FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:10949 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a5c8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a548 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a4c8 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c0f8 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6ab5d48 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74be8 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74c38 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74ba8 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a448 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a3c8 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6ab59d8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74de8 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c0f8 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c0f8 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 1 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 2 | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 5 | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 6 | starting up helper thread 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55cec6b342e8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b73358 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b7a3e8 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x55cec6b7a378 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2cda8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b7a048 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x55cec6b7a818 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b866f8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b919e8 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91a28 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91b58 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91b98 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b388b8 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91c58 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91c98 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6ab6728 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91cd8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91d18 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91de8 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91b98 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91e28 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91f58 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:10991) using fork+execve | forked child 10991 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b92538 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b86648 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b925a8 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b925e8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2ce58 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92658 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b92698 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c778 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92708 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b92748 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34038 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b927b8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b927f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34138 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92868 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b928a8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34238 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92918 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.591 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b86648 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b92538 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b92538 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b86648 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2ce58 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b925e8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b925e8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2ce58 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c778 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b92698 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b92698 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c778 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34038 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b92748 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b92748 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34038 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34138 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b927f8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b927f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34138 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34238 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b928a8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55cec6b928a8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34238 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.248 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 10991 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0127 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection x509 with policy ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | No AUTH policy was set - defaulting to RSASIG | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | ASCII to DN <= "C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org" | ASCII to DN => 30 81 ba 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | ASCII to DN => 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | ASCII to DN => 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | ASCII to DN => 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | ASCII to DN => 6e 74 31 26 30 24 06 03 55 04 03 13 1d 6b 65 79 | ASCII to DN => 34 30 39 36 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | ASCII to DN => 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 31 30 2f 06 09 | ASCII to DN => 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 22 75 73 65 72 2d | ASCII to DN => 6b 65 79 34 30 39 36 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | ASCII to DN => 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | ASCII to DN <= "C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org" | ASCII to DN => 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | ASCII to DN => 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | ASCII to DN => 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | ASCII to DN => 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | ASCII to DN => 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 13 1a 65 61 73 | ASCII to DN => 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | ASCII to DN => 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | ASCII to DN => 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 | ASCII to DN => 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | ASCII to DN => 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55cec6b960f8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55cec6b960a8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55cec6b96058 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55cec6b95da8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55cec6b95d58 | unreference key: 0x55cec6b96148 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55cec6b96058 added connection description "x509" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org]...%any[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.994 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00895 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 488 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 e8 22 00 00 60 | 00 00 00 5c 01 01 00 0a 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 28 00 01 08 | 00 0e 00 00 ad 52 0c 11 fe a0 4a 01 64 04 ed 3e | 61 40 bf e9 fd 50 63 e5 97 ce 41 dc 19 b8 2d e2 | 8d db 7c 85 a7 de 01 f9 04 74 0c 04 60 14 f7 21 | 23 60 c1 4f 21 09 7b c6 39 7b 6b ed f0 db 6b d3 | 77 35 54 92 25 0d 5f f5 36 6c 69 80 ac d3 e8 b7 | a9 a5 51 9f 23 13 2b b2 0c f2 77 0f af 42 a6 40 | be 52 4c 04 89 41 d4 73 35 29 79 12 4f 19 03 8c | 27 bd 68 92 c9 60 c7 7d 3a a8 fc 4f 65 4e b5 35 | 67 00 4d ee 02 ff 71 09 94 96 1b 84 1c 3e 28 1b | f5 99 16 68 aa 58 33 a6 56 46 40 ca 54 f3 17 13 | 38 12 a0 ba b1 c8 71 46 0c 1f b2 50 b0 ee cc a6 | e4 b1 3c f5 5a 68 66 34 a3 00 58 eb c4 20 a3 f3 | ab 58 d3 cb 90 1f db 96 e5 2d c8 8e 7c 5f 9b b1 | 5d 3c 69 5d 2f 41 f8 32 6e 4f fb 33 9d 9b 3e 56 | 2d ea 10 a0 59 65 6b 67 9c e2 f2 24 b3 d5 55 62 | d3 90 a0 74 3f 42 41 b2 bc 34 20 b5 e4 b8 94 bf | 9a e2 3c 14 29 00 00 24 47 60 6b 1b ca a7 61 4d | 54 f0 56 ab d3 ae 5d 4e 78 21 62 80 4a a8 c3 a6 | 7d 68 3b 34 92 d8 26 2e 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e | 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 e7 ec 3a 02 cb 87 1e 9a | d4 c8 be d3 a3 7e 3c 01 16 d8 30 10 00 00 00 1c | 00 00 40 05 08 2d e1 24 0c 05 ff 8b a3 43 27 58 | 8f 91 1a 19 af 4b 79 63 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 488 (0x1e8) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 96 (0x60) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=92) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.3.209:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (x509) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.3.209:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (x509) | find_next_host_connection returns x509 | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | rw_instantiate | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.3.209:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55cec6b9a098 | rw_instantiate() instantiated "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 for 192.1.3.209 | found connection: x509[1] 192.1.3.209 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #1 at 0x55cec6b9d258 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | #1 spent 1.39 milliseconds | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 spent 1.56 milliseconds | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | constructing local IKE proposals for x509 (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209: constructed local IKE proposals for x509 (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 92 (0x5c) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 10 (0xa) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 10 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 1 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 2 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55cec5bf1800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 08 2d e1 24 0c 05 ff 8b a3 43 27 58 8f 91 1a 19 | natd_hash: hash= af 4b 79 63 | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55cec5bf1800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 03 d1 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= e7 ec 3a 02 cb 87 1e 9a d4 c8 be d3 a3 7e 3c 01 | natd_hash: hash= 16 d8 30 10 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.3.209 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55cec6b9a178 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b95ca8 size 128 | #1 spent 1.54 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 3.31 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 3.36 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.00287 seconds | (#1) spent 2.86 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f6a8c002888 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55cec5b1cb50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x 07 46 d7 86 0b 42 94 7b af c5 98 29 26 55 01 0a | ikev2 g^x 2c ed ad 8b b1 a4 ba c7 ec 6f 8d b5 2e 91 77 35 | ikev2 g^x 48 de 8c 79 87 ae f8 1a ce a5 ee 0e 0b 1a 64 bf | ikev2 g^x 74 c7 e8 01 ed ec e3 1e 82 6f 86 de ac 28 00 4a | ikev2 g^x 18 5d 0c 8f b5 78 a5 3c d1 4e 76 65 10 54 0d 47 | ikev2 g^x aa 94 a9 df 3c c7 69 06 c8 04 35 ab 7d 71 97 88 | ikev2 g^x 87 d2 3c 6c 72 b4 1d f1 a4 b5 62 c0 ba 87 96 fd | ikev2 g^x 39 74 6e 81 5b 8f eb c7 09 e7 be 18 61 35 76 65 | ikev2 g^x 33 00 c9 b7 1e 77 3d 85 d7 73 2a 05 ba 63 4f 32 | ikev2 g^x 13 26 80 9a 63 fb 56 89 8b c6 8c 47 97 08 5b 01 | ikev2 g^x fd ee cd c3 c2 21 3b 7c 4a e7 85 da 48 6b f2 b1 | ikev2 g^x 3a ee fa 8b 7c d1 cd a4 04 7a c4 02 67 d3 f6 ce | ikev2 g^x 4f c2 9b 8d ca 73 e9 6e 1b 82 e5 64 7a c0 dc 41 | ikev2 g^x ba 2d d1 4e 19 7b 94 f1 13 43 05 c3 48 ae 6d 26 | ikev2 g^x b1 78 5d 36 71 14 f5 d9 51 f3 e9 84 df 65 33 19 | ikev2 g^x d1 8a 0f 0c a8 61 01 4f 2a 04 06 17 cd 44 d7 7e | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce b9 66 c5 57 76 e9 eb 33 78 a9 4f 5c 97 3b 67 30 | IKEv2 nonce ac 00 70 10 ea ed aa 16 99 21 6c 50 bb 94 2a d3 | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x55cec5bf1800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= a4 ab a9 3c 1e f1 8c 33 2c aa 79 8d 50 85 84 43 | natd_hash: hash= bc 62 00 fd | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data a4 ab a9 3c 1e f1 8c 33 2c aa 79 8d 50 85 84 43 | Notify data bc 62 00 fd | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55cec5bf1800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 03 d1 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 22 81 59 ed e6 c8 9f a0 9d 92 16 e8 17 80 97 7c | natd_hash: hash= 32 9d 00 0e | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 22 81 59 ed e6 c8 9f a0 9d 92 16 e8 17 80 97 7c | Notify data 32 9d 00 0e | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_256 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.3.209:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.3.209:500 (using #1) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 07 46 d7 86 | 0b 42 94 7b af c5 98 29 26 55 01 0a 2c ed ad 8b | b1 a4 ba c7 ec 6f 8d b5 2e 91 77 35 48 de 8c 79 | 87 ae f8 1a ce a5 ee 0e 0b 1a 64 bf 74 c7 e8 01 | ed ec e3 1e 82 6f 86 de ac 28 00 4a 18 5d 0c 8f | b5 78 a5 3c d1 4e 76 65 10 54 0d 47 aa 94 a9 df | 3c c7 69 06 c8 04 35 ab 7d 71 97 88 87 d2 3c 6c | 72 b4 1d f1 a4 b5 62 c0 ba 87 96 fd 39 74 6e 81 | 5b 8f eb c7 09 e7 be 18 61 35 76 65 33 00 c9 b7 | 1e 77 3d 85 d7 73 2a 05 ba 63 4f 32 13 26 80 9a | 63 fb 56 89 8b c6 8c 47 97 08 5b 01 fd ee cd c3 | c2 21 3b 7c 4a e7 85 da 48 6b f2 b1 3a ee fa 8b | 7c d1 cd a4 04 7a c4 02 67 d3 f6 ce 4f c2 9b 8d | ca 73 e9 6e 1b 82 e5 64 7a c0 dc 41 ba 2d d1 4e | 19 7b 94 f1 13 43 05 c3 48 ae 6d 26 b1 78 5d 36 | 71 14 f5 d9 51 f3 e9 84 df 65 33 19 d1 8a 0f 0c | a8 61 01 4f 2a 04 06 17 cd 44 d7 7e 29 00 00 24 | b9 66 c5 57 76 e9 eb 33 78 a9 4f 5c 97 3b 67 30 | ac 00 70 10 ea ed aa 16 99 21 6c 50 bb 94 2a d3 | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | a4 ab a9 3c 1e f1 8c 33 2c aa 79 8d 50 85 84 43 | bc 62 00 fd 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 22 81 59 ed | e6 c8 9f a0 9d 92 16 e8 17 80 97 7c 32 9d 00 0e | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b95ca8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55cec6b9a178 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55cec6b9a178 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b9a258 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 2.14 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f6a8c002888 | spent 0.0116 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 23 00 01 ff | 00 01 00 06 f0 56 08 98 35 36 40 2a 7b fe ed cc | 1d 1e ca b0 e7 55 71 ab 46 e7 cf 72 91 51 6e b0 | 68 00 83 a1 f9 76 a2 1a 6f 91 2a c6 5e 7d a4 4b | e4 b4 b5 a8 95 19 e8 cf 2a 4d 09 c9 1d ad 84 fc | 33 30 00 f6 7d 28 f8 be ad c3 2f ba 87 84 b5 4d | 31 b7 1a 63 af 25 9e 34 53 5e 9b bf 19 4b e9 97 | 1d 23 4b 7d 57 44 fe 1e 4c c1 e3 2f 85 4d db c8 | 52 8e 2e 34 74 cb e2 64 6d 73 bb fc 6a 7f 01 fc | 8b 23 f7 6e 7c 32 47 dd 1d af 14 ca c9 f3 cb f6 | 91 5c 5b 80 70 34 e5 96 0a 67 29 39 f5 48 c3 f5 | 50 46 d1 5e ff 91 38 fd 74 05 22 07 39 47 24 be | ff ca dc 00 e2 e1 68 3b 4c 7f 26 de 6b c5 3a 9d | 56 49 70 35 9b c5 c4 ba e4 3f cc d7 6e 6a d8 f4 | 54 0e 52 32 3a 32 ab f6 2e 30 df 82 be 03 68 c2 | 9a 24 64 ff c2 7e a0 d7 f3 a8 8e dc 0b 0f 40 0d | b5 8d 85 42 68 e4 47 2f de 06 5f c7 86 88 f4 19 | 21 11 48 5e 06 1e f9 ba 9b 8a 28 02 8d c5 c0 dc | 2d 5b dc 98 03 60 79 5a 1c 1e 30 be 49 d6 04 f0 | 64 ab ed ce b5 0d c2 b7 51 8a 08 02 db 6d 3e c2 | d0 bd b2 7d 84 92 4c 67 e0 50 60 34 88 44 35 84 | 07 6e c6 ce 7f 65 83 3a 8e 3b d2 2e a8 ef 89 fa | 67 c2 0e e1 50 f2 ab c1 cd 86 a2 bf e1 c5 5f a9 | cc dc 9c 56 da da fc 89 80 0e 7d 51 34 56 90 d1 | 01 18 39 ab c5 92 da c9 e1 d8 fd d6 e5 1b cc c7 | 87 7a ec fc 23 d0 37 2c 85 0b e9 f9 46 68 cb ba | 96 0f 1f c8 e0 d2 00 e5 33 cb 7c a5 f7 a7 5a ad | e5 c5 13 ab f2 ea 4f 7a 67 0f b6 ce c7 e3 61 71 | 0f dc ec 71 37 be e9 e0 a9 25 93 8e af 62 19 2b | ac 1d a6 78 c8 66 f1 ec d5 41 38 14 89 05 c7 bd | 2d 43 cc f8 65 84 6c 95 f6 1c 2d f1 35 c0 20 cc | 64 a7 38 a0 0d ad 77 3f 4f 9d 51 33 da 59 a2 b3 | 0d 9e 17 70 09 cc bd 3f 61 d0 fa | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '6', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.81 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.873 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00663 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 02 00 06 3f 9f 9d df 14 25 17 8e d4 f8 17 93 | f0 ee ad aa 02 ea 63 83 0c 47 a7 81 aa ff 63 c2 | 62 ae 08 37 30 61 79 32 46 89 ae 62 c0 17 be db | f2 47 d8 b6 9b 08 11 0d 5b 16 b2 c1 33 6e 3b e7 | d6 8e 10 47 a9 9b 18 54 e0 62 3c bb dc 2c a0 2c | f6 85 ec 44 60 aa fd df 4a 9b b2 f5 ba 79 6f f7 | 57 24 19 92 48 bb ff cb 04 e5 af 18 5e a4 e6 22 | 72 37 e3 51 fc ee 73 6e 37 51 97 f1 81 9a fe 19 | 8d 9f f0 cb f6 5e 04 e5 86 67 cb 76 4a ac bd 64 | 13 70 4b 7d 4f 07 4f ed c5 75 d6 69 2c bb 45 ef | bf eb 5c 94 1d 88 34 e8 5e 37 2c b6 74 aa cc 0b | e0 2b 61 23 88 50 10 e1 3d 48 36 44 d5 eb 32 0b | 89 70 85 f5 24 58 2a b6 13 51 32 a6 f3 12 5e 41 | bb b5 ce bc 09 1f a7 d9 c9 93 b0 52 39 c9 49 1c | 73 41 90 9f b3 bb 21 26 21 3c f2 24 77 a0 5f 06 | f6 a9 a7 6a cb 52 22 0c a9 c9 09 94 b7 c7 21 5a | 29 a8 bc fb 49 7a fe 05 1f 2b e9 73 1c be 04 88 | 70 5a b6 3e a6 e9 e5 a0 3b 5c c7 cb c7 d8 28 ab | 0d 65 18 ef ea ad 73 29 f1 4f b0 e2 29 0a a8 c0 | 78 6d 59 02 2a 5a 9b 89 25 c8 ee 98 6c ff 7a 66 | f7 31 e6 11 ae 67 84 35 8e 0c 04 d0 30 ec 4b 0c | b4 cb c3 a7 db 81 56 7a ce 63 28 43 8b 45 b4 83 | 38 d9 38 00 de 29 1b d7 b8 c0 6e b4 e2 df da 11 | 14 c4 00 0a 76 af c6 0c fe 7d 37 b5 68 17 53 90 | 73 26 03 fc ee d1 fa e8 7b 13 2f 0b 18 94 4d 1f | 25 cc aa 6c 06 dc c4 21 d4 f9 37 4e 8b 6b 88 49 | 69 c6 40 16 0e fa b2 75 1c 5f 69 8b 4c 30 83 6d | 74 48 79 82 cb 52 e0 1f 39 a4 c2 05 76 64 c8 89 | 91 97 8d 2c d2 24 3e f3 1f 74 18 c9 a1 02 dd 2a | bd 10 e9 19 a2 a0 44 2b e6 50 3e 25 a6 e6 58 fa | 9e ef 0b 43 7b 94 2d 3b 41 64 48 c1 17 44 9c d4 | 8b 07 45 26 b7 db 99 04 f1 0e 19 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.753 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.805 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0061 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 03 00 06 91 06 b6 c9 97 f7 80 e2 26 fc 75 2c | 7a c3 c7 ec 1b 60 4b d9 7e 5e 2b b0 e2 9f b2 f6 | 26 bf be 5c 20 77 96 33 7e 3a 63 a2 2b a2 68 42 | 20 ed 3e bf 59 87 50 0e 60 e6 cb 0b 17 b0 47 de | d1 eb 7a 48 a0 0d fb ac 39 e6 2b 20 34 c2 54 57 | bc 9d f0 de 15 b6 b5 9f 64 d8 7a bd 37 a9 bf 98 | 60 f8 21 0c 31 b4 61 7b 0b 8d d7 38 88 b9 21 40 | 84 23 a7 d7 79 73 9a 31 f6 0b 65 7f 3f 39 3d f4 | e6 39 b2 ea c9 5c 87 aa 49 4c e2 08 06 0d 13 a3 | d1 e9 2e 19 c2 a2 28 3e b6 e5 e3 6e 70 c2 ff 82 | ca ab 83 e4 8b c6 c2 d9 38 91 d8 f4 c4 63 73 96 | 27 27 d6 96 e2 06 c4 e1 7e 86 8a 52 68 1f eb fb | 68 a3 1a 71 02 72 87 91 44 ee 6b d4 a8 1b b8 3c | e4 16 3e 47 ad 02 83 ee 55 86 b5 c0 0a 65 38 da | eb 5a f4 71 22 72 6a 6a 89 39 91 11 25 62 8e 82 | f5 f3 c2 dd b0 90 e3 2f e1 17 fc d0 59 16 76 f0 | 06 13 6d 87 36 0c 8d 63 f9 f4 8e 45 18 c8 83 a2 | 50 10 79 12 e8 d5 63 30 bd 13 79 c0 78 c8 06 65 | c7 f0 01 20 2f e7 68 c0 98 64 9d 6d 91 37 ca 33 | 07 40 f1 cf 7d 5c 76 ce b6 18 00 dd 17 6b 7b e7 | 01 78 17 da 58 55 aa 76 b5 36 fb 30 ae 25 2e 99 | c2 68 81 39 dd 23 c8 7d 23 9a 28 9d 45 dd 17 a7 | 74 36 39 90 c3 db 89 4c e6 75 2d f0 bb 52 77 ba | 30 ad 22 20 e2 5a b2 69 29 82 3f 62 66 10 56 64 | 5d f6 a7 51 0d 76 84 65 58 2f 95 d6 32 3d 6c 54 | f0 aa cd 8f 38 69 75 ea ea 82 d9 00 90 d0 b7 2d | 70 2e d9 cd 63 b0 fa 4b d4 a3 4c 6f 56 41 fc 24 | 5b 56 52 8c 5d fa ee 75 bb 8f 62 59 4c bb ba e5 | 72 3a 50 a3 07 f3 d6 af f3 ba 68 04 60 8b 98 00 | d5 d6 db 33 1a a7 f6 26 9f 12 d6 fa 49 b5 d5 ed | f7 9a 0a 1e 01 9f 6d 6f b7 c9 69 84 7b be 0c b4 | 45 9c 0c 42 1b 61 c5 c2 83 f8 ff | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.48 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.514 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00528 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 04 00 06 cd d5 2f 6c 9e 8e 0d a0 fa f5 76 ed | 6a 3e c7 71 48 cf ea b6 f9 62 28 3f 99 d4 3f 19 | 6a dc 89 09 cc f9 c5 8b bc 44 27 f8 69 b3 cd a0 | a9 c9 7a d7 31 2c 73 5b 54 7d d6 52 9b a2 b2 09 | f3 14 01 0d af a3 06 a8 ed 4a 4a 4f 68 55 98 c4 | 7c c3 e8 8c 54 d5 f5 0c 4e c3 5d 18 8f 07 81 7b | 03 4c 06 07 31 cc 8f 70 a9 6e d8 46 ee 02 2e 0c | 0e fc bc e2 64 62 23 21 01 2e 77 28 67 5b 1f 1c | 26 1e 1d 7f af cf 12 50 d3 fb 26 e7 f2 f4 54 34 | c7 10 5d 4d e0 4e 23 2c 1f 63 8d d8 eb 43 31 4a | f9 91 27 59 af 27 bc a1 33 96 97 f3 d4 28 70 71 | 4a ec fb b3 f8 83 6c df 3a 29 d2 75 e6 9d c8 0d | 12 9b fb 40 12 52 96 16 65 f7 a6 07 d5 4c 36 b8 | 57 b6 2e 9a 9f 11 18 f0 57 ec 7b cf a8 a1 9b 5a | d7 9b 73 47 60 a3 ed 8b 54 7b dd b1 b1 6a fd 21 | 20 0d f2 1e f9 e5 d3 67 b8 b6 23 79 3e 54 00 09 | b4 3a 22 62 8a 12 43 f2 30 04 50 b8 24 67 eb cb | 49 86 63 64 f9 44 91 9b 9e 3c bd 9a be f3 11 85 | 1f 17 bf fd 62 26 8d bc fe 1a 24 b9 2e 32 5e 7c | 3d 9c 2a b7 f4 6a 6a 03 6d 04 d7 cd 2f ff 2f f4 | 14 a8 d8 98 91 3d b5 36 1c 62 44 d7 b7 2f 67 dc | dd e5 7b 15 76 23 a3 a1 ec 45 7f 1b a8 40 eb dc | 2b f4 24 ad e4 74 b2 78 39 6a 52 e0 28 43 0f 20 | d3 d0 de 0b d7 a4 90 37 11 67 dc bb 71 dd 69 85 | 82 4c 10 cd 77 6c 94 83 96 8a f9 4e 81 96 5c af | 51 e0 91 7e 0d 3d bf 2d ce cf 63 7f 00 99 1b 82 | 08 40 08 0e 5f 97 51 07 09 ea 09 dd 14 95 ae 39 | 88 1e ea 24 75 ea cd 58 b2 57 79 be 22 e8 d5 0b | f8 84 41 eb 64 53 6b 9c 55 28 fb 95 e9 92 50 a0 | e8 ea 56 cc dc 3f 9a fe 51 0a 23 39 12 29 7f ed | ab 34 b4 98 c5 c4 34 c6 7a 89 d3 56 a8 85 01 d8 | 43 d5 c8 93 4e a3 15 ab 59 37 e9 | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.434 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.467 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0049 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 05 00 06 89 58 fd 95 f0 a0 ff 06 1d af 19 2c | 00 b7 97 98 ba 4b fa 51 0b 1a 2d 15 e5 47 09 dd | a5 ad 41 75 5a e5 e7 76 54 06 67 0e 51 2b b6 01 | 36 47 94 22 82 5a bc 7d 3b 2e f9 10 9d 93 a2 34 | 22 4c ff a6 7a e1 a3 05 af 0b f8 c2 1c e0 bb c2 | a7 13 e0 33 46 07 5b 17 e3 2f c4 77 ad 38 25 2f | 5d 78 51 66 84 1d f1 f5 05 22 ed e8 35 72 f1 54 | 71 57 ef 04 39 f3 28 89 07 9e f2 10 ca 06 eb 05 | 85 68 cc 05 16 7e 69 36 8b fd 22 0e ce 32 74 f1 | 41 2c 83 c2 4f 17 be 21 70 48 de aa 38 e9 17 c6 | 08 4f 94 9a b8 4c 24 d9 7e 02 e6 8f 86 4a 6f 08 | 94 e0 65 e1 94 6a c7 6d f1 9a 72 0a 63 36 99 9f | 62 8d 75 16 00 18 bb 54 ba df 37 6c 3f 80 2a a4 | 0c c5 35 29 69 d2 63 31 ce cf f1 c2 17 ee 7a 36 | ad c4 e4 18 cb 42 41 d3 97 05 f4 b1 f7 9f 51 fc | db 25 65 29 62 12 7d ba d1 8b 7e d6 ec 0b 61 ed | a1 4c 97 93 e1 6d f4 fc ab a5 0f e1 64 4e db 93 | ee 91 51 55 ba 02 69 92 79 2c 71 a2 89 7d 09 c4 | ac 5d 91 a7 83 3d 63 52 c9 73 13 54 59 44 09 44 | 87 c0 bb ef e9 8b 9b 87 72 05 f0 dc ba 05 16 86 | 5c 32 cd 98 8a 22 ed 63 1f 63 60 09 44 79 21 3b | 93 1c ea 78 aa 23 6c 91 ab 7e 42 a6 63 c7 ff ce | 5f 2d a9 dd e8 c9 0c cc 20 89 70 c9 8e 73 5b b2 | f0 8e 86 81 c0 e6 b5 ce 13 ae 2f ea 47 ad 40 5f | fe c2 c0 71 3d 33 48 3f d4 c7 8e f2 8a 59 0a 5d | 0c 2b ff a2 3c 3a 10 94 a6 7f 15 fb 77 0d 0a b7 | 0f bf a3 b0 e1 73 4a c1 1d eb 4d 39 fe 1b 3d 03 | ab 9a 8b 40 39 49 84 fe c7 b8 59 90 58 1d 16 ca | c9 97 fd af dc f6 4e 1c 41 4f a7 49 e6 d2 7a 87 | 44 ac 51 14 d4 1c 07 49 13 ea a9 b8 e7 e5 e0 6c | d8 07 89 7e a4 e2 72 7c 37 4b a5 1c 13 f1 ef 97 | fa 0c b4 a3 77 bc dc 82 7a 1f 9e | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '6', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.46 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.494 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00534 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 157 bytes from 192.1.3.209:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 9d 00 00 00 81 | 00 06 00 06 f5 82 2d 11 c8 8b 7a 45 e4 73 c3 96 | 3d ee 17 7b ab 52 47 b4 0a f6 b5 7f 6f b2 3b a5 | bd b2 4e d7 48 e3 73 bf e5 09 93 21 88 fe 6e 3d | 0f 5b 40 af 3e 93 19 8f d5 fc e1 c6 5a 1b af 5c | 5d 4d c0 5a 5b 01 54 77 6a 25 b8 2b c5 08 8a 8d | 66 e4 86 8f b9 12 8b b6 f1 3a a7 a9 3c e6 81 e9 | bc f5 38 d3 13 65 e2 bf 30 84 40 48 c5 ce 77 a3 | 89 bf e2 52 1f 7e 7a 31 7d 4d 41 1f 9d | start processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 157 (0x9d) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 129 (0x81) | fragment number: 6 (0x6) | total fragments: 6 (0x6) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=121) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '6', total number '6', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_256 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b9a258 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55cec6b9a178 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55cec6b9a178 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f6a8c002888 size 128 | #1 spent 0.0916 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | crypto helper 1 resuming | stop processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.513 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | stop processing: from 192.1.3.209:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.589 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_256 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.004023 seconds | (#1) spent 4 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f6a8400a868 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55cec5b1cb50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 197 (0xc5) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=189) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1366 (0x556) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1361) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 520 (0x208) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=512) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,IDr,AUTH,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 12.8 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.0658 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 13 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org,CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.652 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.135 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: Certificate E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA failed IPsec verification "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: ERROR: The certificate was signed using a signature algorithm that is disabled because it is not secure. | #1 spent 1.24 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: X509: Certificate rejected for this connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 ba 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 26 30 24 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1d 6b 65 79 | DER ASN1 DN: 34 30 39 36 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | DER ASN1 DN: 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 31 30 2f 06 09 | DER ASN1 DN: 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 22 75 73 65 72 2d | DER ASN1 DN: 6b 65 79 34 30 39 36 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | DER ASN1 DN: 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | received IDr payload - extracting our alleged ID | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 13 1a 65 61 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 against "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org (ID_DER_ASN1_DN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org (ID_DER_ASN1_DN) "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: No matching subjectAltName found for '=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' | IDr payload 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' is NOT a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked x509[1] 192.1.3.209 against x509[1] 192.1.3.209, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '@east.testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '192.1.2.23' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: no RSA public key known for 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=key4096.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-key4096@testing.libreswan.org' | #1 spent 0.15 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: RSA authentication of I2 Auth Payload failed "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: responding to IKE_AUTH message (ID 1) from 192.1.3.209:500 with encrypted notification AUTHENTICATION_FAILED | Opening output PBS encrypted notification | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 | responder cookie: | 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Adding a v2N Payload | ****emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED (0x18) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 37 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 65 | sending 65 bytes for v2 notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.3.209:500 (using #1) | ff 76 54 47 ed d3 d5 29 11 68 28 8d a6 9e cf 01 | 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 41 29 00 00 25 | b1 6c 78 53 0e 56 e0 6e e5 3e a4 dc 15 56 31 26 | f5 a5 34 6e 24 c6 9a ad cd 94 b6 f8 42 79 bd 92 | d9 | pstats #1 ikev2.ike failed auth-failed | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_FATAL | #1 spent 16.4 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_FATAL | release_pending_whacks: state #1 has no whack fd | pstats #1 ikev2.ike deleted auth-failed | #1 spent 15.8 milliseconds in total | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R1) aged 0.109s and NOT sending notification | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => delete | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f6a8c002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55cec6b9a178 | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection x509 | connection is instance | not in pending use | State DB: state not found (connection_discard) | no states use this connection instance, deleting | start processing: connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 (BACKGROUND) (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) deleting connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 instance with peer 192.1.3.209 {isakmp=#0/ipsec=#0} | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | free hp@0x55cec6b9a098 | flush revival: connection 'x509' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "x509"[1] 192.1.3.209 (BACKGROUND) (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | State DB: deleting IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.3.209:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | in statetime_stop() and could not find #1 | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f6a8400a868 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.02 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) destroying root certificate cache | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | unreference key: 0x55cec6b9b908 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55cec6b9b488 user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55cec6b9af28 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55cec6b997e8 east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55cec6b995c8 192.1.2.23 cnt 1-- | start processing: connection "x509" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | free hp@0x55cec6b96058 | flush revival: connection 'x509' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "x509" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b86648 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b92538 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2ce58 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b925e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c778 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b92698 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34038 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b92748 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34138 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b927f8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b34238 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b928a8 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b866f8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b7a818 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2cda8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b7a378 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b73358 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55cec6b342e8 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b388b8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6ab6728 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91d18 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91f58 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91e28 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74c38 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74be8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b2c0f8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74ba8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b919e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91c58 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b74de8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b7a3e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b7a048 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92918 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92868 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b927b8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92708 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b92658 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b925a8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6ab59d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91cd8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91c98 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91b58 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91de8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b91a28 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a448 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a3c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6ab5d48 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a5c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a548 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55cec6b3a4c8 leak: issuer ca, item size: 175 leak detective found 1 leaks, total size 175