FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:12723 core dump dir: /var/tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893711518 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893711498 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893711418 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703048 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989368ce38 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989374bb08 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989374bb58 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989374bac8 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893711398 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893711318 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989368cac8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989374bd08 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703048 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703048 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 started thread for crypto helper 1 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 2 started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 4 started thread for crypto helper 5 | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 6 | starting up helper thread 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55989370b238 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989374a2c8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893751308 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x559893751298 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703c58 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893750f68 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x559893751738 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989375d618 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768908 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768948 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768a78 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768ab8 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989370f808 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768b78 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768bb8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989368d348 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768bf8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768c38 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768d08 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768ab8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768d48 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893768e78 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:12868) using fork+execve | forked child 12868 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769458 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989375d568 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x5598937694c8 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769508 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703d08 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893769578 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x5598937695b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703628 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893769628 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769668 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893702ce8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x5598937696d8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769718 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893702de8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893769788 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x5598937697c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893702ee8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893769838 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.563 milliseconds in whack | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989375d568 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769458 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769458 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989375d568 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703d08 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769508 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769508 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703d08 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703628 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x5598937695b8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x5598937695b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893703628 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893702ce8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769668 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769668 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893702ce8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893702de8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769718 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x559893769718 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893702de8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893702ee8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x5598937697c8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x5598937697c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893702ee8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.364 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 12868 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0157 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection other with policy RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | counting wild cards for %fromcert is 0 | setting ID to ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org,CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA' | loading right certificate 'othereast' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55989376cf48 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55989376cef8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55989376cdb8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55989376cae8 | unreference key: 0x55989376cf98 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x559893770018 added connection description "other" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org]...%any[%fromcert] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.39 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection main with policy RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | ASCII to DN <= "C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=*" | ASCII to DN => 30 60 31 0a 30 08 06 03 55 04 06 14 01 2a 31 0a | ASCII to DN => 30 08 06 03 55 04 08 14 01 2a 31 10 30 0e 06 03 | ASCII to DN => 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 0a 30 08 | ASCII to DN => 06 03 55 04 0a 14 01 2a 31 0a 30 08 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 14 01 2a 31 0a 30 08 06 03 55 04 03 14 01 2a | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 | ASCII to DN => 01 2a | counting wild cards for C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* is 6 | setting ID to ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org,CN=east.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA' | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x559893773d18 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x559893773b98 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x559893773b08 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x559893773a38 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x5598937739e8 | unreference key: 0x559893773fc8 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@0x559893770018: other added connection description "main" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org]...%any[C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=*] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.47 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00338 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 c1 46 b4 26 05 bf f7 9b | 0d 54 39 6c 65 c5 48 f2 e1 3b 4b 7b f5 7c 87 7d | 45 ff 41 c6 dd 57 c6 3b c5 30 52 cb f9 02 22 87 | fa 7f c2 1c 71 3e 89 ed a8 42 a1 f6 53 56 7c 19 | 6c 14 11 fc 81 39 13 58 3a 50 22 3d 31 bf 18 3f | e4 29 80 99 66 d7 45 e8 6a 92 13 58 63 03 2e 75 | 6a b0 e1 df 38 b7 36 08 a7 0c 29 e0 6e 7d c9 f1 | 30 9b bb 99 4c ca 3b 79 35 03 8a 47 dd a2 71 8d | cd f0 c0 73 78 e1 af c8 bc 63 de 78 7c cf 1f cd | f1 bf 28 0f 93 fe 8d 1c 29 b4 e2 46 0e b4 95 6a | 90 bb 11 2e be 6e de eb 53 c3 ea db 7c 1f 66 9d | a1 72 42 e9 52 02 bf 3b e7 a2 1d 0f 97 7a b1 b8 | 02 75 47 40 5d a7 64 2e 93 ee ca 6f 43 da f4 37 | cc 1f 8f 79 20 cb 48 a2 6b 39 b8 e2 0a 64 f8 69 | 24 de 15 fd da b5 f8 34 ce 80 33 f9 a9 12 35 b4 | 91 c2 ad 12 e8 7c 67 fd aa 1d fd c0 cf 22 30 4c | a0 b6 8e 46 f4 c6 4c 7a 29 00 00 24 37 aa 5f 80 | c8 9b b8 2e 80 c2 86 5e bc 1c c5 fa 71 56 08 b3 | 6d 87 62 3d 28 7e 64 38 bd e1 8e 79 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 13 db e5 e6 | 81 c1 fd 92 ce 0f 78 ed d9 e0 b9 e3 3b f6 d1 82 | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 2d ea ed fd 0f 4e c8 66 | f3 36 98 a1 d8 eb 7c d8 92 88 92 24 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (main) | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (other) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (main) | find_next_host_connection returns main | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (other) | find_next_host_connection returns other | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | rw_instantiate | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x559893779b88 | rw_instantiate() instantiated "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 for 192.1.2.45 | found connection: main[1] 192.1.2.45 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #1 at 0x55989377b358 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | constructing local IKE proposals for main (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "main"[1] 192.1.2.45: constructed local IKE proposals for main (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x559892a12800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 2d ea ed fd 0f 4e c8 66 f3 36 98 a1 d8 eb 7c d8 | natd_hash: hash= 92 88 92 24 | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x559892a12800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 13 db e5 e6 81 c1 fd 92 ce 0f 78 ed d9 e0 b9 e3 | natd_hash: hash= 3b f6 d1 82 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x559893779c68 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55989376c9e8 size 128 | #1 spent 0.764 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 1.2 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.21 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.000981 seconds | (#1) spent 0.989 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f5d20002888 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55989293db50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x bd 11 e9 83 34 f1 1d de 20 8b 64 8e 53 44 61 8f | ikev2 g^x a4 d2 38 41 9f 56 14 b7 24 51 ca 81 0b 22 20 5f | ikev2 g^x be 15 bf 57 9f 27 45 5c cb be 8d a4 7a 55 3b 6d | ikev2 g^x 33 f9 b8 a9 a4 ad d3 5d 78 26 c6 b1 75 fe 54 fc | ikev2 g^x 21 d2 e0 76 7c 19 15 1f 2b bc 14 34 cc 05 02 bc | ikev2 g^x ce a4 e0 2e 33 61 bf bd d9 0d ca a6 c4 2b df d6 | ikev2 g^x 90 6a b3 04 a7 24 ce 3b 6e e8 e8 e9 47 8a ae d1 | ikev2 g^x ae 29 08 0e e1 4e de 45 0b 8e d5 fe 7a 53 f4 14 | ikev2 g^x b8 ac ff 66 4e 45 2d 93 7e 6b 12 27 38 53 e3 fc | ikev2 g^x 6a 59 77 2c 43 b3 fc 24 e2 a4 68 51 f9 26 f3 04 | ikev2 g^x c1 a8 22 04 40 ce 7e 50 4f 02 a0 cc aa 2b 39 d8 | ikev2 g^x 47 a1 67 55 bb db 81 8d ec 8d a5 9b 7c 1a 39 ed | ikev2 g^x e4 c6 d5 45 f5 83 6f ce 70 15 a5 6e 41 00 5c 7b | ikev2 g^x 2c c4 a2 29 23 bb 7f e7 08 b6 61 14 6e 4a c6 c8 | ikev2 g^x 8c 4a 54 3c 1d 0d 7a 82 2d a3 12 f0 e5 de 95 ad | ikev2 g^x 95 15 18 27 ca c2 d4 da 3b 75 51 9c a0 5a a9 60 | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 09 09 85 7e 34 92 41 af 61 d9 21 70 f9 4e ea ab | IKEv2 nonce 57 a2 47 9f a5 02 53 51 ff ce b9 cd 84 f3 45 bd | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x559892a12800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | natd_hash: rcookie= 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= b3 f9 2a 12 fe 30 b3 f9 bf 49 f2 69 90 ca 67 af | natd_hash: hash= 4a 54 72 30 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data b3 f9 2a 12 fe 30 b3 f9 bf 49 f2 69 90 ca 67 af | Notify data 4a 54 72 30 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x559892a12800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | natd_hash: rcookie= 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= ad c4 36 7d 40 03 d6 70 4e 76 ed 6a 0b b2 0f cf | natd_hash: hash= b4 e5 62 f0 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data ad c4 36 7d 40 03 d6 70 4e 76 ed 6a 0b b2 0f cf | Notify data b4 e5 62 f0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 bd 11 e9 83 | 34 f1 1d de 20 8b 64 8e 53 44 61 8f a4 d2 38 41 | 9f 56 14 b7 24 51 ca 81 0b 22 20 5f be 15 bf 57 | 9f 27 45 5c cb be 8d a4 7a 55 3b 6d 33 f9 b8 a9 | a4 ad d3 5d 78 26 c6 b1 75 fe 54 fc 21 d2 e0 76 | 7c 19 15 1f 2b bc 14 34 cc 05 02 bc ce a4 e0 2e | 33 61 bf bd d9 0d ca a6 c4 2b df d6 90 6a b3 04 | a7 24 ce 3b 6e e8 e8 e9 47 8a ae d1 ae 29 08 0e | e1 4e de 45 0b 8e d5 fe 7a 53 f4 14 b8 ac ff 66 | 4e 45 2d 93 7e 6b 12 27 38 53 e3 fc 6a 59 77 2c | 43 b3 fc 24 e2 a4 68 51 f9 26 f3 04 c1 a8 22 04 | 40 ce 7e 50 4f 02 a0 cc aa 2b 39 d8 47 a1 67 55 | bb db 81 8d ec 8d a5 9b 7c 1a 39 ed e4 c6 d5 45 | f5 83 6f ce 70 15 a5 6e 41 00 5c 7b 2c c4 a2 29 | 23 bb 7f e7 08 b6 61 14 6e 4a c6 c8 8c 4a 54 3c | 1d 0d 7a 82 2d a3 12 f0 e5 de 95 ad 95 15 18 27 | ca c2 d4 da 3b 75 51 9c a0 5a a9 60 29 00 00 24 | 09 09 85 7e 34 92 41 af 61 d9 21 70 f9 4e ea ab | 57 a2 47 9f a5 02 53 51 ff ce b9 cd 84 f3 45 bd | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | b3 f9 2a 12 fe 30 b3 f9 bf 49 f2 69 90 ca 67 af | 4a 54 72 30 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 ad c4 36 7d | 40 03 d6 70 4e 76 ed 6a 0b b2 0f cf b4 e5 62 f0 | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989376c9e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x559893779c68 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x559893779c68 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x559893777698 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.482 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f5d20002888 | spent 0.00324 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 23 00 01 ff | 00 01 00 05 e2 78 c4 8b 4d 4d ab 76 5e 0b 74 1d | ad 64 10 d9 96 0b 71 cb 55 57 09 66 a1 51 1c 0a | 18 0a f5 9f cd 1c e6 09 84 69 78 3a e2 73 c5 c4 | 5e f5 1f 26 c2 04 fb f5 ed fb a7 7f 24 32 45 32 | cc 6e a6 dd c9 0a 05 07 e3 09 71 e1 d6 ea 3a ea | 68 39 a1 14 7f 6e dc ac 75 f2 4b 10 17 d4 a1 f0 | 9f e1 46 20 81 e0 ff 9e de 0e f1 3d cf 57 61 3c | 8a bc 0a ed dd fd 09 18 79 ac 2f 2a 02 22 37 04 | 56 e1 a8 92 82 af 4c 9f 90 56 79 7e 3a 1f c3 af | 7d 0c 99 36 62 a2 39 03 e0 89 65 c1 66 08 3c 38 | 5d d2 be 17 a4 21 f9 53 fe c1 cf 23 bb fc ca 74 | e0 ee e2 4b c8 d7 98 4a 67 ad ac db 63 36 6c f9 | 4e b1 c2 5e 58 ed 41 17 0a fe d5 a2 3e 83 77 59 | 94 c9 ba 9a 21 be 70 06 87 30 b5 2e 3b f0 24 4b | c4 62 42 79 cd 16 bb fb 15 13 54 f7 b3 c3 1f ab | e1 5b 8f a5 f8 a1 6a 6e c5 79 c2 4e df 66 27 34 | e6 c7 cf 0b 46 77 2f a1 2e 94 5d 4f 63 a5 5d 2f | 03 71 11 78 d0 c8 da 30 a3 4f c0 40 83 ef 6d 92 | 10 05 fc 02 66 f4 2a cd 6a 06 cb c9 1f a4 d1 9b | dc 3d af 62 1a 24 56 1e 39 37 80 cb 29 4a 52 4e | 30 8a 75 68 a2 dc 76 87 ed 93 1f b4 66 9b 44 74 | 17 1d 41 ea a2 f7 3c 19 46 d4 3d e7 8a 33 3a 41 | a6 14 02 7e ab af 77 7a cc 20 6d 74 b3 4d 51 ff | 25 89 ee d9 e6 23 3f 1c 08 e5 69 e6 4b ac ad 10 | e6 c0 27 f8 40 8c cb ba e2 99 9c 3e 9c 8e 0f d9 | fa 90 90 00 d0 6a bc 4c 51 c2 f1 07 36 0f c3 86 | 83 1d 6b 8e c5 ad 64 4b 23 84 fb ff 40 ab 90 03 | 0e ff 57 f7 07 64 c7 f5 00 0b b0 f9 a7 75 78 2b | f3 dd c5 25 3a 54 54 2d bc 06 2a f5 66 9d db 09 | 08 77 76 91 d6 96 a9 64 84 14 84 eb 99 92 78 61 | 5d 3c 49 d7 ad d4 da bc 39 fd 5c 29 2d 27 98 60 | 73 db 28 32 98 48 d7 28 a3 4c f3 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.163 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.175 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00145 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 02 00 05 c9 75 8a 81 d6 5c 2b d6 57 fc 84 cf | 58 9d 80 1f 25 5b d0 d3 11 7f 76 07 aa 91 89 57 | 31 36 ef c7 07 19 41 b9 88 28 10 31 2d 1f ad 8d | 77 f4 81 b2 f5 e6 b4 c1 f1 85 4c 8a e5 57 55 2f | cb 79 59 86 59 f1 12 e1 26 0d 5f 26 1c 7c 4f 4c | 52 d7 52 be ec 27 88 ea d9 b2 ad 0c 53 3b fa 54 | 71 4c 92 40 2d cd cc 86 f2 7d f1 94 f8 bb 07 54 | 58 cc 5f cd a7 09 bd 19 35 bf 54 23 1d bb e7 d2 | d2 fd e3 46 b7 e6 89 c7 e6 ca 29 b9 e6 05 99 63 | 2d 09 c3 62 6d 6f 85 4f 0a 0e 70 3c 65 0f 13 55 | c6 6a c0 b8 88 b3 52 e9 02 8d 7f e6 0e cc ed 05 | 34 58 ec 84 8f 9c da 59 68 b4 cc 35 59 db 50 59 | 52 e4 da 67 d4 99 3f ed 4d d1 48 ed 9a 74 7f 17 | 94 08 db 30 f6 f1 0f 42 cc db 4e f9 f3 b7 8c 3a | a3 b2 ce 34 dc dc 14 86 4d 1d 0c 47 49 48 9d 41 | 88 24 65 91 c0 14 50 51 a8 84 09 c7 ad 65 7e f3 | cb 2d cd 6b 42 18 3d a8 3f a9 c4 72 da 5c e0 2b | d6 0a ed f3 09 b1 9d f8 60 ad e2 97 b0 3f 70 ec | 5f de 40 89 5d 2a 85 37 44 4e 52 46 62 fb a6 50 | c1 7a e6 a5 f4 b3 99 16 a3 46 15 ce 67 16 1f 3f | c1 1a 65 56 6a fa 56 f0 e3 e9 7b 0a 22 f3 ad d9 | b9 e3 73 ee af 79 e3 75 99 ed cf 0d 98 79 00 a1 | 49 cf 81 7d 09 39 cd 05 f3 92 c2 db 7e e3 46 f7 | 31 31 85 fd 57 69 b6 ea 5a d0 0f cb ad ee 4d ad | f2 96 84 87 47 12 12 9d ac 56 cd c7 4f ca 45 1d | 13 8d 72 3a c2 fb 57 0d be c3 4f 5d 78 13 b4 b2 | 5e 7e 9b e1 17 54 75 e8 3b 65 ce 98 fc 62 83 83 | a6 11 25 7f b4 c8 8e aa c1 1f 58 74 ec 08 60 c8 | c9 75 1e 15 8e a8 08 7c ae b3 1d c3 88 ed 7e 74 | 42 ac 18 d6 1e ca a2 81 46 1b a8 c8 e6 9c ce 2e | 7d fe 80 1a 0e 41 45 f9 2e 2a 6d 2c d2 85 dc cd | 96 9e 32 06 af c0 d1 89 c4 a7 38 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.139 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.149 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00131 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 03 00 05 ed 8f e6 80 8c e3 e6 86 8d 85 ca dc | 94 4a fc b2 31 97 ab 82 ce a2 6a 09 ef 51 cb 56 | 8e 93 ac 13 22 e9 0f ce 84 4a 16 2a a9 5f 5b 6a | 92 80 3e 3d 42 ff 23 83 24 8f 75 49 ac 14 93 48 | aa 93 cf e8 09 b8 35 0b 1c f1 ee f7 79 7f 34 aa | 7d e6 2d 01 2b 08 60 1f 5b 8d 3d 27 d8 4d 78 fe | 7c 00 46 8d 1f 8f c2 7f 7c ac 5c 54 64 ed fe 87 | 4b 1f 97 40 89 82 ee dc 68 b9 d1 0e 8b e6 38 c1 | 35 3c 24 44 15 94 e1 f7 48 55 8d b8 6d 21 3b a2 | 02 f5 11 66 68 a1 60 7c 73 74 af 70 e4 09 d3 6e | be c5 87 6f cd 48 06 38 4f b6 cb d1 ef 10 e6 31 | a6 39 44 cc 21 df 17 47 eb 52 99 11 16 a9 0f f7 | a1 5e 84 30 62 c5 80 e4 09 a6 5c 3c 7a df 9a 49 | ce 55 f9 2f 7c 10 f6 e1 37 a0 57 10 09 5d 91 2b | 90 f7 75 a3 fe 7c 63 2b 61 5e 13 b9 1d d3 06 fa | 32 bc 5a d4 1e db f6 0f 83 bb 96 18 7f 31 db 5b | ee 53 7e c3 7f 5a 7b 1a 24 a6 ea 89 16 56 c3 0d | db 40 25 d6 11 72 ab 14 c1 22 b7 89 34 f2 29 d9 | 0c ad bf a5 3a 89 ac 75 3b f4 7d 67 06 ce 08 a1 | 4f f9 4b 01 ce 9c 3c 90 81 28 bd 34 3a be 42 5b | 1d 57 1e 50 2c 18 e8 3e 2d 22 20 31 7c 17 46 2c | ed 1c 60 5b fb fa 8a 64 c6 c6 0a e1 ad fc c7 46 | a5 61 b0 63 da 42 87 17 a1 cb 5a 45 a8 7d 06 81 | 5d 30 af 81 91 4c d9 62 d4 0f d1 63 05 ed 9d a7 | d3 5e a4 a2 8f cb 6e 6c 2e 52 91 d5 32 41 33 35 | 22 2c 12 01 ca 1d ca 01 0b 23 01 a3 36 ef 00 13 | e1 de 32 bd 62 3b 08 f4 bf 75 7f 6f 7f f8 78 78 | 1d e7 d2 cd 3c b2 6a 6f ab 55 e7 b8 dc b0 0e 7b | 31 f4 ef 1a b8 0f ce db 4c f8 98 bc 6f f6 62 51 | 65 2f 89 51 ee 51 9d 10 fd 51 23 d3 3b dd 24 41 | 39 ed 19 c6 32 cf 8a 5e b2 4c 8e 18 f6 a8 05 2f | 1a ff 2b 67 4b 84 47 12 e3 26 05 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.143 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.154 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00138 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 04 00 05 91 67 ec 7b 7e 4a 4e fc ea bf 73 33 | bf 5a 3a c6 ef af 02 b0 fa 5f 2b 37 ba 17 f8 47 | 43 b2 fa 98 f0 6a f4 59 c4 62 8d 44 25 fd ae 5e | 0c 7f fd f9 84 79 90 9c e9 f0 27 85 1a 40 cd c2 | 96 5f 42 c1 e0 09 3a 09 21 5d 08 c7 df 83 4c 92 | cc 16 55 71 d6 96 30 a5 2d 4e 37 dc 8b 24 cf 12 | ae ac b5 a3 e1 0f 9a 4e b1 9e 68 7e fd c0 8f ba | a1 c7 52 54 d4 a3 50 ea f3 69 2d 21 15 a0 67 7b | 42 90 6d 95 8e bf 6c 1b 8c 42 7f c9 65 78 f7 c8 | f0 e8 fc 4f 89 eb b3 89 96 e5 88 58 bb d3 e1 da | fd d5 44 27 43 88 3a 0c 20 92 cb e0 5e 41 3d 7a | 1a 37 b6 84 16 43 53 10 a7 2b 5a d8 4f bc 94 0e | 31 f1 ca f3 0b dd d7 f2 10 a6 9e 2d 30 e0 ab d3 | 08 c9 2d 31 da 57 32 a2 fa 23 97 7d 93 c2 9f 78 | d3 3d e9 42 f5 ad 6e a7 d8 0e 8b 45 3d 93 b6 d1 | 44 7c da c3 36 23 46 38 45 97 2f 6e 08 a9 2e 42 | ef f0 b8 2b 4b a6 b2 f0 13 15 2a c8 1a 3f 4e 8d | b5 35 10 7e c1 32 1c 14 1f 5a 50 c9 98 4d e3 7a | a6 6d 5c 25 41 26 8d 32 71 e6 90 ae 86 8b be 7b | 9a 42 f2 4b 03 f9 75 8c b0 cd 9e 91 06 53 f5 e5 | 87 9a 00 0e b7 1b ec c6 e1 4d 9a 5e 36 b2 19 65 | a9 bc ee 00 18 08 1b 68 02 5a 67 a1 7d b4 15 9c | 50 02 23 04 52 a2 e7 e7 1f 60 e3 c6 f5 92 3c 08 | 19 5a 09 e8 b0 b4 79 0f f7 a5 5f ef e2 0e e7 0c | 8b ea b6 6a 5a c5 6a 2a 0c 6c 93 59 f2 69 03 ca | 23 b2 f8 5f 20 2f dd d3 9a 21 f2 44 c1 b2 2d 4c | 88 a0 00 fe c9 15 17 7f 2a c6 1b 19 1a dc 0e ed | f0 4e 83 02 8b c1 5a 9c 3a e8 9a 95 68 c1 39 24 | 00 f4 4d 01 10 f1 d0 0f 18 a4 51 33 49 88 a1 33 | 25 bd b0 81 42 73 b2 cc 3f 1a 18 ad 84 85 28 23 | db ff 67 2d 4b 1e 00 2a df 36 14 7b 1d aa 97 14 | e6 fe e3 e8 b6 e0 9a ef 8c ba 18 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.141 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.152 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00147 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 234 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ea 00 00 00 ce | 00 05 00 05 0d f2 70 5a 6e 54 ad dc 07 6b b0 77 | 49 32 42 b3 68 88 84 b5 c1 53 c6 83 38 ef ea 1a | bb 0c 03 69 59 d7 54 90 55 3f 55 ea e9 e9 34 d6 | cd 80 e1 6c e6 ab 8f cd 35 12 2f ec a7 09 ea 80 | a3 c1 0a 08 0d 70 05 e6 c8 33 76 10 1e 74 46 5d | a7 2e d6 ea c1 de 8d 60 20 0f 08 02 c5 c3 8e 11 | fa 7d 53 51 9c 58 24 bd 2a be c6 3d 12 43 47 f9 | 2c 4e dd 0f 30 3f f9 56 57 84 9f 42 c9 de f4 63 | 4d 8c 13 e4 80 8c 34 73 f0 6c 8a 71 8c a6 49 e8 | 83 87 26 b8 38 13 60 4a 73 d9 8f d1 e7 b6 9a b6 | 9a ad 6e b7 7a 36 57 4b 8e e9 f0 9f 62 af 90 9a | 25 93 38 ea c9 1c 45 44 27 fa 13 9c 58 24 8c 09 | 4b 74 06 f9 9c 95 eb 04 3d d4 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 234 (0xea) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 206 (0xce) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=198) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893777698 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x559893779c68 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x559893779c68 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f5d20002888 size 128 | #1 spent 0.0321 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | crypto helper 3 resuming | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.182 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.227 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.001352 seconds | (#1) spent 1.33 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f5d18000f48 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55989293db50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ (0x26) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1265 (0x4f1) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1260) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 25 (0x19) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,CERTREQ,AUTH,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 4.2 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.0308 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 4.27 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org,CN=west.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.187 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.0387 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: Certificate E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA failed IPsec verification "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: ERROR: The certificate was signed using a signature algorithm that is disabled because it is not secure. | #1 spent 0.472 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: X509: Certificate rejected for this connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | CERT_X509_SIGNATURE CR: | 58 13 71 57 9d ee 1a 15 74 03 12 80 12 4d c1 85 | 2b 92 25 e9 | cert blob content is not binary ASN.1 | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 against "main"[1] 192.1.2.45, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(6)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked main[1] 192.1.2.45 against main[1] 192.1.2.45, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org->C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | refine_host_connection: picking new best "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 (wild=6, peer_pathlen=0/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 against "main", best=main with match=1(id=1(6)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked main[1] 192.1.2.45 against main, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org->C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=%fromcert | results fail | refine_host_connection: checking "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 against "other", best=main with match=0(id=0(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked main[1] 192.1.2.45 against other, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org->%fromcert of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAdMtW | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAdMtW vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAdMtW | refine_host_connection: picking new best "other" (wild=0, peer_pathlen=0/our=0) | returning since no better match than original best_found "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: switched from "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 to "other" | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@0x559893779b88: main | rw_instantiate() instantiated "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 for 192.1.2.45 | in connection_discard for connection main | connection is instance | not in pending use | State DB: state not found (connection_discard) | no states use this connection instance, deleting | start processing: connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 (BACKGROUND) (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: deleting connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 instance with peer 192.1.2.45 {isakmp=#0/ipsec=#0} | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | flush revival: connection 'main' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 (BACKGROUND) (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | retrying ikev2_decode_peer_id_and_certs() with new conn | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | CERT_X509_SIGNATURE CR: | 58 13 71 57 9d ee 1a 15 74 03 12 80 12 4d c1 85 | 2b 92 25 e9 | cert blob content is not binary ASN.1 | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 against "other"[1] 192.1.2.45, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked other[1] 192.1.2.45 against other[1] 192.1.2.45, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAdMtW | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAdMtW vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAdMtW | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | received CERTREQ payload; going to decode it | CERT_X509_SIGNATURE CR: | 58 13 71 57 9d ee 1a 15 74 03 12 80 12 4d c1 85 | 2b 92 25 e9 | cert blob content is not binary ASN.1 | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '@east.testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '192.1.2.23' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '@othereast.other.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'othereast@other.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: no RSA public key known for 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | #1 spent 0.0845 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: RSA authentication of I2 Auth Payload failed "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: responding to IKE_AUTH message (ID 1) from 192.1.2.45:500 with encrypted notification AUTHENTICATION_FAILED | Opening output PBS encrypted notification | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 | responder cookie: | 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Adding a v2N Payload | ****emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED (0x18) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 37 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 65 | sending 65 bytes for v2 notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 63 7a bd e0 36 54 b1 66 73 08 aa 3f d4 41 6b f9 | 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 41 29 00 00 25 | 00 16 84 49 9c 63 e4 0f 4d 21 be c7 58 fb e4 09 | a3 40 e7 fd 29 a0 aa 3a 0f 14 d9 95 f7 96 00 db | 7b | pstats #1 ikev2.ike failed auth-failed | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_FATAL | #1 spent 5.83 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_FATAL | release_pending_whacks: state #1 has no whack fd | pstats #1 ikev2.ike deleted auth-failed | #1 spent 4.77 milliseconds in total | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R1) aged 0.023s and NOT sending notification | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => delete | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f5d20002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x559893779c68 | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection other | connection is instance | not in pending use | State DB: state not found (connection_discard) | no states use this connection instance, deleting | start processing: connection "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 (BACKGROUND) (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) deleting connection "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 instance with peer 192.1.2.45 {isakmp=#0/ipsec=#0} | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | free hp@0x559893779b88 | flush revival: connection 'other' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "other"[1] 192.1.2.45 (BACKGROUND) (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | State DB: deleting IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | in statetime_stop() and could not find #1 | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f5d18000f48 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_traffic_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.0403 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.768 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) destroying root certificate cache | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | unreference key: 0x5598937792c8 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893779068 user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893778bc8 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893778668 east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893778158 192.1.2.23 cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893771a88 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=othereast.other.libreswan.org, E=user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893771588 user-othereast@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x559893771018 @othereast.other.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x5598937703e8 othereast@other.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | start processing: connection "main" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | flush revival: connection 'main' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "main" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | start processing: connection "other" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | free hp@0x559893770018 | flush revival: connection 'other' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "other" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989375d568 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769458 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703d08 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769508 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703628 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x5598937695b8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893702ce8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769668 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893702de8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893769718 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893702ee8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x5598937697c8 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989375d618 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893751738 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703c58 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x559893751298 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989374a2c8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55989370b238 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989370f808 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989368d348 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768c38 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768e78 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768d48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989374bb58 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989374bb08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893703048 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989374bac8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768908 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768b78 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989374bd08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893751308 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893750f68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893769838 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893769788 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x5598937696d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893769628 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893769578 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x5598937694c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989368cac8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768bf8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768bb8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768a78 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768d08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893768948 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893711398 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893711318 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55989368ce38 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893711518 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893711498 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x559893711418 leak: issuer ca, item size: 175 leak: issuer ca, item size: 176 leak detective found 2 leaks, total size 351