FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:24800 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5ba8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5cd8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5dd8 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a458 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90e388 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a4c8 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a518 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a418 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5908 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5d38 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90e018 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a6c8 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a458 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a458 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds | encryption algorithm assertion checks | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_16, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 16, IKEv2 id: 16 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 16 enum name: AES_CCM_C | IKEv2 ID id: 16 enum name: AES_CCM_C | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_12, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 15, IKEv2 id: 15 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 15 enum name: AES_CCM_B | IKEv2 ID id: 15 enum name: AES_CCM_B | encryption algorithm AES_CCM_8, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 14, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 14 enum name: AES_CCM_A | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: AES_CCM_A | encryption algorithm 3DES_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 3, IKEv2 id: 3 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: 3DES_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 3 enum name: 3DES | IKEv2 ID id: 3 enum name: 3DES | encryption algorithm CAMELLIA_CTR, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 24, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 24, IKEv2 id: 24 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | IKEv2 ID id: 24 enum name: CAMELLIA_CTR | encryption algorithm CAMELLIA_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 8, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 22, IKEv2 id: 23 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 8 enum name: CAMELLIA_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 22 enum name: CAMELLIA | IKEv2 ID id: 23 enum name: CAMELLIA_CBC | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_16, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 20, IKEv2 id: 20 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 20 enum name: AES_GCM_C | IKEv2 ID id: 20 enum name: AES_GCM_C | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_12, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 19, IKEv2 id: 19 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 19 enum name: AES_GCM_B | IKEv2 ID id: 19 enum name: AES_GCM_B | encryption algorithm AES_GCM_8, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 18, IKEv2 id: 18 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 18 enum name: AES_GCM_A | IKEv2 ID id: 18 enum name: AES_GCM_A | encryption algorithm AES_CTR, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 13, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 13, IKEv2 id: 13 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | IKEv2 ID id: 13 enum name: AES_CTR | encryption algorithm AES_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 7, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 12, IKEv2 id: 12 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 7 enum name: AES_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 12 enum name: AES | IKEv2 ID id: 12 enum name: AES_CBC | encryption algorithm SERPENT_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65004, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 252, IKEv2 id: 65004 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65004 enum name: SERPENT_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 252 enum name: SERPENT | IKEv2 ID id: 65004 enum name: SERPENT_CBC | encryption algorithm TWOFISH_CBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65005, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 253, IKEv2 id: 65005 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65005 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 253 enum name: TWOFISH | IKEv2 ID id: 65005 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC | encryption algorithm TWOFISH_SSH, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 65289, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 65289 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 65289 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC_SSH | IKEv2 ID id: 65289 enum name: TWOFISH_CBC_SSH | encryption algorithm NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 23, IKEv2 id: 21 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 23 enum name: NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC | IKEv2 ID id: 21 enum name: NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC | encryption algorithm NULL, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 11, IKEv2 id: 11 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 11 enum name: NULL | IKEv2 ID id: 11 enum name: NULL | encryption algorithm CHACHA20_POLY1305, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 28 | IKEv2 ID id: 28 enum name: CHACHA20_POLY1305 Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 | hash algorithm assertion checks | hash algorithm MD5, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | hash algorithm SHA1, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | hash algorithm SHA2_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | hash algorithm SHA2_384, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | hash algorithm SHA2_512, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 | PRF algorithm assertion checks | PRF algorithm HMAC_MD5, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | IKEv2 ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA1, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 2 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | IKEv2 ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_384, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 6 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 6 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384 | PRF algorithm HMAC_SHA2_512, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 7 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 | IKEv2 ID id: 7 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512 | PRF algorithm AES_XCBC, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 4 | IKEv2 ID id: 4 enum name: AES128_XCBC PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc | integrity algorithm assertion checks | integrity algorithm HMAC_MD5_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 1, IKEv2 id: 1 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 1 enum name: MD5 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5 | IKEv2 ID id: 1 enum name: HMAC_MD5_96 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA1_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 2, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 2, IKEv2 id: 2 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 2 enum name: SHA1 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1 | IKEv2 ID id: 2 enum name: HMAC_SHA1_96 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_512_256, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 6, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 7, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 6 enum name: SHA2_512 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 7 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512 | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_512_256 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_384_192, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 6, IKEv2 id: 13 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: SHA2_384 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 6 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 13 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_384_192 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256_128, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 4, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 5, IKEv2 id: 12 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 4 enum name: SHA2_256 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 5 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 12 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | integrity algorithm HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 252, IKEv2 id: -1 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 252 enum name: HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG | integrity algorithm AES_XCBC_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 9, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 9 enum name: AES_XCBC | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: AES_XCBC_96 | integrity algorithm AES_CMAC_96, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 250, IKEv2 id: 8 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 250 enum name: AES_CMAC_96 | IKEv2 ID id: 8 enum name: AES_CMAC_96 | integrity algorithm NONE, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 0, IKEv2 id: 0 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 0 enum name: NONE | IKEv2 ID id: 0 enum name: NONE Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null | DH algorithm assertion checks | DH algorithm NONE, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: -1, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 0 | IKEv2 ID id: 0 enum name: NONE | DH algorithm MODP1536, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 5, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 5, IKEv2 id: 5 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | IKEv2 ID id: 5 enum name: MODP1536 | DH algorithm MODP2048, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 14, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 14, IKEv2 id: 14 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | IKEv2 ID id: 14 enum name: MODP2048 | DH algorithm MODP3072, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 15, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 15, IKEv2 id: 15 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | IKEv2 ID id: 15 enum name: MODP3072 | DH algorithm MODP4096, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 16, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 16, IKEv2 id: 16 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | IKEv2 ID id: 16 enum name: MODP4096 | DH algorithm MODP6144, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 17, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 17, IKEv2 id: 17 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | IKEv2 ID id: 17 enum name: MODP6144 | DH algorithm MODP8192, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 18, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: 18, IKEv2 id: 18 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | IKEv1 ESP ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | IKEv2 ID id: 18 enum name: MODP8192 | DH algorithm DH19, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 19, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 19 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 19 enum name: ECP_256 | IKEv2 ID id: 19 enum name: ECP_256 | DH algorithm DH20, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 20, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 20 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 20 enum name: ECP_384 | IKEv2 ID id: 20 enum name: ECP_384 | DH algorithm DH21, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 21, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 21 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 21 enum name: ECP_521 | IKEv2 ID id: 21 enum name: ECP_521 | DH algorithm DH31, IKEv1 OAKLEY id: 31, IKEv1 ESP_INFO id: -1, IKEv2 id: 31 | IKEv1 OAKLEY ID id: 31 enum name: CURVE25519 | IKEv2 ID id: 31 enum name: CURVE25519 DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0x07 92 3A 39 EB 0A 81 7D 1C 4D 87 BD B8 2D 1F 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 07 92 3a 39 eb 0a 81 7d 1c 4d 87 bd b8 2d 1f 1c | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0x14 4D 2B 0F 50 0C 27 B7 EC 2C D1 2D 91 59 6F 37" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 4d 2b 0f 50 0c 27 b7 ec 2c d1 2d 91 59 6f 37 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xB0 C6 B8 8A EA 51 8A B0 9E 84 72 48 E9 1B 1B 9D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | b0 c6 b8 8a ea 51 8a b0 9e 84 72 48 e9 1b 1b 9d | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key passed Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF FF EE DD CC BB AA 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff | ff ee dd cc bb aa 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: CAMELLIA_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, CAMELLIA_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xCC 39 FF EE 18 56 D3 EB 61 02 5E 93 21 9B 65 23 " | decode_to_chunk: output: | cc 39 ff ee 18 56 d3 eb 61 02 5e 93 21 9b 65 23 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: camellia - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key passed testing AES_GCM_16: empty string | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xcf063a34d4a9a76c2c86787d3f96db71" | decode_to_chunk: output: | cf 06 3a 34 d4 a9 a7 6c 2c 86 78 7d 3f 96 db 71 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344570 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344558 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x113b9785971864c83b01c787" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 11 3b 97 85 97 18 64 c8 3b 01 c7 87 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x72ac8493e3a5228b5d130a69d2510e42" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=0 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=0 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 72 ac 84 93 e3 a5 22 8b 5d 13 0a 69 d2 51 0e 42 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_gcm_vector: passed one block | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xe98b72a9881a84ca6b76e0f43e68647a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e9 8b 72 a9 88 1a 84 ca 6b 76 e0 f4 3e 68 64 7a | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344570 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344558 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x8b23299fde174053f3d652ba" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8b 23 29 9f de 17 40 53 f3 d6 52 ba | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0x28286a321293253c3e0aa2704a278032" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0x5a3c1cf1985dbb8bed818036fdd5ab42" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x23c7ab0f952b7091cd324835043b5eb5" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=16 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=16 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 28 28 6a 32 12 93 25 3c 3e 0a a2 70 4a 27 80 32 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 5a 3c 1c f1 98 5d bb 8b ed 81 80 36 fd d5 ab 42 | 23 c7 ab 0f 95 2b 70 91 cd 32 48 35 04 3b 5e b5 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_gcm_vector: passed two blocks | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xbfd414a6212958a607a0f5d3ab48471d" | decode_to_chunk: output: | bf d4 14 a6 21 29 58 a6 07 a0 f5 d3 ab 48 47 1d | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344570 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344558 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0x86d8ea0ab8e40dcc481cd0e2" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 86 d8 ea 0a b8 e4 0d cc 48 1c d0 e2 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0xa6b76a066e63392c9443e60272ceaeb9d25c991b0f2e55e2804e168c05ea591a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0x62171db33193292d930bf6647347652c1ef33316d7feca99d54f1db4fcf513f8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0xc28280aa5c6c7a8bd366f28c1cfd1f6e" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=0 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=16 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | a6 b7 6a 06 6e 63 39 2c 94 43 e6 02 72 ce ae b9 | d2 5c 99 1b 0f 2e 55 e2 80 4e 16 8c 05 ea 59 1a | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | 62 17 1d b3 31 93 29 2d 93 0b f6 64 73 47 65 2c | 1e f3 33 16 d7 fe ca 99 d5 4f 1d b4 fc f5 13 f8 | c2 82 80 aa 5c 6c 7a 8b d3 66 f2 8c 1c fd 1f 6e | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_gcm_vector: passed two blocks with associated data | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x006c458100fc5f4d62949d2c833b82d1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c 45 81 00 fc 5f 4d 62 94 9d 2c 83 3b 82 d1 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344570 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_GCM | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344558 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_GCM) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: salted IV: input "0xa4e9c4bc5725a21ff42c82b2" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a4 e9 c4 bc 57 25 a2 1f f4 2c 82 b2 | decode_to_chunk: AAD: input "0x2efb14fb3657cdd6b9a8ff1a5f5a39b9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 2e fb 14 fb 36 57 cd d6 b9 a8 ff 1a 5f 5a 39 b9 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: input "0xf381d3bfbee0a879f7a4e17b623278cedd6978053dd313530a18f1a836100950" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: input "0xf39b4db3542d8542fb73fd2d66be568f26d7f814b3f87d1eceac3dd09a8d697e" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | decode_to_chunk: tag: input "0x39f045cb23b698c925db134d56c5" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: decrypt: aad-size=16 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=14 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: encrypt: aad-size=16 salt-size=4 wire-IV-size=8 text-size=32 tag-size=14 | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on call | f3 81 d3 bf be e0 a8 79 f7 a4 e1 7b 62 32 78 ce | dd 69 78 05 3d d3 13 53 0a 18 f1 a8 36 10 09 50 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | verify_chunk_data: output ciphertext: ok | verify_chunk_data: TAG: ok | test_gcm_vector: text+tag on return | f3 9b 4d b3 54 2d 85 42 fb 73 fd 2d 66 be 56 8f | 26 d7 f8 14 b3 f8 7d 1e ce ac 3d d0 9a 8d 69 7e | 39 f0 45 cb 23 b6 98 c9 25 db 13 4d 56 c5 | test_gcm_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_gcm_vector: passed testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x AE 68 52 F8 12 10 67 CC 4B F7 A5 76 55 77 F3 9E" | decode_to_chunk: output: | ae 68 52 f8 12 10 67 cc 4b f7 a5 76 55 77 f3 9e | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x E4 09 5D 4F B7 A7 B3 79 2D 61 75 A3 26 13 11 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e4 09 5d 4f b7 a7 b3 79 2d 61 75 a3 26 13 11 b8 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x E4 09 5D 4F B7 A7 B3 79 2D 61 75 A3 26 13 11 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e4 09 5d 4f b7 a7 b3 79 2d 61 75 a3 26 13 11 b8 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x 7E 24 06 78 17 FA E0 D7 43 D6 CE 1F 32 53 91 63" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 7e 24 06 78 17 fa e0 d7 43 d6 ce 1f 32 53 91 63 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x51 04 A1 06 16 8A 72 D9 79 0D 41 EE 8E DA D3 88EB 2E 1E FC 46 DA 57 C8 FC E6 30 DF 91 41 BE 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 51 04 a1 06 16 8a 72 d9 79 0d 41 ee 8e da d3 88 | eb 2e 1e fc 46 da 57 c8 fc e6 30 df 91 41 be 28 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x51 04 A1 06 16 8A 72 D9 79 0D 41 EE 8E DA D3 88EB 2E 1E FC 46 DA 57 C8 FC E6 30 DF 91 41 BE 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 51 04 a1 06 16 8a 72 d9 79 0d 41 ee 8e da d3 88 | eb 2e 1e fc 46 da 57 c8 fc e6 30 df 91 41 be 28 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 6C B6 DB C0 54 3B 59 DA 48 D9 0B 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 6c b6 db c0 54 3b 59 da 48 d9 0b 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x 76 91 BE 03 5E 50 20 A8 AC 6E 61 85 29 F9 A0 DC" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 76 91 be 03 5e 50 20 a8 ac 6e 61 85 29 f9 a0 dc | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xC1 CF 48 A8 9F 2F FD D9 CF 46 52 E9 EF DB 72 D745 40 A4 2B DE 6D 78 36 D5 9A 5C EA AE F3 10 5325 B2 07 2F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c1 cf 48 a8 9f 2f fd d9 cf 46 52 e9 ef db 72 d7 | 45 40 a4 2b de 6d 78 36 d5 9a 5c ea ae f3 10 53 | 25 b2 07 2f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xC1 CF 48 A8 9F 2F FD D9 CF 46 52 E9 EF DB 72 D745 40 A4 2B DE 6D 78 36 D5 9A 5C EA AE F3 10 5325 B2 07 2F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c1 cf 48 a8 9f 2f fd d9 cf 46 52 e9 ef db 72 d7 | 45 40 a4 2b de 6d 78 36 d5 9a 5c ea ae f3 10 53 | 25 b2 07 2f | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 E0 01 7B 27 77 7F 3F 4A 17 86 F0 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 e0 01 7b 27 77 7f 3f 4a 17 86 f0 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x16 AF 5B 14 5F C9 F5 79 C1 75 F9 3E 3B FB 0E ED86 3D 06 CC FD B7 85 15" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 16 af 5b 14 5f c9 f5 79 c1 75 f9 3e 3b fb 0e ed | 86 3d 06 cc fd b7 85 15 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 4B 55 38 4F E2 59 C9 C8 4E 79 35 A0 03 CB E9 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4b 55 38 4f e2 59 c9 c8 4e 79 35 a0 03 cb e9 28 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 4B 55 38 4F E2 59 C9 C8 4E 79 35 A0 03 CB E9 28" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4b 55 38 4f e2 59 c9 c8 4e 79 35 a0 03 cb e9 28 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 48 36 73 3C 14 7D 6D 93 CB 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 48 36 73 3c 14 7d 6d 93 cb 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x7C 5C B2 40 1B 3D C3 3C 19 E7 34 08 19 E0 F6 9C67 8C 3D B8 E6 F6 A9 1A" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 7c 5c b2 40 1b 3d c3 3c 19 e7 34 08 19 e0 f6 9c | 67 8c 3d b8 e6 f6 a9 1a | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x45 32 43 FC 60 9B 23 32 7E DF AA FA 71 31 CD 9F84 90 70 1C 5A D4 A7 9C FC 1F E0 FF 42 F4 FB 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 45 32 43 fc 60 9b 23 32 7e df aa fa 71 31 cd 9f | 84 90 70 1c 5a d4 a7 9c fc 1f e0 ff 42 f4 fb 00 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x45 32 43 FC 60 9B 23 32 7E DF AA FA 71 31 CD 9F84 90 70 1C 5A D4 A7 9C FC 1F E0 FF 42 F4 FB 00" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 45 32 43 fc 60 9b 23 32 7e df aa fa 71 31 cd 9f | 84 90 70 1c 5a d4 a7 9c fc 1f e0 ff 42 f4 fb 00 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 96 B0 3B 02 0C 6E AD C2 CB 50 0D 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 96 b0 3b 02 0c 6e ad c2 cb 50 0d 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x02 BF 39 1E E8 EC B1 59 B9 59 61 7B 09 65 27 9BF5 9B 60 A7 86 D3 E0 FE" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 02 bf 39 1e e8 ec b1 59 b9 59 61 7b 09 65 27 9b | f5 9b 60 a7 86 d3 e0 fe | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (24-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x96 89 3F C5 5E 5C 72 2F 54 0B 7D D1 DD F7 E7 58D2 88 BC 95 C6 91 65 88 45 36 C8 11 66 2F 21 88AB EE 09 35" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 96 89 3f c5 5e 5c 72 2f 54 0b 7d d1 dd f7 e7 58 | d2 88 bc 95 c6 91 65 88 45 36 c8 11 66 2f 21 88 | ab ee 09 35 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x96 89 3F C5 5E 5C 72 2F 54 0B 7D D1 DD F7 E7 58D2 88 BC 95 C6 91 65 88 45 36 C8 11 66 2F 21 88AB EE 09 35" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 96 89 3f c5 5e 5c 72 2f 54 0b 7d d1 dd f7 e7 58 | d2 88 bc 95 c6 91 65 88 45 36 c8 11 66 2f 21 88 | ab ee 09 35 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 07 BD FD 5C BD 60 27 8D CC 09 12 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 07 bd fd 5c bd 60 27 8d cc 09 12 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key passed Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x77 6B EF F2 85 1D B0 6F 4C 8A 05 42 C8 69 6F 6C6A 81 AF 1E EC 96 B4 D3 7F C1 D6 89 E6 C1 C1 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 77 6b ef f2 85 1d b0 6f 4c 8a 05 42 c8 69 6f 6c | 6a 81 af 1e ec 96 b4 d3 7f c1 d6 89 e6 c1 c1 04 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 14 5A D0 1D BF 82 4E C7 56 08 63 DC 71 E3 E0 C0" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 5a d0 1d bf 82 4e c7 56 08 63 dc 71 e3 e0 c0 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0x 14 5A D0 1D BF 82 4E C7 56 08 63 DC 71 E3 E0 C0" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 14 5a d0 1d bf 82 4e c7 56 08 63 dc 71 e3 e0 c0 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 20 62 6C 6F 63 6B 20 6D 73 67" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 00 00 60 DB 56 72 C9 7A A8 F0 B2 00 00 00 02" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 00 00 60 db 56 72 c9 7a a8 f0 b2 00 00 00 02 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x2 for 16 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xF6 D6 6D 6B D5 2D 59 BB 07 96 36 58 79 EF F8 86C6 6D D5 1A 5B 6A 99 74 4B 50 59 0C 87 A2 38 84" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f6 d6 6d 6b d5 2d 59 bb 07 96 36 58 79 ef f8 86 | c6 6d d5 1a 5b 6a 99 74 4b 50 59 0c 87 a2 38 84 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xF0 5E 23 1B 38 94 61 2C 49 EE 00 0B 80 4E B2 A9B8 30 6B 50 8F 83 9D 6A 55 30 83 1D 93 44 AF 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 5e 23 1b 38 94 61 2c 49 ee 00 0b 80 4e b2 a9 | b8 30 6b 50 8f 83 9d 6a 55 30 83 1d 93 44 af 1c | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xF0 5E 23 1B 38 94 61 2C 49 EE 00 0B 80 4E B2 A9B8 30 6B 50 8F 83 9D 6A 55 30 83 1D 93 44 AF 1C" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 5e 23 1b 38 94 61 2c 49 ee 00 0b 80 4e b2 a9 | b8 30 6b 50 8f 83 9d 6a 55 30 83 1d 93 44 af 1c | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 FA AC 24 C1 58 5E F1 5A 43 D8 75 00 00 00 03" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 fa ac 24 c1 58 5e f1 5a 43 d8 75 00 00 00 03 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x3 for 32 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xFF 7A 61 7C E6 91 48 E4 F1 72 6E 2F 43 58 1D E2AA 62 D9 F8 05 53 2E DF F1 EE D6 87 FB 54 15 3D" | decode_to_chunk: output: | ff 7a 61 7c e6 91 48 e4 f1 72 6e 2f 43 58 1d e2 | aa 62 d9 f8 05 53 2e df f1 ee d6 87 fb 54 15 3d | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CTR | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, AES_CTR) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xEB 6C 52 82 1D 0B BB F7 CE 75 94 46 2A CA 4F AAB4 07 DF 86 65 69 FD 07 F4 8C C0 B5 83 D6 07 1F1E C0 E6 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | eb 6c 52 82 1d 0b bb f7 ce 75 94 46 2a ca 4f aa | b4 07 df 86 65 69 fd 07 f4 8c c0 b5 83 d6 07 1f | 1e c0 e6 b8 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | decode_to_chunk: input counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 01" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 01 | decode_to_chunk: Ciphertext: input "0xEB 6C 52 82 1D 0B BB F7 CE 75 94 46 2A CA 4F AAB4 07 DF 86 65 69 FD 07 F4 8C C0 B5 83 D6 07 1F1E C0 E6 B8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | eb 6c 52 82 1d 0b bb f7 ce 75 94 46 2a ca 4f aa | b4 07 df 86 65 69 fd 07 f4 8c c0 b5 83 d6 07 1f | 1e c0 e6 b8 | decode_to_chunk: Plaintext: input "0x00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F20 21 22 23" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 22 23 | decode_to_chunk: expected counter-block: : input "0x 00 1C C5 B7 51 A5 1D 70 A1 C1 11 48 00 00 00 04" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 1c c5 b7 51 a5 1d 70 a1 c1 11 48 00 00 00 04 | do_aes_ctr: enter | do_aes_ctr: counter-block updated from 0x1 to 0x4 for 36 bytes | do_aes_ctr: exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: counter-block: ok | test_ctr_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key passed testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x06a9214036b8a15b512e03d534120006" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 06 a9 21 40 36 b8 a1 5b 51 2e 03 d5 34 12 00 06 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 3d af ba 42 9d 9e b4 30 b4 22 da 80 2c 9f ac 41 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "Single block msg" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 3d af ba 42 9d 9e b4 30 b4 22 da 80 2c 9f ac 41 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | e3 53 77 9c 10 79 ae b8 27 08 94 2d be 77 18 1a | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "Single block msg" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 53 69 6e 67 6c 65 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 20 6d 73 67 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0xc286696d887c9aa0611bbb3e2025a45a" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c2 86 69 6d 88 7c 9a a0 61 1b bb 3e 20 25 a4 5a | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 2e 17 99 6d 09 3d 28 dd b3 ba 69 5a 2e 6f 58 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 2e 17 99 6d 09 3d 28 dd b3 ba 69 5a 2e 6f 58 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 96 cd 94 c2 cc cf 8a 3a 86 30 28 b5 e1 dc 0a | 75 86 60 2d 25 3c ff f9 1b 82 66 be a6 d6 1a b1 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x6c3ea0477630ce21a2ce334aa746c2cd" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 6c 3e a0 47 76 30 ce 21 a2 ce 33 4a a7 46 c2 cd | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c7 82 dc 4c 09 8c 66 cb d9 cd 27 d8 25 68 2c 81 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 34 38 2d 62 79 74 | 65 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 28 65 78 61 63 74 | 6c 79 20 33 20 41 45 53 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 29 | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c7 82 dc 4c 09 8c 66 cb d9 cd 27 d8 25 68 2c 81 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e8862dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d0 a0 2b 38 36 45 17 53 d4 93 66 5d 33 f0 e8 86 | 2d ea 54 cd b2 93 ab c7 50 69 39 27 67 72 f8 d5 | 02 1c 19 21 6b ad 52 5c 85 79 69 5d 83 ba 26 84 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 34 38 2d 62 79 74 | 65 20 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 28 65 78 61 63 74 | 6c 79 20 33 20 41 45 53 20 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 29 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key | decode_to_chunk: raw_key: input "0x56e47a38c5598974bc46903dba290349" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 e4 7a 38 c5 59 89 74 bc 46 90 3d ba 29 03 49 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445d0 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445b8 | result: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c e8 2e ef be a0 da 3c 44 69 9e d7 db 51 b7 d9 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 aa ab ac ad ae af | b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ba bb bc bd be bf | c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf | d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db dc dd de df | decode_to_chunk: ciphertext: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: encrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | decode_to_chunk: IV: : input "0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c e8 2e ef be a0 da 3c 44 69 9e d7 db 51 b7 d9 | decode_to_chunk: new IV: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: cipertext: : input "0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55" | decode_to_chunk: output: | c3 0e 32 ff ed c0 77 4e 6a ff 6a f0 86 9f 71 aa | 0f 3a f0 7a 9a 31 a9 c6 84 db 20 7e b0 ef 8e 4e | 35 90 7a a6 32 c3 ff df 86 8b b7 b2 9d 3d 46 ad | 83 ce 9f 9a 10 2e e9 9d 49 a5 3e 87 f4 c3 da 55 | decode_to_chunk: plaintext: : input "0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" | decode_to_chunk: output: | a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 aa ab ac ad ae af | b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ba bb bc bd be bf | c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 ca cb cc cd ce cf | d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db dc dd de df | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | verify_chunk_data: decrypt: ok | verify_chunk_data: updated CBC IV: ok | test_cbc_vector: release sym_key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_ctr_vector: Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key passed testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "" | decode_to_chunk: output: | | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x75f0251d528ac01c4573dfd584d79f29" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96f298 (length 0) | | XCBC: data | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428123024: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fb98 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | Computing E[0] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 41 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96f8a8 (length 16) | 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | chunk output 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@(nil) (size 0) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@NULL | symkey message NULL key has no bytes | XCBC: data | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1023: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1a8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | Computing E[0] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n] | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 41 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b970180 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 6c 52 86 07 ef b8 8a a1 b6 5b 10 dc b0 a9 8e a1 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f868 | unwrapped: 75 f0 25 1d 52 8a c0 1c 45 73 df d5 84 d7 9f 29 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@NULL | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x5b376580ae2f19afe7219ceef172756f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96f868 (length 3) | 00 01 02 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428123024: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fcb8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | Computing E[1] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | c1 a6 a9 21 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96fd58 (length 16) | 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | chunk output 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (19-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 3 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 3-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (19-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 3) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 3 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (3-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: 68 3c 49 33 5f c0 ca c8 dc fa 68 5f 0b 26 d6 d2 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1a8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fb98 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[1] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | c1 a6 a9 21 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: MAC 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 6a 1f a2 7b 22 58 6c 6c 6e 92 c7 98 84 f9 8c 6e | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1a8 | unwrapped: 5b 37 65 80 ae 2f 19 af e7 21 9c ee f1 72 75 6f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xd2a246fa349b68a79998a4394ff7a263" | decode_to_chunk: output: | d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f868 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96f1a8 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f2d8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | XCBC: Computing E[1] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | bd 87 2d f8 93 a8 29 bf f0 b1 9b fd 0f 22 38 c4 | XCBC: MAC d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | chunk output d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fb98 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fcb8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | XCBC: Computing E[1] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | bd 87 2d f8 93 a8 29 bf f0 b1 9b fd 0f 22 38 c4 | XCBC: MAC d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 49 af b4 f9 a7 9e 45 22 32 42 17 19 b8 7d bd 3a | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fb98 | unwrapped: d2 a2 46 fa 34 9b 68 a7 99 98 a4 39 4f f7 a2 63 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f1a8 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96a708 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f298 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | chunk output 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 ee ab df a1 61 50 d7 cc c7 fb 77 a6 c8 f4 19 f4 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b96f048 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fcb8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b970180 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 46 1a c1 e1 bc 7e 94 77 60 99 1f 31 fd 20 3c 41 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fcb8 | unwrapped: 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xf54f0ec8d2b9f3d36807734bd5283fd4" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96fb98 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96a708 (length 32) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540619040: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f8a8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | XCBC: Computing E[2] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | b0 93 75 12 4c f5 a5 c0 b5 18 18 37 16 b2 15 67 | XCBC: MAC f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96fcb8 (length 16) | f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | chunk output f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 32 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 32-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (48-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 32) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 32 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 79 1c b2 6c 2f 51 f9 c9 99 68 9b c1 4d 1d fb 35 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b96f048 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | XCBC: Computing E[2] using K2 | XCBC: K2 bd 86 2f fb 97 ad 2f b8 f8 b8 91 f6 03 2f 36 cb | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: M[n]^E[n-1]^K2 | b0 93 75 12 4c f5 a5 c0 b5 18 18 37 16 b2 15 67 | XCBC: MAC f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 52 5b 38 a1 89 b2 b7 6b 05 12 64 14 52 a8 f7 de | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: f5 4f 0e c8 d2 b9 f3 d3 68 07 73 4b d5 28 3f d4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xbecbb3bccdb518a30677d5481fb6b4d8" | decode_to_chunk: output: | be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f1a8 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96fcf8 (length 34) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | 20 21 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 20 21 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540619040: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f2d8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | Computing E[3] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 09 02 5e 5a 67 25 20 72 44 14 5c 6b 80 66 85 79 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | e8 84 75 fb c5 1f b4 74 1c 13 fc e7 48 88 55 17 | XCBC: MAC be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | chunk output be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 34 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 34-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 34) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 34 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 48 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 79 1c b2 6c 2f 51 f9 c9 99 68 9b c1 4d 1d fb 35 9d b9 1d 91 d2 34 da 90 be 4f fc ea 5e 1c d7 0f | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 48 bytes at 0x55b81b96fef8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | unwrapped: 20 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f | XCBC: data 20 21 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f868 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[3] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 09 02 5e 5a 67 25 20 72 44 14 5c 6b 80 66 85 79 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n] 20 21 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | e8 84 75 fb c5 1f b4 74 1c 13 fc e7 48 88 55 17 | XCBC: MAC be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 09 f9 67 d5 c5 e8 07 b0 b2 80 46 f5 5f 33 d2 6a | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f868 | unwrapped: be cb b3 bc cd b5 18 a3 06 77 d5 48 1f b6 b4 d8 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xf0dafee895db30253761103b5d84528f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f868 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b974b28 (length 1000) | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540028960: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f2d8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | Computing E[63] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 5c 88 af cc 1e 1e 83 fc c4 2c 0c e4 12 12 f5 17 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 9d 2f 04 6d bc 24 17 fa 1c 2b ac 68 da fc 25 79 | XCBC: MAC f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96fcb8 (length 16) | f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | chunk output f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96a708 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (1016-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 1000 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 1000-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (1016-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 1000) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b971a00 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 1000 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (1000-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 1008 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 1008 bytes at 0x55b81b977128 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[63] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 5c 88 af cc 1e 1e 83 fc c4 2c 0c e4 12 12 f5 17 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 9d 2f 04 6d bc 24 17 fa 1c 2b ac 68 da fc 25 79 | XCBC: MAC f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: b2 be 2c 82 00 83 ed 23 53 9c b4 13 a3 da a7 4a | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: f0 da fe e8 95 db 30 25 37 61 10 3b 5d 84 52 8f | verify_chunk_data: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x47f51b4564966215b8985c63055ed308" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96fd58 (length 16) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96a708 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f8a8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | chunk output 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 16=16 just right | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 ee ab df a1 61 50 d7 cc c7 fb 77 a6 c8 f4 19 f4 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b96f048 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fcb8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: K1 c3 52 80 57 54 23 7f 31 1a c0 ff f4 e3 e0 3e 78 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 c1 a7 ab a1 a2 3a 94 06 58 07 a0 8c c8 ee d0 6e | XCBC: E[n-1] 1d 04 48 fa cf 4d 9c 6f 55 b9 93 da 09 80 3d b3 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | cc b2 f1 48 ed 77 08 69 0d be 33 56 c1 6e ed dd | XCBC: MAC 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b970180 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 46 1a c1 e1 bc 7e 94 77 60 99 1f 31 fd 20 3c 41 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96fcb8 | unwrapped: 47 f5 1b 45 64 96 62 15 b8 98 5c 63 05 5e d3 08 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x00010203040506070809" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x0fa087af7d866e7653434e602fdde835" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f868 (length 10) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 10 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 10-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | XCBC: Key 10<16 too small, padding with zeros | xcbc: reference tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444f0 | result: tmp+=0-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b971a00 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344518 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96a708 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 45 4d a4 31 af e9 33 0e 2c 0e 7b 5d 61 4a fa 2d | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f298 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 50 ca b2 4d 03 34 45 5e 40 7b 25 0f dd 7c f8 d5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8e f7 48 db 56 f1 f7 26 24 72 f2 c5 63 b0 3f 88 | XCBC: E[n-1] fe 1f 63 e9 65 1a 4b bb 3c cc cd 0d cc 83 e4 30 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 60 f9 39 21 b3 eb bc 9d 18 be 3f c8 af 33 db b8 | XCBC: MAC 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96fcb8 (length 16) | 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | chunk output 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 10 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 10-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (26-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (size 10) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 10<16 too small, padding with zeros | xcbc: reference tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (10-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344520 | result: tmp+=0-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b970180 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: PRF symkey interface-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | PRF symkey interface: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96efa8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b971a00 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b971a00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 ee ab df a1 61 50 d7 cc c7 fb 77 a6 c8 f4 19 f4 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b96f048 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 45 4d a4 31 af e9 33 0e 2c 0e 7b 5d 61 4a fa 2d | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 50 ca b2 4d 03 34 45 5e 40 7b 25 0f dd 7c f8 d5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8e f7 48 db 56 f1 f7 26 24 72 f2 c5 63 b0 3f 88 | XCBC: E[n-1] fe 1f 63 e9 65 1a 4b bb 3c cc cd 0d cc 83 e4 30 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 60 f9 39 21 b3 eb bc 9d 18 be 3f c8 af 33 db b8 | XCBC: MAC 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 8d ee 4e 16 37 cc 8e 0a a6 62 a3 6e 5c 85 e7 46 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 0f a0 87 af 7d 86 6e 76 53 43 4e 60 2f dd e8 35 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b971a00 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b970180 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fedcb" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | ed cb | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x8cd3c93ae598a9803006ffb67c40e9e4" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc init key-chunk@0x55b81b96a708 (length 18) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | ed cb | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344550 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 18 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 18-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b971a00 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344538 | result: key-key@0x55b81b970180 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b971a00 | XCBC: Key 18>16 too big, rehashing to size | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444f0 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444d8 | result: key-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | key extracting all 18 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | key: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | key: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1701522796: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 8d 85 de c3 94 fb 0a 81 dd ec 07 d7 05 c2 9d da | key: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | key extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b96f048 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: ed cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data ed cb | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b971a00 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b971a00 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)808460336: 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 e1 4d 5d 0e e2 77 15 df 08 b4 15 2b a2 3d a8 e0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344470 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344458 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8d 34 ef cb 3b d5 45 ca 06 2a ec df ef 7c 0b fa | XCBC: E[n-1] 0b 72 b2 ae 0a 37 79 81 75 6a d5 9c 79 c0 e6 96 | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 6b 8d dd 65 31 e2 3c 4b 73 40 39 43 96 bc ed 6c | XCBC: MAC 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444f0 | result: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444d8 | result: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface: release clone-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96f048 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc update message-bytes@0x55b81b96efa8 (length 20) | 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)540618784: 56 b1 67 37 8a 9b a6 05 86 35 4f ce 57 41 8f 6d | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f2d8 | unwrapped: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K1 27 f3 88 2f b7 b9 4b a4 16 36 09 d5 d2 39 c5 7f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 50 9e d8 ae 74 5a 75 4c 93 4d 6c 91 98 fe e2 1b | XCBC: E[n-1] ec 26 f6 dd e8 bb 1b d1 ec 76 c4 91 78 37 ca 4b | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | ac a9 3c 60 1c e1 6e 9d 7f 3b a8 00 e0 c9 28 50 | XCBC: MAC 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface PRF aes_xcbc final-chunk@0x55b81b96f868 (length 16) | 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | chunk output 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 18 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 18-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b970180 (34-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b970180 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc init key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 18) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | XCBC: Key 18>16 too big, rehashing to size | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344520 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344508 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | key symkey extracting all 18 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | key symkey: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | key symkey: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (18-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1701522796: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 8d 85 de c3 94 fb 0a 81 dd ec 07 d7 05 c2 9d da | key symkey: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | key symkey extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b96eff8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: ed cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data ed cb | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b970180 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b970180 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)808460336: 1a d7 f2 35 3e 4b b2 03 2d 45 35 7a ff bd 94 c1 | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: K1 e1 4d 5d 0e e2 77 15 df 08 b4 15 2b a2 3d a8 e0 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444a0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344488 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 8d 34 ef cb 3b d5 45 ca 06 2a ec df ef 7c 0b fa | XCBC: E[n-1] 0b 72 b2 ae 0a 37 79 81 75 6a d5 9c 79 c0 e6 96 | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n] ed cb | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | 6b 8d dd 65 31 e2 3c 4b 73 40 39 43 96 bc ed 6c | XCBC: MAC 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b96d700 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344520 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344508 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc crypt-prf@0x55b81b96eff8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc update symkey message-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | symkey message extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | symkey message: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | symkey message: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007328: ab 25 24 81 c1 d6 39 66 17 25 dc fa c9 64 84 63 ee ab df a1 61 50 d7 cc c7 fb 77 a6 c8 f4 19 f4 | symkey message: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | symkey message extracted len 32 bytes at 0x55b81b974ed8 | unwrapped: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | unwrapped: 10 11 12 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | XCBC: data 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f | XCBC: data 10 11 12 13 | K extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | K: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | K: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)1920429685: 56 b1 67 37 8a 9b a6 05 86 35 4f ce 57 41 8f 6d | K: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | K extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K: 5d 93 a5 3b 80 a3 e4 06 90 d2 4c ea e1 44 9c 0e | XCBC: K1 27 f3 88 2f b7 b9 4b a4 16 36 09 d5 d2 39 c5 7f | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_ECB | flags: SIGN | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: k1-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, AES_ECB) | k1: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | Computing E[2] using K3 | XCBC: K3 50 9e d8 ae 74 5a 75 4c 93 4d 6c 91 98 fe e2 1b | XCBC: E[n-1] ec 26 f6 dd e8 bb 1b d1 ec 76 c4 91 78 37 ca 4b | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n] 10 11 12 13 | XCBC: M[n]:80...^E[n-1]^K3 | ac a9 3c 60 1c e1 6e 9d 7f 3b a8 00 e0 c9 28 50 | XCBC: MAC 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | xcbc: release k1-key@0x55b81b974d30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344560 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344548 | result: xcbc-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | xcbc: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF aes_xcbc final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b974d30 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 06 38 61 a7 32 a2 18 5f a6 b6 b4 d4 33 72 74 a1 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 8c d3 c9 3a e5 98 a9 80 30 06 ff b6 7c 40 e9 e4 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18): ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b973280 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "Hi There" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 48 69 20 54 68 65 72 65 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x55b81b96fd58 (length 16) | 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b 0b | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344540 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344528 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344480 | result: trimed key-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444c0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55b81b974ca8 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 8) | 48 69 20 54 68 65 72 65 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445b0 | result: message-key@0x55b81b974d30 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 90 1d 23 73 2e dc c0 f1 a1 06 53 2f 6b e5 ec eb | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344440 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344428 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: result-key@0x55b81b96d700 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b974d30 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55b81b96d700 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f2d8 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x55b81b96f2d8 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | chunk output 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344480 | result: trimed key-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b96d700 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444c0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55b81b974ed8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (24-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 8 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 8-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (24-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (8-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 8) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b974d30 (8-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445d8 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976790 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 72) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55b81b976790 (72-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f2d8 (length 16) | 90 1d 23 73 2e dc c0 f1 a1 06 53 2f 6b e5 ec eb | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344460 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b976b70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344448 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x55b81b976790 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976790 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976b70 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976790 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f2d8 (length 16) | 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344520 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344508 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 | : hashed-outer-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: a8 dd 4c 59 29 a4 a5 44 62 01 25 46 19 6a ae b2 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f298 | unwrapped: 92 94 72 7a 36 38 bb 1c 13 f4 8e f8 15 8b fc 9d | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b974d30 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b96d700 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "Jefe" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 4a 65 66 65 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "what do ya want for nothing?" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 77 68 61 74 20 64 6f 20 79 61 20 77 61 6e 74 20 | 66 6f 72 20 6e 6f 74 68 69 6e 67 3f | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x55b81b96f868 (length 4) | 4a 65 66 65 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344540 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 4 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 4-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344528 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b96d700 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344480 | result: trimed key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b96d700 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444c0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b96d700 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55b81b976af8 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x55b81b96a708 (length 28) | 77 68 61 74 20 64 6f 20 79 61 20 77 61 6e 74 20 | 66 6f 72 20 6e 6f 74 68 69 6e 67 3f | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445b0 | result: message-key@0x55b81b973280 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55b81b973280 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | c3 db 14 c0 65 f5 52 03 b0 33 c8 1a 69 7b 97 c5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344440 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b976b70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344428 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x55b81b973280 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976b70 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b974d30 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | chunk output 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 4 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 4-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 4) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x55b81b976b70 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (4-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344480 | result: trimed key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976b70 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444c0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b96d700 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55b81b974ca8 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (44-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 28 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 28-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (44-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (28-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 28) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b973280 (28-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445d8 | result: result-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 92) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (92-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | c3 db 14 c0 65 f5 52 03 b0 33 c8 1a 69 7b 97 c5 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344460 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344448 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976790 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b974d30 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55b81b976790 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344520 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344508 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x55b81b976790 | : hashed-outer-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b974d30 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: e8 aa a9 0d 74 75 a8 ab a0 5b c8 a8 61 41 ca 9f | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f298 | unwrapped: 75 0c 78 3e 6a b0 b5 03 ea a8 6e 31 0a 5d b7 38 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b973280 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b976b70 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | decode_to_chunk: output: | aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD" | decode_to_chunk: output: | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd | decode_to_chunk: test_prf_vector: input "0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6" | decode_to_chunk: output: | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 init key-chunk@0x55b81b96fd58 (length 16) | aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344540 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344528 | result: PRF chunk interface-key@0x55b81b976b70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF chunk interface: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344480 | result: trimed key-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976b70 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444c0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976b70 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55b81b976b48 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 update message-bytes@0x55b81b96f098 (length 50) | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd | dd dd | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445b0 | result: message-key@0x55b81b974d30 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f1e8 (length 16) | 82 0a 6b 33 5d 18 7b 90 dc ba b1 7e f5 b4 26 ff | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344440 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344428 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b976b70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | PRF chunk interface: release inner-key@0x55b81b974d30 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444b0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344498 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976790 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b974d30 | PRF chunk interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF chunk interface: release key-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55b81b976790 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | PRF chunk interface: release outer-key@0x55b81b976790 | PRF chunk interface PRF md5 final-chunk@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | chunk output 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: ok | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: key symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 init key symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface: reference key-key@0x55b81b976790 | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344480 | result: trimed key-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_bytes: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976790 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444c0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b976b70 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 crypt-prf@0x55b81b96f048 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543445c0 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (66-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 50 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 50-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (66-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445a8 | result: message symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | message symkey: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 update symkey message-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 50) | PRF symkey interface: symkey message-key@0x55b81b974d30 (50-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543445d8 | result: result-key@0x55b81b96d700 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 inner-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 digest inner-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 114) | PRF HMAC inner hash: inner-key@0x55b81b96d700 (114-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC inner hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 82 0a 6b 33 5d 18 7b 90 dc ba b1 7e f5 b4 26 ff | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344460 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344448 | result: PRF HMAC inner hash-key@0x55b81b976b70 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC inner hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | PRF symkey interface: release inner-key@0x55b81b96d700 | XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (64-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe543444d0 | result: result-key@0x55b81b96d700 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (64-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543444b8 | result: result-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b96d700 | PRF symkey interface: release hashed-inner-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF symkey interface: release key-key@0x55b81b973280 | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 outer-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 init | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 digest outer-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 80) | PRF HMAC outer hash: outer-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (80-bytes, CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA) | PRF HMAC outer hash hash md5 final chunk@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7ffe54344520 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55b81b976b70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (32-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54344508 | result: PRF HMAC outer hash-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF HMAC outer hash: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | PRF symkey interface: release outer-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | : hashed-outer-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | PRF symkey interface PRF md5 final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 16) | PRF symkey interface: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | output: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 extracting all 16 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (16-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 16 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428007274: 0a 57 ec 79 52 53 59 48 bd 7d 14 a3 17 4e 86 57 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 extracted len 16 bytes at 0x55b81b96f1e8 | unwrapped: 56 be 34 52 1d 14 4c 88 db b8 c7 33 f0 e8 b3 f6 | verify_chunk_data: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3: ok | test_prf_vector: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 passed | test_prf_vector: release symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 | test_prf_vector: release message-key@0x55b81b974d30 | test_prf_vector: release key-key@0x55b81b976790 | test_prf_vector: release output-key@NULL 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 | starting up helper thread 0 started thread for crypto helper 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 2 | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 5 | starting up helper thread 5 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 6 | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | checking IKEv1 state table | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55b81b96f098 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9534a8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96f868 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x55b81b96fbd8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b911388 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96fd58 size 16 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985220b (length 11) | 4b 41 4d 45 2f 72 61 63 6f 6f 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f298 (length 16) | 70 03 cb c1 09 7d be 9c 26 00 ba 69 83 bc 8b 35 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853000 (length 46) | 4e 4c 42 53 5f 50 52 45 53 45 4e 54 28 4e 4c 42 | 2f 4d 53 43 53 20 66 61 73 74 20 66 61 69 6c 6f | 76 65 72 20 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 29 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f2d8 (length 16) | ec 22 62 b5 12 32 63 83 67 12 3b ce 3d 37 3c 5e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853030 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4d 61 6d 69 65 45 78 69 73 74 73 28 41 | 75 74 68 49 50 20 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 65 64 29 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96fcb8 (length 16) | 6f fe a4 ae ec 37 f4 9a 02 6f 97 cf b5 53 30 6d | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985238e (length 17) | 49 4b 45 20 43 47 41 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 20 | 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f8a8 (length 16) | e3 a5 96 6a 76 37 9f e7 07 22 82 31 e5 ce 86 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853058 (length 32) | 4d 53 2d 4e 65 67 6f 74 69 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 44 | 69 73 63 6f 76 65 72 79 20 43 61 70 61 62 6c 65 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96fd98 (length 16) | fb 1d e3 cd f3 41 b7 ea 16 b7 e5 be 08 55 f1 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198523a0 (length 23) | 4d 69 63 72 6f 73 6f 66 74 20 58 62 6f 78 20 4f | 6e 65 20 32 30 31 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96f1a8 (length 16) | 8a a3 94 cf 8a 55 77 dc 31 10 c1 13 b0 27 a4 f2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198523b8 (length 22) | 58 62 6f 78 20 49 4b 45 76 32 20 4e 65 67 6f 74 | 69 61 74 69 6f 6e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b96fb98 (length 16) | aa 28 1f cc d6 8c f8 a8 dc b8 5c c0 a7 10 40 2a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198523cf (length 28) | 4d 53 46 54 20 49 50 73 65 63 20 53 65 63 75 72 | 69 74 79 20 52 65 61 6c 6d 20 49 64 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b976cd8 (length 16) | 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853080 (length 39) | 41 20 47 53 53 2d 41 50 49 20 41 75 74 68 65 6e | 74 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 4d 65 74 68 6f 64 20 | 66 6f 72 20 49 4b 45 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97bfb8 (length 16) | ad 2c 0d d0 b9 c3 20 83 cc ba 25 b8 86 1e c4 55 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198523ec (length 6) | 47 53 53 41 50 49 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97bff8 (length 16) | 62 1b 04 bb 09 88 2a c1 e1 59 35 fe fa 24 ae ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198523f3 (length 12) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c038 (length 16) | 05 41 82 a0 7c 7a e2 06 f9 d2 cf 9d 24 32 c4 82 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852400 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c078 (length 16) | b9 16 23 e6 93 ca 18 a5 4c 6a 27 78 55 23 05 e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852411 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c0b8 (length 16) | 54 30 88 8d e0 1a 31 a6 fa 8f 60 22 4e 44 99 58 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852422 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c0f8 (length 16) | 7e e5 cb 85 f7 1c e2 59 c9 4a 5c 73 1e e4 e7 52 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852433 (length 16) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c138 (length 16) | 63 d9 a1 a7 00 94 91 b5 a0 a6 fd eb 2a 82 84 f0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852444 (length 18) | 53 53 48 20 53 65 6e 74 69 6e 65 6c 20 31 2e 34 | 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c178 (length 16) | eb 4b 0d 96 27 6b 4e 22 0a d1 62 21 a7 b2 a5 e6 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198530a8 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c1b8 (length 16) | fb f4 76 14 98 40 31 fa 8e 3b b6 19 80 89 b2 23 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198530e0 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c1f8 (length 16) | 19 52 dc 91 ac 20 f6 46 fb 01 cf 42 a3 3a ee 30 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853118 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c238 (length 16) | e8 bf fa 64 3e 5c 8f 2c d1 0f da 73 70 b6 eb e5 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853150 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c278 (length 16) | c1 11 1b 2d ee 8c bc 3d 62 05 73 ec 57 aa b9 cb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853188 (length 55) | 53 73 68 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 31 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c2b8 (length 16) | 09 ec 27 bf bc 09 c7 58 23 cf ec bf fe 56 5a 2e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198531c0 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c2f8 (length 16) | 7f 21 a5 96 e4 e3 18 f0 b2 f4 94 4c 23 84 cb 84 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198531f8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c338 (length 16) | 28 36 d1 fd 28 07 bc 9e 5a e3 07 86 32 04 51 ec | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853230 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c378 (length 16) | a6 8d e7 56 a9 c5 22 9b ae 66 49 80 40 95 1a d5 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853268 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 32 2e 31 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c3b8 (length 16) | 3f 23 72 86 7e 23 7c 1c d8 25 0a 75 55 9c ae 20 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198532a0 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 33 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c3f8 (length 16) | 0e 58 d5 77 4d f6 02 00 7d 0b 02 44 36 60 f7 eb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198532d8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 33 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c438 (length 16) | f5 ce 31 eb c2 10 f4 43 50 cf 71 26 5b 57 38 0f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853310 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c478 (length 16) | f6 42 60 af 2e 27 42 da dd d5 69 87 06 8a 99 a0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853348 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 30 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c4b8 (length 16) | 7a 54 d3 bd b3 b1 e6 d9 23 89 20 64 be 2d 98 1c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853380 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c4f8 (length 16) | 9a a1 f3 b4 34 72 a4 5d 5f 50 6a eb 26 0c f2 14 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198533b8 (length 55) | 53 53 48 20 43 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 74 69 6f | 6e 73 20 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 20 49 50 53 45 | 43 20 45 78 70 72 65 73 73 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f | 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c538 (length 16) | 68 80 c7 d0 26 09 91 14 e4 86 c5 54 30 e7 ab ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198533f0 (length 41) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 53 | 5f 56 45 4e 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffe543446a0 (length 16) | 44 76 1b d7 6b 80 85 41 74 87 ee 8a 51 cf fc f3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853420 (length 53) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 58 2e 35 30 39 2d 31 2e 33 2e 31 | 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 53 5f 56 45 4e | 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffe543446a0 (length 16) | b7 0e 8a c3 92 b1 6e 05 48 2f c4 dc 36 10 91 68 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853458 (length 58) | 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 46 72 65 65 53 2f 57 41 4e 20 | 32 2e 30 30 20 58 2e 35 30 39 2d 31 2e 33 2e 31 | 20 4c 44 41 50 20 50 4c 55 54 4f 5f 53 45 4e 44 | 53 5f 56 45 4e 44 4f 52 49 44 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffe543446a0 (length 16) | 97 1d ea 93 c3 c2 06 74 f9 ae 35 40 83 de 3e 2f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852531 (length 14) | 4f 70 65 6e 73 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x7ffe543446a0 (length 16) | 08 72 0b ee 9e 28 95 3c e0 8f 0a 18 b6 e2 9d da | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198534c0 (length 37) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 73 74 65 6e 62 65 72 67 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 72 61 76 65 72 73 | 61 6c 2d 30 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c6f8 (length 16) | 27 ba b5 dc 01 ea 07 60 ea 4e 31 90 ac 27 c0 d0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198534e8 (length 37) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 73 74 65 6e 62 65 72 67 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 72 61 76 65 72 73 | 61 6c 2d 30 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c738 (length 16) | 61 05 c4 22 e7 68 47 e4 3f 96 84 80 12 92 ae cd | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852559 (length 10) | 45 53 50 54 68 72 75 4e 41 54 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c778 (length 16) | 50 76 0f 62 4c 63 e5 c5 3e ea 38 6c 68 5c a0 83 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853510 (length 38) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 68 75 74 74 75 6e 65 6e 2d 69 | 70 73 65 63 2d 65 73 70 2d 69 6e 2d 75 64 70 2d | 30 30 2e 74 78 74 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c7b8 (length 16) | 6a 74 34 c1 9d 7e 36 34 80 90 a0 23 34 c9 c8 05 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852564 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c7f8 (length 16) | 44 85 15 2d 18 b6 bb cd 0b e8 a8 46 95 79 dd cc | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852582 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c838 (length 16) | 16 f6 ca 16 e4 a4 06 6d 83 82 1a 0f 0a ea a8 62 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198525a0 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c878 (length 16) | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819853538 (length 30) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 32 0a | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c8b8 (length 16) | 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198525be (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c8f8 (length 16) | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198525dc (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c938 (length 16) | 99 09 b6 4e ed 93 7c 65 73 de 52 ac e9 52 fa 6b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198525fa (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c978 (length 16) | 80 d0 bb 3d ef 54 56 5e e8 46 45 d4 c8 5c e3 ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852618 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c9b8 (length 16) | 4d 1e 0e 13 6d ea fa 34 c4 f3 ea 9f 02 ec 72 85 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852636 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97c9f8 (length 16) | 43 9b 59 f8 ba 67 6c 4c 77 37 ae 22 ea b8 f5 82 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852654 (length 29) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 2d 30 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97ca38 (length 16) | 8f 8d 83 82 6d 24 6b 6f c7 a8 a6 a4 28 c1 1d e8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852672 (length 26) | 64 72 61 66 74 2d 69 65 74 66 2d 69 70 73 65 63 | 2d 6e 61 74 2d 74 2d 69 6b 65 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97ca78 (length 16) | 4d f3 79 28 e9 fc 4f d1 b3 26 21 70 d5 15 c6 62 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985268d (length 8) | 52 46 43 20 33 39 34 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97cab8 (length 16) | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985b4f9 (length 13) | 46 52 41 47 4d 45 4e 54 41 54 49 4f 4e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97cb78 (length 16) | 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985273d (length 19) | 56 69 64 2d 49 6e 69 74 69 61 6c 2d 43 6f 6e 74 | 61 63 74 | vendor 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(length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97cfb8 (length 16) | 58 49 ab 6d 8b ea bd 6e 4d 09 e5 a3 b8 8c 08 9a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985282c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97cff8 (length 16) | 31 2f 9c b1 a6 b9 0e 19 de 75 28 c9 04 ac 30 87 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985283d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d038 (length 16) | bf 0f bf 73 06 eb b7 82 70 42 d8 93 53 98 86 e2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985284e (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d078 (length 16) | d1 96 83 36 8a f4 b0 ed c2 1c cd e9 82 b1 d1 b0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985285f (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d0b8 (length 16) | ea 84 0a a4 df c9 71 2d 6c 32 b5 a1 6e b3 29 a3 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852870 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d0f8 (length 16) | 66 a2 04 55 07 c1 19 da 78 a4 66 62 59 cd ea 48 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852881 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 39 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d138 (length 16) | 78 fd d2 87 de f0 1a 3f 07 4b 53 69 ea b4 fd 1c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852892 (length 17) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 31 | 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d178 (length 16) | bf 3a 89 ae 5b ef 8e 72 d4 4d ac 8b b8 8d 7d 5f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198528a4 (length 17) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 31 2e 31 | 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d1b8 (length 16) | b7 bd 9f 2f 97 8e 32 59 a7 aa 9f 7a 13 96 ad 6c | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198528b6 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d1f8 (length 16) | 9f 68 90 13 25 a9 72 89 43 35 30 2a 95 31 ab 9f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198528c7 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d238 (length 16) | ba b2 53 f4 cb 10 a8 10 8a 7c 92 7c 56 c8 78 86 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198528d8 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d278 (length 16) | 2a 51 7d 0d 23 c3 7d 08 bc e7 c2 92 a0 21 7b 39 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198528e9 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 34 2e 32 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d2b8 (length 16) | 2d 1f 40 61 18 fb d5 d2 84 74 79 1f fa 00 48 8a | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198528fa (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 38 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d2f8 (length 16) | 8c 4a 3b cb 72 9b 11 f7 03 d2 2a 5b 39 64 0c a8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985290b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 37 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d338 (length 16) | 3a 0d 4e 7c a4 e4 92 ed 4d fe 47 6d 1a c6 01 8b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985291c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d378 (length 16) | fe 3f 49 70 6e 26 a9 fb 36 a8 7b fc e9 ea 36 ce | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985292d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d3b8 (length 16) | 4c 7e fa 31 b3 9e 51 04 32 a3 17 57 0d 97 bb b9 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985293e (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d3f8 (length 16) | 76 c7 2b fd 39 84 24 dd 00 1b 86 d0 01 2f e0 61 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985294f (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d438 (length 16) | fb 46 41 ad 0e eb 2a 34 49 1d 15 f4 ef f5 10 63 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852960 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d478 (length 16) | 29 99 32 27 7b 7d fe 38 2c e2 34 65 33 3a 7d 23 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852971 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d4b8 (length 16) | e3 7f 2d 5b a8 9a 62 cd 20 2e e2 7d ac 06 c8 a8 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852982 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 38 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d4f8 (length 16) | 32 f0 e9 b9 c0 6d fe 8c 9a d5 59 9a 63 69 71 a1 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852993 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d538 (length 16) | 7f 50 cc 4e bf 04 c2 d9 da 73 ab fd 69 b7 7a a2 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198529a4 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d578 (length 16) | a1 94 e2 aa dd d0 ba fb 95 25 3d d9 6d c7 33 eb | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198529b5 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d5b8 (length 16) | 81 34 87 85 82 12 17 85 ba 65 ea 34 5d 6b a7 24 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198529c6 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 37 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d5f8 (length 16) | 07 fa 12 8e 47 54 f9 44 7b 1d d4 63 74 ee f3 60 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198529d7 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d638 (length 16) | b9 27 f9 52 19 a0 fe 36 00 db a3 c1 18 2a e5 5f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b8198529e8 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 36 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d678 (length 16) | b2 86 0e 78 37 f7 11 be f3 d0 ee b1 06 87 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20 9b a0 e5 90 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852a3d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 36 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d7b8 (length 16) | 3c 5e ba 3d 85 64 92 8e 32 ae 43 c3 d9 92 4d ee | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852a4e (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 35 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d7f8 (length 16) | 3f 26 7e d6 21 ad a7 ee 6c 7d 88 93 cc b0 b1 4b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852a5f (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d838 (length 16) | 7a 6b f5 b7 df 89 64 2a 75 a7 8e f7 d6 57 c1 c0 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852a70 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d878 (length 16) | df 5b 1f 0f 1d 56 79 d9 f8 51 2b 16 c5 5a 60 65 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852a81 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d8b8 (length 16) | 86 1c e5 eb 72 16 4b 19 0e 9e 62 9a 31 cf 49 01 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852a92 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d8f8 (length 16) | 9a 4a 46 48 f6 0f 8e da 7c fc bf e2 71 ee 5b 7d | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852aa3 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 35 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d938 (length 16) | 9e b3 d9 07 ed 7a da 4e 3c bc ac b9 17 ab c8 e4 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852ab4 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 34 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d978 (length 16) | 48 5a 70 36 1b 44 33 b3 1d ea 1c 6b e0 df 24 3e | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852ac5 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 33 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d9b8 (length 16) | 98 2b 7a 06 3a 33 c1 43 a8 ea dc 88 24 9f 6b cc | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852ad6 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97d9f8 (length 16) | e7 a3 fd 0c 6d 77 1a 8f 1b 8a 86 a4 16 9c 9e a4 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852ae7 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97da38 (length 16) | 75 b0 65 3c b2 81 eb 26 d3 1e de 38 c8 e1 e2 28 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852af8 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 34 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97da78 (length 16) | e8 29 c8 81 49 ba b3 c0 ce e8 5d a6 0e 18 ae 9b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852b09 (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97dab8 (length 16) | 42 a4 83 4c 92 ab 9a 77 77 06 3a fa 25 4b cb 69 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852b1a (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97daf8 (length 16) | f6 97 c1 af cc 2e c8 dd cd f9 9d c7 af 03 a6 7f | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852b2b (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 33 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97db38 (length 16) | b8 f9 2b 2f a2 d3 fe 5f e1 58 34 4b da 1c c6 ae | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852b3c (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 32 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97db78 (length 16) | 99 dc 7c c8 23 37 6b 3b 33 d0 43 57 89 6a e0 7b | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852b4d (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 31 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97dbb8 (length 16) | d9 11 8b 1e 9d e5 ef ce d9 cc 9d 88 3f 21 68 ff | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b819852b5e (length 16) | 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 53 77 61 6e 20 32 2e 32 2e 30 | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97dbf8 (length 16) | 85 b6 cb ec 48 0d 5c 8c d9 88 2c 82 5a c2 c2 44 | vendor id hash md5 init | vendor id hash md5 digest data-bytes@0x55b81985b4f9 (length 13) | 46 52 41 47 4d 45 4e 54 41 54 49 4f 4e | vendor id hash md5 final bytes@0x55b81b97dc38 (length 16) | 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x55b81b96fc48 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b97bf08 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9870d8 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987118 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987248 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b917b78 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90eee8 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987288 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9872c8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b917aa8 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987308 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987348 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987418 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b917b78 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987458 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987588 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:25045) using fork+execve | forked child 25045 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987b68 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b97be58 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987bd8 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987c18 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90f7d8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987c88 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987cc8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b911e18 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987d38 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987d78 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9130c8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987de8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987e28 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e64e8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987e98 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987ed8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e61d8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987f48 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | id type added to secret(0x55b81b8e1c48) PKK_PSK: @east | id type added to secret(0x55b81b8e1c48) PKK_PSK: @west | Processing PSK at line 1: passed | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.962 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b97be58 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987b68 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987b68 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b97be58 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90f7d8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987c18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987c18 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90f7d8 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b911e18 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987cc8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987cc8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b911e18 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9130c8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987d78 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987d78 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9130c8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e64e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987e28 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987e28 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e64e8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e61d8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987ed8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55b81b987ed8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e61d8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | id type added to secret(0x55b81b8e1c48) PKK_PSK: @east | id type added to secret(0x55b81b8e1c48) PKK_PSK: @west | Processing PSK at line 1: passed | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.29 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 25045 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0106 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection east with policy PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1-MODP2048, 3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1-MODP2048 | from whack: got --esp=aes128-sha1;modp2048,3des-sha1;modp2048 | ESP/AH string values: AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96-MODP2048, 3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96-MODP2048 | counting wild cards for @west is 0 | counting wild cards for @east is 0 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55b81b989198 added connection description "east" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east]...192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.184 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00286 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 01 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db c5 6b 6e 7c fc a1 4d 97 | 76 25 a9 04 0f ca 45 d2 3e 6e 59 e4 d7 98 0e 24 | creating state object #1 at 0x55b81b98abc8 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp started | #1 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #1: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #1 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #1: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9893e8 size 128 "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.456 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00267 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | 14 00 00 24 42 40 d2 cd a2 06 30 af 45 2a 0d bb | 6e 27 30 92 bf b0 7d f0 40 d0 8e f3 3f 41 90 57 | d6 a3 38 6b 14 00 00 18 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 | d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 5b ea 81 6b 00 00 00 18 | 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | 16 af aa 2e | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #1 is idle | #1 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | 5b ea 81 6b | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | natd_hash: hash= 5b ea 81 6b | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | 16 af aa 2e | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | natd_hash: hash= 16 af aa 2e | expected NAT-D(me): 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | expected NAT-D(me): 5b ea 81 6b | expected NAT-D(him): | 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | 16 af aa 2e | received NAT-D: 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | received NAT-D: 5b ea 81 6b | received NAT-D: 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | received NAT-D: 16 af aa 2e | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE scheduled in 20 seconds | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9893e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9893e8 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 0 resuming | #1 spent 0.218 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 1 | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.382 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0003a28: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0f0003a28 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | Generated nonce: 9f 91 9b 21 d3 91 33 16 98 57 72 32 f2 1c 84 b7 | Generated nonce: f2 96 99 09 a1 41 71 7e 1a 25 a5 2e 7e 85 cf 17 | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.000816 seconds | (#1) spent 0.816 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0002888 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0003a28: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #1 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | keyex value b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | keyex value 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | keyex value 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | keyex value 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | keyex value b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | keyex value c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | keyex value e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | keyex value 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | keyex value 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | keyex value bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | keyex value 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | keyex value 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | keyex value 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | keyex value 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | keyex value 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 9f 91 9b 21 d3 91 33 16 98 57 72 32 f2 1c 84 b7 | Nr f2 96 99 09 a1 41 71 7e 1a 25 a5 2e 7e 85 cf 17 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | 16 af aa 2e | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | natd_hash: hash= 16 af aa 2e | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c | NAT-D 16 af aa 2e | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | 5b ea 81 6b | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | natd_hash: rcookie= bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | natd_hash: hash= 5b ea 81 6b | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | NAT-D 5b ea 81 6b | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0003a28: transferring ownership from state #1 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9893e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #1 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #1 is idle; has background offloaded task | crypto helper 2 resuming | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | parent state #1: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 2 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | peer's g: 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | peer's g: ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | peer's g: f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | peer's g: 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | peer's g: 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | peer's g: 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | peer's g: c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | peer's g: 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | peer's g: 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | peer's g: da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | peer's g: 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | peer's g: 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | peer's g: 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | peer's g: 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | peer's g: 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | 14 00 00 24 9f 91 9b 21 d3 91 33 16 98 57 72 32 | f2 1c 84 b7 f2 96 99 09 a1 41 71 7e 1a 25 a5 2e | 7e 85 cf 17 14 00 00 18 1e ad b3 ac d4 67 72 97 | 0d 59 e2 32 ec 2f c1 7c 16 af aa 2e 00 00 00 18 | 1d 4f 52 d9 f2 89 ff 28 d5 c3 85 10 ca 96 e2 a4 | 5b ea 81 6b | peer's g: 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #1 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10447.612742 "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.387 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0002888 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0003a28: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b976790 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b98ca38 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8001108 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b98ca5c (length 32) | 42 40 d2 cd a2 06 30 af 45 2a 0d bb 6e 27 30 92 | bf b0 7d f0 40 d0 8e f3 3f 41 90 57 d6 a3 38 6b | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b98ca7c (length 32) | 9f 91 9b 21 d3 91 33 16 98 57 72 32 f2 1c 84 b7 | f2 96 99 09 a1 41 71 7e 1a 25 a5 2e 7e 85 cf 17 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e80010b8 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: e7 9b a2 0c 3f 6d 0b 3c e0 65 dd 19 59 8f d6 83 10 e8 f2 40 b5 a3 5d ce e2 33 72 e0 7d 41 21 1f 6e d1 b7 35 72 dd bb 59 b9 59 84 b6 ce 9e 6b 43 ed a9 73 cf 6d a8 11 3d 54 23 43 90 29 8c ea 42 9b 38 78 e6 31 f3 54 90 16 18 3f e9 9e b7 96 7b dd e2 da 97 10 8d e4 0a ef ce c4 55 d5 33 6a cf 1a a5 01 3a 92 bb fe 17 8d 22 71 4b d3 5f 87 17 c9 e8 c7 c2 23 fc 95 2f 74 b0 4d 97 5c 37 b0 c0 b6 09 e7 c2 30 ca d6 a8 58 e4 0c 0f 51 3f f7 5a d8 f3 40 bc 4b 21 f8 eb 03 37 07 cf e1 42 65 a4 12 2b 5c ca 98 6b 09 12 5a 20 9f 51 0d 24 ea d7 a3 6a 2f 26 3d 12 1c e1 97 ad a4 f5 51 dd 20 80 5a 47 64 44 a2 93 08 4b aa de a9 01 ca a9 71 27 6e a6 91 45 18 a8 5e d8 da c2 26 49 c2 2d 1c 7b fa 76 10 60 56 d4 67 4c c5 08 2b fc ac 46 1f e6 ba 5f 3b 28 cf 3b 3e 2e 03 15 10 56 cd 22 0d cd | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e8004f28 | unwrapped: 4c 57 f9 ee e8 e1 e6 06 19 c6 aa c0 1a 55 f0 8c | unwrapped: e3 15 d1 22 31 b1 0b ec 51 e0 4b c1 37 ce 40 62 | unwrapped: d1 9e 51 be 81 28 d6 35 73 cf fd fa 7d 42 f5 07 | unwrapped: 20 c8 dc b7 0d a3 53 59 e7 d2 42 00 33 e1 9f ea | unwrapped: 12 d6 51 d2 d1 e4 af b5 4a 36 a6 fe 32 73 a5 20 | unwrapped: bc ba ee 5c 50 a3 6f ae 37 4c 63 8f b5 74 4a f3 | unwrapped: c2 21 6d ae 30 07 c6 3a b2 a1 a5 77 b4 f4 c0 d4 | unwrapped: 46 7f ae 9d 42 76 e9 94 9e bd 4e 20 5a 4a 5b 7f | unwrapped: ba eb 0e eb 79 75 b5 24 89 4f 26 c7 83 89 27 bc | unwrapped: d8 05 98 45 69 c6 c1 4d 91 ca 76 6c 56 20 71 dd | unwrapped: b4 b3 ee 8f fb 69 aa bc a8 2b f9 80 09 ec 68 f8 | unwrapped: ab 34 15 ad 51 48 66 40 1e 4b 65 58 8e 90 2d 25 | unwrapped: 4b 8d 6d 34 75 52 98 2f db a0 89 b7 23 69 eb 69 | unwrapped: 25 8c 79 c6 7f 79 56 17 a5 94 22 5a 26 e8 59 d5 | unwrapped: 38 5c 26 f1 0c db 17 f3 b5 12 46 f9 58 3e 62 b6 | unwrapped: b1 a4 5d 85 f7 ca 0b 7e 7b 05 07 f1 6d 3a 26 3e | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b98cc9c (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b98cca4 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8001108 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: 74 24 81 77 9d 95 de b8 be 74 66 c0 27 e2 79 9f f0 72 2b e1 b2 76 ae fa 7a a7 08 1f 0e 39 86 eb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e80030c8 | unwrapped: 43 92 73 15 e1 2a 69 1a ae b6 70 6d 27 0f d6 04 | unwrapped: c7 ca d3 4e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: e7 9b a2 0c 3f 6d 0b 3c e0 65 dd 19 59 8f d6 83 10 e8 f2 40 b5 a3 5d ce e2 33 72 e0 7d 41 21 1f 6e d1 b7 35 72 dd bb 59 b9 59 84 b6 ce 9e 6b 43 ed a9 73 cf 6d a8 11 3d 54 23 43 90 29 8c ea 42 9b 38 78 e6 31 f3 54 90 16 18 3f e9 9e b7 96 7b dd e2 da 97 10 8d e4 0a ef ce c4 55 d5 33 6a cf 1a a5 01 3a 92 bb fe 17 8d 22 71 4b d3 5f 87 17 c9 e8 c7 c2 23 fc 95 2f 74 b0 4d 97 5c 37 b0 c0 b6 09 e7 c2 30 ca d6 a8 58 e4 0c 0f 51 3f f7 5a d8 f3 40 bc 4b 21 f8 eb 03 37 07 cf e1 42 65 a4 12 2b 5c ca 98 6b 09 12 5a 20 9f 51 0d 24 ea d7 a3 6a 2f 26 3d 12 1c e1 97 ad a4 f5 51 dd 20 80 5a 47 64 44 a2 93 08 4b aa de a9 01 ca a9 71 27 6e a6 91 45 18 a8 5e d8 da c2 26 49 c2 2d 1c 7b fa 76 10 60 56 d4 67 4c c5 08 2b fc ac 46 1f e6 ba 5f 3b 28 cf 3b 3e 2e 03 15 10 56 cd 22 0d cd | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e8003db8 | unwrapped: 4c 57 f9 ee e8 e1 e6 06 19 c6 aa c0 1a 55 f0 8c | unwrapped: e3 15 d1 22 31 b1 0b ec 51 e0 4b c1 37 ce 40 62 | unwrapped: d1 9e 51 be 81 28 d6 35 73 cf fd fa 7d 42 f5 07 | unwrapped: 20 c8 dc b7 0d a3 53 59 e7 d2 42 00 33 e1 9f ea | unwrapped: 12 d6 51 d2 d1 e4 af b5 4a 36 a6 fe 32 73 a5 20 | unwrapped: bc ba ee 5c 50 a3 6f ae 37 4c 63 8f b5 74 4a f3 | unwrapped: c2 21 6d ae 30 07 c6 3a b2 a1 a5 77 b4 f4 c0 d4 | unwrapped: 46 7f ae 9d 42 76 e9 94 9e bd 4e 20 5a 4a 5b 7f | unwrapped: ba eb 0e eb 79 75 b5 24 89 4f 26 c7 83 89 27 bc | unwrapped: d8 05 98 45 69 c6 c1 4d 91 ca 76 6c 56 20 71 dd | unwrapped: b4 b3 ee 8f fb 69 aa bc a8 2b f9 80 09 ec 68 f8 | unwrapped: ab 34 15 ad 51 48 66 40 1e 4b 65 58 8e 90 2d 25 | unwrapped: 4b 8d 6d 34 75 52 98 2f db a0 89 b7 23 69 eb 69 | unwrapped: 25 8c 79 c6 7f 79 56 17 a5 94 22 5a 26 e8 59 d5 | unwrapped: 38 5c 26 f1 0c db 17 f3 b5 12 46 f9 58 3e 62 b6 | unwrapped: b1 a4 5d 85 f7 ca 0b 7e 7b 05 07 f1 6d 3a 26 3e | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b98cc9c (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b98cca4 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e80010b8 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: 8a ae d2 2e 8d 50 e7 cc 23 9a 41 32 0d ef ad 13 0b 83 57 42 01 90 3d bb 70 19 1e 88 c8 5f 0d d1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e8001158 | unwrapped: ce 2b 57 10 a6 30 cf 97 89 dd 97 45 9e 04 d9 a5 | unwrapped: 04 63 2f 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: e7 9b a2 0c 3f 6d 0b 3c e0 65 dd 19 59 8f d6 83 10 e8 f2 40 b5 a3 5d ce e2 33 72 e0 7d 41 21 1f 6e d1 b7 35 72 dd bb 59 b9 59 84 b6 ce 9e 6b 43 ed a9 73 cf 6d a8 11 3d 54 23 43 90 29 8c ea 42 9b 38 78 e6 31 f3 54 90 16 18 3f e9 9e b7 96 7b dd e2 da 97 10 8d e4 0a ef ce c4 55 d5 33 6a cf 1a a5 01 3a 92 bb fe 17 8d 22 71 4b d3 5f 87 17 c9 e8 c7 c2 23 fc 95 2f 74 b0 4d 97 5c 37 b0 c0 b6 09 e7 c2 30 ca d6 a8 58 e4 0c 0f 51 3f f7 5a d8 f3 40 bc 4b 21 f8 eb 03 37 07 cf e1 42 65 a4 12 2b 5c ca 98 6b 09 12 5a 20 9f 51 0d 24 ea d7 a3 6a 2f 26 3d 12 1c e1 97 ad a4 f5 51 dd 20 80 5a 47 64 44 a2 93 08 4b aa de a9 01 ca a9 71 27 6e a6 91 45 18 a8 5e d8 da c2 26 49 c2 2d 1c 7b fa 76 10 60 56 d4 67 4c c5 08 2b fc ac 46 1f e6 ba 5f 3b 28 cf 3b 3e 2e 03 15 10 56 cd 22 0d cd | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e8004f28 | unwrapped: 4c 57 f9 ee e8 e1 e6 06 19 c6 aa c0 1a 55 f0 8c | unwrapped: e3 15 d1 22 31 b1 0b ec 51 e0 4b c1 37 ce 40 62 | unwrapped: d1 9e 51 be 81 28 d6 35 73 cf fd fa 7d 42 f5 07 | unwrapped: 20 c8 dc b7 0d a3 53 59 e7 d2 42 00 33 e1 9f ea | unwrapped: 12 d6 51 d2 d1 e4 af b5 4a 36 a6 fe 32 73 a5 20 | unwrapped: bc ba ee 5c 50 a3 6f ae 37 4c 63 8f b5 74 4a f3 | unwrapped: c2 21 6d ae 30 07 c6 3a b2 a1 a5 77 b4 f4 c0 d4 | unwrapped: 46 7f ae 9d 42 76 e9 94 9e bd 4e 20 5a 4a 5b 7f | unwrapped: ba eb 0e eb 79 75 b5 24 89 4f 26 c7 83 89 27 bc | unwrapped: d8 05 98 45 69 c6 c1 4d 91 ca 76 6c 56 20 71 dd | unwrapped: b4 b3 ee 8f fb 69 aa bc a8 2b f9 80 09 ec 68 f8 | unwrapped: ab 34 15 ad 51 48 66 40 1e 4b 65 58 8e 90 2d 25 | unwrapped: 4b 8d 6d 34 75 52 98 2f db a0 89 b7 23 69 eb 69 | unwrapped: 25 8c 79 c6 7f 79 56 17 a5 94 22 5a 26 e8 59 d5 | unwrapped: 38 5c 26 f1 0c db 17 f3 b5 12 46 f9 58 3e 62 b6 | unwrapped: b1 a4 5d 85 f7 ca 0b 7e 7b 05 07 f1 6d 3a 26 3e | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b98cc9c (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b98cca4 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_a 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_e 0x55b81b976b70, enc_key 0x55b81b96d700 | DH_i: 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | DH_i: ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | DH_i: f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | DH_i: 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | DH_i: 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | DH_i: 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | DH_i: c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | DH_i: 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | DH_i: 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | DH_i: da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | DH_i: 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | DH_i: 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | DH_i: 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | DH_i: 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | DH_i: 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | DH_i: 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | DH_r: d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | DH_r: b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | DH_r: 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | DH_r: 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | DH_r: 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | DH_r: b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | DH_r: c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | DH_r: e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | DH_r: 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | DH_r: 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | DH_r: bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | DH_r: 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | DH_r: 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | DH_r: 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | DH_r: 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | DH_r: 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b98ca9c (length 256) | 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b98cb9c (length 256) | d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 20) | 1f 47 49 c4 30 d6 a3 1a 76 26 04 f3 ef 7b 47 e2 | 7a b3 10 a5 | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.001489 seconds | (#1) spent 1.44 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003978 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #1: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0003a28: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #1 | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.018 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003978 | spent 0.00216 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 7a 12 9d a5 | 59 48 ab 6b 53 de 65 44 f2 5f aa 42 b6 31 cf f2 | 1d bb 8f 69 88 c5 5f 02 d5 79 f8 a3 7e e8 7c 81 | 03 de 88 5c d0 b8 02 df 8e 99 6a 50 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 1f 47 49 c4 30 d6 a3 1a 76 26 04 f3 ef 7b 47 e2 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 7e e8 7c 81 03 de 88 5c d0 b8 02 df 8e 99 6a 50 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 1e 1f 8d f0 | d2 4d fa 55 78 23 94 4e cf 3e 1d c0 53 af 9d 91 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #1: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98aa98 (length 256) | 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f0000b48 (length 256) | d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892cc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b8e18b8 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | 1e 1f 8d f0 d2 4d fa 55 78 23 94 4e cf 3e 1d c0 | 53 af 9d 91 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8001158 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f0000b48 (length 256) | d7 05 40 f5 f5 cb 54 c9 0c c1 14 50 8b 82 2d dc | b9 3c 6d fa 81 8a eb 82 51 80 0e 00 d3 5a ac 47 | 5e 77 0f a2 7e 92 aa ab cb d5 cc b6 12 da fc 7a | 1a 2e 3a 80 97 05 dc 12 09 36 e0 36 f3 36 8f f7 | 19 8a 21 ae 75 1e 76 d8 ed 5a 22 4d ec 98 eb d4 | b8 0d 68 08 52 f3 e5 c8 f4 ad 21 eb cb d7 ed 04 | c9 e8 71 4e 1b 8b 5d 3f dd 4a 74 74 7a 8b cf a2 | e3 1e 0b 97 56 fd 0d 6b 68 bb 2f 0f c8 3f 8f de | 61 0e c8 9e 95 a1 a8 db b5 31 f0 a8 e5 83 5f 5a | 51 47 34 7d 74 8c 81 45 ed 59 b2 f1 6c ca 04 8b | bb fe a1 3e cd 15 b5 8e ba 83 fe dd 56 86 bc d8 | 39 f4 a5 8c 07 ac 55 12 e1 0b 8d ba 59 6e c2 74 | 53 12 72 e3 e4 13 bf 3d d5 0f 28 d8 1a ec 8e f0 | 76 fd f2 f2 af 76 d6 3e a9 5f 08 cf 63 53 85 da | 86 59 d6 92 8e 5d fb 46 8d be de 2c aa f7 5b 7c | 21 a9 58 eb 82 3e 54 95 0f d7 f4 fb bf f7 2a e1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98aa98 (length 256) | 16 62 d7 4f 72 6a 7c 86 8e 71 ed 42 47 bb 1a 57 | ed 41 59 d6 cf 01 4d 3b 5b 47 a8 64 f7 db 90 77 | f8 fb 88 95 d1 c7 6f b7 27 17 ed 26 17 9d 09 cc | 93 dc 96 3a 5a 31 ad 4f 62 54 e9 6b d8 7e a4 09 | 62 6a 37 0c 97 3f 0e b7 d9 24 62 c1 20 c0 f0 8a | 5a 8b 23 d0 45 15 dc 85 1b ac b5 7f c4 fa 49 47 | c3 ed 5a 9a 78 a9 74 83 15 6b be 3a a9 7b ed 39 | 76 ce 34 b2 46 23 94 ee a6 e5 1d 91 ea 67 a6 b7 | 29 7f 74 9a 58 28 6d 57 18 73 0b 1e d3 9d 55 09 | da 7f 2b 89 84 74 6f cb f8 fe 56 8c fc b1 c9 39 | 2e f6 91 e9 23 2b 8f a4 d1 c5 cd 16 b4 dd 1a 2c | 21 1b 65 ae 93 c7 65 43 5c 61 f2 63 0b 4c 35 22 | 13 e6 42 de 8c 7e dd 9d 51 23 49 a5 75 08 09 bd | 7e 1a 50 d8 c0 46 89 bd 7d a4 48 9f 46 5d f4 ab | 55 99 7a f9 b9 0d 78 c7 54 ed c9 78 4d 0e 66 74 | 3c 2f 09 a8 20 6b 83 0a e9 a5 61 37 1a 7e de 20 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892cc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | 02 fb 27 b6 69 86 b3 44 bf a8 8c d5 6a ba 26 c8 | e0 91 df db | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 02 fb 27 b6 69 86 b3 44 bf a8 8c d5 6a ba 26 c8 | HASH_R e0 91 df db | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 02 fb 27 b6 69 86 b3 44 bf a8 8c d5 6a ba 26 c8 | encrypting: e0 91 df db | IV: 7e e8 7c 81 03 de 88 5c d0 b8 02 df 8e 99 6a 50 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #1 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #1: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #1 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #1 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c b6 c3 2b e0 | bb 97 bc 9d 15 bc d4 17 54 ef e4 ae 4c 35 4f 2a | 9c 22 fc ee 35 f1 77 a4 50 86 f2 65 85 46 b9 fe | 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0002888 size 128 | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #1: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #1 | #1 spent 0.428 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.534 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00234 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 20 01 b0 83 55 49 00 00 01 bc 17 68 bf 32 | c3 79 b3 2d d6 0c 6e f2 c6 f5 8d 0b 64 cd 23 e4 | ac 05 dc 7d d0 83 26 d3 fd 03 09 fe 10 c7 bc f7 | 9c 5b 85 c8 d9 22 f8 a2 64 1f f5 d8 28 c0 9a 7e | d1 91 df d7 7a 16 44 3a 12 b7 6b b6 d0 5d 94 b5 | e4 2c 21 28 f5 67 7e 2a e5 dc da 38 68 07 59 9d | db 5a cc 37 a0 21 e1 de 14 d5 a1 fc e9 55 f9 6b | ec 79 93 0a a2 ae 68 a2 77 d0 0a 81 c3 19 31 5f | fe 38 b3 89 36 4a a8 40 00 43 74 0f 1e b5 85 ea | 24 cb e3 89 01 d4 55 35 92 39 38 76 55 e4 75 10 | 6e 6b f8 3d 62 79 0d ba c5 c6 a7 93 65 23 85 b5 | 3e af 02 8e ae 54 74 1b dd 9e e0 f6 69 ac 0b be | 91 eb 6b 73 14 1b b3 1c f6 2a 68 24 6c f5 ac 1a | cd ef 5c 4b 11 b2 cd d5 33 cb 93 92 cd e3 87 85 | 99 18 0c 8f 2b 78 89 b1 fc 16 7d 00 70 d7 66 b8 | 6c 61 c2 50 70 49 00 83 43 f5 81 cf 0d 5b 8a 37 | 61 73 c1 5c 7a 6f 67 e9 53 86 9d b1 73 14 63 d3 | 87 9c 8e 4c 0a 7c 21 65 82 72 5e 90 26 2b e3 1f | cd ff a1 46 5b 5b ce 5c bb e3 5b 96 e5 e0 cc 92 | 9f 58 35 29 b8 82 d3 97 97 21 3c e1 e2 f2 50 c7 | b3 55 25 85 ea d3 a0 7d 17 d8 57 a8 ae cd 6b 03 | 79 03 0a cd 59 70 64 0c 32 aa f2 5c cf 0a 77 e2 | f8 01 c0 c2 e2 94 09 97 8f 31 df d9 42 5b 78 ab | 47 ad 56 8e 53 44 1d c4 54 fd a0 18 81 0f a9 8c | ed da e0 87 1a b4 44 c4 bf 81 21 e1 97 96 90 3d | b7 22 9c 34 a8 6c 57 58 4b 5c 67 23 e1 db bb 21 | c8 82 b1 0b 37 ca 3d 13 61 c2 50 b4 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2961397065 (0xb0835549) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | current Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 16) | 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | b0 83 55 49 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | 42 86 29 bf 3d 98 94 ca 50 bc 18 ae d7 05 c4 1f | f5 10 eb 28 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 42 86 29 bf 3d 98 94 ca 50 bc 18 ae d7 05 c4 1f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: e1 db bb 21 c8 82 b1 0b 37 ca 3d 13 61 c2 50 b4 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 20 01 b0 83 55 49 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | cb 72 41 d8 60 7c 69 db 6e 59 58 da 7e 6d 44 00 | ff 30 cf 6c 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 f1 fc af 80 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | 05 00 01 04 31 fe 4f 18 ab 9f e3 05 93 c1 a6 b9 | 80 fd 22 b4 c0 43 e0 d2 d9 44 12 e9 d1 f6 01 c1 | 24 74 e8 5b 5c 96 39 de 33 dc 0f fa 11 4a f1 ce | 8a 76 e1 81 a7 57 25 9b 49 61 03 93 a1 a1 e2 17 | d2 87 ed 79 f8 ab 9c 47 87 b4 03 c8 8f 4b f1 a4 | 87 1e a1 c4 d6 d6 21 b0 aa e4 1d e4 03 e4 98 19 | 04 78 60 a3 34 3d 52 73 55 7d 9e c5 83 e4 0a 53 | 6a db f9 36 6b 53 14 ac f1 6c 82 d1 4d 4f 38 39 | 96 02 6e 9d 13 f6 f6 5b 24 de b1 aa 12 56 9a 03 | b7 bd 3b bc cc 8b b3 a8 38 b9 20 d6 ff 5d 4d be | ab f8 82 7d 7e 4c 5e 65 85 06 bf 26 a9 35 9c 97 | d0 ba 35 17 52 20 c6 51 67 e1 5d 37 b9 64 26 54 | 1a f1 a3 87 7d 79 61 04 7c 0f f9 2d f5 9e a5 86 | 31 3e 6f 06 06 e6 24 e3 20 ea 11 4d cf 1a 8b 5c | 3e 13 4f 1a c6 46 0e 48 5d 99 90 5b aa a2 a0 63 | 0b 4d 92 3c e2 79 16 99 98 21 6d 97 2e 97 dc c0 | f9 54 8e 08 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8001158 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | b0 83 55 49 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98cbfc (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 f1 fc af 80 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 76 b1 94 0f | 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 b7 a7 4a 9c | a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e 05 00 01 04 | 31 fe 4f 18 ab 9f e3 05 93 c1 a6 b9 80 fd 22 b4 | c0 43 e0 d2 d9 44 12 e9 d1 f6 01 c1 24 74 e8 5b | 5c 96 39 de 33 dc 0f fa 11 4a f1 ce 8a 76 e1 81 | a7 57 25 9b 49 61 03 93 a1 a1 e2 17 d2 87 ed 79 | f8 ab 9c 47 87 b4 03 c8 8f 4b f1 a4 87 1e a1 c4 | d6 d6 21 b0 aa e4 1d e4 03 e4 98 19 04 78 60 a3 | 34 3d 52 73 55 7d 9e c5 83 e4 0a 53 6a db f9 36 | 6b 53 14 ac f1 6c 82 d1 4d 4f 38 39 96 02 6e 9d | 13 f6 f6 5b 24 de b1 aa 12 56 9a 03 b7 bd 3b bc | cc 8b b3 a8 38 b9 20 d6 ff 5d 4d be ab f8 82 7d | 7e 4c 5e 65 85 06 bf 26 a9 35 9c 97 d0 ba 35 17 | 52 20 c6 51 67 e1 5d 37 b9 64 26 54 1a f1 a3 87 | 7d 79 61 04 7c 0f f9 2d f5 9e a5 86 31 3e 6f 06 | 06 e6 24 e3 20 ea 11 4d cf 1a 8b 5c 3e 13 4f 1a | c6 46 0e 48 5d 99 90 5b aa a2 a0 63 0b 4d 92 3c | e2 79 16 99 98 21 6d 97 2e 97 dc c0 f9 54 8e 08 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | cb 72 41 d8 60 7c 69 db 6e 59 58 da 7e 6d 44 00 | ff 30 cf 6c | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | cb 72 41 d8 60 7c 69 db 6e 59 58 da 7e 6d 44 00 | ff 30 cf 6c | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #1: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | fc_try trying east:192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 vs east:192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | fc_try concluding with east [129] | fc_try east gives east | concluding with d = east | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #2 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #2 in UNDEFINED | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #1 "east" as #2 for IPSEC SA | #2 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #1.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #2: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI f1 fc af 80 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 31 fe 4f 18 ab 9f e3 05 93 c1 a6 b9 80 fd 22 b4 | c0 43 e0 d2 d9 44 12 e9 d1 f6 01 c1 24 74 e8 5b | 5c 96 39 de 33 dc 0f fa 11 4a f1 ce 8a 76 e1 81 | a7 57 25 9b 49 61 03 93 a1 a1 e2 17 d2 87 ed 79 | f8 ab 9c 47 87 b4 03 c8 8f 4b f1 a4 87 1e a1 c4 | d6 d6 21 b0 aa e4 1d e4 03 e4 98 19 04 78 60 a3 | 34 3d 52 73 55 7d 9e c5 83 e4 0a 53 6a db f9 36 | 6b 53 14 ac f1 6c 82 d1 4d 4f 38 39 96 02 6e 9d | 13 f6 f6 5b 24 de b1 aa 12 56 9a 03 b7 bd 3b bc | cc 8b b3 a8 38 b9 20 d6 ff 5d 4d be ab f8 82 7d | 7e 4c 5e 65 85 06 bf 26 a9 35 9c 97 d0 ba 35 17 | 52 20 c6 51 67 e1 5d 37 b9 64 26 54 1a f1 a3 87 | 7d 79 61 04 7c 0f f9 2d f5 9e a5 86 31 3e 6f 06 | 06 e6 24 e3 20 ea 11 4d cf 1a 8b 5c 3e 13 4f 1a | c6 46 0e 48 5d 99 90 5b aa a2 a0 63 0b 4d 92 3c | e2 79 16 99 98 21 6d 97 2e 97 dc c0 f9 54 8e 08 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 3 for state #2 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #2 and saving MD | #2 is busy; has a suspended MD | #1 spent 0.184 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.503 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 3 for state #2 | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 3 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0050c8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0ec0050c8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 5d 6b de fe 80 e8 3d 87 ff cd 0b b1 71 39 5f 03 | b2 98 55 81 1e 45 07 d6 ed 14 36 09 10 3d 18 3c | 37 fa 24 00 f1 cb e5 57 3a 6d 8d a8 36 8b 5c 95 | 82 65 84 51 29 8a 72 d5 00 2f 75 4b 81 af 77 ad | 4e e9 bb 8b bc 94 e8 2b 09 01 ed 0a 21 92 f8 73 | a2 11 43 31 ed 37 86 b6 c5 6e f3 d1 4f 77 b8 9f | 3c 8c 72 e6 b5 27 91 49 83 a1 13 49 18 36 64 b6 | 75 97 fe c8 01 9f fd 0a c1 e6 1a 1a 2a 78 03 c3 | 62 23 8b b0 cb 74 5e 2a 30 14 26 b2 90 b4 f9 aa | 9d 13 d8 1e da d3 a4 e2 50 4c 4f 7a 93 94 a8 6e | 85 da 28 b8 7f f2 07 c0 d4 4e 9e c0 c1 35 f0 3b | 7e 00 b8 10 34 a1 54 83 15 12 2a 57 15 d1 26 1e | 6c 75 f0 32 92 4f 12 63 44 49 de f8 d4 6f 59 78 | 8a c5 bc 8f 9c d2 07 b9 65 7b 29 a3 3f e9 17 51 | c7 c0 46 82 e1 41 57 04 1b 91 34 b9 d6 57 2e d1 | 8a 20 ef 16 81 e5 e6 4b 81 4a 98 c7 9b 4d 47 64 | Generated nonce: cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | Generated nonce: b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 3 time elapsed 0.000647 seconds | (#2) spent 0.644 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 3: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 3 for state #2 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 size 128 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a458 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003e78 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #2 | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 3 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #2: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0050c8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #2 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0050c8: transferring ownership from state #2 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 4 for state #2 | state #2 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | suspending state #2 and saving MD | #2 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #2 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #2 spent 0.067 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 4 for state #2 | crypto helper 4 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 4 | peer's g: 31 fe 4f 18 ab 9f e3 05 93 c1 a6 b9 80 fd 22 b4 | peer's g: c0 43 e0 d2 d9 44 12 e9 d1 f6 01 c1 24 74 e8 5b | peer's g: 5c 96 39 de 33 dc 0f fa 11 4a f1 ce 8a 76 e1 81 | peer's g: a7 57 25 9b 49 61 03 93 a1 a1 e2 17 d2 87 ed 79 | peer's g: f8 ab 9c 47 87 b4 03 c8 8f 4b f1 a4 87 1e a1 c4 | peer's g: d6 d6 21 b0 aa e4 1d e4 03 e4 98 19 04 78 60 a3 | peer's g: 34 3d 52 73 55 7d 9e c5 83 e4 0a 53 6a db f9 36 | peer's g: 6b 53 14 ac f1 6c 82 d1 4d 4f 38 39 96 02 6e 9d | peer's g: 13 f6 f6 5b 24 de b1 aa 12 56 9a 03 b7 bd 3b bc | peer's g: cc 8b b3 a8 38 b9 20 d6 ff 5d 4d be ab f8 82 7d | peer's g: 7e 4c 5e 65 85 06 bf 26 a9 35 9c 97 d0 ba 35 17 | peer's g: 52 20 c6 51 67 e1 5d 37 b9 64 26 54 1a f1 a3 87 | peer's g: 7d 79 61 04 7c 0f f9 2d f5 9e a5 86 31 3e 6f 06 | peer's g: 06 e6 24 e3 20 ea 11 4d cf 1a 8b 5c 3e 13 4f 1a | peer's g: c6 46 0e 48 5d 99 90 5b aa a2 a0 63 0b 4d 92 3c | peer's g: e2 79 16 99 98 21 6d 97 2e 97 dc c0 f9 54 8e 08 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0050c8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b987630 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 4 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 4 time elapsed 0.000615 seconds | (#2) spent 0.613 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 4: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 4 for state #2 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0003618 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #2 | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 4 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #2: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2961397065 (0xb0835549) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI f1 fc af 80 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x34bbe08a for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 34 bb e0 8a | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #2: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:b0835549} "east" #2: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #2: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | Nr b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 5d 6b de fe 80 e8 3d 87 ff cd 0b b1 71 39 5f 03 | keyex value b2 98 55 81 1e 45 07 d6 ed 14 36 09 10 3d 18 3c | keyex value 37 fa 24 00 f1 cb e5 57 3a 6d 8d a8 36 8b 5c 95 | keyex value 82 65 84 51 29 8a 72 d5 00 2f 75 4b 81 af 77 ad | keyex value 4e e9 bb 8b bc 94 e8 2b 09 01 ed 0a 21 92 f8 73 | keyex value a2 11 43 31 ed 37 86 b6 c5 6e f3 d1 4f 77 b8 9f | keyex value 3c 8c 72 e6 b5 27 91 49 83 a1 13 49 18 36 64 b6 | keyex value 75 97 fe c8 01 9f fd 0a c1 e6 1a 1a 2a 78 03 c3 | keyex value 62 23 8b b0 cb 74 5e 2a 30 14 26 b2 90 b4 f9 aa | keyex value 9d 13 d8 1e da d3 a4 e2 50 4c 4f 7a 93 94 a8 6e | keyex value 85 da 28 b8 7f f2 07 c0 d4 4e 9e c0 c1 35 f0 3b | keyex value 7e 00 b8 10 34 a1 54 83 15 12 2a 57 15 d1 26 1e | keyex value 6c 75 f0 32 92 4f 12 63 44 49 de f8 d4 6f 59 78 | keyex value 8a c5 bc 8f 9c d2 07 b9 65 7b 29 a3 3f e9 17 51 | keyex value c7 c0 46 82 e1 41 57 04 1b 91 34 b9 d6 57 2e d1 | keyex value 8a 20 ef 16 81 e5 e6 4b 81 4a 98 c7 9b 4d 47 64 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0050c8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #2 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a88 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54342b6c (length 4) | b0 83 55 49 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 32) | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b8198d38f4 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 34 bb e0 8a 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 cd c9 1c 4e | d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 b5 de 52 4c | 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc 05 00 01 04 | 5d 6b de fe 80 e8 3d 87 ff cd 0b b1 71 39 5f 03 | b2 98 55 81 1e 45 07 d6 ed 14 36 09 10 3d 18 3c | 37 fa 24 00 f1 cb e5 57 3a 6d 8d a8 36 8b 5c 95 | 82 65 84 51 29 8a 72 d5 00 2f 75 4b 81 af 77 ad | 4e e9 bb 8b bc 94 e8 2b 09 01 ed 0a 21 92 f8 73 | a2 11 43 31 ed 37 86 b6 c5 6e f3 d1 4f 77 b8 9f | 3c 8c 72 e6 b5 27 91 49 83 a1 13 49 18 36 64 b6 | 75 97 fe c8 01 9f fd 0a c1 e6 1a 1a 2a 78 03 c3 | 62 23 8b b0 cb 74 5e 2a 30 14 26 b2 90 b4 f9 aa | 9d 13 d8 1e da d3 a4 e2 50 4c 4f 7a 93 94 a8 6e | 85 da 28 b8 7f f2 07 c0 d4 4e 9e c0 c1 35 f0 3b | 7e 00 b8 10 34 a1 54 83 15 12 2a 57 15 d1 26 1e | 6c 75 f0 32 92 4f 12 63 44 49 de f8 d4 6f 59 78 | 8a c5 bc 8f 9c d2 07 b9 65 7b 29 a3 3f e9 17 51 | c7 c0 46 82 e1 41 57 04 1b 91 34 b9 d6 57 2e d1 | 8a 20 ef 16 81 e5 e6 4b 81 4a 98 c7 9b 4d 47 64 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 20) | 91 22 6a 24 8e 1f c4 e8 fa c2 ac ad 2b 32 c9 31 | 5f bd 3b 6a | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 91 22 6a 24 8e 1f c4 e8 fa c2 ac ad 2b 32 c9 31 | 5f bd 3b 6a | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98f618 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 49 7c 49 fc 42 b9 15 67 a4 bc b2 9f 00 8c 0b 22 5d a8 f8 ba 7f af d8 0b ba 83 63 ce e2 29 6c 6d 4f 9f 03 0a d4 be 0f 9b a0 36 66 4f 8b df 3b 2a 18 0c 26 ed b5 fe 59 77 e7 2e 7e a9 ed aa 2f 0d 4b b5 21 67 11 bf 88 d5 20 aa 07 81 0a 36 02 d6 b5 8d 2e d8 0c 1d 55 1e 0c f0 c4 09 7e df 47 86 d1 dc f5 c7 90 91 38 ec 83 da da 70 b2 fe 5e 96 8d a2 5e b5 16 cb e5 8a 3b cf 09 02 5d c9 32 19 45 c3 38 aa f6 78 bc 00 df 07 54 1e ff 70 40 9d c4 b4 e4 95 68 51 77 2b 8b ea bd f5 6a 9a 3f 5c 33 85 34 2f 23 d2 59 53 86 3f 91 c4 83 2c 85 9a 76 23 86 35 31 30 03 52 35 f9 cc bc 41 fd 35 52 19 f8 64 49 34 43 fe 62 7f f6 b3 14 f9 8c b5 b4 e8 a5 59 c9 f5 d4 c4 9f bf 33 da eb 4d 8a 4e de db e8 4f ed 4c 77 44 27 33 06 12 97 0b d0 9e 4a 77 5a 46 2a da 01 b9 db 98 9c 1b 5a 15 5b 30 cb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b994928 | unwrapped: 0d ea 0d 35 e3 26 6c 4a bc 48 3f 18 f1 31 b2 39 | unwrapped: a0 73 fe 53 f2 cd 70 e0 df a2 fb 02 eb 53 44 74 | unwrapped: 8f 57 e8 15 58 66 92 cb 3c a1 cc 50 8e 2f 5c 3f | unwrapped: be 58 e9 d0 45 23 c4 0f a8 88 80 73 e3 28 6c f1 | unwrapped: 0e 82 bd 78 80 69 42 b0 e8 d4 63 b5 2b b5 fe fc | unwrapped: fa 59 08 7b d2 33 db c7 91 58 52 42 a7 5c 6c 1d | unwrapped: 46 77 e0 7a da 6e 2e 2c 31 4a 7f f5 53 0b 45 c2 | unwrapped: aa e7 b8 d4 e4 84 c2 49 a7 d3 d8 4e 16 54 b3 71 | unwrapped: c8 13 e6 25 fa ee 31 70 c1 8b 8d c4 9b 33 d1 fa | unwrapped: e9 b6 27 a6 64 7f df 09 34 52 ef 91 bd 60 d1 b5 | unwrapped: 13 2f bf 63 b3 77 b2 57 bb a0 54 6d 1c e8 7d 83 | unwrapped: 29 e2 ba f7 7d d1 87 4b bf b6 ca 93 e4 ff e2 55 | unwrapped: a6 dd 46 39 bd 9f 1d 90 60 1a 95 61 87 b9 13 f4 | unwrapped: 87 72 dc 4b 2c af 53 63 fa c3 ff 31 cd ae 5a e4 | unwrapped: 69 84 3f 2f 3c aa b8 e9 a7 ea 51 30 2c da 5c b8 | unwrapped: c3 68 0a 95 7e 26 ed 8f 83 71 54 38 72 3b 6d 5a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 49 7c 49 fc 42 b9 15 67 a4 bc b2 9f 00 8c 0b 22 5d a8 f8 ba 7f af d8 0b ba 83 63 ce e2 29 6c 6d 4f 9f 03 0a d4 be 0f 9b a0 36 66 4f 8b df 3b 2a 18 0c 26 ed b5 fe 59 77 e7 2e 7e a9 ed aa 2f 0d 4b b5 21 67 11 bf 88 d5 20 aa 07 81 0a 36 02 d6 b5 8d 2e d8 0c 1d 55 1e 0c f0 c4 09 7e df 47 86 d1 dc f5 c7 90 91 38 ec 83 da da 70 b2 fe 5e 96 8d a2 5e b5 16 cb e5 8a 3b cf 09 02 5d c9 32 19 45 c3 38 aa f6 78 bc 00 df 07 54 1e ff 70 40 9d c4 b4 e4 95 68 51 77 2b 8b ea bd f5 6a 9a 3f 5c 33 85 34 2f 23 d2 59 53 86 3f 91 c4 83 2c 85 9a 76 23 86 35 31 30 03 52 35 f9 cc bc 41 fd 35 52 19 f8 64 49 34 43 fe 62 7f f6 b3 14 f9 8c b5 b4 e8 a5 59 c9 f5 d4 c4 9f bf 33 da eb 4d 8a 4e de db e8 4f ed 4c 77 44 27 33 06 12 97 0b d0 9e 4a 77 5a 46 2a da 01 b9 db 98 9c 1b 5a 15 5b 30 cb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b9945d8 | unwrapped: 0d ea 0d 35 e3 26 6c 4a bc 48 3f 18 f1 31 b2 39 | unwrapped: a0 73 fe 53 f2 cd 70 e0 df a2 fb 02 eb 53 44 74 | unwrapped: 8f 57 e8 15 58 66 92 cb 3c a1 cc 50 8e 2f 5c 3f | unwrapped: be 58 e9 d0 45 23 c4 0f a8 88 80 73 e3 28 6c f1 | unwrapped: 0e 82 bd 78 80 69 42 b0 e8 d4 63 b5 2b b5 fe fc | unwrapped: fa 59 08 7b d2 33 db c7 91 58 52 42 a7 5c 6c 1d | unwrapped: 46 77 e0 7a da 6e 2e 2c 31 4a 7f f5 53 0b 45 c2 | unwrapped: aa e7 b8 d4 e4 84 c2 49 a7 d3 d8 4e 16 54 b3 71 | unwrapped: c8 13 e6 25 fa ee 31 70 c1 8b 8d c4 9b 33 d1 fa | unwrapped: e9 b6 27 a6 64 7f df 09 34 52 ef 91 bd 60 d1 b5 | unwrapped: 13 2f bf 63 b3 77 b2 57 bb a0 54 6d 1c e8 7d 83 | unwrapped: 29 e2 ba f7 7d d1 87 4b bf b6 ca 93 e4 ff e2 55 | unwrapped: a6 dd 46 39 bd 9f 1d 90 60 1a 95 61 87 b9 13 f4 | unwrapped: 87 72 dc 4b 2c af 53 63 fa c3 ff 31 cd ae 5a e4 | unwrapped: 69 84 3f 2f 3c aa b8 e9 a7 ea 51 30 2c da 5c b8 | unwrapped: c3 68 0a 95 7e 26 ed 8f 83 71 54 38 72 3b 6d 5a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98be60 (length 4) | 34 bb e0 8a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98be40 (length 4) | f1 fc af 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 32) | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 32) | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002918 (length 32) | cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002918 (length 32) | cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e8004138 (length 20) | 3f 44 ea 25 ff d5 90 d9 48 d1 ec a0 89 d2 5f f2 | ba bf fb 10 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b98f668 (length 20) | f3 c8 18 00 5f 7b a9 2f ed c0 08 03 ed c4 6c 83 | 0f 34 ff b5 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98c7d8 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8004138 (length 20) | 3f 44 ea 25 ff d5 90 d9 48 d1 ec a0 89 d2 5f f2 | ba bf fb 10 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98f668 (length 20) | f3 c8 18 00 5f 7b a9 2f ed c0 08 03 ed c4 6c 83 | 0f 34 ff b5 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 49 7c 49 fc 42 b9 15 67 a4 bc b2 9f 00 8c 0b 22 5d a8 f8 ba 7f af d8 0b ba 83 63 ce e2 29 6c 6d 4f 9f 03 0a d4 be 0f 9b a0 36 66 4f 8b df 3b 2a 18 0c 26 ed b5 fe 59 77 e7 2e 7e a9 ed aa 2f 0d 4b b5 21 67 11 bf 88 d5 20 aa 07 81 0a 36 02 d6 b5 8d 2e d8 0c 1d 55 1e 0c f0 c4 09 7e df 47 86 d1 dc f5 c7 90 91 38 ec 83 da da 70 b2 fe 5e 96 8d a2 5e b5 16 cb e5 8a 3b cf 09 02 5d c9 32 19 45 c3 38 aa f6 78 bc 00 df 07 54 1e ff 70 40 9d c4 b4 e4 95 68 51 77 2b 8b ea bd f5 6a 9a 3f 5c 33 85 34 2f 23 d2 59 53 86 3f 91 c4 83 2c 85 9a 76 23 86 35 31 30 03 52 35 f9 cc bc 41 fd 35 52 19 f8 64 49 34 43 fe 62 7f f6 b3 14 f9 8c b5 b4 e8 a5 59 c9 f5 d4 c4 9f bf 33 da eb 4d 8a 4e de db e8 4f ed 4c 77 44 27 33 06 12 97 0b d0 9e 4a 77 5a 46 2a da 01 b9 db 98 9c 1b 5a 15 5b 30 cb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b994928 | unwrapped: 0d ea 0d 35 e3 26 6c 4a bc 48 3f 18 f1 31 b2 39 | unwrapped: a0 73 fe 53 f2 cd 70 e0 df a2 fb 02 eb 53 44 74 | unwrapped: 8f 57 e8 15 58 66 92 cb 3c a1 cc 50 8e 2f 5c 3f | unwrapped: be 58 e9 d0 45 23 c4 0f a8 88 80 73 e3 28 6c f1 | unwrapped: 0e 82 bd 78 80 69 42 b0 e8 d4 63 b5 2b b5 fe fc | unwrapped: fa 59 08 7b d2 33 db c7 91 58 52 42 a7 5c 6c 1d | unwrapped: 46 77 e0 7a da 6e 2e 2c 31 4a 7f f5 53 0b 45 c2 | unwrapped: aa e7 b8 d4 e4 84 c2 49 a7 d3 d8 4e 16 54 b3 71 | unwrapped: c8 13 e6 25 fa ee 31 70 c1 8b 8d c4 9b 33 d1 fa | unwrapped: e9 b6 27 a6 64 7f df 09 34 52 ef 91 bd 60 d1 b5 | unwrapped: 13 2f bf 63 b3 77 b2 57 bb a0 54 6d 1c e8 7d 83 | unwrapped: 29 e2 ba f7 7d d1 87 4b bf b6 ca 93 e4 ff e2 55 | unwrapped: a6 dd 46 39 bd 9f 1d 90 60 1a 95 61 87 b9 13 f4 | unwrapped: 87 72 dc 4b 2c af 53 63 fa c3 ff 31 cd ae 5a e4 | unwrapped: 69 84 3f 2f 3c aa b8 e9 a7 ea 51 30 2c da 5c b8 | unwrapped: c3 68 0a 95 7e 26 ed 8f 83 71 54 38 72 3b 6d 5a | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 49 7c 49 fc 42 b9 15 67 a4 bc b2 9f 00 8c 0b 22 5d a8 f8 ba 7f af d8 0b ba 83 63 ce e2 29 6c 6d 4f 9f 03 0a d4 be 0f 9b a0 36 66 4f 8b df 3b 2a 18 0c 26 ed b5 fe 59 77 e7 2e 7e a9 ed aa 2f 0d 4b b5 21 67 11 bf 88 d5 20 aa 07 81 0a 36 02 d6 b5 8d 2e d8 0c 1d 55 1e 0c f0 c4 09 7e df 47 86 d1 dc f5 c7 90 91 38 ec 83 da da 70 b2 fe 5e 96 8d a2 5e b5 16 cb e5 8a 3b cf 09 02 5d c9 32 19 45 c3 38 aa f6 78 bc 00 df 07 54 1e ff 70 40 9d c4 b4 e4 95 68 51 77 2b 8b ea bd f5 6a 9a 3f 5c 33 85 34 2f 23 d2 59 53 86 3f 91 c4 83 2c 85 9a 76 23 86 35 31 30 03 52 35 f9 cc bc 41 fd 35 52 19 f8 64 49 34 43 fe 62 7f f6 b3 14 f9 8c b5 b4 e8 a5 59 c9 f5 d4 c4 9f bf 33 da eb 4d 8a 4e de db e8 4f ed 4c 77 44 27 33 06 12 97 0b d0 9e 4a 77 5a 46 2a da 01 b9 db 98 9c 1b 5a 15 5b 30 cb | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b9945d8 | unwrapped: 0d ea 0d 35 e3 26 6c 4a bc 48 3f 18 f1 31 b2 39 | unwrapped: a0 73 fe 53 f2 cd 70 e0 df a2 fb 02 eb 53 44 74 | unwrapped: 8f 57 e8 15 58 66 92 cb 3c a1 cc 50 8e 2f 5c 3f | unwrapped: be 58 e9 d0 45 23 c4 0f a8 88 80 73 e3 28 6c f1 | unwrapped: 0e 82 bd 78 80 69 42 b0 e8 d4 63 b5 2b b5 fe fc | unwrapped: fa 59 08 7b d2 33 db c7 91 58 52 42 a7 5c 6c 1d | unwrapped: 46 77 e0 7a da 6e 2e 2c 31 4a 7f f5 53 0b 45 c2 | unwrapped: aa e7 b8 d4 e4 84 c2 49 a7 d3 d8 4e 16 54 b3 71 | unwrapped: c8 13 e6 25 fa ee 31 70 c1 8b 8d c4 9b 33 d1 fa | unwrapped: e9 b6 27 a6 64 7f df 09 34 52 ef 91 bd 60 d1 b5 | unwrapped: 13 2f bf 63 b3 77 b2 57 bb a0 54 6d 1c e8 7d 83 | unwrapped: 29 e2 ba f7 7d d1 87 4b bf b6 ca 93 e4 ff e2 55 | unwrapped: a6 dd 46 39 bd 9f 1d 90 60 1a 95 61 87 b9 13 f4 | unwrapped: 87 72 dc 4b 2c af 53 63 fa c3 ff 31 cd ae 5a e4 | unwrapped: 69 84 3f 2f 3c aa b8 e9 a7 ea 51 30 2c da 5c b8 | unwrapped: c3 68 0a 95 7e 26 ed 8f 83 71 54 38 72 3b 6d 5a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98be60 (length 4) | 34 bb e0 8a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98be40 (length 4) | f1 fc af 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 32) | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 32) | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002918 (length 32) | cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002918 (length 32) | cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e800414c (length 20) | 51 fb 19 54 b1 ff ee fa 39 4f 33 c4 0c 6c c8 a2 | 2c a3 a9 4e | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b98f67c (length 20) | f9 7f 78 2d 62 25 53 d2 c8 88 36 e4 1c 49 3b be | 08 77 d8 ce | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55b81b98bc58 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#2 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.f1fcaf80@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.34bbe08a@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 91 22 6a 24 8e 1f c4 e8 fa c2 ac ad | encrypting: 2b 32 c9 31 5f bd 3b 6a 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 34 bb e0 8a | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a | encrypting: 44 a9 6a a7 b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 | encrypting: 87 62 64 fc 05 00 01 04 5d 6b de fe 80 e8 3d 87 | encrypting: ff cd 0b b1 71 39 5f 03 b2 98 55 81 1e 45 07 d6 | encrypting: ed 14 36 09 10 3d 18 3c 37 fa 24 00 f1 cb e5 57 | encrypting: 3a 6d 8d a8 36 8b 5c 95 82 65 84 51 29 8a 72 d5 | encrypting: 00 2f 75 4b 81 af 77 ad 4e e9 bb 8b bc 94 e8 2b | encrypting: 09 01 ed 0a 21 92 f8 73 a2 11 43 31 ed 37 86 b6 | encrypting: c5 6e f3 d1 4f 77 b8 9f 3c 8c 72 e6 b5 27 91 49 | encrypting: 83 a1 13 49 18 36 64 b6 75 97 fe c8 01 9f fd 0a | encrypting: c1 e6 1a 1a 2a 78 03 c3 62 23 8b b0 cb 74 5e 2a | encrypting: 30 14 26 b2 90 b4 f9 aa 9d 13 d8 1e da d3 a4 e2 | encrypting: 50 4c 4f 7a 93 94 a8 6e 85 da 28 b8 7f f2 07 c0 | encrypting: d4 4e 9e c0 c1 35 f0 3b 7e 00 b8 10 34 a1 54 83 | encrypting: 15 12 2a 57 15 d1 26 1e 6c 75 f0 32 92 4f 12 63 | encrypting: 44 49 de f8 d4 6f 59 78 8a c5 bc 8f 9c d2 07 b9 | encrypting: 65 7b 29 a3 3f e9 17 51 c7 c0 46 82 e1 41 57 04 | encrypting: 1b 91 34 b9 d6 57 2e d1 8a 20 ef 16 81 e5 e6 4b | encrypting: 81 4a 98 c7 9b 4d 47 64 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: e1 db bb 21 c8 82 b1 0b 37 ca 3d 13 61 c2 50 b4 | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 6f 1d 8b ca a2 24 2c e0 f7 24 f6 4e 67 97 d3 a1 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #2 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #2: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #2 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #2) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 20 01 b0 83 55 49 00 00 01 bc b2 f7 cf b5 | 7a 84 06 5e 8e 16 0a 00 ce 9b d0 02 18 f9 8e 8a | 48 70 b6 f8 43 91 b6 07 34 2b e0 d4 5e 56 a1 17 | 07 df c6 c0 ff 5b f0 89 9b 37 3b 83 5d d3 66 00 | eb f9 fd 1a 29 89 b2 0f 8a a5 e6 2e 18 0f f4 cd | 81 70 5b da d6 86 7e 0b ce 60 95 b4 f4 d5 cc 34 | cb 32 09 9b 0a d5 25 9b 9a cd 5f 73 ae 5f 36 32 | be c0 8c a0 eb 74 d7 da 00 f2 1b fb c9 55 9d 93 | bb 13 02 14 be 01 90 f5 c6 f4 b3 6b 86 b9 bf 44 | f3 95 c5 49 21 33 65 59 ff 2e 15 26 47 72 65 47 | 42 b6 e6 fb ee 01 9d 0d ec df a2 bc 6c f1 00 d7 | 91 7d 83 03 ff 18 44 52 ba 16 1c 95 d7 18 8d 74 | ff cf 92 ec dc 3b 49 16 40 f6 3d 53 78 ec bf 1c | 2e 68 14 a6 65 04 c4 11 a1 77 c3 4b c5 bf 46 e6 | c2 5d 9c 68 43 89 6d 4c b2 40 cb 3f e2 0c b3 28 | 3b f0 0b b6 a1 f6 d2 75 96 a3 ad b0 48 bf 41 40 | 4f c8 de ab c9 5a 47 6e ae c8 a3 87 0c cf 47 0b | 8b a9 f9 82 67 e9 00 0a bc 52 bf a9 2d dd 01 69 | bb 06 ef 16 eb ae 15 34 85 ba 03 96 0b c7 8a 68 | 08 0a 5c 17 47 d4 19 b6 86 fd 34 e8 b2 3e 22 94 | 62 84 96 ba ce f8 59 b2 51 08 20 90 eb c0 1a 5f | df 15 56 af 36 8f be 2b 55 82 5b 3a 4b 9f 60 11 | 25 e8 32 a1 79 f5 46 62 6c b8 b6 00 75 c8 98 04 | c6 52 d3 2b dc 14 08 e7 21 f2 ee d4 0e b0 33 44 | 78 da 6e e2 00 c7 5b ae 49 0a b8 d8 88 b9 89 be | 81 32 1a 7f 2b 0f 2c ca dd 99 5d 73 6f 1d 8b ca | a2 24 2c e0 f7 24 f6 4e 67 97 d3 a1 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 size 128 | #2 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10447.620058 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #2: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0xf1fcaf80 <0x34bbe08a xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #2 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #2 spent 1.18 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0003618 | spent 0.00297 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 20 01 b0 83 55 49 00 00 00 3c f9 7e a3 98 | 09 2d 83 ba 68 1d 2e 45 f5 6b 9e ae 6e 23 7e 4c | 5c 4a 71 a9 b2 ed 77 4a 46 89 54 27 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2961397065 (0xb0835549) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #2 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1633) | #2 is idle | #2 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 6f 1d 8b ca a2 24 2c e0 f7 24 f6 4e 67 97 d3 a1 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 6e 23 7e 4c 5c 4a 71 a9 b2 ed 77 4a 46 89 54 27 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 20 01 b0 83 55 49 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | 11 92 2e a5 8e c5 f6 6b fc cf d5 f5 e7 0f b4 b0 | 1e 42 5e 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b994780 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b994780 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | b0 83 55 49 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0e8001158 (length 32) | 76 b1 94 0f 07 69 11 36 4f f9 3c 13 cc 99 6e 25 | b7 a7 4a 9c a3 30 82 cd e1 95 da 41 e5 e9 bf 2e | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fa0ec002918 (length 32) | cd c9 1c 4e d3 eb d0 96 a3 55 53 8a 44 a9 6a a7 | b5 de 52 4c 7b 24 19 df ea 04 16 f0 87 62 64 fc | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 11 92 2e a5 8e c5 f6 6b fc cf d5 f5 e7 0f b4 b0 | 1e 42 5e 62 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 11 92 2e a5 8e c5 f6 6b fc cf d5 f5 e7 0f b4 b0 | 1e 42 5e 62 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #2: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | sr for #2: unrouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:null esr:{(nil)} ro:null rosr:{(nil)} and state: #2 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection add eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI_OUT=0x34b | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI_OUT=0x34bbe08a ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb prepare | command executing prepare-client | executing prepare-client: PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI | popen cmd is 1025 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_IN: | cmd( 80):TERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@e: | cmd( 160):ast' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLI: | cmd( 240):ENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID=: | cmd( 320):'16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_: | cmd( 400):PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 480):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='': | cmd( 560): PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PF: | cmd( 640):S+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' : | cmd( 720):PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_D: | cmd( 800):NS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' P: | cmd( 880):LUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SH: | cmd( 960):ARED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI_OUT=0x34bbe08a ipsec _updown 2>&1: | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb route | command executing route-client | executing route-client: PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI_OUT | popen cmd is 1023 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTE: | cmd( 80):RFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@eas: | cmd( 160):t' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIEN: | cmd( 240):T_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1: | cmd( 320):6388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PE: | cmd( 400):ER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MAS: | cmd( 480):K='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' P: | cmd( 560):LUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+: | cmd( 640):IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PL: | cmd( 720):UTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS: | cmd( 800):_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLU: | cmd( 880):TO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHAR: | cmd( 960):ED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI_OUT=0x34bbe08a ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55b81b988648,sr=0x55b81b988648} to #2 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #1 spent 1.48 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #2 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#2) cloned from #1 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #2 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #2: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #2 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #2 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0003618 size 128 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #2: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0xf1fcaf80 <0x34bbe08a xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #2 spent 1.56 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.75 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00384 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00214 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00208 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00269 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 05 01 95 d8 ce e4 00 00 00 4c 97 f8 ed 48 | 38 c8 d8 9c 2e 1e 05 0d f5 8f cf 79 3c 79 0f eb | cd af 48 ef 7b 54 2d 00 54 cd f7 26 45 9c 29 70 | b8 6f 97 da 98 6f 30 fe b9 7e 71 89 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2514013924 (0x95d8cee4) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #2; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=b0835549 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #1; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #1 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | current Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 16) | 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 95 d8 ce e4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | 24 81 83 5a f1 0a 66 91 18 9d 6d 86 18 5e 7d 96 | 98 90 0b 8f | #1 is idle | #1 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 24 81 83 5a f1 0a 66 91 18 9d 6d 86 18 5e 7d 96 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 45 9c 29 70 b8 6f 97 da 98 6f 30 fe b9 7e 71 89 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 05 01 95 d8 ce e4 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | 56 22 f3 30 5d a5 9f ba d9 a6 84 42 10 1a e9 f2 | 74 31 ea 66 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | f1 fc af 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 95 d8 ce e4 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b8e18cc (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 f1 fc af 80 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 56 22 f3 30 5d a5 9f ba d9 a6 84 42 10 1a e9 f2 | 74 31 ea 66 | informational HASH(1): | 56 22 f3 30 5d a5 9f ba d9 a6 84 42 10 1a e9 f2 | 74 31 ea 66 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI f1 fc af 80 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2515) "east" #1: received Delete SA(0xf1fcaf80) payload: deleting IPsec State #2 | pstats #2 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #2 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #2: deleting other state #2 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.069s and sending notification | child state #2: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.f1fcaf80@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.34bbe08a@192.1.2.23 "east" #2: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #2 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2749361296 (0xa3dfec90) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 34 bb e0 8a | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340928 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a0c (length 4) | a3 df ec 90 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340db4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 34 bb e0 8a | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340da0 (length 20) | f5 43 be 04 c7 80 3f ad d5 dc b9 95 b2 fd e9 bb | 82 37 a6 72 | send delete HASH(1): | f5 43 be 04 c7 80 3f ad d5 dc b9 95 b2 fd e9 bb | 82 37 a6 72 | last Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | current Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 16) | 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a1c (length 4) | a3 df ec 90 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | 4f 96 ef 15 c8 c1 30 38 1d ae c4 d5 46 09 bb 0e | 01 16 21 5a | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 f5 43 be 04 c7 80 3f ad d5 dc b9 95 | encrypting: b2 fd e9 bb 82 37 a6 72 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 34 bb e0 8a | IV: 4f 96 ef 15 c8 c1 30 38 1d ae c4 d5 46 09 bb 0e | IV: 01 16 21 5a | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 03 72 dc f8 60 ff 9c 08 64 08 db 08 31 76 58 60 | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 05 01 a3 df ec 90 00 00 00 4c 21 67 3e 95 | 07 22 7a 05 92 35 fe 01 f1 7d 4b 74 83 a4 e6 73 | e6 59 2b 04 2b 4b b7 cf 20 86 97 a2 03 72 dc f8 | 60 ff 9c 08 64 08 db 08 31 76 58 60 | state #2 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0003618 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825161' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825161' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xf1fcaf80 SPI_OUT=0x34bbe08a ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 0--0->-0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.f1fcaf80@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.f1fcaf80@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.34bbe08a@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.34bbe08a@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4076) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4077) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #2 in QUICK_R2 | child state #2: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0050c8: destroyed | stop processing: state #2 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #1 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #1: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.086s and sending notification | parent state #1: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #1 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3272954143 (0xc315511f) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543408c8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004fc8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543409ac (length 4) | c3 15 51 1f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340d54 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 5e 98 22 ac | 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340d40 (length 20) | 0a 12 05 d5 68 11 db bc a8 41 15 03 ee bd c2 16 | 1e b5 f6 6f | send delete HASH(1): | 0a 12 05 d5 68 11 db bc a8 41 15 03 ee bd c2 16 | 1e b5 f6 6f | last Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | current Phase 1 IV: 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 16) | 85 46 b9 fe 1f 89 14 12 ca 22 94 f9 e6 7e bf 4b | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe543409bc (length 4) | c3 15 51 1f | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | 46 42 57 77 f4 46 c8 2e e6 66 30 7f 3e 02 c8 12 | 31 36 16 cf | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 0a 12 05 d5 68 11 db bc a8 41 15 03 | encrypting: ee bd c2 16 1e b5 f6 6f 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a | encrypting: 1e c0 40 db | IV: 46 42 57 77 f4 46 c8 2e e6 66 30 7f 3e 02 c8 12 | IV: 31 36 16 cf | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 59 c0 48 2d 05 10 25 82 8d d1 e1 a6 38 e6 a5 be | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 05 01 c3 15 51 1f 00 00 00 5c 0c 3a 50 b5 | 4c 4f b1 15 2f 15 d7 40 60 be 84 15 72 b9 8f b0 | cc c6 14 5c a2 06 db 25 5a ff cb 5e 0d 0c 33 1f | f0 a2 bd da 58 b1 2d a8 56 b9 75 df 59 c0 48 2d | 05 10 25 82 8d d1 e1 a6 38 e6 a5 be | state #1 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #1 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #1: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0003a28: destroyed | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2556) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2559) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.49 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00391 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00267 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | 08 10 05 01 81 50 1f a0 00 00 00 5c 49 a3 99 83 | 94 b8 41 a1 c2 34 56 d5 67 a3 dc ab 6f 83 9f 0e | 26 64 8c 08 a4 26 b2 ee 39 e8 f9 81 9e c0 9f e4 | 9d a3 14 32 c1 64 14 06 05 16 73 3f 02 91 78 ce | 6d e4 c0 43 d6 ad ed 9e b3 5f d7 e1 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | responder cookie: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2169511840 (0x81501fa0) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x81501fa0 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 5e 98 22 ac 7d d1 dc f4 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | bb 7e 1d 9a 1e c0 40 db | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0807 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00402 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 208 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 20 12 4e 39 c0 5d b0 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 0d 00 00 3c | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 | 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 | af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 | 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f | 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 | 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 20 12 4e 39 c0 5d b0 06 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 208 (0xd0) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 02 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 5c b5 89 2d 83 15 7e 76 03 d1 7f f0 b3 05 9e a4 | 5d 14 8f 03 e5 3f 43 a1 b6 ca 33 52 64 60 d2 7c | creating state object #3 at 0x55b81b98abc8 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #3 in UNDEFINED | pstats #3 ikev1.isakmp started | #3 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #3: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #3: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 20 12 4e 39 c0 5d b0 06 | responder cookie: | 5c b5 89 2d 83 15 7e 76 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #3: repeated OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute in Oakley Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #3 is idle "east" #3: sending notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 20 12 4e 39 c0 5d b0 06 | responder cookie: | 5c b5 89 2d 83 15 7e 76 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #3) | 20 12 4e 39 c0 5d b0 06 5c b5 89 2d 83 15 7e 76 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.431 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00308 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 208 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 3e db bc e6 32 45 c7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 0d 00 00 3c | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 | 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 | af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 | 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f | 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 | 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 | cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 3e db bc e6 32 45 c7 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 208 (0xd0) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 03 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 2c 54 e0 66 79 37 8d d0 22 02 c3 3f 55 e2 22 40 | 8c 1d 1e 04 ab 89 6d e1 5e db 64 da 00 61 2a 36 | creating state object #4 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #4 in UNDEFINED | pstats #4 ikev1.isakmp started | #4 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #4: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #4: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 3e db bc e6 32 45 c7 | responder cookie: | 2c 54 e0 66 79 37 8d d0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #4: repeated OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute in Oakley Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #4 is idle "east" #4: sending notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 3e db bc e6 32 45 c7 | responder cookie: | 2c 54 e0 66 79 37 8d d0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #4) | c7 3e db bc e6 32 45 c7 2c 54 e0 66 79 37 8d d0 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.565 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0026 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 04 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 8f 5d d6 97 22 6a 78 54 | ea 22 fa 70 69 74 56 2e 77 28 bb 80 d2 ad 1f 4e | creating state object #5 at 0x55b81b98fa48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #5 in UNDEFINED | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp started | #5 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #5: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #5: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #5 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #5: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.625 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00212 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | 14 00 00 24 ef 41 90 04 8d 38 05 7c 59 c4 61 26 | c0 86 ae 6d c6 fe 39 bf c9 c6 2b c9 ea 9d 54 8a | 83 7d b6 20 14 00 00 18 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e | c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 73 b9 0f 9e 00 00 00 18 | d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | 51 16 79 b7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #5 is idle | #5 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe0 (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe8 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | 73 b9 0f 9e | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | natd_hash: rcookie= 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | natd_hash: hash= 73 b9 0f 9e | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe0 (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe8 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | 51 16 79 b7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | natd_hash: rcookie= 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | natd_hash: hash= 51 16 79 b7 | expected NAT-D(me): 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | expected NAT-D(me): 73 b9 0f 9e | expected NAT-D(him): | d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | 51 16 79 b7 | received NAT-D: 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | received NAT-D: 73 b9 0f 9e | received NAT-D: d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | received NAT-D: 51 16 79 b7 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 5 for state #5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b990538 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #5 and saving MD | crypto helper 1 resuming | #5 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 5 for state #5 | #5 spent 0.181 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 5 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.349 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e4003a28: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0e4003a28 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | Generated nonce: 0e 87 f9 5c ef 58 51 7f da e9 73 97 bb d3 15 68 | Generated nonce: d8 6c e2 4b c7 26 49 91 1d e3 44 b3 28 db fc 1d | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 5 time elapsed 0.000692 seconds | (#5) spent 0.694 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 5: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 5 for state #5 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4002888 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #5 | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 5 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #5: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e4003a28: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #5 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | keyex value 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | keyex value bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | keyex value f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | keyex value e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | keyex value b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | keyex value bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | keyex value 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | keyex value ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | keyex value b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | keyex value bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | keyex value b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | keyex value ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | keyex value 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | keyex value 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | keyex value 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 0e 87 f9 5c ef 58 51 7f da e9 73 97 bb d3 15 68 | Nr d8 6c e2 4b c7 26 49 91 1d e3 44 b3 28 db fc 1d | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | 51 16 79 b7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | natd_hash: rcookie= 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | natd_hash: hash= 51 16 79 b7 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b | NAT-D 51 16 79 b7 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | 73 b9 0f 9e | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | natd_hash: rcookie= 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | natd_hash: hash= 73 b9 0f 9e | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | NAT-D 73 b9 0f 9e | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e4003a28: transferring ownership from state #5 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 6 for state #5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b990538 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #5 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #5 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 5 resuming | parent state #5: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #5 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 6 for state #5 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 6 | peer's g: a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | peer's g: 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | peer's g: ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | peer's g: 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | peer's g: 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | peer's g: 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | peer's g: d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | peer's g: 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | peer's g: 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | peer's g: 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | peer's g: 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | peer's g: 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | peer's g: 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | peer's g: 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | peer's g: 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | peer's g: 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | 14 00 00 24 0e 87 f9 5c ef 58 51 7f da e9 73 97 | bb d3 15 68 d8 6c e2 4b c7 26 49 91 1d e3 44 b3 | 28 db fc 1d 14 00 00 18 d0 d7 d1 a4 2a 26 55 e0 | 8c 23 9d 6d fd d3 40 3b 51 16 79 b7 00 00 00 18 | 45 aa 96 9a f1 cb e0 9e c3 12 fa c6 b4 42 a1 e6 | 73 b9 0f 9e | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #5 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10449.000047 "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #5 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #5 spent 0.442 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4002888 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e4003a28: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b96d700 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b995888 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001108 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b9958ac (length 32) | ef 41 90 04 8d 38 05 7c 59 c4 61 26 c0 86 ae 6d | c6 fe 39 bf c9 c6 2b c9 ea 9d 54 8a 83 7d b6 20 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b9958cc (length 32) | 0e 87 f9 5c ef 58 51 7f da e9 73 97 bb d3 15 68 | d8 6c e2 4b c7 26 49 91 1d e3 44 b3 28 db fc 1d | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80010b8 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 5c ee c9 50 7e 58 0f 46 f6 dc 68 ba 75 78 8a 0d 8e d8 c0 71 07 ea 8d cb 40 e6 a6 70 5a be c0 ba db 9a 07 c3 b0 b7 3f 19 65 be e8 7e f7 42 1c 31 54 ba 3b ac 25 43 44 cb 8b fd 6b 20 4d 3a b1 3e 6f b7 d6 61 81 11 a3 85 85 74 92 d9 79 99 c9 96 fe e7 ae 64 58 d4 5c 75 9f 97 ea 50 75 4b d6 cb a9 74 d0 ed 3c bb 23 6f 64 90 ff 8c 7d 5d 9d b5 09 2c 51 4e 3a 7a 29 ad 58 49 e2 ed dc f0 9a eb 05 32 51 f8 a4 8d ee ce 78 c6 54 a7 ef 5c 2f eb 36 22 57 98 74 be 2a 40 55 46 ea c0 02 8f 38 d6 d6 08 8b 38 ba 9f b8 6c c2 61 d7 65 5b 63 ab 91 a5 97 1a 73 f2 32 82 73 31 9c 16 c3 a6 08 b5 44 1e d3 f5 a3 36 e6 ee 33 b6 43 a5 d6 f1 b1 c6 fb 49 f1 8d 71 c6 c8 46 89 9c 47 18 3d 2a e4 d1 fa bf 7f 9c 62 7c c4 a6 2e 6e 30 d3 bf ac ea 48 6b 2a 32 f5 21 a3 9e 57 11 9f 10 cd 3f 8d bf 3e 2d | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0d8004f28 | unwrapped: 2b ef 1b 70 39 3e 3b 7b e9 68 71 76 22 26 99 85 | unwrapped: 7e 23 9f 3b 9d 70 f1 8d 76 6b ec 31 0b 92 71 b9 | unwrapped: 25 be af a3 22 72 2c 37 b0 65 39 02 30 db c7 71 | unwrapped: f4 1a ed 03 dc 4d de f1 a9 2d d6 d8 07 f5 76 94 | unwrapped: f8 71 15 de c6 c4 ad e2 cf fe ea ff b8 7e e3 50 | unwrapped: a6 4e b8 ff c5 76 14 b4 86 b0 32 c3 c2 25 1e 69 | unwrapped: 25 2d 7a 9c 6b 96 a8 d2 70 7a a5 82 64 71 83 10 | unwrapped: 33 cc 6c 66 2f 4f 2d 8a 7e 48 b7 f6 02 d4 c7 53 | unwrapped: 5f 93 25 bf 7d 70 42 3b 5e 49 79 54 4c 1a 2b 7b | unwrapped: f9 fc 52 a6 c7 bd ae 00 38 90 43 93 09 c5 ed 91 | unwrapped: e0 33 81 bf 6e da 0f 7c fa 5e 84 ba b9 80 bb de | unwrapped: 7e 9c c0 be d1 0a a0 be fd ad 2d bf 8e 99 1e 85 | unwrapped: ff d9 da 6d 0a 24 2a b8 70 6e 8a f3 3e e0 0b aa | unwrapped: 9b ff 67 de 0a 38 5b 80 b5 30 8f de 11 9d 14 02 | unwrapped: 14 cb 55 3b 6b f8 4d 19 98 ec 6e 03 66 92 52 3f | unwrapped: 01 64 2e ff 9c 85 6f e1 5b 22 86 b6 ae 5a 9f f2 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001108 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: a9 29 df 41 ed 4f 48 61 6f d5 c6 c8 95 e0 70 a6 3f c2 f1 0c 0c 66 9f 2d 94 ed 73 27 b8 97 c0 c6 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0d80030c8 | unwrapped: a5 ca 5b 77 90 8f 29 70 98 8c e6 37 90 d5 cb ee | unwrapped: 58 e6 76 92 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 5c ee c9 50 7e 58 0f 46 f6 dc 68 ba 75 78 8a 0d 8e d8 c0 71 07 ea 8d cb 40 e6 a6 70 5a be c0 ba db 9a 07 c3 b0 b7 3f 19 65 be e8 7e f7 42 1c 31 54 ba 3b ac 25 43 44 cb 8b fd 6b 20 4d 3a b1 3e 6f b7 d6 61 81 11 a3 85 85 74 92 d9 79 99 c9 96 fe e7 ae 64 58 d4 5c 75 9f 97 ea 50 75 4b d6 cb a9 74 d0 ed 3c bb 23 6f 64 90 ff 8c 7d 5d 9d b5 09 2c 51 4e 3a 7a 29 ad 58 49 e2 ed dc f0 9a eb 05 32 51 f8 a4 8d ee ce 78 c6 54 a7 ef 5c 2f eb 36 22 57 98 74 be 2a 40 55 46 ea c0 02 8f 38 d6 d6 08 8b 38 ba 9f b8 6c c2 61 d7 65 5b 63 ab 91 a5 97 1a 73 f2 32 82 73 31 9c 16 c3 a6 08 b5 44 1e d3 f5 a3 36 e6 ee 33 b6 43 a5 d6 f1 b1 c6 fb 49 f1 8d 71 c6 c8 46 89 9c 47 18 3d 2a e4 d1 fa bf 7f 9c 62 7c c4 a6 2e 6e 30 d3 bf ac ea 48 6b 2a 32 f5 21 a3 9e 57 11 9f 10 cd 3f 8d bf 3e 2d | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0d8003db8 | unwrapped: 2b ef 1b 70 39 3e 3b 7b e9 68 71 76 22 26 99 85 | unwrapped: 7e 23 9f 3b 9d 70 f1 8d 76 6b ec 31 0b 92 71 b9 | unwrapped: 25 be af a3 22 72 2c 37 b0 65 39 02 30 db c7 71 | unwrapped: f4 1a ed 03 dc 4d de f1 a9 2d d6 d8 07 f5 76 94 | unwrapped: f8 71 15 de c6 c4 ad e2 cf fe ea ff b8 7e e3 50 | unwrapped: a6 4e b8 ff c5 76 14 b4 86 b0 32 c3 c2 25 1e 69 | unwrapped: 25 2d 7a 9c 6b 96 a8 d2 70 7a a5 82 64 71 83 10 | unwrapped: 33 cc 6c 66 2f 4f 2d 8a 7e 48 b7 f6 02 d4 c7 53 | unwrapped: 5f 93 25 bf 7d 70 42 3b 5e 49 79 54 4c 1a 2b 7b | unwrapped: f9 fc 52 a6 c7 bd ae 00 38 90 43 93 09 c5 ed 91 | unwrapped: e0 33 81 bf 6e da 0f 7c fa 5e 84 ba b9 80 bb de | unwrapped: 7e 9c c0 be d1 0a a0 be fd ad 2d bf 8e 99 1e 85 | unwrapped: ff d9 da 6d 0a 24 2a b8 70 6e 8a f3 3e e0 0b aa | unwrapped: 9b ff 67 de 0a 38 5b 80 b5 30 8f de 11 9d 14 02 | unwrapped: 14 cb 55 3b 6b f8 4d 19 98 ec 6e 03 66 92 52 3f | unwrapped: 01 64 2e ff 9c 85 6f e1 5b 22 86 b6 ae 5a 9f f2 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80010b8 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: f5 11 ab a1 fe 92 45 50 cd ac a9 21 ef 77 aa 8b 0d 90 eb 89 cc 70 f7 bc c9 75 d6 5f ab 77 60 a7 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0d8001158 | unwrapped: fd 1a 54 98 d7 a9 63 79 21 31 81 83 02 69 0c 04 | unwrapped: 3c 6d a9 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 5c ee c9 50 7e 58 0f 46 f6 dc 68 ba 75 78 8a 0d 8e d8 c0 71 07 ea 8d cb 40 e6 a6 70 5a be c0 ba db 9a 07 c3 b0 b7 3f 19 65 be e8 7e f7 42 1c 31 54 ba 3b ac 25 43 44 cb 8b fd 6b 20 4d 3a b1 3e 6f b7 d6 61 81 11 a3 85 85 74 92 d9 79 99 c9 96 fe e7 ae 64 58 d4 5c 75 9f 97 ea 50 75 4b d6 cb a9 74 d0 ed 3c bb 23 6f 64 90 ff 8c 7d 5d 9d b5 09 2c 51 4e 3a 7a 29 ad 58 49 e2 ed dc f0 9a eb 05 32 51 f8 a4 8d ee ce 78 c6 54 a7 ef 5c 2f eb 36 22 57 98 74 be 2a 40 55 46 ea c0 02 8f 38 d6 d6 08 8b 38 ba 9f b8 6c c2 61 d7 65 5b 63 ab 91 a5 97 1a 73 f2 32 82 73 31 9c 16 c3 a6 08 b5 44 1e d3 f5 a3 36 e6 ee 33 b6 43 a5 d6 f1 b1 c6 fb 49 f1 8d 71 c6 c8 46 89 9c 47 18 3d 2a e4 d1 fa bf 7f 9c 62 7c c4 a6 2e 6e 30 d3 bf ac ea 48 6b 2a 32 f5 21 a3 9e 57 11 9f 10 cd 3f 8d bf 3e 2d | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0d8004f28 | unwrapped: 2b ef 1b 70 39 3e 3b 7b e9 68 71 76 22 26 99 85 | unwrapped: 7e 23 9f 3b 9d 70 f1 8d 76 6b ec 31 0b 92 71 b9 | unwrapped: 25 be af a3 22 72 2c 37 b0 65 39 02 30 db c7 71 | unwrapped: f4 1a ed 03 dc 4d de f1 a9 2d d6 d8 07 f5 76 94 | unwrapped: f8 71 15 de c6 c4 ad e2 cf fe ea ff b8 7e e3 50 | unwrapped: a6 4e b8 ff c5 76 14 b4 86 b0 32 c3 c2 25 1e 69 | unwrapped: 25 2d 7a 9c 6b 96 a8 d2 70 7a a5 82 64 71 83 10 | unwrapped: 33 cc 6c 66 2f 4f 2d 8a 7e 48 b7 f6 02 d4 c7 53 | unwrapped: 5f 93 25 bf 7d 70 42 3b 5e 49 79 54 4c 1a 2b 7b | unwrapped: f9 fc 52 a6 c7 bd ae 00 38 90 43 93 09 c5 ed 91 | unwrapped: e0 33 81 bf 6e da 0f 7c fa 5e 84 ba b9 80 bb de | unwrapped: 7e 9c c0 be d1 0a a0 be fd ad 2d bf 8e 99 1e 85 | unwrapped: ff d9 da 6d 0a 24 2a b8 70 6e 8a f3 3e e0 0b aa | unwrapped: 9b ff 67 de 0a 38 5b 80 b5 30 8f de 11 9d 14 02 | unwrapped: 14 cb 55 3b 6b f8 4d 19 98 ec 6e 03 66 92 52 3f | unwrapped: 01 64 2e ff 9c 85 6f e1 5b 22 86 b6 ae 5a 9f f2 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b976790 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_a 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_e 0x55b81b974d30, enc_key 0x55b81b976790 | DH_i: a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | DH_i: 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | DH_i: ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | DH_i: 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | DH_i: 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | DH_i: 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | DH_i: d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | DH_i: 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | DH_i: 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | DH_i: 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | DH_i: 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | DH_i: 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | DH_i: 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | DH_i: 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | DH_i: 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | DH_i: 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | DH_r: 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | DH_r: 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | DH_r: bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | DH_r: f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | DH_r: e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | DH_r: b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | DH_r: bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | DH_r: 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | DH_r: ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | DH_r: b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | DH_r: bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | DH_r: b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | DH_r: ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | DH_r: 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | DH_r: 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | DH_r: 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b9958ec (length 256) | a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b9959ec (length 256) | 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0d8001158 (length 20) | 75 5a 17 8e 06 86 55 75 af 53 d6 f1 2f 08 fc f5 | d0 9b 8c 04 | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 6 time elapsed 0.00191 seconds | (#5) spent 1.91 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 6: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 6 for state #5 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003978 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #5 | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 6 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #5: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e4003a28: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #5 | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #5 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #5 spent 0.022 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003978 | spent 0.00208 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 90 23 ee 27 | 95 92 db e6 ae 11 a5 bb cc 5a 71 37 19 ee e9 5b | 68 b3 a2 43 44 7a ef 93 ea 58 ca 3c 05 d3 c8 e4 | 10 a8 df 05 9f 8f 01 eb be f8 b9 51 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 75 5a 17 8e 06 86 55 75 af 53 d6 f1 2f 08 fc f5 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 05 d3 c8 e4 10 a8 df 05 9f 8f 01 eb be f8 b9 51 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 cd 1c 5d 0a | e4 29 22 ba f7 73 ff 8f db 70 8a bb 65 6b a5 3b | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #5: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f0000b48 (length 256) | a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe0 (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe8 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892cc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b8e18b8 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | cd 1c 5d 0a e4 29 22 ba f7 73 ff 8f db 70 8a bb | 65 6b a5 3b | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001158 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | 61 84 5f 93 06 b6 dc 3f 86 11 fe 8e 1e 55 0c 4d | 2a 1d ba cd e4 d7 57 9f 89 30 50 80 1d 94 e3 49 | bb 6f a8 83 56 ae 9e 95 91 a4 32 5a e6 5e 0b 0e | f3 4d 36 64 88 5c d6 08 e1 c6 e4 9e 10 78 77 a8 | e3 f8 a6 a9 84 01 02 84 2f 43 45 9a 80 4b 71 68 | b4 ca 16 7b 4d 06 7c 3d dd 30 c8 ec 1e 1c f9 be | bb 43 6e 03 79 4a 13 53 fd da 82 8f 37 20 f5 34 | 1c 5e 08 3b d3 48 5c 0b 3f f4 a6 e5 c2 c7 43 50 | ae 80 eb d5 e5 cb 5a 61 6b a8 e4 c6 9e 58 f0 5c | b3 31 51 76 90 28 34 01 14 a9 ac 28 00 b6 ce b9 | bf 57 be 13 0b aa e9 0e f6 52 cc 15 bf 2a 7f 9e | b0 6e 53 3c 17 aa a7 75 b6 d8 61 37 95 05 79 e4 | ae c4 21 bc 1b 5e e6 40 dc 16 74 95 00 a7 51 15 | 4f af 43 42 07 e3 d6 59 f6 cb 10 ba 31 2a 57 d9 | 80 ab 92 47 d0 ea 38 14 02 e3 02 e9 e7 ae 85 5e | 52 8b 16 3c 6a f3 c8 8f 32 2c 0c 00 c1 36 39 3c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f0000b48 (length 256) | a3 0e d0 08 3b 0b 36 41 d7 76 79 74 3b bc d0 8e | 1e 4f 1e 04 96 1e 9d dd 17 bc 6a bb cf f0 a9 31 | ac 50 6d 75 8e 2e c7 f4 8a 70 f3 db c5 aa 0a 64 | 95 cd 3d d6 5e a6 89 e5 1d 7e 39 66 1c f8 31 3b | 74 27 39 33 51 de 28 2c ef a2 86 37 da b1 8d d7 | 36 6a 79 4c d6 84 02 62 fc ab ff 54 a3 ad a8 90 | d7 cc 9d 5a e6 22 09 83 e4 3c 65 88 1f 15 2a 4b | 0e 08 0c 03 46 31 aa ea 0e e6 c0 74 d3 ed ee 00 | 6b 51 ee d7 6d 40 0e f8 22 3b d1 81 98 aa 81 6d | 48 29 90 3d 15 b9 09 78 7e 7e 2a 0f 4a de 99 dc | 03 67 82 7b 44 08 b6 3a fa 91 19 e4 f8 2b 94 ce | 92 c3 2b 46 88 1b 5f 05 0f 14 bb 1a 04 24 2d 79 | 8b b4 41 8e ed 21 44 92 29 4f ed b7 a4 a6 1f dd | 18 3c 23 c6 39 e5 14 c0 be 2a c5 c2 80 6f 11 cb | 66 97 53 bd da f2 45 a3 c2 28 dc 7b a7 dd ed 95 | 60 ac 78 a8 e3 55 4c 97 fd da c2 4b a6 5d 7c d6 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe8 (length 8) | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98ffe0 (length 8) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892cc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | f5 fe 37 15 d9 34 5f 93 e1 9c 7d 54 bb e5 63 78 | 2e 84 ef 02 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R f5 fe 37 15 d9 34 5f 93 e1 9c 7d 54 bb e5 63 78 | HASH_R 2e 84 ef 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: f5 fe 37 15 d9 34 5f 93 e1 9c 7d 54 bb e5 63 78 | encrypting: 2e 84 ef 02 | IV: 05 d3 c8 e4 10 a8 df 05 9f 8f 01 eb be f8 b9 51 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #5 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #5: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #5 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #5 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c ae 02 ef 40 | ff 7c dc 99 2d a1 b7 46 02 b8 30 1d 28 d7 08 0e | 9f 97 0e 51 a4 28 a7 f1 93 5c f5 0b 00 05 6e 98 | 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #5 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4002888 size 128 | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #5: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #5 | #5 spent 0.594 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.763 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00183 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 08 10 20 01 27 0d 31 7b 00 00 01 bc a8 68 04 89 | 66 96 d0 c0 6b 4f 96 4b fd 6f 4c f2 0a d1 4e 47 | de 64 a0 37 5d 83 70 fd dc d0 b9 cf 3f 62 31 22 | df ca c1 9e 48 a4 30 55 96 57 23 9d ee d4 ea 71 | 71 c2 df 19 d4 1c b6 0f fd 65 55 8e 22 6b 2c 9b | 80 79 dc 48 f2 80 66 47 c0 22 d3 26 5f 31 72 a4 | 8e d0 0a 19 ab 95 f7 ea 8e 1e f9 53 53 0f 7a ee | ee 89 1b 66 8a 1e 98 c4 08 d7 22 42 77 13 de c1 | 59 0c 31 48 dd 30 2a b2 91 43 0f 28 9e 97 0d cf | 63 61 d0 45 68 78 b8 a6 b9 72 e2 bd 3d 69 ee 37 | 90 81 e6 05 46 1d 6d f1 e6 a5 12 ab 4d f9 d4 d7 | 53 46 2c e5 ff 1a 12 a0 c3 46 40 27 e0 c3 74 d9 | 4d 88 1b fe 05 d3 88 7f 01 f9 f2 2a 60 5b 71 61 | e8 18 8a fd 8c 0c c4 72 26 bc 8c 8a 1f 74 35 d8 | 3f e1 58 c5 b0 68 21 5f 9b 61 3f c7 9f 8a 34 91 | 01 c9 df a8 e9 fe c6 97 aa 3b c2 a5 b4 4f aa dd | 27 a3 83 51 69 cd 97 9b 37 e9 ad b2 fd cb 80 45 | 7e 7d 30 75 08 af 92 27 44 b9 51 2e a5 85 ee da | c1 35 67 29 54 5a bb 42 4a 13 34 e9 f0 75 65 00 | e0 f7 a0 6b 91 c5 56 cd ec 1e 8c b3 fe 99 09 73 | fa 8a 5d 4e ef 7d ee 64 d8 15 53 59 ca 05 d1 b1 | 8b 47 e1 10 ae 97 cd 68 b2 c8 b5 99 d1 4d b4 58 | 8d e0 8f 7f 44 a7 ab cb 47 e6 4e bb f5 43 8b 9b | df 4b 25 b8 7e 40 d3 73 96 56 35 d8 4b 4b d1 d3 | d5 a3 78 37 14 81 63 9a 4f 29 91 84 a4 96 5d 02 | 6a 3e ab 8a f6 de c7 83 31 ae 37 41 15 5c 36 36 | 15 11 eb 43 45 88 37 ea 3c ce 0b 2c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 655176059 (0x270d317b) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | current Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98fed8 (length 16) | 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 27 0d 31 7b | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98fe58 (length 20) | 9e 45 b0 dd 43 e2 bf b9 36 29 a9 19 73 5d 88 8e | 90 f1 55 63 | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 9e 45 b0 dd 43 e2 bf b9 36 29 a9 19 73 5d 88 8e | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 15 5c 36 36 15 11 eb 43 45 88 37 ea 3c ce 0b 2c | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 08 10 20 01 27 0d 31 7b 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | e7 3b 18 64 97 9b 32 48 90 a6 9c b2 15 e5 de ad | 4a 6c 6a 4f 0a 00 00 3c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 30 00 03 04 01 d6 f6 8e 47 00 00 00 24 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 80 06 00 80 | 04 00 00 24 3a 17 57 39 f1 f2 df 80 64 f2 da 61 | 9d b1 1a 03 c0 03 de 91 48 a2 20 09 12 93 38 7e | 9c 80 06 3d 05 00 01 04 a9 4f bb b1 12 6a da 6d | bb 4d 7c ab 3a 75 bf 04 7a 0a d2 4b 8d 4b 95 87 | 64 4a b9 d7 1a da 94 5d 1d 2d f0 c5 8e a3 4b 5b | d9 5d 29 01 63 c4 fd 09 43 ba c1 c6 3a 70 2a b9 | d5 7d b7 06 ed cb 31 82 8f cf ff d9 87 19 29 61 | 39 13 83 39 a9 06 bc 11 1a 2b 16 63 e8 ae 1c de | 99 a1 c5 ea 24 11 d6 04 8b e8 b1 d3 51 58 27 50 | 93 36 0e 4d c5 17 73 f6 0e 08 13 fe 3c cd 17 d1 | 92 18 4a e7 1c 85 15 b3 36 42 48 f9 1e 46 d3 b8 | d4 8d a4 9c 30 9c 16 4a 76 fc 11 eb a6 51 17 22 | 98 8f cc aa 27 97 df 83 ce 2a a8 57 ff 82 d2 5b | f3 dd 2a 6a a7 4f 44 b9 8e 41 14 6e d6 ea c5 9a | 10 01 1d a6 03 0f 24 5f 80 e3 80 c9 5e 07 de ff | 36 82 cb 56 c1 32 06 85 c6 f4 aa 4a 56 88 dc 1d | 68 2b 26 03 6b 5b 33 22 1d 0c b5 f3 26 33 70 05 | 9e 29 f3 8c bd 6b 3b 83 6c 90 9f 7d 0d 4c 67 dd | 98 54 30 45 c0 1a 18 e2 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 60 (0x3c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001158 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 27 0d 31 7b | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b994a8c (length 388) | 0a 00 00 3c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 | 00 03 04 01 d6 f6 8e 47 00 00 00 24 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 3a 17 57 39 f1 f2 df 80 64 f2 da 61 9d b1 1a 03 | c0 03 de 91 48 a2 20 09 12 93 38 7e 9c 80 06 3d | 05 00 01 04 a9 4f bb b1 12 6a da 6d bb 4d 7c ab | 3a 75 bf 04 7a 0a d2 4b 8d 4b 95 87 64 4a b9 d7 | 1a da 94 5d 1d 2d f0 c5 8e a3 4b 5b d9 5d 29 01 | 63 c4 fd 09 43 ba c1 c6 3a 70 2a b9 d5 7d b7 06 | ed cb 31 82 8f cf ff d9 87 19 29 61 39 13 83 39 | a9 06 bc 11 1a 2b 16 63 e8 ae 1c de 99 a1 c5 ea | 24 11 d6 04 8b e8 b1 d3 51 58 27 50 93 36 0e 4d | c5 17 73 f6 0e 08 13 fe 3c cd 17 d1 92 18 4a e7 | 1c 85 15 b3 36 42 48 f9 1e 46 d3 b8 d4 8d a4 9c | 30 9c 16 4a 76 fc 11 eb a6 51 17 22 98 8f cc aa | 27 97 df 83 ce 2a a8 57 ff 82 d2 5b f3 dd 2a 6a | a7 4f 44 b9 8e 41 14 6e d6 ea c5 9a 10 01 1d a6 | 03 0f 24 5f 80 e3 80 c9 5e 07 de ff 36 82 cb 56 | c1 32 06 85 c6 f4 aa 4a 56 88 dc 1d 68 2b 26 03 | 6b 5b 33 22 1d 0c b5 f3 26 33 70 05 9e 29 f3 8c | bd 6b 3b 83 6c 90 9f 7d 0d 4c 67 dd 98 54 30 45 | c0 1a 18 e2 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | e7 3b 18 64 97 9b 32 48 90 a6 9c b2 15 e5 de ad | 4a 6c 6a 4f | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | e7 3b 18 64 97 9b 32 48 90 a6 9c b2 15 e5 de ad | 4a 6c 6a 4f | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #5: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #6 at 0x55b81b994c48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #6 in UNDEFINED | pstats #6 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #5 "east" as #6 for IPSEC SA | #6 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #5.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #6: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI d6 f6 8e 47 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) "east" #6: repeated KEY_LENGTH attribute in IPsec Transform 0 | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #6 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #6: sending encrypted notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3539399184 (0xd2f6f210) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342648 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe5434272c (length 4) | d2 f6 f2 10 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe543429d4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe543429c0 (length 20) | e0 83 e3 16 f3 01 32 80 58 9a 75 4e 44 c1 50 2b | 7c b8 56 4e | send notification HASH(1): | e0 83 e3 16 f3 01 32 80 58 9a 75 4e 44 c1 50 2b | 7c b8 56 4e | last Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | current Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98fed8 (length 16) | 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434273c (length 4) | d2 f6 f2 10 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98fe58 (length 20) | 02 75 3f 89 fe ef d4 24 a2 e5 58 de de 6b 31 1d | d8 f5 51 37 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 e0 83 e3 16 f3 01 32 80 58 9a 75 4e | encrypting: 44 c1 50 2b 7c b8 56 4e 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0f | IV: 02 75 3f 89 fe ef d4 24 a2 e5 58 de de 6b 31 1d | IV: d8 f5 51 37 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: d8 16 8e cf 0e 97 b1 5b 7d da 0b 9c b6 7b b3 9e | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #6) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 08 10 05 01 d2 f6 f2 10 00 00 00 4c d7 7f 1c bb | c2 72 f6 80 fb 2c f2 2a 1e 2f 76 24 a6 80 f4 33 | e7 25 19 4e 2b fe 85 7f fe cb 2a c4 d8 16 8e cf | 0e 97 b1 5b 7d da 0b 9c b6 7b b3 9e | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | pstats #6 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #6 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #6: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #6: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #6: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #6 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #6: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #6 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #5 spent 0.519 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.898 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00297 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 08 10 05 01 23 26 9a e2 00 00 00 5c 1d 5a a9 11 | 44 09 a6 d2 6b 43 72 b5 cd 05 75 26 ff b9 d2 8d | ce 07 63 5f aa 28 1c cc 72 96 3c 82 4d b4 78 8f | 1c 14 b6 c7 09 35 eb d4 a8 4f 47 73 5a 17 40 cc | ab 83 fc 66 0d a3 31 f2 a5 c3 cf fe | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 589732578 (0x23269ae2) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #5; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #5 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | current Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98fed8 (length 16) | 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 23 26 9a e2 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98fe58 (length 20) | 7e bd df 9e 84 8d ef 4a de 27 97 40 36 50 bb 51 | 15 8b bd a6 | #5 is idle | #5 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 7e bd df 9e 84 8d ef 4a de 27 97 40 36 50 bb 51 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 5a 17 40 cc ab 83 fc 66 0d a3 31 f2 a5 c3 cf fe | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 08 10 05 01 23 26 9a e2 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | 0c 2b bf 83 0b 17 a9 25 41 ba 35 bb 74 3c 99 0b | 3a 42 29 d3 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 23 26 9a e2 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b99056c (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 cc 49 01 61 | cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 0c 2b bf 83 0b 17 a9 25 41 ba 35 bb 74 3c 99 0b | 3a 42 29 d3 | informational HASH(1): | 0c 2b bf 83 0b 17 a9 25 41 ba 35 bb 74 3c 99 0b | 3a 42 29 d3 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #5: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #5 | pstats #5 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #5 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #5: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.524s and sending notification | parent state #5: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #5 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | responder cookie: | 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1452954419 (0x569a5333) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340998 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001158 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a7c (length 4) | 56 9a 53 33 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340e24 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 cc 49 01 61 | cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340e10 (length 20) | 0d e0 bd 9c 20 95 7e b2 91 1d 38 05 37 0f 84 84 | a0 3d 7a 37 | send delete HASH(1): | 0d e0 bd 9c 20 95 7e b2 91 1d 38 05 37 0f 84 84 | a0 3d 7a 37 | last Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | current Phase 1 IV: 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98fed8 (length 16) | 00 05 6e 98 6a 57 04 54 e8 77 c4 63 95 53 f9 07 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a8c (length 4) | 56 9a 53 33 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98fe58 (length 20) | b5 5f c1 cf c2 ab 03 44 01 1a 61 e2 c1 e9 d3 b5 | fb f7 33 74 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 0d e0 bd 9c 20 95 7e b2 91 1d 38 05 | encrypting: 37 0f 84 84 a0 3d 7a 37 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 | encrypting: d0 a7 c7 e2 | IV: b5 5f c1 cf c2 ab 03 44 01 1a 61 e2 c1 e9 d3 b5 | IV: fb f7 33 74 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 86 fb ed 8c c1 1e 45 fd 78 ea 78 40 c4 3c 25 d5 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #5) | cc 49 01 61 cb 1d 8d a1 58 44 20 c9 d0 a7 c7 e2 | 08 10 05 01 56 9a 53 33 00 00 00 5c fc ac 16 fd | b1 e0 1a 01 85 de 56 55 d2 02 6a 5e 6a 52 d1 3f | f1 58 90 41 99 5b c0 14 fa 97 63 50 42 44 93 25 | ef 6e 41 32 dd df 2f 82 8a 2b 5b 1c 86 fb ed 8c | c1 1e 45 fd 78 ea 78 40 c4 3c 25 d5 | state #5 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #5 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #5: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e4003a28: destroyed | stop processing: state #5 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.557 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0027 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 3a f1 87 4c 2f 1a 4d a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 3a f1 87 4c 2f 1a 4d a1 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 05 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 5f 74 52 a5 12 41 9e dd ba 63 3c cb 3b 8a 9f f4 | 3a 84 78 18 f2 ae a8 b7 0c cc 50 70 96 35 23 7b | creating state object #7 at 0x55b81b98fa48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #7 in UNDEFINED | pstats #7 ikev1.isakmp started | #7 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #7: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #7: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 3a f1 87 4c 2f 1a 4d a1 | responder cookie: | 5f 74 52 a5 12 41 9e dd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #7: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #7: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #7 is idle "east" #7: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 3a f1 87 4c 2f 1a 4d a1 | responder cookie: | 5f 74 52 a5 12 41 9e dd | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #7) | 3a f1 87 4c 2f 1a 4d a1 5f 74 52 a5 12 41 9e dd | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.689 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00308 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | e6 76 33 c9 ce 0b 8d 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 76 33 c9 ce 0b 8d 78 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 06 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 09 1f c9 2b 20 0b fc 29 a0 6f 9e aa c5 65 5c 16 | 36 79 d6 dc 77 d9 c3 5f 94 16 7e 9f 5a 1c 09 f3 | creating state object #8 at 0x55b81b994c48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #8 in UNDEFINED | pstats #8 ikev1.isakmp started | #8 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #8: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #8: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 76 33 c9 ce 0b 8d 78 | responder cookie: | 09 1f c9 2b 20 0b fc 29 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #8: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #8: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #8 is idle "east" #8: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | e6 76 33 c9 ce 0b 8d 78 | responder cookie: | 09 1f c9 2b 20 0b fc 29 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #8) | e6 76 33 c9 ce 0b 8d 78 09 1f c9 2b 20 0b fc 29 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.528 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00325 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 07 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 f7 b7 e3 ad 12 1e 64 64 | 40 d8 48 1e f3 c5 a8 0f 60 1c 43 4b cd 95 62 21 | creating state object #9 at 0x55b81b995738 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #9 in UNDEFINED | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp started | #9 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #9: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #9: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #9 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #9: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.575 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00257 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | 14 00 00 24 e2 91 6a 2f 6b 7e 94 f5 22 14 f6 12 | 2f 75 2d 45 76 86 83 3f a8 54 22 5a 66 d3 9d 57 | 51 61 46 b6 14 00 00 18 c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e | e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b 93 1a 86 12 00 00 00 18 | a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | 17 08 a6 d6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #9 is idle | #9 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | 93 1a 86 12 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | natd_hash: rcookie= d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | natd_hash: hash= 93 1a 86 12 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | 17 08 a6 d6 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | natd_hash: rcookie= d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | natd_hash: hash= 17 08 a6 d6 | expected NAT-D(me): c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | expected NAT-D(me): 93 1a 86 12 | expected NAT-D(him): | a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | 17 08 a6 d6 | received NAT-D: c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | received NAT-D: 93 1a 86 12 | received NAT-D: a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | received NAT-D: 17 08 a6 d6 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 7 for state #9 | state #9 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 7 for state #9 | crypto helper 6 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 7 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc003a28: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0dc003a28 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | Generated nonce: 7b 32 35 74 9f 55 7d cc 21 fb af c9 4f 7f 8d 02 | Generated nonce: 1a cf 85 95 f9 7c e0 88 5d b1 54 10 23 19 d9 64 | crypto helper 6 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 7 time elapsed 0.000825 seconds | (#9) spent 0.818 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 7: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 7 for state #9 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #9 and saving MD | #9 is busy; has a suspended MD | #9 spent 0.173 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.315 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #9 | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 7 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #9: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc003a28: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #9 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | keyex value d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | keyex value 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | keyex value 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | keyex value 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | keyex value 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | keyex value 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | keyex value 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | keyex value 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | keyex value fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | keyex value 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | keyex value 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | keyex value 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | keyex value a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | keyex value 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | keyex value 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 7b 32 35 74 9f 55 7d cc 21 fb af c9 4f 7f 8d 02 | Nr 1a cf 85 95 f9 7c e0 88 5d b1 54 10 23 19 d9 64 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | 17 08 a6 d6 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | natd_hash: rcookie= d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | natd_hash: hash= 17 08 a6 d6 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c | NAT-D 17 08 a6 d6 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | 93 1a 86 12 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | natd_hash: rcookie= d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | natd_hash: hash= 93 1a 86 12 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | NAT-D 93 1a 86 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc003a28: transferring ownership from state #9 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 8 for state #9 | state #9 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #9 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 8 for state #9 | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 8 | peer's g: 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | peer's g: 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | peer's g: 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | peer's g: 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | peer's g: cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | peer's g: d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | peer's g: 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | peer's g: bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | peer's g: 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | peer's g: 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | peer's g: 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | peer's g: f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | peer's g: 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | peer's g: 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | peer's g: 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | peer's g: 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #9 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #9: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #9 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | 14 00 00 24 7b 32 35 74 9f 55 7d cc 21 fb af c9 | 4f 7f 8d 02 1a cf 85 95 f9 7c e0 88 5d b1 54 10 | 23 19 d9 64 14 00 00 18 a0 4d 04 a5 e6 90 29 09 | 42 7c 07 70 5d 7f fa 7c 17 08 a6 d6 00 00 00 18 | c0 a7 ae 3f d1 85 14 3e e4 dd 47 d0 42 cc 86 8b | 93 1a 86 12 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #9 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10450.82501 "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #9 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #9 spent 0.393 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc003a28: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b976790 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b996e68 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00015f8 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b996e8c (length 32) | e2 91 6a 2f 6b 7e 94 f5 22 14 f6 12 2f 75 2d 45 | 76 86 83 3f a8 54 22 5a 66 d3 9d 57 51 61 46 b6 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b996eac (length 32) | 7b 32 35 74 9f 55 7d cc 21 fb af c9 4f 7f 8d 02 | 1a cf 85 95 f9 7c e0 88 5d b1 54 10 23 19 d9 64 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001278 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: ce f2 f8 ee 74 4e 45 f3 c8 1b 3a db 26 92 97 91 59 e5 04 83 da 4e 17 15 dd f1 0f 28 d9 1e 31 77 94 7e 85 af 67 b6 1c 14 d1 98 22 b8 71 38 3a f7 26 8c 24 a5 a3 65 df 70 4a 5d e6 f0 fa fc 05 e9 d1 25 c3 d6 18 5a 07 ef 64 ab 88 f9 36 a2 06 3e 6f 71 ce 13 8b e0 1f 8c b2 ae 47 5e d4 af ab c1 66 e5 aa 31 45 eb 5f 02 ba bc 0a c9 2f cc bd 88 f4 56 3b 65 8e 43 b7 76 b8 1b b8 fa 99 17 a3 7c ab d6 0f 10 27 d0 f7 48 2a ee 4c df 76 4a db cd af ff fc 79 b0 87 5f b1 85 a7 c8 a4 c9 d8 3e bb 04 31 2f 30 cc 90 9a 78 25 ac d7 96 25 e7 70 98 05 56 81 0a 39 5a 8d 81 8e f1 91 41 21 05 4d 19 f8 b2 35 bc 8a 59 0c da c5 86 77 c7 18 20 e2 9e 43 7d d2 fe e1 ea 89 8f 8a dc f7 09 ae 99 2c e3 85 44 08 dc 6c e8 33 9e 33 16 2e 20 ae 14 ee bc 1a 29 57 0d a2 6d bd 2f dc b8 bd 2d f2 f9 24 c2 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0f0004728 | unwrapped: 0f da 63 f9 ad f8 d8 55 14 f5 35 65 81 b1 76 fd | unwrapped: eb 37 a9 bb 7d e8 c0 bc 0a f5 c4 ac 77 f3 38 2a | unwrapped: ac 40 07 de c7 ec ea f0 94 67 b9 49 77 cf dc 29 | unwrapped: a4 0f ce 14 90 3b de 4c 33 b5 2d 67 e0 c7 55 e7 | unwrapped: a3 93 29 fa 4f 5d 40 36 7f b7 90 46 5e f5 2e b3 | unwrapped: 6a be 99 d2 ad 1a 86 3c 2c 80 9a 46 39 a9 3b 26 | unwrapped: 27 e7 e4 81 32 b8 39 5d 18 18 63 da a4 ec 39 fb | unwrapped: e8 74 58 2e 04 c8 c9 52 9b 76 d8 e2 88 f8 6d 29 | unwrapped: bf 5c 28 a3 bc 44 53 23 46 9a 48 25 6b ec 5d 3e | unwrapped: 38 82 c4 fd 89 e0 4e 5b b7 4d 77 12 8b 73 50 69 | unwrapped: 45 96 63 78 c4 05 b0 88 65 05 b0 84 12 ac 5d 70 | unwrapped: f8 7e 9b cb 6d 1d b4 df 04 e9 50 ae 34 12 96 84 | unwrapped: f1 f2 01 52 09 37 6f 71 6a a9 ce b2 bb f4 0c 14 | unwrapped: bf 60 e4 7a 3d ed 2e 0e 28 ab b2 ae 41 e6 27 4e | unwrapped: bc b9 85 fc cf ff 74 b3 b2 32 bc de b2 95 b2 f4 | unwrapped: bc af 48 22 72 62 4f ce 10 a0 2f 81 b2 5c ec af | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b9970cc (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b9970d4 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00015f8 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: 89 c4 cc 39 ae 8b 9f 33 4f 26 66 50 45 9c 07 33 9e df d8 3b 77 a8 94 c1 b0 fb dd cf 36 ce 36 a3 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0f0002148 | unwrapped: 9a 5a 81 2d b8 53 f0 bd 4e 58 8f 9a fc 8a 24 4a | unwrapped: c5 2b ea 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: ce f2 f8 ee 74 4e 45 f3 c8 1b 3a db 26 92 97 91 59 e5 04 83 da 4e 17 15 dd f1 0f 28 d9 1e 31 77 94 7e 85 af 67 b6 1c 14 d1 98 22 b8 71 38 3a f7 26 8c 24 a5 a3 65 df 70 4a 5d e6 f0 fa fc 05 e9 d1 25 c3 d6 18 5a 07 ef 64 ab 88 f9 36 a2 06 3e 6f 71 ce 13 8b e0 1f 8c b2 ae 47 5e d4 af ab c1 66 e5 aa 31 45 eb 5f 02 ba bc 0a c9 2f cc bd 88 f4 56 3b 65 8e 43 b7 76 b8 1b b8 fa 99 17 a3 7c ab d6 0f 10 27 d0 f7 48 2a ee 4c df 76 4a db cd af ff fc 79 b0 87 5f b1 85 a7 c8 a4 c9 d8 3e bb 04 31 2f 30 cc 90 9a 78 25 ac d7 96 25 e7 70 98 05 56 81 0a 39 5a 8d 81 8e f1 91 41 21 05 4d 19 f8 b2 35 bc 8a 59 0c da c5 86 77 c7 18 20 e2 9e 43 7d d2 fe e1 ea 89 8f 8a dc f7 09 ae 99 2c e3 85 44 08 dc 6c e8 33 9e 33 16 2e 20 ae 14 ee bc 1a 29 57 0d a2 6d bd 2f dc b8 bd 2d f2 f9 24 c2 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0f0001978 | unwrapped: 0f da 63 f9 ad f8 d8 55 14 f5 35 65 81 b1 76 fd | unwrapped: eb 37 a9 bb 7d e8 c0 bc 0a f5 c4 ac 77 f3 38 2a | unwrapped: ac 40 07 de c7 ec ea f0 94 67 b9 49 77 cf dc 29 | unwrapped: a4 0f ce 14 90 3b de 4c 33 b5 2d 67 e0 c7 55 e7 | unwrapped: a3 93 29 fa 4f 5d 40 36 7f b7 90 46 5e f5 2e b3 | unwrapped: 6a be 99 d2 ad 1a 86 3c 2c 80 9a 46 39 a9 3b 26 | unwrapped: 27 e7 e4 81 32 b8 39 5d 18 18 63 da a4 ec 39 fb | unwrapped: e8 74 58 2e 04 c8 c9 52 9b 76 d8 e2 88 f8 6d 29 | unwrapped: bf 5c 28 a3 bc 44 53 23 46 9a 48 25 6b ec 5d 3e | unwrapped: 38 82 c4 fd 89 e0 4e 5b b7 4d 77 12 8b 73 50 69 | unwrapped: 45 96 63 78 c4 05 b0 88 65 05 b0 84 12 ac 5d 70 | unwrapped: f8 7e 9b cb 6d 1d b4 df 04 e9 50 ae 34 12 96 84 | unwrapped: f1 f2 01 52 09 37 6f 71 6a a9 ce b2 bb f4 0c 14 | unwrapped: bf 60 e4 7a 3d ed 2e 0e 28 ab b2 ae 41 e6 27 4e | unwrapped: bc b9 85 fc cf ff 74 b3 b2 32 bc de b2 95 b2 f4 | unwrapped: bc af 48 22 72 62 4f ce 10 a0 2f 81 b2 5c ec af | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b9970cc (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b9970d4 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001278 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: ff c4 aa e0 44 e5 51 08 0f 91 ac 7b 73 e1 a5 8f 2c c9 f2 03 4b 8e 48 b7 66 73 b3 a1 62 5f 9b 7c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0f0001648 | unwrapped: f9 2c 3c bf 57 17 8c 1a e9 93 ed 0c 2d 75 87 ea | unwrapped: 77 58 e0 85 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: ce f2 f8 ee 74 4e 45 f3 c8 1b 3a db 26 92 97 91 59 e5 04 83 da 4e 17 15 dd f1 0f 28 d9 1e 31 77 94 7e 85 af 67 b6 1c 14 d1 98 22 b8 71 38 3a f7 26 8c 24 a5 a3 65 df 70 4a 5d e6 f0 fa fc 05 e9 d1 25 c3 d6 18 5a 07 ef 64 ab 88 f9 36 a2 06 3e 6f 71 ce 13 8b e0 1f 8c b2 ae 47 5e d4 af ab c1 66 e5 aa 31 45 eb 5f 02 ba bc 0a c9 2f cc bd 88 f4 56 3b 65 8e 43 b7 76 b8 1b b8 fa 99 17 a3 7c ab d6 0f 10 27 d0 f7 48 2a ee 4c df 76 4a db cd af ff fc 79 b0 87 5f b1 85 a7 c8 a4 c9 d8 3e bb 04 31 2f 30 cc 90 9a 78 25 ac d7 96 25 e7 70 98 05 56 81 0a 39 5a 8d 81 8e f1 91 41 21 05 4d 19 f8 b2 35 bc 8a 59 0c da c5 86 77 c7 18 20 e2 9e 43 7d d2 fe e1 ea 89 8f 8a dc f7 09 ae 99 2c e3 85 44 08 dc 6c e8 33 9e 33 16 2e 20 ae 14 ee bc 1a 29 57 0d a2 6d bd 2f dc b8 bd 2d f2 f9 24 c2 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0f0004728 | unwrapped: 0f da 63 f9 ad f8 d8 55 14 f5 35 65 81 b1 76 fd | unwrapped: eb 37 a9 bb 7d e8 c0 bc 0a f5 c4 ac 77 f3 38 2a | unwrapped: ac 40 07 de c7 ec ea f0 94 67 b9 49 77 cf dc 29 | unwrapped: a4 0f ce 14 90 3b de 4c 33 b5 2d 67 e0 c7 55 e7 | unwrapped: a3 93 29 fa 4f 5d 40 36 7f b7 90 46 5e f5 2e b3 | unwrapped: 6a be 99 d2 ad 1a 86 3c 2c 80 9a 46 39 a9 3b 26 | unwrapped: 27 e7 e4 81 32 b8 39 5d 18 18 63 da a4 ec 39 fb | unwrapped: e8 74 58 2e 04 c8 c9 52 9b 76 d8 e2 88 f8 6d 29 | unwrapped: bf 5c 28 a3 bc 44 53 23 46 9a 48 25 6b ec 5d 3e | unwrapped: 38 82 c4 fd 89 e0 4e 5b b7 4d 77 12 8b 73 50 69 | unwrapped: 45 96 63 78 c4 05 b0 88 65 05 b0 84 12 ac 5d 70 | unwrapped: f8 7e 9b cb 6d 1d b4 df 04 e9 50 ae 34 12 96 84 | unwrapped: f1 f2 01 52 09 37 6f 71 6a a9 ce b2 bb f4 0c 14 | unwrapped: bf 60 e4 7a 3d ed 2e 0e 28 ab b2 ae 41 e6 27 4e | unwrapped: bc b9 85 fc cf ff 74 b3 b2 32 bc de b2 95 b2 f4 | unwrapped: bc af 48 22 72 62 4f ce 10 a0 2f 81 b2 5c ec af | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b9970cc (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b9970d4 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_a 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_e 0x55b81b976b70, enc_key 0x55b81b96d700 | DH_i: 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | DH_i: 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | DH_i: 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | DH_i: 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | DH_i: cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | DH_i: d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | DH_i: 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | DH_i: bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | DH_i: 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | DH_i: 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | DH_i: 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | DH_i: f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | DH_i: 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | DH_i: 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | DH_i: 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | DH_i: 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | DH_r: 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | DH_r: d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | DH_r: 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | DH_r: 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | DH_r: 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | DH_r: 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | DH_r: 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | DH_r: 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | DH_r: 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | DH_r: fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | DH_r: 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | DH_r: 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | DH_r: 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | DH_r: a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | DH_r: 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | DH_r: 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b996ecc (length 256) | 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b996fcc (length 256) | 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0f0001648 (length 20) | f4 fb 90 e6 71 a4 ba 46 c5 83 f4 dc b9 20 ee 7d | d4 df 28 ef | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 8 time elapsed 0.001861 seconds | (#9) spent 1.84 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 8: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 8 for state #9 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #9 | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 8 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #9: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc003a28: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #9 | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #9 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #9 spent 0.0206 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 | spent 0.0025 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c b9 c0 86 56 | 49 56 f8 65 d5 d1 78 a3 2e 10 10 5f ca 94 01 24 | 4e e6 60 59 93 05 ab 93 c3 e5 8f 71 6b c3 d1 65 | 03 98 61 c2 bb d0 17 41 d5 0a 43 fa | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: f4 fb 90 e6 71 a4 ba 46 c5 83 f4 dc b9 20 ee 7d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 6b c3 d1 65 03 98 61 c2 bb d0 17 41 d5 0a 43 fa | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 b9 e3 da 57 | 3d 51 99 c6 c5 69 7e 84 4a 2a c9 48 c9 7f 5d 62 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #9: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0dc000b48 (length 256) | 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892cc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98f518 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | b9 e3 da 57 3d 51 99 c6 c5 69 7e 84 4a 2a c9 48 | c9 7f 5d 62 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001648 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0dc000b48 (length 256) | 6e bf 07 a6 44 92 5e 72 02 98 bb 8b f1 a7 c5 d9 | d4 23 cc 5b e8 2c 9c 53 d4 34 6a 56 37 ac 19 18 | 3b b9 d4 d1 fa a3 69 9a bd 1b db ef 74 e0 61 dd | 0d c4 c5 6c ca 79 a9 e7 01 25 17 75 e3 b6 a3 3d | 05 f8 ff 92 e8 2f 9b 04 45 23 5a 3d fb b3 ba 63 | 27 f2 e2 52 1d dd f1 a1 8b 17 4b 4d fa 76 95 7d | 72 d2 81 80 e2 7d ad 5a f3 90 0d 81 75 20 ab c7 | 2a 11 22 ca 31 14 6b 8d 4d 5d 8e 22 14 80 b4 d9 | 54 ed 40 ce 0b 35 d6 37 13 59 3f 7e ab 45 e4 1c | fe bb 0e bd 17 53 7b 96 ac c4 92 b5 95 b8 45 a5 | 76 7e 33 76 70 c8 00 f5 34 7a 8e cd f7 7a 89 4d | 8c bf fa 71 4b d5 4d 36 0e d8 a0 b9 c3 fe 81 fa | 6c 39 1e 82 a6 4f 45 d0 1b 89 09 0d 71 64 4b 4e | a0 a1 b6 8e b2 0a 0b ca 1d 9d d0 fa b8 bc 84 b3 | 97 8c c7 c2 a6 ff 42 a9 48 3f c1 e0 b2 83 91 15 | 74 a4 19 02 b7 6d f6 c3 27 84 46 84 29 17 62 71 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | 42 d0 7b 02 44 41 96 8f 60 27 c1 04 45 d0 43 b4 | 89 43 dc 2e af fa c3 50 d1 55 5e 96 83 71 ec a7 | 49 2b 98 6d b7 72 18 2b 7f 52 79 04 c0 48 08 58 | 79 a6 39 b4 b6 dd 5e f2 c4 a9 89 3c d9 d7 18 aa | cb 1e df 59 0d e8 44 4c 8b ba 97 31 94 28 47 31 | d9 fe c5 c4 82 15 db 71 32 e4 65 bf 62 cd 26 c8 | 56 71 d1 9e df 30 84 9e 0f 61 8c 11 75 75 a8 47 | bc 4d 1b d0 4e 42 0e ca 2b f5 6f c6 84 b6 64 b1 | 5f 89 c9 30 e4 d3 1e 0b 7b 71 a4 05 9e 62 12 b3 | 0e 35 16 3b e4 05 ab 11 8d 84 de ac 04 db df f5 | 87 ed 30 f0 e0 49 73 1e 1f fb 40 de 1d ac 62 4c | f4 6c 11 12 37 ce 4d c9 4c cd cd dd de 0e 15 15 | 63 ef bd c3 0c 2a af 45 aa 00 71 39 10 f0 d7 db | 55 b8 d7 4e 91 b0 3c 3d 95 b0 fa 4a e2 7c 21 8e | 4e d4 15 8b 35 b2 0d d7 e9 98 62 72 bd 02 c1 d9 | 3c 27 0d 4e ce 54 d6 21 12 75 12 ea cb fe 72 a9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892cc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | 8b 02 b4 93 67 18 59 61 9c 15 c9 20 ba 10 b3 62 | bf d3 3a 47 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 8b 02 b4 93 67 18 59 61 9c 15 c9 20 ba 10 b3 62 | HASH_R bf d3 3a 47 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 8b 02 b4 93 67 18 59 61 9c 15 c9 20 ba 10 b3 62 | encrypting: bf d3 3a 47 | IV: 6b c3 d1 65 03 98 61 c2 bb d0 17 41 d5 0a 43 fa | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #9 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #9: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #9 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #9 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 0c 78 29 0d | 39 01 b5 4a e0 76 3d 5b 43 ef bf 1e c9 b0 63 e5 | e0 7e 03 bb 63 10 69 09 fb 88 a0 07 8c 8d f8 f0 | 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #9 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 size 128 | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #9: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #9 | #9 spent 0.528 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.661 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00219 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 08 10 20 01 ca f2 0e 8d 00 00 01 bc 26 2e 53 82 | b6 9f 34 5e 76 10 87 0d 3a 0a f5 f7 42 e5 1e 79 | 0e de db ca 4c 57 59 e5 2e f5 23 bf a5 b8 80 bd | ef 30 10 bb e0 85 3d af 67 94 19 c3 f1 0e 32 b7 | 09 53 09 f4 c5 c0 41 0a 93 14 0d 93 fb 99 e6 6b | 4a 61 93 90 c8 b8 8e 1a a8 37 de 00 1c 34 1d b2 | a0 ed 05 13 2f e1 c1 27 3f e4 4d 9f 7f db 5a 3c | 8d d4 86 7d 5c 7e fb 22 64 1a d6 5b a4 b8 7c 00 | 7a 38 8d 0f b3 77 a6 6a 1b ef d9 ec 43 12 b2 c3 | 7b f0 cc c6 7f 10 ce 9c 46 ec 0b a9 30 f8 a7 42 | 16 09 24 73 e2 b8 2b ba 82 b9 af ae 05 75 fd 1c | 6b cf 44 e6 78 c0 3e 66 e4 8d 86 26 20 31 fc 59 | 1e 29 80 dd 32 73 14 aa 29 43 88 b8 39 4d f3 7b | 98 b0 89 ad a2 cb 7b 8b fb b3 e7 75 bf 50 75 cd | 91 ff e2 a0 4a 45 be 0f 3b 8f a4 c1 e3 db 1e 60 | fc fc 6b 59 73 e5 20 38 b3 f4 86 1b ef 0c 60 bc | 78 75 16 fa 57 a1 25 72 f5 fa 82 89 5f be 17 ed | 1b 50 b0 d5 4f 34 d8 61 9c a7 93 4e b0 be 27 7a | 51 d9 0b 19 af 78 4d 20 ef cb f6 1b 9f ae 8a 8e | ea 16 4d 55 e6 54 cf 14 a8 e3 10 34 d4 7a 5d e6 | 9f 23 78 a2 71 cf 00 c5 2b c4 af 9e 3d 54 fe 25 | 54 c7 4b aa 8e 63 4f 9f 07 ab ac e1 90 ae c7 c6 | 94 60 5f df fe ff 77 a8 35 10 8d 8d 97 4a d2 8a | 9a 78 c0 0b b9 d3 1c dc f5 0d af 03 00 c9 31 37 | f6 7c f7 d9 62 6d b8 c1 86 48 1e 24 25 2f 0f 01 | e7 91 72 b9 77 35 1e aa d9 28 30 16 ff 56 63 8c | 90 93 24 f1 0f 56 c2 5f b7 15 b4 bb | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3404861069 (0xcaf20e8d) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | current Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | ca f2 0e 8d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | f1 89 be 1d c7 82 81 d4 1d 63 d9 6f 46 c7 c7 95 | 87 4e fc 6a | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: f1 89 be 1d c7 82 81 d4 1d 63 d9 6f 46 c7 c7 95 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: ff 56 63 8c 90 93 24 f1 0f 56 c2 5f b7 15 b4 bb | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 08 10 20 01 ca f2 0e 8d 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 4c 83 f0 9b 28 7b 20 e3 1f 86 8b d1 71 93 5a 1a | 96 9b 1d 33 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 07 6e b6 ee 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 00 04 00 00 24 | f3 91 ad 0a 92 68 59 08 68 74 cf 51 5a e6 b3 b0 | a3 22 de 4d 25 d6 41 eb e8 c5 d5 ce 88 92 78 38 | 05 00 01 04 0f dd cd a3 f6 89 bb 33 93 97 e6 1b | 47 74 8f 7c 2b df be 46 c1 b0 a9 8a 08 cb eb 44 | 45 68 bb cf 76 df c5 04 47 45 7c 12 78 17 ee 6b | c7 69 6c 0d 10 45 da f4 7f 03 32 f7 b2 40 a6 b2 | 21 f2 ed c7 60 d8 9d cf e7 a9 06 ba 16 24 21 4a | 9c bd cc 07 db 3c b0 31 84 69 24 cd f9 8d 9b 5b | 22 56 8f 92 bd 0d 46 75 c8 7f 5b 6e 8d 68 fa aa | e1 a8 31 7e ef b2 98 b3 08 2d 9b f1 5c 55 8f 20 | 7b 83 1b 27 47 6d 42 63 1c a9 b1 e5 69 56 d1 25 | 90 8f af aa 90 9b 79 65 7c 69 97 bd f0 af f8 57 | 2f df 84 5c 36 71 52 1b 4e 0c 9b 6c ee 80 90 27 | 86 4d 7e df 7a 63 67 36 4d b6 d1 c2 63 7b 57 cc | de 78 5f 3f 33 05 78 ca 11 84 2e d9 92 df 75 0b | 2e ce 0d 83 ae cd 34 b8 cb e3 b3 cd 0b e9 a1 13 | d9 f0 12 85 3a 46 b8 34 79 9b 2e 9b 03 1e f9 c3 | a7 67 97 aa 4b e5 8d b0 01 31 d9 19 ba 3a e3 d7 | 45 9a 46 5e 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001648 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | ca f2 0e 8d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b994a8c (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 07 6e b6 ee 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 00 04 00 00 24 f3 91 ad 0a | 92 68 59 08 68 74 cf 51 5a e6 b3 b0 a3 22 de 4d | 25 d6 41 eb e8 c5 d5 ce 88 92 78 38 05 00 01 04 | 0f dd cd a3 f6 89 bb 33 93 97 e6 1b 47 74 8f 7c | 2b df be 46 c1 b0 a9 8a 08 cb eb 44 45 68 bb cf | 76 df c5 04 47 45 7c 12 78 17 ee 6b c7 69 6c 0d | 10 45 da f4 7f 03 32 f7 b2 40 a6 b2 21 f2 ed c7 | 60 d8 9d cf e7 a9 06 ba 16 24 21 4a 9c bd cc 07 | db 3c b0 31 84 69 24 cd f9 8d 9b 5b 22 56 8f 92 | bd 0d 46 75 c8 7f 5b 6e 8d 68 fa aa e1 a8 31 7e | ef b2 98 b3 08 2d 9b f1 5c 55 8f 20 7b 83 1b 27 | 47 6d 42 63 1c a9 b1 e5 69 56 d1 25 90 8f af aa | 90 9b 79 65 7c 69 97 bd f0 af f8 57 2f df 84 5c | 36 71 52 1b 4e 0c 9b 6c ee 80 90 27 86 4d 7e df | 7a 63 67 36 4d b6 d1 c2 63 7b 57 cc de 78 5f 3f | 33 05 78 ca 11 84 2e d9 92 df 75 0b 2e ce 0d 83 | ae cd 34 b8 cb e3 b3 cd 0b e9 a1 13 d9 f0 12 85 | 3a 46 b8 34 79 9b 2e 9b 03 1e f9 c3 a7 67 97 aa | 4b e5 8d b0 01 31 d9 19 ba 3a e3 d7 45 9a 46 5e | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 4c 83 f0 9b 28 7b 20 e3 1f 86 8b d1 71 93 5a 1a | 96 9b 1d 33 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 4c 83 f0 9b 28 7b 20 e3 1f 86 8b d1 71 93 5a 1a | 96 9b 1d 33 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #9: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #10 at 0x55b81b996228 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #10 in UNDEFINED | pstats #10 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #9 "east" as #10 for IPSEC SA | #10 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #9.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #10: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 07 6e b6 ee | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #10: IKEv1 key-length attribute without encryption algorithm | complete v1 state transition with BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | [RE]START processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #10 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #10: sending encrypted notification BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4288841351 (0xffa28687) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX (0xf) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342648 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe5434272c (length 4) | ff a2 86 87 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe543429d4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe543429c0 (length 20) | f6 11 57 62 57 16 2f 33 22 7b 00 9d 91 88 97 a3 | b1 8a 59 11 | send notification HASH(1): | f6 11 57 62 57 16 2f 33 22 7b 00 9d 91 88 97 a3 | b1 8a 59 11 | last Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | current Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434273c (length 4) | ff a2 86 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | 57 23 c8 0c 99 b1 e0 eb a7 31 f7 25 73 26 97 fa | 97 e9 0b 49 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 f6 11 57 62 57 16 2f 33 22 7b 00 9d | encrypting: 91 88 97 a3 b1 8a 59 11 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0f | IV: 57 23 c8 0c 99 b1 e0 eb a7 31 f7 25 73 26 97 fa | IV: 97 e9 0b 49 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 2d 7b cc 65 87 7a 8b a1 50 b5 91 8d 35 7d f7 03 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #10) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 08 10 05 01 ff a2 86 87 00 00 00 4c 83 a3 cf e6 | 2a 34 2d f0 c3 b2 aa c9 a4 fa 59 27 b2 1f d5 9a | 8e 2c 51 ca a7 fc ac 43 e2 08 31 d2 2d 7b cc 65 | 87 7a 8b a1 50 b5 91 8d 35 7d f7 03 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX | pstats #10 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #10 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #10: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #10: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #10: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #10 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #10: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #10 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #9 spent 0.607 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.06 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00288 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 08 10 05 01 ab b7 1d 2f 00 00 00 5c 9a 3b 19 ef | 21 c3 0c 6d 70 fe 71 63 94 67 8f 41 69 7c 91 6d | 91 61 ce ea e6 fa 97 11 04 d7 ba b1 34 d9 df 57 | 30 8a 5a 2b df 00 79 a0 18 0c 9f 69 ae fe 02 a6 | 92 2c fd c2 a3 49 bb bc 39 89 91 0f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2880904495 (0xabb71d2f) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #9; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #9 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | current Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | ab b7 1d 2f | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | 44 bd 6e f9 09 ca e4 e6 f7 cb 1f 96 91 5d 16 69 | 36 80 2a 77 | #9 is idle | #9 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 44 bd 6e f9 09 ca e4 e6 f7 cb 1f 96 91 5d 16 69 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: ae fe 02 a6 92 2c fd c2 a3 49 bb bc 39 89 91 0f | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 08 10 05 01 ab b7 1d 2f 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | d0 0e 41 bd 56 1a e7 30 e2 f0 91 ad 0b 25 ac 82 | b9 90 e4 53 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | ab b7 1d 2f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b99056c (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 c2 2f e6 e6 | a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | d0 0e 41 bd 56 1a e7 30 e2 f0 91 ad 0b 25 ac 82 | b9 90 e4 53 | informational HASH(1): | d0 0e 41 bd 56 1a e7 30 e2 f0 91 ad 0b 25 ac 82 | b9 90 e4 53 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #9: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #9 | pstats #9 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #9 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #9: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.522s and sending notification | parent state #9: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #9 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | responder cookie: | d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2386591857 (0x8e408071) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340998 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001648 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a7c (length 4) | 8e 40 80 71 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340e24 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 c2 2f e6 e6 | a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340e10 (length 20) | e4 30 4d 53 26 89 a9 03 42 0a 91 32 9b 8d f4 18 | bd 81 80 50 | send delete HASH(1): | e4 30 4d 53 26 89 a9 03 42 0a 91 32 9b 8d f4 18 | bd 81 80 50 | last Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | current Phase 1 IV: 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 8c 8d f8 f0 9b 64 fe 0a 6b 54 2c 2c 75 d7 8d ac | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a8c (length 4) | 8e 40 80 71 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | e0 ba 7b 5c fe e7 87 e2 56 65 39 d5 e3 60 71 91 | d5 1c a8 ce | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 e4 30 4d 53 26 89 a9 03 42 0a 91 32 | encrypting: 9b 8d f4 18 bd 81 80 50 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de | encrypting: b1 86 69 c9 | IV: e0 ba 7b 5c fe e7 87 e2 56 65 39 d5 e3 60 71 91 | IV: d5 1c a8 ce | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: b9 1a 73 ab 59 81 b6 34 f2 11 1b 78 f4 a7 39 7e | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #9) | c2 2f e6 e6 a8 13 3b 01 d8 05 bf de b1 86 69 c9 | 08 10 05 01 8e 40 80 71 00 00 00 5c 83 82 ee ce | 29 a5 82 23 c8 53 e2 00 c3 d1 f0 67 bc 61 86 2e | d2 d0 82 90 cd 31 28 74 ca 7e 1f c8 38 d1 6c 54 | 41 41 6c da 68 8a 25 92 d5 3c ae fe b9 1a 73 ab | 59 81 b6 34 f2 11 1b 78 f4 a7 39 7e | state #9 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b6b8 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #9 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #9: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc003a28: destroyed | stop processing: state #9 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.555 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00311 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 08 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab 4b 86 a8 8f a5 cf 67 f1 | 40 59 46 5c 4f d4 cb 73 af 9b 23 ec 46 72 d4 b0 | creating state object #11 at 0x55b81b995738 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #11 in UNDEFINED | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp started | #11 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #11: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #11: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #11 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #11: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.535 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0029 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | 14 00 00 24 c9 de 74 6c 11 9d 0e d9 9c ba 8a 2c | 39 a1 95 29 dd 59 56 d3 bf 15 12 5e d4 93 1a 30 | 0b 72 91 42 14 00 00 18 a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 | 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 f0 59 42 e7 00 00 00 18 | 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | f9 db 1c 68 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #11 is idle | #11 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | f0 59 42 e7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | natd_hash: rcookie= 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | natd_hash: hash= f0 59 42 e7 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | f9 db 1c 68 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | natd_hash: rcookie= 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | natd_hash: hash= f9 db 1c 68 | expected NAT-D(me): a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | expected NAT-D(me): f0 59 42 e7 | expected NAT-D(him): | 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | f9 db 1c 68 | received NAT-D: a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | received NAT-D: f0 59 42 e7 | received NAT-D: 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | received NAT-D: f9 db 1c 68 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 9 for state #11 | state #11 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #11 and saving MD | #11 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 2 resuming | #11 spent 0.184 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 9 for state #11 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 9 | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.352 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e80098d8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0e80098d8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | Generated nonce: 4f 09 d6 80 bc 12 46 43 5e 3d 05 d3 9f 7a 97 2d | Generated nonce: 2e c4 95 8c d7 fb 2c 58 a8 b8 58 74 d7 58 99 a1 | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 9 time elapsed 0.000812 seconds | (#11) spent 0.763 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 9: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 9 for state #11 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #11 | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 9 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #11: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e80098d8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #11 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | keyex value d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | keyex value 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | keyex value a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | keyex value 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | keyex value ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | keyex value dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | keyex value 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | keyex value 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | keyex value c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | keyex value 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | keyex value 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | keyex value b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | keyex value 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | keyex value 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | keyex value ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 4f 09 d6 80 bc 12 46 43 5e 3d 05 d3 9f 7a 97 2d | Nr 2e c4 95 8c d7 fb 2c 58 a8 b8 58 74 d7 58 99 a1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | f9 db 1c 68 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | natd_hash: rcookie= 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | natd_hash: hash= f9 db 1c 68 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd | NAT-D f9 db 1c 68 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | f0 59 42 e7 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | natd_hash: rcookie= 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | natd_hash: hash= f0 59 42 e7 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | NAT-D f0 59 42 e7 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e80098d8: transferring ownership from state #11 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 10 for state #11 | state #11 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #11 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #11 is idle; has background offloaded task | crypto helper 3 resuming | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 10 for state #11 | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 10 | parent state #11: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #11 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | peer's g: b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | peer's g: 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | peer's g: 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | peer's g: 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | peer's g: b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | peer's g: 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | peer's g: 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | peer's g: 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | peer's g: bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | peer's g: 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | peer's g: da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | peer's g: b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | peer's g: bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | peer's g: bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | peer's g: db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | peer's g: a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | 14 00 00 24 4f 09 d6 80 bc 12 46 43 5e 3d 05 d3 | 9f 7a 97 2d 2e c4 95 8c d7 fb 2c 58 a8 b8 58 74 | d7 58 99 a1 14 00 00 18 1c ea 36 84 19 98 00 77 | b5 25 c4 4f 84 e5 9d fd f9 db 1c 68 00 00 00 18 | a9 92 0c 9f 6c b0 75 29 80 89 af 87 c6 6a 59 e5 | f0 59 42 e7 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #11 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10451.773426 "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #11 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #11 spent 0.358 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e80098d8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b96d700 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b996e68 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f6e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x55b81b96a430 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b96a430 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec002918 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b996e8c (length 32) | c9 de 74 6c 11 9d 0e d9 9c ba 8a 2c 39 a1 95 29 | dd 59 56 d3 bf 15 12 5e d4 93 1a 30 0b 72 91 42 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b996eac (length 32) | 4f 09 d6 80 bc 12 46 43 5e 3d 05 d3 9f 7a 97 2d | 2e c4 95 8c d7 fb 2c 58 a8 b8 58 74 d7 58 99 a1 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x55b81b96a430 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b96a430 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0041c8 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 10 e6 06 02 5c 2c 1f f3 9b 51 f4 0b 7f 19 2e 1f 72 17 77 31 76 62 58 72 27 98 9c f2 0a b0 f8 72 83 06 c0 33 17 85 9e 99 ba 9f 15 b9 a8 ba 90 fe 1a ca 61 4e f0 00 95 eb f1 07 f9 b4 31 62 fa 06 6a 3a c0 83 5f 19 e4 48 22 c9 0e ee 51 92 9e 3f 22 64 62 4f 11 41 14 c1 13 59 46 8d 78 b4 a8 30 41 4c 3a 50 80 e0 05 6e 87 bc 75 6d 87 5a 99 4d 0c 11 d1 48 3b 06 2a 28 6b 82 e1 f0 10 53 0a b9 50 bd fb 75 fa ab e9 b8 be 57 14 dc 6a 43 9c 9d 06 ab c3 0e 99 aa 8f dc c8 08 5d 72 9f c5 7d 33 3e c2 aa 19 eb e6 5e 87 59 0d 69 85 c3 df 8e 84 b1 37 4b 1f f8 9c c1 58 7d 7d ec 1f 3e aa 0f 9f 28 e0 92 58 7f 7b 75 21 f5 76 49 49 13 f0 fe 6f e6 91 98 c8 8f 22 f5 e2 ab d3 ea 16 f7 53 d6 60 65 d8 54 08 7f f8 4c 9c e6 8f 9e ea a6 0f 5a 61 b3 3a bf 3c 8d 4e 3a 62 07 9d c0 90 8d fd 56 9e | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec002ff8 | unwrapped: 2b 30 5e d4 22 8f e8 13 9b 93 13 57 5b 84 c4 3e | unwrapped: af cd cb 51 4b 79 5e 12 d2 27 7f 72 04 f5 4a a6 | unwrapped: 21 28 b1 bb d5 74 fc 71 f5 d1 41 36 fb e5 ea dc | unwrapped: bc 26 b3 dd 9c dc 01 93 01 2d a4 69 4d 6c b9 14 | unwrapped: c0 e9 08 98 26 61 b0 74 98 75 4d 0f d7 a5 f4 33 | unwrapped: 2d 85 86 e4 66 78 18 a1 9f f0 13 08 c0 c8 ff 92 | unwrapped: 6e 7c 26 16 34 3e 9b 92 e9 ee 5e d2 48 69 81 b0 | unwrapped: ba 21 ca e3 e5 71 1b e9 dd c9 ed 52 61 de 2d 66 | unwrapped: b4 d8 cf ce 63 88 94 e8 f4 55 8b bf 87 02 2a fa | unwrapped: e8 f5 07 93 9b 9a 38 1d 38 09 dc f1 16 c9 77 75 | unwrapped: 78 57 49 a2 d2 8f 27 a2 b8 a8 89 b1 29 bd 97 88 | unwrapped: b3 46 fe d6 ea 95 f7 aa de 09 ff 10 09 53 69 a4 | unwrapped: 80 07 29 4e 76 a6 29 eb 7e 0f fd 22 4b c4 ed af | unwrapped: c5 5a 56 dc 65 97 9a 0d d5 37 5e 3b de a0 5f 5c | unwrapped: fa 2d 5a e3 8e fc 5c be 0f 23 47 8b 38 68 9c 9e | unwrapped: 0d 2a 69 9f bb e4 58 b6 63 9e 7b c4 f1 5b d5 b4 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b9970cc (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b9970d4 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f6f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x55b81b96a430 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b96a430 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec002918 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: d4 f9 db fd e9 ba 12 be c4 7a 7c 4f a7 23 bb d7 8f 58 bf 82 14 63 39 0f 0a 8e 38 ee 21 50 f6 28 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0ec002d28 | unwrapped: 25 f6 49 62 20 45 82 39 73 96 04 11 15 8b af 58 | unwrapped: 27 fd 61 3f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 10 e6 06 02 5c 2c 1f f3 9b 51 f4 0b 7f 19 2e 1f 72 17 77 31 76 62 58 72 27 98 9c f2 0a b0 f8 72 83 06 c0 33 17 85 9e 99 ba 9f 15 b9 a8 ba 90 fe 1a ca 61 4e f0 00 95 eb f1 07 f9 b4 31 62 fa 06 6a 3a c0 83 5f 19 e4 48 22 c9 0e ee 51 92 9e 3f 22 64 62 4f 11 41 14 c1 13 59 46 8d 78 b4 a8 30 41 4c 3a 50 80 e0 05 6e 87 bc 75 6d 87 5a 99 4d 0c 11 d1 48 3b 06 2a 28 6b 82 e1 f0 10 53 0a b9 50 bd fb 75 fa ab e9 b8 be 57 14 dc 6a 43 9c 9d 06 ab c3 0e 99 aa 8f dc c8 08 5d 72 9f c5 7d 33 3e c2 aa 19 eb e6 5e 87 59 0d 69 85 c3 df 8e 84 b1 37 4b 1f f8 9c c1 58 7d 7d ec 1f 3e aa 0f 9f 28 e0 92 58 7f 7b 75 21 f5 76 49 49 13 f0 fe 6f e6 91 98 c8 8f 22 f5 e2 ab d3 ea 16 f7 53 d6 60 65 d8 54 08 7f f8 4c 9c e6 8f 9e ea a6 0f 5a 61 b3 3a bf 3c 8d 4e 3a 62 07 9d c0 90 8d fd 56 9e | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec002b58 | unwrapped: 2b 30 5e d4 22 8f e8 13 9b 93 13 57 5b 84 c4 3e | unwrapped: af cd cb 51 4b 79 5e 12 d2 27 7f 72 04 f5 4a a6 | unwrapped: 21 28 b1 bb d5 74 fc 71 f5 d1 41 36 fb e5 ea dc | unwrapped: bc 26 b3 dd 9c dc 01 93 01 2d a4 69 4d 6c b9 14 | unwrapped: c0 e9 08 98 26 61 b0 74 98 75 4d 0f d7 a5 f4 33 | unwrapped: 2d 85 86 e4 66 78 18 a1 9f f0 13 08 c0 c8 ff 92 | unwrapped: 6e 7c 26 16 34 3e 9b 92 e9 ee 5e d2 48 69 81 b0 | unwrapped: ba 21 ca e3 e5 71 1b e9 dd c9 ed 52 61 de 2d 66 | unwrapped: b4 d8 cf ce 63 88 94 e8 f4 55 8b bf 87 02 2a fa | unwrapped: e8 f5 07 93 9b 9a 38 1d 38 09 dc f1 16 c9 77 75 | unwrapped: 78 57 49 a2 d2 8f 27 a2 b8 a8 89 b1 29 bd 97 88 | unwrapped: b3 46 fe d6 ea 95 f7 aa de 09 ff 10 09 53 69 a4 | unwrapped: 80 07 29 4e 76 a6 29 eb 7e 0f fd 22 4b c4 ed af | unwrapped: c5 5a 56 dc 65 97 9a 0d d5 37 5e 3b de a0 5f 5c | unwrapped: fa 2d 5a e3 8e fc 5c be 0f 23 47 8b 38 68 9c 9e | unwrapped: 0d 2a 69 9f bb e4 58 b6 63 9e 7b c4 f1 5b d5 b4 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b9970cc (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b9970d4 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f6e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x55b81b96a430 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b96a430 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0041c8 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: 0b 17 e4 2b ca a8 47 fa c3 d2 49 7d 01 4e 81 7c 1e 1e 98 9d b5 e9 41 eb 70 4d bc e5 fe c3 83 6b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0ec005d78 | unwrapped: 33 05 cc 92 52 80 4c a2 81 37 5d 48 99 8b 81 0e | unwrapped: 09 1e 07 bb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 10 e6 06 02 5c 2c 1f f3 9b 51 f4 0b 7f 19 2e 1f 72 17 77 31 76 62 58 72 27 98 9c f2 0a b0 f8 72 83 06 c0 33 17 85 9e 99 ba 9f 15 b9 a8 ba 90 fe 1a ca 61 4e f0 00 95 eb f1 07 f9 b4 31 62 fa 06 6a 3a c0 83 5f 19 e4 48 22 c9 0e ee 51 92 9e 3f 22 64 62 4f 11 41 14 c1 13 59 46 8d 78 b4 a8 30 41 4c 3a 50 80 e0 05 6e 87 bc 75 6d 87 5a 99 4d 0c 11 d1 48 3b 06 2a 28 6b 82 e1 f0 10 53 0a b9 50 bd fb 75 fa ab e9 b8 be 57 14 dc 6a 43 9c 9d 06 ab c3 0e 99 aa 8f dc c8 08 5d 72 9f c5 7d 33 3e c2 aa 19 eb e6 5e 87 59 0d 69 85 c3 df 8e 84 b1 37 4b 1f f8 9c c1 58 7d 7d ec 1f 3e aa 0f 9f 28 e0 92 58 7f 7b 75 21 f5 76 49 49 13 f0 fe 6f e6 91 98 c8 8f 22 f5 e2 ab d3 ea 16 f7 53 d6 60 65 d8 54 08 7f f8 4c 9c e6 8f 9e ea a6 0f 5a 61 b3 3a bf 3c 8d 4e 3a 62 07 9d c0 90 8d fd 56 9e | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec002ff8 | unwrapped: 2b 30 5e d4 22 8f e8 13 9b 93 13 57 5b 84 c4 3e | unwrapped: af cd cb 51 4b 79 5e 12 d2 27 7f 72 04 f5 4a a6 | unwrapped: 21 28 b1 bb d5 74 fc 71 f5 d1 41 36 fb e5 ea dc | unwrapped: bc 26 b3 dd 9c dc 01 93 01 2d a4 69 4d 6c b9 14 | unwrapped: c0 e9 08 98 26 61 b0 74 98 75 4d 0f d7 a5 f4 33 | unwrapped: 2d 85 86 e4 66 78 18 a1 9f f0 13 08 c0 c8 ff 92 | unwrapped: 6e 7c 26 16 34 3e 9b 92 e9 ee 5e d2 48 69 81 b0 | unwrapped: ba 21 ca e3 e5 71 1b e9 dd c9 ed 52 61 de 2d 66 | unwrapped: b4 d8 cf ce 63 88 94 e8 f4 55 8b bf 87 02 2a fa | unwrapped: e8 f5 07 93 9b 9a 38 1d 38 09 dc f1 16 c9 77 75 | unwrapped: 78 57 49 a2 d2 8f 27 a2 b8 a8 89 b1 29 bd 97 88 | unwrapped: b3 46 fe d6 ea 95 f7 aa de 09 ff 10 09 53 69 a4 | unwrapped: 80 07 29 4e 76 a6 29 eb 7e 0f fd 22 4b c4 ed af | unwrapped: c5 5a 56 dc 65 97 9a 0d d5 37 5e 3b de a0 5f 5c | unwrapped: fa 2d 5a e3 8e fc 5c be 0f 23 47 8b 38 68 9c 9e | unwrapped: 0d 2a 69 9f bb e4 58 b6 63 9e 7b c4 f1 5b d5 b4 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b9970cc (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b9970d4 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f6f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f9f4f768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b976790 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_a 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_e 0x55b81b974d30, enc_key 0x55b81b976790 | DH_i: b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | DH_i: 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | DH_i: 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | DH_i: 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | DH_i: b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | DH_i: 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | DH_i: 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | DH_i: 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | DH_i: bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | DH_i: 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | DH_i: da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | DH_i: b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | DH_i: bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | DH_i: bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | DH_i: db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | DH_i: a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | DH_r: 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | DH_r: d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | DH_r: 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | DH_r: a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | DH_r: 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | DH_r: ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | DH_r: dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | DH_r: 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | DH_r: 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | DH_r: c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | DH_r: 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | DH_r: 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | DH_r: b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | DH_r: 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | DH_r: 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | DH_r: ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b996ecc (length 256) | b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b996fcc (length 256) | 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 20) | b4 9d 72 88 40 70 5d 8f 79 ba 80 c7 8c 75 e0 16 | bb d6 d4 85 | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 10 time elapsed 0.001813 seconds | (#11) spent 1.78 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 10: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 10 for state #11 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec005af8 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #11 | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 10 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #11: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e80098d8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #11 | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #11 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #11 spent 0.0184 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec005af8 | spent 0.00253 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c ea ee 48 70 | 02 d6 7f 2a 36 24 57 a8 4b c7 fb a1 12 04 26 20 | 2b 75 75 ba 02 95 70 93 46 c9 6e 5f 92 ba ab 45 | 8d fe 3f 63 2c 44 21 47 1a 5b 0c dd | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: b4 9d 72 88 40 70 5d 8f 79 ba 80 c7 8c 75 e0 16 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 92 ba ab 45 8d fe 3f 63 2c 44 21 47 1a 5b 0c dd | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 1c 43 2e 0c | ea e2 d4 69 a9 02 5a c8 af 0c df e1 c3 06 c3 c5 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #11: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8004f28 (length 256) | 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b97b308 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | 1c 43 2e 0c ea e2 d4 69 a9 02 5a c8 af 0c df e1 | c3 06 c3 c5 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec005d78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8004f28 (length 256) | 88 d3 b7 dd c1 17 8c 8a 7b f3 62 35 39 d6 e2 8b | d4 39 f4 51 4f e0 90 b6 82 93 23 93 26 c1 6a 11 | 3c af 20 c1 f3 d6 85 2a 45 3b 9a b1 f1 e6 28 d4 | a2 50 1d f1 cc a1 83 3f fa 5d 2c 0a eb ab 3a 55 | 0d 1e 97 25 e7 60 f3 1b b5 c1 64 51 9b f3 68 ca | ed 3c 03 d4 f8 22 47 16 77 a2 a3 e5 7e 62 10 86 | dd 08 f6 0c 1f 5e c9 95 78 33 19 1e 58 35 27 80 | 4e 15 6d d9 fe 92 36 9d 99 66 2f 2d 0e 56 2e 53 | 62 ec 85 86 9b 98 84 e0 94 34 3e a3 c8 46 96 f4 | c2 3d 18 ef 33 c9 57 ff 4f 7b d6 1d d9 09 37 4e | 98 be 04 e3 5f 4a 3c cd 09 15 25 9c 38 5a 2d 7b | 10 a6 e5 8f 10 24 7d a6 c6 1c e9 40 06 19 9d 54 | b7 5b dc 3e dd af de 54 53 18 a0 12 dc 20 38 80 | 69 31 36 f0 93 0e 2d d8 eb 6c b0 e5 72 43 5f e3 | 87 75 e2 20 11 b2 fc 17 2b e5 5e 7e 50 b9 06 53 | ca 63 29 85 99 58 e0 7d 8e ac f2 b5 e9 e4 44 0c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | b9 c6 ba 1e c7 9d d8 3c a7 93 af 8b 9e 1a 6b e0 | 80 41 14 4f 11 83 f9 42 54 7f 1e 33 16 6f 3c 6b | 67 ae 59 ef 9a 78 93 4a d6 fd f8 cc a1 4a d1 43 | 5e fe b5 9d 9a 67 9e 5f bf 4e 42 55 7e a6 6a 4a | b5 2b e4 85 9e 23 e3 14 90 3c b8 f4 67 38 da ed | 4a e8 5a 33 df c3 4f 04 19 b5 c4 2a e8 f7 92 a8 | 4c 49 7a e1 28 79 a7 d2 06 e9 ec fc f8 a6 12 89 | 9d 62 69 e5 9d 90 95 d3 16 f2 36 5c 10 fa 31 8d | bd 75 9d 0b 64 97 c2 57 31 35 d3 45 eb 3c cc 9c | 0b 5b 58 40 91 72 fc 3a bf 3f 3c e9 b0 11 d8 f0 | da 6e 84 19 29 c9 63 ff 38 28 42 56 1e 7f 6c 86 | b8 16 c7 07 65 75 8d 89 c7 c2 73 ca ce 3b dc a1 | bd 69 73 4d e2 ca 23 c1 b4 3c ba 29 4f 76 1a eb | bc 30 e3 5a a5 c0 fb ce c9 28 d5 08 b4 0e dc 52 | db 98 ab 25 28 20 75 59 be ce cc 78 b9 65 89 d5 | a1 c0 2d 58 72 5b f9 f4 a0 f8 06 5e bc 71 0d 45 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd8 (length 8) | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b995cd0 (length 8) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | a1 85 6f c2 f7 7a 79 f9 e6 1c e3 7f 45 db d1 23 | 4f 4e 07 7b | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R a1 85 6f c2 f7 7a 79 f9 e6 1c e3 7f 45 db d1 23 | HASH_R 4f 4e 07 7b | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: a1 85 6f c2 f7 7a 79 f9 e6 1c e3 7f 45 db d1 23 | encrypting: 4f 4e 07 7b | IV: 92 ba ab 45 8d fe 3f 63 2c 44 21 47 1a 5b 0c dd | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #11 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #11: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #11 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #11 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 33 60 fe 57 | 3c c5 55 5c d2 f3 b7 b1 bd 28 ba 61 0c 3e 97 6c | 17 1c 5e 76 1c f4 37 c4 57 c3 84 39 07 1a 4d 98 | 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #11 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 size 128 | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #11: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #11 | #11 spent 0.583 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.699 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00215 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 20 01 9a 3f 98 50 00 00 01 bc 0f 8a cc f6 | 70 09 e1 be 52 1a 41 cd 23 98 11 9e 58 dc 9c 13 | 9a 4b e6 bd 94 7b 70 64 92 31 34 83 ae f2 92 e3 | 35 88 57 62 58 22 eb 23 94 a9 47 50 eb 52 fb aa | 83 5a 5c 82 61 bb b5 b0 7d c1 ca fe e9 21 01 3e | 67 ad bb ba 18 c0 fd f4 9b 07 5a ab f5 fa 9a 6e | 54 81 71 1c 21 37 02 3f b1 83 c7 03 7c 8b c6 7d | 07 b6 08 7a 53 2f b5 62 c5 a7 2b c4 4b 5e 37 7d | e6 ca b1 0d 47 2d 89 15 ba cd b0 49 c1 a4 be c1 | d4 bd 9d 7f b1 41 63 27 1b ec f7 55 cc c7 f3 87 | 1d dc 99 fd a5 2b 96 17 37 db 46 44 01 e1 49 50 | 49 d2 d5 25 49 94 23 6b 58 bf c3 ce 97 d5 41 3a | e3 33 17 7a a6 a7 5c cc 91 f0 87 6c 7c ec 07 71 | 02 6f 6e 82 17 2b 40 7c 6b 56 fe 06 f0 9b 35 b0 | 4d fa 89 4a 80 53 ed b8 44 af b6 0e d3 21 10 c7 | 24 65 e2 86 d5 32 3e 22 bf be fb 4b 30 c8 5c f5 | ab 0d c2 32 34 54 c2 19 88 10 4f 99 54 66 30 f0 | 30 f0 73 fd 07 c1 31 8e 38 19 f1 ec f2 86 b3 17 | 61 5e 06 5c 85 f2 69 b0 d1 5c 8f c8 9f 4d f7 b0 | b2 52 2c f3 cf ae 74 ba a7 cd f1 68 cc 43 3d 53 | cc c0 cb 38 95 85 8d 73 9e 9e c6 62 b5 e8 1c 4d | fd 7b c7 1f c9 70 9f 56 51 41 06 ee 8b 86 18 26 | f9 15 9a e1 c6 ce 87 1f 06 5d cf f9 58 14 02 74 | a7 fe 7f 00 7a 10 a9 31 18 7e 0f 0f 2b e6 f1 d5 | d8 f7 e5 8c cd a1 82 08 63 f1 56 17 95 8d fb 7f | d3 bf bd 4f b2 db 82 d9 55 39 74 16 06 a5 76 92 | e5 9c 86 cb a9 a1 7e 1a 94 94 10 2b | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2587859024 (0x9a3f9850) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | current Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 9a 3f 98 50 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | c7 8a cd d5 4d 47 88 4b 8e a7 c1 4c 8f 29 d2 e9 | af a1 11 0b | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: c7 8a cd d5 4d 47 88 4b 8e a7 c1 4c 8f 29 d2 e9 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 06 a5 76 92 e5 9c 86 cb a9 a1 7e 1a 94 94 10 2b | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 20 01 9a 3f 98 50 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | db 74 51 e5 94 34 8a d3 12 d7 5c 8a 24 43 79 09 | 25 4a a1 af 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 d3 f3 11 4f 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | 05 00 01 04 5b 23 dd 27 4a da ea 4c d5 52 6a 9a | b5 f5 cb f3 d7 67 d3 c9 99 2a 88 3c c6 89 84 a8 | 0c 1c f8 63 1e b7 b2 e4 17 6c af 05 66 66 8b 06 | 3b 64 82 bc f5 83 4c f6 2d 8a b6 9e a7 4e dc 06 | 74 43 2d ef 5f e7 63 9e f0 37 d8 92 69 3d a7 92 | 32 f7 a8 c7 7b 9d 50 dd 69 d7 90 a2 b6 16 07 b6 | 27 bc 6d e1 62 52 40 5b 34 e4 d9 3e 4d d1 b9 ac | db 8e 63 4f f8 24 6c 9a fc a3 18 fc 55 68 81 48 | 60 80 b0 3f 22 ad e8 a5 79 bb d2 41 7b ae c3 06 | 5f bc 75 39 db e6 41 ee 55 a8 6e 30 49 1f 09 eb | b3 d1 bc 3d 6f 37 a6 73 a0 9e dc 87 20 bb 92 0e | b2 90 db f8 fc d9 b3 25 d0 5e 42 fc 3e 58 9b c4 | 76 19 ec 79 43 15 39 96 02 5f e3 bb dd 20 56 a2 | 71 38 75 5f 75 51 f0 c8 29 fe 1f 6e 45 23 51 64 | b3 ba 77 29 14 43 b5 49 11 71 37 0c f5 ff 6d a5 | 47 bb 49 f4 9a cc 7c 4a 6c 4b f7 0a 01 23 99 c3 | 9a 72 cf 61 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec005d78 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 9a 3f 98 50 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b994a8c (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 d3 f3 11 4f 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 6e a3 02 df | e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 c4 35 46 f9 | 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 05 00 01 04 | 5b 23 dd 27 4a da ea 4c d5 52 6a 9a b5 f5 cb f3 | d7 67 d3 c9 99 2a 88 3c c6 89 84 a8 0c 1c f8 63 | 1e b7 b2 e4 17 6c af 05 66 66 8b 06 3b 64 82 bc | f5 83 4c f6 2d 8a b6 9e a7 4e dc 06 74 43 2d ef | 5f e7 63 9e f0 37 d8 92 69 3d a7 92 32 f7 a8 c7 | 7b 9d 50 dd 69 d7 90 a2 b6 16 07 b6 27 bc 6d e1 | 62 52 40 5b 34 e4 d9 3e 4d d1 b9 ac db 8e 63 4f | f8 24 6c 9a fc a3 18 fc 55 68 81 48 60 80 b0 3f | 22 ad e8 a5 79 bb d2 41 7b ae c3 06 5f bc 75 39 | db e6 41 ee 55 a8 6e 30 49 1f 09 eb b3 d1 bc 3d | 6f 37 a6 73 a0 9e dc 87 20 bb 92 0e b2 90 db f8 | fc d9 b3 25 d0 5e 42 fc 3e 58 9b c4 76 19 ec 79 | 43 15 39 96 02 5f e3 bb dd 20 56 a2 71 38 75 5f | 75 51 f0 c8 29 fe 1f 6e 45 23 51 64 b3 ba 77 29 | 14 43 b5 49 11 71 37 0c f5 ff 6d a5 47 bb 49 f4 | 9a cc 7c 4a 6c 4b f7 0a 01 23 99 c3 9a 72 cf 61 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | db 74 51 e5 94 34 8a d3 12 d7 5c 8a 24 43 79 09 | 25 4a a1 af | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | db 74 51 e5 94 34 8a d3 12 d7 5c 8a 24 43 79 09 | 25 4a a1 af | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #11: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #12 at 0x55b81b996228 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #12 in UNDEFINED | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #11 "east" as #12 for IPSEC SA | #12 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #11.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #12: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI d3 f3 11 4f | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 5b 23 dd 27 4a da ea 4c d5 52 6a 9a b5 f5 cb f3 | d7 67 d3 c9 99 2a 88 3c c6 89 84 a8 0c 1c f8 63 | 1e b7 b2 e4 17 6c af 05 66 66 8b 06 3b 64 82 bc | f5 83 4c f6 2d 8a b6 9e a7 4e dc 06 74 43 2d ef | 5f e7 63 9e f0 37 d8 92 69 3d a7 92 32 f7 a8 c7 | 7b 9d 50 dd 69 d7 90 a2 b6 16 07 b6 27 bc 6d e1 | 62 52 40 5b 34 e4 d9 3e 4d d1 b9 ac db 8e 63 4f | f8 24 6c 9a fc a3 18 fc 55 68 81 48 60 80 b0 3f | 22 ad e8 a5 79 bb d2 41 7b ae c3 06 5f bc 75 39 | db e6 41 ee 55 a8 6e 30 49 1f 09 eb b3 d1 bc 3d | 6f 37 a6 73 a0 9e dc 87 20 bb 92 0e b2 90 db f8 | fc d9 b3 25 d0 5e 42 fc 3e 58 9b c4 76 19 ec 79 | 43 15 39 96 02 5f e3 bb dd 20 56 a2 71 38 75 5f | 75 51 f0 c8 29 fe 1f 6e 45 23 51 64 b3 ba 77 29 | 14 43 b5 49 11 71 37 0c f5 ff 6d a5 47 bb 49 f4 | 9a cc 7c 4a 6c 4b f7 0a 01 23 99 c3 9a 72 cf 61 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 11 for state #12 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #12 and saving MD | #12 is busy; has a suspended MD | #11 spent 0.155 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.453 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 11 for state #12 | crypto helper 4 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 11 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00027f8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0e00027f8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | e9 54 e8 63 c6 0b 24 d2 fa a5 b0 3d c7 94 ec 09 | dc 1e 31 3e 7d eb 82 0a d9 ce d0 dc 9e 5d 4e 17 | d5 ed 9a eb 1a 54 2b 37 fd 2a 85 6c fe 13 2c 0e | b8 72 41 f6 8f f5 f9 ee 18 bf 42 4c 6f fa 39 3c | e7 1b e5 e0 e4 bd c8 e4 09 f4 ff 54 f6 a6 90 34 | 74 5c ba e0 5b 75 5f 45 6a a3 da 00 e9 45 56 01 | c2 9a 96 3a 47 c3 62 8e 48 23 23 43 c4 fb 18 9b | d4 4b d1 da 19 ac 59 e8 70 ea f5 6b 5c b9 40 08 | ba f9 91 5d b0 18 87 ab 69 88 1c f6 6f 0d b1 ca | d1 05 45 8a 1e 55 49 2a b4 1f a6 fe 7f ef e9 25 | c0 cc ba 81 42 69 af 26 77 af 54 39 6b 8f 36 dd | da d9 be 10 8c e9 ba 85 22 50 86 e2 f3 74 e8 9d | 30 e8 34 6c 9d e9 58 c9 3c 09 e6 fc ff a9 36 eb | af ba 5c cd 75 47 27 95 6d 97 0f 8b f6 11 89 ea | 49 b6 66 ad 42 85 c5 cc 91 09 01 63 cb a5 42 56 | 03 6e 86 b9 c5 74 9d 11 99 62 8c 68 85 eb 32 cc | Generated nonce: 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | Generated nonce: 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | crypto helper 4 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 11 time elapsed 0.000568 seconds | (#12) spent 0.57 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 11: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 11 for state #12 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007658 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #12 | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 11 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #12: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00027f8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #12 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00027f8: transferring ownership from state #12 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 12 for state #12 | state #12 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | suspending state #12 and saving MD | #12 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 1 resuming | resume sending helper answer for #12 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 12 for state #12 | #12 spent 0.0474 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 12 | peer's g: 5b 23 dd 27 4a da ea 4c d5 52 6a 9a b5 f5 cb f3 | peer's g: d7 67 d3 c9 99 2a 88 3c c6 89 84 a8 0c 1c f8 63 | peer's g: 1e b7 b2 e4 17 6c af 05 66 66 8b 06 3b 64 82 bc | peer's g: f5 83 4c f6 2d 8a b6 9e a7 4e dc 06 74 43 2d ef | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007658 | peer's g: 5f e7 63 9e f0 37 d8 92 69 3d a7 92 32 f7 a8 c7 | peer's g: 7b 9d 50 dd 69 d7 90 a2 b6 16 07 b6 27 bc 6d e1 | peer's g: 62 52 40 5b 34 e4 d9 3e 4d d1 b9 ac db 8e 63 4f | peer's g: f8 24 6c 9a fc a3 18 fc 55 68 81 48 60 80 b0 3f | peer's g: 22 ad e8 a5 79 bb d2 41 7b ae c3 06 5f bc 75 39 | peer's g: db e6 41 ee 55 a8 6e 30 49 1f 09 eb b3 d1 bc 3d | peer's g: 6f 37 a6 73 a0 9e dc 87 20 bb 92 0e b2 90 db f8 | peer's g: fc d9 b3 25 d0 5e 42 fc 3e 58 9b c4 76 19 ec 79 | peer's g: 43 15 39 96 02 5f e3 bb dd 20 56 a2 71 38 75 5f | peer's g: 75 51 f0 c8 29 fe 1f 6e 45 23 51 64 b3 ba 77 29 | peer's g: 14 43 b5 49 11 71 37 0c f5 ff 6d a5 47 bb 49 f4 | peer's g: 9a cc 7c 4a 6c 4b f7 0a 01 23 99 c3 9a 72 cf 61 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00027f8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b987630 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 12 time elapsed 0.000649 seconds | (#12) spent 0.623 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 12: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 12 for state #12 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e40027d8 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #12 | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 12 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #12: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2587859024 (0x9a3f9850) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI d3 f3 11 4f | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x5562b77 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 05 56 2b 77 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #12: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:9a3f9850} "east" #12: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #12: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | Nr 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value e9 54 e8 63 c6 0b 24 d2 fa a5 b0 3d c7 94 ec 09 | keyex value dc 1e 31 3e 7d eb 82 0a d9 ce d0 dc 9e 5d 4e 17 | keyex value d5 ed 9a eb 1a 54 2b 37 fd 2a 85 6c fe 13 2c 0e | keyex value b8 72 41 f6 8f f5 f9 ee 18 bf 42 4c 6f fa 39 3c | keyex value e7 1b e5 e0 e4 bd c8 e4 09 f4 ff 54 f6 a6 90 34 | keyex value 74 5c ba e0 5b 75 5f 45 6a a3 da 00 e9 45 56 01 | keyex value c2 9a 96 3a 47 c3 62 8e 48 23 23 43 c4 fb 18 9b | keyex value d4 4b d1 da 19 ac 59 e8 70 ea f5 6b 5c b9 40 08 | keyex value ba f9 91 5d b0 18 87 ab 69 88 1c f6 6f 0d b1 ca | keyex value d1 05 45 8a 1e 55 49 2a b4 1f a6 fe 7f ef e9 25 | keyex value c0 cc ba 81 42 69 af 26 77 af 54 39 6b 8f 36 dd | keyex value da d9 be 10 8c e9 ba 85 22 50 86 e2 f3 74 e8 9d | keyex value 30 e8 34 6c 9d e9 58 c9 3c 09 e6 fc ff a9 36 eb | keyex value af ba 5c cd 75 47 27 95 6d 97 0f 8b f6 11 89 ea | keyex value 49 b6 66 ad 42 85 c5 cc 91 09 01 63 cb a5 42 56 | keyex value 03 6e 86 b9 c5 74 9d 11 99 62 8c 68 85 eb 32 cc | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00027f8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #12 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a88 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54342b6c (length 4) | 9a 3f 98 50 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 32) | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b8198d38f4 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 05 56 2b 77 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 05 e4 a2 67 | 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 98 35 b3 21 | 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b 05 00 01 04 | e9 54 e8 63 c6 0b 24 d2 fa a5 b0 3d c7 94 ec 09 | dc 1e 31 3e 7d eb 82 0a d9 ce d0 dc 9e 5d 4e 17 | d5 ed 9a eb 1a 54 2b 37 fd 2a 85 6c fe 13 2c 0e | b8 72 41 f6 8f f5 f9 ee 18 bf 42 4c 6f fa 39 3c | e7 1b e5 e0 e4 bd c8 e4 09 f4 ff 54 f6 a6 90 34 | 74 5c ba e0 5b 75 5f 45 6a a3 da 00 e9 45 56 01 | c2 9a 96 3a 47 c3 62 8e 48 23 23 43 c4 fb 18 9b | d4 4b d1 da 19 ac 59 e8 70 ea f5 6b 5c b9 40 08 | ba f9 91 5d b0 18 87 ab 69 88 1c f6 6f 0d b1 ca | d1 05 45 8a 1e 55 49 2a b4 1f a6 fe 7f ef e9 25 | c0 cc ba 81 42 69 af 26 77 af 54 39 6b 8f 36 dd | da d9 be 10 8c e9 ba 85 22 50 86 e2 f3 74 e8 9d | 30 e8 34 6c 9d e9 58 c9 3c 09 e6 fc ff a9 36 eb | af ba 5c cd 75 47 27 95 6d 97 0f 8b f6 11 89 ea | 49 b6 66 ad 42 85 c5 cc 91 09 01 63 cb a5 42 56 | 03 6e 86 b9 c5 74 9d 11 99 62 8c 68 85 eb 32 cc | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 20) | 36 cb ba 54 1f f1 8a 21 e3 61 9a 8f a7 36 d5 51 | 39 15 11 21 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 36 cb ba 54 1f f1 8a 21 e3 61 9a 8f a7 36 d5 51 | 39 15 11 21 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 87 2e f9 6f ff f4 40 e3 d4 bd d7 ee fd 5f 50 8c 87 ec a0 46 2a 01 55 e8 e7 c1 8c 02 c6 25 f7 7e 28 f6 f4 0f 9e b0 69 ea 9a 71 88 ae 23 8d 05 c8 0a 93 b5 6e 66 82 bd ee 31 b1 0f 96 7d c0 02 ac 00 f6 9a f2 c8 0d 83 04 c0 7b af b0 6c 79 57 b2 bf d8 64 eb 34 bd 48 67 59 eb f8 31 bf 24 6a e6 48 9e 28 a3 c3 18 c7 e9 0a 73 e4 59 94 34 b6 73 2a 7e ba 83 0b 31 16 65 20 15 95 8c 91 35 da 60 17 f6 6b 3c b7 1c 01 45 83 28 ee b2 ad 19 2b 40 35 e5 e8 17 9e 0c 07 e3 7d 7d 86 29 e8 89 49 0f 13 b9 57 17 93 82 1b af a0 65 16 fa 0f 4a d3 bc d6 51 b3 6e 1c 49 ca 12 34 ce 07 0d fd 96 0f 35 46 05 5f 85 e9 90 0c a4 75 1d 8f 34 5c 59 d7 e3 cd 8e ec cb 19 c0 46 a5 06 d2 63 47 1d 4b e8 9d 67 e6 c7 fb dc 04 b3 cf 08 3a 0f 09 64 d5 6f 62 0a 96 3e 28 13 97 df 3e 44 68 d4 ed 8e 26 22 c5 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 34 20 84 ce 8a e4 af b4 23 3c 4d f5 84 1d e4 cd | unwrapped: 59 89 a2 3e 21 1f 4d eb b9 21 bb e9 17 9b 08 17 | unwrapped: 6b de 40 cb 8b 3b 66 a7 31 5e e7 78 2b 75 29 84 | unwrapped: 9e 85 dd b4 d0 cd 4f 6a f8 62 33 17 af 0f 8e 0b | unwrapped: f5 85 ce 85 d7 98 d2 ff 4a 10 b7 fb c8 99 75 00 | unwrapped: d7 65 32 2b 81 2f fa 72 59 b8 f0 b5 7c 09 0d ec | unwrapped: 2f ba 0c bd 92 6c 6e 6b b3 26 3e 51 c7 4f 5c 78 | unwrapped: 0a eb e9 72 a0 a4 39 a7 39 e9 b9 e4 34 6a 40 0e | unwrapped: a4 5f be 83 14 83 f3 65 df df d0 3b fa 0d 76 0e | unwrapped: 1a 2d 06 c6 68 61 e4 4a ba 23 5f 22 f6 fc 0e cd | unwrapped: e7 9d 25 34 89 d1 d5 38 b5 70 83 eb be ff ec da | unwrapped: 20 76 37 ba 48 27 94 5f f4 7a 5c f5 84 47 42 53 | unwrapped: 43 82 8c 5c 11 0d 1b bc e2 b3 5b f8 14 b6 11 5b | unwrapped: 79 c4 42 78 fe 27 b9 bf bf 4f fb 73 4a 9e f6 db | unwrapped: bb ff d3 5b 8c 81 06 3e 53 61 e9 0d 0a 21 0d c6 | unwrapped: 8f 26 e4 b0 44 ad c2 45 ef 14 94 ae 16 f9 06 19 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 87 2e f9 6f ff f4 40 e3 d4 bd d7 ee fd 5f 50 8c 87 ec a0 46 2a 01 55 e8 e7 c1 8c 02 c6 25 f7 7e 28 f6 f4 0f 9e b0 69 ea 9a 71 88 ae 23 8d 05 c8 0a 93 b5 6e 66 82 bd ee 31 b1 0f 96 7d c0 02 ac 00 f6 9a f2 c8 0d 83 04 c0 7b af b0 6c 79 57 b2 bf d8 64 eb 34 bd 48 67 59 eb f8 31 bf 24 6a e6 48 9e 28 a3 c3 18 c7 e9 0a 73 e4 59 94 34 b6 73 2a 7e ba 83 0b 31 16 65 20 15 95 8c 91 35 da 60 17 f6 6b 3c b7 1c 01 45 83 28 ee b2 ad 19 2b 40 35 e5 e8 17 9e 0c 07 e3 7d 7d 86 29 e8 89 49 0f 13 b9 57 17 93 82 1b af a0 65 16 fa 0f 4a d3 bc d6 51 b3 6e 1c 49 ca 12 34 ce 07 0d fd 96 0f 35 46 05 5f 85 e9 90 0c a4 75 1d 8f 34 5c 59 d7 e3 cd 8e ec cb 19 c0 46 a5 06 d2 63 47 1d 4b e8 9d 67 e6 c7 fb dc 04 b3 cf 08 3a 0f 09 64 d5 6f 62 0a 96 3e 28 13 97 df 3e 44 68 d4 ed 8e 26 22 c5 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 34 20 84 ce 8a e4 af b4 23 3c 4d f5 84 1d e4 cd | unwrapped: 59 89 a2 3e 21 1f 4d eb b9 21 bb e9 17 9b 08 17 | unwrapped: 6b de 40 cb 8b 3b 66 a7 31 5e e7 78 2b 75 29 84 | unwrapped: 9e 85 dd b4 d0 cd 4f 6a f8 62 33 17 af 0f 8e 0b | unwrapped: f5 85 ce 85 d7 98 d2 ff 4a 10 b7 fb c8 99 75 00 | unwrapped: d7 65 32 2b 81 2f fa 72 59 b8 f0 b5 7c 09 0d ec | unwrapped: 2f ba 0c bd 92 6c 6e 6b b3 26 3e 51 c7 4f 5c 78 | unwrapped: 0a eb e9 72 a0 a4 39 a7 39 e9 b9 e4 34 6a 40 0e | unwrapped: a4 5f be 83 14 83 f3 65 df df d0 3b fa 0d 76 0e | unwrapped: 1a 2d 06 c6 68 61 e4 4a ba 23 5f 22 f6 fc 0e cd | unwrapped: e7 9d 25 34 89 d1 d5 38 b5 70 83 eb be ff ec da | unwrapped: 20 76 37 ba 48 27 94 5f f4 7a 5c f5 84 47 42 53 | unwrapped: 43 82 8c 5c 11 0d 1b bc e2 b3 5b f8 14 b6 11 5b | unwrapped: 79 c4 42 78 fe 27 b9 bf bf 4f fb 73 4a 9e f6 db | unwrapped: bb ff d3 5b 8c 81 06 3e 53 61 e9 0d 0a 21 0d c6 | unwrapped: 8f 26 e4 b0 44 ad c2 45 ef 14 94 ae 16 f9 06 19 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b996430 (length 4) | 05 56 2b 77 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b996410 (length 4) | d3 f3 11 4f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 32) | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 32) | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0004638 (length 32) | 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0004638 (length 32) | 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0ec005ba8 (length 20) | de 99 24 f2 66 98 f9 64 79 4c 4a 49 8b 7c ea fa | b9 99 5f 99 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e8009978 (length 20) | 18 3b b5 ef 7d 35 64 3f dc 27 bb e2 78 e5 2a da | c8 55 0c eb | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec005ba8 (length 20) | de 99 24 f2 66 98 f9 64 79 4c 4a 49 8b 7c ea fa | b9 99 5f 99 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8009978 (length 20) | 18 3b b5 ef 7d 35 64 3f dc 27 bb e2 78 e5 2a da | c8 55 0c eb | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 87 2e f9 6f ff f4 40 e3 d4 bd d7 ee fd 5f 50 8c 87 ec a0 46 2a 01 55 e8 e7 c1 8c 02 c6 25 f7 7e 28 f6 f4 0f 9e b0 69 ea 9a 71 88 ae 23 8d 05 c8 0a 93 b5 6e 66 82 bd ee 31 b1 0f 96 7d c0 02 ac 00 f6 9a f2 c8 0d 83 04 c0 7b af b0 6c 79 57 b2 bf d8 64 eb 34 bd 48 67 59 eb f8 31 bf 24 6a e6 48 9e 28 a3 c3 18 c7 e9 0a 73 e4 59 94 34 b6 73 2a 7e ba 83 0b 31 16 65 20 15 95 8c 91 35 da 60 17 f6 6b 3c b7 1c 01 45 83 28 ee b2 ad 19 2b 40 35 e5 e8 17 9e 0c 07 e3 7d 7d 86 29 e8 89 49 0f 13 b9 57 17 93 82 1b af a0 65 16 fa 0f 4a d3 bc d6 51 b3 6e 1c 49 ca 12 34 ce 07 0d fd 96 0f 35 46 05 5f 85 e9 90 0c a4 75 1d 8f 34 5c 59 d7 e3 cd 8e ec cb 19 c0 46 a5 06 d2 63 47 1d 4b e8 9d 67 e6 c7 fb dc 04 b3 cf 08 3a 0f 09 64 d5 6f 62 0a 96 3e 28 13 97 df 3e 44 68 d4 ed 8e 26 22 c5 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 34 20 84 ce 8a e4 af b4 23 3c 4d f5 84 1d e4 cd | unwrapped: 59 89 a2 3e 21 1f 4d eb b9 21 bb e9 17 9b 08 17 | unwrapped: 6b de 40 cb 8b 3b 66 a7 31 5e e7 78 2b 75 29 84 | unwrapped: 9e 85 dd b4 d0 cd 4f 6a f8 62 33 17 af 0f 8e 0b | unwrapped: f5 85 ce 85 d7 98 d2 ff 4a 10 b7 fb c8 99 75 00 | unwrapped: d7 65 32 2b 81 2f fa 72 59 b8 f0 b5 7c 09 0d ec | unwrapped: 2f ba 0c bd 92 6c 6e 6b b3 26 3e 51 c7 4f 5c 78 | unwrapped: 0a eb e9 72 a0 a4 39 a7 39 e9 b9 e4 34 6a 40 0e | unwrapped: a4 5f be 83 14 83 f3 65 df df d0 3b fa 0d 76 0e | unwrapped: 1a 2d 06 c6 68 61 e4 4a ba 23 5f 22 f6 fc 0e cd | unwrapped: e7 9d 25 34 89 d1 d5 38 b5 70 83 eb be ff ec da | unwrapped: 20 76 37 ba 48 27 94 5f f4 7a 5c f5 84 47 42 53 | unwrapped: 43 82 8c 5c 11 0d 1b bc e2 b3 5b f8 14 b6 11 5b | unwrapped: 79 c4 42 78 fe 27 b9 bf bf 4f fb 73 4a 9e f6 db | unwrapped: bb ff d3 5b 8c 81 06 3e 53 61 e9 0d 0a 21 0d c6 | unwrapped: 8f 26 e4 b0 44 ad c2 45 ef 14 94 ae 16 f9 06 19 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 87 2e f9 6f ff f4 40 e3 d4 bd d7 ee fd 5f 50 8c 87 ec a0 46 2a 01 55 e8 e7 c1 8c 02 c6 25 f7 7e 28 f6 f4 0f 9e b0 69 ea 9a 71 88 ae 23 8d 05 c8 0a 93 b5 6e 66 82 bd ee 31 b1 0f 96 7d c0 02 ac 00 f6 9a f2 c8 0d 83 04 c0 7b af b0 6c 79 57 b2 bf d8 64 eb 34 bd 48 67 59 eb f8 31 bf 24 6a e6 48 9e 28 a3 c3 18 c7 e9 0a 73 e4 59 94 34 b6 73 2a 7e ba 83 0b 31 16 65 20 15 95 8c 91 35 da 60 17 f6 6b 3c b7 1c 01 45 83 28 ee b2 ad 19 2b 40 35 e5 e8 17 9e 0c 07 e3 7d 7d 86 29 e8 89 49 0f 13 b9 57 17 93 82 1b af a0 65 16 fa 0f 4a d3 bc d6 51 b3 6e 1c 49 ca 12 34 ce 07 0d fd 96 0f 35 46 05 5f 85 e9 90 0c a4 75 1d 8f 34 5c 59 d7 e3 cd 8e ec cb 19 c0 46 a5 06 d2 63 47 1d 4b e8 9d 67 e6 c7 fb dc 04 b3 cf 08 3a 0f 09 64 d5 6f 62 0a 96 3e 28 13 97 df 3e 44 68 d4 ed 8e 26 22 c5 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 34 20 84 ce 8a e4 af b4 23 3c 4d f5 84 1d e4 cd | unwrapped: 59 89 a2 3e 21 1f 4d eb b9 21 bb e9 17 9b 08 17 | unwrapped: 6b de 40 cb 8b 3b 66 a7 31 5e e7 78 2b 75 29 84 | unwrapped: 9e 85 dd b4 d0 cd 4f 6a f8 62 33 17 af 0f 8e 0b | unwrapped: f5 85 ce 85 d7 98 d2 ff 4a 10 b7 fb c8 99 75 00 | unwrapped: d7 65 32 2b 81 2f fa 72 59 b8 f0 b5 7c 09 0d ec | unwrapped: 2f ba 0c bd 92 6c 6e 6b b3 26 3e 51 c7 4f 5c 78 | unwrapped: 0a eb e9 72 a0 a4 39 a7 39 e9 b9 e4 34 6a 40 0e | unwrapped: a4 5f be 83 14 83 f3 65 df df d0 3b fa 0d 76 0e | unwrapped: 1a 2d 06 c6 68 61 e4 4a ba 23 5f 22 f6 fc 0e cd | unwrapped: e7 9d 25 34 89 d1 d5 38 b5 70 83 eb be ff ec da | unwrapped: 20 76 37 ba 48 27 94 5f f4 7a 5c f5 84 47 42 53 | unwrapped: 43 82 8c 5c 11 0d 1b bc e2 b3 5b f8 14 b6 11 5b | unwrapped: 79 c4 42 78 fe 27 b9 bf bf 4f fb 73 4a 9e f6 db | unwrapped: bb ff d3 5b 8c 81 06 3e 53 61 e9 0d 0a 21 0d c6 | unwrapped: 8f 26 e4 b0 44 ad c2 45 ef 14 94 ae 16 f9 06 19 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b996430 (length 4) | 05 56 2b 77 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b996410 (length 4) | d3 f3 11 4f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 32) | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 32) | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0004638 (length 32) | 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0004638 (length 32) | 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0ec005bbc (length 20) | 94 e3 7e 96 b9 6c 41 36 97 50 ab 08 05 c3 40 7e | dc f7 41 56 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e800998c (length 20) | d1 30 90 23 68 7e fa 71 b6 07 42 42 ce 32 ea 12 | fe c8 6b 21 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55b81b996228 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#12 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.d3f3114f@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.5562b77@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 36 cb ba 54 1f f1 8a 21 e3 61 9a 8f | encrypting: a7 36 d5 51 39 15 11 21 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 05 56 2b 77 | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 | encrypting: 65 bd 59 74 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a | encrypting: c7 5b 1a 7b 05 00 01 04 e9 54 e8 63 c6 0b 24 d2 | encrypting: fa a5 b0 3d c7 94 ec 09 dc 1e 31 3e 7d eb 82 0a | encrypting: d9 ce d0 dc 9e 5d 4e 17 d5 ed 9a eb 1a 54 2b 37 | encrypting: fd 2a 85 6c fe 13 2c 0e b8 72 41 f6 8f f5 f9 ee | encrypting: 18 bf 42 4c 6f fa 39 3c e7 1b e5 e0 e4 bd c8 e4 | encrypting: 09 f4 ff 54 f6 a6 90 34 74 5c ba e0 5b 75 5f 45 | encrypting: 6a a3 da 00 e9 45 56 01 c2 9a 96 3a 47 c3 62 8e | encrypting: 48 23 23 43 c4 fb 18 9b d4 4b d1 da 19 ac 59 e8 | encrypting: 70 ea f5 6b 5c b9 40 08 ba f9 91 5d b0 18 87 ab | encrypting: 69 88 1c f6 6f 0d b1 ca d1 05 45 8a 1e 55 49 2a | encrypting: b4 1f a6 fe 7f ef e9 25 c0 cc ba 81 42 69 af 26 | encrypting: 77 af 54 39 6b 8f 36 dd da d9 be 10 8c e9 ba 85 | encrypting: 22 50 86 e2 f3 74 e8 9d 30 e8 34 6c 9d e9 58 c9 | encrypting: 3c 09 e6 fc ff a9 36 eb af ba 5c cd 75 47 27 95 | encrypting: 6d 97 0f 8b f6 11 89 ea 49 b6 66 ad 42 85 c5 cc | encrypting: 91 09 01 63 cb a5 42 56 03 6e 86 b9 c5 74 9d 11 | encrypting: 99 62 8c 68 85 eb 32 cc 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: 06 a5 76 92 e5 9c 86 cb a9 a1 7e 1a 94 94 10 2b | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 95 4f c8 1a 27 a0 68 c2 5c 8a ac af 9c 5f 0f 43 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #12 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #12: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #12 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #12) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 20 01 9a 3f 98 50 00 00 01 bc 75 fb c1 09 | 67 05 a1 b0 da 75 b4 34 e6 ea 88 af 50 dd 25 c1 | ea 7d 04 ac f1 d2 2f ca 3a 9d 68 92 60 ab b2 e4 | ad 08 71 b2 5c 93 cb 05 85 6a bf e2 aa dc fd 62 | 59 a9 f0 69 5e 22 f2 3a 76 b0 e8 cf 40 7f 1c 66 | 55 03 32 7b 84 49 a2 a7 86 a2 70 e3 6e f3 9c 24 | 1b b5 4c 80 ed 70 3d 45 ce e3 44 fe 1d 7e 0c 0c | 22 f4 fc 1d f0 2a 1b 29 5a 60 ed 98 01 e7 d5 c3 | a0 bf d0 5a 36 29 af 24 ea da fb 64 b0 30 bf 64 | 2e de 19 e0 08 38 11 a5 46 ed 3b b7 df 70 4c 60 | 13 9d 72 5b cd cc 30 f9 e9 aa f4 0c 11 5c 4f dc | ac e3 4a 25 f1 1e 90 4d fc bb c9 d8 91 14 05 30 | 26 4e ae 70 d4 76 6f 4c e0 e7 b4 fb ec f3 0b a8 | 6c de 0d 39 b0 1e d4 5d cd 2a 45 e0 4e e2 0f 85 | 7b c8 0e a1 77 71 9a bd ed 8b 79 f3 8d 3b 5a 76 | b7 34 7f 02 93 99 32 b9 ea 41 84 ac d1 f3 7c f3 | 83 55 aa 0f f7 e5 c9 b1 25 9a 5e 23 7b 57 e1 76 | 6f c7 c7 cb 1b 49 0e 19 88 b9 5c c0 c9 eb 94 be | 9d 07 fd cd 3f 85 97 a7 3a 64 31 d7 4e b3 85 d3 | a4 35 66 2b 5b cd eb 5e f2 9f 0f 8f 7e d5 a7 bf | b8 23 0f 4c 2c d5 2b 03 39 5a 6e 92 24 c6 8a 0e | f3 ff 9e 02 b6 50 02 e5 c9 34 85 e4 99 86 18 b7 | 36 f0 c7 b2 00 79 28 ed 96 1d 83 77 85 34 e3 7f | b5 2f cc ba c8 a5 ae 49 a4 a5 6b 56 81 95 52 02 | 18 a7 a8 dd 82 d9 f6 fe a9 7c 52 8f 58 5a db 8a | e5 46 ec 1d d8 38 88 79 a5 c1 27 dd 95 4f c8 1a | 27 a0 68 c2 5c 8a ac af 9c 5f 0f 43 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007658 size 128 | #12 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10451.781748 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #12: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0xd3f3114f <0x05562b77 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #12 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #12 spent 1.35 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e40027d8 | spent 0.00267 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 20 01 9a 3f 98 50 00 00 00 3c 9f b6 2b 1e | e9 36 67 46 da d4 98 26 ca 42 57 57 c7 60 56 cb | a8 c6 72 43 0d 9a 7a aa 16 76 93 65 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2587859024 (0x9a3f9850) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #12 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1633) | #12 is idle | #12 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 95 4f c8 1a 27 a0 68 c2 5c 8a ac af 9c 5f 0f 43 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: c7 60 56 cb a8 c6 72 43 0d 9a 7a aa 16 76 93 65 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 20 01 9a 3f 98 50 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | 0d 59 a7 9e b2 14 27 6d ee ae 67 64 61 0e af 53 | 25 c4 31 9a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 9a 3f 98 50 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0ec005d78 (length 32) | 6e a3 02 df e0 4c e1 65 9f 7d 63 b6 2a 49 f2 b4 | c4 35 46 f9 7a f3 e3 8c 29 5d e9 ba 46 04 e8 f9 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fa0e0004638 (length 32) | 05 e4 a2 67 47 eb 3e 4a b7 f6 95 26 65 bd 59 74 | 98 35 b3 21 7b f5 04 b8 c0 10 cd 3a c7 5b 1a 7b | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 0d 59 a7 9e b2 14 27 6d ee ae 67 64 61 0e af 53 | 25 c4 31 9a | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 0d 59 a7 9e b2 14 27 6d ee ae 67 64 61 0e af 53 | 25 c4 31 9a | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #12: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #12: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #12 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xd3f3114f SPI_OUT=0x556 | popen cmd is 1019 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0xd3f3114f SPI_OUT=0x5562b77 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55b81b988648,sr=0x55b81b988648} to #12 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #11 spent 0.596 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #12 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#12) cloned from #11 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #12 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #12: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #12 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #12 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007658 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #12 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e40027d8 size 128 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #12: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0xd3f3114f <0x05562b77 xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #12 spent 0.673 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.873 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00325 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.0025 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 05 01 fa 09 a6 6b 00 00 00 4c 5a f9 78 fd | 03 e9 cf b1 fe 47 06 d0 fd e0 ec 06 f0 52 95 ec | d8 bb d7 42 fa e2 d4 15 65 d3 ff 98 d8 fa 2d 00 | 88 5c 45 1a 41 52 cd f0 d9 51 fe 1a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4194936427 (0xfa09a66b) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #12; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=9a3f9850 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #11; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #11 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | current Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | fa 09 a6 6b | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | 07 66 ba 08 b5 1e 2c 09 85 c3 8c 24 c6 79 e5 6f | b4 34 3d cc | #11 is idle | #11 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 07 66 ba 08 b5 1e 2c 09 85 c3 8c 24 c6 79 e5 6f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: d8 fa 2d 00 88 5c 45 1a 41 52 cd f0 d9 51 fe 1a | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 05 01 fa 09 a6 6b 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | fc d6 b4 f8 96 2f 35 71 f7 b9 13 bb 6e 35 5b 64 | 26 fc a1 6d 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | d3 f3 11 4f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | fa 09 a6 6b | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b97b31c (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 d3 f3 11 4f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | fc d6 b4 f8 96 2f 35 71 f7 b9 13 bb 6e 35 5b 64 | 26 fc a1 6d | informational HASH(1): | fc d6 b4 f8 96 2f 35 71 f7 b9 13 bb 6e 35 5b 64 | 26 fc a1 6d | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI d3 f3 11 4f | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2515) "east" #11: received Delete SA(0xd3f3114f) payload: deleting IPsec State #12 | pstats #12 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #12 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #12: deleting other state #12 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.065s and sending notification | child state #12: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.d3f3114f@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.5562b77@192.1.2.23 "east" #12: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #12 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2198786464 (0x830ed1a0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 05 56 2b 77 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340928 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a0c (length 4) | 83 0e d1 a0 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340db4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 05 56 2b 77 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340da0 (length 20) | 6d bc ed 1d 6e 58 4a b4 43 a2 c3 ae 10 52 7e ff | 3d 9b 34 7c | send delete HASH(1): | 6d bc ed 1d 6e 58 4a b4 43 a2 c3 ae 10 52 7e ff | 3d 9b 34 7c | last Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | current Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a1c (length 4) | 83 0e d1 a0 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | 45 8b 41 ba 4c 23 7f ec 02 04 fc 24 db de f9 a8 | b9 65 4b 68 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 6d bc ed 1d 6e 58 4a b4 43 a2 c3 ae | encrypting: 10 52 7e ff 3d 9b 34 7c 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 05 56 2b 77 | IV: 45 8b 41 ba 4c 23 7f ec 02 04 fc 24 db de f9 a8 | IV: b9 65 4b 68 | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: ec bb 94 f8 e0 cf b6 ba 03 de c2 60 e4 2d 74 9c | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 05 01 83 0e d1 a0 00 00 00 4c 61 7f 9c 46 | b3 84 f5 d1 8f 23 ac b6 fc 66 ff 22 40 ca 1b 15 | 91 2e 4c 5a df 8a dc 26 e5 8e a5 06 ec bb 94 f8 | e0 cf b6 ba 03 de c2 60 e4 2d 74 9c | state #12 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e40027d8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0e4002b78 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825166' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xd3f3114f | popen cmd is 1030 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825166' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xd3f3114f SPI_OUT=0x5562b77 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 0--0->-0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.d3f3114f@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.d3f3114f@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.5562b77@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.5562b77@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4076) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4077) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #12 in QUICK_R2 | child state #12: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00027f8: destroyed | stop processing: state #12 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #11 | state #8 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #8 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #8 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #8: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.406s and NOT sending notification | parent state #8: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #8 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #8: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #8 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #7 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #7 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #7 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #7: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.907s and NOT sending notification | parent state #7: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #7 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #7: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #7 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #4 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #4 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #4 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #4: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 3.189s and NOT sending notification | parent state #4: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #4 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #4: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #4 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #3 | suspend processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #3 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #3: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 3.690s and NOT sending notification | parent state #3: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #3 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #3: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #3 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #11 | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #11 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #11 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #11: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.085s and sending notification | parent state #11: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #11 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 628448825 (0x25755e39) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543408c8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec003758 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543409ac (length 4) | 25 75 5e 39 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340d54 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 21 52 58 7d | 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340d40 (length 20) | 20 a1 41 8d ff 7f 8c 78 94 50 ed e8 2a c4 60 ac | 9f f5 d1 f4 | send delete HASH(1): | 20 a1 41 8d ff 7f 8c 78 94 50 ed e8 2a c4 60 ac | 9f f5 d1 f4 | last Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | current Phase 1 IV: 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b995bc8 (length 16) | 07 1a 4d 98 60 f7 c9 fc 5d 7e 74 82 e1 c0 6f be | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe543409bc (length 4) | 25 75 5e 39 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b995b48 (length 20) | 71 55 9b df 4d ab f7 28 2b 3a 29 7d fc 2e c4 05 | f6 41 39 b6 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 20 a1 41 8d ff 7f 8c 78 94 50 ed e8 | encrypting: 2a c4 60 ac 9f f5 d1 f4 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 | encrypting: 0d bd d0 ab | IV: 71 55 9b df 4d ab f7 28 2b 3a 29 7d fc 2e c4 05 | IV: f6 41 39 b6 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 22 bb 9b 0d ee 33 d8 01 10 3e 76 b9 a3 b1 67 b3 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #11) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 05 01 25 75 5e 39 00 00 00 5c ee 13 40 a7 | a0 ac db 07 0b 4f 7b cb 7f 20 b7 47 dc 8f 8c 41 | bd 0f 09 6a 76 4b ce 84 97 76 cb 58 08 af ba 48 | 5b 38 23 e7 5d e8 cb e5 59 28 5f e9 22 bb 9b 0d | ee 33 d8 01 10 3e 76 b9 a3 b1 67 b3 | state #11 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #11 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #11: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e80098d8: destroyed | stop processing: state #11 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2556) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2559) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.96 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00159 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | 08 10 05 01 12 ca f6 b7 00 00 00 5c 38 5a 88 f1 | d1 24 15 ad e7 04 fa 95 b1 aa 37 00 48 ef 39 ca | 99 a1 32 27 db ff 9f bd 72 0a fc f7 39 16 34 c0 | 6e a6 b6 dd 2e 47 55 59 40 0a ab bc cc e3 9c 1e | 72 ae 5e 83 52 2e ba cf ed 3b 71 4c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | responder cookie: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 315291319 (0x12caf6b7) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x12caf6b7 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 21 52 58 7d 18 4e 79 8e | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | 27 41 79 e1 0d bd d0 ab | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0671 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00417 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00305 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 09 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 c2 43 88 02 4b dd 46 0d | 38 3d b7 bd 16 b8 a0 e7 e1 49 f8 71 1f 6e 6e 53 | creating state object #13 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #13 in UNDEFINED | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp started | #13 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #13: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #13: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #13 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #13: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.623 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00271 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | 14 00 00 24 eb 85 b9 cb 22 0f 7c b8 22 6b b6 3a | 01 4d 45 3c b5 a9 71 6a 6f 0d fb dc 0d 70 4d 44 | 67 f0 f9 d1 14 00 00 18 e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 | c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a e2 90 68 32 00 00 00 18 | fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | e7 47 c9 1e | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #13 is idle | #13 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | e2 90 68 32 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | natd_hash: hash= e2 90 68 32 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | e7 47 c9 1e | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | natd_hash: hash= e7 47 c9 1e | expected NAT-D(me): e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | expected NAT-D(me): e2 90 68 32 | expected NAT-D(him): | fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | e7 47 c9 1e | received NAT-D: e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | received NAT-D: e2 90 68 32 | received NAT-D: fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | received NAT-D: e7 47 c9 1e | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 13 for state #13 | state #13 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #13 and saving MD | #13 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 5 resuming | #13 spent 0.192 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 13 for state #13 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | crypto helper 5 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 13 | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.344 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8006b98: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0d8006b98 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | Generated nonce: 49 0f 8f a7 63 aa ad 75 5e da 21 51 cb 6c 9d ba | Generated nonce: 66 56 eb eb c3 cc 92 e9 5c 88 46 d8 8f 0c 0c 5d | crypto helper 5 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 13 time elapsed 0.000637 seconds | (#13) spent 0.64 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 13: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 13 for state #13 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #13 | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 13 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #13: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8006b98: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #13 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | keyex value e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | keyex value da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | keyex value eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | keyex value e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | keyex value 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | keyex value 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | keyex value d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | keyex value 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | keyex value be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | keyex value 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | keyex value db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | keyex value 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | keyex value ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | keyex value 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | keyex value ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 49 0f 8f a7 63 aa ad 75 5e da 21 51 cb 6c 9d ba | Nr 66 56 eb eb c3 cc 92 e9 5c 88 46 d8 8f 0c 0c 5d | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | e7 47 c9 1e | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | natd_hash: hash= e7 47 c9 1e | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 | NAT-D e7 47 c9 1e | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | e2 90 68 32 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | natd_hash: rcookie= a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | natd_hash: hash= e2 90 68 32 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | NAT-D e2 90 68 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8006b98: transferring ownership from state #13 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 14 for state #13 | state #13 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #13 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #13 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #13: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #13 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 14 for state #13 | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | crypto helper 6 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 14 | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | peer's g: be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | peer's g: 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | peer's g: 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | peer's g: f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | peer's g: 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | peer's g: eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | 14 00 00 24 49 0f 8f a7 63 aa ad 75 5e da 21 51 | peer's g: 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | peer's g: 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | cb 6c 9d ba 66 56 eb eb c3 cc 92 e9 5c 88 46 d8 | 8f 0c 0c 5d 14 00 00 18 fa 6d a6 07 f5 63 7a ef | peer's g: 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | peer's g: b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | peer's g: 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | peer's g: aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | 89 df c6 f7 f7 d1 5f 69 e7 47 c9 1e 00 00 00 18 | e4 17 e2 e6 35 cb fd c8 c6 d0 bd 16 f7 cb c1 3a | e2 90 68 32 | peer's g: d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | peer's g: 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | peer's g: 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | peer's g: a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #13 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10452.198121 "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #13 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #13 spent 0.463 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8006b98: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b976790 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b995888 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f874c700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c6e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001548 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b9958ac (length 32) | eb 85 b9 cb 22 0f 7c b8 22 6b b6 3a 01 4d 45 3c | b5 a9 71 6a 6f 0d fb dc 0d 70 4d 44 67 f0 f9 d1 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b9958cc (length 32) | 49 0f 8f a7 63 aa ad 75 5e da 21 51 cb 6c 9d ba | 66 56 eb eb c3 cc 92 e9 5c 88 46 d8 8f 0c 0c 5d | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f874c720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001278 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: bf 85 92 dc 93 f6 58 e2 b0 6d 99 c9 be a5 36 ad 65 bd 30 40 92 06 a8 d3 5f 2b d8 58 f5 82 23 4c 3e e3 c8 80 95 2d 18 7f 31 0f 8d 88 63 64 d1 71 61 48 f6 02 95 21 8e 8a e9 d2 8d c5 9a 67 44 71 bd 01 4b 06 9f 78 2a 33 ad 46 7a 40 9e 09 cc 37 d8 48 66 55 5b 20 8a 2f a2 ae 7c 55 ff 9f dc 0c 7f 46 49 11 fe 11 99 1a 82 f5 6b 9e 76 c4 c6 82 fe 6a 69 11 be 32 0f a6 99 cc 5d 46 fd 93 5d 55 56 bf d8 18 61 11 e5 50 bc 46 a4 a7 da 31 10 1f 6b 47 41 9b dc ba f6 30 2b 1d e8 20 3b 1c 38 2a 0a 57 ff 4f d2 6c 6f bf 9a 2d f2 d3 ca 8a e3 de 4c 81 5c c9 51 d4 97 ab 10 23 fe 3b 19 14 1f a5 20 3f 5e 14 64 ac aa 5c aa 6d a0 b6 64 8d e4 8d 48 ae 48 73 b0 d9 9c f2 16 17 b7 16 d5 89 8d 06 d8 f8 e8 db 29 aa 9a f5 f0 46 34 70 6f 8f cd a5 70 64 d3 7a 96 bf 35 67 e7 ac 34 c9 41 e8 62 1a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0dc004678 | unwrapped: bb a0 b3 98 2e 3f 6e 6b 7b 28 f6 34 f6 64 2e 7c | unwrapped: c8 9c cc 51 e0 47 d8 37 bd 07 84 ef 65 e1 e7 0c | unwrapped: b9 85 05 27 f6 f0 c1 e7 ca 67 5a 8a 4e 56 09 77 | unwrapped: 16 a0 3b d4 35 c1 a8 ff cf 81 a5 c0 b2 32 83 c5 | unwrapped: 6a dd 70 e0 7d 52 fe 03 08 d9 87 92 e5 00 75 25 | unwrapped: 46 c6 a5 45 fd 7f 4a 9a 5e 34 f1 da 86 91 23 6c | unwrapped: 25 a4 59 14 3e b7 31 58 71 59 b5 02 92 8c 9e e0 | unwrapped: 15 ad 97 8c 16 c9 c8 97 81 f0 06 1d 16 4c 63 08 | unwrapped: 4e 4f 72 c1 ba d8 fe 12 c0 eb 88 19 99 d0 df 2f | unwrapped: 49 67 a9 02 a2 01 67 17 bf 84 c3 a0 9e af 59 2e | unwrapped: 20 43 ee 01 b2 60 9e 80 88 26 b5 4b 0d b8 51 a7 | unwrapped: 55 65 88 13 0d 30 cd 9a 7b 8a fd cd df 7d 07 98 | unwrapped: cc ec 78 1f 27 37 38 3c 02 34 72 55 fa fc 0f 90 | unwrapped: 50 80 e9 47 7e 15 32 e9 5e 26 d5 23 81 49 67 ec | unwrapped: 94 25 65 47 74 76 ae 45 bd 05 90 7a 1f 81 a4 dc | unwrapped: 16 b8 bc 45 0c 97 fb bb c3 86 22 16 36 fc db d3 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f874c720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c6f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001548 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: c4 ca 85 d5 67 2b af 3b 63 2b 4d 18 b2 04 fb ae 9a ae eb 7a 94 0e 70 da fe 39 43 72 22 bf c4 15 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0dc002148 | unwrapped: cc 52 80 35 66 8d 5d 94 85 fc b2 43 cb f7 59 db | unwrapped: bd 3c c1 23 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: bf 85 92 dc 93 f6 58 e2 b0 6d 99 c9 be a5 36 ad 65 bd 30 40 92 06 a8 d3 5f 2b d8 58 f5 82 23 4c 3e e3 c8 80 95 2d 18 7f 31 0f 8d 88 63 64 d1 71 61 48 f6 02 95 21 8e 8a e9 d2 8d c5 9a 67 44 71 bd 01 4b 06 9f 78 2a 33 ad 46 7a 40 9e 09 cc 37 d8 48 66 55 5b 20 8a 2f a2 ae 7c 55 ff 9f dc 0c 7f 46 49 11 fe 11 99 1a 82 f5 6b 9e 76 c4 c6 82 fe 6a 69 11 be 32 0f a6 99 cc 5d 46 fd 93 5d 55 56 bf d8 18 61 11 e5 50 bc 46 a4 a7 da 31 10 1f 6b 47 41 9b dc ba f6 30 2b 1d e8 20 3b 1c 38 2a 0a 57 ff 4f d2 6c 6f bf 9a 2d f2 d3 ca 8a e3 de 4c 81 5c c9 51 d4 97 ab 10 23 fe 3b 19 14 1f a5 20 3f 5e 14 64 ac aa 5c aa 6d a0 b6 64 8d e4 8d 48 ae 48 73 b0 d9 9c f2 16 17 b7 16 d5 89 8d 06 d8 f8 e8 db 29 aa 9a f5 f0 46 34 70 6f 8f cd a5 70 64 d3 7a 96 bf 35 67 e7 ac 34 c9 41 e8 62 1a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0dc0018c8 | unwrapped: bb a0 b3 98 2e 3f 6e 6b 7b 28 f6 34 f6 64 2e 7c | unwrapped: c8 9c cc 51 e0 47 d8 37 bd 07 84 ef 65 e1 e7 0c | unwrapped: b9 85 05 27 f6 f0 c1 e7 ca 67 5a 8a 4e 56 09 77 | unwrapped: 16 a0 3b d4 35 c1 a8 ff cf 81 a5 c0 b2 32 83 c5 | unwrapped: 6a dd 70 e0 7d 52 fe 03 08 d9 87 92 e5 00 75 25 | unwrapped: 46 c6 a5 45 fd 7f 4a 9a 5e 34 f1 da 86 91 23 6c | unwrapped: 25 a4 59 14 3e b7 31 58 71 59 b5 02 92 8c 9e e0 | unwrapped: 15 ad 97 8c 16 c9 c8 97 81 f0 06 1d 16 4c 63 08 | unwrapped: 4e 4f 72 c1 ba d8 fe 12 c0 eb 88 19 99 d0 df 2f | unwrapped: 49 67 a9 02 a2 01 67 17 bf 84 c3 a0 9e af 59 2e | unwrapped: 20 43 ee 01 b2 60 9e 80 88 26 b5 4b 0d b8 51 a7 | unwrapped: 55 65 88 13 0d 30 cd 9a 7b 8a fd cd df 7d 07 98 | unwrapped: cc ec 78 1f 27 37 38 3c 02 34 72 55 fa fc 0f 90 | unwrapped: 50 80 e9 47 7e 15 32 e9 5e 26 d5 23 81 49 67 ec | unwrapped: 94 25 65 47 74 76 ae 45 bd 05 90 7a 1f 81 a4 dc | unwrapped: 16 b8 bc 45 0c 97 fb bb c3 86 22 16 36 fc db d3 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f874c700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c6e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0dc003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001278 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: 24 89 d7 5b e8 75 d2 14 79 62 fb a8 f3 ad 92 d3 5e e0 a8 5d e7 07 dc ad bb 1a 1d 51 8b ba b2 85 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0dc001598 | unwrapped: 57 33 22 df 1b c3 c6 6d 54 44 a6 c6 3d ff 43 f3 | unwrapped: 08 7d 27 9b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: bf 85 92 dc 93 f6 58 e2 b0 6d 99 c9 be a5 36 ad 65 bd 30 40 92 06 a8 d3 5f 2b d8 58 f5 82 23 4c 3e e3 c8 80 95 2d 18 7f 31 0f 8d 88 63 64 d1 71 61 48 f6 02 95 21 8e 8a e9 d2 8d c5 9a 67 44 71 bd 01 4b 06 9f 78 2a 33 ad 46 7a 40 9e 09 cc 37 d8 48 66 55 5b 20 8a 2f a2 ae 7c 55 ff 9f dc 0c 7f 46 49 11 fe 11 99 1a 82 f5 6b 9e 76 c4 c6 82 fe 6a 69 11 be 32 0f a6 99 cc 5d 46 fd 93 5d 55 56 bf d8 18 61 11 e5 50 bc 46 a4 a7 da 31 10 1f 6b 47 41 9b dc ba f6 30 2b 1d e8 20 3b 1c 38 2a 0a 57 ff 4f d2 6c 6f bf 9a 2d f2 d3 ca 8a e3 de 4c 81 5c c9 51 d4 97 ab 10 23 fe 3b 19 14 1f a5 20 3f 5e 14 64 ac aa 5c aa 6d a0 b6 64 8d e4 8d 48 ae 48 73 b0 d9 9c f2 16 17 b7 16 d5 89 8d 06 d8 f8 e8 db 29 aa 9a f5 f0 46 34 70 6f 8f cd a5 70 64 d3 7a 96 bf 35 67 e7 ac 34 c9 41 e8 62 1a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0dc004678 | unwrapped: bb a0 b3 98 2e 3f 6e 6b 7b 28 f6 34 f6 64 2e 7c | unwrapped: c8 9c cc 51 e0 47 d8 37 bd 07 84 ef 65 e1 e7 0c | unwrapped: b9 85 05 27 f6 f0 c1 e7 ca 67 5a 8a 4e 56 09 77 | unwrapped: 16 a0 3b d4 35 c1 a8 ff cf 81 a5 c0 b2 32 83 c5 | unwrapped: 6a dd 70 e0 7d 52 fe 03 08 d9 87 92 e5 00 75 25 | unwrapped: 46 c6 a5 45 fd 7f 4a 9a 5e 34 f1 da 86 91 23 6c | unwrapped: 25 a4 59 14 3e b7 31 58 71 59 b5 02 92 8c 9e e0 | unwrapped: 15 ad 97 8c 16 c9 c8 97 81 f0 06 1d 16 4c 63 08 | unwrapped: 4e 4f 72 c1 ba d8 fe 12 c0 eb 88 19 99 d0 df 2f | unwrapped: 49 67 a9 02 a2 01 67 17 bf 84 c3 a0 9e af 59 2e | unwrapped: 20 43 ee 01 b2 60 9e 80 88 26 b5 4b 0d b8 51 a7 | unwrapped: 55 65 88 13 0d 30 cd 9a 7b 8a fd cd df 7d 07 98 | unwrapped: cc ec 78 1f 27 37 38 3c 02 34 72 55 fa fc 0f 90 | unwrapped: 50 80 e9 47 7e 15 32 e9 5e 26 d5 23 81 49 67 ec | unwrapped: 94 25 65 47 74 76 ae 45 bd 05 90 7a 1f 81 a4 dc | unwrapped: 16 b8 bc 45 0c 97 fb bb c3 86 22 16 36 fc db d3 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f874c710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c6f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f874c768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_a 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_e 0x55b81b976b70, enc_key 0x55b81b96d700 | DH_i: be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | DH_i: 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | DH_i: 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | DH_i: f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | DH_i: 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | DH_i: eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | DH_i: 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | DH_i: 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | DH_i: 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | DH_i: b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | DH_i: 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | DH_i: aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | DH_i: d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | DH_i: 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | DH_i: 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | DH_i: a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | DH_r: 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | DH_r: e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | DH_r: da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | DH_r: eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | DH_r: e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | DH_r: 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | DH_r: 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | DH_r: d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | DH_r: 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | DH_r: be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | DH_r: 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | DH_r: db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | DH_r: 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | DH_r: ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | DH_r: 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | DH_r: ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b9958ec (length 256) | be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b9959ec (length 256) | 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0dc001598 (length 20) | 5d f4 e9 00 6b ce 6e f7 20 8b 8f bf 44 85 fb 42 | 24 31 b9 67 | crypto helper 6 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 14 time elapsed 0.001303 seconds | (#13) spent 1.28 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 14: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 14 for state #13 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002098 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #13 | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 14 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #13: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8006b98: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #13 | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #13 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #13 spent 0.0148 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002098 | spent 0.00194 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c f9 5f c6 7d | 2d 96 dd af e3 e4 2a 45 81 e1 1a b2 41 19 88 cc | a4 c3 32 ec 27 6d 78 68 51 af ba b1 9a f6 18 00 | 06 08 a0 2c 35 1d 11 33 ba b9 c5 66 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 5d f4 e9 00 6b ce 6e f7 20 8b 8f bf 44 85 fb 42 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 9a f6 18 00 06 08 a0 2c 35 1d 11 33 ba b9 c5 66 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 c7 e8 da 81 | 6f 28 a5 53 43 bf 6e e1 18 01 33 9a dc f3 72 c8 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #13: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003618 (length 256) | be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d8004f28 (length 256) | 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b97b308 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | c7 e8 da 81 6f 28 a5 53 43 bf 6e e1 18 01 33 9a | dc f3 72 c8 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001598 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d8004f28 (length 256) | 9d 5e a4 12 4f 60 c9 95 c5 6c e7 26 08 a7 6d a9 | e0 e0 62 bf 2f 7b c8 82 18 5e d9 33 59 b0 e6 48 | da e1 63 2f 0b 84 ae f4 f0 ea ed 26 50 9f 10 d3 | eb f2 6e e7 82 8d bb 08 d9 e2 73 c2 4c 06 9a 09 | e8 48 0f de f6 d3 47 bf e4 5f 95 47 58 45 a9 b5 | 3e cd b6 9d 06 3d d9 23 34 35 be ca 18 6e 5f 21 | 28 77 cc 5c c3 01 a1 31 fb a3 53 ed eb a1 b4 22 | d6 86 79 ca c1 c6 18 5e c0 28 59 cf 23 da c0 7e | 10 81 32 1a 3e 90 ad 45 bd 6c 2e 1d 5f 29 b7 5f | be 43 cf a7 b7 b5 e5 75 39 2f eb 14 11 17 42 e0 | 23 a3 c6 0b 1e ab c8 6e f6 59 1e 96 3f 98 97 72 | db b0 3f ff 39 5c 63 67 3e 97 2e 84 b1 79 fc e2 | 2c 0d 59 51 c2 3e 5a 21 93 aa e5 42 44 9a c7 1c | ef fd 08 76 ae 2b a2 aa 99 7d b3 f0 ed cf 94 f8 | 85 46 36 27 fc 3b 95 0d c8 ab ef 01 99 63 6a b1 | ef 55 c3 7f 2f 2a 4b 00 e6 b4 5a 05 8d 21 13 5e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003618 (length 256) | be 4b ea f0 cc 9d 87 93 dd 9b 3f 48 68 8c f9 07 | 29 fb 6f 4b 9d 43 70 68 4c ef cf dd bc 94 2e f9 | 70 54 5a 7a 0d 66 73 c5 d3 4e c9 c1 9b 58 9b 76 | f7 e9 f6 43 51 b7 14 84 1f a9 16 df 97 11 04 1b | 96 14 67 7c dc 05 e6 85 df be 09 d6 1b 32 fa 6d | eb c3 5c 2a 81 71 ae 69 c8 c1 69 a5 56 82 8a 69 | 05 e5 c7 f0 fe 53 2b 79 20 56 17 fc 6b 84 d5 77 | 82 7f ac db 11 8b 8f 05 e4 c4 ed d2 d7 3c 1e f5 | 52 1a 47 9d ba 55 ac a0 4b ec 45 dc 05 3c f4 62 | b1 8b df 2d b3 bf 74 6c d6 90 42 8c 42 07 50 58 | 83 44 87 be c5 36 86 07 8c 00 01 c5 0f 3f d1 bc | aa 32 e1 bb 26 5f d2 49 94 86 fb ca 75 48 8f 65 | d1 70 3c d1 3c 2e cb af 74 0c ae 0a ee 6f fd 36 | 32 59 9b ec e0 14 20 8b 62 26 d9 37 89 b4 53 71 | 48 0f 21 03 09 0a 5b 36 05 32 ce 92 67 7f 6b 83 | a8 87 75 a3 1c 6e b8 17 f3 2e 98 89 bf 61 f4 86 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | 63 f7 9d 8c b9 5a c5 44 c5 18 c7 2c 0f d5 8b e2 | a0 c5 1f 14 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 63 f7 9d 8c b9 5a c5 44 c5 18 c7 2c 0f d5 8b e2 | HASH_R a0 c5 1f 14 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 63 f7 9d 8c b9 5a c5 44 c5 18 c7 2c 0f d5 8b e2 | encrypting: a0 c5 1f 14 | IV: 9a f6 18 00 06 08 a0 2c 35 1d 11 33 ba b9 c5 66 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #13 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #13: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #13 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #13 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 8e 42 64 57 | 5b d6 d1 51 6f 81 17 44 e0 59 fc 12 7e 80 0e 95 | 75 52 a9 8c a1 82 33 66 77 6f 97 61 33 cb 1c cb | d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #13 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 size 128 | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #13: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #13 | #13 spent 0.495 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.606 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00234 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 08 10 20 01 a7 ef a3 2c 00 00 01 bc bc e5 bf da | 59 3b bd 93 18 05 5f 67 3f ea 20 9f 1a e4 99 9d | d7 cf 2d 0a fe 36 22 4c 00 1e d8 a5 8f e7 5e cc | 98 f2 b7 98 66 7d c4 22 42 64 23 70 c1 4f 6b dd | 0e 83 7d d7 16 3f 71 6d 2f d7 ad 3e 52 60 41 a3 | 0b a9 e8 74 3d 85 da 79 50 60 60 ef 33 e0 0c ca | 26 64 8b 22 46 c2 1f 29 17 d9 4c e4 39 e2 95 18 | d3 7a 16 0e d5 91 cc cb 8b b0 b3 3d 24 20 11 77 | 77 8f 68 94 3a fb eb bc 29 2a c5 9c 76 69 1f fe | 85 f6 08 15 8a 9e 10 70 30 04 bc de df 56 6b 7d | b6 77 ce ea af b6 ab 35 04 1f 29 18 81 49 bc 2f | 46 85 ac d7 82 b4 90 39 bc 6a d4 af a9 24 40 32 | b6 76 b0 f0 29 2b 11 37 8f 9e 7c c0 de b9 38 67 | fb f7 a7 16 56 f5 56 39 51 47 c3 0e 8a 87 7a 27 | 96 93 61 71 c2 84 25 bb 03 4e 13 ab e9 35 74 eb | d9 a5 3b 66 6c 57 b2 98 68 3f ca d3 f4 3c bb 0c | ae b3 12 81 38 06 3d 04 64 f5 dd f4 26 87 b1 72 | 33 16 0a ec cf b1 f8 bc 73 2d e9 93 76 f1 38 2d | 13 41 8d c6 a7 e4 c7 90 c8 a8 8c 04 42 a9 02 96 | 4d f9 2b b2 46 62 76 52 ac ac 0f 92 71 0b bc b2 | 3c f3 e9 3b 6d b1 09 aa b9 5f 4f c3 43 8d ad ab | 72 bd 61 34 50 78 77 c8 3e 66 2a 55 92 ca 9b 06 | 7d bb e7 f3 b8 d8 27 ce ab f8 63 e1 a6 ad d1 c4 | 59 a3 d6 a2 68 98 9a 32 05 1c ca f1 7a 9b 03 31 | fe b3 81 e0 b1 da 05 58 85 35 c0 ee f9 55 4d e6 | b2 fe fa b9 de f4 70 12 87 76 6a 40 f7 38 42 d4 | 2a b4 46 80 3c 99 01 b3 85 f4 54 30 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2817499948 (0xa7efa32c) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | current Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | a7 ef a3 2c | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 55 f8 07 cf 41 90 fc b6 b2 5c 42 dd 0c d6 e5 35 | 72 76 b5 0c | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 55 f8 07 cf 41 90 fc b6 b2 5c 42 dd 0c d6 e5 35 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: f7 38 42 d4 2a b4 46 80 3c 99 01 b3 85 f4 54 30 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 08 10 20 01 a7 ef a3 2c 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 2c 9f 18 c0 70 b4 b8 13 87 3c e2 01 48 79 6a 91 | c1 b5 eb 6d 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 81 0e 0e 70 00 00 00 1c | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 eb 85 63 16 | 97 65 7a f6 58 f3 4f 35 7d 1b 23 5e 54 ee cf c4 | 2a 60 6e 28 25 1c b4 bc fb 71 fb e9 05 00 01 04 | e5 c7 a1 6f a1 a4 54 42 d6 fb ec 3d 37 1c 11 ca | 61 b1 46 74 9c 87 7a 73 18 59 00 8c 94 87 df 8b | f5 d9 6c 2e 6c f7 52 53 8d b4 f4 0f fc 89 3e 22 | e2 32 7e fa 8a a8 33 ab 96 e3 5c ed af ea 7c 0e | 26 39 87 63 e4 16 9e 55 ce eb ac 94 51 f5 92 01 | 7d 14 74 b7 6d fd aa fc 9f ba bb a8 ae 88 62 ba | 1d d7 bd 3e 42 1f 5a da 2b 55 24 23 8e dc ff b5 | 6b 3d e9 23 7d fa bc 63 92 94 8b 44 58 98 73 9e | e6 e5 20 02 81 5e 27 25 8f 8d 99 21 9f ab 57 f4 | 87 5f a1 0d 6b 2e 83 18 f8 90 36 1e ac 04 93 2f | aa b4 86 ad 7c 36 16 4f f2 5f fe b9 0d 93 90 36 | c2 e8 fc 00 42 15 28 79 ae 0f e5 e5 e9 29 84 22 | 5a fd 31 6d 54 8d 31 57 24 b7 00 f4 16 15 30 9e | 60 5e b0 b3 25 4c aa 6c 80 41 5c 9c 7d b5 1a 52 | 0b 99 32 75 07 35 cb 1c 86 e4 01 db d3 a6 a7 15 | 29 30 c6 e5 3d f1 6d bf fc 96 b9 04 ff e2 48 f9 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001598 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | a7 ef a3 2c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98cbfc (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 81 0e 0e 70 00 00 00 1c 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 eb 85 63 16 97 65 7a f6 | 58 f3 4f 35 7d 1b 23 5e 54 ee cf c4 2a 60 6e 28 | 25 1c b4 bc fb 71 fb e9 05 00 01 04 e5 c7 a1 6f | a1 a4 54 42 d6 fb ec 3d 37 1c 11 ca 61 b1 46 74 | 9c 87 7a 73 18 59 00 8c 94 87 df 8b f5 d9 6c 2e | 6c f7 52 53 8d b4 f4 0f fc 89 3e 22 e2 32 7e fa | 8a a8 33 ab 96 e3 5c ed af ea 7c 0e 26 39 87 63 | e4 16 9e 55 ce eb ac 94 51 f5 92 01 7d 14 74 b7 | 6d fd aa fc 9f ba bb a8 ae 88 62 ba 1d d7 bd 3e | 42 1f 5a da 2b 55 24 23 8e dc ff b5 6b 3d e9 23 | 7d fa bc 63 92 94 8b 44 58 98 73 9e e6 e5 20 02 | 81 5e 27 25 8f 8d 99 21 9f ab 57 f4 87 5f a1 0d | 6b 2e 83 18 f8 90 36 1e ac 04 93 2f aa b4 86 ad | 7c 36 16 4f f2 5f fe b9 0d 93 90 36 c2 e8 fc 00 | 42 15 28 79 ae 0f e5 e5 e9 29 84 22 5a fd 31 6d | 54 8d 31 57 24 b7 00 f4 16 15 30 9e 60 5e b0 b3 | 25 4c aa 6c 80 41 5c 9c 7d b5 1a 52 0b 99 32 75 | 07 35 cb 1c 86 e4 01 db d3 a6 a7 15 29 30 c6 e5 | 3d f1 6d bf fc 96 b9 04 ff e2 48 f9 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 2c 9f 18 c0 70 b4 b8 13 87 3c e2 01 48 79 6a 91 | c1 b5 eb 6d | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 2c 9f 18 c0 70 b4 b8 13 87 3c e2 01 48 79 6a 91 | c1 b5 eb 6d | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #13: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #14 at 0x55b81b98fa48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #14 in UNDEFINED | pstats #14 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #13 "east" as #14 for IPSEC SA | #14 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #13.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #14: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 81 0e 0e 70 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 "east" #14: IPsec encryption transform AES_CBC did not specify required KEY_LENGTH attribute | ignoring ESP proposal with NULLed or unknown encryption "east" #14: no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #14 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #14: sending encrypted notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3344714587 (0xc75c4b5b) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342648 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe5434272c (length 4) | c7 5c 4b 5b | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe543429d4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe543429c0 (length 20) | e6 76 75 2b fc a6 57 06 df 61 fd 53 1f 3f 34 0e | d6 d4 2f 85 | send notification HASH(1): | e6 76 75 2b fc a6 57 06 df 61 fd 53 1f 3f 34 0e | d6 d4 2f 85 | last Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | current Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434273c (length 4) | c7 5c 4b 5b | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 08 3a d8 92 c3 46 7c 11 22 9d 5e 55 c9 80 50 22 | 3c 53 c4 a9 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 e6 76 75 2b fc a6 57 06 df 61 fd 53 | encrypting: 1f 3f 34 0e d6 d4 2f 85 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0e | IV: 08 3a d8 92 c3 46 7c 11 22 9d 5e 55 c9 80 50 22 | IV: 3c 53 c4 a9 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: f0 b5 e3 0d 4c 8d 41 b2 50 c8 2d c8 93 e1 7b 22 | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #14) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 08 10 05 01 c7 5c 4b 5b 00 00 00 4c 23 37 36 70 | 60 ea 0c 83 b0 6a 8e 68 9a 7f 63 9a 92 63 16 32 | 72 70 db dd 21 3d 00 1a a5 3c dd 57 f0 b5 e3 0d | 4c 8d 41 b2 50 c8 2d c8 93 e1 7b 22 | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | pstats #14 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #14 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #14: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #14: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #14: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #14 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #14: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #14 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #13 spent 0.514 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.903 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00292 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 08 10 05 01 05 d0 f9 2b 00 00 00 5c c5 6d 61 02 | 94 dc d0 01 8a a4 1c 91 f8 0f 48 89 4a 4e 71 6e | 40 8f e3 a0 1e 2f f5 13 91 89 b1 55 91 64 05 6b | a3 3e 01 f6 45 bc 54 f4 48 db 58 b9 23 4a 47 50 | ba ce ed ad 6b dd c5 9c 2f 1b 07 0c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 97581355 (0x5d0f92b) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #13; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #13 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | current Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 05 d0 f9 2b | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | bb 0c 8a 59 11 ba c3 f4 9c 5c b3 ef 9e de 1c 74 | 3f 59 53 fc | #13 is idle | #13 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: bb 0c 8a 59 11 ba c3 f4 9c 5c b3 ef 9e de 1c 74 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 23 4a 47 50 ba ce ed ad 6b dd c5 9c 2f 1b 07 0c | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 08 10 05 01 05 d0 f9 2b 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | 90 aa 4e c5 b4 91 42 79 4e e9 a4 23 91 4c d2 6c | 5e 52 e5 95 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 05 d0 f9 2b | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b99056c (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 0f 9d 39 88 | 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 90 aa 4e c5 b4 91 42 79 4e e9 a4 23 91 4c d2 6c | 5e 52 e5 95 | informational HASH(1): | 90 aa 4e c5 b4 91 42 79 4e e9 a4 23 91 4c d2 6c | 5e 52 e5 95 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #13: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #13 | pstats #13 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #13 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #13: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.527s and sending notification | parent state #13: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #13 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | responder cookie: | a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3000179610 (0xb2d31b9a) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340998 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0dc001598 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a7c (length 4) | b2 d3 1b 9a | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340e24 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 0f 9d 39 88 | 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340e10 (length 20) | 96 aa cd 2c 75 67 63 4a 24 ff 30 7b 6a ad d1 d2 | 95 6e c9 85 | send delete HASH(1): | 96 aa cd 2c 75 67 63 4a 24 ff 30 7b 6a ad d1 d2 | 95 6e c9 85 | last Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | current Phase 1 IV: 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 33 cb 1c cb d5 11 5b 12 c9 9b 65 16 0e 2e 3c 08 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a8c (length 4) | b2 d3 1b 9a | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | a4 7a 96 12 70 13 2b 16 af 32 c4 49 7e 49 d0 1a | c6 4e 83 96 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 96 aa cd 2c 75 67 63 4a 24 ff 30 7b | encrypting: 6a ad d1 d2 95 6e c9 85 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 | encrypting: 41 9e 17 77 | IV: a4 7a 96 12 70 13 2b 16 af 32 c4 49 7e 49 d0 1a | IV: c6 4e 83 96 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 61 11 b9 c1 4b 6f 43 10 28 20 8a 3c ec 81 50 e5 | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #13) | 0f 9d 39 88 3b 32 68 29 a5 0f 70 c0 41 9e 17 77 | 08 10 05 01 b2 d3 1b 9a 00 00 00 5c fb 41 d8 3c | 85 88 14 8a 5f 7c c0 6f 36 d0 02 7e dd 77 69 77 | 45 c0 d2 bd 15 9a 4c 85 69 8f c8 87 0d 2e ce a6 | 6c 92 6c 1f a6 9c 26 6f a2 f2 55 6c 61 11 b9 c1 | 4b 6f 43 10 28 20 8a 3c ec 81 50 e5 | state #13 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #13 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #13: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8006b98: destroyed | stop processing: state #13 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.64 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00285 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 0a 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d dd 9c ef df 9d 2e e3 ee | a7 df e8 a4 db 11 52 b1 b7 1a 82 05 80 a7 bf 64 | creating state object #15 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #15 in UNDEFINED | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp started | #15 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #15: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #15: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #15 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #15: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.394 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00202 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | 14 00 00 24 b3 61 40 d6 b4 db f0 9b bf fa 13 9c | 9a 13 ab 0b b1 3b 0c 8e 18 db db b4 68 d2 d9 ed | f6 ef 0c c9 14 00 00 18 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 | c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 61 42 71 11 00 00 00 18 | 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | 4e fa c6 ff | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #15 is idle | #15 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | 61 42 71 11 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | natd_hash: rcookie= 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | natd_hash: hash= 61 42 71 11 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | 4e fa c6 ff | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | natd_hash: rcookie= 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | natd_hash: hash= 4e fa c6 ff | expected NAT-D(me): 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | expected NAT-D(me): 61 42 71 11 | expected NAT-D(him): | 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | 4e fa c6 ff | received NAT-D: 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | received NAT-D: 61 42 71 11 | received NAT-D: 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | received NAT-D: 4e fa c6 ff | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 15 for state #15 | state #15 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #15 and saving MD | #15 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 15 for state #15 | #15 spent 0.121 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 15 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.222 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0006f48: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0f0006f48 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | Generated nonce: ac be 9a aa 4f 24 7e a8 4d fd f4 08 a2 a3 d1 8e | Generated nonce: 80 fd 3d 30 30 4c ea 11 61 fb 52 a1 a5 5c 51 d2 | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 15 time elapsed 0.000611 seconds | (#15) spent 0.611 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 15: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 15 for state #15 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001698 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #15 | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 15 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #15: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0006f48: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #15 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | keyex value fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | keyex value 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | keyex value 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | keyex value ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | keyex value 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | keyex value f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | keyex value ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | keyex value c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | keyex value e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | keyex value 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | keyex value 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | keyex value fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | keyex value e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | keyex value cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | keyex value 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr ac be 9a aa 4f 24 7e a8 4d fd f4 08 a2 a3 d1 8e | Nr 80 fd 3d 30 30 4c ea 11 61 fb 52 a1 a5 5c 51 d2 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | 4e fa c6 ff | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | natd_hash: rcookie= 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | natd_hash: hash= 4e fa c6 ff | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 | NAT-D 4e fa c6 ff | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | 61 42 71 11 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | natd_hash: rcookie= 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | natd_hash: hash= 61 42 71 11 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | NAT-D 61 42 71 11 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0006f48: transferring ownership from state #15 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 16 for state #15 | state #15 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #15 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #15 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #15: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #15 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 16 for state #15 | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | crypto helper 2 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 16 | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | peer's g: 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | peer's g: 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | peer's g: 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | 14 00 00 24 ac be 9a aa 4f 24 7e a8 4d fd f4 08 | a2 a3 d1 8e 80 fd 3d 30 30 4c ea 11 61 fb 52 a1 | a5 5c 51 d2 14 00 00 18 5e 8f 9d 79 b0 60 7d 1a | 59 7a 21 fe 42 5b 51 47 4e fa c6 ff 00 00 00 18 | 22 bc a5 e5 fa e6 d2 e3 c1 18 8c 19 fc b8 0e 51 | 61 42 71 11 | peer's g: 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | peer's g: 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | peer's g: c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | peer's g: 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | peer's g: cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | peer's g: f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | peer's g: 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | peer's g: 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | peer's g: aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | peer's g: ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | peer's g: 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | peer's g: ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | peer's g: b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #15 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10453.205513 "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #15 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #15 spent 0.368 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001698 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0006f48: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b96d700 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b995888 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e80010b8 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b9958ac (length 32) | b3 61 40 d6 b4 db f0 9b bf fa 13 9c 9a 13 ab 0b | b1 3b 0c 8e 18 db db b4 68 d2 d9 ed f6 ef 0c c9 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b9958cc (length 32) | ac be 9a aa 4f 24 7e a8 4d fd f4 08 a2 a3 d1 8e | 80 fd 3d 30 30 4c ea 11 61 fb 52 a1 a5 5c 51 d2 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8001108 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 57 0a 22 73 e2 1d 12 38 b0 89 49 93 f2 3b 05 76 c0 a3 e5 45 44 4c b6 bc 19 b8 c8 31 5a cd 74 17 9c 35 64 61 dc 81 75 c3 cb e9 dc 0e 41 0b eb 8c 40 d1 d2 1a f3 fb 90 e5 6a 62 f8 2e 77 3d 7c a4 5c 19 d7 9a a8 f2 1c ee 81 c7 68 b5 3f 08 fd a0 db e6 18 84 56 5a ec 97 c4 07 3d 1f b3 5d 36 23 78 97 e0 3b d8 ad d5 d6 eb 9f 3c 2d 1a 2f 3a 21 2f e3 60 e8 29 78 43 bd c2 5b cb 34 4b cb 07 2f f6 0e c9 cc 44 97 31 89 ba c7 1c cd 24 23 af 70 a9 fa 98 f3 fb 66 08 6a 32 4e eb 85 00 76 fb a3 b9 31 3e 0d ab b9 29 2c 70 62 c2 95 6a e5 c5 34 8d d6 ba df b0 34 8a 1b ed 24 b3 2d a8 1a 14 9a a2 b4 dc 25 56 d0 c4 bf 77 32 b3 2c 96 25 38 e2 2b 01 b3 c6 e4 07 09 99 ae 2d 37 87 e2 b4 3f 66 82 55 6b c9 f8 83 73 ba 87 87 9a ed 2a 02 f7 54 39 dc ff 94 12 fd b5 5c 7e 61 0d 9f 95 55 f6 7c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e8003db8 | unwrapped: b7 e8 e7 6a 3e be ec 3c 40 cf 20 07 da e4 5f e7 | unwrapped: 39 78 71 60 11 99 b1 97 56 d9 bf f7 7f 35 54 d3 | unwrapped: 22 b7 e0 08 24 a0 4c 95 66 49 db 86 06 a5 dd ae | unwrapped: 4a 18 61 e2 92 7a 8b ab 3c 95 ec d8 10 09 9d 62 | unwrapped: 7a c7 af 1b 6e 47 ea f3 49 c7 fc af 27 be ff 5b | unwrapped: e7 44 72 b3 05 55 71 ef e9 63 81 9f a2 7c 6e 9f | unwrapped: 13 1f f6 b2 eb fb 2d 2b 46 08 e6 e4 19 7e f9 3c | unwrapped: 6b 10 9b b2 a9 ec bd 91 a0 4c 1f db 20 a3 85 31 | unwrapped: 79 4a eb 0c 24 33 66 d1 0e d0 a0 a4 8a 4c fc a6 | unwrapped: ef 13 07 83 25 44 ae 33 43 e9 24 e1 da 9a 8e 28 | unwrapped: 9f 13 d2 b1 84 f9 d3 5c f0 00 8e cc 97 47 05 b7 | unwrapped: 95 ba 7e 7d 39 ae 3a 64 3b bb 0b c6 d0 92 86 4c | unwrapped: f4 00 0b 08 16 8c 96 8d 2c 0b 77 33 e5 a8 b5 27 | unwrapped: 35 9f 2e 4f 5d 0b e6 e9 ce a9 bb 45 8a 86 dc 7e | unwrapped: 46 dc 35 da 88 cd 15 74 04 a9 37 ee 3e 7a 57 72 | unwrapped: c1 a6 7d 0f a2 ae e8 72 58 0b 01 4e 4c 58 30 c1 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e80010b8 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: ed 82 9c 4c 0a 21 0d 88 9d 33 4d f3 7a 1a 7e 29 23 bf a7 71 81 1e 51 d0 09 7a 9c 66 e0 84 73 1c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e8001158 | unwrapped: a5 64 39 57 99 bf 3a 68 3f 9f 1f 42 82 49 e5 3a | unwrapped: b8 26 75 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 57 0a 22 73 e2 1d 12 38 b0 89 49 93 f2 3b 05 76 c0 a3 e5 45 44 4c b6 bc 19 b8 c8 31 5a cd 74 17 9c 35 64 61 dc 81 75 c3 cb e9 dc 0e 41 0b eb 8c 40 d1 d2 1a f3 fb 90 e5 6a 62 f8 2e 77 3d 7c a4 5c 19 d7 9a a8 f2 1c ee 81 c7 68 b5 3f 08 fd a0 db e6 18 84 56 5a ec 97 c4 07 3d 1f b3 5d 36 23 78 97 e0 3b d8 ad d5 d6 eb 9f 3c 2d 1a 2f 3a 21 2f e3 60 e8 29 78 43 bd c2 5b cb 34 4b cb 07 2f f6 0e c9 cc 44 97 31 89 ba c7 1c cd 24 23 af 70 a9 fa 98 f3 fb 66 08 6a 32 4e eb 85 00 76 fb a3 b9 31 3e 0d ab b9 29 2c 70 62 c2 95 6a e5 c5 34 8d d6 ba df b0 34 8a 1b ed 24 b3 2d a8 1a 14 9a a2 b4 dc 25 56 d0 c4 bf 77 32 b3 2c 96 25 38 e2 2b 01 b3 c6 e4 07 09 99 ae 2d 37 87 e2 b4 3f 66 82 55 6b c9 f8 83 73 ba 87 87 9a ed 2a 02 f7 54 39 dc ff 94 12 fd b5 5c 7e 61 0d 9f 95 55 f6 7c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e8004f28 | unwrapped: b7 e8 e7 6a 3e be ec 3c 40 cf 20 07 da e4 5f e7 | unwrapped: 39 78 71 60 11 99 b1 97 56 d9 bf f7 7f 35 54 d3 | unwrapped: 22 b7 e0 08 24 a0 4c 95 66 49 db 86 06 a5 dd ae | unwrapped: 4a 18 61 e2 92 7a 8b ab 3c 95 ec d8 10 09 9d 62 | unwrapped: 7a c7 af 1b 6e 47 ea f3 49 c7 fc af 27 be ff 5b | unwrapped: e7 44 72 b3 05 55 71 ef e9 63 81 9f a2 7c 6e 9f | unwrapped: 13 1f f6 b2 eb fb 2d 2b 46 08 e6 e4 19 7e f9 3c | unwrapped: 6b 10 9b b2 a9 ec bd 91 a0 4c 1f db 20 a3 85 31 | unwrapped: 79 4a eb 0c 24 33 66 d1 0e d0 a0 a4 8a 4c fc a6 | unwrapped: ef 13 07 83 25 44 ae 33 43 e9 24 e1 da 9a 8e 28 | unwrapped: 9f 13 d2 b1 84 f9 d3 5c f0 00 8e cc 97 47 05 b7 | unwrapped: 95 ba 7e 7d 39 ae 3a 64 3b bb 0b c6 d0 92 86 4c | unwrapped: f4 00 0b 08 16 8c 96 8d 2c 0b 77 33 e5 a8 b5 27 | unwrapped: 35 9f 2e 4f 5d 0b e6 e9 ce a9 bb 45 8a 86 dc 7e | unwrapped: 46 dc 35 da 88 cd 15 74 04 a9 37 ee 3e 7a 57 72 | unwrapped: c1 a6 7d 0f a2 ae e8 72 58 0b 01 4e 4c 58 30 c1 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8001108 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: 95 8c c6 a4 e0 ff 5d 3a a1 0e 18 21 37 31 8e 9f a1 2d 62 86 d1 8a fc 1a 69 26 8d ea 10 fe d9 c8 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e80030c8 | unwrapped: 9c 47 4f 2d e3 87 45 8d b6 38 99 6a 63 50 80 0d | unwrapped: 12 01 36 3f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 57 0a 22 73 e2 1d 12 38 b0 89 49 93 f2 3b 05 76 c0 a3 e5 45 44 4c b6 bc 19 b8 c8 31 5a cd 74 17 9c 35 64 61 dc 81 75 c3 cb e9 dc 0e 41 0b eb 8c 40 d1 d2 1a f3 fb 90 e5 6a 62 f8 2e 77 3d 7c a4 5c 19 d7 9a a8 f2 1c ee 81 c7 68 b5 3f 08 fd a0 db e6 18 84 56 5a ec 97 c4 07 3d 1f b3 5d 36 23 78 97 e0 3b d8 ad d5 d6 eb 9f 3c 2d 1a 2f 3a 21 2f e3 60 e8 29 78 43 bd c2 5b cb 34 4b cb 07 2f f6 0e c9 cc 44 97 31 89 ba c7 1c cd 24 23 af 70 a9 fa 98 f3 fb 66 08 6a 32 4e eb 85 00 76 fb a3 b9 31 3e 0d ab b9 29 2c 70 62 c2 95 6a e5 c5 34 8d d6 ba df b0 34 8a 1b ed 24 b3 2d a8 1a 14 9a a2 b4 dc 25 56 d0 c4 bf 77 32 b3 2c 96 25 38 e2 2b 01 b3 c6 e4 07 09 99 ae 2d 37 87 e2 b4 3f 66 82 55 6b c9 f8 83 73 ba 87 87 9a ed 2a 02 f7 54 39 dc ff 94 12 fd b5 5c 7e 61 0d 9f 95 55 f6 7c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e8003db8 | unwrapped: b7 e8 e7 6a 3e be ec 3c 40 cf 20 07 da e4 5f e7 | unwrapped: 39 78 71 60 11 99 b1 97 56 d9 bf f7 7f 35 54 d3 | unwrapped: 22 b7 e0 08 24 a0 4c 95 66 49 db 86 06 a5 dd ae | unwrapped: 4a 18 61 e2 92 7a 8b ab 3c 95 ec d8 10 09 9d 62 | unwrapped: 7a c7 af 1b 6e 47 ea f3 49 c7 fc af 27 be ff 5b | unwrapped: e7 44 72 b3 05 55 71 ef e9 63 81 9f a2 7c 6e 9f | unwrapped: 13 1f f6 b2 eb fb 2d 2b 46 08 e6 e4 19 7e f9 3c | unwrapped: 6b 10 9b b2 a9 ec bd 91 a0 4c 1f db 20 a3 85 31 | unwrapped: 79 4a eb 0c 24 33 66 d1 0e d0 a0 a4 8a 4c fc a6 | unwrapped: ef 13 07 83 25 44 ae 33 43 e9 24 e1 da 9a 8e 28 | unwrapped: 9f 13 d2 b1 84 f9 d3 5c f0 00 8e cc 97 47 05 b7 | unwrapped: 95 ba 7e 7d 39 ae 3a 64 3b bb 0b c6 d0 92 86 4c | unwrapped: f4 00 0b 08 16 8c 96 8d 2c 0b 77 33 e5 a8 b5 27 | unwrapped: 35 9f 2e 4f 5d 0b e6 e9 ce a9 bb 45 8a 86 dc 7e | unwrapped: 46 dc 35 da 88 cd 15 74 04 a9 37 ee 3e 7a 57 72 | unwrapped: c1 a6 7d 0f a2 ae e8 72 58 0b 01 4e 4c 58 30 c1 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fa750710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa7506f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fa750768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b976790 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_a 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_e 0x55b81b974d30, enc_key 0x55b81b976790 | DH_i: 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | DH_i: 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | DH_i: 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | DH_i: 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | DH_i: 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | DH_i: c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | DH_i: 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | DH_i: cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | DH_i: f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | DH_i: 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | DH_i: 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | DH_i: aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | DH_i: ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | DH_i: 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | DH_i: ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | DH_i: b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | DH_r: 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | DH_r: fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | DH_r: 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | DH_r: 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | DH_r: ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | DH_r: 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | DH_r: f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | DH_r: ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | DH_r: c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | DH_r: e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | DH_r: 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | DH_r: 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | DH_r: fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | DH_r: e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | DH_r: cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | DH_r: 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b9958ec (length 256) | 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b9959ec (length 256) | 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 20) | 3a 72 ab a7 3f 3d 47 eb df 46 85 8b 3d 71 9b f1 | 4a 12 92 ba | crypto helper 2 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 16 time elapsed 0.001813 seconds | (#15) spent 1.78 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 16: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 16 for state #15 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e80085b8 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #15 | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 16 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #15: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0006f48: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #15 | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #15 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #15 spent 0.0158 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e80085b8 | spent 0.00186 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 7d ab 3b 44 | a8 74 9f d4 13 a7 5e ad dc 1a 73 8d e7 2f c0 00 | f6 14 01 b1 e2 cb c0 69 0c 21 98 bf a1 fc cb 43 | ce 21 23 9b 66 0a 4b 1e a5 68 a0 44 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 3a 72 ab a7 3f 3d 47 eb df 46 85 8b 3d 71 9b f1 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: a1 fc cb 43 ce 21 23 9b 66 0a 4b 1e a5 68 a0 44 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 aa e9 8c 63 | dc fa 96 c2 07 68 cc 63 3c 8d 81 cf 9b 77 2c 1f | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #15: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003618 (length 256) | 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f0004728 (length 256) | 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b987708 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | aa e9 8c 63 dc fa 96 c2 07 68 cc 63 3c 8d 81 cf | 9b 77 2c 1f | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e80030c8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f0004728 (length 256) | 35 bd 45 78 f9 f6 66 2c 3b 9d 94 89 e3 9c 48 c0 | fe d3 dd 8d 1a ca eb c8 9e 5f 19 b2 f3 8c 31 0b | 1b 7f 95 9d b4 c9 78 ee 43 db 53 54 3f 74 a2 ac | 5b 30 06 df 36 97 96 6e e1 2b 45 da 2a e9 40 26 | ac 7e 1f a4 6c 4d ba ea 6e e6 57 97 fb 7f dd e9 | 95 dc 7b 79 a8 a8 b9 12 72 90 2a 77 c6 4e bc 99 | f0 01 f2 f6 74 5e 79 55 95 85 b4 65 94 9b 96 c4 | ce f1 63 e1 43 93 c0 e2 9e 99 b8 4f 4c b1 b3 4d | c1 33 70 56 72 5f 70 82 23 90 04 84 ef 17 ef 41 | e0 80 71 a3 b4 62 d3 1d 7d c1 f1 08 2f 67 fb 44 | 0a 6d 25 9c 50 82 72 b5 3e e8 8f 98 4e 20 1b be | 93 c1 53 29 af 34 5d c2 79 67 29 ad f9 a0 cf fa | fc 56 29 49 ff 18 91 a8 35 1c 00 4f 63 9c 68 ad | e2 7b c8 a8 2f 43 05 d4 4f cf 7f fb 7e d1 44 33 | cb 59 8c c1 29 bc 56 cf 25 16 e4 9b a4 8a e3 9c | 64 32 23 b5 dc 5a 6e 22 1a 86 fe 9c 8a 6c f7 f7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003618 (length 256) | 24 47 f9 ef 76 d0 c2 e3 a6 c6 cc 6f ed 12 fc ca | 9b b3 9c bc 4d e2 dc ef 01 64 1e d5 bc 53 2c 86 | 82 cc 4b 9c c3 0e 87 a4 ec ce 91 bb 92 70 52 00 | 56 36 c5 2c cd d9 44 1c f4 f9 41 66 78 0e 0d c1 | 8a 87 f3 a7 5e b5 29 e1 09 49 d5 5a a4 89 8f d8 | c5 8f 08 aa 3c d2 1e e6 f1 a6 0c 12 b6 42 53 73 | 21 8a ca f5 bd d1 45 e2 29 c9 04 76 c0 ff 72 e9 | cc 0f 8e b1 ec 4f 5c 03 67 a8 6f ad 62 7e 0a 28 | f7 02 f0 25 2e c1 f5 ce 5c e6 79 c3 85 94 17 3c | 1f 1d 94 42 0a e3 c5 47 cc d6 24 66 5f 5a 32 3c | 4d 57 b4 b4 a8 a1 c6 1e 2d 1a 54 5c ec aa a6 3d | aa a9 f4 90 53 fa 41 f4 f9 5f 35 5c c3 98 28 aa | ee 30 6d be fa 6a 87 d4 b9 71 08 43 92 f8 43 31 | 98 8e f7 2d d5 f4 9f 6c 7f 64 59 9f 7c a2 e3 a0 | ec 62 c6 91 4b 9c bb 55 d8 3b 8a b9 7b 4b 66 91 | b9 f2 ef 33 17 b2 8e 75 4e a6 4b 04 09 5d a4 48 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | f0 32 de 9f 1e 9f cf e6 ec f4 1a d3 5b 01 dc a0 | 05 2c 1c bc | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R f0 32 de 9f 1e 9f cf e6 ec f4 1a d3 5b 01 dc a0 | HASH_R 05 2c 1c bc | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: f0 32 de 9f 1e 9f cf e6 ec f4 1a d3 5b 01 dc a0 | encrypting: 05 2c 1c bc | IV: a1 fc cb 43 ce 21 23 9b 66 0a 4b 1e a5 68 a0 44 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #15 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #15: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #15 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #15 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 7d d7 3a 20 | f0 48 9a 05 eb 91 be 18 79 36 e6 e6 7f b9 8c b3 | fb 18 f5 f9 28 73 9f f7 55 6c a5 05 53 58 3c ab | 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #15 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001698 size 128 | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #15: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #15 | #15 spent 0.495 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.617 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00279 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 20 01 3d 72 eb bb 00 00 01 bc d4 7c 72 a6 | 81 1d c4 51 34 5f f4 10 e4 82 fc 3e fd 5f 4e 62 | ca 0f 54 03 61 df 91 b7 5d 20 f3 ee 2a 16 a1 03 | 55 9e 9f 69 2a 84 04 c3 4e f8 bd a1 69 05 79 38 | 52 a9 e8 b2 ed 07 ee 2e 2e a8 c1 68 8e 59 f6 b4 | 4b 52 ac 54 a7 40 47 ef 1f fb 82 22 39 06 3e 94 | 97 14 a4 b2 8c d1 4c 0c d3 a1 c1 d2 94 e9 ba c9 | 7c ac a0 71 27 52 3a b8 0c ee 57 b5 15 29 97 72 | 1a 5c 1c 35 e8 a4 75 d0 27 54 d3 8f d0 33 5c fe | 2e 11 03 26 f0 dc df 8c a5 70 f9 97 86 61 39 11 | 39 08 84 4a 7b d0 78 0d 3a 61 cb ce 44 61 04 54 | a2 22 2e 10 c5 79 e2 9d d1 e1 91 a1 1a bb 80 fd | 54 43 a8 65 14 6b 75 43 d3 cd e0 24 4a fc 44 bb | e4 87 fc 31 b8 4e 0e db a1 e1 bf 3f a8 ec 55 5a | 18 05 40 26 03 db 4e ae 78 57 80 fb fa 19 3f e9 | dc f3 4a a3 a3 a7 f3 42 e7 ea 49 70 1f 2c 39 4f | 9f ef a6 69 e2 f6 ae 79 fb ab 8d d5 e0 f7 12 57 | f0 36 f7 b5 76 d2 bb d2 35 a6 ca 38 20 fa c9 04 | 96 fc bb 53 96 a1 95 5c 7f 9d 17 b4 98 74 62 5c | 84 e4 7c 8a 85 77 8f df 35 32 b6 23 00 6f 7e 81 | e3 6d 5e 09 ec e1 19 51 b1 d9 bf 85 41 d7 b0 4d | 56 0e a2 75 d1 47 61 29 7d 11 43 9c 2d d7 5b 88 | 98 07 f9 53 8e 4e 20 ee cb 9a 01 0d f9 4d 54 54 | e0 47 eb 53 30 a6 78 f8 21 4c be 01 61 69 9c 53 | 0a 05 22 c3 9b 51 47 f8 24 eb 7a 25 62 f4 89 20 | de 26 43 08 03 d4 32 7a 3f 2d 17 04 a4 f2 1f c1 | dd 69 f8 b0 ba b2 c5 78 5b 04 5a e5 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1030941627 (0x3d72ebbb) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | current Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 3d 72 eb bb | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 7a bd db ba 24 ea 7a 4e b8 26 1a c7 a9 8f d5 00 | 4f ea 7c 1e | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 7a bd db ba 24 ea 7a 4e b8 26 1a c7 a9 8f d5 00 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: a4 f2 1f c1 dd 69 f8 b0 ba b2 c5 78 5b 04 5a e5 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 20 01 3d 72 eb bb 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | 83 f4 e8 37 38 7e cc 72 08 5c cf dd b8 70 45 9b | 3d d4 7d a5 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 2c 60 61 b8 00 00 00 20 | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | 05 00 01 04 63 07 41 8a 8a 00 a2 f9 a9 18 5e 8d | d0 9f 5b 64 81 a1 7b 0a c6 f2 c8 80 70 47 d9 18 | 98 c6 5a bc 8b a1 ed 4f ab 65 c9 3b f7 fa 3a 90 | 06 cb 2f 05 6a ed 24 36 3a bd 0c 4c 46 e9 00 79 | 15 29 20 b6 a3 69 33 63 2d 6a c5 2a aa 35 0f ef | d3 6a 6f f1 f6 b8 70 4d f1 ff 85 e0 dc b1 df ba | e7 06 c3 9b 0b 72 e8 d6 f4 48 6b f7 c1 86 9b 87 | 0c c3 76 89 05 ba 02 45 e8 17 e2 36 84 aa c6 ab | 02 00 fc 3a bf 5e 6f 39 fb f8 75 50 20 ee 0e 7c | 42 dd 0c fe 2c 22 b7 8c ae ea f5 5f 8a cd bc cd | 4e 38 c7 4a 4b f8 96 0b 2a 58 e9 87 2b 5b 0f a8 | 01 62 62 a5 b3 da 74 03 20 a3 8c 7b 24 4a 23 9d | e8 37 70 eb 92 d9 12 fd ea ea 58 21 85 5a 89 62 | b3 d1 b1 8b b8 91 88 d0 db bc cf 04 82 7c c8 a8 | 43 69 1b 1d 62 90 ee a6 a1 b3 a0 24 f1 23 94 f9 | c6 01 28 6f 2e 10 15 88 89 6b 58 99 7e dd ba 3f | cb 9a dc 4c 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e80030c8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 3d 72 eb bb | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98cbfc (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 2c 60 61 b8 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 70 e9 85 d8 | 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 07 b7 86 fe | ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb 05 00 01 04 | 63 07 41 8a 8a 00 a2 f9 a9 18 5e 8d d0 9f 5b 64 | 81 a1 7b 0a c6 f2 c8 80 70 47 d9 18 98 c6 5a bc | 8b a1 ed 4f ab 65 c9 3b f7 fa 3a 90 06 cb 2f 05 | 6a ed 24 36 3a bd 0c 4c 46 e9 00 79 15 29 20 b6 | a3 69 33 63 2d 6a c5 2a aa 35 0f ef d3 6a 6f f1 | f6 b8 70 4d f1 ff 85 e0 dc b1 df ba e7 06 c3 9b | 0b 72 e8 d6 f4 48 6b f7 c1 86 9b 87 0c c3 76 89 | 05 ba 02 45 e8 17 e2 36 84 aa c6 ab 02 00 fc 3a | bf 5e 6f 39 fb f8 75 50 20 ee 0e 7c 42 dd 0c fe | 2c 22 b7 8c ae ea f5 5f 8a cd bc cd 4e 38 c7 4a | 4b f8 96 0b 2a 58 e9 87 2b 5b 0f a8 01 62 62 a5 | b3 da 74 03 20 a3 8c 7b 24 4a 23 9d e8 37 70 eb | 92 d9 12 fd ea ea 58 21 85 5a 89 62 b3 d1 b1 8b | b8 91 88 d0 db bc cf 04 82 7c c8 a8 43 69 1b 1d | 62 90 ee a6 a1 b3 a0 24 f1 23 94 f9 c6 01 28 6f | 2e 10 15 88 89 6b 58 99 7e dd ba 3f cb 9a dc 4c | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 83 f4 e8 37 38 7e cc 72 08 5c cf dd b8 70 45 9b | 3d d4 7d a5 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 83 f4 e8 37 38 7e cc 72 08 5c cf dd b8 70 45 9b | 3d d4 7d a5 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #15: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #16 at 0x55b81b98fa48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #16 in UNDEFINED | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #15 "east" as #16 for IPSEC SA | #16 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #15.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #16: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 2c 60 61 b8 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | 63 07 41 8a 8a 00 a2 f9 a9 18 5e 8d d0 9f 5b 64 | 81 a1 7b 0a c6 f2 c8 80 70 47 d9 18 98 c6 5a bc | 8b a1 ed 4f ab 65 c9 3b f7 fa 3a 90 06 cb 2f 05 | 6a ed 24 36 3a bd 0c 4c 46 e9 00 79 15 29 20 b6 | a3 69 33 63 2d 6a c5 2a aa 35 0f ef d3 6a 6f f1 | f6 b8 70 4d f1 ff 85 e0 dc b1 df ba e7 06 c3 9b | 0b 72 e8 d6 f4 48 6b f7 c1 86 9b 87 0c c3 76 89 | 05 ba 02 45 e8 17 e2 36 84 aa c6 ab 02 00 fc 3a | bf 5e 6f 39 fb f8 75 50 20 ee 0e 7c 42 dd 0c fe | 2c 22 b7 8c ae ea f5 5f 8a cd bc cd 4e 38 c7 4a | 4b f8 96 0b 2a 58 e9 87 2b 5b 0f a8 01 62 62 a5 | b3 da 74 03 20 a3 8c 7b 24 4a 23 9d e8 37 70 eb | 92 d9 12 fd ea ea 58 21 85 5a 89 62 b3 d1 b1 8b | b8 91 88 d0 db bc cf 04 82 7c c8 a8 43 69 1b 1d | 62 90 ee a6 a1 b3 a0 24 f1 23 94 f9 c6 01 28 6f | 2e 10 15 88 89 6b 58 99 7e dd ba 3f cb 9a dc 4c | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 17 for state #16 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #16 and saving MD | #16 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 3 resuming | #15 spent 0.162 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 17 for state #16 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | crypto helper 3 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 17 | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.492 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0088f8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0ec0088f8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 64 f7 22 a5 33 9a 4a ce 35 d0 a5 02 6b 3a ec f4 | 67 82 21 2e 5a 05 c6 d1 be 29 84 a8 41 36 97 c3 | 12 7d c8 51 a3 22 2d 06 f7 2f 82 43 3b 17 16 a8 | e1 a3 3d 6a 7a b6 18 90 5b b2 ca 16 3a bf 7f 10 | f1 ae 74 a0 0b dd 0a 1b 5c 92 9a 1f 60 63 5c 5d | bb e3 8b bf c5 2a b4 9d ec 1c 1f 9e ab be 80 b5 | d0 25 c6 cf cb 74 24 0f ca fa 94 26 7c 52 61 20 | 1b a5 2f a9 66 c8 de 5b eb 03 9b e1 0f df 07 e8 | d3 75 b9 0e e6 e4 94 74 a8 01 89 18 64 7b 37 64 | 5d ec 35 3c 3c 82 0d c7 4e fd b0 92 01 af ad 78 | cd 7e 2d 4a 11 77 d4 62 fb ca 77 2b a6 87 74 58 | f6 54 6c b3 4c ae 13 88 4a c5 b3 a2 d3 e2 50 6f | 1a 4a 2e 7e 8b a8 24 fd cb 04 6a eb 2e 19 08 a0 | fa d1 e4 76 0e 38 f6 61 f5 89 10 64 90 70 85 bf | 12 57 15 4c e4 d6 1e 9f c1 04 c0 4b a8 9b b3 1f | f6 17 85 fd eb e6 29 c9 c5 8b 3f 4d 3c 4a b9 d3 | Generated nonce: cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | Generated nonce: 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | crypto helper 3 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 17 time elapsed 0.000904 seconds | (#16) spent 0.897 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 17: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 17 for state #16 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec005af8 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #16 | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 17 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #16: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0088f8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #16 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0088f8: transferring ownership from state #16 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 18 for state #16 | state #16 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | suspending state #16 and saving MD | #16 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #16 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | crypto helper 4 resuming | #16 spent 0.0474 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 18 for state #16 | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | crypto helper 4 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 18 | peer's g: 63 07 41 8a 8a 00 a2 f9 a9 18 5e 8d d0 9f 5b 64 | peer's g: 81 a1 7b 0a c6 f2 c8 80 70 47 d9 18 98 c6 5a bc | peer's g: 8b a1 ed 4f ab 65 c9 3b f7 fa 3a 90 06 cb 2f 05 | peer's g: 6a ed 24 36 3a bd 0c 4c 46 e9 00 79 15 29 20 b6 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec005af8 | peer's g: a3 69 33 63 2d 6a c5 2a aa 35 0f ef d3 6a 6f f1 | peer's g: f6 b8 70 4d f1 ff 85 e0 dc b1 df ba e7 06 c3 9b | peer's g: 0b 72 e8 d6 f4 48 6b f7 c1 86 9b 87 0c c3 76 89 | peer's g: 05 ba 02 45 e8 17 e2 36 84 aa c6 ab 02 00 fc 3a | peer's g: bf 5e 6f 39 fb f8 75 50 20 ee 0e 7c 42 dd 0c fe | peer's g: 2c 22 b7 8c ae ea f5 5f 8a cd bc cd 4e 38 c7 4a | peer's g: 4b f8 96 0b 2a 58 e9 87 2b 5b 0f a8 01 62 62 a5 | peer's g: b3 da 74 03 20 a3 8c 7b 24 4a 23 9d e8 37 70 eb | peer's g: 92 d9 12 fd ea ea 58 21 85 5a 89 62 b3 d1 b1 8b | peer's g: b8 91 88 d0 db bc cf 04 82 7c c8 a8 43 69 1b 1d | peer's g: 62 90 ee a6 a1 b3 a0 24 f1 23 94 f9 c6 01 28 6f | peer's g: 2e 10 15 88 89 6b 58 99 7e dd ba 3f cb 9a dc 4c | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0088f8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b987630 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 4 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 18 time elapsed 0.000566 seconds | (#16) spent 0.555 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 18: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 18 for state #16 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e00075a8 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #16 | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 18 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #16: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1030941627 (0x3d72ebbb) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 2c 60 61 b8 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+KEY_LENGTH (0x8006) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xf0aa697e for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI f0 aa 69 7e | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #16: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:3d72ebbb} "east" #16: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #16: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | Nr 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 64 f7 22 a5 33 9a 4a ce 35 d0 a5 02 6b 3a ec f4 | keyex value 67 82 21 2e 5a 05 c6 d1 be 29 84 a8 41 36 97 c3 | keyex value 12 7d c8 51 a3 22 2d 06 f7 2f 82 43 3b 17 16 a8 | keyex value e1 a3 3d 6a 7a b6 18 90 5b b2 ca 16 3a bf 7f 10 | keyex value f1 ae 74 a0 0b dd 0a 1b 5c 92 9a 1f 60 63 5c 5d | keyex value bb e3 8b bf c5 2a b4 9d ec 1c 1f 9e ab be 80 b5 | keyex value d0 25 c6 cf cb 74 24 0f ca fa 94 26 7c 52 61 20 | keyex value 1b a5 2f a9 66 c8 de 5b eb 03 9b e1 0f df 07 e8 | keyex value d3 75 b9 0e e6 e4 94 74 a8 01 89 18 64 7b 37 64 | keyex value 5d ec 35 3c 3c 82 0d c7 4e fd b0 92 01 af ad 78 | keyex value cd 7e 2d 4a 11 77 d4 62 fb ca 77 2b a6 87 74 58 | keyex value f6 54 6c b3 4c ae 13 88 4a c5 b3 a2 d3 e2 50 6f | keyex value 1a 4a 2e 7e 8b a8 24 fd cb 04 6a eb 2e 19 08 a0 | keyex value fa d1 e4 76 0e 38 f6 61 f5 89 10 64 90 70 85 bf | keyex value 12 57 15 4c e4 d6 1e 9f c1 04 c0 4b a8 9b b3 1f | keyex value f6 17 85 fd eb e6 29 c9 c5 8b 3f 4d 3c 4a b9 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0088f8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a88 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54342b6c (length 4) | 3d 72 eb bb | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b8198d38f4 (length 384) | 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c | 00 03 04 01 f0 aa 69 7e 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 04 00 00 24 cc a0 86 0a | 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f 01 8f 3b 9b | 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 05 00 01 04 | 64 f7 22 a5 33 9a 4a ce 35 d0 a5 02 6b 3a ec f4 | 67 82 21 2e 5a 05 c6 d1 be 29 84 a8 41 36 97 c3 | 12 7d c8 51 a3 22 2d 06 f7 2f 82 43 3b 17 16 a8 | e1 a3 3d 6a 7a b6 18 90 5b b2 ca 16 3a bf 7f 10 | f1 ae 74 a0 0b dd 0a 1b 5c 92 9a 1f 60 63 5c 5d | bb e3 8b bf c5 2a b4 9d ec 1c 1f 9e ab be 80 b5 | d0 25 c6 cf cb 74 24 0f ca fa 94 26 7c 52 61 20 | 1b a5 2f a9 66 c8 de 5b eb 03 9b e1 0f df 07 e8 | d3 75 b9 0e e6 e4 94 74 a8 01 89 18 64 7b 37 64 | 5d ec 35 3c 3c 82 0d c7 4e fd b0 92 01 af ad 78 | cd 7e 2d 4a 11 77 d4 62 fb ca 77 2b a6 87 74 58 | f6 54 6c b3 4c ae 13 88 4a c5 b3 a2 d3 e2 50 6f | 1a 4a 2e 7e 8b a8 24 fd cb 04 6a eb 2e 19 08 a0 | fa d1 e4 76 0e 38 f6 61 f5 89 10 64 90 70 85 bf | 12 57 15 4c e4 d6 1e 9f c1 04 c0 4b a8 9b b3 1f | f6 17 85 fd eb e6 29 c9 c5 8b 3f 4d 3c 4a b9 d3 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 20) | 83 26 6d 84 64 3f 4b bf fb af d9 df f2 ff 8a 88 | af d2 95 e8 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 83 26 6d 84 64 3f 4b bf fb af d9 df f2 ff 8a 88 | af d2 95 e8 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=16 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=36 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 08 25 50 f0 af a6 8e 72 e1 cf ab c6 c1 f1 d4 fb ca 5e b9 42 28 61 bb e7 2c c6 5c 2d 0e 2b b4 23 63 e0 ee 0b a0 0b 7a 73 92 ca 36 f0 29 5f 26 24 3d 96 32 ff 31 ab b4 4c db 83 6e fc 33 9c 00 51 3f 00 83 97 bf 21 73 c5 5c 1e ca bf 7e ea 4c 81 4d de 8f 65 44 5d 59 27 a1 33 46 c1 a1 e8 e4 ed 99 0f 38 6a 93 c0 6b 74 ea fb 28 cf 7d fd b6 bc b6 78 0f 0a c1 c6 b9 b6 a9 b3 b3 c0 5a b8 7c df 5b b8 92 5f 1f bb a1 f2 4e ee b0 a3 03 c5 bb 32 ee 82 47 8a 6b 4b cb c2 8e a0 3b 52 37 78 ca c7 97 4d d3 16 77 43 08 2b 0f d7 c2 2a 3c 22 91 c4 e8 5f 48 34 e6 68 ed 63 6a 35 63 65 82 32 ae 9d 2e de fd 28 52 fd be af a8 eb 33 b3 57 d1 64 32 52 63 08 84 0b 9b bd 30 6d 67 a1 1e a6 17 8d 48 af 46 d8 cf 7e 74 9f 81 56 05 cf b7 0c 57 bc 26 2c e2 4e ee f7 37 fd 54 f5 f5 6e f0 1c da 05 c1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 64 cf b2 d5 ef e5 6e b1 58 3c bc 89 5f 78 5c 41 | unwrapped: 49 92 e1 02 21 0c 14 f1 60 21 bf 05 d2 24 e8 ba | unwrapped: 44 f7 a9 0d e7 d8 3b ff 67 1b 68 b3 ca 4d b5 4a | unwrapped: 2c 5b ce 98 7d 16 02 7a a3 5d 34 ff ed d4 6e 6c | unwrapped: ad 4b 34 1d 17 0e 16 0c 74 00 ea e7 79 b4 ab 35 | unwrapped: 1a eb 2d 77 6c 29 bf dc 00 63 fe 08 ce e0 91 3b | unwrapped: 95 c4 b1 a6 62 e0 f1 9f 2b aa dd 2c 24 ee f3 28 | unwrapped: 61 39 55 51 23 66 5e fb 48 d3 8f 49 6c 94 43 82 | unwrapped: 51 bf bf 30 f2 08 94 03 d0 f8 eb ba 10 83 b0 1c | unwrapped: 0a 94 ce f7 ef 2f 2a f5 7c 49 fc 5f 42 e0 4e d5 | unwrapped: 35 e6 ab 19 27 55 53 8c 31 e2 a9 7f 0e a9 72 76 | unwrapped: 87 6f b2 90 91 cc a2 ca 7e 82 64 da dc aa 6e 41 | unwrapped: 62 6e b5 cc 5c 0b 73 b6 c5 e2 23 2f 73 5c 55 58 | unwrapped: 94 74 3c 44 c8 d5 b4 4c 84 28 bf ac fa 18 97 b9 | unwrapped: 0b 0c 6c 20 ca d8 90 3c a8 3f 6a 88 8f 59 d2 66 | unwrapped: 81 c9 a4 c0 8b fb 30 7e b9 f0 dd bf d5 8f 75 41 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 08 25 50 f0 af a6 8e 72 e1 cf ab c6 c1 f1 d4 fb ca 5e b9 42 28 61 bb e7 2c c6 5c 2d 0e 2b b4 23 63 e0 ee 0b a0 0b 7a 73 92 ca 36 f0 29 5f 26 24 3d 96 32 ff 31 ab b4 4c db 83 6e fc 33 9c 00 51 3f 00 83 97 bf 21 73 c5 5c 1e ca bf 7e ea 4c 81 4d de 8f 65 44 5d 59 27 a1 33 46 c1 a1 e8 e4 ed 99 0f 38 6a 93 c0 6b 74 ea fb 28 cf 7d fd b6 bc b6 78 0f 0a c1 c6 b9 b6 a9 b3 b3 c0 5a b8 7c df 5b b8 92 5f 1f bb a1 f2 4e ee b0 a3 03 c5 bb 32 ee 82 47 8a 6b 4b cb c2 8e a0 3b 52 37 78 ca c7 97 4d d3 16 77 43 08 2b 0f d7 c2 2a 3c 22 91 c4 e8 5f 48 34 e6 68 ed 63 6a 35 63 65 82 32 ae 9d 2e de fd 28 52 fd be af a8 eb 33 b3 57 d1 64 32 52 63 08 84 0b 9b bd 30 6d 67 a1 1e a6 17 8d 48 af 46 d8 cf 7e 74 9f 81 56 05 cf b7 0c 57 bc 26 2c e2 4e ee f7 37 fd 54 f5 f5 6e f0 1c da 05 c1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 64 cf b2 d5 ef e5 6e b1 58 3c bc 89 5f 78 5c 41 | unwrapped: 49 92 e1 02 21 0c 14 f1 60 21 bf 05 d2 24 e8 ba | unwrapped: 44 f7 a9 0d e7 d8 3b ff 67 1b 68 b3 ca 4d b5 4a | unwrapped: 2c 5b ce 98 7d 16 02 7a a3 5d 34 ff ed d4 6e 6c | unwrapped: ad 4b 34 1d 17 0e 16 0c 74 00 ea e7 79 b4 ab 35 | unwrapped: 1a eb 2d 77 6c 29 bf dc 00 63 fe 08 ce e0 91 3b | unwrapped: 95 c4 b1 a6 62 e0 f1 9f 2b aa dd 2c 24 ee f3 28 | unwrapped: 61 39 55 51 23 66 5e fb 48 d3 8f 49 6c 94 43 82 | unwrapped: 51 bf bf 30 f2 08 94 03 d0 f8 eb ba 10 83 b0 1c | unwrapped: 0a 94 ce f7 ef 2f 2a f5 7c 49 fc 5f 42 e0 4e d5 | unwrapped: 35 e6 ab 19 27 55 53 8c 31 e2 a9 7f 0e a9 72 76 | unwrapped: 87 6f b2 90 91 cc a2 ca 7e 82 64 da dc aa 6e 41 | unwrapped: 62 6e b5 cc 5c 0b 73 b6 c5 e2 23 2f 73 5c 55 58 | unwrapped: 94 74 3c 44 c8 d5 b4 4c 84 28 bf ac fa 18 97 b9 | unwrapped: 0b 0c 6c 20 ca d8 90 3c a8 3f 6a 88 8f 59 d2 66 | unwrapped: 81 c9 a4 c0 8b fb 30 7e b9 f0 dd bf d5 8f 75 41 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98fc50 (length 4) | f0 aa 69 7e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98fc30 (length 4) | 2c 60 61 b8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec003758 (length 32) | cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec003758 (length 32) | cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e0003748 (length 20) | 81 c5 cf 5a ea 0d b1 45 d3 a1 9a 00 8b 19 cd 1b | c8 1c b8 1b | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e4002888 (length 20) | ee 1e d7 62 cb fc d5 e3 ed 74 0a 47 2b 87 64 ab | 40 09 1f eb | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003748 (length 20) | 81 c5 cf 5a ea 0d b1 45 d3 a1 9a 00 8b 19 cd 1b | c8 1c b8 1b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4002888 (length 20) | ee 1e d7 62 cb fc d5 e3 ed 74 0a 47 2b 87 64 ab | 40 09 1f eb | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 08 25 50 f0 af a6 8e 72 e1 cf ab c6 c1 f1 d4 fb ca 5e b9 42 28 61 bb e7 2c c6 5c 2d 0e 2b b4 23 63 e0 ee 0b a0 0b 7a 73 92 ca 36 f0 29 5f 26 24 3d 96 32 ff 31 ab b4 4c db 83 6e fc 33 9c 00 51 3f 00 83 97 bf 21 73 c5 5c 1e ca bf 7e ea 4c 81 4d de 8f 65 44 5d 59 27 a1 33 46 c1 a1 e8 e4 ed 99 0f 38 6a 93 c0 6b 74 ea fb 28 cf 7d fd b6 bc b6 78 0f 0a c1 c6 b9 b6 a9 b3 b3 c0 5a b8 7c df 5b b8 92 5f 1f bb a1 f2 4e ee b0 a3 03 c5 bb 32 ee 82 47 8a 6b 4b cb c2 8e a0 3b 52 37 78 ca c7 97 4d d3 16 77 43 08 2b 0f d7 c2 2a 3c 22 91 c4 e8 5f 48 34 e6 68 ed 63 6a 35 63 65 82 32 ae 9d 2e de fd 28 52 fd be af a8 eb 33 b3 57 d1 64 32 52 63 08 84 0b 9b bd 30 6d 67 a1 1e a6 17 8d 48 af 46 d8 cf 7e 74 9f 81 56 05 cf b7 0c 57 bc 26 2c e2 4e ee f7 37 fd 54 f5 f5 6e f0 1c da 05 c1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 64 cf b2 d5 ef e5 6e b1 58 3c bc 89 5f 78 5c 41 | unwrapped: 49 92 e1 02 21 0c 14 f1 60 21 bf 05 d2 24 e8 ba | unwrapped: 44 f7 a9 0d e7 d8 3b ff 67 1b 68 b3 ca 4d b5 4a | unwrapped: 2c 5b ce 98 7d 16 02 7a a3 5d 34 ff ed d4 6e 6c | unwrapped: ad 4b 34 1d 17 0e 16 0c 74 00 ea e7 79 b4 ab 35 | unwrapped: 1a eb 2d 77 6c 29 bf dc 00 63 fe 08 ce e0 91 3b | unwrapped: 95 c4 b1 a6 62 e0 f1 9f 2b aa dd 2c 24 ee f3 28 | unwrapped: 61 39 55 51 23 66 5e fb 48 d3 8f 49 6c 94 43 82 | unwrapped: 51 bf bf 30 f2 08 94 03 d0 f8 eb ba 10 83 b0 1c | unwrapped: 0a 94 ce f7 ef 2f 2a f5 7c 49 fc 5f 42 e0 4e d5 | unwrapped: 35 e6 ab 19 27 55 53 8c 31 e2 a9 7f 0e a9 72 76 | unwrapped: 87 6f b2 90 91 cc a2 ca 7e 82 64 da dc aa 6e 41 | unwrapped: 62 6e b5 cc 5c 0b 73 b6 c5 e2 23 2f 73 5c 55 58 | unwrapped: 94 74 3c 44 c8 d5 b4 4c 84 28 bf ac fa 18 97 b9 | unwrapped: 0b 0c 6c 20 ca d8 90 3c a8 3f 6a 88 8f 59 d2 66 | unwrapped: 81 c9 a4 c0 8b fb 30 7e b9 f0 dd bf d5 8f 75 41 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 08 25 50 f0 af a6 8e 72 e1 cf ab c6 c1 f1 d4 fb ca 5e b9 42 28 61 bb e7 2c c6 5c 2d 0e 2b b4 23 63 e0 ee 0b a0 0b 7a 73 92 ca 36 f0 29 5f 26 24 3d 96 32 ff 31 ab b4 4c db 83 6e fc 33 9c 00 51 3f 00 83 97 bf 21 73 c5 5c 1e ca bf 7e ea 4c 81 4d de 8f 65 44 5d 59 27 a1 33 46 c1 a1 e8 e4 ed 99 0f 38 6a 93 c0 6b 74 ea fb 28 cf 7d fd b6 bc b6 78 0f 0a c1 c6 b9 b6 a9 b3 b3 c0 5a b8 7c df 5b b8 92 5f 1f bb a1 f2 4e ee b0 a3 03 c5 bb 32 ee 82 47 8a 6b 4b cb c2 8e a0 3b 52 37 78 ca c7 97 4d d3 16 77 43 08 2b 0f d7 c2 2a 3c 22 91 c4 e8 5f 48 34 e6 68 ed 63 6a 35 63 65 82 32 ae 9d 2e de fd 28 52 fd be af a8 eb 33 b3 57 d1 64 32 52 63 08 84 0b 9b bd 30 6d 67 a1 1e a6 17 8d 48 af 46 d8 cf 7e 74 9f 81 56 05 cf b7 0c 57 bc 26 2c e2 4e ee f7 37 fd 54 f5 f5 6e f0 1c da 05 c1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 64 cf b2 d5 ef e5 6e b1 58 3c bc 89 5f 78 5c 41 | unwrapped: 49 92 e1 02 21 0c 14 f1 60 21 bf 05 d2 24 e8 ba | unwrapped: 44 f7 a9 0d e7 d8 3b ff 67 1b 68 b3 ca 4d b5 4a | unwrapped: 2c 5b ce 98 7d 16 02 7a a3 5d 34 ff ed d4 6e 6c | unwrapped: ad 4b 34 1d 17 0e 16 0c 74 00 ea e7 79 b4 ab 35 | unwrapped: 1a eb 2d 77 6c 29 bf dc 00 63 fe 08 ce e0 91 3b | unwrapped: 95 c4 b1 a6 62 e0 f1 9f 2b aa dd 2c 24 ee f3 28 | unwrapped: 61 39 55 51 23 66 5e fb 48 d3 8f 49 6c 94 43 82 | unwrapped: 51 bf bf 30 f2 08 94 03 d0 f8 eb ba 10 83 b0 1c | unwrapped: 0a 94 ce f7 ef 2f 2a f5 7c 49 fc 5f 42 e0 4e d5 | unwrapped: 35 e6 ab 19 27 55 53 8c 31 e2 a9 7f 0e a9 72 76 | unwrapped: 87 6f b2 90 91 cc a2 ca 7e 82 64 da dc aa 6e 41 | unwrapped: 62 6e b5 cc 5c 0b 73 b6 c5 e2 23 2f 73 5c 55 58 | unwrapped: 94 74 3c 44 c8 d5 b4 4c 84 28 bf ac fa 18 97 b9 | unwrapped: 0b 0c 6c 20 ca d8 90 3c a8 3f 6a 88 8f 59 d2 66 | unwrapped: 81 c9 a4 c0 8b fb 30 7e b9 f0 dd bf d5 8f 75 41 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98fc50 (length 4) | f0 aa 69 7e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98fc30 (length 4) | 2c 60 61 b8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec003758 (length 32) | cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec003758 (length 32) | cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e000375c (length 20) | 93 41 6d 0c e8 9b 6c 73 d5 0f fa c3 e3 bb d6 ce | 73 39 10 b8 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e400289c (length 20) | 30 d6 49 ee 5f ec 8b 4d 6b e8 f2 ae bb c2 d0 95 | bf c2 b3 ed | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55b81b98fa48 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#16 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.2c6061b8@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_CBC keylen: 128 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt AES_CBC keylen=128 transid=12, key_size=16, encryptalg=12 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=16 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.f0aa697e@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 83 26 6d 84 64 3f 4b bf fb af d9 df | encrypting: f2 ff 8a 88 af d2 95 e8 0a 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 03 04 01 f0 aa 69 7e | encrypting: 00 00 00 20 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 80 06 00 80 | encrypting: 04 00 00 24 cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 | encrypting: 8f f9 68 4f 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 | encrypting: cc 58 e5 66 05 00 01 04 64 f7 22 a5 33 9a 4a ce | encrypting: 35 d0 a5 02 6b 3a ec f4 67 82 21 2e 5a 05 c6 d1 | encrypting: be 29 84 a8 41 36 97 c3 12 7d c8 51 a3 22 2d 06 | encrypting: f7 2f 82 43 3b 17 16 a8 e1 a3 3d 6a 7a b6 18 90 | encrypting: 5b b2 ca 16 3a bf 7f 10 f1 ae 74 a0 0b dd 0a 1b | encrypting: 5c 92 9a 1f 60 63 5c 5d bb e3 8b bf c5 2a b4 9d | encrypting: ec 1c 1f 9e ab be 80 b5 d0 25 c6 cf cb 74 24 0f | encrypting: ca fa 94 26 7c 52 61 20 1b a5 2f a9 66 c8 de 5b | encrypting: eb 03 9b e1 0f df 07 e8 d3 75 b9 0e e6 e4 94 74 | encrypting: a8 01 89 18 64 7b 37 64 5d ec 35 3c 3c 82 0d c7 | encrypting: 4e fd b0 92 01 af ad 78 cd 7e 2d 4a 11 77 d4 62 | encrypting: fb ca 77 2b a6 87 74 58 f6 54 6c b3 4c ae 13 88 | encrypting: 4a c5 b3 a2 d3 e2 50 6f 1a 4a 2e 7e 8b a8 24 fd | encrypting: cb 04 6a eb 2e 19 08 a0 fa d1 e4 76 0e 38 f6 61 | encrypting: f5 89 10 64 90 70 85 bf 12 57 15 4c e4 d6 1e 9f | encrypting: c1 04 c0 4b a8 9b b3 1f f6 17 85 fd eb e6 29 c9 | encrypting: c5 8b 3f 4d 3c 4a b9 d3 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 | encrypting: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | IV: a4 f2 1f c1 dd 69 f8 b0 ba b2 c5 78 5b 04 5a e5 | unpadded size is: 408 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 416 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 444 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: e8 f6 46 7b 0d 43 39 ac d1 6a 92 12 3f 52 26 ab | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #16 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #16: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #16 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 444 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #16) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 20 01 3d 72 eb bb 00 00 01 bc d5 83 85 07 | 7a 97 12 34 6f 28 ec 5b 57 9a f2 1b 60 65 f2 b4 | 5f 6c 95 5a 90 62 61 37 11 e2 d4 d6 37 a5 31 6a | 2f 93 ad cf 0a 56 0b 25 fd a8 cb c4 58 d8 83 59 | 3a d3 43 6e 9a d5 b9 ac c9 87 8d 33 3c b7 d7 17 | d3 cb 67 a6 4b 90 a3 52 a9 29 3b c0 59 bb fa c3 | 52 d8 e8 38 18 2a 0b 63 07 b2 f4 76 c9 f9 50 e9 | 6c be 66 7c d6 d4 a7 09 85 d7 bb 62 51 15 bb 8f | 13 07 b9 29 ee ef ba a0 0c a2 8c 67 8f 78 8a 76 | a6 2d 61 21 24 80 0b 81 69 ef 5b eb d0 28 dc 82 | 7a f5 4f 61 61 7b 28 06 d5 70 0d 12 9e 72 b4 f1 | 96 34 09 3c 86 61 e1 00 96 c3 65 32 01 fc a5 4a | 75 ea 1a ce 7d 69 cc cc 7d 39 36 53 0c d6 96 0b | 4e f1 38 bc 8e 9e ab 42 96 0b 8a c4 e3 c2 3d 84 | 8b c2 ef f3 e4 7f c4 97 28 1e 63 38 7b 9f a2 d3 | 5a d5 19 4a 79 24 1c 4d c6 18 4e 99 82 e6 71 46 | dd 4f 1f 3d 66 a2 08 3c 47 95 63 b7 a2 0a 78 96 | 5d d3 55 f2 65 a4 58 11 8b e5 f1 e9 76 d0 d6 9d | ea ad e2 ef 00 2e 73 8e 91 0c af ca 1f f9 d0 e7 | dc 06 b7 47 d7 f8 e2 11 a0 b9 2c 6c d4 e7 81 6d | e0 a7 08 2c b1 d7 6c da 8b 09 39 8f f6 57 04 9f | cd a6 70 12 77 27 9a f1 0b fe 37 3d 72 46 68 11 | 64 b0 d8 3c 85 c6 d2 c1 a0 55 6a 41 69 cd 0c 25 | 9a 2c 47 a0 1c 82 3b 5e 2c d9 d3 63 40 cb 44 a2 | 8c a1 ba 60 45 70 5e b1 16 bf 47 39 94 0f 68 4a | cf a7 8b e1 bb 87 37 6b 0e fd b9 a0 e8 f6 46 7b | 0d 43 39 ac d1 6a 92 12 3f 52 26 ab | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec005af8 size 128 | #16 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10453.213469 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #16: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x2c6061b8 <0xf0aa697e xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #16 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #16 spent 1.29 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e00075a8 | spent 0.00289 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 60 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 20 01 3d 72 eb bb 00 00 00 3c 9d f9 35 a2 | 48 bf f0 d9 fe 91 d2 68 02 b4 49 c8 d6 e3 27 57 | c0 67 8b e5 2c 4c a4 77 fb 13 37 dd | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1030941627 (0x3d72ebbb) | length: 60 (0x3c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #16 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1633) | #16 is idle | #16 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 32 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: e8 f6 46 7b 0d 43 39 ac d1 6a 92 12 3f 52 26 ab | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: d6 e3 27 57 c0 67 8b e5 2c 4c a4 77 fb 13 37 dd | decrypted payload (starts at offset -32): | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 20 01 3d 72 eb bb 00 00 00 3c 00 00 00 18 | 39 4c e5 bf d6 b5 2e 13 9e 6a 48 5b ba 06 6e 81 | 8b 76 1d 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 3d 72 eb bb | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 70 e9 85 d8 2e 7c 21 5f bf 12 be b1 9e 51 3f 42 | 07 b7 86 fe ea d9 c6 1f 31 1e 78 52 d3 6c 55 cb | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fa0ec003758 (length 32) | cc a0 86 0a 45 06 49 f6 54 2e a7 d2 8f f9 68 4f | 01 8f 3b 9b 01 a2 64 73 3a 71 c5 52 cc 58 e5 66 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 39 4c e5 bf d6 b5 2e 13 9e 6a 48 5b ba 06 6e 81 | 8b 76 1d 12 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | 39 4c e5 bf d6 b5 2e 13 9e 6a 48 5b ba 06 6e 81 | 8b 76 1d 12 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #16: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #16: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #16 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2c6061b8 SPI_OUT=0xf0a | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x2c6061b8 SPI_OUT=0xf0aa697e ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55b81b988648,sr=0x55b81b988648} to #16 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #15 spent 0.551 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #16 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#16) cloned from #15 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #16 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #16: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #16 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #16 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec005af8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e00075a8 size 128 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #16: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x2c6061b8 <0xf0aa697e xfrm=AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #16 spent 0.624 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.826 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00334 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00272 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 05 01 82 18 3f 0d 00 00 00 4c 93 a8 2a 6d | 98 d2 27 b6 19 ff 52 df fb d8 5d 1f 0b 8b a3 b8 | 2a 12 13 da 89 2c 48 95 7a f3 4d 20 cf 53 9c 98 | 48 5b 92 8e 92 f5 e4 da d9 68 a7 f9 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2182627085 (0x82183f0d) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #16; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=3d72ebbb st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #15; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #15 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | current Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 82 18 3f 0d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 3e fe 91 71 d5 91 93 07 b6 ae 6a bd d3 fe 6f 8f | 90 81 fb 60 | #15 is idle | #15 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 3e fe 91 71 d5 91 93 07 b6 ae 6a bd d3 fe 6f 8f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: cf 53 9c 98 48 5b 92 8e 92 f5 e4 da d9 68 a7 f9 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 05 01 82 18 3f 0d 00 00 00 4c 0c 00 00 18 | 93 4b cb 92 a9 2f 4d a2 13 ad 64 06 7e b1 8d ea | 84 58 c0 6f 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 2c 60 61 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 8 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 82 18 3f 0d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98771c (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 2c 60 61 b8 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 93 4b cb 92 a9 2f 4d a2 13 ad 64 06 7e b1 8d ea | 84 58 c0 6f | informational HASH(1): | 93 4b cb 92 a9 2f 4d a2 13 ad 64 06 7e b1 8d ea | 84 58 c0 6f | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 2c 60 61 b8 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2515) "east" #15: received Delete SA(0x2c6061b8) payload: deleting IPsec State #16 | pstats #16 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #16 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #16: deleting other state #16 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.085s and sending notification | child state #16: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.2c6061b8@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.f0aa697e@192.1.2.23 "east" #16: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #16 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1369939241 (0x51a79d29) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload f0 aa 69 7e | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340928 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a0c (length 4) | 51 a7 9d 29 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340db4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 f0 aa 69 7e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340da0 (length 20) | c2 54 ae 25 5f 60 a4 5f 1b 80 24 1a 30 07 79 e7 | 1d a9 0f c7 | send delete HASH(1): | c2 54 ae 25 5f 60 a4 5f 1b 80 24 1a 30 07 79 e7 | 1d a9 0f c7 | last Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | current Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a1c (length 4) | 51 a7 9d 29 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 99 4c f6 09 1d 66 90 ca 66 89 55 a7 cc 28 d4 9f | eb 53 e8 bb | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 c2 54 ae 25 5f 60 a4 5f 1b 80 24 1a | encrypting: 30 07 79 e7 1d a9 0f c7 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 f0 aa 69 7e | IV: 99 4c f6 09 1d 66 90 ca 66 89 55 a7 cc 28 d4 9f | IV: eb 53 e8 bb | unpadded size is: 40 | emitting 8 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 51 41 49 ed 96 66 57 a0 aa 2e 7e 71 6b 2b 6d 0c | sending 76 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 05 01 51 a7 9d 29 00 00 00 4c fa fa c7 95 | fa bc f6 16 21 7e e8 a1 72 56 85 19 5b 78 d6 2d | ae 13 ea bd cf 90 a4 13 fe 86 ae 44 51 41 49 ed | 96 66 57 a0 aa 2e 7e 71 6b 2b 6d 0c | state #16 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e00075a8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0f0002b78 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825167' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2c6061b8 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825167' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2c6061b8 SPI_OUT=0xf0aa697e ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 0--0->-0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.2c6061b8@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.2c6061b8@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.f0aa697e@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.f0aa697e@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4076) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4077) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #16 in QUICK_R2 | child state #16: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0ec0088f8: destroyed | stop processing: state #16 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #15 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #15 | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #15 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #15 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #15: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.104s and sending notification | parent state #15: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #15 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4232206226 (0xfc425792) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543408c8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e0002f08 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543409ac (length 4) | fc 42 57 92 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340d54 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 d5 80 2b 12 | 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340d40 (length 20) | 8c c9 18 a3 d9 8b c0 b8 d3 3f 86 38 ef a9 f7 aa | 80 41 fb 09 | send delete HASH(1): | 8c c9 18 a3 d9 8b c0 b8 d3 3f 86 38 ef a9 f7 aa | 80 41 fb 09 | last Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | current Phase 1 IV: 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 53 58 3c ab 6f ac 4c 79 b1 39 66 ee bc b8 0d 98 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe543409bc (length 4) | fc 42 57 92 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | be 6d 60 42 4b 0b 1a d6 2d 0b b1 25 00 e5 4b 15 | 3b 35 c1 4d | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 8c c9 18 a3 d9 8b c0 b8 d3 3f 86 38 | encrypting: ef a9 f7 aa 80 41 fb 09 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a | encrypting: 11 28 a8 8d | IV: be 6d 60 42 4b 0b 1a d6 2d 0b b1 25 00 e5 4b 15 | IV: 3b 35 c1 4d | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: ff 02 1f 9d ae 27 fb 7c d8 32 af 4d fa 17 9f bb | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #15) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 05 01 fc 42 57 92 00 00 00 5c 0f 8f 35 aa | 2f 8f 5a 32 d5 7a e4 2b b7 84 19 c8 40 c3 b6 af | 3f 76 7f cd 63 a6 ef c2 fc 31 b1 b1 c5 ef b0 ef | 04 bf a3 e4 27 39 cf 1c e2 92 36 80 ff 02 1f 9d | ae 27 fb 7c d8 32 af 4d fa 17 9f bb | state #15 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001698 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #15 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #15: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0f0006f48: destroyed | stop processing: state #15 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2556) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2559) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 2.24 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00488 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00184 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | 08 10 05 01 73 bd d1 ef 00 00 00 5c 28 f8 b3 2a | e6 96 04 8a db 61 5d dc fe 9d df 2e 55 dd 1b ee | ba 02 31 0b b1 a0 ea 31 d7 bb 61 d6 d8 3b 89 8c | 5b 41 5f d3 05 eb b5 44 7a 0a 45 0c 31 c7 09 0a | be 49 da 7b 03 12 cd 60 57 aa be 43 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | responder cookie: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1941819887 (0x73bdd1ef) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0x73bdd1ef | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | d5 80 2b 12 69 31 15 e5 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | 17 f2 a3 4a 11 28 a8 8d | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0654 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00325 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 0b 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f e8 d0 da 0f 6a 61 74 71 | 5c 2e 98 9e d0 e5 28 f1 76 8b f2 de c9 0e 0a b7 | creating state object #17 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #17 in UNDEFINED | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp started | #17 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #17: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #17: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 7 (0x7) | [7 is OAKLEY_AES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES_CBC=7, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 80 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #17 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #17: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.487 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00235 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | 14 00 00 24 82 6a cc 3e e1 f1 ef 4f 08 4a cc c8 | e7 5f f8 0b 55 f1 3d b4 f3 b7 1d 4e 94 fd 1a 2b | 3e 44 c1 4f 14 00 00 18 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 | c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 38 23 5d 7b 00 00 00 18 | 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | 29 0f 56 16 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #17 is idle | #17 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | 38 23 5d 7b | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | natd_hash: rcookie= 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | natd_hash: hash= 38 23 5d 7b | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | 29 0f 56 16 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | natd_hash: rcookie= 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | natd_hash: hash= 29 0f 56 16 | expected NAT-D(me): 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | expected NAT-D(me): 38 23 5d 7b | expected NAT-D(him): | 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | 29 0f 56 16 | received NAT-D: 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | received NAT-D: 38 23 5d 7b | received NAT-D: 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | received NAT-D: 29 0f 56 16 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 19 for state #17 | state #17 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 19 for state #17 | crypto helper 1 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 19 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e40045b8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0e40045b8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | Generated nonce: a6 0f 9a 61 86 a4 e9 d8 85 09 2f b3 dc 40 c5 07 | Generated nonce: ec a4 d9 a5 dd 8a 6d 9f 53 e7 a5 59 2e e4 7c b9 | crypto helper 1 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 19 time elapsed 0.001013 seconds | (#17) spent 1.01 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 19: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 19 for state #17 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4004768 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #17 and saving MD | #17 is busy; has a suspended MD | #17 spent 0.217 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.38 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #17 | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 19 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #17: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e40045b8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #17 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | keyex value bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | keyex value 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | keyex value d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | keyex value bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | keyex value 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | keyex value 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | keyex value 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | keyex value a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | keyex value 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | keyex value 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | keyex value 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | keyex value 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | keyex value 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | keyex value 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | keyex value 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr a6 0f 9a 61 86 a4 e9 d8 85 09 2f b3 dc 40 c5 07 | Nr ec a4 d9 a5 dd 8a 6d 9f 53 e7 a5 59 2e e4 7c b9 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | 29 0f 56 16 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | natd_hash: rcookie= 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | natd_hash: hash= 29 0f 56 16 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 | NAT-D 29 0f 56 16 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | 38 23 5d 7b | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | natd_hash: rcookie= 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | natd_hash: hash= 38 23 5d 7b | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | NAT-D 38 23 5d 7b | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e40045b8: transferring ownership from state #17 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 20 for state #17 | state #17 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #17 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #17 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #17: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #17 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | crypto helper 5 resuming | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 20 for state #17 | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | crypto helper 5 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 20 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | peer's g: 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | peer's g: 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | peer's g: 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | peer's g: 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | peer's g: 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | peer's g: 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | peer's g: 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | peer's g: 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | peer's g: 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | peer's g: b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | peer's g: c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | 14 00 00 24 a6 0f 9a 61 86 a4 e9 d8 85 09 2f b3 | dc 40 c5 07 ec a4 d9 a5 dd 8a 6d 9f 53 e7 a5 59 | peer's g: c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | peer's g: 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | 2e e4 7c b9 14 00 00 18 27 15 14 25 9d 15 19 ce | ad 68 9e f8 83 ca 95 25 29 0f 56 16 00 00 00 18 | 51 6d 92 bc 0d bb 70 f2 c6 c0 33 25 16 06 10 84 | 38 23 5d 7b | peer's g: dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | peer's g: bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | peer's g: 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #17 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10453.720377 "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #17 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #17 spent 0.49 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4004768 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e40045b8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b976790 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b995888 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80010b8 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b9958ac (length 32) | 82 6a cc 3e e1 f1 ef 4f 08 4a cc c8 e7 5f f8 0b | 55 f1 3d b4 f3 b7 1d 4e 94 fd 1a 2b 3e 44 c1 4f | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b9958cc (length 32) | a6 0f 9a 61 86 a4 e9 d8 85 09 2f b3 dc 40 c5 07 | ec a4 d9 a5 dd 8a 6d 9f 53 e7 a5 59 2e e4 7c b9 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001108 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: af fb 33 cb 22 17 40 11 70 f9 95 b5 c1 67 8c 53 ca 85 10 8b 4d 84 99 0c 7a c1 88 86 cb e8 93 be 42 c3 70 be 18 55 14 fb 7b 36 c3 c1 c7 13 55 ce 4a 70 40 2d 88 28 6e 6d 15 81 10 70 61 46 8a 8f ea 98 ad d5 ae a4 ad 9a ba 5a eb 78 8e 2d 8a 07 90 c3 2d ef e4 f6 b7 69 87 ed e8 51 b5 ea fd e9 1a 1a 4a e6 55 7c b9 50 80 89 c5 9d 1c 7c d9 09 65 16 0c 6e 11 e5 c2 10 d3 b4 5b e1 f4 80 8e 4b 39 7c 1c ad ae 02 2b dd 57 3d 80 ff 19 d6 87 b9 00 c4 0b 0a 09 ef fa 00 c0 6e 2c 97 a1 0e e7 56 ed 70 c0 83 a7 a4 0e a6 3a 17 a1 24 93 47 b0 ad 89 7b 10 5b 34 9a ea 70 f0 8b 0e cf bc 8d 03 98 d1 af 74 9f a1 ba 76 ac 4e 6b d5 a6 9c 43 e8 3b 6b e1 3f 6d 04 b8 58 c3 6d 1d ea 56 22 80 fc 53 5d 02 ca d0 15 d9 34 91 76 03 79 6b 17 9a a9 65 11 be 0a ae 1a 94 9c 04 69 7a fa 57 6f ee 6f a9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0d8003db8 | unwrapped: 02 78 9b df 0e 57 71 6b 6a c3 4e 91 d4 3a fa 43 | unwrapped: 53 6b 0d 70 9a 40 11 88 ea d0 0a e2 30 be b8 88 | unwrapped: 7e 47 61 f1 6e 6f 30 15 70 aa c0 e7 1b 4f 2a 2c | unwrapped: fd c0 4b 49 f1 91 61 53 21 99 73 b3 a1 76 37 77 | unwrapped: b5 ad fc 51 0d 63 fa c3 66 cf 74 89 26 04 00 35 | unwrapped: b9 09 54 53 40 19 2e 64 f1 67 38 11 f0 23 5f a4 | unwrapped: 64 4d 37 a0 8c 1f 20 2e b7 a7 65 af 69 02 59 78 | unwrapped: 49 ad 3d b1 80 f8 36 b1 57 ce df 50 d2 15 fd fe | unwrapped: 18 0e 8c 50 2d 72 a5 17 b9 86 cf c9 1e a5 c5 ba | unwrapped: 83 64 c2 42 12 37 7f 77 14 7e 3f e1 e1 84 ff 14 | unwrapped: f1 8e 80 8a 27 0f 32 d7 06 c9 d3 d8 cc fa 67 3a | unwrapped: 67 8a 8d af 3f 2c 19 b5 7b e8 16 09 01 8e 8e 65 | unwrapped: dd 51 e9 82 cf da d6 99 f6 34 ad 0c 0b 0a 27 38 | unwrapped: 04 21 77 bf ae 0f 9d 4a 2d 67 86 b1 cf 32 8b 61 | unwrapped: e8 31 64 7d 97 94 5f 3e ba 8e 89 6e 02 25 3a 69 | unwrapped: c8 4b 0f e6 a8 9d c6 a6 2b 43 1c 2c 70 99 f6 fd | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80010b8 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: 8d f4 80 1d 68 04 c8 2f 4d 83 d2 be 8b db 86 c8 59 03 2c 71 f1 a8 94 8a 9d 49 2b 82 0f 32 b3 14 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0d8001158 | unwrapped: 82 2f cd d7 39 7c 66 bf 00 57 8b 3c da 83 88 df | unwrapped: d6 69 79 ab 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: af fb 33 cb 22 17 40 11 70 f9 95 b5 c1 67 8c 53 ca 85 10 8b 4d 84 99 0c 7a c1 88 86 cb e8 93 be 42 c3 70 be 18 55 14 fb 7b 36 c3 c1 c7 13 55 ce 4a 70 40 2d 88 28 6e 6d 15 81 10 70 61 46 8a 8f ea 98 ad d5 ae a4 ad 9a ba 5a eb 78 8e 2d 8a 07 90 c3 2d ef e4 f6 b7 69 87 ed e8 51 b5 ea fd e9 1a 1a 4a e6 55 7c b9 50 80 89 c5 9d 1c 7c d9 09 65 16 0c 6e 11 e5 c2 10 d3 b4 5b e1 f4 80 8e 4b 39 7c 1c ad ae 02 2b dd 57 3d 80 ff 19 d6 87 b9 00 c4 0b 0a 09 ef fa 00 c0 6e 2c 97 a1 0e e7 56 ed 70 c0 83 a7 a4 0e a6 3a 17 a1 24 93 47 b0 ad 89 7b 10 5b 34 9a ea 70 f0 8b 0e cf bc 8d 03 98 d1 af 74 9f a1 ba 76 ac 4e 6b d5 a6 9c 43 e8 3b 6b e1 3f 6d 04 b8 58 c3 6d 1d ea 56 22 80 fc 53 5d 02 ca d0 15 d9 34 91 76 03 79 6b 17 9a a9 65 11 be 0a ae 1a 94 9c 04 69 7a fa 57 6f ee 6f a9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0d8004f28 | unwrapped: 02 78 9b df 0e 57 71 6b 6a c3 4e 91 d4 3a fa 43 | unwrapped: 53 6b 0d 70 9a 40 11 88 ea d0 0a e2 30 be b8 88 | unwrapped: 7e 47 61 f1 6e 6f 30 15 70 aa c0 e7 1b 4f 2a 2c | unwrapped: fd c0 4b 49 f1 91 61 53 21 99 73 b3 a1 76 37 77 | unwrapped: b5 ad fc 51 0d 63 fa c3 66 cf 74 89 26 04 00 35 | unwrapped: b9 09 54 53 40 19 2e 64 f1 67 38 11 f0 23 5f a4 | unwrapped: 64 4d 37 a0 8c 1f 20 2e b7 a7 65 af 69 02 59 78 | unwrapped: 49 ad 3d b1 80 f8 36 b1 57 ce df 50 d2 15 fd fe | unwrapped: 18 0e 8c 50 2d 72 a5 17 b9 86 cf c9 1e a5 c5 ba | unwrapped: 83 64 c2 42 12 37 7f 77 14 7e 3f e1 e1 84 ff 14 | unwrapped: f1 8e 80 8a 27 0f 32 d7 06 c9 d3 d8 cc fa 67 3a | unwrapped: 67 8a 8d af 3f 2c 19 b5 7b e8 16 09 01 8e 8e 65 | unwrapped: dd 51 e9 82 cf da d6 99 f6 34 ad 0c 0b 0a 27 38 | unwrapped: 04 21 77 bf ae 0f 9d 4a 2d 67 86 b1 cf 32 8b 61 | unwrapped: e8 31 64 7d 97 94 5f 3e ba 8e 89 6e 02 25 3a 69 | unwrapped: c8 4b 0f e6 a8 9d c6 a6 2b 43 1c 2c 70 99 f6 fd | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0d8002d60 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d8001108 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: d1 bb d0 06 5a 79 85 73 eb 2e 35 b1 60 3a ac ac 30 84 ba 75 75 22 88 c8 9b 1c 7f 3b 26 a6 76 c7 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0d80030c8 | unwrapped: e7 a9 e2 bd dc b0 d1 c6 d9 0a fe f1 c9 c7 74 f1 | unwrapped: a7 6c 9b 39 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: af fb 33 cb 22 17 40 11 70 f9 95 b5 c1 67 8c 53 ca 85 10 8b 4d 84 99 0c 7a c1 88 86 cb e8 93 be 42 c3 70 be 18 55 14 fb 7b 36 c3 c1 c7 13 55 ce 4a 70 40 2d 88 28 6e 6d 15 81 10 70 61 46 8a 8f ea 98 ad d5 ae a4 ad 9a ba 5a eb 78 8e 2d 8a 07 90 c3 2d ef e4 f6 b7 69 87 ed e8 51 b5 ea fd e9 1a 1a 4a e6 55 7c b9 50 80 89 c5 9d 1c 7c d9 09 65 16 0c 6e 11 e5 c2 10 d3 b4 5b e1 f4 80 8e 4b 39 7c 1c ad ae 02 2b dd 57 3d 80 ff 19 d6 87 b9 00 c4 0b 0a 09 ef fa 00 c0 6e 2c 97 a1 0e e7 56 ed 70 c0 83 a7 a4 0e a6 3a 17 a1 24 93 47 b0 ad 89 7b 10 5b 34 9a ea 70 f0 8b 0e cf bc 8d 03 98 d1 af 74 9f a1 ba 76 ac 4e 6b d5 a6 9c 43 e8 3b 6b e1 3f 6d 04 b8 58 c3 6d 1d ea 56 22 80 fc 53 5d 02 ca d0 15 d9 34 91 76 03 79 6b 17 9a a9 65 11 be 0a ae 1a 94 9c 04 69 7a fa 57 6f ee 6f a9 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0d8003db8 | unwrapped: 02 78 9b df 0e 57 71 6b 6a c3 4e 91 d4 3a fa 43 | unwrapped: 53 6b 0d 70 9a 40 11 88 ea d0 0a e2 30 be b8 88 | unwrapped: 7e 47 61 f1 6e 6f 30 15 70 aa c0 e7 1b 4f 2a 2c | unwrapped: fd c0 4b 49 f1 91 61 53 21 99 73 b3 a1 76 37 77 | unwrapped: b5 ad fc 51 0d 63 fa c3 66 cf 74 89 26 04 00 35 | unwrapped: b9 09 54 53 40 19 2e 64 f1 67 38 11 f0 23 5f a4 | unwrapped: 64 4d 37 a0 8c 1f 20 2e b7 a7 65 af 69 02 59 78 | unwrapped: 49 ad 3d b1 80 f8 36 b1 57 ce df 50 d2 15 fd fe | unwrapped: 18 0e 8c 50 2d 72 a5 17 b9 86 cf c9 1e a5 c5 ba | unwrapped: 83 64 c2 42 12 37 7f 77 14 7e 3f e1 e1 84 ff 14 | unwrapped: f1 8e 80 8a 27 0f 32 d7 06 c9 d3 d8 cc fa 67 3a | unwrapped: 67 8a 8d af 3f 2c 19 b5 7b e8 16 09 01 8e 8e 65 | unwrapped: dd 51 e9 82 cf da d6 99 f6 34 ad 0c 0b 0a 27 38 | unwrapped: 04 21 77 bf ae 0f 9d 4a 2d 67 86 b1 cf 32 8b 61 | unwrapped: e8 31 64 7d 97 94 5f 3e ba 8e 89 6e 02 25 3a 69 | unwrapped: c8 4b 0f e6 a8 9d c6 a6 2b 43 1c 2c 70 99 f6 fd | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d6f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 16 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: AES_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 16-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0f8f4d768 | result: keymat-key@0x55b81b96d700 (16-bytes, AES_CBC) | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_a 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_e 0x55b81b976b70, enc_key 0x55b81b96d700 | DH_i: 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | DH_i: 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | DH_i: 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | DH_i: 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | DH_i: 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | DH_i: 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | DH_i: 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | DH_i: 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | DH_i: 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | DH_i: b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | DH_i: c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | DH_i: c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | DH_i: 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | DH_i: dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | DH_i: bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | DH_i: 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | DH_r: 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | DH_r: bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | DH_r: 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | DH_r: d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | DH_r: bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | DH_r: 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | DH_r: 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | DH_r: 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | DH_r: a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | DH_r: 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | DH_r: 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | DH_r: 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | DH_r: 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | DH_r: 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | DH_r: 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | DH_r: 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b9958ec (length 256) | 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b9959ec (length 256) | 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 20) | 66 3f b8 6e fb 8e 16 3a c2 16 3d 85 93 77 27 87 | 0a 8c 88 54 | crypto helper 5 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 20 time elapsed 0.002114 seconds | (#17) spent 2.08 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 20: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 20 for state #17 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003978 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #17 | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 20 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #17: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e40045b8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #17 | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #17 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #17 spent 0.0213 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003978 | spent 0.00196 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 76 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c b3 09 f4 91 | 97 0c 17 d6 5f 37 fa 70 01 2e b0 d1 1a 7e 7a 58 | f8 51 3a 09 1e 14 93 c9 8d 23 be 5c 2d 39 d3 2a | b6 e2 7b 25 8f 80 2d 37 eb 79 4d d8 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 76 (0x4c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 48 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 66 3f b8 6e fb 8e 16 3a c2 16 3d 85 93 77 27 87 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 2d 39 d3 2a b6 e2 7b 25 8f 80 2d 37 eb 79 4d d8 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -48): | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 dc dc 08 19 | da d8 e5 03 cb aa 1f b7 08 0d b0 ec b7 19 ed d6 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 12 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #17: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002ff8 (length 256) | 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b987708 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | dc dc 08 19 da d8 e5 03 cb aa 1f b7 08 0d b0 ec | b7 19 ed d6 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80030c8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4000b48 (length 256) | 98 a0 7e 81 5d f4 62 3c 05 e1 c0 59 bb af 1e 24 | bb c6 e3 08 28 17 59 90 a9 3d 5c 26 dd d1 94 1c | 62 a5 5c 96 ec a0 e1 5a 28 89 f0 8e 2f 9d 10 19 | d0 ef 66 f4 40 05 b1 9f 33 ee 90 04 0c ec 72 74 | bf 7f 50 27 f4 d2 75 ee c2 a8 4f 55 29 71 34 d0 | 98 2a ba fe a2 d4 ce 82 e0 92 bf 7b 50 38 1b 28 | 3d 24 f8 b2 f8 7b 55 bd 0c f9 06 f9 e8 9b f1 d5 | 78 33 96 6b d1 24 31 92 93 0f 09 99 ee 78 b3 fb | a9 a4 d8 c7 66 02 ec f9 15 fe 1f 0b 93 42 2d fa | 50 70 12 f7 68 90 e7 08 a9 c3 a7 e8 9a a6 57 f6 | 67 bb 2f d5 cd 7d 95 f2 15 c1 71 6f e2 8c 01 bd | 72 90 93 9d e2 d8 9e 17 4a 0d 7d 85 0c 9c e9 ef | 5d 6a 9b af 1a 57 6b df e5 96 58 fd 08 3b c8 c3 | 22 1d f0 66 89 c8 0d 97 48 85 3f b7 4d 95 d2 d4 | 09 c9 9b 7c db b3 ce 53 a0 b2 4f 2e f7 78 c6 1e | 67 c7 d7 da ac 7a f0 83 a0 52 f2 42 f3 57 dd 18 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002ff8 (length 256) | 46 fa eb 52 11 9d 79 59 bd d1 59 77 17 17 5c 38 | 16 70 fa 12 87 9a c3 ef 04 7a 09 05 e1 c1 a7 30 | 56 68 03 11 63 e6 88 fb 59 85 8f 00 cd d5 db 2a | 44 93 9e 2d 6a 79 a8 72 3d 90 70 6a 92 47 dc f9 | 0e d6 1a 15 8c 40 71 7e b0 d4 88 b6 7f e6 1b 9f | 7a ed de 55 b0 b7 42 9c 65 61 c6 c0 61 b7 ac 63 | 9b 1d a3 8a c9 62 49 57 53 59 bd 72 d8 ee 0c ed | 62 6e 95 93 a2 4f e1 21 bf a0 dd cc 71 30 39 6b | 8a 77 db 05 b5 22 c9 1c 59 09 b6 40 79 7a 29 db | b5 29 ac 2b d6 66 8c b9 ac 25 c6 95 0d 79 73 2d | c1 bc 50 24 b8 0f 2f 19 d4 52 4e 68 d5 d5 88 9c | c7 b6 af ba eb 03 87 28 b3 13 48 a8 53 26 a2 97 | 2f a2 94 84 09 20 1f 33 21 aa 94 48 b8 ad b4 b0 | dd e6 0e c9 03 e4 fa 03 4e d3 e4 77 7a 53 7f 2b | bd bb b6 44 1c dd a9 f4 9f 8b e5 64 30 78 ba a9 | 10 02 29 66 cc ec 8c f6 23 69 d6 5f 8a 75 74 e3 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 07 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 80 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | d5 b0 cf fa 19 ec 5d 75 23 c5 44 4b 3d 23 33 2e | 83 6e a4 ea | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R d5 b0 cf fa 19 ec 5d 75 23 c5 44 4b 3d 23 33 2e | HASH_R 83 6e a4 ea | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: d5 b0 cf fa 19 ec 5d 75 23 c5 44 4b 3d 23 33 2e | encrypting: 83 6e a4 ea | IV: 2d 39 d3 2a b6 e2 7b 25 8f 80 2d 37 eb 79 4d d8 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #17 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #17: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #17 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #17 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 76 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4c 09 97 8e a2 | 21 9c 18 34 e2 d2 48 78 70 23 c0 97 40 a7 dd 09 | cb 4f 46 34 a0 89 83 79 ac 0d 7f ff 78 06 d1 e5 | 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #17 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4004768 size 128 | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #17: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=AES_CBC_128 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #17 | #17 spent 0.636 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.79 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00266 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 444 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 08 10 20 01 d6 53 0c 77 00 00 01 bc b7 e8 32 33 | b1 7d 7e 1d 1e 2f 69 93 55 64 89 b2 22 e2 ab 75 | f1 57 51 30 37 0d db 71 ca f7 f7 f8 4a 0a d6 57 | 70 0b b8 cb 16 8a ee 4f 65 ed 56 c7 91 b4 93 27 | 5c df 1e b7 3e 60 36 53 9a d0 2a 75 18 87 a2 77 | 5c e8 36 95 fd 58 78 4c cf 0f 81 aa cb a1 52 9e | 3b 8f 6f 1d 33 a0 58 b0 5b b4 f3 13 f7 cf ef f8 | 61 65 b5 d5 ff e3 ad d6 36 f3 fd d3 89 72 54 70 | 20 86 5b 63 0a b8 c6 e2 87 37 cd 13 07 3e f0 b1 | 4d 0c d9 15 83 69 97 f7 21 6f 2f 03 92 43 98 51 | cb 64 1d d2 7a 4f 8c 99 00 1c 48 81 d8 9a 95 14 | a7 96 72 27 1a 7b 99 b7 d3 f0 99 98 a6 3a 87 eb | c8 68 ce 43 f6 65 b1 fc e4 30 97 49 7b e1 a7 fd | 95 d0 79 a5 0d 81 c4 5a 32 dc fa fb 66 dd 57 dc | 9e 38 9b 81 14 8c 64 c7 d3 9a 8a e3 3a 54 32 97 | 91 3a 9c b9 fb b8 bf d4 b4 18 68 3b 70 a3 ef 70 | 72 2a fe 1e 5a 15 fa 50 89 ba 17 fc 8f 1e 74 c7 | c1 c1 79 7f a5 25 a3 0f f0 f0 5c 45 4a ec 1a 01 | 4b 5c 70 71 00 d1 b0 32 91 7d 43 03 05 22 30 0a | b7 fa 15 16 64 9c 76 e5 33 ae ed 9d 7f 87 d8 d5 | a9 72 89 ed 5e e8 73 15 d5 4e dc 8a 8e a6 02 1a | 6a a3 65 1e 39 07 7e ac ee a8 1e b7 03 c8 f1 96 | bd aa a8 c5 3b 64 1d ae db 96 84 61 44 78 6e 53 | 61 5a 3d 84 44 82 82 3c 98 82 6f 51 19 24 88 d7 | fe ff d8 69 db 15 6e f0 c6 bf 49 ae 4b dd d2 0f | 2f 2c 0c a0 e9 be f5 0a 02 c5 02 1f 84 7a b3 11 | 6a be c0 e3 c0 76 ed 9c b3 72 90 b0 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3595766903 (0xd6530c77) | length: 444 (0x1bc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | current Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | d6 53 0c 77 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 5e 88 42 b9 f7 93 2f dc 60 8d c7 13 d2 f4 9e 21 | 4f c5 84 d4 | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 416 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 5e 88 42 b9 f7 93 2f dc 60 8d c7 13 d2 f4 9e 21 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 84 7a b3 11 6a be c0 e3 c0 76 ed 9c b3 72 90 b0 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -416): | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 08 10 20 01 d6 53 0c 77 00 00 01 bc 01 00 00 18 | a4 5f 04 d7 f6 d6 22 e5 69 3b fb dd a2 70 bb 5f | 0e fa 5f 62 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 70 65 a0 02 00 00 00 1c | 00 0c 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 72 c9 36 4f | 29 43 e1 71 d9 92 29 52 c3 24 f3 d6 6f 48 1c 2d | e7 3c e1 60 21 f5 66 5b 7b 0b 86 37 05 00 01 04 | 8f a0 d2 4c 29 a5 b4 44 ec 44 fe b8 93 cc 1d 36 | 64 45 6c 28 ae 3d 5f 4e 19 70 2c c6 68 55 8e fb | c7 0c e3 1d 1e 04 b8 e8 0a 08 fe 28 39 1b 10 8a | 10 d8 f2 27 e1 7d 2c 32 d3 f7 0f 66 f4 0b 88 c4 | 34 29 9e 5f 37 17 2f 12 e0 e4 7e 54 13 2b 5c c5 | b9 ac 71 62 39 97 0b a8 c2 b5 3c 28 08 d3 1e d3 | 2c 24 7a 87 17 3a e4 0b 87 01 7d d5 5e 5c 46 af | eb c7 b5 52 98 85 78 40 7d cf 6f 2a 76 7b 41 df | e1 0c 35 a0 e1 91 f3 29 86 3d a8 29 e5 f8 0a c3 | 4a f2 1f 25 4b af 4f e8 e4 79 21 be a5 18 8e 82 | ff f5 78 1c 46 ed b2 a9 f0 69 ca 20 41 f4 a6 75 | ff e0 38 ff f4 2c 10 7f 60 cd 45 9a e5 ff c8 cf | a0 f0 1e e8 30 9e 0e fd 01 8a 69 04 28 9f d7 29 | 24 79 17 be 10 8e 61 2d 2f 31 1e a6 2d ad 0c 7d | d7 e5 d6 6d c1 53 86 fa b2 9c 6b b9 07 01 8b 5c | 14 df 7e b1 3a da cb b7 37 24 32 76 84 72 75 bd | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80030c8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | d6 53 0c 77 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b994a8c (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 70 65 a0 02 00 00 00 1c 00 0c 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 72 c9 36 4f 29 43 e1 71 | d9 92 29 52 c3 24 f3 d6 6f 48 1c 2d e7 3c e1 60 | 21 f5 66 5b 7b 0b 86 37 05 00 01 04 8f a0 d2 4c | 29 a5 b4 44 ec 44 fe b8 93 cc 1d 36 64 45 6c 28 | ae 3d 5f 4e 19 70 2c c6 68 55 8e fb c7 0c e3 1d | 1e 04 b8 e8 0a 08 fe 28 39 1b 10 8a 10 d8 f2 27 | e1 7d 2c 32 d3 f7 0f 66 f4 0b 88 c4 34 29 9e 5f | 37 17 2f 12 e0 e4 7e 54 13 2b 5c c5 b9 ac 71 62 | 39 97 0b a8 c2 b5 3c 28 08 d3 1e d3 2c 24 7a 87 | 17 3a e4 0b 87 01 7d d5 5e 5c 46 af eb c7 b5 52 | 98 85 78 40 7d cf 6f 2a 76 7b 41 df e1 0c 35 a0 | e1 91 f3 29 86 3d a8 29 e5 f8 0a c3 4a f2 1f 25 | 4b af 4f e8 e4 79 21 be a5 18 8e 82 ff f5 78 1c | 46 ed b2 a9 f0 69 ca 20 41 f4 a6 75 ff e0 38 ff | f4 2c 10 7f 60 cd 45 9a e5 ff c8 cf a0 f0 1e e8 | 30 9e 0e fd 01 8a 69 04 28 9f d7 29 24 79 17 be | 10 8e 61 2d 2f 31 1e a6 2d ad 0c 7d d7 e5 d6 6d | c1 53 86 fa b2 9c 6b b9 07 01 8b 5c 14 df 7e b1 | 3a da cb b7 37 24 32 76 84 72 75 bd 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | a4 5f 04 d7 f6 d6 22 e5 69 3b fb dd a2 70 bb 5f | 0e fa 5f 62 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | a4 5f 04 d7 f6 d6 22 e5 69 3b fb dd a2 70 bb 5f | 0e fa 5f 62 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #17: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #18 at 0x55b81b98fa48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #18 in UNDEFINED | pstats #18 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #17 "east" as #18 for IPSEC SA | #18 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #17.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #18: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 70 65 a0 02 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_AES (0xc) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: AES=12, found AES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 "east" #18: IPsec encryption transform AES_CBC did not specify required KEY_LENGTH attribute | ignoring ESP proposal with NULLed or unknown encryption "east" #18: no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #18 is idle | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state "east" #18: sending encrypted notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2684852638 (0xa007999e) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342648 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe5434272c (length 4) | a0 07 99 9e | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe543429d4 (length 12) | 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe543429c0 (length 20) | fb 0c 3e 66 43 f4 3b 41 51 d1 48 92 51 11 25 42 | 52 05 95 a4 | send notification HASH(1): | fb 0c 3e 66 43 f4 3b 41 51 d1 48 92 51 11 25 42 | 52 05 95 a4 | last Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | current Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434273c (length 4) | a0 07 99 9e | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 65 7e 8b 2d 48 76 c9 16 12 ed 32 c4 50 3d 7b be | cd 32 4b d8 | encrypting: 0b 00 00 18 fb 0c 3e 66 43 f4 3b 41 51 d1 48 92 | encrypting: 51 11 25 42 52 05 95 a4 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 00 00 0e | IV: 65 7e 8b 2d 48 76 c9 16 12 ed 32 c4 50 3d 7b be | IV: cd 32 4b d8 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 48 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 76 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: d8 5d ec 5b ac 75 08 c7 68 93 ad 7a 68 01 ca df | sending 76 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #18) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 08 10 05 01 a0 07 99 9e 00 00 00 4c 5d 52 2a 20 | cc bf 89 77 58 59 34 56 a7 cc 2b 89 9b 2c 53 b7 | e6 f6 93 2d 8c fb dc 5d 7e e3 20 d3 d8 5d ec 5b | ac 75 08 c7 68 93 ad 7a 68 01 ca df | state transition function for STATE_QUICK_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | pstats #18 ikev1.ipsec deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #18 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #18: deleting state (STATE_QUICK_R0) aged 0.000s and NOT sending notification | child state #18: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => delete | child state #18: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => CHILDSA_DEL(informational) | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #18 in CHILDSA_DEL | child state #18: CHILDSA_DEL(informational) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #18 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | #17 spent 0.57 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00364 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 92 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 08 10 05 01 d0 60 3c b1 00 00 00 5c bd 26 fd 62 | b6 d6 39 f1 1c 7b 55 21 1c 04 25 5a 00 56 32 bf | 8e d5 55 7a 9e 49 7b 46 0d 53 fc 3e ae d3 32 94 | a4 c5 18 cb cb f5 91 3e 9e 87 aa a1 45 7a 0b db | cd 9a c7 fe c3 af 5e 2d d4 ca 70 96 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3495967921 (0xd0603cb1) | length: 92 (0x5c) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #17; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #17 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | current Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | d0 60 3c b1 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 74 c1 41 a1 b7 f7 b4 44 0a 14 d2 da d5 33 05 f6 | 57 bb 4f 64 | #17 is idle | #17 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 64 bytes using algorithm AES_CBC | IV before: 74 c1 41 a1 b7 f7 b4 44 0a 14 d2 da d5 33 05 f6 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | IV after: 45 7a 0b db cd 9a c7 fe c3 af 5e 2d d4 ca 70 96 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -64): | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 08 10 05 01 d0 60 3c b1 00 00 00 5c 0c 00 00 18 | dd 5b d6 9b a5 d3 0e 49 b5 95 37 f5 4a 76 b3 12 | b4 c1 a6 55 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | removing 12 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | d0 60 3c b1 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b99056c (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 b9 ba aa e4 | a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | dd 5b d6 9b a5 d3 0e 49 b5 95 37 f5 4a 76 b3 12 | b4 c1 a6 55 | informational HASH(1): | dd 5b d6 9b a5 d3 0e 49 b5 95 37 f5 4a 76 b3 12 | b4 c1 a6 55 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into iCookie | iCookie b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | parsing 8 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into rCookie | rCookie 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | State DB: found IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | del: "east" #17: received Delete SA payload: self-deleting ISAKMP State #17 | pstats #17 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #17 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #17: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.525s and sending notification | parent state #17: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #17 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | responder cookie: | 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 1724983958 (0x66d12a96) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340998 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0d80030c8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a7c (length 4) | 66 d1 2a 96 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340e24 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 b9 ba aa e4 | a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340e10 (length 20) | 12 96 ca 90 9a 63 88 c6 25 40 4e 5c 93 0d 26 8b | f0 44 51 f9 | send delete HASH(1): | 12 96 ca 90 9a 63 88 c6 25 40 4e 5c 93 0d 26 8b | f0 44 51 f9 | last Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | current Phase 1 IV: 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 16) | 78 06 d1 e5 33 5d 9e 1a 8e 0b ac 5a 8e b7 dd cb | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a8c (length 4) | 66 d1 2a 96 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 4e e1 a0 78 6d d5 9c 0e 99 b8 59 e1 1a 16 fc 79 | 62 17 55 5f | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 12 96 ca 90 9a 63 88 c6 25 40 4e 5c | encrypting: 93 0d 26 8b f0 44 51 f9 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 | encrypting: 0f d4 86 0f | IV: 4e e1 a0 78 6d d5 9c 0e 99 b8 59 e1 1a 16 fc 79 | IV: 62 17 55 5f | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 12 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 64 using AES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 92 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: aes - exit | next IV: d4 17 fd 5f 0f 1d d0 81 7c 39 90 77 55 32 0f 4e | sending 92 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #17) | b9 ba aa e4 a5 81 1b 6d 4b ad 83 a9 0f d4 86 0f | 08 10 05 01 66 d1 2a 96 00 00 00 5c fd d0 cf 14 | 10 a1 5d ae ec e3 45 a6 c8 65 9a c7 04 5f 11 be | 01 dd 56 cd 26 8d e9 6e 23 69 1e 89 9f 36 7a 1b | f5 f5 aa 59 85 25 49 fc bc 86 54 e1 d4 17 fd 5f | 0f 1d d0 81 7c 39 90 77 55 32 0f 4e | state #17 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4004768 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #17 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #17: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e40045b8: destroyed | stop processing: state #17 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b976790 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.585 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0029 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 200 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c8 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f 0d 00 00 14 | 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56 | 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 | ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 | 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 200 (0xc8) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 0c 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 95 d8 9f ec 5f 7e ab 8c | d5 1c 27 12 a0 14 2c 54 93 34 e6 8c 2d 3f 3f d8 | creating state object #19 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #19 in UNDEFINED | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp started | #19 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #19: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #19: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 32 (0x20) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 24 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 32 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 140 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #19 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #19: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 140 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 0d 00 00 34 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f | 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 | 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 4a 13 1c 81 | 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.428 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00273 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | 14 00 00 24 cc 7e 07 94 24 b3 f9 00 3e d3 ae fd | c0 06 e0 22 03 f3 8f 99 e4 06 91 fd 7e 56 58 db | ba de e2 55 14 00 00 18 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 | 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 5f cd d2 1c 00 00 00 18 | 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | 94 54 80 54 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #19 is idle | #19 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | 5f cd d2 1c | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | natd_hash: rcookie= 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | natd_hash: hash= 5f cd d2 1c | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | 94 54 80 54 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | natd_hash: rcookie= 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | natd_hash: hash= 94 54 80 54 | expected NAT-D(me): 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | expected NAT-D(me): 5f cd d2 1c | expected NAT-D(him): | 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | 94 54 80 54 | received NAT-D: 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | received NAT-D: 5f cd d2 1c | received NAT-D: 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | received NAT-D: 94 54 80 54 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 21 for state #19 | state #19 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 21 for state #19 | suspending state #19 and saving MD | #19 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 6 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 21 | #19 spent 0.198 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | spent 0.348 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc006de8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0dc006de8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | Generated nonce: 35 3a f2 e6 64 26 ad 9c 95 bd 11 f6 0b be 5b 55 | Generated nonce: c8 b2 3e 01 cb e3 31 4e 9e 72 b4 b9 7a bb e8 11 | crypto helper 6 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 21 time elapsed 0.001176 seconds | (#19) spent 1.17 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 21: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 21 for state #19 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc0015e8 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #19 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 21 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #19: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc006de8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #19 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | keyex value b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | keyex value 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | keyex value 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | keyex value e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | keyex value 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | keyex value a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | keyex value 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | keyex value 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | keyex value 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | keyex value 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | keyex value 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | keyex value a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | keyex value 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | keyex value 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | keyex value 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 35 3a f2 e6 64 26 ad 9c 95 bd 11 f6 0b be 5b 55 | Nr c8 b2 3e 01 cb e3 31 4e 9e 72 b4 b9 7a bb e8 11 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | 94 54 80 54 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | natd_hash: rcookie= 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | natd_hash: hash= 94 54 80 54 | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 | NAT-D 94 54 80 54 | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | 5f cd d2 1c | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | natd_hash: rcookie= 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | natd_hash: hash= 5f cd d2 1c | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | NAT-D 5f cd d2 1c | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc006de8: transferring ownership from state #19 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 22 for state #19 | state #19 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #19 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | crypto helper 0 resuming | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #19 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 22 for state #19 | parent state #19: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | crypto helper 0 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 22 | peer's g: 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | event_already_set, deleting event | state #19 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | peer's g: d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | peer's g: a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | peer's g: 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | peer's g: 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | peer's g: f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | peer's g: 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | peer's g: e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | peer's g: 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | peer's g: 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | peer's g: b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | peer's g: cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | peer's g: 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | peer's g: e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | peer's g: 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | peer's g: d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | 14 00 00 24 35 3a f2 e6 64 26 ad 9c 95 bd 11 f6 | 0b be 5b 55 c8 b2 3e 01 cb e3 31 4e 9e 72 b4 b9 | 7a bb e8 11 14 00 00 18 8b bf 0b a0 a2 d2 fd b9 | 6c a8 cd a4 3c 73 d3 07 94 54 80 54 00 00 00 18 | 0e 0e bb 6c ae 0e 09 47 63 44 95 5d 34 7e 70 95 | 5f cd d2 1c | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #19 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10454.71913 "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #19 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #19 spent 0.43 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc0015e8 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc006de8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b96d700 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b995888 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001278 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b9958ac (length 32) | cc 7e 07 94 24 b3 f9 00 3e d3 ae fd c0 06 e0 22 | 03 f3 8f 99 e4 06 91 fd 7e 56 58 db ba de e2 55 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b9958cc (length 32) | 35 3a f2 e6 64 26 ad 9c 95 bd 11 f6 0b be 5b 55 | c8 b2 3e 01 cb e3 31 4e 9e 72 b4 b9 7a bb e8 11 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00015f8 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: ad 00 0d 23 ae c7 c1 75 63 a8 b4 97 12 8a 17 90 66 10 28 33 47 42 44 fa d8 71 10 f1 b4 7c 5c 6f 30 50 dc db e1 ee 9d 89 ae e9 3f 8a bc 8d 4f 94 4a e6 e3 09 51 11 5a 35 07 4c 62 12 85 49 f9 db d3 15 7a 3f aa ec 39 90 05 3e 12 b4 68 67 5c d2 4f cd e5 05 44 e8 35 55 55 aa 36 bf bf 78 ed 60 6a d9 31 dc e6 82 eb e9 f5 a8 41 54 8d 2f 17 d6 91 56 87 49 b7 07 3f 7d f1 d5 b7 3b 83 43 de c8 38 cf f5 9d bd a8 89 e6 5b 4b a4 c3 3d f0 a4 fb 12 cf 9a 25 a9 57 e9 b0 76 b4 23 c0 1d b4 c7 d2 2f be e6 28 b4 f5 04 ed 75 5c da 71 2f 2f da 79 09 1f 9b 83 50 d7 ea 30 e9 1c 37 e3 97 fe 81 18 7b 12 24 29 fe b1 41 00 55 46 e7 37 3e a6 90 37 56 4c e0 76 9c 9d fc a2 8e eb 5d 24 14 a4 8b 2c 02 2e b2 ca 00 13 20 26 7c e1 1d 62 59 b2 cf a7 42 3f 64 ac d9 21 e2 5d b0 e7 42 d0 6a 36 06 9f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0f0001978 | unwrapped: 00 02 97 8e f7 ab c7 2c 45 bb 2a 5d 7e d7 d6 e0 | unwrapped: 4d 81 78 82 09 17 d6 90 d3 19 21 99 26 d7 43 2d | unwrapped: 97 df 35 86 3b bb 3b a9 89 55 7b da 51 8d 5f c1 | unwrapped: 84 94 02 dc f8 55 47 e5 0b 75 5c d3 6c c8 9a 5e | unwrapped: b5 5a ee 19 44 94 d7 5c 9c 0c e8 e5 cb 6d d3 a2 | unwrapped: 38 ab 2b 7e 5b 1c 34 09 ef e7 28 16 42 a6 a6 3b | unwrapped: 21 5e 78 2a b5 bc a6 be 4d be ca de 22 94 cb 9f | unwrapped: 7f 65 69 d0 ff de 9b a5 f9 62 f0 f9 f8 5c 82 f0 | unwrapped: 5f d7 a9 82 e2 aa 42 6c 60 70 ba 5f 22 aa 81 e8 | unwrapped: f4 fe cc 72 e5 28 1c 6e 3c ac 44 e2 38 11 34 a4 | unwrapped: b8 5f 28 9b dd 74 65 d4 ef 6e 4a 05 3a 0b ba 33 | unwrapped: 11 c7 0d 49 75 7a ce ac 9e c0 5a 0c eb d8 71 3c | unwrapped: bf 2d 47 95 ff ee 9c ef b7 95 e6 ad 25 66 ae 0c | unwrapped: 25 e9 2b b8 ba 42 c0 14 8d 27 eb 66 c7 d3 65 48 | unwrapped: 3f c8 db 42 48 66 b0 26 9f 27 de fa 66 30 bc c0 | unwrapped: 91 63 9c 27 8d 8f fd 80 a3 ee c6 b9 9a 48 f9 1d | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001278 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: 26 bf 81 d9 67 40 17 a1 15 7e 60 9f 63 47 e5 67 c6 96 71 b1 2c f6 bb f5 42 46 7c e3 4e 50 44 94 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0f00044b8 | unwrapped: 12 f5 7d 71 b5 5c 35 6c 58 8e 7f d6 06 73 23 86 | unwrapped: 4d 30 5a 25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: ad 00 0d 23 ae c7 c1 75 63 a8 b4 97 12 8a 17 90 66 10 28 33 47 42 44 fa d8 71 10 f1 b4 7c 5c 6f 30 50 dc db e1 ee 9d 89 ae e9 3f 8a bc 8d 4f 94 4a e6 e3 09 51 11 5a 35 07 4c 62 12 85 49 f9 db d3 15 7a 3f aa ec 39 90 05 3e 12 b4 68 67 5c d2 4f cd e5 05 44 e8 35 55 55 aa 36 bf bf 78 ed 60 6a d9 31 dc e6 82 eb e9 f5 a8 41 54 8d 2f 17 d6 91 56 87 49 b7 07 3f 7d f1 d5 b7 3b 83 43 de c8 38 cf f5 9d bd a8 89 e6 5b 4b a4 c3 3d f0 a4 fb 12 cf 9a 25 a9 57 e9 b0 76 b4 23 c0 1d b4 c7 d2 2f be e6 28 b4 f5 04 ed 75 5c da 71 2f 2f da 79 09 1f 9b 83 50 d7 ea 30 e9 1c 37 e3 97 fe 81 18 7b 12 24 29 fe b1 41 00 55 46 e7 37 3e a6 90 37 56 4c e0 76 9c 9d fc a2 8e eb 5d 24 14 a4 8b 2c 02 2e b2 ca 00 13 20 26 7c e1 1d 62 59 b2 cf a7 42 3f 64 ac d9 21 e2 5d b0 e7 42 d0 6a 36 06 9f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0f0004728 | unwrapped: 00 02 97 8e f7 ab c7 2c 45 bb 2a 5d 7e d7 d6 e0 | unwrapped: 4d 81 78 82 09 17 d6 90 d3 19 21 99 26 d7 43 2d | unwrapped: 97 df 35 86 3b bb 3b a9 89 55 7b da 51 8d 5f c1 | unwrapped: 84 94 02 dc f8 55 47 e5 0b 75 5c d3 6c c8 9a 5e | unwrapped: b5 5a ee 19 44 94 d7 5c 9c 0c e8 e5 cb 6d d3 a2 | unwrapped: 38 ab 2b 7e 5b 1c 34 09 ef e7 28 16 42 a6 a6 3b | unwrapped: 21 5e 78 2a b5 bc a6 be 4d be ca de 22 94 cb 9f | unwrapped: 7f 65 69 d0 ff de 9b a5 f9 62 f0 f9 f8 5c 82 f0 | unwrapped: 5f d7 a9 82 e2 aa 42 6c 60 70 ba 5f 22 aa 81 e8 | unwrapped: f4 fe cc 72 e5 28 1c 6e 3c ac 44 e2 38 11 34 a4 | unwrapped: b8 5f 28 9b dd 74 65 d4 ef 6e 4a 05 3a 0b ba 33 | unwrapped: 11 c7 0d 49 75 7a ce ac 9e c0 5a 0c eb d8 71 3c | unwrapped: bf 2d 47 95 ff ee 9c ef b7 95 e6 ad 25 66 ae 0c | unwrapped: 25 e9 2b b8 ba 42 c0 14 8d 27 eb 66 c7 d3 65 48 | unwrapped: 3f c8 db 42 48 66 b0 26 9f 27 de fa 66 30 bc c0 | unwrapped: 91 63 9c 27 8d 8f fd 80 a3 ee c6 b9 9a 48 f9 1d | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00015f8 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: 7d 27 9f 4b 91 2a e6 1b 82 d1 b8 68 37 fc 7d 71 38 67 88 d0 3a 75 46 a9 2e bd 87 87 f0 9c 0c 70 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0f0002148 | unwrapped: 69 7a 73 f4 c4 c4 be e9 1b 34 e5 68 e1 10 b0 8b | unwrapped: e3 c5 97 a7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: ad 00 0d 23 ae c7 c1 75 63 a8 b4 97 12 8a 17 90 66 10 28 33 47 42 44 fa d8 71 10 f1 b4 7c 5c 6f 30 50 dc db e1 ee 9d 89 ae e9 3f 8a bc 8d 4f 94 4a e6 e3 09 51 11 5a 35 07 4c 62 12 85 49 f9 db d3 15 7a 3f aa ec 39 90 05 3e 12 b4 68 67 5c d2 4f cd e5 05 44 e8 35 55 55 aa 36 bf bf 78 ed 60 6a d9 31 dc e6 82 eb e9 f5 a8 41 54 8d 2f 17 d6 91 56 87 49 b7 07 3f 7d f1 d5 b7 3b 83 43 de c8 38 cf f5 9d bd a8 89 e6 5b 4b a4 c3 3d f0 a4 fb 12 cf 9a 25 a9 57 e9 b0 76 b4 23 c0 1d b4 c7 d2 2f be e6 28 b4 f5 04 ed 75 5c da 71 2f 2f da 79 09 1f 9b 83 50 d7 ea 30 e9 1c 37 e3 97 fe 81 18 7b 12 24 29 fe b1 41 00 55 46 e7 37 3e a6 90 37 56 4c e0 76 9c 9d fc a2 8e eb 5d 24 14 a4 8b 2c 02 2e b2 ca 00 13 20 26 7c e1 1d 62 59 b2 cf a7 42 3f 64 ac d9 21 e2 5d b0 e7 42 d0 6a 36 06 9f | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0f0001978 | unwrapped: 00 02 97 8e f7 ab c7 2c 45 bb 2a 5d 7e d7 d6 e0 | unwrapped: 4d 81 78 82 09 17 d6 90 d3 19 21 99 26 d7 43 2d | unwrapped: 97 df 35 86 3b bb 3b a9 89 55 7b da 51 8d 5f c1 | unwrapped: 84 94 02 dc f8 55 47 e5 0b 75 5c d3 6c c8 9a 5e | unwrapped: b5 5a ee 19 44 94 d7 5c 9c 0c e8 e5 cb 6d d3 a2 | unwrapped: 38 ab 2b 7e 5b 1c 34 09 ef e7 28 16 42 a6 a6 3b | unwrapped: 21 5e 78 2a b5 bc a6 be 4d be ca de 22 94 cb 9f | unwrapped: 7f 65 69 d0 ff de 9b a5 f9 62 f0 f9 f8 5c 82 f0 | unwrapped: 5f d7 a9 82 e2 aa 42 6c 60 70 ba 5f 22 aa 81 e8 | unwrapped: f4 fe cc 72 e5 28 1c 6e 3c ac 44 e2 38 11 34 a4 | unwrapped: b8 5f 28 9b dd 74 65 d4 ef 6e 4a 05 3a 0b ba 33 | unwrapped: 11 c7 0d 49 75 7a ce ac 9e c0 5a 0c eb d8 71 3c | unwrapped: bf 2d 47 95 ff ee 9c ef b7 95 e6 ad 25 66 ae 0c | unwrapped: 25 e9 2b b8 ba 42 c0 14 8d 27 eb 66 c7 d3 65 48 | unwrapped: 3f c8 db 42 48 66 b0 26 9f 27 de fa 66 30 bc c0 | unwrapped: 91 63 9c 27 8d 8f fd 80 a3 ee c6 b9 9a 48 f9 1d | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb752710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976790 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | appendix_b: SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | appendix_b prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b976790 | appendix_b prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b976790 | appendix_b: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | appendix_b PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f0001278 | appendix_b PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526f0 | result: final-key@0x55b81b987630 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b987630 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526d8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b987630 | appendix_b PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 20) | appendix_b: key-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b_keymat_e: reference old_k#1-key@0x55b81b976790 | Kn PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | Kn: SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | Kn prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b987630 | Kn prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b987630 | Kn: release clone-key@0x55b81b987630 | Kn PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00015f8 | Kn PRF sha update old_k-key@0x55b81b976790 (size 20) | Kn: old_k-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b976790 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245303: a3 29 9f 2d cb 25 86 cb 35 3c 91 74 31 8d 67 0b 05 9b 4d 4f 27 72 62 10 4b 92 05 4d cb ca 20 00 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0f00044b8 | unwrapped: ac 6a fa 86 cd 50 a6 dd 66 d6 dc 45 dd 96 0c 76 | unwrapped: 07 3a c8 a8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526f0 | result: final-key@0x55b81b98c720 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b98c720 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb7526d8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b98c720 | Kn PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 20) | Kn: key-key@0x55b81b987630 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752768 | result: result-key@0x55b81b98c720 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b976790 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#N-key@0x55b81b976790 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#final-key@0x55b81b987630 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: DES3_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b98c720 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0fb752768 | result: cryptkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (24-bytes, DES3_CBC) | appendix_b_keymat_e: release keymat-key@0x55b81b98c720 | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_a 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_e 0x55b81b974d30, enc_key 0x55b81b987630 | DH_i: 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | DH_i: d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | DH_i: a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | DH_i: 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | DH_i: 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | DH_i: f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | DH_i: 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | DH_i: e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | DH_i: 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | DH_i: 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | DH_i: b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | DH_i: cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | DH_i: 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | DH_i: e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | DH_i: 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | DH_i: d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | DH_r: ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | DH_r: b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | DH_r: 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | DH_r: 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | DH_r: e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | DH_r: 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | DH_r: a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | DH_r: 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | DH_r: 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | DH_r: 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | DH_r: 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | DH_r: 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | DH_r: a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | DH_r: 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | DH_r: 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | DH_r: 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b9958ec (length 256) | 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b9959ec (length 256) | ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | spent 0.00184 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 b8 05 d0 b9 | 80 fb b7 85 76 c6 35 bd 2c 41 7b f8 2e cb 17 96 | 4e 26 ee 50 01 3b 14 94 1d 23 f8 53 fb d3 ed 75 | 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | c5 10 7e 8d | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 20) | 82 02 c0 70 3b b1 c7 8b f2 ac 9f 7d 2f 9a 97 fc | 48 68 10 6b | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | crypto helper 0 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 22 time elapsed 0.0022 seconds | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | (#19) spent 2.18 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 22: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 22 for state #19 to event queue | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #19 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 size 128 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #19 is idle; has background offloaded task | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 but exponentiation still in progress | suspending state #19 and saving MD | #19 is busy; has a suspended MD | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.109 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #19 | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 22 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #19: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc006de8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #19 | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 82 02 c0 70 3b b1 c7 8b | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: fb d3 ed 75 c5 10 7e 8d | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 fa 6a 9f 5c | 75 c1 1b 1d 65 51 87 1e 03 de 1c 46 73 91 ec 86 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 4 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #19: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543426e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002ff8 (length 256) | 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0dc004678 (length 256) | ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98f518 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342870 (length 20) | fa 6a 9f 5c 75 c1 1b 1d 65 51 87 1e 03 de 1c 46 | 73 91 ec 86 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342788 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00044b8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0dc004678 (length 256) | ac b2 6a f8 11 54 b9 29 2a a1 7b d5 db 3b 7b b9 | b8 0a 3e c7 78 ce 8d 2f e3 3c 30 d6 1b 05 cc de | 44 d9 40 8c 1f b7 6c 5e ae 7b 55 dc 91 bd d2 4f | 62 76 41 aa 02 8d 74 96 1a 8f d2 26 d3 0e 4b 16 | e9 d6 2d 2b 5a d6 66 78 80 d1 08 82 4b 1c b8 e1 | 8d a2 1e 1b c0 0a 8d f1 90 94 bc cb 8f f3 b6 d2 | a7 42 7e 94 b4 cf 3e e0 70 7a 87 f5 3b 43 90 c3 | 90 3c 03 3b 7f cd b9 0c c6 d3 3a 80 10 3c c5 63 | 40 91 b8 b6 c2 c3 8c 11 8e 33 3f 4b 57 14 7c 37 | 5a 3f e4 1b 5e 33 46 91 5f 25 40 83 5b e4 83 f9 | 18 9e c6 47 a2 13 14 1d 05 08 0b 1e 8b 06 fb 38 | 9c 1e d0 cb 96 d4 bd 3a 7e 52 a1 94 5f 15 a8 86 | a8 50 c2 d6 83 32 cf 77 9f 20 f1 42 b5 8f 96 66 | 9b e5 04 65 20 18 71 3a 88 7b a6 39 54 90 b7 dc | 5c 54 9d ad d7 de 28 45 f3 59 cb 67 24 4d d6 9b | 98 f1 ff 3a 9c 00 cf af f4 54 f4 45 c9 0f 3b 17 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec002ff8 (length 256) | 08 6b 79 0d a0 18 3f 61 73 74 fd c5 8c 4e e2 8f | d6 76 a0 ef ad a5 50 ef 79 2d fc 5a 69 77 4a 95 | a9 43 32 f9 3a 89 6d 68 1f dc 74 93 de c5 11 6f | 38 1b 94 f3 cb f7 1e 30 ff 30 0b 78 59 43 30 3e | 38 2f 5a 0d f2 49 75 25 7b 2e 55 ab d1 41 87 4c | f2 10 12 36 00 b2 7b 79 cb 59 db ee 3d e7 c3 18 | 72 cf 83 e0 40 00 cb 66 d7 a0 18 7e 4f 57 24 69 | e7 f8 3b 02 29 98 4b ad da f3 eb 45 46 45 90 35 | 47 9c d6 6b 41 4f eb 4c 91 7f b5 b6 08 82 e3 f3 | 89 a0 58 a5 cb 74 1f c9 d2 3c 15 db 45 67 dc 39 | b7 26 02 a0 1e 22 ec 01 c4 97 84 12 04 e5 07 2e | cf 11 63 8d 47 3a 07 fa 53 ba 46 c5 1d 97 5d 17 | 80 bc 3a 9f bb 5d 41 f6 fb 3d 5a e9 a4 b7 d7 12 | e0 4b 43 85 1b a2 a1 35 09 e4 11 a4 48 6f ee 8e | 3e ee 66 01 68 27 2b a4 65 16 6c 0e 59 4e 68 0a | d6 94 84 9d 98 5b 05 23 ff 49 eb dc 57 61 7c f0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f8 (length 8) | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98c1f0 (length 8) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | hashing 48 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b6bc (length 48) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 20 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342aa0 (length 20) | 2c 94 e4 25 31 ff 76 0e 4c a0 b1 94 1e d3 1c c9 | ca 3f 7c 1e | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 2c 94 e4 25 31 ff 76 0e 4c a0 b1 94 1e d3 1c c9 | HASH_R ca 3f 7c 1e | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 2c 94 e4 25 31 ff 76 0e 4c a0 b1 94 1e d3 1c c9 | encrypting: ca 3f 7c 1e | IV: fb d3 ed 75 c5 10 7e 8d | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #19 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #19: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #19 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #19 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 68 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 d7 53 96 17 | 66 e8 d1 25 8c c3 2e 36 94 ea cc 84 67 4d c5 ed | 73 2a 27 19 b9 d5 a7 ba f5 98 99 26 9d b9 08 a1 | d2 ff de c4 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #19 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc0015e8 size 128 | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #19: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=3DES_CBC_192 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #19 | #19 spent 0.394 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #19 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #19 spent 0.464 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 | spent 0.0022 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 436 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 20 01 88 d6 3e 55 00 00 01 b4 e8 be 46 c0 | cb a7 37 de 33 d0 f3 6e 43 64 bc 2a d7 54 c7 b9 | 64 9e 61 e7 bf e3 7e 02 a2 81 b2 f0 9f 4a 59 d0 | 50 df b0 e7 8c 30 fe 75 46 34 ae 53 a7 61 d3 4c | 43 11 64 9d ea 21 5a 32 45 91 b9 4b 81 40 cd 2f | 09 ad 51 c6 2d ea d3 43 f2 b1 29 9c b3 38 fc 19 | 09 5c c8 83 85 62 af 68 cd f4 d8 03 db ad a5 ab | 70 fb bd 97 b9 27 12 8e f4 9e 64 c6 7f 82 0f 20 | c8 b8 79 7c aa 2e 5e 09 56 d0 85 7b 5c 81 ac fe | b5 34 bd 09 26 bd e5 5c 9d ae 31 4e f7 90 fa cb | f4 03 fe 34 21 fe f4 7e 86 19 cf 19 7c 17 71 ee | d2 24 64 97 93 9d 74 a5 b2 de 40 7c 37 6b 55 78 | ba 08 6e 8e 46 ec 16 6d de 7f 74 05 cd 5a 38 a4 | 2c 1e 26 c4 d8 48 b9 73 a5 23 28 80 5c 15 83 b8 | bc 62 37 6e 41 83 58 0f 76 ef fc 15 ea ea a7 81 | 44 51 8c 81 41 8d 43 ec de 04 71 0d 51 94 4a 2f | f9 2e aa 12 27 5d e6 cb 9c 0c 49 90 74 8f 61 8f | 12 de d2 97 49 15 1c 54 e2 f1 74 78 da 6b 5f ab | e9 d5 28 b4 f8 b8 43 93 4f 65 93 e4 3d 66 18 d6 | 21 f3 0f 07 ab 29 03 59 93 f3 60 8e 0a 58 67 e3 | 2f be 88 1c c4 9a ac b4 e8 db 8f 97 de 35 ab 4f | 3a b4 9e c7 cb 0f 9d 97 ec 7c 31 fd a7 03 4d d3 | 13 49 9d b7 e4 06 0f fc d6 8e 63 3f 03 75 02 dd | ff 5d ce 85 f0 b7 e4 40 1a dd 4a ba f2 e8 e5 c5 | 44 16 47 39 fe 8a 96 fd 53 66 7f 35 7d 47 15 1f | 65 45 4c b3 88 1d 87 c9 66 f7 a0 7c 75 22 11 d8 | bc 14 5c 43 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2295742037 (0x88d63e55) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | current Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 8) | 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | 88 d6 3e 55 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 2b 4d 66 4c 87 56 3d 2f 07 7d 00 ed 39 26 d6 ff | aa 56 49 c1 | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 408 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 2b 4d 66 4c 87 56 3d 2f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 75 22 11 d8 bc 14 5c 43 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -408): | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 20 01 88 d6 3e 55 00 00 01 b4 01 00 00 18 | 31 26 bd e5 7a 09 08 9e 2d 67 7d 8d bb d7 c2 01 | e4 e5 43 7a 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 20 44 e4 97 00 00 00 1c | 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 d2 3d af df | f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 a2 12 3a d7 | a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c 05 00 01 04 | d6 d8 4e 92 2b a1 35 53 ec 9a 65 f4 46 39 48 97 | c2 44 c6 67 57 57 c5 46 5d 99 4a 67 98 4a b1 38 | 2d 05 17 64 84 c6 2a 6a 7e 02 05 ff f2 13 f4 f9 | d6 44 9f 32 16 ea 4b 19 5f 7d b5 7a fe f3 d6 82 | ed 97 d0 3b 91 79 0b 8a 73 a1 fa 13 d9 99 23 14 | 93 ef e6 08 ea 03 5a d7 a7 c1 ce 5e c0 d0 00 8f | 0d 38 d5 8d bd 4b 74 0d c8 0e 7c b8 84 9a 32 91 | 89 26 5f 0b 75 f6 89 4d 67 01 0d 6f 63 d7 93 83 | 3c 3d f8 80 84 e6 8a 19 e1 e2 9d 59 58 e2 a1 3c | ac f7 65 da 08 2e 21 57 31 cf 83 28 0f eb 97 a4 | d7 34 2b 46 46 1f ac e4 3c 7b ec 61 f1 b2 c2 01 | fc a5 3f 5d ac 09 fb 9e 9b c9 09 53 d2 8a 70 fc | 3d 1a 16 59 f0 73 fa f5 d7 eb 48 52 b5 e3 44 cf | dd e3 36 e8 f5 3e 04 8e 4f c2 b0 2e a1 a2 cd 5c | 8a c5 fd 68 fb 10 3f 6e 1a ec db 69 6f 86 24 b0 | 11 b1 c9 5a 3a 2b ee 89 44 b8 b6 a6 65 c2 c3 df | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0f00044b8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 88 d6 3e 55 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b994a8c (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 20 44 e4 97 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 | 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 | de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c 05 00 01 04 d6 d8 4e 92 | 2b a1 35 53 ec 9a 65 f4 46 39 48 97 c2 44 c6 67 | 57 57 c5 46 5d 99 4a 67 98 4a b1 38 2d 05 17 64 | 84 c6 2a 6a 7e 02 05 ff f2 13 f4 f9 d6 44 9f 32 | 16 ea 4b 19 5f 7d b5 7a fe f3 d6 82 ed 97 d0 3b | 91 79 0b 8a 73 a1 fa 13 d9 99 23 14 93 ef e6 08 | ea 03 5a d7 a7 c1 ce 5e c0 d0 00 8f 0d 38 d5 8d | bd 4b 74 0d c8 0e 7c b8 84 9a 32 91 89 26 5f 0b | 75 f6 89 4d 67 01 0d 6f 63 d7 93 83 3c 3d f8 80 | 84 e6 8a 19 e1 e2 9d 59 58 e2 a1 3c ac f7 65 da | 08 2e 21 57 31 cf 83 28 0f eb 97 a4 d7 34 2b 46 | 46 1f ac e4 3c 7b ec 61 f1 b2 c2 01 fc a5 3f 5d | ac 09 fb 9e 9b c9 09 53 d2 8a 70 fc 3d 1a 16 59 | f0 73 fa f5 d7 eb 48 52 b5 e3 44 cf dd e3 36 e8 | f5 3e 04 8e 4f c2 b0 2e a1 a2 cd 5c 8a c5 fd 68 | fb 10 3f 6e 1a ec db 69 6f 86 24 b0 11 b1 c9 5a | 3a 2b ee 89 44 b8 b6 a6 65 c2 c3 df 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 31 26 bd e5 7a 09 08 9e 2d 67 7d 8d bb d7 c2 01 | e4 e5 43 7a | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 31 26 bd e5 7a 09 08 9e 2d 67 7d 8d bb d7 c2 01 | e4 e5 43 7a | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #19: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #20 at 0x55b81b98abc8 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #20 in UNDEFINED | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #19 "east" as #20 for IPSEC SA | #20 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #19.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #20: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 20 44 e4 97 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | d6 d8 4e 92 2b a1 35 53 ec 9a 65 f4 46 39 48 97 | c2 44 c6 67 57 57 c5 46 5d 99 4a 67 98 4a b1 38 | 2d 05 17 64 84 c6 2a 6a 7e 02 05 ff f2 13 f4 f9 | d6 44 9f 32 16 ea 4b 19 5f 7d b5 7a fe f3 d6 82 | ed 97 d0 3b 91 79 0b 8a 73 a1 fa 13 d9 99 23 14 | 93 ef e6 08 ea 03 5a d7 a7 c1 ce 5e c0 d0 00 8f | 0d 38 d5 8d bd 4b 74 0d c8 0e 7c b8 84 9a 32 91 | 89 26 5f 0b 75 f6 89 4d 67 01 0d 6f 63 d7 93 83 | 3c 3d f8 80 84 e6 8a 19 e1 e2 9d 59 58 e2 a1 3c | ac f7 65 da 08 2e 21 57 31 cf 83 28 0f eb 97 a4 | d7 34 2b 46 46 1f ac e4 3c 7b ec 61 f1 b2 c2 01 | fc a5 3f 5d ac 09 fb 9e 9b c9 09 53 d2 8a 70 fc | 3d 1a 16 59 f0 73 fa f5 d7 eb 48 52 b5 e3 44 cf | dd e3 36 e8 f5 3e 04 8e 4f c2 b0 2e a1 a2 cd 5c | 8a c5 fd 68 fb 10 3f 6e 1a ec db 69 6f 86 24 b0 | 11 b1 c9 5a 3a 2b ee 89 44 b8 b6 a6 65 c2 c3 df | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 23 for state #20 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #20 and saving MD | #20 is busy; has a suspended MD | #19 spent 0.183 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.537 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 23 for state #20 | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 23 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e8009fa8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0e8009fa8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 3c 5e cf a7 1e aa c1 3e 40 07 28 69 2e 86 cb 40 | 61 60 20 c7 b3 a4 68 4e 4c 74 9b 61 d0 08 b4 cf | 8a 2c cc c4 28 cd d0 ee 55 56 29 23 30 b0 cb d5 | ed f6 e0 e9 37 7e c8 0a a0 1e d7 f3 ec a3 1a 62 | ea 30 01 f1 86 2f e2 8d 89 43 b5 ff ed 3a 4f 02 | 80 68 d8 60 a1 fc 08 8f 8e 21 a5 1e 8e 56 6b cf | 33 8a 46 99 0a ca 21 49 c8 b4 4d 39 f7 d6 46 37 | 3e a0 47 3b 3e 48 9f 20 e4 3b d2 0c af 45 1f 98 | ad a7 ba 63 3b c6 82 51 7b f1 68 70 24 ae 22 71 | 7d 83 66 5a 31 86 b0 92 cd 93 3e 9f af b8 9c 4a | fa 42 85 14 dc d0 26 56 fa db 3b 01 09 68 be 20 | 4a f8 93 3b f7 fd 9a d0 c5 b3 91 83 68 42 d1 de | 04 a7 bd 4c 5b 9d 1d 10 42 9f 90 6f 3d 47 41 40 | 70 81 71 f1 34 bb fb 3e 5b a5 4f 10 07 e7 03 ef | d8 7b 13 c1 9e 93 c2 48 b1 29 8d 46 a0 23 ff e2 | 32 ff 27 60 93 c5 82 6b a8 85 12 af b2 92 dd 1b | Generated nonce: 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | Generated nonce: 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 23 time elapsed 0.000794 seconds | (#20) spent 0.785 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 23: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 23 for state #20 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #20 | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 23 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #20: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e8009fa8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #20 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e8009fa8: transferring ownership from state #20 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 24 for state #20 | state #20 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 size 128 | suspending state #20 and saving MD | #20 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #20 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 24 for state #20 | #20 spent 0.046 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 24 | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 | peer's g: d6 d8 4e 92 2b a1 35 53 ec 9a 65 f4 46 39 48 97 | peer's g: c2 44 c6 67 57 57 c5 46 5d 99 4a 67 98 4a b1 38 | peer's g: 2d 05 17 64 84 c6 2a 6a 7e 02 05 ff f2 13 f4 f9 | peer's g: d6 44 9f 32 16 ea 4b 19 5f 7d b5 7a fe f3 d6 82 | peer's g: ed 97 d0 3b 91 79 0b 8a 73 a1 fa 13 d9 99 23 14 | peer's g: 93 ef e6 08 ea 03 5a d7 a7 c1 ce 5e c0 d0 00 8f | peer's g: 0d 38 d5 8d bd 4b 74 0d c8 0e 7c b8 84 9a 32 91 | peer's g: 89 26 5f 0b 75 f6 89 4d 67 01 0d 6f 63 d7 93 83 | peer's g: 3c 3d f8 80 84 e6 8a 19 e1 e2 9d 59 58 e2 a1 3c | peer's g: ac f7 65 da 08 2e 21 57 31 cf 83 28 0f eb 97 a4 | peer's g: d7 34 2b 46 46 1f ac e4 3c 7b ec 61 f1 b2 c2 01 | peer's g: fc a5 3f 5d ac 09 fb 9e 9b c9 09 53 d2 8a 70 fc | peer's g: 3d 1a 16 59 f0 73 fa f5 d7 eb 48 52 b5 e3 44 cf | peer's g: dd e3 36 e8 f5 3e 04 8e 4f c2 b0 2e a1 a2 cd 5c | peer's g: 8a c5 fd 68 fb 10 3f 6e 1a ec db 69 6f 86 24 b0 | peer's g: 11 b1 c9 5a 3a 2b ee 89 44 b8 b6 a6 65 c2 c3 df | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e8009fa8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b98c720 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 24 time elapsed 0.000553 seconds | (#20) spent 0.551 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 24: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 24 for state #20 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #20 | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 24 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #20: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2295742037 (0x88d63e55) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 20 44 e4 97 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0xf23b279b for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI f2 3b 27 9b | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 20 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 28 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #20: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:88d63e55} "east" #20: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #20: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | Nr 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 3c 5e cf a7 1e aa c1 3e 40 07 28 69 2e 86 cb 40 | keyex value 61 60 20 c7 b3 a4 68 4e 4c 74 9b 61 d0 08 b4 cf | keyex value 8a 2c cc c4 28 cd d0 ee 55 56 29 23 30 b0 cb d5 | keyex value ed f6 e0 e9 37 7e c8 0a a0 1e d7 f3 ec a3 1a 62 | keyex value ea 30 01 f1 86 2f e2 8d 89 43 b5 ff ed 3a 4f 02 | keyex value 80 68 d8 60 a1 fc 08 8f 8e 21 a5 1e 8e 56 6b cf | keyex value 33 8a 46 99 0a ca 21 49 c8 b4 4d 39 f7 d6 46 37 | keyex value 3e a0 47 3b 3e 48 9f 20 e4 3b d2 0c af 45 1f 98 | keyex value ad a7 ba 63 3b c6 82 51 7b f1 68 70 24 ae 22 71 | keyex value 7d 83 66 5a 31 86 b0 92 cd 93 3e 9f af b8 9c 4a | keyex value fa 42 85 14 dc d0 26 56 fa db 3b 01 09 68 be 20 | keyex value 4a f8 93 3b f7 fd 9a d0 c5 b3 91 83 68 42 d1 de | keyex value 04 a7 bd 4c 5b 9d 1d 10 42 9f 90 6f 3d 47 41 40 | keyex value 70 81 71 f1 34 bb fb 3e 5b a5 4f 10 07 e7 03 ef | keyex value d8 7b 13 c1 9e 93 c2 48 b1 29 8d 46 a0 23 ff e2 | keyex value 32 ff 27 60 93 c5 82 6b a8 85 12 af b2 92 dd 1b | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e8009fa8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #20 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a88 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54342b6c (length 4) | 88 d6 3e 55 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b8198d38f4 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 f2 3b 27 9b 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c | 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd | e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd 05 00 01 04 3c 5e cf a7 | 1e aa c1 3e 40 07 28 69 2e 86 cb 40 61 60 20 c7 | b3 a4 68 4e 4c 74 9b 61 d0 08 b4 cf 8a 2c cc c4 | 28 cd d0 ee 55 56 29 23 30 b0 cb d5 ed f6 e0 e9 | 37 7e c8 0a a0 1e d7 f3 ec a3 1a 62 ea 30 01 f1 | 86 2f e2 8d 89 43 b5 ff ed 3a 4f 02 80 68 d8 60 | a1 fc 08 8f 8e 21 a5 1e 8e 56 6b cf 33 8a 46 99 | 0a ca 21 49 c8 b4 4d 39 f7 d6 46 37 3e a0 47 3b | 3e 48 9f 20 e4 3b d2 0c af 45 1f 98 ad a7 ba 63 | 3b c6 82 51 7b f1 68 70 24 ae 22 71 7d 83 66 5a | 31 86 b0 92 cd 93 3e 9f af b8 9c 4a fa 42 85 14 | dc d0 26 56 fa db 3b 01 09 68 be 20 4a f8 93 3b | f7 fd 9a d0 c5 b3 91 83 68 42 d1 de 04 a7 bd 4c | 5b 9d 1d 10 42 9f 90 6f 3d 47 41 40 70 81 71 f1 | 34 bb fb 3e 5b a5 4f 10 07 e7 03 ef d8 7b 13 c1 | 9e 93 c2 48 b1 29 8d 46 a0 23 ff e2 32 ff 27 60 | 93 c5 82 6b a8 85 12 af b2 92 dd 1b 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 20) | 83 9b 5a 61 46 01 aa 0e ec f3 41 f0 c4 85 8b 7c | d8 46 66 52 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 83 9b 5a 61 46 01 aa 0e ec f3 41 f0 c4 85 8b 7c | d8 46 66 52 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=24 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=44 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98c720 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 95 6f 4c d2 a5 d4 39 38 b1 b6 09 8f 7e fe c4 14 ac 94 f6 82 22 c7 c4 50 c9 fa ca ec 38 6a 00 50 b4 3f b2 9d 98 2e 7c 09 ca 7d 70 77 4f 63 08 e7 05 9a 60 ac e4 9a 09 3a 86 08 90 5f de 98 fd 4d 79 1c a7 7e 9e 61 fd 5f 34 8f 89 33 26 2a b8 7c 1a 19 09 59 cf 9f d4 61 28 62 31 d9 d6 d1 85 c0 3b 8c 48 e9 63 6e 3e fa 55 4d 06 b5 d5 30 97 f9 a2 5a e9 47 95 08 f7 e7 c9 86 7a fb 04 55 4a dd 2e a2 ea 82 eb 1a 83 1a 39 40 65 46 fe 70 d3 9b 7c d3 92 85 45 e4 fb 24 d0 65 09 83 cd 8b 17 b3 47 06 c0 55 ab 94 7e 27 3e bb 88 7f 53 c8 13 3a 4c 85 4b d8 22 3b 70 94 43 08 dd ae 4f ff 1d 81 dd 82 93 de 7f c0 c2 c3 68 8a 55 7f 01 af 53 0a 87 08 d7 b8 02 e0 e6 1a 22 45 72 0d b5 0f 10 fa 19 19 5e 45 cc e6 50 0c aa 03 1a 62 5e 4a 69 c9 fd c8 4b e1 cf 97 31 84 1c 0c 31 4b cb 1e c6 f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 95 a5 6c 0d 60 36 9a 36 83 b3 b3 e4 6f 3c 7d d7 | unwrapped: 38 4e d7 b3 ba 4e 32 87 a4 6d 6b 8f e3 cb 92 48 | unwrapped: 75 29 d1 07 ee 9a 26 71 4f db a1 87 5b 03 f9 2c | unwrapped: af 01 0d 6c 1e f4 5c ff 27 72 52 15 74 3e 36 e4 | unwrapped: 28 19 6d b0 35 fe bf f3 f2 79 80 c9 08 14 f9 85 | unwrapped: 8b 75 cd da 92 b7 c4 7f 8e a7 00 3f 56 f8 a9 b0 | unwrapped: 72 e3 3a 13 f2 89 cc 75 ee 98 00 1b 46 b8 6e a5 | unwrapped: 0b d5 e0 99 d9 1d a0 72 57 46 f6 6e 79 dd 6d 16 | unwrapped: 1c 2d 9e eb fa 52 d5 e8 b8 9c df 25 33 4f 58 17 | unwrapped: ed d5 24 2a a2 f2 09 5e 28 12 82 be 95 f1 eb 42 | unwrapped: 9b 16 70 83 20 a7 d8 be ef fe b0 d0 a0 f9 4a dd | unwrapped: be 53 a2 30 53 64 89 4e b6 c9 5b c5 37 52 a5 c0 | unwrapped: 69 b3 15 05 cb bc cf 12 03 f1 a6 20 9d 62 9e 4f | unwrapped: 85 ad de 3e 4d bd a8 68 06 77 4d 91 00 de b0 79 | unwrapped: df 7e 74 0e b2 01 47 3a 17 7c 53 69 98 89 13 9c | unwrapped: 1e 48 c9 fa 00 a2 71 0d 07 da a5 1f 78 5a 4b e7 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98c720 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 95 6f 4c d2 a5 d4 39 38 b1 b6 09 8f 7e fe c4 14 ac 94 f6 82 22 c7 c4 50 c9 fa ca ec 38 6a 00 50 b4 3f b2 9d 98 2e 7c 09 ca 7d 70 77 4f 63 08 e7 05 9a 60 ac e4 9a 09 3a 86 08 90 5f de 98 fd 4d 79 1c a7 7e 9e 61 fd 5f 34 8f 89 33 26 2a b8 7c 1a 19 09 59 cf 9f d4 61 28 62 31 d9 d6 d1 85 c0 3b 8c 48 e9 63 6e 3e fa 55 4d 06 b5 d5 30 97 f9 a2 5a e9 47 95 08 f7 e7 c9 86 7a fb 04 55 4a dd 2e a2 ea 82 eb 1a 83 1a 39 40 65 46 fe 70 d3 9b 7c d3 92 85 45 e4 fb 24 d0 65 09 83 cd 8b 17 b3 47 06 c0 55 ab 94 7e 27 3e bb 88 7f 53 c8 13 3a 4c 85 4b d8 22 3b 70 94 43 08 dd ae 4f ff 1d 81 dd 82 93 de 7f c0 c2 c3 68 8a 55 7f 01 af 53 0a 87 08 d7 b8 02 e0 e6 1a 22 45 72 0d b5 0f 10 fa 19 19 5e 45 cc e6 50 0c aa 03 1a 62 5e 4a 69 c9 fd c8 4b e1 cf 97 31 84 1c 0c 31 4b cb 1e c6 f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 95 a5 6c 0d 60 36 9a 36 83 b3 b3 e4 6f 3c 7d d7 | unwrapped: 38 4e d7 b3 ba 4e 32 87 a4 6d 6b 8f e3 cb 92 48 | unwrapped: 75 29 d1 07 ee 9a 26 71 4f db a1 87 5b 03 f9 2c | unwrapped: af 01 0d 6c 1e f4 5c ff 27 72 52 15 74 3e 36 e4 | unwrapped: 28 19 6d b0 35 fe bf f3 f2 79 80 c9 08 14 f9 85 | unwrapped: 8b 75 cd da 92 b7 c4 7f 8e a7 00 3f 56 f8 a9 b0 | unwrapped: 72 e3 3a 13 f2 89 cc 75 ee 98 00 1b 46 b8 6e a5 | unwrapped: 0b d5 e0 99 d9 1d a0 72 57 46 f6 6e 79 dd 6d 16 | unwrapped: 1c 2d 9e eb fa 52 d5 e8 b8 9c df 25 33 4f 58 17 | unwrapped: ed d5 24 2a a2 f2 09 5e 28 12 82 be 95 f1 eb 42 | unwrapped: 9b 16 70 83 20 a7 d8 be ef fe b0 d0 a0 f9 4a dd | unwrapped: be 53 a2 30 53 64 89 4e b6 c9 5b c5 37 52 a5 c0 | unwrapped: 69 b3 15 05 cb bc cf 12 03 f1 a6 20 9d 62 9e 4f | unwrapped: 85 ad de 3e 4d bd a8 68 06 77 4d 91 00 de b0 79 | unwrapped: df 7e 74 0e b2 01 47 3a 17 7c 53 69 98 89 13 9c | unwrapped: 1e 48 c9 fa 00 a2 71 0d 07 da a5 1f 78 5a 4b e7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98add0 (length 4) | f2 3b 27 9b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98adb0 (length 4) | 20 44 e4 97 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0ec004218 (length 20) | ed b7 eb 97 b9 2e b1 a3 3e a4 1a d1 51 ac 46 50 | 84 4a 6e 96 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b9947a8 (length 20) | ec 93 56 9a 2c 32 cf 62 65 5e bb 7d c4 1a 25 6b | 68 df 2f 9d | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec004218 (length 20) | ed b7 eb 97 b9 2e b1 a3 3e a4 1a d1 51 ac 46 50 | 84 4a 6e 96 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9947a8 (length 20) | ec 93 56 9a 2c 32 cf 62 65 5e bb 7d c4 1a 25 6b | 68 df 2f 9d | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98c720 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 95 6f 4c d2 a5 d4 39 38 b1 b6 09 8f 7e fe c4 14 ac 94 f6 82 22 c7 c4 50 c9 fa ca ec 38 6a 00 50 b4 3f b2 9d 98 2e 7c 09 ca 7d 70 77 4f 63 08 e7 05 9a 60 ac e4 9a 09 3a 86 08 90 5f de 98 fd 4d 79 1c a7 7e 9e 61 fd 5f 34 8f 89 33 26 2a b8 7c 1a 19 09 59 cf 9f d4 61 28 62 31 d9 d6 d1 85 c0 3b 8c 48 e9 63 6e 3e fa 55 4d 06 b5 d5 30 97 f9 a2 5a e9 47 95 08 f7 e7 c9 86 7a fb 04 55 4a dd 2e a2 ea 82 eb 1a 83 1a 39 40 65 46 fe 70 d3 9b 7c d3 92 85 45 e4 fb 24 d0 65 09 83 cd 8b 17 b3 47 06 c0 55 ab 94 7e 27 3e bb 88 7f 53 c8 13 3a 4c 85 4b d8 22 3b 70 94 43 08 dd ae 4f ff 1d 81 dd 82 93 de 7f c0 c2 c3 68 8a 55 7f 01 af 53 0a 87 08 d7 b8 02 e0 e6 1a 22 45 72 0d b5 0f 10 fa 19 19 5e 45 cc e6 50 0c aa 03 1a 62 5e 4a 69 c9 fd c8 4b e1 cf 97 31 84 1c 0c 31 4b cb 1e c6 f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 95 a5 6c 0d 60 36 9a 36 83 b3 b3 e4 6f 3c 7d d7 | unwrapped: 38 4e d7 b3 ba 4e 32 87 a4 6d 6b 8f e3 cb 92 48 | unwrapped: 75 29 d1 07 ee 9a 26 71 4f db a1 87 5b 03 f9 2c | unwrapped: af 01 0d 6c 1e f4 5c ff 27 72 52 15 74 3e 36 e4 | unwrapped: 28 19 6d b0 35 fe bf f3 f2 79 80 c9 08 14 f9 85 | unwrapped: 8b 75 cd da 92 b7 c4 7f 8e a7 00 3f 56 f8 a9 b0 | unwrapped: 72 e3 3a 13 f2 89 cc 75 ee 98 00 1b 46 b8 6e a5 | unwrapped: 0b d5 e0 99 d9 1d a0 72 57 46 f6 6e 79 dd 6d 16 | unwrapped: 1c 2d 9e eb fa 52 d5 e8 b8 9c df 25 33 4f 58 17 | unwrapped: ed d5 24 2a a2 f2 09 5e 28 12 82 be 95 f1 eb 42 | unwrapped: 9b 16 70 83 20 a7 d8 be ef fe b0 d0 a0 f9 4a dd | unwrapped: be 53 a2 30 53 64 89 4e b6 c9 5b c5 37 52 a5 c0 | unwrapped: 69 b3 15 05 cb bc cf 12 03 f1 a6 20 9d 62 9e 4f | unwrapped: 85 ad de 3e 4d bd a8 68 06 77 4d 91 00 de b0 79 | unwrapped: df 7e 74 0e b2 01 47 3a 17 7c 53 69 98 89 13 9c | unwrapped: 1e 48 c9 fa 00 a2 71 0d 07 da a5 1f 78 5a 4b e7 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98c720 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 95 6f 4c d2 a5 d4 39 38 b1 b6 09 8f 7e fe c4 14 ac 94 f6 82 22 c7 c4 50 c9 fa ca ec 38 6a 00 50 b4 3f b2 9d 98 2e 7c 09 ca 7d 70 77 4f 63 08 e7 05 9a 60 ac e4 9a 09 3a 86 08 90 5f de 98 fd 4d 79 1c a7 7e 9e 61 fd 5f 34 8f 89 33 26 2a b8 7c 1a 19 09 59 cf 9f d4 61 28 62 31 d9 d6 d1 85 c0 3b 8c 48 e9 63 6e 3e fa 55 4d 06 b5 d5 30 97 f9 a2 5a e9 47 95 08 f7 e7 c9 86 7a fb 04 55 4a dd 2e a2 ea 82 eb 1a 83 1a 39 40 65 46 fe 70 d3 9b 7c d3 92 85 45 e4 fb 24 d0 65 09 83 cd 8b 17 b3 47 06 c0 55 ab 94 7e 27 3e bb 88 7f 53 c8 13 3a 4c 85 4b d8 22 3b 70 94 43 08 dd ae 4f ff 1d 81 dd 82 93 de 7f c0 c2 c3 68 8a 55 7f 01 af 53 0a 87 08 d7 b8 02 e0 e6 1a 22 45 72 0d b5 0f 10 fa 19 19 5e 45 cc e6 50 0c aa 03 1a 62 5e 4a 69 c9 fd c8 4b e1 cf 97 31 84 1c 0c 31 4b cb 1e c6 f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 95 a5 6c 0d 60 36 9a 36 83 b3 b3 e4 6f 3c 7d d7 | unwrapped: 38 4e d7 b3 ba 4e 32 87 a4 6d 6b 8f e3 cb 92 48 | unwrapped: 75 29 d1 07 ee 9a 26 71 4f db a1 87 5b 03 f9 2c | unwrapped: af 01 0d 6c 1e f4 5c ff 27 72 52 15 74 3e 36 e4 | unwrapped: 28 19 6d b0 35 fe bf f3 f2 79 80 c9 08 14 f9 85 | unwrapped: 8b 75 cd da 92 b7 c4 7f 8e a7 00 3f 56 f8 a9 b0 | unwrapped: 72 e3 3a 13 f2 89 cc 75 ee 98 00 1b 46 b8 6e a5 | unwrapped: 0b d5 e0 99 d9 1d a0 72 57 46 f6 6e 79 dd 6d 16 | unwrapped: 1c 2d 9e eb fa 52 d5 e8 b8 9c df 25 33 4f 58 17 | unwrapped: ed d5 24 2a a2 f2 09 5e 28 12 82 be 95 f1 eb 42 | unwrapped: 9b 16 70 83 20 a7 d8 be ef fe b0 d0 a0 f9 4a dd | unwrapped: be 53 a2 30 53 64 89 4e b6 c9 5b c5 37 52 a5 c0 | unwrapped: 69 b3 15 05 cb bc cf 12 03 f1 a6 20 9d 62 9e 4f | unwrapped: 85 ad de 3e 4d bd a8 68 06 77 4d 91 00 de b0 79 | unwrapped: df 7e 74 0e b2 01 47 3a 17 7c 53 69 98 89 13 9c | unwrapped: 1e 48 c9 fa 00 a2 71 0d 07 da a5 1f 78 5a 4b e7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98add0 (length 4) | f2 3b 27 9b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98adb0 (length 4) | 20 44 e4 97 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0ec00422c (length 20) | f5 69 d9 52 08 e4 a7 f8 d8 fa ba 01 f0 f9 44 b7 | f1 15 d6 8d | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b9947bc (length 20) | 1d 14 61 ce ba 46 af 44 a0 30 76 a6 2c 2d c2 fb | 4e e4 f7 5d | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0ec00422c (length 20) | f5 69 d9 52 08 e4 a7 f8 d8 fa ba 01 f0 f9 44 b7 | f1 15 d6 8d | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9947bc (length 20) | 1d 14 61 ce ba 46 af 44 a0 30 76 a6 2c 2d c2 fb | 4e e4 f7 5d | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98c720 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 95 6f 4c d2 a5 d4 39 38 b1 b6 09 8f 7e fe c4 14 ac 94 f6 82 22 c7 c4 50 c9 fa ca ec 38 6a 00 50 b4 3f b2 9d 98 2e 7c 09 ca 7d 70 77 4f 63 08 e7 05 9a 60 ac e4 9a 09 3a 86 08 90 5f de 98 fd 4d 79 1c a7 7e 9e 61 fd 5f 34 8f 89 33 26 2a b8 7c 1a 19 09 59 cf 9f d4 61 28 62 31 d9 d6 d1 85 c0 3b 8c 48 e9 63 6e 3e fa 55 4d 06 b5 d5 30 97 f9 a2 5a e9 47 95 08 f7 e7 c9 86 7a fb 04 55 4a dd 2e a2 ea 82 eb 1a 83 1a 39 40 65 46 fe 70 d3 9b 7c d3 92 85 45 e4 fb 24 d0 65 09 83 cd 8b 17 b3 47 06 c0 55 ab 94 7e 27 3e bb 88 7f 53 c8 13 3a 4c 85 4b d8 22 3b 70 94 43 08 dd ae 4f ff 1d 81 dd 82 93 de 7f c0 c2 c3 68 8a 55 7f 01 af 53 0a 87 08 d7 b8 02 e0 e6 1a 22 45 72 0d b5 0f 10 fa 19 19 5e 45 cc e6 50 0c aa 03 1a 62 5e 4a 69 c9 fd c8 4b e1 cf 97 31 84 1c 0c 31 4b cb 1e c6 f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 95 a5 6c 0d 60 36 9a 36 83 b3 b3 e4 6f 3c 7d d7 | unwrapped: 38 4e d7 b3 ba 4e 32 87 a4 6d 6b 8f e3 cb 92 48 | unwrapped: 75 29 d1 07 ee 9a 26 71 4f db a1 87 5b 03 f9 2c | unwrapped: af 01 0d 6c 1e f4 5c ff 27 72 52 15 74 3e 36 e4 | unwrapped: 28 19 6d b0 35 fe bf f3 f2 79 80 c9 08 14 f9 85 | unwrapped: 8b 75 cd da 92 b7 c4 7f 8e a7 00 3f 56 f8 a9 b0 | unwrapped: 72 e3 3a 13 f2 89 cc 75 ee 98 00 1b 46 b8 6e a5 | unwrapped: 0b d5 e0 99 d9 1d a0 72 57 46 f6 6e 79 dd 6d 16 | unwrapped: 1c 2d 9e eb fa 52 d5 e8 b8 9c df 25 33 4f 58 17 | unwrapped: ed d5 24 2a a2 f2 09 5e 28 12 82 be 95 f1 eb 42 | unwrapped: 9b 16 70 83 20 a7 d8 be ef fe b0 d0 a0 f9 4a dd | unwrapped: be 53 a2 30 53 64 89 4e b6 c9 5b c5 37 52 a5 c0 | unwrapped: 69 b3 15 05 cb bc cf 12 03 f1 a6 20 9d 62 9e 4f | unwrapped: 85 ad de 3e 4d bd a8 68 06 77 4d 91 00 de b0 79 | unwrapped: df 7e 74 0e b2 01 47 3a 17 7c 53 69 98 89 13 9c | unwrapped: 1e 48 c9 fa 00 a2 71 0d 07 da a5 1f 78 5a 4b e7 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98c720 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 95 6f 4c d2 a5 d4 39 38 b1 b6 09 8f 7e fe c4 14 ac 94 f6 82 22 c7 c4 50 c9 fa ca ec 38 6a 00 50 b4 3f b2 9d 98 2e 7c 09 ca 7d 70 77 4f 63 08 e7 05 9a 60 ac e4 9a 09 3a 86 08 90 5f de 98 fd 4d 79 1c a7 7e 9e 61 fd 5f 34 8f 89 33 26 2a b8 7c 1a 19 09 59 cf 9f d4 61 28 62 31 d9 d6 d1 85 c0 3b 8c 48 e9 63 6e 3e fa 55 4d 06 b5 d5 30 97 f9 a2 5a e9 47 95 08 f7 e7 c9 86 7a fb 04 55 4a dd 2e a2 ea 82 eb 1a 83 1a 39 40 65 46 fe 70 d3 9b 7c d3 92 85 45 e4 fb 24 d0 65 09 83 cd 8b 17 b3 47 06 c0 55 ab 94 7e 27 3e bb 88 7f 53 c8 13 3a 4c 85 4b d8 22 3b 70 94 43 08 dd ae 4f ff 1d 81 dd 82 93 de 7f c0 c2 c3 68 8a 55 7f 01 af 53 0a 87 08 d7 b8 02 e0 e6 1a 22 45 72 0d b5 0f 10 fa 19 19 5e 45 cc e6 50 0c aa 03 1a 62 5e 4a 69 c9 fd c8 4b e1 cf 97 31 84 1c 0c 31 4b cb 1e c6 f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 95 a5 6c 0d 60 36 9a 36 83 b3 b3 e4 6f 3c 7d d7 | unwrapped: 38 4e d7 b3 ba 4e 32 87 a4 6d 6b 8f e3 cb 92 48 | unwrapped: 75 29 d1 07 ee 9a 26 71 4f db a1 87 5b 03 f9 2c | unwrapped: af 01 0d 6c 1e f4 5c ff 27 72 52 15 74 3e 36 e4 | unwrapped: 28 19 6d b0 35 fe bf f3 f2 79 80 c9 08 14 f9 85 | unwrapped: 8b 75 cd da 92 b7 c4 7f 8e a7 00 3f 56 f8 a9 b0 | unwrapped: 72 e3 3a 13 f2 89 cc 75 ee 98 00 1b 46 b8 6e a5 | unwrapped: 0b d5 e0 99 d9 1d a0 72 57 46 f6 6e 79 dd 6d 16 | unwrapped: 1c 2d 9e eb fa 52 d5 e8 b8 9c df 25 33 4f 58 17 | unwrapped: ed d5 24 2a a2 f2 09 5e 28 12 82 be 95 f1 eb 42 | unwrapped: 9b 16 70 83 20 a7 d8 be ef fe b0 d0 a0 f9 4a dd | unwrapped: be 53 a2 30 53 64 89 4e b6 c9 5b c5 37 52 a5 c0 | unwrapped: 69 b3 15 05 cb bc cf 12 03 f1 a6 20 9d 62 9e 4f | unwrapped: 85 ad de 3e 4d bd a8 68 06 77 4d 91 00 de b0 79 | unwrapped: df 7e 74 0e b2 01 47 3a 17 7c 53 69 98 89 13 9c | unwrapped: 1e 48 c9 fa 00 a2 71 0d 07 da a5 1f 78 5a 4b e7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98add0 (length 4) | f2 3b 27 9b | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98adb0 (length 4) | 20 44 e4 97 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0ec004240 (length 20) | 6d be 4d a3 b9 89 2a 47 6d 36 a4 0d 26 26 9b 00 | f2 35 c4 a0 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b9947d0 (length 20) | 8c 43 1e 9b 05 d0 2b e0 8d 22 00 aa 7c c0 51 5c | 59 5f 75 88 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55b81b98abc8 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#20 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.2044e497@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.f23b279b@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 83 9b 5a 61 46 01 aa 0e ec f3 41 f0 | encrypting: c4 85 8b 7c d8 46 66 52 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 f2 3b 27 9b | encrypting: 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 | encrypting: 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | encrypting: 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | encrypting: 05 00 01 04 3c 5e cf a7 1e aa c1 3e 40 07 28 69 | encrypting: 2e 86 cb 40 61 60 20 c7 b3 a4 68 4e 4c 74 9b 61 | encrypting: d0 08 b4 cf 8a 2c cc c4 28 cd d0 ee 55 56 29 23 | encrypting: 30 b0 cb d5 ed f6 e0 e9 37 7e c8 0a a0 1e d7 f3 | encrypting: ec a3 1a 62 ea 30 01 f1 86 2f e2 8d 89 43 b5 ff | encrypting: ed 3a 4f 02 80 68 d8 60 a1 fc 08 8f 8e 21 a5 1e | encrypting: 8e 56 6b cf 33 8a 46 99 0a ca 21 49 c8 b4 4d 39 | encrypting: f7 d6 46 37 3e a0 47 3b 3e 48 9f 20 e4 3b d2 0c | encrypting: af 45 1f 98 ad a7 ba 63 3b c6 82 51 7b f1 68 70 | encrypting: 24 ae 22 71 7d 83 66 5a 31 86 b0 92 cd 93 3e 9f | encrypting: af b8 9c 4a fa 42 85 14 dc d0 26 56 fa db 3b 01 | encrypting: 09 68 be 20 4a f8 93 3b f7 fd 9a d0 c5 b3 91 83 | encrypting: 68 42 d1 de 04 a7 bd 4c 5b 9d 1d 10 42 9f 90 6f | encrypting: 3d 47 41 40 70 81 71 f1 34 bb fb 3e 5b a5 4f 10 | encrypting: 07 e7 03 ef d8 7b 13 c1 9e 93 c2 48 b1 29 8d 46 | encrypting: a0 23 ff e2 32 ff 27 60 93 c5 82 6b a8 85 12 af | encrypting: b2 92 dd 1b 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 | IV: 75 22 11 d8 bc 14 5c 43 | unpadded size is: 404 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 408 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 436 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 01 91 e2 fb f4 85 8b 02 | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #20 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #20: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #20 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0f0001378 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 436 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #20) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 20 01 88 d6 3e 55 00 00 01 b4 a5 4f 3f 30 | a8 37 97 8c 73 52 8a ba cb 32 1a 6b c7 0b 29 94 | e9 f6 9e 41 ad 27 72 31 93 eb 92 0f f3 3d 98 bd | 5e 37 f8 1d 55 b0 5d e7 8f 37 62 93 0d 76 1e 3f | ea 86 88 06 bd ec 45 84 81 69 b8 9b d1 22 8f 33 | 44 b4 bd b3 2e be cc fa c8 d3 ef 0e 13 77 5e 4b | 99 8c 8d df cd f9 51 7d 3a 0d 91 65 d0 45 35 bb | dd e0 b9 4a f5 2a 47 8d 49 3d 24 56 5e 89 71 e7 | 43 27 a4 b7 0d 8b fd 3d 6f 52 c8 cb 40 b2 69 df | ba fc 5a 19 ae 82 83 86 36 75 48 d7 99 97 05 1b | 84 95 cc 5f 4e 45 0e 4c b4 37 61 8d 46 0c 5b 3c | 79 b3 ea 43 ad 63 9c d6 bb 67 ce 43 5f b9 3f 6b | 13 23 02 31 e6 4a 6d dc 32 92 25 6f 1c a5 c3 c7 | 2d aa 01 34 7b 4a b9 02 85 79 d5 97 71 1b af 31 | 32 e6 8c 9b ed 71 e5 b7 1a df 61 6c cc e2 12 8f | 89 64 29 b0 b2 6d 46 aa db 09 41 29 57 db 7e e8 | 35 f7 a3 45 30 35 98 70 97 90 77 87 99 be eb b9 | eb 18 6d d2 e4 25 b8 d2 2e 64 a9 8b 41 64 b0 a8 | 38 36 de 3a 7b 4b f8 f3 8a 76 94 85 a7 0d 30 35 | 42 9b d5 f9 78 07 5c c0 7a 59 d8 27 e5 83 c5 3e | 2c 4a f4 a9 03 95 b8 01 1d 0b 82 02 3a c0 d0 ee | ef 57 58 b5 39 6a 05 c8 43 37 66 79 b5 16 71 c4 | 94 ee 03 13 95 43 80 85 e2 cd 09 27 72 5c 10 c2 | 16 3f 4f f1 02 3f b3 db 70 4b 01 98 71 44 0c 30 | 71 ea 21 6e ea 88 e4 fe 7e ff b6 d1 55 b3 d0 6a | 19 18 f6 fa d7 e0 72 42 a5 82 d5 d1 01 91 e2 fb | f4 85 8b 02 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 size 128 | #20 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10454.727296 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #20: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x2044e497 <0xf23b279b xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #20 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #20 spent 1.51 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 | spent 0.00271 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 52 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 20 01 88 d6 3e 55 00 00 00 34 17 91 ab 7f | 6d 3a 24 55 3e 6b 30 5f 33 62 1f 40 ad 7b a1 cf | 11 78 4d 70 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2295742037 (0x88d63e55) | length: 52 (0x34) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #20 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1633) | #20 is idle | #20 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 24 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 01 91 e2 fb f4 85 8b 02 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: ad 7b a1 cf 11 78 4d 70 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -24): | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 20 01 88 d6 3e 55 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 18 | c3 80 bd 82 37 55 55 40 d4 b3 69 72 14 95 1d f2 | 59 75 e5 76 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b9892a0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b9892a0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | 88 d6 3e 55 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0f00044b8 (length 32) | d2 3d af df f8 58 15 f1 33 0d 36 85 08 ba 99 46 | a2 12 3a d7 a2 94 f2 a3 de 8f 2d 76 6c 84 9b 7c | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fa0e80030c8 (length 32) | 37 23 9d d0 8c cd 51 7c 3c bd ec 64 c9 db 43 5b | 71 7e 1c 2f 6f 67 d9 bd e9 8a 75 62 82 4f db fd | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | c3 80 bd 82 37 55 55 40 d4 b3 69 72 14 95 1d f2 | 59 75 e5 76 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | c3 80 bd 82 37 55 55 40 d4 b3 69 72 14 95 1d f2 | 59 75 e5 76 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #20: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #20: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #20 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2044e497 SPI_OUT=0xf23 | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x2044e497 SPI_OUT=0xf23b279b ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55b81b988648,sr=0x55b81b988648} to #20 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #19 spent 0.592 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #20 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#20) cloned from #19 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #20 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #20: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #20 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #20 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e8003ad8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #20 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 size 128 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #20: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x2044e497 <0xf23b279b xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #20 spent 0.685 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.871 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00441 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00241 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 05 01 b4 0d 7d 67 00 00 00 44 ff 19 94 9d | 27 d9 14 4c f1 8f 41 4c 95 d4 9f eb 94 80 34 03 | c6 d0 b5 53 0a 0c 34 3d 92 7f a0 14 f6 7b 79 e8 | c9 49 e8 58 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3020782951 (0xb40d7d67) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #20; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=88d63e55 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #19; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #19 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | current Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 8) | 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | b4 0d 7d 67 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | 14 97 e0 b5 c7 e1 27 3b 77 1d 49 66 a0 38 81 88 | df c2 c7 be | #19 is idle | #19 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 14 97 e0 b5 c7 e1 27 3b | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: f6 7b 79 e8 c9 49 e8 58 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 05 01 b4 0d 7d 67 00 00 00 44 0c 00 00 18 | 6b 0e 95 1d 8d 91 8f 73 79 e2 6d 6c 92 c9 00 58 | 89 1e 08 e6 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 20 44 e4 97 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | b4 0d 7d 67 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98f52c (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 20 44 e4 97 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 6b 0e 95 1d 8d 91 8f 73 79 e2 6d 6c 92 c9 00 58 | 89 1e 08 e6 | informational HASH(1): | 6b 0e 95 1d 8d 91 8f 73 79 e2 6d 6c 92 c9 00 58 | 89 1e 08 e6 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 20 44 e4 97 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2515) "east" #19: received Delete SA(0x2044e497) payload: deleting IPsec State #20 | pstats #20 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #20 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #20: deleting other state #20 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.057s and sending notification | child state #20: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.2044e497@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.f23b279b@192.1.2.23 "east" #20: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #20 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2201855373 (0x833da58d) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload f2 3b 27 9b | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340928 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a0c (length 4) | 83 3d a5 8d | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340db4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 f2 3b 27 9b | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340da0 (length 20) | ec ed 64 b6 da 5f 51 68 7c d1 4b fb cd eb 99 a2 | 86 6d e2 fe | send delete HASH(1): | ec ed 64 b6 da 5f 51 68 7c d1 4b fb cd eb 99 a2 | 86 6d e2 fe | last Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | current Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 8) | 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a1c (length 4) | 83 3d a5 8d | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | d1 52 37 33 a7 77 f5 eb d2 ce 4d 64 5a 53 3b b3 | cc 8d 76 4f | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 ec ed 64 b6 da 5f 51 68 7c d1 4b fb | encrypting: cd eb 99 a2 86 6d e2 fe 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 f2 3b 27 9b | IV: d1 52 37 33 a7 77 f5 eb d2 ce 4d 64 5a 53 3b b3 | IV: cc 8d 76 4f | unpadded size is: 40 | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 9e d2 1b c1 55 ec d8 4b | sending 68 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 05 01 83 3d a5 8d 00 00 00 44 21 ef 8b 6a | 09 bf 29 3e d6 0e 81 dc 49 b2 ff 4d 8b a2 0c 89 | 2e 4c 4c dc 86 f5 3e 97 de e3 28 ce 9e d2 1b c1 | 55 ec d8 4b | state #20 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003f28 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b98b8d8 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825168' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2044e497 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825168' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x2044e497 SPI_OUT=0xf23b279b ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 0--0->-0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.2044e497@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.2044e497@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.f23b279b@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.f23b279b@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4076) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4077) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #20 in QUICK_R2 | child state #20: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e8009fa8: destroyed | stop processing: state #20 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b98c720 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #19 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #19 | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #19 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #19 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #19: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.074s and sending notification | parent state #19: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #19 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 189774325 (0xb4fb9f5) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543408c8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b994780 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b994780 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b989278 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543409ac (length 4) | 0b 4f b9 f5 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340d54 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 94 13 01 bf | f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340d40 (length 20) | c0 5b 74 5c 23 6b 2d ec b2 ae 80 43 e7 5d 4b 8f | 64 9d 27 de | send delete HASH(1): | c0 5b 74 5c 23 6b 2d ec b2 ae 80 43 e7 5d 4b 8f | 64 9d 27 de | last Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | current Phase 1 IV: 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98c0e8 (length 8) | 9d b9 08 a1 d2 ff de c4 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe543409bc (length 4) | 0b 4f b9 f5 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98c068 (length 20) | a1 79 05 f0 88 8a 40 1a bc fd 8f 8a 67 ef 6e 1d | 3c 23 a6 0d | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 c0 5b 74 5c 23 6b 2d ec b2 ae 80 43 | encrypting: e7 5d 4b 8f 64 9d 27 de 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 | encrypting: 19 4f c9 54 | IV: a1 79 05 f0 88 8a 40 1a bc fd 8f 8a 67 ef 6e 1d | IV: 3c 23 a6 0d | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 56 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: cc 91 98 65 fc 1f 34 9c | sending 84 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #19) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 05 01 0b 4f b9 f5 00 00 00 54 88 de 60 36 | 19 c9 a0 14 df 19 19 58 35 1d 18 6e 98 26 fc 7e | 00 5f a8 82 6a 5f 8a 22 61 d1 6a b5 c5 14 d0 28 | e5 93 32 5c 64 eb e3 e4 1a 38 34 eb cc 91 98 65 | fc 1f 34 9c | state #19 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc0015e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0dc002b78 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #19 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #19: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0dc006de8: destroyed | stop processing: state #19 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b96d700 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2556) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2559) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.48 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00124 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 84 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | 08 10 05 01 c8 b4 46 05 00 00 00 54 4b 4e 13 f6 | 59 10 ab 0c c6 bd 93 0a 6c 10 19 9c 48 d7 f4 e1 | f0 d2 f7 c3 81 ec c1 3f 8d 91 f6 fa c3 32 ba d3 | 40 7f 3d 1c f3 b7 95 9a 0b 2d d5 2b d2 8c ab 56 | 50 16 5b 2a | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | responder cookie: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3367257605 (0xc8b44605) | length: 84 (0x54) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0xc8b44605 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | 94 13 01 bf f9 6d 03 77 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | 89 1f 46 71 19 4f c9 54 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.068 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0035 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00282 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 9e d9 02 87 e3 3d de 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e d9 02 87 e3 3d de 73 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 0d 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | fb 3a dd 11 8a 4c f9 50 9b 0b f7 dd 7d 38 aa 23 | a8 26 15 02 54 c9 57 f1 23 48 00 a3 c7 d4 64 eb | creating state object #21 at 0x55b81b98bc58 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #21 in UNDEFINED | pstats #21 ikev1.isakmp started | #21 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #21: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #21: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e d9 02 87 e3 3d de 73 | responder cookie: | fb 3a dd 11 8a 4c f9 50 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #21: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #21: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #21 is idle "east" #21: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 9e d9 02 87 e3 3d de 73 | responder cookie: | fb 3a dd 11 8a 4c f9 50 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #21) | 9e d9 02 87 e3 3d de 73 fb 3a dd 11 8a 4c f9 50 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.577 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0101 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 76 71 27 ea 79 6e 40 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 00 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 76 71 27 ea 79 6e 40 05 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 0e 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | eb 69 b2 74 b5 9e 72 d6 19 14 ce 73 b9 7d d7 d9 | 64 ef 8a af c3 0e 0b d7 c6 55 64 5f 6c bc c3 1a | creating state object #22 at 0x55b81b98fa48 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #22 in UNDEFINED | pstats #22 ikev1.isakmp started | #22 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #22: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #22: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 76 71 27 ea 79 6e 40 05 | responder cookie: | eb 69 b2 74 b5 9e 72 d6 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 0 (0x0) "east" #22: peer proposed key_len not valid for encrypt algo setup specified. Attribute OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH "east" #22: no acceptable Oakley Transform | complete v1 state transition with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | [RE]START processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #22 is idle "east" #22: sending notification NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to 192.1.2.45:500 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 76 71 27 ea 79 6e 40 05 | responder cookie: | eb 69 b2 74 b5 9e 72 d6 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Notification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Notification Payload (11:ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Notification Payload'.'next payload type' in 'notification msg' | emitting length of ISAKMP Notification Payload: 12 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 40 | sending 40 bytes for notification packet through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #22) | 76 71 27 ea 79 6e 40 05 eb 69 b2 74 b5 9e 72 d6 | 0b 10 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 0c | 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 0e | state transition function for STATE_MAIN_R0 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 2.55 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00269 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 204 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 0d 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | 0d 00 00 14 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 | 15 52 9d 56 0d 00 00 14 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e | 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f 00 00 00 14 cd 60 46 43 | 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 204 (0xcc) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | #null state always idle | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x2 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 56 (0x38) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | length: 20 (0x14) | got payload 0x2000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 20 (0x14) | message 'main_inI1_outR1' HASH payload not checked early | received Vendor ID payload [FRAGMENTATION] | received Vendor ID payload [Dead Peer Detection] | quirks.qnat_traversal_vid set to=117 [RFC 3947] | received Vendor ID payload [RFC 3947] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n] | Ignoring older NAT-T Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | ignoring Vendor ID payload [draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02] | in statetime_start() with no state | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=IKEV1_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (east) | find_next_host_connection returns east | find_next_host_connection policy=IKEV1_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 init | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest addr-bytes@0x55b81b9895d8 (length 28) | 02 00 01 f4 c0 01 02 2d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest sod-bytes@0x55b8198c7700 (length 32) | b8 e8 6b e0 e1 83 97 39 e7 11 16 31 0c 5f 9f f2 | 4c 8a bc ed 2c bb ca 59 85 95 d9 b3 11 2b 98 2b | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 digest counter-bytes@0x55b8198c76e0 (length 4) | 0f 00 00 00 | IKE SPIr hash sha2_256 final bytes@0x7ffe54343000 (length 32) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 cd f2 b7 d8 f6 83 fc 15 | a1 5e 97 02 64 02 b7 d7 7d 45 52 77 e6 35 da cc | creating state object #23 at 0x55b81b98abc8 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #23 in UNDEFINED | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp started | #23 updating local interface from to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI1_outR1() at ikev1_main.c:667) | parent state #23: UNDEFINED(ignore) => MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) | sender checking NAT-T: enabled; VID 117 | returning NAT-T method NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD_IETF_RFC | enabling possible NAT-traversal with method RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) "east" #23: responding to Main Mode | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 44 (0x2c) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE (0x800b) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x800c) | length/value: 3600 (0xe10) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM (0x8001) | length/value: 5 (0x5) | [5 is OAKLEY_3DES_CBC] | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES_CBC=5, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM (0x8002) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is OAKLEY_SHA1] | PRF ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD (0x8003) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY] | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8004) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP Oakley attribute: | af+type: AF+OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 192 (0xc0) | OAKLEY proposal verified; matching alg_info found | Oakley Transform 0 accepted | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP (0x1) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ISAKMP transform ID: KEY_IKE (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 28 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP) | attributes 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 | attributes 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e 80 0e 00 c0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP): 36 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 44 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 56 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 | out_vid(): sending [FRAGMENTATION] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (0xd) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' value 13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [Dead Peer Detection] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID af ca d7 13 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | out_vid(): sending [RFC 3947] | ***emit ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload (13:ISAKMP_NEXT_VID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 16 raw bytes of V_ID into ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload | V_ID 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | emitting length of ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload: 20 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 144 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #23 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | peer supports fragmentation | peer supports DPD | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R0 to state STATE_MAIN_R1 | parent state #23: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 144 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 01 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 0d 00 00 38 | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 0d 00 00 14 40 48 b7 d5 6e bc e8 85 | 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3 0d 00 00 14 af ca d7 13 | 68 a1 f1 c9 6b 86 96 fc 77 57 01 00 00 00 00 14 | 4a 13 1c 81 07 03 58 45 5c 57 28 f2 0e 95 45 2f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R1: sent MR1, expecting MI2 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.396 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00217 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 372 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | 14 00 00 24 a9 ed a3 d6 c0 f6 17 8e 4c ff 4f ef | 04 09 68 1d 83 09 59 49 15 70 52 8a ee a0 0d 48 | 8c b9 dc 63 14 00 00 18 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 | 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac 15 2c 72 4a 00 00 00 18 | 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | 0f fa 1e 8f | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 372 (0x174) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #23 is idle | #23 idle | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x410 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x100000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x102080 | ***parse ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | message 'main_inI2_outR2' HASH payload not checked early | DH public value received: | 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | init checking NAT-T: enabled; RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe543431e0 (length 20) | 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | 15 2c 72 4a | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | natd_hash: hash= 15 2c 72 4a | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54343144 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54343136 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54343220 (length 20) | 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | 0f fa 1e 8f | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | natd_hash: hash= 0f fa 1e 8f | expected NAT-D(me): 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | expected NAT-D(me): 15 2c 72 4a | expected NAT-D(him): | 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | 0f fa 1e 8f | received NAT-D: 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | received NAT-D: 15 2c 72 4a | received NAT-D: 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | received NAT-D: 0f fa 1e 8f | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | NAT-Traversal: Result using RFC 3947 (NAT-Traversal) sender port 500: no NAT detected | NAT_T_WITH_KA detected | adding inI2_outR2 KE work-order 25 for state #23 | state #23 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #23 and saving MD | #23 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 4 resuming | crypto helper 4 starting work-order 25 for state #23 | #23 spent 0.12 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | crypto helper 4 doing build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 25 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.228 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00026e8: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0e00026e8 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | Generated nonce: 81 05 da 89 76 ba 2c 3b 2c 3e 1e 22 8e 4f cc 4b | Generated nonce: 4a 8d 13 0e 35 71 17 49 56 f5 7c 3e a7 c5 67 a4 | crypto helper 4 finished build KE and nonce (inI2_outR2 KE); request ID 25 time elapsed 0.00063 seconds | (#23) spent 0.635 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 25: inI2_outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 4 sending results from work-order 25 for state #23 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007988 size 128 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #23 | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 4 replies to request ID 25 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_continue for #23: calculated ke+nonce, sending R2 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: none (0x0) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00026e8: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #23 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | keyex value b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | keyex value 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | keyex value 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | keyex value df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | keyex value b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | keyex value fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | keyex value 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | keyex value 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | keyex value 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | keyex value 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | keyex value bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | keyex value b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | keyex value 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | keyex value d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | keyex value 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 81 05 da 89 76 ba 2c 3b 2c 3e 1e 22 8e 4f cc 4b | Nr 4a 8d 13 0e 35 71 17 49 56 f5 7c 3e a7 c5 67 a4 | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | sending NAT-D payloads | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 2d | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | 0f fa 1e 8f | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | natd_hash: hash= 0f fa 1e 8f | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC (0x14) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' value 20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 | NAT-D 0f fa 1e 8f | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | NATD hash sha init | NATD hash sha digest ICOOKIE/IKE SPIi-bytes@0x7ffe54342e20 (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | NATD hash sha digest RCOOKIE/IKE SPIr-bytes@0x7ffe54342e28 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | NATD hash sha digest IP addr-bytes@0x7ffe54342da4 (length 4) | c0 01 02 17 | NATD hash sha digest PORT-bytes@0x7ffe54342d96 (length 2) | 01 f4 | NATD hash sha final bytes@0x7ffe54342e70 (length 20) | 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | 15 2c 72 4a | natd_hash: hasher=0x55b8198aa800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | natd_hash: rcookie= fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | natd_hash: hash= 15 2c 72 4a | ***emit ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP NAT-D Payload (20:ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP NAT-D Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of NAT-D into ISAKMP NAT-D Payload | NAT-D 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | NAT-D 15 2c 72 4a | emitting length of ISAKMP NAT-D Payload: 24 | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 372 | main inI2_outR2: starting async DH calculation (group=14) | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00026e8: transferring ownership from state #23 to helper IKEv1 DH+IV | adding main_inI2_outR2_tail work-order 26 for state #23 | state #23 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98ee78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #23 main_inI2_outR2_continue1_tail:1165 st->st_calculating = FALSE; | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #23 is idle; has background offloaded task | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R1 to state STATE_MAIN_R2 | parent state #23: MAIN_R1(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #23 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 372 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 04 10 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 74 0a 00 01 04 | fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 26 for state #23 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 26 | peer's g: 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | peer's g: ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | peer's g: 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | peer's g: ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | peer's g: 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | peer's g: a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | peer's g: 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | peer's g: d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | peer's g: 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | peer's g: 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | peer's g: 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | peer's g: d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | peer's g: e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | peer's g: 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | peer's g: 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | peer's g: e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | 14 00 00 24 81 05 da 89 76 ba 2c 3b 2c 3e 1e 22 | 8e 4f cc 4b 4a 8d 13 0e 35 71 17 49 56 f5 7c 3e | a7 c5 67 a4 14 00 00 18 75 72 15 89 b6 9a 76 d1 | f4 9d 77 dd 2a 08 99 88 0f fa 1e 8f 00 00 00 18 | 0c e0 4c a3 26 f1 0a b1 49 d7 ca 2e 7f 9a 37 ac | 15 2c 72 4a | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | #23 STATE_MAIN_R2: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10456.176071 "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R2: sent MR2, expecting MI3 | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #23 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #23 spent 0.311 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007988 | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00026e8: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b987630 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | SKEYID psk PRF sha init psk-chunk@0x55b81b995888 (length 36) | 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 | 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 31 32 33 34 35 36 | 37 38 39 30 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf51700 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 36 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 36-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (52-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516e8 | result: psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 (36-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | psk: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from psk-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk: release clone-key@0x55b81b974d30 | SKEYID psk PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e4003948 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Ni-bytes@0x55b81b9958ac (length 32) | a9 ed a3 d6 c0 f6 17 8e 4c ff 4f ef 04 09 68 1d | 83 09 59 49 15 70 52 8a ee a0 0d 48 8c b9 dc 63 | SKEYID psk PRF sha update Nr-bytes@0x55b81b9958cc (length 32) | 81 05 da 89 76 ba 2c 3b 2c 3e 1e 22 8e 4f cc 4b | 4a 8d 13 0e 35 71 17 49 56 f5 7c 3e a7 c5 67 a4 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf51720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf51708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID psk PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID psk: key-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_d PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf51718 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_d prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d: release clone-key@0x55b81b973280 | SKEYID_d PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e4001278 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | SKEYID_d: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 4d 49 b1 b7 5d d6 a6 ec 57 7d 3e 22 ee 16 b7 9a e1 2f 4a f5 48 5c 2a bc af 3d 2e 93 2f 26 71 05 4c 4c bd b2 9f 34 82 10 6a 42 7c 20 05 92 a0 5f d3 54 88 5d 38 97 7e af f4 31 77 66 13 e9 6a ae 5e d2 b4 1c f7 64 29 fb 88 66 07 1d 41 11 67 10 6c 61 bb ad 84 05 3a ea e9 a6 29 e0 d1 a2 73 5c 5e 3b ed 0d 66 3f 10 d4 18 96 54 26 25 6d e6 6e e8 34 e4 86 53 a3 88 94 a4 d9 7f 09 9d b1 c7 42 86 f1 35 a7 6b 2d 08 28 aa 6e 09 78 e1 88 4e aa a3 28 e8 18 2a f6 6d 55 f8 32 ca c9 33 9f 6a 99 51 f3 df 1a 42 64 40 f5 7a db eb 9f 2d 54 93 83 e2 de f5 24 33 09 40 5d 4a 04 0f fc 42 f6 66 c7 91 f8 b3 03 1d 21 4c 9c 43 e7 ae ed be 53 6f 1b 17 2c bb d6 a5 5b bc 7c a2 30 bf 9c cb 8f 78 86 18 07 08 9c c9 82 ba a2 4d 22 16 63 d3 b1 52 60 3d c3 29 2c 72 9a 3d cf 57 3e ff 40 18 70 d9 2b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e40014c8 | unwrapped: 94 ff 3f 8f f1 a6 0d e9 4c 2d 36 1a b4 f5 18 12 | unwrapped: 07 43 a0 23 8b 7d df 71 6c d7 37 c4 ef f8 6b f2 | unwrapped: 8c df d8 c8 bf 23 19 aa f4 66 ec d2 01 56 04 60 | unwrapped: 07 7a 36 b1 c8 5a 95 cc 15 02 91 3c a5 cb 92 52 | unwrapped: 68 76 31 35 0f 69 98 b6 c1 c8 1d 6c 01 4a 04 41 | unwrapped: 1a dc a6 31 3f d3 e1 c1 75 c8 40 ff 8d 43 47 8c | unwrapped: 99 b4 72 30 40 49 d4 1b 4d 03 15 50 fa 43 67 7a | unwrapped: e7 cc 6b 91 56 e0 7a 61 66 95 00 d3 70 e1 5a 49 | unwrapped: 4f 13 93 b5 2c d8 a9 fe 3c 66 ae df c0 98 93 e6 | unwrapped: 77 6a 53 ff fb 26 77 8d f2 a1 f2 20 8e 2d ed 2f | unwrapped: 14 5a 80 aa ef c0 31 1d 83 e4 00 cd 85 21 6e 52 | unwrapped: 8f ea 50 d1 42 0c 04 43 b9 e1 86 6d 92 6b 0e bf | unwrapped: 6b ce 39 b0 95 ac ac b3 b0 73 00 c2 a6 ef 5c b9 | unwrapped: 44 1d bb 3a 13 c1 b5 6e 6e 0f d8 bd d7 73 4f 5b | unwrapped: 7b c1 d5 e4 96 8c e5 9e 58 b4 7b 91 11 b1 04 02 | unwrapped: c8 01 7c ee 58 2c 83 46 8e 7a 9c 73 0c 86 76 40 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | SKEYID_d PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf51720 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf51708 | result: final-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_d PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_d: key-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_a PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516f8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_a prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a: release clone-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | SKEYID_a PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e4003948 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: SKEYID_d-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b973280 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245357: 37 52 8e e3 46 23 4b 52 e0 44 96 f0 32 8e 33 3b 7c 93 64 7d 20 29 22 3f 22 ab 31 ad 40 f4 8f f1 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e40039e8 | unwrapped: 60 68 47 eb 0b 87 64 83 5c 5d bc 73 88 65 56 2b | unwrapped: f5 c1 fb a6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | SKEYID_a: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 4d 49 b1 b7 5d d6 a6 ec 57 7d 3e 22 ee 16 b7 9a e1 2f 4a f5 48 5c 2a bc af 3d 2e 93 2f 26 71 05 4c 4c bd b2 9f 34 82 10 6a 42 7c 20 05 92 a0 5f d3 54 88 5d 38 97 7e af f4 31 77 66 13 e9 6a ae 5e d2 b4 1c f7 64 29 fb 88 66 07 1d 41 11 67 10 6c 61 bb ad 84 05 3a ea e9 a6 29 e0 d1 a2 73 5c 5e 3b ed 0d 66 3f 10 d4 18 96 54 26 25 6d e6 6e e8 34 e4 86 53 a3 88 94 a4 d9 7f 09 9d b1 c7 42 86 f1 35 a7 6b 2d 08 28 aa 6e 09 78 e1 88 4e aa a3 28 e8 18 2a f6 6d 55 f8 32 ca c9 33 9f 6a 99 51 f3 df 1a 42 64 40 f5 7a db eb 9f 2d 54 93 83 e2 de f5 24 33 09 40 5d 4a 04 0f fc 42 f6 66 c7 91 f8 b3 03 1d 21 4c 9c 43 e7 ae ed be 53 6f 1b 17 2c bb d6 a5 5b bc 7c a2 30 bf 9c cb 8f 78 86 18 07 08 9c c9 82 ba a2 4d 22 16 63 d3 b1 52 60 3d c3 29 2c 72 9a 3d cf 57 3e ff 40 18 70 d9 2b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e4004998 | unwrapped: 94 ff 3f 8f f1 a6 0d e9 4c 2d 36 1a b4 f5 18 12 | unwrapped: 07 43 a0 23 8b 7d df 71 6c d7 37 c4 ef f8 6b f2 | unwrapped: 8c df d8 c8 bf 23 19 aa f4 66 ec d2 01 56 04 60 | unwrapped: 07 7a 36 b1 c8 5a 95 cc 15 02 91 3c a5 cb 92 52 | unwrapped: 68 76 31 35 0f 69 98 b6 c1 c8 1d 6c 01 4a 04 41 | unwrapped: 1a dc a6 31 3f d3 e1 c1 75 c8 40 ff 8d 43 47 8c | unwrapped: 99 b4 72 30 40 49 d4 1b 4d 03 15 50 fa 43 67 7a | unwrapped: e7 cc 6b 91 56 e0 7a 61 66 95 00 d3 70 e1 5a 49 | unwrapped: 4f 13 93 b5 2c d8 a9 fe 3c 66 ae df c0 98 93 e6 | unwrapped: 77 6a 53 ff fb 26 77 8d f2 a1 f2 20 8e 2d ed 2f | unwrapped: 14 5a 80 aa ef c0 31 1d 83 e4 00 cd 85 21 6e 52 | unwrapped: 8f ea 50 d1 42 0c 04 43 b9 e1 86 6d 92 6b 0e bf | unwrapped: 6b ce 39 b0 95 ac ac b3 b0 73 00 c2 a6 ef 5c b9 | unwrapped: 44 1d bb 3a 13 c1 b5 6e 6e 0f d8 bd d7 73 4f 5b | unwrapped: 7b c1 d5 e4 96 8c e5 9e 58 b4 7b 91 11 b1 04 02 | unwrapped: c8 01 7c ee 58 2c 83 46 8e 7a 9c 73 0c 86 76 40 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | SKEYID_a PRF sha update 1-byte@0x1 (1) | 01 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf51700 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516e8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_a PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_a: key-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | SKEYID_e PRF sha init SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf51708 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | SKEYID_e prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e: release clone-key@0x55b81b976b70 | SKEYID_e PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e4001278 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b8ec080 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428078060: 6e e4 88 50 ef 1c 86 da 39 5b 98 7c 7c c0 e9 04 c3 eb 94 0c ac 7a f6 d5 73 b6 75 bd c9 48 ba 8c | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e4003998 | unwrapped: b5 f9 51 ee 08 fc 99 a5 09 61 40 e6 ca 83 af a5 | unwrapped: 25 ed 7d 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (size 256) | SKEYID_e: g^xy-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b987630 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b987630 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 4d 49 b1 b7 5d d6 a6 ec 57 7d 3e 22 ee 16 b7 9a e1 2f 4a f5 48 5c 2a bc af 3d 2e 93 2f 26 71 05 4c 4c bd b2 9f 34 82 10 6a 42 7c 20 05 92 a0 5f d3 54 88 5d 38 97 7e af f4 31 77 66 13 e9 6a ae 5e d2 b4 1c f7 64 29 fb 88 66 07 1d 41 11 67 10 6c 61 bb ad 84 05 3a ea e9 a6 29 e0 d1 a2 73 5c 5e 3b ed 0d 66 3f 10 d4 18 96 54 26 25 6d e6 6e e8 34 e4 86 53 a3 88 94 a4 d9 7f 09 9d b1 c7 42 86 f1 35 a7 6b 2d 08 28 aa 6e 09 78 e1 88 4e aa a3 28 e8 18 2a f6 6d 55 f8 32 ca c9 33 9f 6a 99 51 f3 df 1a 42 64 40 f5 7a db eb 9f 2d 54 93 83 e2 de f5 24 33 09 40 5d 4a 04 0f fc 42 f6 66 c7 91 f8 b3 03 1d 21 4c 9c 43 e7 ae ed be 53 6f 1b 17 2c bb d6 a5 5b bc 7c a2 30 bf 9c cb 8f 78 86 18 07 08 9c c9 82 ba a2 4d 22 16 63 d3 b1 52 60 3d c3 29 2c 72 9a 3d cf 57 3e ff 40 18 70 d9 2b | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0e40014c8 | unwrapped: 94 ff 3f 8f f1 a6 0d e9 4c 2d 36 1a b4 f5 18 12 | unwrapped: 07 43 a0 23 8b 7d df 71 6c d7 37 c4 ef f8 6b f2 | unwrapped: 8c df d8 c8 bf 23 19 aa f4 66 ec d2 01 56 04 60 | unwrapped: 07 7a 36 b1 c8 5a 95 cc 15 02 91 3c a5 cb 92 52 | unwrapped: 68 76 31 35 0f 69 98 b6 c1 c8 1d 6c 01 4a 04 41 | unwrapped: 1a dc a6 31 3f d3 e1 c1 75 c8 40 ff 8d 43 47 8c | unwrapped: 99 b4 72 30 40 49 d4 1b 4d 03 15 50 fa 43 67 7a | unwrapped: e7 cc 6b 91 56 e0 7a 61 66 95 00 d3 70 e1 5a 49 | unwrapped: 4f 13 93 b5 2c d8 a9 fe 3c 66 ae df c0 98 93 e6 | unwrapped: 77 6a 53 ff fb 26 77 8d f2 a1 f2 20 8e 2d ed 2f | unwrapped: 14 5a 80 aa ef c0 31 1d 83 e4 00 cd 85 21 6e 52 | unwrapped: 8f ea 50 d1 42 0c 04 43 b9 e1 86 6d 92 6b 0e bf | unwrapped: 6b ce 39 b0 95 ac ac b3 b0 73 00 c2 a6 ef 5c b9 | unwrapped: 44 1d bb 3a 13 c1 b5 6e 6e 0f d8 bd d7 73 4f 5b | unwrapped: 7b c1 d5 e4 96 8c e5 9e 58 b4 7b 91 11 b1 04 02 | unwrapped: c8 01 7c ee 58 2c 83 46 8e 7a 9c 73 0c 86 76 40 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_i-bytes@0x55b81b995aec (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update CKI_r-bytes@0x55b81b995af4 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | SKEYID_e PRF sha update 2-byte@0x2 (2) | 02 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf51710 | result: final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516f8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b96d700 | SKEYID_e PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | SKEYID_e: key-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | appendix_b: SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | appendix_b prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b96d700 | appendix_b prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b96d700 | appendix_b: release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | appendix_b PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e4003948 | appendix_b PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf516f0 | result: final-key@0x55b81b98c720 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b98c720 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516d8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b98c720 | appendix_b PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 20) | appendix_b: key-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | appendix_b_keymat_e: reference old_k#1-key@0x55b81b96d700 | Kn PRF sha init SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b976b70 (size 20) | Kn: SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b976b70 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | Kn prf: created sha context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b98c720 | Kn prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0e4003b00 from SKEYID_e-key@0x55b81b98c720 | Kn: release clone-key@0x55b81b98c720 | Kn PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e4001278 | Kn PRF sha update old_k-key@0x55b81b96d700 (size 20) | Kn: old_k-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 20 bytes of key@0x55b81b96d700 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | sizeof bytes 32 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428245303: f0 c6 ce 8f 0f 9e 38 12 4d ba d3 a2 4a 24 fe 5c 61 4f f1 2a 76 65 63 af 7f bf 55 e1 e8 92 54 4a | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 32 bytes at 0x7fa0e40039e8 | unwrapped: d2 1c e6 d0 b7 c9 02 6b 38 14 7a b4 11 a5 af ab | unwrapped: 73 e8 cf 37 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | params: 16-bytes@0x7fa0faf516f0 | result: final-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (36-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf516d8 | result: final-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | final: release tmp-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | Kn PRF sha final-key@0x55b81b98c720 (size 20) | Kn: key-key@0x55b81b98c720 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: | target: EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY | base: base-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf51768 | result: result-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | append_symkey_symkey: release lhs-key@0x55b81b96d700 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#N-key@0x55b81b96d700 | appendix_b_keymat_e: release old_k#final-key@0x55b81b98c720 | key-offset: 0, key-size: 24 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: DES3_CBC | flags: ENCRYPT+DECRYPT | key_size: 24-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (40-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7fa0faf51768 | result: cryptkey-key@0x55b81b98c720 (24-bytes, DES3_CBC) | appendix_b_keymat_e: release keymat-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | NSS: pointers skeyid_d 0x55b81b973280, skeyid_a 0x55b81b8ec080, skeyid_e 0x55b81b976b70, enc_key 0x55b81b98c720 | DH_i: 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | DH_i: ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | DH_i: 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | DH_i: ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | DH_i: 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | DH_i: a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | DH_i: 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | DH_i: d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | DH_i: 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | DH_i: 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | DH_i: 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | DH_i: d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | DH_i: e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | DH_i: 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | DH_i: 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | DH_i: e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | DH_r: fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | DH_r: b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | DH_r: 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | DH_r: 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | DH_r: df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | DH_r: b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | DH_r: fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | DH_r: 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | DH_r: 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | DH_r: 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | DH_r: 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | DH_r: bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | DH_r: b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | DH_r: 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | DH_r: d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | DH_r: 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | new IV hash sha init | new IV hash sha digest GI-bytes@0x55b81b9958ec (length 256) | 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | new IV hash sha digest GR-bytes@0x55b81b9959ec (length 256) | fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | new IV hash sha final chunk@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 20) | 3c 29 20 66 cb 0c bd 0d 2f 59 38 82 5d ea 94 e8 | 66 2d 5b c4 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh+iv (V1 Phase 1) (main_inI2_outR2_tail); request ID 26 time elapsed 0.001346 seconds | (#23) spent 1.35 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 26: main_inI2_outR2_tail (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 26 for state #23 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4001fa8 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #23 | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 26 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | main_inI2_outR2_calcdone for #23: calculate DH finished | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1015) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00026e8: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH+IV to state #23 | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in main_inI2_outR2_continue2() at ikev1_main.c:1028) | resume sending helper answer for #23 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #23 spent 0.015 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e4001fa8 | spent 0.00213 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 4e e6 e5 48 | 43 64 32 1f ff e0 2b 3b 4e 50 5c 26 4d f6 52 4b | 1a 5d 7a 09 46 ac c8 ed 93 8a 97 ab 4b be 05 d3 | eb 57 b4 b7 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (2) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R2 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1459) | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 3c 29 20 66 cb 0c bd 0d | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 4b be 05 d3 eb 57 b4 b7 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 08 00 00 0c | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 00 00 00 18 6e 13 e6 dd | 80 57 f0 e0 10 56 9c ae f1 b1 03 11 c1 81 ff d3 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x120 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | length: 12 (0xc) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | DOI specific A: 0 (0x0) | DOI specific B: 0 (0x0) | obj: 77 65 73 74 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x2080 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | removing 4 bytes of padding | message 'main_inI3_outR3' HASH payload not checked early "east" #23: Peer ID is ID_FQDN: '@west' | X509: no CERT payloads to process | refine_host_connection for IKEv1: starting with "east" | match_id a=@west | b=@west | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "east" against "east", best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked east against east, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | returning because exact peer id match | offered CA: '%none' | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a98 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8003978 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8003db8 (length 256) | 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003618 (length 256) | fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0dc002b7c (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98f518 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 77 65 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342c20 (length 20) | 6e 13 e6 dd 80 57 f0 e0 10 56 9c ae f1 b1 03 11 | c1 81 ff d3 | received 'Main' message HASH_I data ok | authentication succeeded | thinking about whether to send my certificate: | I have RSA key: OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cert.type: 0?? | sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request | so do not send cert. | I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT (0x2) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 4 raw bytes of my identity into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | my identity 65 61 73 74 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 12 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b974d30 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342b38 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e40039e8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e0003618 (length 256) | fc 94 b3 8b 05 88 7f 31 31 a3 c0 18 18 90 0d 75 | b9 3f b3 2b 86 f1 79 14 e0 ab 80 52 7a 9e f7 e7 | 8a be 80 b9 e8 49 b8 b2 14 3f a4 19 6e ef 5d 1d | 89 d1 c1 ae e6 cb 22 f0 a3 4f 6c ac 74 42 35 5b | df 56 20 32 ae b8 f6 91 66 9d 8b 71 23 be f0 2c | b3 55 7b 9f 6f cd 38 a3 dc ae 7b 50 c7 74 f8 8e | fa 65 04 75 29 77 6d af 10 8e 5f ec db c6 13 7f | 5e f9 f3 ed b1 67 53 93 6f 93 e5 72 f5 71 a7 05 | 2d cc 45 00 8e 5d 29 b8 71 7a 96 b8 84 0e 5e 48 | 84 4d 29 d6 64 c5 99 84 16 58 10 38 66 da f7 a5 | 2d 83 4d 8d 9d a4 63 44 61 5f 10 3a 42 b7 cd 0e | bf c9 1b b2 dc 1e 48 0f fc ef 5f f2 9d e7 3c 95 | b8 88 c0 ff 48 93 a2 94 5c 8f 29 26 3d 96 39 c5 | 11 0e 6c 44 4b 9f 11 02 69 b6 43 d5 96 2e b4 0c | d6 91 17 db 9e d8 10 53 22 30 26 e8 13 0c 34 09 | 1d d5 62 24 ce 62 22 e6 29 5f ff 72 25 12 e8 42 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e8003db8 (length 256) | 4d d3 20 40 2b 74 f3 d9 ba 02 46 6c be 73 b4 a5 | ee 7d 57 34 c7 e7 57 f3 f0 0a 55 82 c6 ae c6 20 | 05 06 46 15 e7 e0 fc ec 85 8b 9f b3 a4 bb b9 9b | ba ab d4 c5 92 ee d3 90 bf ff 2e 29 09 eb 7e 3f | 86 b1 1e 46 70 27 2b 25 2d d0 b5 a1 3d 71 0b 36 | a5 b7 bc 57 60 e2 be 6a f0 e3 d5 ff 03 76 3a df | 62 98 b4 78 c3 ed 45 d6 fb d8 fc 2b 7f 92 73 e7 | d7 aa e5 a6 5d a3 e6 b1 78 17 4b 3c ca a7 2e 09 | 29 65 52 a0 49 4f b3 58 59 75 8e e2 46 8e 96 8a | 19 17 23 70 5c 36 4f 78 85 e4 c0 f8 50 57 c1 86 | 0e 66 52 ce f1 03 01 b4 b7 0d 09 8a 64 2a 45 94 | d7 9b 36 64 98 7d 78 80 ea 97 09 48 6d a9 5d fa | e1 33 72 ae 76 dc e2 e3 54 06 71 20 da a9 e9 61 | 2d 49 db 66 38 f8 ac f8 97 03 db 8e de 0f 6c 41 | 7e d8 e1 6b 89 6f 3c 4f 8e b4 d7 a5 20 2c 9f b6 | e3 6d d3 64 d2 80 7a 0e 88 74 d7 e6 dd 7f b0 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b168 (length 8) | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b98b160 (length 8) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | hashing 52 bytes of SA | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0dc002b7c (length 52) | 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 2c 00 01 00 01 | 00 00 00 24 00 01 00 00 80 0b 00 01 80 0c 0e 10 | 80 01 00 05 80 02 00 02 80 03 00 01 80 04 00 0e | 80 0e 00 c0 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 8) | 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54342e50 (length 20) | 58 22 05 7e de 4b 58 cd cd 31 c4 93 9f b0 c9 5e | d5 9a 79 75 | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of HASH_R into ISAKMP Hash Payload | HASH_R 58 22 05 7e de 4b 58 cd cd 31 c4 93 9f b0 c9 5e | HASH_R d5 9a 79 75 | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | encrypting: 08 00 00 0c 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 00 00 00 18 | encrypting: 58 22 05 7e de 4b 58 cd cd 31 c4 93 9f b0 c9 5e | encrypting: d5 9a 79 75 | IV: 4b be 05 d3 eb 57 b4 b7 | unpadded size is: 36 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | last encrypted block of Phase 1: | d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in ISAKMP_SA_established | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #23 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_R2 to state STATE_MAIN_R3 | parent state #23: MAIN_R2(open IKE SA) => MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #23 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #23 STATE_MAIN_R3: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 68 bytes for STATE_MAIN_R2 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 05 10 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 a9 8b e9 e2 | 66 e0 3b 8a b7 1d 1f f3 16 88 49 94 65 4f 82 ac | dc e1 ab 4c 85 51 1b dc 33 51 7b 9d d2 d9 01 0c | 33 6b 79 87 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #23 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007988 size 128 | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp established "east" #23: STATE_MAIN_R3: sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established {auth=PRESHARED_KEY cipher=3DES_CBC_192 integ=HMAC_SHA1 group=MODP2048} | DPD: dpd_init() called on ISAKMP SA | DPD: Peer supports Dead Peer Detection | DPD: not initializing DPD because DPD is disabled locally | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | unpending state #23 | #23 spent 0.861 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.993 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0026 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 436 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 20 01 e4 24 34 76 00 00 01 b4 7b 14 58 ed | 89 0f a2 e1 3f 0a 41 dd 2a 69 97 f0 f5 92 c3 50 | 39 33 e4 ae e2 2b 09 9a 59 5d 2d fc c0 94 2a a1 | ba 9d a5 f2 59 c3 17 86 a7 36 c1 2a 29 9c 85 a3 | 34 fc 68 d8 d4 34 c7 16 63 31 23 c5 3f e7 39 f5 | cf 1b 8d c5 e7 9c 2d 30 b5 a1 52 09 a8 69 73 04 | 4e 72 db 01 7b 28 9e 74 57 ea 0b d5 45 67 46 29 | d5 66 cc 3b 0f e7 30 91 74 c1 53 a0 64 b8 45 bd | 41 96 19 6e a0 68 26 f7 5c aa 31 39 f1 95 c2 3b | 15 1a 1e 45 79 9d c0 88 ba 1b 46 de 82 3e df 56 | ab 7e 07 8b 4a 46 f4 59 49 4a 2c 1a 21 6b 5d 44 | 83 3f ed a7 07 d9 36 cc ff 6a 1a b2 e4 89 bb 6e | 0a 9e 6f d1 47 cf 60 9e f5 fd 95 bf f1 b4 2b 74 | 41 45 b3 f5 eb 21 fb a6 2a eb 85 48 d5 fa 7e 2a | 0d 07 15 ac 6d f3 a9 8a a6 ad 21 51 e8 53 15 30 | 4b ad de 24 83 b2 43 d3 8c 05 6d f8 85 f5 17 f1 | 26 a9 87 80 70 8a c7 c2 01 4e f9 73 1a 36 97 3a | a5 1c 25 1e ea 5d eb 1d e2 73 57 b7 83 ec 93 d4 | 53 a9 f2 89 61 3e b9 88 2d 4f 26 05 a5 fc 40 33 | 9a bc d5 62 27 7a bd 52 92 cf b2 7f da f6 e3 c6 | 37 5c 00 49 69 bf 95 a8 9a 70 10 2a 89 8a c4 ed | e5 4c 28 87 9c 4a 49 06 42 2c 6f 0f 65 72 10 52 | 94 ad ec fc 6e 08 ff 64 22 b8 8c 6d 6c 90 1f 10 | ea 9b 7e 0c fa fe 87 40 ee ad 9b 9b 1a 68 cc 3b | 09 a9 12 dd 91 61 3e 34 cf b1 8b 44 fe 07 e2 de | ae b2 51 ad 2a 9f a0 f0 75 6b a1 f2 59 73 d4 c3 | ec 60 58 5d | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3827577974 (0xe4243476) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1607) | last Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | current Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 8) | d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | e4 24 34 76 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | db dc fb 19 e8 10 c9 25 eb 08 3d 5a 47 36 1c 2f | 58 eb 96 85 | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 408 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: db dc fb 19 e8 10 c9 25 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 59 73 d4 c3 ec 60 58 5d | decrypted payload (starts at offset -408): | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 20 01 e4 24 34 76 00 00 01 b4 01 00 00 18 | 00 5f ed 9c 5c 62 00 42 9f 26 fa 80 36 50 67 8c | b2 a8 e5 41 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 | 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 49 f0 89 c5 00 00 00 1c | 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 | 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 05 eb 40 84 | 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 c6 07 83 1b | 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f 05 00 01 04 | dc fd bd f4 a5 b4 2d a3 18 6f 76 d4 63 b2 4a 02 | 51 84 44 6b a0 12 f7 b9 8f 37 cc 81 3a 5a 8b eb | 21 2b f5 c2 91 51 5e 19 bd 9f d4 23 13 b5 5d 1f | 02 0b 18 04 f6 06 78 56 26 85 8d b4 ad 38 54 e0 | c7 6e 2b a9 47 97 9a 52 04 ca dd 69 4d 10 c1 15 | c5 b9 b3 65 86 ba 48 07 26 93 b3 2c fe 1f 89 de | e2 ab cb 90 23 0a 85 9c e8 46 ca 27 c9 d0 90 7d | 65 55 d6 45 8f 67 d9 8d ea d8 8d dd a3 43 c7 bf | f9 f0 36 6e 75 12 36 91 e5 8e 1d bb ef 30 78 39 | 25 9b 3c ca e8 18 dd 63 21 73 5b 67 2f 94 08 a7 | ed df 13 68 1c c0 2e 7e c9 14 2b 3c 9e a8 60 11 | 60 db 40 c5 e3 87 94 1b 42 69 ce 88 55 f9 76 f1 | 39 d2 03 d1 11 04 8a f8 90 ce 07 79 b4 d5 e2 12 | f6 a6 41 2f d1 3c 33 5a 2c 4d 43 25 ac 7a cb 9e | 7d 39 68 8e 20 cd 91 22 0e 7c dc 3e 02 35 b6 e9 | ab 8a 89 5d 40 c2 5e 37 43 0e 47 64 3e 71 d4 07 | 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | 00 00 00 00 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x502 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (0x1) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x2 (ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) needed: 0x402 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | length: 52 (0x34) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | got payload 0x400 (ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) needed: 0x400 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | length: 36 (0x24) | got payload 0x10 (ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 260 (0x104) | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | got payload 0x20 (ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x200030 | ***parse ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | obj: c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | removing 4 bytes of padding | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0ec0041f0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e40039e8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | e4 24 34 76 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98cbfc (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 49 f0 89 c5 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 | 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 | 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f 05 00 01 04 dc fd bd f4 | a5 b4 2d a3 18 6f 76 d4 63 b2 4a 02 51 84 44 6b | a0 12 f7 b9 8f 37 cc 81 3a 5a 8b eb 21 2b f5 c2 | 91 51 5e 19 bd 9f d4 23 13 b5 5d 1f 02 0b 18 04 | f6 06 78 56 26 85 8d b4 ad 38 54 e0 c7 6e 2b a9 | 47 97 9a 52 04 ca dd 69 4d 10 c1 15 c5 b9 b3 65 | 86 ba 48 07 26 93 b3 2c fe 1f 89 de e2 ab cb 90 | 23 0a 85 9c e8 46 ca 27 c9 d0 90 7d 65 55 d6 45 | 8f 67 d9 8d ea d8 8d dd a3 43 c7 bf f9 f0 36 6e | 75 12 36 91 e5 8e 1d bb ef 30 78 39 25 9b 3c ca | e8 18 dd 63 21 73 5b 67 2f 94 08 a7 ed df 13 68 | 1c c0 2e 7e c9 14 2b 3c 9e a8 60 11 60 db 40 c5 | e3 87 94 1b 42 69 ce 88 55 f9 76 f1 39 d2 03 d1 | 11 04 8a f8 90 ce 07 79 b4 d5 e2 12 f6 a6 41 2f | d1 3c 33 5a 2c 4d 43 25 ac 7a cb 9e 7d 39 68 8e | 20 cd 91 22 0e 7c dc 3e 02 35 b6 e9 ab 8a 89 5d | 40 c2 5e 37 43 0e 47 64 3e 71 d4 07 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 00 5f ed 9c 5c 62 00 42 9f 26 fa 80 36 50 67 8c | b2 a8 e5 41 | quick_inI1_outR1 HASH(1): | 00 5f ed 9c 5c 62 00 42 9f 26 fa 80 36 50 67 8c | b2 a8 e5 41 | received 'quick_inI1_outR1' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 01 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | peer client is subnet 192.0.1.0/24 | peer client protocol/port is 0/0 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID address | ID address c0 00 02 00 | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) into ID mask | ID mask ff ff ff 00 | our client is subnet 192.0.2.0/24 | our client protocol/port is 0/0 "east" #23: the peer proposed: 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | find_client_connection starting with east | looking for 192.0.2.0/24:0/0 -> 192.0.1.0/24:0/0 | concrete checking against sr#0 192.0.2.0/24 -> 192.0.1.0/24 | client wildcard: no port wildcard: no virtual: no | creating state object #24 at 0x55b81b994de8 | State DB: adding IKEv1 state #24 in UNDEFINED | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec started | duplicating state object #23 "east" as #24 for IPSEC SA | #24 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:500 from #23.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | duplicate_state: reference st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b98c720 | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | duplicate_state: reference st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in quick_inI1_outR1_tail() at ikev1_quick.c:1295) | child state #24: UNDEFINED(ignore) => QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 49 f0 89 c5 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | DH public value received: | dc fd bd f4 a5 b4 2d a3 18 6f 76 d4 63 b2 4a 02 | 51 84 44 6b a0 12 f7 b9 8f 37 cc 81 3a 5a 8b eb | 21 2b f5 c2 91 51 5e 19 bd 9f d4 23 13 b5 5d 1f | 02 0b 18 04 f6 06 78 56 26 85 8d b4 ad 38 54 e0 | c7 6e 2b a9 47 97 9a 52 04 ca dd 69 4d 10 c1 15 | c5 b9 b3 65 86 ba 48 07 26 93 b3 2c fe 1f 89 de | e2 ab cb 90 23 0a 85 9c e8 46 ca 27 c9 d0 90 7d | 65 55 d6 45 8f 67 d9 8d ea d8 8d dd a3 43 c7 bf | f9 f0 36 6e 75 12 36 91 e5 8e 1d bb ef 30 78 39 | 25 9b 3c ca e8 18 dd 63 21 73 5b 67 2f 94 08 a7 | ed df 13 68 1c c0 2e 7e c9 14 2b 3c 9e a8 60 11 | 60 db 40 c5 e3 87 94 1b 42 69 ce 88 55 f9 76 f1 | 39 d2 03 d1 11 04 8a f8 90 ce 07 79 b4 d5 e2 12 | f6 a6 41 2f d1 3c 33 5a 2c 4d 43 25 ac 7a cb 9e | 7d 39 68 8e 20 cd 91 22 0e 7c dc 3e 02 35 b6 e9 | ab 8a 89 5d 40 c2 5e 37 43 0e 47 64 3e 71 d4 07 | adding quick_outI1 KE work-order 27 for state #24 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | complete v1 state transition with STF_SUSPEND | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2648) | suspending state #24 and saving MD | #24 is busy; has a suspended MD | #23 spent 0.239 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.651 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 5 resuming | crypto helper 5 starting work-order 27 for state #24 | crypto helper 5 doing build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 27 | NSS: Value of Prime: | ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 | c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 | 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd | ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 | 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 | f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed | ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 | 49 28 66 51 ec e4 5b 3d c2 00 7c b8 a1 63 bf 05 | 98 da 48 36 1c 55 d3 9a 69 16 3f a8 fd 24 cf 5f | 83 65 5d 23 dc a3 ad 96 1c 62 f3 56 20 85 52 bb | 9e d5 29 07 70 96 96 6d 67 0c 35 4e 4a bc 98 04 | f1 74 6c 08 ca 18 21 7c 32 90 5e 46 2e 36 ce 3b | e3 9e 77 2c 18 0e 86 03 9b 27 83 a2 ec 07 a2 8f | b5 c5 5d f0 6f 4c 52 c9 de 2b cb f6 95 58 17 18 | 39 95 49 7c ea 95 6a e5 15 d2 26 18 98 fa 05 10 | 15 72 8e 5a 8a ac aa 68 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | NSS: Value of base: 02 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8005f58: created | NSS: Local DH MODP2048 secret (pointer): 0x7fa0d8005f58 | NSS: Public DH wire value: | 09 b0 35 d1 33 6c bc 30 86 a2 ff a4 97 5c f0 e7 | 30 48 48 6d 9f 8f 35 68 d2 ac 44 63 21 6d a4 eb | d9 0b 28 2a 8b c9 2b 1f d1 7d 4c a9 ca bf be 2e | ee 24 91 89 3a d0 45 25 c7 48 67 29 5e 4d ad 06 | 1b 56 22 f1 fb 20 69 12 b7 6b a6 99 78 66 20 15 | b8 ba 6c d7 cd e2 86 9d 9d 96 25 f1 8f 6b 88 41 | 33 d5 96 a7 fd 17 b3 e6 24 01 13 bd 67 fb b4 9b | 14 4e cf 33 f7 ce c4 1b 83 6a eb aa 6a 6f 40 0d | ba 7f ff 88 4d a7 32 29 7d 65 99 4b 48 76 03 3b | 20 cf b3 10 b2 e4 d1 ea d2 23 62 54 de dd e0 89 | 48 8f f0 81 59 4a 20 45 39 20 3b 82 c8 4d 24 fa | 31 f1 6b e6 3e 39 e4 10 48 d1 a4 bd c8 be cf 92 | 07 7b 6f a8 48 26 5c 1d 23 cf 8c 00 d8 9f a3 d3 | 2d b8 e4 c6 3f 98 c8 e1 6a 54 c3 40 14 e0 b5 8e | 71 6e cb 71 ee 08 08 ae f1 ec 91 ca c7 9a 38 83 | ce b7 0e c9 38 19 1b f5 1c f8 de 14 4b 37 59 a1 | Generated nonce: 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | Generated nonce: d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | crypto helper 5 finished build KE and nonce (quick_outI1 KE); request ID 27 time elapsed 0.000579 seconds | (#24) spent 0.582 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 27: quick_outI1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 5 sending results from work-order 27 for state #24 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 size 128 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #24 | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 5 replies to request ID 27 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue1 for #24: calculated ke+nonce, calculating DH | wire (crypto helper) group MODP2048 and state group MODP2048 match | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8005f58: transferring ownership from helper KE to state #24 | started looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | actually looking for secret for @east->@west of kind PKK_PSK | line 1: key type PKK_PSK(@east) to type PKK_PSK | 1: compared key @west to @east / @west -> 004 | 2: compared key @east to @east / @west -> 014 | line 1: match=014 | match 014 beats previous best_match 000 match=0x55b81b8e1c48 (line=1) | concluding with best_match=014 best=0x55b81b8e1c48 (lineno=1) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8005f58: transferring ownership from state #24 to helper IKEv1 DH | adding quick outR1 DH work-order 28 for state #24 | state #24 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 size 128 | suspending state #24 and saving MD | #24 is busy; has a suspended MD | resume sending helper answer for #24 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() and stole MD | #24 spent 0.069 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 | crypto helper 6 resuming | crypto helper 6 starting work-order 28 for state #24 | crypto helper 6 doing compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 28 | peer's g: dc fd bd f4 a5 b4 2d a3 18 6f 76 d4 63 b2 4a 02 | peer's g: 51 84 44 6b a0 12 f7 b9 8f 37 cc 81 3a 5a 8b eb | peer's g: 21 2b f5 c2 91 51 5e 19 bd 9f d4 23 13 b5 5d 1f | peer's g: 02 0b 18 04 f6 06 78 56 26 85 8d b4 ad 38 54 e0 | peer's g: c7 6e 2b a9 47 97 9a 52 04 ca dd 69 4d 10 c1 15 | peer's g: c5 b9 b3 65 86 ba 48 07 26 93 b3 2c fe 1f 89 de | peer's g: e2 ab cb 90 23 0a 85 9c e8 46 ca 27 c9 d0 90 7d | peer's g: 65 55 d6 45 8f 67 d9 8d ea d8 8d dd a3 43 c7 bf | peer's g: f9 f0 36 6e 75 12 36 91 e5 8e 1d bb ef 30 78 39 | peer's g: 25 9b 3c ca e8 18 dd 63 21 73 5b 67 2f 94 08 a7 | peer's g: ed df 13 68 1c c0 2e 7e c9 14 2b 3c 9e a8 60 11 | peer's g: 60 db 40 c5 e3 87 94 1b 42 69 ce 88 55 f9 76 f1 | peer's g: 39 d2 03 d1 11 04 8a f8 90 ce 07 79 b4 d5 e2 12 | peer's g: f6 a6 41 2f d1 3c 33 5a 2c 4d 43 25 ac 7a cb 9e | peer's g: 7d 39 68 8e 20 cd 91 22 0e 7c dc 3e 02 35 b6 e9 | peer's g: ab 8a 89 5d 40 c2 5e 37 43 0e 47 64 3e 71 d4 07 | Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: | new : g_ir-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8005f58: computed shared DH secret key@0x55b81b98ef70 | dh-shared : g^ir-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | crypto helper 6 finished compute dh (V1 Phase 2 PFS) (quick outR1 DH); request ID 28 time elapsed 0.000695 seconds | (#24) spent 0.698 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 28: quick outR1 DH (pcr) | crypto helper 6 sending results from work-order 28 for state #24 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 size 128 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #24 | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 6 replies to request ID 28 | calling continuation function 0x55b8197d5b50 | quick_inI1_outR1_cryptocontinue2 for #24: calculated DH, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3827577974 (0xe4243476) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (0xa) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' value 10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Security Association Payload (1:ISAKMP_NEXT_SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****parse IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****parse ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 40 (0x28) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Proposal Payload into SPI | SPI 49 f0 89 c5 | *****parse ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | encryption ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: 3DES=3, found 3DES_CBC | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+GROUP_DESCRIPTION (0x8003) | length/value: 14 (0xe) | [14 is OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048] | DH ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: MODP2048=14, found MODP2048 | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+ENCAPSULATION_MODE (0x8004) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL] | NAT-T non-encap: Installing IPsec SA without ENCAP, st->hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal is none | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_TYPE (0x8001) | length/value: 1 (0x1) | [1 is SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS] | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length) (0x8002) | length/value: 28800 (0x7080) | ******parse ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute: | af+type: AF+AUTH_ALGORITHM (0x8005) | length/value: 2 (0x2) | [2 is AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1] | integrity ike_alg_lookup_by_id id: HMAC_SHA1=2, found HMAC_SHA1_96 | ESP IPsec Transform verified; matches alg_info entry | ****emit IPsec DOI SIT: | IPsec DOI SIT: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY (0x1) | ****emit ISAKMP Proposal Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | proposal number: 0 (0x0) | protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of transforms: 1 (0x1) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x40ea8fa7 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | emitting 4 raw bytes of SPI into ISAKMP Proposal Payload | SPI 40 ea 8f a7 | *****emit ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ESP transform number: 0 (0x0) | ESP transform ID: ESP_3DES (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' | emitting 20 raw bytes of attributes into ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP) | attributes 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | attributes 80 05 00 02 | emitting length of ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP): 28 | emitting length of ISAKMP Proposal Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)'.'next payload type' is 0 | emitting length of ISAKMP Security Association Payload: 52 | last substructure: checking 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'ISAKMP Proposal Payload'.'next payload type' is 0 "east" #24: responding to Quick Mode proposal {msgid:e4243476} "east" #24: us: 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east] "east" #24: them: 192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[@west]===192.0.1.0/24 | ***emit ISAKMP Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (0x4) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Nonce Payload (10:ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of Nr into ISAKMP Nonce Payload | Nr 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | Nr d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | emitting length of ISAKMP Nonce Payload: 36 | ***emit ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload (4:ISAKMP_NEXT_KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of keyex value into ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload | keyex value 09 b0 35 d1 33 6c bc 30 86 a2 ff a4 97 5c f0 e7 | keyex value 30 48 48 6d 9f 8f 35 68 d2 ac 44 63 21 6d a4 eb | keyex value d9 0b 28 2a 8b c9 2b 1f d1 7d 4c a9 ca bf be 2e | keyex value ee 24 91 89 3a d0 45 25 c7 48 67 29 5e 4d ad 06 | keyex value 1b 56 22 f1 fb 20 69 12 b7 6b a6 99 78 66 20 15 | keyex value b8 ba 6c d7 cd e2 86 9d 9d 96 25 f1 8f 6b 88 41 | keyex value 33 d5 96 a7 fd 17 b3 e6 24 01 13 bd 67 fb b4 9b | keyex value 14 4e cf 33 f7 ce c4 1b 83 6a eb aa 6a 6f 40 0d | keyex value ba 7f ff 88 4d a7 32 29 7d 65 99 4b 48 76 03 3b | keyex value 20 cf b3 10 b2 e4 d1 ea d2 23 62 54 de dd e0 89 | keyex value 48 8f f0 81 59 4a 20 45 39 20 3b 82 c8 4d 24 fa | keyex value 31 f1 6b e6 3e 39 e4 10 48 d1 a4 bd c8 be cf 92 | keyex value 07 7b 6f a8 48 26 5c 1d 23 cf 8c 00 d8 9f a3 d3 | keyex value 2d b8 e4 c6 3f 98 c8 e1 6a 54 c3 40 14 e0 b5 8e | keyex value 71 6e cb 71 ee 08 08 ae f1 ec 91 ca c7 9a 38 83 | keyex value ce b7 0e c9 38 19 1b f5 1c f8 de 14 4b 37 59 a1 | emitting length of ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: 260 | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8005f58: transferring ownership from helper IKEv1 DH to state #24 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (0x5) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' value 5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | ***emit ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (0x4) | Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | port: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) (5:ISAKMP_NEXT_ID) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 raw bytes of ID body into ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI) | ID body c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | emitting length of ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI): 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a88 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b96d700 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b96d700 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54342b6c (length 4) | e4 24 34 76 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b8198d38f4 (length 380) | 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 | 00 03 04 01 40 ea 8f a7 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 | 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 | 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 | 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e | df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec 05 00 01 04 09 b0 35 d1 | 33 6c bc 30 86 a2 ff a4 97 5c f0 e7 30 48 48 6d | 9f 8f 35 68 d2 ac 44 63 21 6d a4 eb d9 0b 28 2a | 8b c9 2b 1f d1 7d 4c a9 ca bf be 2e ee 24 91 89 | 3a d0 45 25 c7 48 67 29 5e 4d ad 06 1b 56 22 f1 | fb 20 69 12 b7 6b a6 99 78 66 20 15 b8 ba 6c d7 | cd e2 86 9d 9d 96 25 f1 8f 6b 88 41 33 d5 96 a7 | fd 17 b3 e6 24 01 13 bd 67 fb b4 9b 14 4e cf 33 | f7 ce c4 1b 83 6a eb aa 6a 6f 40 0d ba 7f ff 88 | 4d a7 32 29 7d 65 99 4b 48 76 03 3b 20 cf b3 10 | b2 e4 d1 ea d2 23 62 54 de dd e0 89 48 8f f0 81 | 59 4a 20 45 39 20 3b 82 c8 4d 24 fa 31 f1 6b e6 | 3e 39 e4 10 48 d1 a4 bd c8 be cf 92 07 7b 6f a8 | 48 26 5c 1d 23 cf 8c 00 d8 9f a3 d3 2d b8 e4 c6 | 3f 98 c8 e1 6a 54 c3 40 14 e0 b5 8e 71 6e cb 71 | ee 08 08 ae f1 ec 91 ca c7 9a 38 83 ce b7 0e c9 | 38 19 1b f5 1c f8 de 14 4b 37 59 a1 05 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 | 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 ff ff ff 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b8198d38e0 (length 20) | 30 57 5f 11 14 92 0b 9a 42 56 bc 8b 0c 74 51 63 | ad 0f 62 29 | quick inR1 outI2 HASH(2): | 30 57 5f 11 14 92 0b 9a 42 56 bc 8b 0c 74 51 63 | ad 0f 62 29 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP enc)=24 | compute_proto_keymat: needed_len (after ESP auth)=44 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8003978 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98ef70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 74 5e a0 82 ce 56 5f 9f 95 39 32 39 1a 25 d7 d1 e0 3c 55 fc 20 2d d0 ac 94 eb 19 46 7d 26 cd c4 93 84 41 eb 95 49 77 0d 9f 73 d8 5c 4e 18 02 bd 99 1d 5f e9 9a ac d5 4d e3 4b 38 a2 f3 72 ea 39 98 94 17 9a f1 37 ba c3 dd 4c e7 ec f2 d7 d8 13 9a 7f 87 78 10 18 a3 af 2d d7 e6 f8 56 da 04 e4 ff c3 ec fb 7d 8e f9 2b 02 e0 8d 89 c1 0a 52 e6 0e 08 34 0a dd 96 88 0d 89 d3 f0 d0 5b 00 42 7a 7d de 3d e4 b4 19 bd ee 1c 7b b5 e3 18 6e a9 02 40 b5 23 87 34 57 6d 15 ce da 17 53 97 16 45 43 a9 32 b6 93 eb 66 ca 55 6d 6f 2c 3d f7 c2 ed 44 f9 7e 29 37 63 69 8b 62 8f 38 b6 d7 5d df fd 9d f9 12 ea d7 a1 07 07 b7 99 96 04 4f 0f b9 1a cb 5d 8e 10 70 3c 9c 5d e4 c6 5a 75 60 f1 47 99 43 c4 76 48 34 c4 52 47 83 d3 f0 6a 8a bd c8 57 84 f1 cb 8e 00 de 2e e8 da 97 73 cf ec bb 86 69 34 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 82 a7 b5 0a ce c4 a8 b8 ff 59 ed 95 b2 84 60 f7 | unwrapped: ce 42 d0 5a bf 58 e5 61 0e 46 43 f6 43 38 55 9a | unwrapped: 7c e4 d3 58 91 87 23 1f d3 ca 09 92 26 45 c5 5a | unwrapped: b9 3a 69 b0 ed 36 d0 48 c0 7b bb 39 1d 10 88 f5 | unwrapped: 7e 2a 9a 58 33 ab a0 88 ce 6f e7 68 19 d3 0f 02 | unwrapped: 47 41 1f 75 dc 40 66 80 d1 b1 23 8b 10 34 eb 6a | unwrapped: 9f 9c f8 99 db f1 da a5 f1 9e 3f b0 59 dc 3e b1 | unwrapped: 5e 6d f9 36 b5 89 64 db 35 48 68 c3 89 26 e5 f6 | unwrapped: 29 1b 93 d7 29 fe b8 d6 d5 01 f4 53 29 bb 24 ae | unwrapped: 2a bf d5 0e 03 fc b7 de 89 e9 e3 79 62 7c da ff | unwrapped: c7 2f 5e 0b 23 85 93 11 78 4b ac 7e 03 4b 36 39 | unwrapped: 18 75 70 7e c6 bb ff c4 3b 8b e7 62 2d 15 84 c9 | unwrapped: 4f 12 e8 0b 64 40 d8 d9 eb 68 8a 4a fe b6 ea 19 | unwrapped: 0d 4a 4b 31 b5 df 2f da 14 fd ae 2f 0f dc 82 86 | unwrapped: 37 0f c3 fc 58 e4 8c 1f 03 91 13 f7 b2 d3 77 2b | unwrapped: f4 a5 d7 33 26 93 ea ab 16 4a 1b b9 17 63 50 89 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98ef70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 74 5e a0 82 ce 56 5f 9f 95 39 32 39 1a 25 d7 d1 e0 3c 55 fc 20 2d d0 ac 94 eb 19 46 7d 26 cd c4 93 84 41 eb 95 49 77 0d 9f 73 d8 5c 4e 18 02 bd 99 1d 5f e9 9a ac d5 4d e3 4b 38 a2 f3 72 ea 39 98 94 17 9a f1 37 ba c3 dd 4c e7 ec f2 d7 d8 13 9a 7f 87 78 10 18 a3 af 2d d7 e6 f8 56 da 04 e4 ff c3 ec fb 7d 8e f9 2b 02 e0 8d 89 c1 0a 52 e6 0e 08 34 0a dd 96 88 0d 89 d3 f0 d0 5b 00 42 7a 7d de 3d e4 b4 19 bd ee 1c 7b b5 e3 18 6e a9 02 40 b5 23 87 34 57 6d 15 ce da 17 53 97 16 45 43 a9 32 b6 93 eb 66 ca 55 6d 6f 2c 3d f7 c2 ed 44 f9 7e 29 37 63 69 8b 62 8f 38 b6 d7 5d df fd 9d f9 12 ea d7 a1 07 07 b7 99 96 04 4f 0f b9 1a cb 5d 8e 10 70 3c 9c 5d e4 c6 5a 75 60 f1 47 99 43 c4 76 48 34 c4 52 47 83 d3 f0 6a 8a bd c8 57 84 f1 cb 8e 00 de 2e e8 da 97 73 cf ec bb 86 69 34 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 82 a7 b5 0a ce c4 a8 b8 ff 59 ed 95 b2 84 60 f7 | unwrapped: ce 42 d0 5a bf 58 e5 61 0e 46 43 f6 43 38 55 9a | unwrapped: 7c e4 d3 58 91 87 23 1f d3 ca 09 92 26 45 c5 5a | unwrapped: b9 3a 69 b0 ed 36 d0 48 c0 7b bb 39 1d 10 88 f5 | unwrapped: 7e 2a 9a 58 33 ab a0 88 ce 6f e7 68 19 d3 0f 02 | unwrapped: 47 41 1f 75 dc 40 66 80 d1 b1 23 8b 10 34 eb 6a | unwrapped: 9f 9c f8 99 db f1 da a5 f1 9e 3f b0 59 dc 3e b1 | unwrapped: 5e 6d f9 36 b5 89 64 db 35 48 68 c3 89 26 e5 f6 | unwrapped: 29 1b 93 d7 29 fe b8 d6 d5 01 f4 53 29 bb 24 ae | unwrapped: 2a bf d5 0e 03 fc b7 de 89 e9 e3 79 62 7c da ff | unwrapped: c7 2f 5e 0b 23 85 93 11 78 4b ac 7e 03 4b 36 39 | unwrapped: 18 75 70 7e c6 bb ff c4 3b 8b e7 62 2d 15 84 c9 | unwrapped: 4f 12 e8 0b 64 40 d8 d9 eb 68 8a 4a fe b6 ea 19 | unwrapped: 0d 4a 4b 31 b5 df 2f da 14 fd ae 2f 0f dc 82 86 | unwrapped: 37 0f c3 fc 58 e4 8c 1f 03 91 13 f7 b2 d3 77 2b | unwrapped: f4 a5 d7 33 26 93 ea ab 16 4a 1b b9 17 63 50 89 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b994ff0 (length 4) | 40 ea 8f a7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b994fd0 (length 4) | 49 f0 89 c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e4002b78 (length 20) | 7b e7 8e 71 53 7c 21 87 61 48 09 f9 09 5d 22 e5 | 10 dc 35 3e | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b9892c8 (length 20) | d4 c6 9b 32 08 98 8f a9 9c e4 4a 1c be 67 f9 c5 | 3b 37 f1 f0 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x55b81b98baa8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4002b78 (length 20) | 7b e7 8e 71 53 7c 21 87 61 48 09 f9 09 5d 22 e5 | 10 dc 35 3e | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892c8 (length 20) | d4 c6 9b 32 08 98 8f a9 9c e4 4a 1c be 67 f9 c5 | 3b 37 f1 f0 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98ef70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 74 5e a0 82 ce 56 5f 9f 95 39 32 39 1a 25 d7 d1 e0 3c 55 fc 20 2d d0 ac 94 eb 19 46 7d 26 cd c4 93 84 41 eb 95 49 77 0d 9f 73 d8 5c 4e 18 02 bd 99 1d 5f e9 9a ac d5 4d e3 4b 38 a2 f3 72 ea 39 98 94 17 9a f1 37 ba c3 dd 4c e7 ec f2 d7 d8 13 9a 7f 87 78 10 18 a3 af 2d d7 e6 f8 56 da 04 e4 ff c3 ec fb 7d 8e f9 2b 02 e0 8d 89 c1 0a 52 e6 0e 08 34 0a dd 96 88 0d 89 d3 f0 d0 5b 00 42 7a 7d de 3d e4 b4 19 bd ee 1c 7b b5 e3 18 6e a9 02 40 b5 23 87 34 57 6d 15 ce da 17 53 97 16 45 43 a9 32 b6 93 eb 66 ca 55 6d 6f 2c 3d f7 c2 ed 44 f9 7e 29 37 63 69 8b 62 8f 38 b6 d7 5d df fd 9d f9 12 ea d7 a1 07 07 b7 99 96 04 4f 0f b9 1a cb 5d 8e 10 70 3c 9c 5d e4 c6 5a 75 60 f1 47 99 43 c4 76 48 34 c4 52 47 83 d3 f0 6a 8a bd c8 57 84 f1 cb 8e 00 de 2e e8 da 97 73 cf ec bb 86 69 34 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 82 a7 b5 0a ce c4 a8 b8 ff 59 ed 95 b2 84 60 f7 | unwrapped: ce 42 d0 5a bf 58 e5 61 0e 46 43 f6 43 38 55 9a | unwrapped: 7c e4 d3 58 91 87 23 1f d3 ca 09 92 26 45 c5 5a | unwrapped: b9 3a 69 b0 ed 36 d0 48 c0 7b bb 39 1d 10 88 f5 | unwrapped: 7e 2a 9a 58 33 ab a0 88 ce 6f e7 68 19 d3 0f 02 | unwrapped: 47 41 1f 75 dc 40 66 80 d1 b1 23 8b 10 34 eb 6a | unwrapped: 9f 9c f8 99 db f1 da a5 f1 9e 3f b0 59 dc 3e b1 | unwrapped: 5e 6d f9 36 b5 89 64 db 35 48 68 c3 89 26 e5 f6 | unwrapped: 29 1b 93 d7 29 fe b8 d6 d5 01 f4 53 29 bb 24 ae | unwrapped: 2a bf d5 0e 03 fc b7 de 89 e9 e3 79 62 7c da ff | unwrapped: c7 2f 5e 0b 23 85 93 11 78 4b ac 7e 03 4b 36 39 | unwrapped: 18 75 70 7e c6 bb ff c4 3b 8b e7 62 2d 15 84 c9 | unwrapped: 4f 12 e8 0b 64 40 d8 d9 eb 68 8a 4a fe b6 ea 19 | unwrapped: 0d 4a 4b 31 b5 df 2f da 14 fd ae 2f 0f dc 82 86 | unwrapped: 37 0f c3 fc 58 e4 8c 1f 03 91 13 f7 b2 d3 77 2b | unwrapped: f4 a5 d7 33 26 93 ea ab 16 4a 1b b9 17 63 50 89 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98ef70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 74 5e a0 82 ce 56 5f 9f 95 39 32 39 1a 25 d7 d1 e0 3c 55 fc 20 2d d0 ac 94 eb 19 46 7d 26 cd c4 93 84 41 eb 95 49 77 0d 9f 73 d8 5c 4e 18 02 bd 99 1d 5f e9 9a ac d5 4d e3 4b 38 a2 f3 72 ea 39 98 94 17 9a f1 37 ba c3 dd 4c e7 ec f2 d7 d8 13 9a 7f 87 78 10 18 a3 af 2d d7 e6 f8 56 da 04 e4 ff c3 ec fb 7d 8e f9 2b 02 e0 8d 89 c1 0a 52 e6 0e 08 34 0a dd 96 88 0d 89 d3 f0 d0 5b 00 42 7a 7d de 3d e4 b4 19 bd ee 1c 7b b5 e3 18 6e a9 02 40 b5 23 87 34 57 6d 15 ce da 17 53 97 16 45 43 a9 32 b6 93 eb 66 ca 55 6d 6f 2c 3d f7 c2 ed 44 f9 7e 29 37 63 69 8b 62 8f 38 b6 d7 5d df fd 9d f9 12 ea d7 a1 07 07 b7 99 96 04 4f 0f b9 1a cb 5d 8e 10 70 3c 9c 5d e4 c6 5a 75 60 f1 47 99 43 c4 76 48 34 c4 52 47 83 d3 f0 6a 8a bd c8 57 84 f1 cb 8e 00 de 2e e8 da 97 73 cf ec bb 86 69 34 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 82 a7 b5 0a ce c4 a8 b8 ff 59 ed 95 b2 84 60 f7 | unwrapped: ce 42 d0 5a bf 58 e5 61 0e 46 43 f6 43 38 55 9a | unwrapped: 7c e4 d3 58 91 87 23 1f d3 ca 09 92 26 45 c5 5a | unwrapped: b9 3a 69 b0 ed 36 d0 48 c0 7b bb 39 1d 10 88 f5 | unwrapped: 7e 2a 9a 58 33 ab a0 88 ce 6f e7 68 19 d3 0f 02 | unwrapped: 47 41 1f 75 dc 40 66 80 d1 b1 23 8b 10 34 eb 6a | unwrapped: 9f 9c f8 99 db f1 da a5 f1 9e 3f b0 59 dc 3e b1 | unwrapped: 5e 6d f9 36 b5 89 64 db 35 48 68 c3 89 26 e5 f6 | unwrapped: 29 1b 93 d7 29 fe b8 d6 d5 01 f4 53 29 bb 24 ae | unwrapped: 2a bf d5 0e 03 fc b7 de 89 e9 e3 79 62 7c da ff | unwrapped: c7 2f 5e 0b 23 85 93 11 78 4b ac 7e 03 4b 36 39 | unwrapped: 18 75 70 7e c6 bb ff c4 3b 8b e7 62 2d 15 84 c9 | unwrapped: 4f 12 e8 0b 64 40 d8 d9 eb 68 8a 4a fe b6 ea 19 | unwrapped: 0d 4a 4b 31 b5 df 2f da 14 fd ae 2f 0f dc 82 86 | unwrapped: 37 0f c3 fc 58 e4 8c 1f 03 91 13 f7 b2 d3 77 2b | unwrapped: f4 a5 d7 33 26 93 ea ab 16 4a 1b b9 17 63 50 89 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b994ff0 (length 4) | 40 ea 8f a7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b994fd0 (length 4) | 49 f0 89 c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e4002b8c (length 20) | ed 5d e1 5f 8d d9 38 bb b3 87 57 35 44 48 68 fd | 0c 40 58 1a | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b9892dc (length 20) | 22 d1 6a c9 85 3f 74 20 b8 f9 df b8 79 7f 49 59 | a2 ed 8a a8 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x7fa0f0002b50 from symkey-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b96d700 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0e8003978 | hmac PRF sha init symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (size 20) | hmac: symkey-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b973280 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54342a08 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | hmac prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from symkey-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac: release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | hmac PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e4002b8c (length 20) | ed 5d e1 5f 8d d9 38 bb b3 87 57 35 44 48 68 fd | 0c 40 58 1a | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b9892dc (length 20) | 22 d1 6a c9 85 3f 74 20 b8 f9 df b8 79 7f 49 59 | a2 ed 8a a8 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98ef70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 74 5e a0 82 ce 56 5f 9f 95 39 32 39 1a 25 d7 d1 e0 3c 55 fc 20 2d d0 ac 94 eb 19 46 7d 26 cd c4 93 84 41 eb 95 49 77 0d 9f 73 d8 5c 4e 18 02 bd 99 1d 5f e9 9a ac d5 4d e3 4b 38 a2 f3 72 ea 39 98 94 17 9a f1 37 ba c3 dd 4c e7 ec f2 d7 d8 13 9a 7f 87 78 10 18 a3 af 2d d7 e6 f8 56 da 04 e4 ff c3 ec fb 7d 8e f9 2b 02 e0 8d 89 c1 0a 52 e6 0e 08 34 0a dd 96 88 0d 89 d3 f0 d0 5b 00 42 7a 7d de 3d e4 b4 19 bd ee 1c 7b b5 e3 18 6e a9 02 40 b5 23 87 34 57 6d 15 ce da 17 53 97 16 45 43 a9 32 b6 93 eb 66 ca 55 6d 6f 2c 3d f7 c2 ed 44 f9 7e 29 37 63 69 8b 62 8f 38 b6 d7 5d df fd 9d f9 12 ea d7 a1 07 07 b7 99 96 04 4f 0f b9 1a cb 5d 8e 10 70 3c 9c 5d e4 c6 5a 75 60 f1 47 99 43 c4 76 48 34 c4 52 47 83 d3 f0 6a 8a bd c8 57 84 f1 cb 8e 00 de 2e e8 da 97 73 cf ec bb 86 69 34 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x7fa0ec000b48 | unwrapped: 82 a7 b5 0a ce c4 a8 b8 ff 59 ed 95 b2 84 60 f7 | unwrapped: ce 42 d0 5a bf 58 e5 61 0e 46 43 f6 43 38 55 9a | unwrapped: 7c e4 d3 58 91 87 23 1f d3 ca 09 92 26 45 c5 5a | unwrapped: b9 3a 69 b0 ed 36 d0 48 c0 7b bb 39 1d 10 88 f5 | unwrapped: 7e 2a 9a 58 33 ab a0 88 ce 6f e7 68 19 d3 0f 02 | unwrapped: 47 41 1f 75 dc 40 66 80 d1 b1 23 8b 10 34 eb 6a | unwrapped: 9f 9c f8 99 db f1 da a5 f1 9e 3f b0 59 dc 3e b1 | unwrapped: 5e 6d f9 36 b5 89 64 db 35 48 68 c3 89 26 e5 f6 | unwrapped: 29 1b 93 d7 29 fe b8 d6 d5 01 f4 53 29 bb 24 ae | unwrapped: 2a bf d5 0e 03 fc b7 de 89 e9 e3 79 62 7c da ff | unwrapped: c7 2f 5e 0b 23 85 93 11 78 4b ac 7e 03 4b 36 39 | unwrapped: 18 75 70 7e c6 bb ff c4 3b 8b e7 62 2d 15 84 c9 | unwrapped: 4f 12 e8 0b 64 40 d8 d9 eb 68 8a 4a fe b6 ea 19 | unwrapped: 0d 4a 4b 31 b5 df 2f da 14 fd ae 2f 0f dc 82 86 | unwrapped: 37 0f c3 fc 58 e4 8c 1f 03 91 13 f7 b2 d3 77 2b | unwrapped: f4 a5 d7 33 26 93 ea ab 16 4a 1b b9 17 63 50 89 | hmac PRF sha update g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (size 256) | hmac: g^xy-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | nss hmac digest hack extracting all 256 bytes of key@0x55b81b98ef70 | nss hmac digest hack: symkey-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | : ephemeral-key@0x55b81b8e5ec0 (16-bytes, AES_KEY_GEN) | nss hmac digest hack: new slot-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 (256-bytes, CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE) | sizeof bytes 256 | wrapper: (SECItemType)428061393: 74 5e a0 82 ce 56 5f 9f 95 39 32 39 1a 25 d7 d1 e0 3c 55 fc 20 2d d0 ac 94 eb 19 46 7d 26 cd c4 93 84 41 eb 95 49 77 0d 9f 73 d8 5c 4e 18 02 bd 99 1d 5f e9 9a ac d5 4d e3 4b 38 a2 f3 72 ea 39 98 94 17 9a f1 37 ba c3 dd 4c e7 ec f2 d7 d8 13 9a 7f 87 78 10 18 a3 af 2d d7 e6 f8 56 da 04 e4 ff c3 ec fb 7d 8e f9 2b 02 e0 8d 89 c1 0a 52 e6 0e 08 34 0a dd 96 88 0d 89 d3 f0 d0 5b 00 42 7a 7d de 3d e4 b4 19 bd ee 1c 7b b5 e3 18 6e a9 02 40 b5 23 87 34 57 6d 15 ce da 17 53 97 16 45 43 a9 32 b6 93 eb 66 ca 55 6d 6f 2c 3d f7 c2 ed 44 f9 7e 29 37 63 69 8b 62 8f 38 b6 d7 5d df fd 9d f9 12 ea d7 a1 07 07 b7 99 96 04 4f 0f b9 1a cb 5d 8e 10 70 3c 9c 5d e4 c6 5a 75 60 f1 47 99 43 c4 76 48 34 c4 52 47 83 d3 f0 6a 8a bd c8 57 84 f1 cb 8e 00 de 2e e8 da 97 73 cf ec bb 86 69 34 | nss hmac digest hack: release slot-key-key@0x55b81b96ffa0 | nss hmac digest hack extracted len 256 bytes at 0x55b81b98aa98 | unwrapped: 82 a7 b5 0a ce c4 a8 b8 ff 59 ed 95 b2 84 60 f7 | unwrapped: ce 42 d0 5a bf 58 e5 61 0e 46 43 f6 43 38 55 9a | unwrapped: 7c e4 d3 58 91 87 23 1f d3 ca 09 92 26 45 c5 5a | unwrapped: b9 3a 69 b0 ed 36 d0 48 c0 7b bb 39 1d 10 88 f5 | unwrapped: 7e 2a 9a 58 33 ab a0 88 ce 6f e7 68 19 d3 0f 02 | unwrapped: 47 41 1f 75 dc 40 66 80 d1 b1 23 8b 10 34 eb 6a | unwrapped: 9f 9c f8 99 db f1 da a5 f1 9e 3f b0 59 dc 3e b1 | unwrapped: 5e 6d f9 36 b5 89 64 db 35 48 68 c3 89 26 e5 f6 | unwrapped: 29 1b 93 d7 29 fe b8 d6 d5 01 f4 53 29 bb 24 ae | unwrapped: 2a bf d5 0e 03 fc b7 de 89 e9 e3 79 62 7c da ff | unwrapped: c7 2f 5e 0b 23 85 93 11 78 4b ac 7e 03 4b 36 39 | unwrapped: 18 75 70 7e c6 bb ff c4 3b 8b e7 62 2d 15 84 c9 | unwrapped: 4f 12 e8 0b 64 40 d8 d9 eb 68 8a 4a fe b6 ea 19 | unwrapped: 0d 4a 4b 31 b5 df 2f da 14 fd ae 2f 0f dc 82 86 | unwrapped: 37 0f c3 fc 58 e4 8c 1f 03 91 13 f7 b2 d3 77 2b | unwrapped: f4 a5 d7 33 26 93 ea ab 16 4a 1b b9 17 63 50 89 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7ffe54342b3c (length 1) | 03 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b994ff0 (length 4) | 40 ea 8f a7 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x55b81b994fd0 (length 4) | 49 f0 89 c5 | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | hmac PRF sha update data-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x7fa0e4002ba0 (length 20) | df e6 1e 19 4f d7 2a a9 0e 6f 85 d8 72 93 48 4a | a1 8f 55 9a | hmac PRF sha final-bytes@0x55b81b9892f0 (length 20) | 64 25 70 3e ea 94 7d b5 ff 46 35 2e 6a 15 07 04 | 7e a8 b6 b3 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self | install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | routing is easy, or has resolvable near-conflict | checking if this is a replacement state | st=0x55b81b994de8 ost=(nil) st->serialno=#24 ost->serialno=#0 | installing outgoing SA now as refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.49f089c5@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | outgoing SA has refhim=0 | looking for alg with encrypt: 3DES_CBC keylen: 192 integ: HMAC_SHA1_96 | encrypt 3DES_CBC keylen=192 transid=3, key_size=24, encryptalg=3 | st->st_esp.keymat_len=44 is encrypt_keymat_size=24 + integ_keymat_size=20 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'east' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.40ea8fa7@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | add inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | encrypting: 01 00 00 18 30 57 5f 11 14 92 0b 9a 42 56 bc 8b | encrypting: 0c 74 51 63 ad 0f 62 29 0a 00 00 34 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 03 04 01 40 ea 8f a7 | encrypting: 00 00 00 1c 00 03 00 00 80 03 00 0e 80 04 00 01 | encrypting: 80 01 00 01 80 02 70 80 80 05 00 02 04 00 00 24 | encrypting: 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | encrypting: d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | encrypting: 05 00 01 04 09 b0 35 d1 33 6c bc 30 86 a2 ff a4 | encrypting: 97 5c f0 e7 30 48 48 6d 9f 8f 35 68 d2 ac 44 63 | encrypting: 21 6d a4 eb d9 0b 28 2a 8b c9 2b 1f d1 7d 4c a9 | encrypting: ca bf be 2e ee 24 91 89 3a d0 45 25 c7 48 67 29 | encrypting: 5e 4d ad 06 1b 56 22 f1 fb 20 69 12 b7 6b a6 99 | encrypting: 78 66 20 15 b8 ba 6c d7 cd e2 86 9d 9d 96 25 f1 | encrypting: 8f 6b 88 41 33 d5 96 a7 fd 17 b3 e6 24 01 13 bd | encrypting: 67 fb b4 9b 14 4e cf 33 f7 ce c4 1b 83 6a eb aa | encrypting: 6a 6f 40 0d ba 7f ff 88 4d a7 32 29 7d 65 99 4b | encrypting: 48 76 03 3b 20 cf b3 10 b2 e4 d1 ea d2 23 62 54 | encrypting: de dd e0 89 48 8f f0 81 59 4a 20 45 39 20 3b 82 | encrypting: c8 4d 24 fa 31 f1 6b e6 3e 39 e4 10 48 d1 a4 bd | encrypting: c8 be cf 92 07 7b 6f a8 48 26 5c 1d 23 cf 8c 00 | encrypting: d8 9f a3 d3 2d b8 e4 c6 3f 98 c8 e1 6a 54 c3 40 | encrypting: 14 e0 b5 8e 71 6e cb 71 ee 08 08 ae f1 ec 91 ca | encrypting: c7 9a 38 83 ce b7 0e c9 38 19 1b f5 1c f8 de 14 | encrypting: 4b 37 59 a1 05 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 01 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 10 04 00 00 00 c0 00 02 00 | encrypting: ff ff ff 00 | IV: 59 73 d4 c3 ec 60 58 5d | unpadded size is: 404 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 408 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 436 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: 44 e7 db 80 9b 1b e9 7f | finished processing quick inI1 | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #24 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R0 to state STATE_QUICK_R1 | child state #24: QUICK_R0(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #24 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b98c918 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | sending reply packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 436 bytes for STATE_QUICK_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #24) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 20 01 e4 24 34 76 00 00 01 b4 93 f0 57 97 | fd e2 52 7a 64 89 55 e9 14 a6 62 b4 e5 4b 24 56 | b2 78 b1 5a 67 17 cc 9f f1 8d 1a b5 b6 3d 0f 8c | 41 a5 75 8f 1d ec 84 d2 d3 5e a9 e9 94 00 29 16 | 0b 81 4e dc 8e 3c 76 02 cb 4b 97 fc 71 c0 47 ae | 6f 57 60 be 06 d5 81 92 fb a3 75 7e 27 83 07 97 | a8 b0 1c a1 2f e0 92 ba b1 57 77 ac f3 e1 90 de | 69 8d 27 d4 da 59 95 34 06 12 91 ae 22 72 9e d6 | ce 2a de 42 81 31 74 78 b0 34 bf be 51 97 31 8a | 84 f5 16 27 19 13 38 77 ae 05 e5 31 ad d5 d6 b7 | 4e ec a2 42 83 79 1b 28 08 81 0f e2 03 fe 54 55 | 55 ad aa 22 56 40 7c 8a 7f 06 04 4b d7 95 8c e7 | 84 66 f4 05 72 7a 9f 53 07 df 27 b2 72 89 d4 6b | d3 b6 42 fa ad 59 e8 df 82 c1 3f 3f e9 6f 72 d2 | 56 48 6a 43 30 d7 ca 97 e3 f2 09 56 ee 32 e2 d8 | 37 8c e8 6a 5c 91 c1 ce 8a 17 38 e8 5c c6 40 40 | f0 b8 50 b8 a6 13 b9 68 6f be 1d 8d eb ba e3 2b | a9 66 63 0d 4b 15 61 11 4e 54 3a 00 c3 85 e7 63 | 22 e1 38 11 6a 51 62 5c 1c b9 d3 8d ac a4 5f e5 | d7 55 5d 8f 37 96 af f6 b5 9c e5 00 cd 25 83 5b | 58 ad a3 e4 32 76 e4 c0 66 b9 0a 8b 47 cf 34 3a | 3f 56 26 2f 8a 7b 0c 5a 03 f8 1f 1c 89 dd ee 8b | ed 41 7a dc a1 5a 8f 01 ac 6a 8d fc 70 48 d2 c3 | c1 57 2a cc 7c 7b cd 3b 02 b4 2d 8e e8 fa d1 99 | fd 0e 18 d7 70 58 85 2c 3c d0 65 49 08 47 69 3d | 7d 5d 1d 61 eb 01 40 da 63 b6 56 e9 44 e7 db 80 | 9b 1b e9 7f | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | inserting event EVENT_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 0.5 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 size 128 | #24 STATE_QUICK_R1: retransmits: first event in 0.5 seconds; timeout in 60 seconds; limit of 12 retransmits; current time is 10456.184866 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #24: STATE_QUICK_R1: sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2 tunnel mode {ESP=>0x49f089c5 <0x40ea8fa7 xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | resume sending helper answer for #24 suppresed complete_v1_state_transition() | #24 spent 1.28 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 | spent 0.00272 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 52 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 20 01 e4 24 34 76 00 00 00 34 5a da 26 2f | 46 b4 2a d5 36 4f c3 42 c9 1f 87 5a 05 08 ff 2c | f0 a1 78 64 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (0x20) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 3827577974 (0xe4243476) | length: 52 (0x34) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK (32) | State DB: found IKEv1 state #24 in QUICK_R1 (find_state_ikev1) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1633) | #24 is idle | #24 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 24 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: 44 e7 db 80 9b 1b e9 7f | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 05 08 ff 2c f0 a1 78 64 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -24): | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 20 01 e4 24 34 76 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 18 | c5 6b 3c 27 9e 2e d7 07 8d ea d4 f4 1b 43 f8 51 | f1 d3 47 67 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b690 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b690 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update 0-byte@0x0 (0) | 00 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | e4 24 34 76 | HASH(1) PRF sha update Ni_b-bytes@0x7fa0e40039e8 (length 32) | 05 eb 40 84 8a 2e 2d f1 61 73 3a ef 15 33 e0 b4 | c6 07 83 1b 48 4c 28 99 48 b7 b9 af e9 81 1d 3f | HASH(1) PRF sha update Nr_b-bytes@0x7fa0d80030c8 (length 32) | 9e 13 10 73 e4 23 e6 a3 56 b0 5a 41 15 1d 33 15 | d8 31 5a ce 75 e6 6f 0e df 7d c3 91 4f 99 73 ec | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | c5 6b 3c 27 9e 2e d7 07 8d ea d4 f4 1b 43 f8 51 | f1 d3 47 67 | quick_inI2 HASH(3): | c5 6b 3c 27 9e 2e d7 07 8d ea d4 f4 1b 43 f8 51 | f1 d3 47 67 | received 'quick_inI2' message HASH(3) data ok | install_ipsec_sa() for #24: outbound only | could_route called for east (kind=CK_PERMANENT) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | sr for #24: prospective erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" prospective erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: east (next: none) ero:east esr:{(nil)} ro:east rosr:{(nil)} and state: #24 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.1.0/24:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.45>tun.0@192.1.2.45 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x49f089c5 SPI_OUT=0x40e | popen cmd is 1020 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFA: | cmd( 80):CE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' : | cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_M: | cmd( 240):ASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='1638: | cmd( 320):8' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK=': | cmd( 480):255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUT: | cmd( 560):O_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKE: | cmd( 640):V1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO: | cmd( 720):_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_IN: | cmd( 800):FO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 880):CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED=: | cmd( 960):'no' SPI_IN=0x49f089c5 SPI_OUT=0x40ea8fa7 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "east", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x55b81b988648,sr=0x55b81b988648} to #24 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #23 spent 0.558 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | inI2: instance east[0], setting IKEv1 newest_ipsec_sa to #24 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#24) cloned from #23 | DPD: dpd_init() called on IPsec SA | DPD: Peer does not support Dead Peer Detection | complete v1 state transition with STF_OK | [RE]START processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v1_state_transition() at ikev1.c:2673) | #24 is idle | doing_xauth:no, t_xauth_client_done:no | IKEv1: transition from state STATE_QUICK_R1 to state STATE_QUICK_R2 | child state #24: QUICK_R1(established CHILD SA) => QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) | event_already_set, deleting event | state #24 requesting EVENT_RETRANSMIT to be deleted | #24 STATE_QUICK_R2: retransmits: cleared | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0d8003ad8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_RETRANSMIT-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | !event_already_set at reschedule | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 size 128 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec established | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "east" #24: STATE_QUICK_R2: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP=>0x49f089c5 <0x40ea8fa7 xfrm=3DES_CBC-HMAC_SHA1_96 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} | modecfg pull: noquirk policy:push not-client | phase 1 is done, looking for phase 2 to unpend | #24 spent 0.632 milliseconds in process_packet_tail() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (BACKGROUND) (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | stop processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.795 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00349 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.0026 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 68 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 05 01 a4 3f 5a 18 00 00 00 44 ea 17 d2 61 | 72 0c e1 ef a1 17 4e 34 4f e4 70 6b e8 b1 a6 f1 | 9c 07 bb 9f dd 94 0d 53 2b 9e 75 f9 47 a9 6f 01 | 09 75 37 b4 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2755615256 (0xa43f5a18) | length: 68 (0x44) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | peer and cookies match on #24; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=e4243476 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | peer and cookies match on #23; msgid=00000000 st_msgid=00000000 st_msgid_phase15=00000000 | p15 state object #23 found, in STATE_MAIN_R3 | State DB: found IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 (find_v1_info_state) | start processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_v1_packet() at ikev1.c:1479) | last Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | current Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 8) | d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe5434338c (length 4) | a4 3f 5a 18 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | da 4d 31 e0 4d 28 53 8b cf 89 a5 de b0 11 7d a8 | d5 96 0c ce | #23 is idle | #23 idle | received encrypted packet from 192.1.2.45:500 | decrypting 40 bytes using algorithm 3DES_CBC | IV before: da 4d 31 e0 4d 28 53 8b | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | IV after: 47 a9 6f 01 09 75 37 b4 | decrypted payload (starts at offset -40): | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 05 01 a4 3f 5a 18 00 00 00 44 0c 00 00 18 | 84 f4 db 2a b0 b5 65 8b a1 ac 4c 21 f2 02 b8 82 | 2d 31 2c 92 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 | 49 f0 89 c5 | got payload 0x100 (ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) needed: 0x100 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_D (0xc) | length: 24 (0x18) | got payload 0x1000 (ISAKMP_NEXT_D) needed: 0x0 opt: 0x0 | ***parse ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | length: 16 (0x10) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543430e8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543431cc (length 4) | a4 3f 5a 18 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x55b81b98f52c (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 49 f0 89 c5 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54343250 (length 20) | 84 f4 db 2a b0 b5 65 8b a1 ac 4c 21 f2 02 b8 82 | 2d 31 2c 92 | informational HASH(1): | 84 f4 db 2a b0 b5 65 8b a1 ac 4c 21 f2 02 b8 82 | 2d 31 2c 92 | received 'informational' message HASH(1) data ok | parsing 4 raw bytes of ISAKMP Delete Payload into SPI | SPI 49 f0 89 c5 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase2_state_to_delete | start processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2515) "east" #23: received Delete SA(0x49f089c5) payload: deleting IPsec State #24 | pstats #24 ikev1.ipsec deleted completed | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) | start processing: state #24 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #24: deleting other state #24 (STATE_QUICK_R2) aged 0.059s and sending notification | child state #24: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => delete | get_sa_info esp.49f089c5@192.1.2.45 | get_sa_info esp.40ea8fa7@192.1.2.23 "east" #24: ESP traffic information: in=84B out=84B | #24 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_QUICK_R2 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in find_phase1_state | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 2582427512 (0x99ecb778) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 3 (0x3) | SPI size: 4 (0x4) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 4 raw bytes of delete payload into ISAKMP Delete Payload | delete payload 40 ea 8f a7 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 16 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe54340928 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b976790 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b98b8b0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b976790 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec004ec8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a0c (length 4) | 99 ec b7 78 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340db4 (length 16) | 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 03 04 00 01 40 ea 8f a7 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340da0 (length 20) | f5 34 8c 66 57 25 fb 76 d8 86 2a e4 e7 c5 1d d5 | 8c 6d d0 98 | send delete HASH(1): | f5 34 8c 66 57 25 fb 76 d8 86 2a e4 e7 c5 1d d5 | 8c 6d d0 98 | last Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | current Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 8) | d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe54340a1c (length 4) | 99 ec b7 78 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | 87 71 69 43 a6 cf 1d fa f8 8e 74 f6 48 6e 0a 02 | b3 29 56 6b | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 f5 34 8c 66 57 25 fb 76 d8 86 2a e4 | encrypting: e7 c5 1d d5 8c 6d d0 98 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 03 04 00 01 40 ea 8f a7 | IV: 87 71 69 43 a6 cf 1d fa f8 8e 74 f6 48 6e 0a 02 | IV: b3 29 56 6b | unpadded size is: 40 | encrypting 40 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: a6 17 59 a1 93 77 94 05 | sending 68 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 05 01 99 ec b7 78 00 00 00 44 81 b1 e7 e6 | df c7 35 f7 d1 61 85 1e 62 e8 89 e3 1d 0d c5 ef | 89 52 91 66 93 4a a0 7b 6e ad a7 ed a6 17 59 a1 | 93 77 94 05 | state #24 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0dc002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x7fa0ec004218 | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb down | command executing down-client | executing down-client: PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825170' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x49f089c5 | popen cmd is 1031 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTER: | cmd( 80):FACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT: | cmd( 240):_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16: | cmd( 320):388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEE: | cmd( 400):R_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK: | cmd( 480):='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PL: | cmd( 560):UTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='1566825170' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUN: | cmd( 640):NEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMA: | cmd( 720):NENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 800):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd( 880):='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd( 960):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x49f089c5 SPI_OUT=0x40ea8fa7 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'replace with shunt' for rt_kind 'prospective erouted' using protoports 0--0->-0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042407 | delete esp.49f089c5@192.1.2.45 | netlink response for Del SA esp.49f089c5@192.1.2.45 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | delete inbound eroute 192.0.1.0/24:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => unk255.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | raw_eroute result=success | delete esp.40ea8fa7@192.1.2.23 | netlink response for Del SA esp.40ea8fa7@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | stop processing: connection "east" (BACKGROUND) (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4076) | start processing: connection NULL (in update_state_connection() at connections.c:4077) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #24 in QUICK_R2 | child state #24: QUICK_R2(established CHILD SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0d8005f58: destroyed | stop processing: state #24 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b98c720 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | connection 'east' -POLICY_UP | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in shared_phase1_connection | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #23 | state #22 | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #22 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #22 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #22: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 0.521s and NOT sending notification | parent state #22: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #22 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #22: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #22 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | state #21 | suspend processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | start processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #21 ikev1.isakmp deleted other | [RE]START processing: state #21 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #21: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R0) aged 1.025s and NOT sending notification | parent state #21: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => delete | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #21 in MAIN_R0 | parent state #21: MAIN_R0(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #21 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | resume processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #23 | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1310) | pstats #23 ikev1.isakmp deleted completed | [RE]START processing: state #23 connection "east" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "east" #23: deleting state (STATE_MAIN_R3) aged 0.078s and sending notification | parent state #23: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => delete | #23 send IKEv1 delete notification for STATE_MAIN_R3 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 774726017 (0x2e2d6181) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit ISAKMP Hash Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Hash Payload (8:ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 20 zero bytes of HASH DATA into ISAKMP Hash Payload | emitting length of ISAKMP Hash Payload: 24 | ***emit ISAKMP Delete Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC (0x1) | protocol ID: 1 (0x1) | SPI size: 16 (0x10) | number of SPIs: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Hash Payload'.'next payload type' to current ISAKMP Delete Payload (12:ISAKMP_NEXT_D) | next payload chain: saving location 'ISAKMP Delete Payload'.'next payload type' in 'delete msg' | emitting 8 raw bytes of initiator SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | initiator SPI c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | emitting 8 raw bytes of responder SPI into ISAKMP Delete Payload | responder SPI fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | emitting length of ISAKMP Delete Payload: 28 | HASH(1) PRF sha init SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (size 20) | HASH(1): SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | key-offset: 0, key-size: 20 | EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: | target: SHA_1_HMAC | flags: SIGN | key_size: 20-bytes | base: base-key@0x55b81b8ec080 (20-bytes, EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) | operation: FLAGS_ONLY | params: 8-bytes@0x7ffe543408c8 | result: clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 (20-bytes, SHA_1_HMAC) | HASH(1) prf: created sha context 0x55b81b9892a0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) prf: begin sha with context 0x55b81b9892a0 from SKEYID_a-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1): release clone-key@0x55b81b98ef70 | HASH(1) PRF sha crypt-prf@0x7fa0ec0031d8 | HASH(1) PRF sha update M-ID-bytes@0x7ffe543409ac (length 4) | 2e 2d 61 81 | HASH(1) PRF sha update payload-bytes@0x7ffe54340d54 (length 28) | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 01 10 00 01 c7 8f 09 fa | d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | HASH(1) PRF sha final-bytes@0x7ffe54340d40 (length 20) | a0 ac 8e ae 95 17 d8 23 61 c7 8c 12 31 87 d1 85 | 91 23 af 06 | send delete HASH(1): | a0 ac 8e ae 95 17 d8 23 61 c7 8c 12 31 87 d1 85 | 91 23 af 06 | last Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | current Phase 1 IV: d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha init | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest PH1_IV-bytes@0x55b81b98b058 (length 8) | d2 d9 01 0c 33 6b 79 87 | Phase 2 IV hash sha digest MSGID-bytes@0x7ffe543409bc (length 4) | 2e 2d 61 81 | Phase 2 IV hash sha final bytes@0x55b81b98afd8 (length 20) | b7 d3 fb c5 b3 de f9 a5 f2 e4 f7 5c b8 43 b6 4d | b1 b1 9a b7 | encrypting: 0c 00 00 18 a0 ac 8e ae 95 17 d8 23 61 c7 8c 12 | encrypting: 31 87 d1 85 91 23 af 06 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 01 | encrypting: 01 10 00 01 c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 | encrypting: 9f 11 cd 78 | IV: b7 d3 fb c5 b3 de f9 a5 f2 e4 f7 5c b8 43 b6 4d | IV: b1 b1 9a b7 | unpadded size is: 52 | emitting 4 zero bytes of encryption padding into ISAKMP Message | encrypting 56 using 3DES_CBC | no IKEv1 message padding required | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 84 | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - enter | NSS ike_alg_nss_cbc: 3des_cbc - exit | next IV: d7 4f 9d 95 7b 62 0a c5 | sending 84 bytes for delete notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #23) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 05 01 2e 2d 61 81 00 00 00 54 75 93 c8 63 | 4e a8 19 2f 97 c8 fd 24 99 98 f9 bf 24 b5 e2 55 | 9d 83 cd 9d ad 81 f8 78 15 44 4f 9e 85 aa 73 61 | 73 34 07 f9 b4 08 cd 81 01 0c 3e 7b d7 4f 9d 95 | 7b 62 0a c5 | state #23 requesting EVENT_SA_REPLACE to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0e0007988 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SA_REPLACE-pe@0x55b81b9947a8 | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection east | State DB: deleting IKEv1 state #23 in MAIN_R3 | parent state #23: MAIN_R3(established IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | DH secret MODP2048@0x7fa0e00026e8: destroyed | stop processing: state #23 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | delete_state: release st->st_shared_nss-key@0x55b81b987630 | delete_state: release st->st_skeyid_nss-key@0x55b81b974d30 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_d_nss-key@0x55b81b973280 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ai_nss-key@0x55b81b8ec080 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ar_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_ei_nss-key@0x55b81b976b70 | delete_state: release st->st_skey_er_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pi_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_skey_pr_nss-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_enc_key_nss-key@0x55b81b98c720 | delete_state: release st->st_sk_d_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pi_no_ppk-key@NULL | delete_state: release st->st_sk_pr_no_ppk-key@NULL | processing: STOP state #0 (in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete() at state.c:1312) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2556) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in accept_delete() at ikev1_main.c:2559) | del: | in statetime_start() with no state | complete v1 state transition with STF_IGNORE | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.55 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0013 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 84 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | 08 10 05 01 f2 f8 7e 5c 00 00 00 54 9d aa b5 48 | 7e ac 0f 55 1b ed e9 b8 44 a0 3e de af 69 25 c9 | b6 df ae 20 ef 28 a9 99 21 bf 6d 30 a6 6b 93 91 | 44 f8 1f c7 fd d7 d6 3c 49 f5 07 e2 6f 6e a5 9e | 03 86 47 d6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | responder cookie: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (0x8) | ISAKMP version: ISAKMP Version 1.0 (rfc2407) (0x10) | exchange type: ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (0x5) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v1_ENCRYPTION (0x1) | Message ID: 4076371548 (0xf2f87e5c) | length: 84 (0x54) | processing version=1.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO (5) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_v1_info_state) | State DB: IKEv1 state not found (find_state_ikev1_init) | Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA with MSGID:0xf2f87e5c | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi.bytes: | c7 8f 09 fa d1 8f 64 81 | - unknown SA's md->hdr.isa_ike_responder_spi.bytes: | fb 73 14 a9 9f 11 cd 78 | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.048 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00338 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.597 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | start processing: connection "east" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | shunt_eroute() called for connection 'east' to 'delete' for rt_kind 'unrouted' using protoports 0--0->-0 | netlink_shunt_eroute for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | priority calculation of connection "east" is 0xfe7e7 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn east mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "east" unrouted: NULL | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb unroute | command executing unroute-client | executing unroute-client: PLUTO_VERB='unroute-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0x0 SPI_OUT=0 | popen cmd is 1012 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='unroute-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='east' PLUTO_IN: | cmd( 80):TERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@e: | cmd( 160):ast' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLI: | cmd( 240):ENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID=: | cmd( 320):'16388' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.45' PLUTO_PEER_ID='@west' PLUTO: | cmd( 400):_PEER_CLIENT='192.0.1.0/24' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='192.0.1.0' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_: | cmd( 480):MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA=': | cmd( 560):' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+P: | cmd( 640):FS+IKEV1_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_PERMANENT': | cmd( 720): PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 800):DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER='0' : | cmd( 880):PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' VTI_S: | cmd( 960):HARED='no' SPI_IN=0x0 SPI_OUT=0x0 ipsec _updown 2>&1: "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. "east": unroute-client output: Error: Peer netns reference is invalid. | free hp@0x55b81b989198 | flush revival: connection 'east' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "east" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b97be58 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987b68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90f7d8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987c18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b911e18 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987cc8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9130c8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987d78 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e64e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987e28 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e61d8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b987ed8 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b97bf08 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b96fc48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b911388 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b96fbd8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9534a8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55b81b96f098 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90eee8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b917aa8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987348 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987588 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987458 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a518 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a4c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa0ec003e78 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a418 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9870d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987288 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96a6c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96f868 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b96fd58 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987f48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987e98 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987de8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987d38 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987c88 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987bd8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90e018 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987308 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b9872c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987248 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987418 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b987118 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5908 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5d38 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b90e388 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5ba8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5cd8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55b81b8e5dd8 leak detective found no leaks