e ae b3 41 bb 31 88 | 57 b9 00 87 d4 57 d5 09 70 14 fb c7 7c ac 01 46 | e5 ff 57 61 6f b1 9d ae e6 09 23 98 97 a2 d6 a3 | 4c 74 3f f5 76 30 6e a8 b9 8b 6f f4 2f 3f 71 3c | 28 6b 37 73 92 c6 c9 1b b0 00 c4 16 6d 20 d2 2b | 95 64 7b ca dc c0 1a 56 a7 f2 f4 f6 cf 25 25 b1 | 63 5e 2b 7d 52 79 b5 b8 df 83 c5 13 f7 f2 2f e7 | e4 87 62 af 54 08 88 8d 41 a3 47 5c 3d 36 c7 44 | 24 52 ae e9 c5 ed 3f b0 bc 28 7c 96 9f c7 5f d4 | 73 c7 83 cf db 1b 07 96 8d 21 ca 0a b9 b9 35 77 | 98 39 6d b2 57 34 f9 9e 78 ee 4a 62 dd ad a7 a3 | f4 29 1e 86 80 7f 24 7a 5f ab 6c aa c2 79 9c 5c | ee 74 2f d1 97 1e bf 9a c7 96 50 20 22 65 be 7c | 48 b9 54 f3 cf a5 42 fd 58 ed 57 f9 88 f4 47 a7 | 15 c6 63 18 10 a3 a6 11 c0 27 2b 6e e9 c9 7b 07 | 02 30 c9 ee 8a 0a 21 9d e3 6b 57 d6 30 b5 e3 6c | af 1c 8c d4 fa be 29 c8 b7 10 83 ad 07 d7 b0 94 | 6a 7d 09 c1 38 b8 ed 0b 1c 19 f5 4e 65 52 0d 0a | b2 51 92 3b ab 6c 3a 3a fb 06 6f 92 83 33 1e 1c | d4 22 97 78 ba 55 02 74 6e 0c 9c 91 45 ba 9d b3 | a0 3c 21 02 39 f6 94 01 cb ce 5e 1d ff 3c 6d d3 | 6e d2 0e c1 ca a9 3e 84 8e 38 90 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '6', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.124 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.132 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00121 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 02 00 06 ed 45 1d 95 92 9c 72 07 f1 cb d1 55 | cb a3 0e e5 77 33 84 22 55 29 0b 03 72 2c e4 f3 | a8 c5 d2 71 7a 1b 6a ef 77 90 ec 6f 37 f7 96 be | 57 30 7e a5 8c b7 6d b6 a3 1f 6b 52 66 22 1b 2e | 7e e0 29 89 5f 4d 17 6b 0c e2 29 0a 36 a2 d4 c3 | 88 fe c6 e8 6b 0d ff c4 6b e3 23 41 d0 45 eb 31 | 40 e0 01 1d 6e 68 ad 14 a7 a8 5b 11 73 0f 2a 30 | 29 fb a7 aa 68 84 29 8a f4 f7 80 51 d9 a3 71 58 | 58 db 62 77 a1 e1 b6 aa b5 bc 5f f2 4e ec e4 96 | c4 06 1a 17 1b 9d 78 0e 3e 49 d2 5c 63 77 d1 ed | 25 20 97 a1 50 b2 10 dc 2f f1 a1 0c 18 44 23 03 | ac 27 d4 48 64 c7 ce a1 17 97 50 44 14 5d 9b ae | e8 13 c1 74 da fa 1b 62 8c c1 c5 c3 89 31 d0 f2 | 36 ce 2b 8d 52 29 98 2d 38 7f b7 bd a1 68 04 ab | 5e e1 e8 0d 4d 3f 7c 77 d7 c1 ab 04 a7 a4 bd 61 | 92 f4 89 f5 4e fb 25 d4 96 4d 27 09 68 01 9d a6 | bd 35 82 89 22 c3 31 ee 12 44 34 03 52 01 dc 3f | a5 70 1c 91 4e 41 26 c5 ad d5 de 88 36 bd 6d bd | b9 fb 26 a1 28 c2 55 2a 85 a2 0d 69 9e 51 f1 11 | e7 74 ae 39 5b 49 b8 53 26 60 df fb 0a 74 7a 87 | 07 62 20 bb 10 e7 7c bc 67 28 e7 0e f5 4e 0c 95 | ea 8f 0c 6f 68 4e dc 5b e5 1a 90 f5 52 dc 64 48 | 81 42 34 98 86 54 59 95 f3 07 0a 0e 67 72 6e fd | 5b 6f 4a bb aa 70 d9 71 6a c4 41 af 7e 49 b1 e2 | 47 df 55 91 2a 22 4f da e9 9b 2f 41 ed 79 50 3f | 60 2e 27 50 d4 53 bd b8 35 a5 a2 ec 13 64 ea bd | be fd 36 95 3d f3 0d 59 09 06 69 46 71 91 28 db | a2 21 9b ac 3c 71 9c db a5 02 45 b6 79 2f f1 39 | 15 f0 2d 26 63 73 6d bc 75 c7 17 10 3f f1 f4 3a | 39 c3 cf 59 cf a8 b0 02 f2 93 73 71 78 ea 4e 05 | 71 ba c4 d0 49 5a 52 cf 71 15 f9 40 e1 2d da 40 | 2e 6b 5a fa 62 30 a4 91 ea 23 b2 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.165 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.176 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00149 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 03 00 06 c0 df a8 1a cb d7 19 b7 ea 63 91 71 | d7 7a aa 3e 37 1d 6f e5 06 53 d6 2d 60 eb 58 12 | 5f e1 16 14 8c 98 8b 67 14 1c ba 00 78 ea ea cd | 90 24 73 f7 09 fe d3 5e 85 98 b1 85 29 d9 07 49 | 7a a9 71 0e 68 a4 a8 b7 38 c2 93 d3 0d d5 fb 84 | a5 48 46 db b5 33 ca fe d0 39 57 56 a2 61 f7 00 | 15 76 82 db e7 4c 17 46 e3 8b df 92 56 93 16 91 | 81 f1 5a 3c d3 40 32 4e 1d 56 40 29 f2 df 11 b6 | 7c 46 b2 f6 e7 42 ce 39 4b a6 8d 1c 08 de 31 68 | cb 10 1c e5 64 93 b4 c7 d0 b5 f1 88 6e c1 72 6f | 3b df b6 9c 74 be b7 93 8e ce 80 26 10 19 82 0d | ce b6 49 d0 9f df 30 18 c4 8c 7d e2 2a 26 2e c5 | 84 a4 07 9f 5f 53 f5 0b c6 9b b8 ed ea 7e ce d4 | af c2 f9 33 3a 7b ea 6e 33 27 92 c5 36 c3 0d 9e | 74 5e d4 d0 22 6a 09 e6 b6 a9 e2 bb b0 d6 88 5b | 1a 7e e0 97 da 51 bb 53 35 2d 71 be 9a 1c a1 4c | cf 5d cf 56 ca be 22 cd 13 46 3c 0d dd 7e 55 55 | 46 51 11 6b c8 10 aa 94 b5 f8 96 85 36 76 56 39 | 8f f7 63 0a 51 81 3b 8b 81 0e 8f 18 1d 3d 4c 84 | 07 d3 e5 15 4b 50 bd d2 25 05 89 3d a6 85 67 9e | 66 aa f3 d9 d1 ac 38 be 56 f6 59 3b 56 1e 8e d7 | 0e 02 c8 87 74 3b 58 94 2c b4 63 7a 60 e8 c4 7b | 3c c7 ad 7f 38 94 2a 26 38 82 4c 55 33 9d b2 41 | 70 28 54 b0 d0 d4 a7 bc 4b 99 52 70 ff 33 d5 46 | e0 6c 05 ac 42 61 96 6c e0 6d 1a 18 31 3d 88 67 | ac f8 43 5d fb 12 41 be db 4f e6 21 27 8d a0 3e | 33 af 40 3d c0 e8 6e c0 e4 c7 bb 71 3d 0b 51 31 | 9d c6 7f e8 ae 78 87 df fe 56 12 91 52 b9 a2 fe | df 7e f4 fb 8e 17 47 a0 22 76 af 19 8b 73 73 b4 | 7a 7f 74 64 a1 14 0c 67 02 02 bf 19 0d 69 93 a3 | ea 09 57 eb 64 4e 0b 41 98 79 f9 e6 08 86 71 20 | 5c 58 52 62 d6 74 e9 c1 c7 80 f8 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.108 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.115 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00115 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 04 00 06 e5 f6 75 ca 83 4b 2d 5a 5f 48 b6 50 | 59 00 95 ad 28 4a bc 05 84 91 93 53 4d 5e c0 c3 | 8e d2 42 58 27 74 51 1b 84 80 3c 41 b4 05 ac f7 | 7a 2c d3 d9 7a 00 fc 38 22 74 df f0 87 1b ce 2d | b4 5c 75 49 80 90 ef e2 6f aa 91 98 74 d2 87 63 | e7 b9 aa 24 03 21 2d 55 b6 e9 b3 25 d8 89 8a 91 | b2 e1 14 49 96 6c 00 2e 36 e9 aa 48 6a 15 25 22 | b2 8d 9f a1 2a 1f 3c 9b be df 5b 41 4a 47 45 93 | 21 b5 5f 83 57 46 17 49 99 f5 8f a3 63 95 27 1b | cd cc 98 57 6e b3 68 0f bd c7 05 19 9b d4 d5 4a | 47 08 50 8c a3 af 9c 57 54 9c fd 0a f0 08 5f c5 | a8 a9 27 0a be 5f ea 54 63 1d 36 96 a9 89 32 a5 | 3a ff fd 66 75 0d 0d 40 8c 44 78 eb b4 19 9f 01 | 3f df b5 5a 72 cb 8b a8 7c 1b 43 ba 3e ee ea 1a | 40 f8 36 69 9d 24 fb 0c 38 b0 ee db 93 70 b7 34 | 70 9c b0 07 4e 64 e7 d3 07 63 fe 9a fd f7 9d 53 | bf ac cf 99 9a 04 98 1f 23 27 c4 53 1f a4 00 10 | 0a be 51 67 5e 8c 41 99 19 c1 46 ff 44 6d d3 5b | 46 d7 a4 2c 7d 6e 2e 75 f4 50 88 a2 73 34 30 27 | 24 ea 87 a2 b3 b6 c5 6b a0 f7 34 a6 e6 ac d3 87 | bc d0 dd 8d 17 98 74 e2 85 6d 1a 6f 8f 74 df e3 | 8a 57 21 ab 62 9a dd 2d a7 cf 9d 8a 83 3a 14 b1 | 50 db 2d c5 5c cd ad 45 57 f1 53 7e 6d 42 70 02 | ec 80 c8 f3 4a d5 1c a0 b3 fb 4c 42 00 3a 08 f6 | 80 55 94 96 70 aa 13 72 38 5d 69 42 e8 a9 b5 41 | 48 37 83 86 b3 45 3a 69 f4 de fb 78 49 c8 3f b4 | 74 19 2d 5e 5b 9c c0 6a ce 31 b5 98 7e c6 bb 00 | e0 5f 14 f8 ee 5c 5f 2f 55 66 da f7 db 2e a2 07 | 1f 58 c9 9d df c0 b8 38 4d e8 28 08 1e ed 3b 04 | 21 28 c8 0a 1a 46 a8 8d 6e 3c 2e 8e be ab a6 05 | e6 0d 64 8f 33 22 e8 13 d4 c0 58 6f d8 51 bf 1c | b9 c1 0e 0d 98 ca b3 15 3c cc 7a | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.094 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.105 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00117 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 05 00 06 1f 54 97 6d 66 ca a8 e9 6d 0c c2 bb | 25 7d 68 c2 16 ad 2b 6f 18 76 fc ac 16 d2 01 54 | 7a 51 ee 65 74 92 6b 06 67 6e e4 82 a5 8b 7e e8 | e9 39 21 96 2b 95 34 af db 56 2a e5 b0 1f ff 43 | e4 ac 76 2b 1c a8 e4 77 23 6f 14 d5 2f 4d 06 3b | 3e 4d 20 e3 c7 b8 5d 87 b1 cc a5 56 b0 14 52 b4 | de 77 b8 f1 66 9d a4 47 54 4e a8 cf cd 6b 67 bf | 9c 56 75 d4 72 3e 2c 33 fe 6b 3e 40 f9 95 7d 73 | 0f 73 8c 8b 43 c8 c6 a8 93 fa aa 75 c3 7b 1c df | 8f e8 24 93 21 fb 63 4a 69 9e b6 b8 14 d4 74 11 | 0e af 00 42 6e a4 40 d1 dd d8 21 91 68 a1 cd 6a | 71 63 22 28 63 30 b9 97 b9 d7 d7 c8 f8 e0 b8 52 | 41 ac 6b 33 14 c9 5b 92 71 03 ee a3 e3 7f 84 91 | 0a b1 71 a4 71 61 b3 a0 9f ac 08 22 89 9b 2c 9b | 1e 1f a3 4c c4 d0 c2 4d c6 ca 21 a0 0d 4b 90 31 | cd 6b 7a 2e f9 14 0e 38 95 6e 8e 03 6f 4a cc 0b | a6 d8 f9 f8 65 90 a3 0f 45 a2 a2 9f af fe db 56 | b8 3a a5 3e d5 fa bd f6 e5 84 62 8a 8f b1 cb e0 | fd d1 c7 21 7f 58 97 2a 8c 81 60 60 c8 f1 d1 3e | f1 1c 33 cb a9 7f 57 e9 1f 00 1d 2c 74 c5 3c 82 | b8 5c 61 70 a6 61 7e 49 1c 31 65 20 08 f2 de a6 | c3 e4 84 e7 cd 51 a6 a8 03 07 d4 8f a3 cb 49 a1 | 83 44 ca c2 44 b5 7a 2d e1 29 2a 1d f5 99 6e ba | 55 56 87 c4 49 f3 c3 44 55 2d c5 80 f5 db 9a 87 | 3c 10 3a 54 ae 09 01 8b e2 01 87 34 7c bd 56 09 | c8 de a6 52 09 5b 77 dd 5e 4f df cb 88 35 f4 c9 | 47 4a 6a d9 69 58 11 02 72 49 ba 96 85 26 6b 4e | c1 9b 46 60 14 42 19 9b 3b a2 9b 95 9e 69 21 c4 | 58 a6 bf 0d ba 57 44 4d 6a c3 04 45 fe 7c b7 37 | 0f 15 e8 dc 54 16 6a df 66 35 30 31 13 f4 91 48 | bb b5 27 b7 84 92 f6 f9 4d 3b fa 45 26 ae f8 cf | 26 48 63 6b 3e e6 4a ba ee 32 d8 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.0907 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0972 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.001 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 157 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 9d 00 00 00 81 | 00 06 00 06 73 2b 43 79 5c 14 26 bb ae 5c 83 1a | e8 d2 38 2d 46 46 68 18 56 73 ce b3 6f 61 97 d4 | d6 17 7b 8f 2b a9 99 a1 91 9b d6 eb 94 6f 75 07 | 6b e2 66 a5 7f b2 0d b6 4c 2c bf 00 9c 6d 14 6f | 94 3d ab 0b f3 98 04 88 76 26 48 2c 56 85 3d 07 | e9 5a 11 f3 9c ab 42 a0 60 cb f9 0d a8 ae e8 93 | 39 77 23 7a a9 d6 7a bf a1 6c 6f 2b 2d e5 03 15 | be 04 4f c8 f4 99 5b 7c 01 35 8e 47 15 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 157 (0x9d) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 129 (0x81) | fragment number: 6 (0x6) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=121) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '6', total number '6', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_256 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e8b268 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55d5e3e8b188 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d5e3e8b188 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7ff0c8002888 size 128 | #1 spent 0.0195 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.0991 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.105 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_256 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.000848 seconds | (#1) spent 0.841 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7ff0c000a868 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55d5e30d2b50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 197 (0xc5) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=189) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1366 (0x556) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1361) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 520 (0x208) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=512) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,IDr,AUTH,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 3.03 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.0162 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 3.07 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org,CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.128 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.0274 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: Certificate E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA failed IPsec verification "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: ERROR: The certificate was signed using a signature algorithm that is disabled because it is not secure. | #1 spent 0.314 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: X509: Certificate rejected for this connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 ba 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 26 30 24 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1d 6b 65 79 | DER ASN1 DN: 34 30 39 36 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | DER ASN1 DN: 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 31 30 2f 06 09 | DER ASN1 DN: 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 22 75 73 65 72 2d | DER ASN1 DN: 6b 65 79 34 30 39 36 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | DER ASN1 DN: 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | received IDr payload - extracting our alleged ID | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 13 1a 65 61 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 against "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org (ID_DER_ASN1_DN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org (ID_DER_ASN1_DN) "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: No matching subjectAltName found for '=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' | IDr payload 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' is NOT a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked x509[1] 192.1.3.209 against x509[1] 192.1.3.209, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '@east.testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '192.1.2.23' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: no RSA public key known for 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | #1 spent 0.0312 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: RSA authentication of I2 Auth Payload failed "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: responding to IKE_AUTH message (ID 1) from 192.1.3.209:500 with encrypted notification AUTHENTICATION_FAILED | Opening output PBS encrypted notification | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 | responder cookie: | d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Adding a v2N Payload | ****emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED (0x18) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 37 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 65 | sending 65 bytes for v2 notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.3.209:500 (using #1) | e6 22 c6 af f1 77 87 c2 d8 68 d9 01 f2 72 7a 7a | 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 41 29 00 00 25 | d2 b3 9d bb 01 87 df e1 1f 36 33 64 4a a0 86 1e | 0c 68 5e aa 18 5f 6f 92 4c 53 2f 4a 9f da 84 aa | bb | pstats #1 ikev2.ike failed auth-failed | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_FATAL | #1 spent 3.86 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_FATAL | release_pending_whacks: state #1 has no whack fd | pstats #1 ikev2.ike deleted auth-failed | #1 spent 2.92 milliseconds in total | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R1) aged 0.019s and NOT sending notification | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => delete | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7ff0c8002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d5e3e8b188 | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection x509 | connection is instance | not in pending use | State DB: state not found (connection_discard) | no states use this connection instance, deleting | start processing: connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 (BACKGROUND) (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) deleting connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 instance with peer 192.1.3.209 {isakmp=#0/ipsec=#0} | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | free hp@0x55d5e3e8b0a8 | flush revival: connection 'x509' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 (BACKGROUND) (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | State DB: deleting IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | in statetime_stop() and could not find #1 | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7ff0c000a868 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.481 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) destroying root certificate cache | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | unreference key: 0x55d5e3e8c918 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d5e3e8c498 user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d5e3e8bf38 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d5e3e8a7f8 east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d5e3e8a5d8 192.1.2.23 cnt 1-- | start processing: connection "x509" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | free hp@0x55d5e3e87068 | flush revival: connection 'x509' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "x509" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e77658 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e83548 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1de68 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e835f8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d788 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e836a8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25048 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e83758 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25148 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e83808 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e25248 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e838b8 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e77708 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e6b828 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1ddb8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e6b388 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e64368 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d5e3e252f8 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e298c8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3da7738 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82d28 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82f68 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82e38 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65c48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65bf8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e1d108 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65bb8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e829f8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82c68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e65df8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e6b3f8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e6b058 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83928 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83878 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e837c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83718 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e83668 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e835b8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3da69e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82ce8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82ca8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82b68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82df8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e82a38 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b458 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b3d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3da6d58 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b5d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b558 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d5e3e2b4d8 leak: issuer ca, item size: 175 leak detective found 1 leaks, total size 175