FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:26677 core dump dir: /tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd38778 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd386f8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd38678 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a2a8 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febcb3e48 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd72d98 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd72de8 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd72d58 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd385f8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd38578 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febcb3ad8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd72f98 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a2a8 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a2a8 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 | starting up helper thread 0 started thread for crypto helper 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 2 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 2 started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 5 | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x563febd32498 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd71508 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd78598 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x563febd78528 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2af58 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd781f8 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x563febd789c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd84828 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fa98 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fad8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fc08 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fc48 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd36a68 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fd08 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fd48 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febcb47b8 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fd88 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fdc8 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fe98 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fc48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd8fed8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd90008 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:26817) using fork+execve | forked child 26817 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd905e8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd84778 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd90658 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd90698 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2b008 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd90708 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd90748 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a928 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd907b8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd907f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd321e8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd90868 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd908a8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd322e8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd90918 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd90958 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd323e8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd909c8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.803 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd84778 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x563febd905e8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd905e8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd84778 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd2b008 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x563febd90698 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd90698 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2b008 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a928 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x563febd90748 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd90748 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a928 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd321e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x563febd907f8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd907f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd321e8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd322e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x563febd908a8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd908a8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd322e8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd323e8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x563febd90958 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x563febd90958 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd323e8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.45 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 26817 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0128 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection rw with policy RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | counting wild cards for %fromcert is 0 | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febd94068 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febd94018 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febd93fc8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febd93d18 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febd93cc8 | unreference key: 0x563febd940b8 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x563febd98e98 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for @east.testing.libreswan.org is 0 | add new addresspool to global pools 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 size 10 ptr 0x563febd900d8 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | reference addresspool of conn rw[0] kind CK_TEMPLATE refcnt 0 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x563febd97138 added connection description "rw" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.0.2.0/24===192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[@east.testing.libreswan.org,MS+S=C]...%any[%fromcert,+MC+S=C] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.984 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00258 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.254:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 b0 a0 83 04 12 b8 17 9f | 07 24 51 d1 af 17 70 7b 57 52 4f 96 12 04 76 4f | bd 55 66 31 63 a6 f8 db 80 0e d6 ae 4b 54 24 62 | c3 d0 9a 68 e3 a3 00 09 ff 19 13 4a 5a 03 fd 50 | 09 c9 7e ce dd 2f 92 6d 17 da d4 67 8a 27 3a 2b | e7 b7 f8 e3 90 b6 04 92 dc 1b 7d 6c f8 5c 5a 87 | 03 2e 42 8a 8e 60 47 cf ab 4f 45 9e 5a 75 ee 97 | 31 7a 6f c3 67 1e 2b cd e2 b7 43 fa ea ac 75 2a | 4f d4 07 16 ef 35 1a b8 cb a0 d2 ed bd da b4 dd | cf 40 1e c8 04 d2 cd 56 89 76 b1 87 ba b6 04 07 | 4c 6b 7f 71 d7 ce 6f 87 0f 5d 23 c4 47 c1 08 65 | fc f7 33 a0 3a 7e 23 dd e5 31 87 4e ed 79 3c 23 | ac ba b5 66 9b f6 91 58 42 17 72 f4 4d 30 7f 7e | f7 07 e7 b5 c3 8f b2 7e e4 0d 2a 9d f7 ff 62 8c | a7 78 fa b3 e4 71 3f 6c fd 5a ba 4a 6a 75 83 85 | cb fc 8d 33 d8 23 71 27 bf 4a e3 71 a6 50 0f 95 | 97 c0 b4 ba 46 f0 d5 b1 29 00 00 24 02 e4 12 9a | 00 3c 76 00 38 44 ae 0c 71 d8 0d 2d c2 7b 57 ca | 5e a0 35 6c 44 f2 5c 52 b4 1c 2e fb 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 cf b3 ed 1a | bd 65 6b 4b 85 d0 b4 ad 10 7e 5d e2 d9 23 2d 78 | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 ad 16 f3 c7 42 df 9c 44 | 2c 01 6e fd 58 b8 f1 90 ae c2 36 fb | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns rw | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | rw_instantiate | reference addresspool of conn rw[1] kind CK_TEMPLATE refcnt 1 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.254:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x563febd99b08 | rw_instantiate() instantiated "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 for 192.1.2.254 | found connection: rw[1] 192.1.2.254 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #1 at 0x563febd9b1c8 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | constructing local IKE proposals for rw (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254: constructed local IKE proposals for rw (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= ad 16 f3 c7 42 df 9c 44 2c 01 6e fd 58 b8 f1 90 | natd_hash: hash= ae c2 36 fb | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 51 cf e3 a7 e9 ef 2f ca d6 37 d1 7c 14 61 ca 20 | natd_hash: hash= 59 7b f0 26 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is behind NAT 192.1.2.254 | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.254 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd98378 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd93c18 size 128 | #1 spent 0.484 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.844 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.853 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.000912 seconds | (#1) spent 0.919 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa738002888 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x563feb00db50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x d0 d0 25 01 02 20 53 f9 6c 74 ab 04 48 6b 84 c3 | ikev2 g^x ee 72 ae 0d 1e 7d 56 b8 2f 2c 88 6d 7b 17 4b 22 | ikev2 g^x f1 63 4a 8c 22 ba 52 60 1b 98 b3 03 12 c6 e7 a8 | ikev2 g^x 33 9f 56 8c de d4 88 d7 64 0f f4 98 0e 2e c5 92 | ikev2 g^x 5e 6f ea 71 fc 03 88 6d 65 58 96 31 f6 a9 92 3d | ikev2 g^x 43 e5 79 b9 ba 6f 8b 3c b9 83 c0 03 1b 4f 8c 3a | ikev2 g^x dc e1 88 c9 ee 18 ac 7c 42 98 48 a1 3a 05 d5 37 | ikev2 g^x ac 96 b9 cc 98 4d 69 69 87 85 5e 4d 88 3d 00 14 | ikev2 g^x 10 79 c7 c7 85 12 f0 dd b9 00 80 1d 42 b1 3e 40 | ikev2 g^x c7 26 2d 91 22 ea fa dd 09 c0 f9 c8 f3 f8 dd 22 | ikev2 g^x 12 53 de 5a cf b3 15 a6 65 fd af f9 2b a3 af 69 | ikev2 g^x 26 7a 63 1e 2a 2c 97 f5 ef 4f 21 53 f4 52 22 66 | ikev2 g^x 6c 9a 8b 92 36 00 41 ac 0e 80 34 30 be 69 fd fd | ikev2 g^x ac 94 a1 8a 59 d3 57 d1 6b 91 87 94 45 af fe cb | ikev2 g^x 20 69 53 1d d4 b7 ba 5d 73 fc 89 50 de 98 34 45 | ikev2 g^x 26 b2 fd 52 b8 f5 65 df 6c 42 a4 72 62 d0 c7 a4 | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 98 7e 38 47 c3 b6 63 83 2b 57 47 e0 f7 63 08 1e | IKEv2 nonce f5 90 db 83 c9 b7 54 cc a8 cc ed e4 32 d7 dd 45 | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | natd_hash: rcookie= 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= e4 20 9b 8d 0c 39 20 1a 6c c4 d7 c4 c8 bc 8e c9 | natd_hash: hash= 9a bd 18 31 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data e4 20 9b 8d 0c 39 20 1a 6c c4 d7 c4 c8 bc 8e c9 | Notify data 9a bd 18 31 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | natd_hash: rcookie= 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 79 22 61 ce 50 5a b0 8b 90 0a 27 f3 a2 05 52 fe | natd_hash: hash= c3 bc 58 7e | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 79 22 61 ce 50 5a b0 8b 90 0a 27 f3 a2 05 52 fe | Notify data c3 bc 58 7e | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:500 (using #1) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 d0 d0 25 01 | 02 20 53 f9 6c 74 ab 04 48 6b 84 c3 ee 72 ae 0d | 1e 7d 56 b8 2f 2c 88 6d 7b 17 4b 22 f1 63 4a 8c | 22 ba 52 60 1b 98 b3 03 12 c6 e7 a8 33 9f 56 8c | de d4 88 d7 64 0f f4 98 0e 2e c5 92 5e 6f ea 71 | fc 03 88 6d 65 58 96 31 f6 a9 92 3d 43 e5 79 b9 | ba 6f 8b 3c b9 83 c0 03 1b 4f 8c 3a dc e1 88 c9 | ee 18 ac 7c 42 98 48 a1 3a 05 d5 37 ac 96 b9 cc | 98 4d 69 69 87 85 5e 4d 88 3d 00 14 10 79 c7 c7 | 85 12 f0 dd b9 00 80 1d 42 b1 3e 40 c7 26 2d 91 | 22 ea fa dd 09 c0 f9 c8 f3 f8 dd 22 12 53 de 5a | cf b3 15 a6 65 fd af f9 2b a3 af 69 26 7a 63 1e | 2a 2c 97 f5 ef 4f 21 53 f4 52 22 66 6c 9a 8b 92 | 36 00 41 ac 0e 80 34 30 be 69 fd fd ac 94 a1 8a | 59 d3 57 d1 6b 91 87 94 45 af fe cb 20 69 53 1d | d4 b7 ba 5d 73 fc 89 50 de 98 34 45 26 b2 fd 52 | b8 f5 65 df 6c 42 a4 72 62 d0 c7 a4 29 00 00 24 | 98 7e 38 47 c3 b6 63 83 2b 57 47 e0 f7 63 08 1e | f5 90 db 83 c9 b7 54 cc a8 cc ed e4 32 d7 dd 45 | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | e4 20 9b 8d 0c 39 20 1a 6c c4 d7 c4 c8 bc 8e c9 | 9a bd 18 31 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 79 22 61 ce | 50 5a b0 8b 90 0a 27 f3 a2 05 52 fe c3 bc 58 7e | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd93c18 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd98378 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x563febd98378 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd98458 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.317 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa738002888 | spent 0.00266 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 23 00 01 fb | 00 01 00 05 82 bd f9 3e c8 76 90 f5 0f dc a1 e5 | 28 c4 9d 64 e3 d5 bc 0e ec 13 86 08 41 7a 18 04 | 58 32 69 e3 e5 07 1f ef df f0 4c 55 8d c3 89 88 | cf 3b fe 97 01 db ac 44 8f 32 14 2a 7e f3 59 85 | 0b 1b ce 7c f9 14 5e a9 ae 97 6a ee 51 56 7b 47 | 73 36 21 9f 21 73 c0 98 d0 f7 58 7a 3c 77 7e e4 | 07 43 d8 b6 d8 24 ac e4 de 81 6b c1 02 df a4 3a | ba e0 0f b3 88 48 3d f5 a8 40 49 dd 53 f3 0b 39 | b5 d7 5f 2f 75 ba 8c 08 43 78 b3 08 49 f4 60 31 | 6d 7b 5a c6 62 aa ac ce 44 4e 12 df 0d d4 9a 00 | 82 55 56 16 e7 79 07 28 44 8d a6 cb fb 7d 04 c9 | f0 ca f9 12 95 13 7a 1d e5 9d 8f 9d b9 83 e9 40 | 7a 13 75 8d 6a f3 be 9f 7c 06 8d cd b6 a0 dd c7 | cf c0 57 1d 4d ce 42 64 bf e3 ab ab a7 82 fc 1e | ba da 18 09 22 2e 1e 7e e8 03 49 93 36 72 9a 39 | 5a 4b 1f c1 93 3d 62 aa bf fc d2 5c 8a 82 bb eb | 3d 91 c7 91 31 c9 c3 11 39 c6 58 0d 8f c0 10 55 | b0 df 0e 04 5f 61 6a 1e 46 92 49 88 6f 8d 65 ff | 67 91 89 7a e5 f4 28 48 e2 ec eb 7f 70 1d b3 cc | ce a8 86 0c 84 00 82 44 51 cc 1f 88 e6 99 ab ca | 6c 46 ee 3a 2d fc 0d 07 46 94 07 78 52 4e 5f a3 | a4 76 8e 96 9b 4d 71 ee b7 e4 c2 30 06 24 84 ad | 64 ce 04 91 73 75 b1 b0 7b ca fc 36 cb 19 aa ee | 8c ea 16 7d 69 8e ac da c8 d4 0a 30 f2 39 17 18 | c4 b6 54 b5 4e 46 a3 26 43 0d 74 9a f2 e6 08 92 | 07 7c d0 f0 98 ed 68 19 9e 57 00 19 66 a8 9c f6 | 5b 3e e2 3b bb 43 61 05 08 80 b5 20 49 1f bc 73 | f2 f5 95 e9 d8 41 de 34 99 4f e0 62 b9 fb 9c ff | 6c f0 ae 69 52 f5 b1 2c de a0 07 14 d5 24 2d 1a | 27 43 43 66 4b 0b 42 bd 52 68 62 81 38 58 9f 5c | c0 38 2d 06 18 09 7e ce 04 4d a0 76 32 e9 b7 65 | cd bf b9 db 22 81 2b | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.108 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.116 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00108 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 02 00 05 7f 8d 45 7b 3a a5 20 20 89 88 14 86 | 24 6e 08 1f 8d bc a7 4b f8 f4 84 c2 0f 0e 57 2a | 8d a8 9f 24 af 74 61 82 fd 7a c7 82 63 7c f2 ba | 09 ca e8 12 af ba 46 5c 3e d1 40 ea 7d 1c ce 0d | 3e 76 91 0c 0a 55 d1 83 0b ad b4 c4 4f cd 06 1e | b7 eb 64 b9 54 d6 0d 4d 80 10 b5 b5 2f 34 f1 44 | c8 f1 fe e0 b5 21 ba 6f 2d f5 be 17 a0 1b bf bd | 5d 5b 2c 99 74 99 8e b9 92 84 dd 90 fb 58 ee 19 | 1e 92 c0 ae e6 c7 3a c6 22 ef 6a 46 e9 15 5c 61 | 8f 8d 2a 1b 48 80 43 95 87 9f a1 2d cc f0 91 e1 | 9f f7 4d aa 8b 25 31 5b b3 e0 f9 83 3b 89 ea 21 | c6 d6 78 54 5d 2c 5c 19 d2 eb 1e e4 4f 1b ab b7 | 61 4f b1 d1 6c 52 cf e4 0e fb 94 fd 8b cf 63 01 | 9c f9 98 a3 67 19 88 6e 8e c9 29 fe 38 96 0a 0c | ee 93 4e 17 68 2b ef 65 56 68 e7 e0 53 47 36 02 | d5 a6 45 cc d8 8c 42 0a d1 62 83 a8 74 34 89 ab | 61 e1 36 7e 11 51 35 0f 1c fb de 7e 38 ba 87 67 | 5a cb fb b9 9a 64 de 2a ca 26 68 b1 4e ac 65 7d | 93 30 2a c1 b3 f7 82 93 88 d7 86 c8 08 04 e1 48 | fe 86 d0 d3 24 64 28 0d cb a3 9d 7c 29 cb 7d 0d | 2c 87 70 1a 0f 09 8f 82 40 6c 08 a3 32 a2 d1 90 | 11 74 b6 c9 c8 2c 56 39 02 f7 a2 41 25 80 ab 51 | 4f 96 5a b8 a7 b8 1c ba 45 a6 f3 a8 5c c1 3b f8 | 06 11 c2 c4 21 bf 70 bb dc bd c0 11 48 55 1e 29 | 40 ac 40 a5 cc 58 b0 67 50 c5 40 94 e5 45 59 75 | 03 21 52 c2 f6 1e 6b cd 30 27 25 16 d3 2c b3 e5 | bf 25 bf 90 4a 0c 10 87 ae ef e7 34 f7 30 22 27 | 16 9d f4 e2 a1 1e 39 10 33 ab 8c 6a 55 67 de cc | a9 5a b0 bc 63 27 da 9e b8 65 7f 3b ea f5 cc 15 | 91 45 f0 eb 56 1f 92 ed 63 4f c5 65 64 92 9f 0a | 2a b7 b1 82 9c df fb 5e dc 9b 46 f5 06 1f 83 9b | c6 bd d1 bc 8d d8 d6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.09 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.0996 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.016 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 03 00 05 30 27 82 13 91 57 25 bc 3f 64 46 ed | 2a ce dd 17 d1 8c 58 a8 fd 9d d7 d0 39 db f1 7a | 4b 60 c2 f0 b6 eb 3f 3b d9 3f a3 b2 97 3f 83 05 | a8 4e d3 70 4c 71 cd e9 fe 1d 81 6b ca 0f 6d 7c | d3 8b c4 0d ee 1c b9 e6 d6 ef 87 3a 4c f2 60 39 | f3 25 e2 e4 d7 2e 95 61 2d d8 19 b7 4c c5 13 26 | 3c 3c 37 b4 64 54 5c f1 a3 c9 83 f6 f9 7b f4 a8 | 6b de 7f 4c 45 83 1d 81 e9 20 d7 0b 98 ce df 25 | 5b 4b a8 2a e5 11 49 dd 75 18 4b 2c aa 24 88 52 | 98 aa 48 ba 33 b7 e6 9d d4 ef 23 5a ec 79 40 38 | 7b 71 5e 99 33 1d 79 8e b0 3a fc 86 a0 68 14 97 | f0 8c 3d a8 a1 15 1e 40 f5 73 c9 13 dd 3d 03 70 | c6 a2 1d 0a 08 29 bd 7f c9 9d 5c 7d 79 e8 17 c6 | 23 bf e5 3d 3d f1 1f 6e ed 78 56 02 ff 35 4f 02 | ee f2 20 94 d5 f7 49 64 da 79 8d 03 5f cf e0 86 | e7 ca 34 b0 66 42 a9 a2 32 a5 fd 1d d4 13 80 8c | ab 2d b6 4a 26 5f 92 9e 3c a5 c6 81 e5 31 96 ed | de 03 9e 91 bc 51 5c 28 4a 18 bc 68 4f 65 ec de | 07 93 de cd 1e 04 e6 08 67 93 a9 f4 f2 8e cf 49 | b1 5f 3d 14 36 36 94 cc 1f 39 ca a4 5b 59 69 90 | 90 d5 07 f6 39 7f 72 0c d7 2e 23 63 0e 82 3d a3 | 76 a9 45 6f 00 34 45 08 5a 61 33 7f 53 7d ae f0 | 68 3c c4 14 5b 0c 24 b0 be 92 2b e3 30 51 42 f1 | 4b 85 f1 9e 18 d2 74 a9 1c 9c 04 0f 24 92 62 76 | 42 59 1d 28 2b 2a f5 1c 28 65 08 46 9c 7c c7 cb | 29 e5 fd 89 68 a4 e6 28 80 81 4e 0d 81 1e 9c a4 | a6 46 fa f2 33 da 5a 82 29 cf cf e3 70 85 4b dc | 64 f5 64 c2 ff 6a 30 a3 45 7a 90 b2 16 93 33 34 | 9d 5f a5 c7 3e 09 82 93 e7 d9 46 b6 2f 30 ed cc | 98 5a f2 29 06 d1 ef 6a ce b8 7d 0e 8e 82 a0 24 | 52 64 0c 51 33 72 10 85 d3 f0 15 ec e7 ed c8 f5 | 33 ff ed 00 57 f4 f1 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.109 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.116 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00109 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 04 00 05 3e 71 92 b3 e2 6f 25 7c e7 18 98 1e | 20 77 af 27 de a9 7f e6 7f 14 8d 53 c4 38 fd 9c | 53 c7 ab 1a 9b 2e 89 69 b9 26 81 2d 0d 03 e9 26 | a8 47 b8 4f 97 be 69 63 fb aa b1 97 93 42 5f 8b | 75 b1 6f 55 63 50 e3 9b c4 aa fb 47 f4 71 4c 3f | ae d8 ba 34 6b c0 d9 74 1a 10 60 0f ed f5 cc be | 2c 4e 6f 7b 5c c5 ae 9a 94 67 8d 37 93 03 9a ac | 59 23 72 df c5 c4 5b 5a 22 6b e0 9d f9 b4 58 d0 | 2b 5a 58 f2 42 82 01 58 5a ea aa b0 c6 e1 a5 ca | 94 4a 23 1e 5f 99 b3 d5 d8 b9 97 10 6f 3d b4 81 | 28 ff c1 1c 56 8a ed 09 e8 1b 53 42 b6 8c 1a 21 | cc b6 a9 91 f6 e9 0b 16 ed 6e 65 44 76 ff d9 29 | 19 ad 91 0f a0 b6 6f ed ce 04 c0 08 0a df 86 08 | f3 79 ac 51 bf 82 1d 27 c7 31 b3 01 12 67 ee b3 | b5 b4 d9 92 03 40 02 d5 40 c3 c8 af 45 c9 20 e4 | e1 19 cc d7 9f fb 88 bd 57 2c b7 f0 06 03 5c 5c | 1d dc 45 7f 88 36 3b a4 63 56 b8 a4 71 33 8d 22 | 2b f6 a9 2c d1 f2 ab aa 3a 78 fb 3b a4 1d 31 6c | 48 29 c4 44 bd 74 9d 39 d5 13 48 e8 75 4d 3a dd | 7f 26 d2 5d 42 08 45 ac 88 0c 60 67 62 d4 d1 90 | 92 9e 27 ce 08 fc a0 ae a0 7c e2 f8 1f d7 5a 75 | 78 6d 17 27 2b 8a d6 df 32 df 60 3d b2 c9 18 b2 | 62 21 65 63 1a 25 ac 1d 1d 42 cf b0 fe 0c fc f0 | 2b 66 38 b5 0b 44 07 b6 ed 65 11 53 26 73 59 31 | 79 8f bc fe a3 9f 6d 76 af 7c a6 73 27 40 25 77 | 61 fb cc 56 a8 63 96 36 b2 2d 2c 2f 34 80 1e cb | 97 22 6a 22 57 ff a9 ff 57 e7 b8 31 8b 6d fd a9 | 16 20 b9 03 2a df 1e 3f f3 3d c3 0c bd ee 44 7a | 90 23 00 32 ef 86 fa fc 89 7e e9 c4 47 a5 a0 45 | 06 1b 46 87 53 ad 38 a0 c8 25 b2 b1 23 5f eb bc | ef b3 ab a1 15 46 03 ac e6 83 4c 09 2e 45 8d 21 | 18 26 ad f4 f2 a2 66 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.104 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.11 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00102 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 251 bytes from 192.1.2.254:4500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fb 00 00 00 df | 00 05 00 05 94 53 b0 09 f7 de fd 4a 85 f2 ad 24 | 14 87 2f 04 9f 36 da 79 58 e9 67 f8 3e d9 ff 49 | 1b 03 39 bc e1 c5 38 1d 95 0a 42 28 c3 f6 4e 62 | 21 10 36 20 95 5f d0 a7 9c d6 0b 22 d3 79 94 97 | f9 db 9c bb 17 9b 3d 25 6b 56 2b 39 70 6a a4 26 | a0 8f b4 1b 91 b9 4a 43 6d a7 9e 7d cb 7b c9 f1 | 2e 5f 7b 6b 98 bd c2 d8 87 a9 78 48 8f 44 0b fb | 54 86 fa f5 65 3c 7b 7a ed 8e 14 58 7b ba a0 42 | 43 b4 69 32 50 f5 ce 6d 1f 31 05 12 7a cc 07 8a | b5 d2 8f bf 01 66 47 4e 46 c7 f7 c9 3c 1f b8 47 | 43 91 39 4d cf cd f3 8d fd b6 57 3d 04 cd 5d c4 | 34 6e 20 f9 09 10 7b 40 3c 99 c4 4a d2 c1 7f 4b | e3 5b e5 40 b3 df b0 34 2e 24 e1 98 0a 63 fd 71 | e3 3a 95 7d ac ae 70 ee 8d 81 9e | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 251 (0xfb) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 223 (0xdf) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=215) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd98458 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x563febd98378 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd98378 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa738002888 size 128 | #1 spent 0.033 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | crypto helper 1 resuming | suspending state #1 and saving MD | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.173 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.185 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.001074 seconds | (#1) spent 1.07 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa730000f48 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x563feb00db50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1229 (0x4cd) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1224) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 34 (0x22) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (len=26) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | **parse IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REQUEST (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,IDr,AUTH,CP,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:4500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 3.66 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.0218 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 3.72 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.562 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.0354 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec | certificate is valid (profile IPsec) | #1 spent 0.139 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: certificate verified OK: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febda5f18 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febda5d68 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febda5bb8 | unreference key: 0x563febdb8238 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | #1 spent 0.206 milliseconds in decode_certs() calling add_pubkey_from_nss_cert() | #1 spent 4.69 milliseconds in decode_certs() | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | received IDr payload - extracting our alleged ID | ID_DER_ASN1_DN '%fromcert' does not need further ID verification | stomping on peer_id | X509: CERT and ID matches current connection | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw[1] 192.1.2.254, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | refine_host_connection: picking new best "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 (wild=0, peer_pathlen=7/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=%fromcert | results fail | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw", best=rw with match=0(id=0(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->%fromcert of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | returning since no better match than original best_found | offered CA: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | key issuer CA is 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | an RSA Sig check passed with *AwEAAd7rc [remote certificates] | #1 spent 0.169 milliseconds in try_all_RSA_keys() trying a pubkey "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: Authenticated using RSA | #1 spent 0.206 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R2(established IKE SA) | #1 will start re-keying in 3330 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa738002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd98378 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x563febd98378 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 3330 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febda9a18 size 128 | pstats #1 ikev2.ike established | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | IKEv2 CERT: send a certificate? | IKEv2 CERT: OK to send a certificate (always) | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | ****emit IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload (36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 26 raw bytes of my identity into IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload | my identity 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | my identity 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | emitting length of IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: 34 | assembled IDr payload | Sending [CERT] of certificate: E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org,CN=east.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | ****emit IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Payload (37:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 1260 raw bytes of CERT into IKEv2 Certificate Payload | CERT 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 | CERT 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 | CERT 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 | CERT 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 | CERT 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f | CERT 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 | CERT 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b | CERT 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e | CERT 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f | CERT 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 | CERT 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 | CERT 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 | CERT 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 38 32 34 30 39 30 37 35 33 | CERT 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 38 32 33 30 39 30 37 35 | CERT 33 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 | CERT 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 | CERT 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 | CERT 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c | CERT 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 | CERT 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 | CERT 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a | CERT 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 | CERT 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 | CERT 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f | CERT 00 30 82 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b1 1e 7c b3 bf 11 | CERT 96 94 23 ca 97 5e c7 66 36 55 71 49 95 8d 0c 2a | CERT 5c 30 4d 58 29 a3 7b 4d 3b 3f 03 06 46 a6 04 63 | CERT 71 0d e1 59 4f 9c ec 3a 17 24 8d 91 6a a8 e2 da | CERT 57 41 de f4 ff 65 bf f6 11 34 d3 7d 5a 7f 6e 3a | CERT 3b 74 3c 51 2b e4 bf ce 6b b2 14 47 26 52 f5 57 | CERT 28 bc c5 fb f9 bc 2d 4e b9 f8 46 54 c7 95 41 a7 | CERT a4 b4 d3 b3 fe 55 4b df f5 c3 78 39 8b 4e 04 57 | CERT c0 1d 5b 17 3c 28 eb 40 9d 1d 7c b3 bb 0f f0 63 | CERT c7 c0 84 b0 4e e4 a9 7c c5 4b 08 43 a6 2d 00 22 | CERT fd 98 d4 03 d0 ad 97 85 d1 48 15 d3 e4 e5 2d 46 | CERT 7c ab 41 97 05 27 61 77 3d b6 b1 58 a0 5f e0 8d | CERT 26 84 9b 03 20 ce 5e 27 7f 7d 14 03 b6 9d 6b 9f | CERT fd 0c d4 c7 2d eb be ea 62 87 fa 99 e0 a6 1c 85 | CERT 4f 34 da 93 2e 5f db 03 10 58 a8 c4 99 17 2d b1 | CERT bc e5 7b bd af 0e 28 aa a5 74 ea 69 74 5e fa 2c | CERT c3 00 3c 2f 58 d0 20 cf e3 46 8d de aa f9 f7 30 | CERT 5c 16 05 04 89 4c 92 9b 8a 33 11 70 83 17 58 24 | CERT 2a 4b ab be b6 ec 84 9c 78 9c 11 04 2a 02 ce 27 | CERT 83 a1 1f 2b 38 3f 27 7d 46 94 63 ff 64 59 4e 6c | CERT 87 ca 3e e6 31 df 1e 7d 48 88 02 c7 9d fa 4a d7 | CERT f2 5b a5 fd 7f 1b c6 dc 1a bb a6 c4 f8 32 cd bf | CERT a7 0b 71 8b 2b 31 41 17 25 a4 18 52 7d 32 fc 0f | CERT 5f b8 bb ca e1 94 1a 42 4d 1f 37 16 67 84 ae b4 | CERT 32 42 9c 5a 91 71 62 b4 4b 07 02 03 01 00 01 a3 | CERT 82 01 06 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 | CERT 30 00 30 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 73 74 40 | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b 06 03 55 | CERT 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 | CERT 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 06 08 2b | CERT 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 03 55 1d | CERT 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c 68 74 74 | CERT 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | CERT 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 2f 72 65 | CERT 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 | CERT 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 3a 56 a3 7d | CERT b1 4e 62 2f 82 0d e3 fe 74 40 ef cb eb 93 ea ad | CERT e4 74 8b 80 6f ae 8b 65 87 12 a6 24 0d 21 9c 5f | CERT 70 5c 6f d9 66 8d 98 8b ea 59 f8 96 52 6a 6c 86 | CERT d6 7d ba 37 a9 8c 33 8c 77 18 23 0b 1b 2a 66 47 | CERT e7 95 94 e6 75 84 30 d4 db b8 23 eb 89 82 a9 fd | CERT ed 46 8b ce 46 7f f9 19 8f 49 da 29 2e 1e 97 cd | CERT 12 42 86 c7 57 fc 4f 0a 19 26 8a a1 0d 26 81 4d | CERT 53 f4 5c 92 a1 03 03 8d 6c 51 33 cc | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Payload: 1265 | CHILD SA proposals received | going to assemble AUTH payload | ****emit IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' value 47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Authentication Payload (39:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | #1 spent 9.12 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() calling sign_hash_RSA() | emitting 384 raw bytes of rsa signature into IKEv2 Authentication Payload | rsa signature 03 e5 a5 f8 d4 3b ce b3 b8 59 8f f0 30 85 41 49 | rsa signature df ab 68 27 84 12 45 a2 e3 da 80 af d7 fc dd 95 | rsa signature de c2 01 bf 12 66 72 d2 a5 4a a5 81 a3 27 b3 2e | rsa signature b5 88 a1 12 43 d6 06 8c 7d 5c 6c 4c 20 4e 85 95 | rsa signature c3 51 9b 22 42 b4 50 f0 6b c1 e3 4e 6e 4e 10 15 | rsa signature 17 c2 5f 47 e3 1d 23 59 89 0c f1 a3 b9 d6 af c8 | rsa signature b9 03 13 42 8f 1c 2b 91 6d 0f ed c3 fc 13 63 96 | rsa signature 19 3b a6 d5 6d e3 eb 88 e3 2c 7d 67 b1 44 16 6c | rsa signature 12 8d 78 37 04 05 d9 5b 2e 00 68 31 cb 68 67 f0 | rsa signature 41 cc c4 55 88 7e ec e7 e4 21 90 74 b0 eb 0c 22 | rsa signature 65 c9 32 42 3e 90 da 8e ce 9e a5 16 f3 dc 4c 2b | rsa signature 37 8f 11 e5 83 98 7b fd fa 2d 5d a8 69 83 b6 02 | rsa signature ee b4 51 c0 e6 6e 96 ee 46 67 2b 73 2c cb b0 94 | rsa signature 80 66 ba 1e 1d 41 8d 8e 20 72 13 e1 51 b7 3f 9d | rsa signature b0 c0 36 24 74 ed 4d 79 32 8b 53 17 1c 9c 78 b6 | rsa signature fc f2 b3 94 52 ab 64 a8 65 da bc de fc 40 fb 55 | rsa signature 19 a6 a1 01 03 a0 04 dc 97 de 14 9f e6 bf 7d 86 | rsa signature 21 e9 5a 32 59 fc 4a fe 3b d7 44 c4 27 d7 e2 c5 | rsa signature 19 e4 66 b7 78 91 61 9c da 16 00 f7 50 a7 39 e0 | rsa signature 2e 38 57 fa eb 17 fc 1f 32 f9 92 2b c7 12 4f 62 | rsa signature 8a 47 2f 51 15 02 32 2a 32 63 03 f5 25 b1 b9 10 | rsa signature a7 d1 d4 a6 1a 93 e7 d1 1d f9 23 5a fa 27 ba 7d | rsa signature 76 aa bb 91 a0 23 d5 59 a6 1b 34 4c a2 07 e8 00 | rsa signature b1 10 95 07 52 3d f9 34 74 08 dc f9 68 7e f2 56 | #1 spent 9.24 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() | emitting length of IKEv2 Authentication Payload: 392 | request lease from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 reference count 2 thatid '' that.client.addr 192.1.2.254 | cannot share a lease, find a new lease IP | New lease from addresspool index 0 | new lease 100.64.0.1 from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 to that.client.addr 192.1.2.254 thatid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | creating state object #2 at 0x563febdb5e98 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #2 in UNDEFINED | pstats #2 ikev2.child started | duplicating state object #1 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 as #2 for IPSEC SA | #2 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:4500 from #1.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | Message ID: init_child #1.#2; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: switch-from #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: switch-to #1.#2 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | Send Configuration Payload reply | ****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REPLY (0x2) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' value 33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Configuration Payload (47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS (0x1) | emitting 4 raw bytes of Internal IP Address into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | Internal IP Address 64 40 00 01 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (0x3) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP4_DNS into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | IP4_DNS 01 02 03 04 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (0x3) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP4_DNS into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | IP4_DNS 08 08 08 08 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload: 32 | constructing ESP/AH proposals with all DH removed for rw (IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals) | converting proposal AES_GCM_16_256-NONE to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal AES_GCM_16_128-NONE to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254: constructed local ESP/AH proposals for rw (IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals): 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | Comparing remote proposals against IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 0b 81 14 eb | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 1 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 2 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 3 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 4 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: ENCR+ESN; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+ESN transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH; matched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 0b 81 14 eb | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 0b 81 14 eb | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 0b 81 14 eb | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #1: proposal 1:ESP:SPI=0b8114eb;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED chosen from remote proposals 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED[first-match] 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED | IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals ikev2_proposal: 1:ESP:SPI=0b8114eb;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x12a719d6 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ****emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | emitting 4 raw bytes of our spi into IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload | our spi 12 a7 19 d6 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | *******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 32 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload (44:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 start 64 40 00 01 | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 end 64 40 00 01 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: 24 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload (45:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 start c0 00 02 00 | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 end c0 00 02 ff | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: 24 | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | integ=none: .key_size=0 encrypt=aes_gcm_16: .key_size=32 .salt_size=4 keymat_len=36 | uniqueIDs disabled, not contemplating releasing older self | install_ipsec_sa() for #2: inbound and outbound | could_route called for rw (kind=CK_INSTANCE) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.b8114eb@192.1.2.254 included non-error error | set up outgoing SA, ref=0/0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.12a719d6@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | priority calculation of connection "rw" is 0xfe7df | add inbound eroute 100.64.0.1/32:0 --0-> 192.0.2.0/24:0 => tun.10000@192.1.2.23 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042399 | raw_eroute result=success | set up incoming SA, ref=0/0 | sr for #2: unrouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL | route_and_eroute with c: rw (next: none) ero:null esr:{(nil)} ro:null rosr:{(nil)} and state: #2 | priority calculation of connection "rw" is 0xfe7df | eroute_connection add eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 100.64.0.1/32:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.254 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042399 | raw_eroute result=success | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb up | command executing up-client | executing up-client: PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_I | popen cmd is 1190 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE: | cmd( 80):='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.te: | cmd( 160):sting.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2: | cmd( 240):.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0': | cmd( 320): PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_: | cmd( 400):ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testin: | cmd( 480):g.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.: | cmd( 560):1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255: | cmd( 640):' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netk: | cmd( 720):ey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+I: | cmd( 800):KEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INST: | cmd( 880):ANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_: | cmd( 960):PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SERVER: | cmd(1040):='1' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='no' : | cmd(1120):VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xb8114eb SPI_OUT=0x12a719d6 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb prepare | command executing prepare-client | executing prepare-client: PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEE | popen cmd is 1195 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='prepare-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTE: | cmd( 80):RFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@ea: | cmd( 160):st.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='19: | cmd( 240):2.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCO: | cmd( 320):L='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_: | cmd( 400):PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.t: | cmd( 480):esting.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.: | cmd( 560):64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.25: | cmd( 640):5.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK=: | cmd( 720):'netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_AL: | cmd( 800):LOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK: | cmd( 880):_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' P: | cmd( 960):LUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_S: | cmd(1040):ERVER='1' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING=: | cmd(1120):'no' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xb8114eb SPI_OUT=0x12a719d6 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | running updown command "ipsec _updown" for verb route | command executing route-client | executing route-client: PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERFACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PEER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_INSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DO | popen cmd is 1193 chars long | cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='route-client' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='rw' PLUTO_INTERF: | cmd( 80):ACE='eth1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_ME='192.1.2.23' PLUTO_MY_ID='@east: | cmd( 160):.testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='192.0.2.0/24' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='192.: | cmd( 240):0.2.0' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.0' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL=: | cmd( 320):'0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16392' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='192.1.2.254' PLUTO_PE: | cmd( 400):ER_ID='C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.tes: | cmd( 480):ting.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='100.64: | cmd( 560):.0.1/32' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='100.64.0.1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='255.255.255.: | cmd( 640):255' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='n: | cmd( 720):etkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLO: | cmd( 800):W+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO' PLUTO_CONN_KIND='CK_I: | cmd( 880):NSTANCE' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv4' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLU: | cmd( 960):TO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_CFG_SER: | cmd(1040):VER='1' PLUTO_CFG_CLIENT='0' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' VTI_IFACE='' VTI_ROUTING='n: | cmd(1120):o' VTI_SHARED='no' SPI_IN=0xb8114eb SPI_OUT=0x12a719d6 ipsec _updown 2>&1: | route_and_eroute: instance "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, setting eroute_owner {spd=0x563febd97ed8,sr=0x563febd97ed8} to #2 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) | #1 spent 1.93 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH: instance rw[1], setting IKEv2 newest_ipsec_sa to #2 (was #0) (spd.eroute=#2) cloned from #1 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 1836 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 1864 | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK (0x2e) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 1864 (0x748) | **parse IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1836 (0x72c) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 25 00 00 22 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f | cleartext fragment 72 67 27 00 04 f1 04 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 | cleartext fragment 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 | cleartext fragment 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c | cleartext fragment 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 | cleartext fragment 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 | cleartext fragment 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 | cleartext fragment 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 | cleartext fragment 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 | cleartext fragment 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 38 32 | cleartext fragment 34 30 39 30 37 35 33 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 38 | cleartext fragment 32 33 30 39 30 37 35 33 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 | cleartext fragment 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 | cleartext fragment 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 | cleartext fragment 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f 00 30 82 | cleartext fragment 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b1 1e 7c b3 bf 11 96 94 23 | cleartext fragment ca 97 5e c7 66 36 55 71 49 95 8d 0c 2a 5c 30 4d | cleartext fragment 58 29 a3 7b 4d 3b 3f 03 06 46 a6 04 63 71 0d e1 | cleartext fragment 59 4f 9c ec 3a 17 24 8d 91 6a a8 e2 da 57 41 de | cleartext fragment f4 ff 65 bf f6 11 34 d3 7d 5a 7f 6e 3a 3b 74 3c | cleartext fragment 51 2b e4 bf ce 6b b2 14 47 26 52 f5 57 28 bc c5 | cleartext fragment fb f9 bc 2d 4e b9 f8 46 54 c7 95 41 a7 a4 b4 d3 | cleartext fragment b3 fe 55 4b df f5 c3 78 39 8b 4e 04 57 c0 1d 5b | cleartext fragment 17 3c 28 eb 40 9d 1d 7c b3 bb 0f f0 63 c7 c0 84 | cleartext fragment b0 4e e4 a9 7c c5 4b 08 43 a6 2d 00 22 fd 98 d4 | cleartext fragment 03 d0 ad 97 85 d1 48 15 d3 e4 e5 2d 46 7c ab 41 | cleartext fragment 97 05 27 61 77 3d b6 b1 58 a0 5f e0 8d 26 84 9b | cleartext fragment 03 20 ce 5e 27 7f 7d 14 03 b6 9d 6b 9f fd 0c d4 | cleartext fragment c7 2d eb be ea 62 87 fa 99 e0 a6 1c 85 4f 34 da | cleartext fragment 93 2e 5f db 03 10 58 a8 c4 99 17 2d b1 bc e5 7b | cleartext fragment bd af 0e 28 aa a5 74 ea 69 74 5e fa 2c c3 00 3c | cleartext fragment 2f 58 d0 20 cf e3 46 8d de aa f9 f7 30 5c 16 05 | cleartext fragment 04 89 4c 92 9b 8a 33 11 70 83 17 58 24 2a 4b ab | cleartext fragment be b6 ec 84 9c 78 9c 11 04 2a 02 ce 27 83 a1 1f | cleartext fragment 2b 38 3f 27 7d 46 94 63 ff 64 59 4e 6c 87 ca 3e | cleartext fragment e6 31 df 1e 7d 48 88 02 c7 9d fa 4a d7 f2 5b a5 | cleartext fragment fd 7f 1b c6 dc 1a bb a6 c4 f8 32 cd bf a7 0b 71 | cleartext fragment 8b 2b 31 41 17 25 a4 18 52 7d 32 fc 0f 5f b8 bb | cleartext fragment ca e1 94 1a 42 4d 1f 37 16 67 84 ae b4 32 42 9c | cleartext fragment 5a 91 71 62 b4 4b 07 02 03 01 00 01 a3 82 01 06 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 30 00 30 | cleartext fragment 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 61 73 74 | cleartext fragment 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 | cleartext fragment 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 | cleartext fragment 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e | cleartext fragment 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 1d 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c | cleartext fragment 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 2f 72 65 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 | cleartext fragment 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 3a | cleartext fragment 56 a3 7d b1 4e 62 2f 82 0d e3 fe 74 40 ef cb eb | cleartext fragment 93 ea ad e4 74 8b 80 6f ae 8b 65 87 12 a6 24 0d | cleartext fragment 21 9c 5f 70 5c 6f d9 66 8d 98 8b ea 59 f8 96 52 | cleartext fragment 6a 6c 86 d6 7d ba 37 a9 8c 33 8c 77 18 23 0b 1b | cleartext fragment 2a 66 47 e7 95 94 e6 75 84 30 d4 db b8 23 eb 89 | cleartext fragment 82 a9 fd ed 46 8b ce 46 7f f9 19 8f 49 da 29 2e | cleartext fragment 1e 97 cd 12 42 86 c7 57 fc 4f 0a 19 26 8a a1 0d | cleartext fragment 26 81 4d 53 f4 5c 92 a1 03 03 8d 6c 51 33 cc 2f | cleartext fragment 00 01 88 01 00 00 00 03 e5 a5 f8 d4 3b ce b3 b8 | cleartext fragment 59 8f f0 30 85 41 49 df ab 68 27 84 12 45 a2 e3 | cleartext fragment da 80 af d7 fc dd 95 de c2 01 bf 12 66 72 d2 a5 | cleartext fragment 4a a5 81 a3 27 b3 2e b5 88 a1 12 43 d6 06 8c 7d | cleartext fragment 5c 6c 4c 20 4e 85 95 c3 51 9b 22 42 b4 50 f0 6b | cleartext fragment c1 e3 4e 6e 4e 10 15 17 c2 5f 47 e3 1d 23 59 89 | cleartext fragment 0c f1 a3 b9 d6 af c8 b9 03 13 42 8f 1c 2b 91 6d | cleartext fragment 0f ed c3 fc 13 63 96 19 3b a6 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b | responder cookie: | 5a 6d 8d 92 0d 68 f6 f0 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 385 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment d5 6d e3 eb 88 e3 2c 7d 67 b1 44 16 6c 12 8d 78 | cleartext fragment 37 04 05 d9 5b 2e 00 68 31 cb 68 67 f0 41 cc c4 | cleartext fragment 55 88 7e ec e7 e4 21 90 74 b0 eb 0c 22 65 c9 32 | cleartext fragment 42 3e 90 da 8e ce 9e a5 16 f3 dc 4c 2b 37 8f 11 | cleartext fragment e5 83 98 7b fd fa 2d 5d a8 69 83 b6 02 ee b4 51 | cleartext fragment c0 e6 6e 96 ee 46 67 2b 73 2c cb b0 94 80 66 ba | cleartext fragment 1e 1d 41 8d 8e 20 72 13 e1 51 b7 3f 9d b0 c0 36 | cleartext fragment 24 74 ed 4d 79 32 8b 53 17 1c 9c 78 b6 fc f2 b3 | cleartext fragment 94 52 ab 64 a8 65 da bc de fc 40 fb 55 19 a6 a1 | cleartext fragment 01 03 a0 04 dc 97 de 14 9f e6 bf 7d 86 21 e9 5a | cleartext fragment 32 59 fc 4a fe 3b d7 44 c4 27 d7 e2 c5 19 e4 66 | cleartext fragment b7 78 91 61 9c da 16 00 f7 50 a7 39 e0 2e 38 57 | cleartext fragment fa eb 17 fc 1f 32 f9 92 2b c7 12 4f 62 8a 47 2f | cleartext fragment 51 15 02 32 2a 32 63 03 f5 25 b1 b9 10 a7 d1 d4 | cleartext fragment a6 1a 93 e7 d1 1d f9 23 5a fa 27 ba 7d 76 aa bb | cleartext fragment 91 a0 23 d5 59 a6 1b 34 4c a2 07 e8 00 b1 10 95 | cleartext fragment 07 52 3d f9 34 74 08 dc f9 68 7e f2 56 21 00 00 | cleartext fragment 20 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 64 40 00 01 00 03 00 | cleartext fragment 04 01 02 03 04 00 03 00 04 08 08 08 08 2c 00 00 | cleartext fragment 24 00 00 00 20 01 03 04 02 12 a7 19 d6 03 00 00 | cleartext fragment 0c 01 00 00 14 80 0e 01 00 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 | cleartext fragment 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff | cleartext fragment ff 64 40 00 01 64 40 00 01 00 00 00 18 01 00 00 | cleartext fragment 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff c0 00 02 00 c0 00 02 | cleartext fragment ff | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 418 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 446 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_OK | #1 spent 18.3 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | suspend processing: state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | start processing: state #2 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #2 complete_v2_state_transition() md.from_state=PARENT_R1 md.svm.state[from]=PARENT_R1 UNDEFINED->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R1 to state STATE_V2_IPSEC_R | child state #2: UNDEFINED(ignore) => V2_IPSEC_R(established CHILD SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #2 to 1 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1.#2 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0->1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: sent #1.#2 response 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0->1 responder.recv=1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 | pstats #2 ikev2.child established "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #2: negotiated connection [192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255:0-65535 0] -> [100.64.0.1-100.64.0.1:0-65535 0] | NAT-T: NAT Traversal detected - their IKE port is '500' | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #2: STATE_V2_IPSEC_R: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP/NAT=>0x0b8114eb <0x12a719d6 xfrm=AES_GCM_16_256-NONE NATOA=none NATD=192.1.2.254:4500 DPD=passive} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:4500 (from 192.1.2.23:4500) | sending fragments ... | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 | 0d 68 f6 f0 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 24 00 01 fb 00 01 00 04 af 98 52 64 05 82 0c cb | be 79 07 e1 49 2e 8f 47 67 c9 e0 b8 fc c9 f7 ea | 3d 5d 82 8a e1 a0 b7 4d 7c ec 48 49 f1 fa ba d9 | f9 74 e9 2c 5a 49 64 b8 cd fa 02 e5 90 14 90 2f | 80 17 b3 6e b7 52 2d 5c 5a d2 69 5d 63 c0 e0 39 | 94 93 c6 ec ac 92 11 1b 53 55 e2 a2 cb ee ab 23 | c1 94 ca 55 58 ed b5 6d d9 97 c1 8f b4 d5 15 af | 88 7b 91 71 27 ad c5 2e 96 37 f5 a9 9e d6 27 89 | 66 30 a3 8f 36 7e 16 51 d7 e4 7b 24 5a d4 ee 97 | b6 3d 81 56 a5 62 2a 3d 3e 95 f7 b3 35 8d 7f f8 | 8f 6c 99 f0 c1 bb 1a 97 1c 4d 0d 31 ab f9 e9 f7 | 3e c0 7a 4b b3 21 fb b5 5f 4e 48 39 ef 45 24 a6 | 61 58 6a 21 a0 b3 35 b3 59 4e a0 f2 63 d0 12 0d | 69 81 6f f5 90 8f 00 56 75 68 f6 0f fd 80 fa 1a | ff ed 90 f6 0b c9 9a 47 ff ba e5 07 b7 db 0d 58 | 55 64 a6 c3 63 1b 3c 63 e0 7f 32 6e f0 5b fc 2f | 72 1b ea 68 9c b7 4d be 27 5b 08 54 80 a8 e9 f7 | 90 d5 62 3f 25 af 37 57 32 fe ec 61 93 f9 62 60 | ca 66 fb 02 8a e7 cc 42 f3 0a 4b ee 75 06 42 41 | 92 a4 2e 07 dc ff c3 9f 85 d8 00 c4 f6 13 b7 a4 | d7 de 5d 99 0a dd 57 06 76 33 3b 45 06 1a f9 94 | 73 df 92 d8 81 2e 40 05 05 82 45 94 cb 2c ea e4 | 30 69 ab 9f 8c 59 9c a7 95 9b bb ae 8d 2b 71 ac | c8 50 15 2a 58 f1 dd 1b 6f 01 95 a4 29 ce 8e c7 | 1c e8 94 1d af 51 10 a9 d7 fc 66 07 d8 41 73 24 | 82 89 0c 2f 6a 0f 80 cb 5c 23 17 e1 89 bd 42 a8 | 59 5d 20 50 67 b4 d4 86 3f 32 c1 bf ba 1a f6 b1 | d5 ee cd 10 96 5e 8b 5d 57 82 fa e8 ac 29 c7 cc | 91 d2 e6 41 85 2e ac 03 52 a6 35 95 a2 00 70 fa | 79 e6 02 10 53 d4 4d a6 7e de a2 62 cd 0c ce f6 | ef 3b 44 0b fe 8f 11 05 e3 80 fe cf 98 75 e9 38 | 22 3f bb ee da 8e 55 44 91 b2 52 | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 | 0d 68 f6 f0 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 02 00 04 1c 62 8d 59 1a 7c f5 1b | f3 2c db fd 9c 7e 35 32 eb a2 09 47 de 24 6b 8d | a2 29 b5 dd e6 10 0e a4 b7 a1 e0 57 91 9d b5 58 | 58 4a 7e 56 70 6c c2 5e 67 0b 5e e8 e0 63 ca 94 | ad 3c 4c f2 c8 0c 84 46 94 0f 49 f5 60 b4 ff c3 | 19 5e 7d 93 66 e1 f7 6e e1 76 fc 65 c3 a7 91 ff | 2d 5c 99 11 c5 47 10 65 5e c4 a2 d6 4a 6e f4 c6 | 60 7a a9 71 6a 60 09 33 91 7d 43 14 c2 4e dd 96 | 73 dd 13 1f 26 8c 9e 59 34 35 de d6 86 4b 9e 32 | e4 f9 56 04 53 03 f9 79 b1 b0 3f bb 34 41 4d 4e | 7c df fa c8 8b 01 b0 f8 7b ba 47 a9 4e 1d 97 dc | e2 1d 66 19 db 8c fc 7c 0f 3d cc 41 c6 21 9f 4d | 5d d2 8b 9e 1a 77 f6 66 46 d5 71 23 fb 50 4d d1 | 7c 4e c0 15 eb 61 f6 1a 2f 90 46 65 4d d3 27 66 | ba 71 71 5d 79 14 14 6b a5 fe 8f 49 a4 a6 0c a1 | 1f 53 2c 30 ca 38 24 be 57 16 d2 81 2e 61 aa de | 87 af fb a1 9a 92 54 6c fb d7 9e 57 45 3b 8e fa | da 3f e5 d0 78 b2 a4 8a 35 e7 f3 e2 e1 32 b4 5a | 92 6a 56 7a ed fb 3e c0 ab 68 97 aa 98 bf 30 dd | f4 9c 37 27 09 33 27 01 1c a4 31 bf 70 80 7a 0f | dd 07 e5 9c b7 72 5b 8d ea 94 5e 73 5d c5 8f dd | 8e 16 03 97 22 b0 eb 73 17 0b d3 31 08 23 b9 12 | bf ae fa e1 0d 9a c8 99 06 73 6c 04 90 11 dd 8e | 18 49 2e f2 d3 8b 63 7b ac 04 a6 f2 ed 53 26 5b | b5 70 bc 28 cd 92 ea 7d b3 69 a3 e7 71 7a 6f 48 | da e6 11 d6 cd 2a cf a6 4a ee 37 18 30 26 6d ca | 3e 88 05 20 0e 3e 34 83 97 05 07 6d 27 f2 aa 94 | cc dc 88 a1 c4 85 5a 22 b1 2f 84 e3 b7 df b3 95 | f4 f4 fe 9a 43 a4 88 e1 a4 ec ea 41 ae 0f 5e 21 | 9f 92 75 6f 86 d4 a4 f8 55 5e 0f 8e bf c7 6a 80 | 52 3a df d3 9e f3 11 8f 78 e8 01 f5 eb 31 2f 9c | bf 81 88 53 89 2c dc 1b db 5f de | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 | 0d 68 f6 f0 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 03 00 04 e4 84 f4 ec a3 c5 79 47 | 37 e0 53 5b d6 5d 12 b0 d1 e6 04 35 69 f8 a3 52 | 0f ff ac 46 fe 5f 4f 54 cf 3a f9 44 0e 6d 12 89 | 38 a1 8f 64 2d e0 ed 21 8e ec aa cf a4 35 82 00 | 24 e7 d7 55 db 43 c7 2c 59 fd 8b 8f da 2b fe cd | 75 da 3e 6b 79 6e 82 0d 39 8e 94 eb 97 06 d6 c4 | 7c ae 6b a4 d6 f7 20 1c 80 f1 35 05 6f 47 9c b5 | 94 1b 12 93 6c eb 20 76 2c 06 d1 61 b6 dc 43 71 | 87 80 e0 e8 44 a6 89 20 89 f8 d3 dc 86 3f 60 76 | 07 84 68 ae c5 0c 61 9d 13 e4 b4 ed ba b7 42 2c | 0f a2 79 db a2 60 0f a3 0f 8d e6 95 cc e8 f9 df | 5e 72 e6 6e c2 8e b9 f1 6c 99 ed eb c6 1a 1b db | 87 4f e4 d6 81 db c6 a2 1d 43 70 42 e0 ea 21 c1 | af e5 9f ea b8 79 da 62 d4 01 60 5c 2a 49 77 be | d5 42 84 98 52 28 f7 28 07 44 5e c7 a5 c6 2a cf | 28 86 b1 61 fe 9f 0e 37 05 2b 0a 2d 18 35 14 4e | 0e 85 2a 9d f1 ce 9b 70 f2 3c 44 16 4b 8a 09 79 | fe 59 85 1f d4 f8 ff cc 27 e9 0e b9 b8 14 bb 60 | c3 11 82 40 c2 12 79 05 2a 09 19 53 92 58 db c0 | 11 0b 81 96 3a 2f 1e 4e bb ee 84 09 43 d4 f9 8b | 09 d6 08 bf 86 d0 19 58 77 14 ae ca cc 42 d3 e3 | 46 de 14 37 28 c8 aa bd c5 69 2a 8a bb 61 62 c6 | 09 22 8d a5 75 f6 c4 fc 11 f7 0f 5c ae 8c fb 2a | fb 8b 8d b9 3d 93 77 4a e1 d7 b3 09 7e b4 43 22 | 77 34 5d d3 52 3f 7a 50 a7 dd da 89 44 3d 04 a8 | 54 44 2b f2 8d 3b 21 de ba 64 c2 c4 ea 72 11 2d | 77 32 71 1c 9d 1f 0d 5b 14 81 e5 8a f4 47 05 03 | b8 5d 57 c5 3a 86 2c 3e 81 50 70 66 f0 d1 cb 2f | 04 06 a6 b6 c0 4a 5b a8 54 25 07 fa 9a fd 48 ad | d1 99 bd 37 2a 9e 54 dc ca 49 fe 8d 65 d0 c1 6e | 51 c1 fd 1d e6 e1 3e af 64 4b d4 d2 6f 29 74 22 | ca 3e fa 98 a8 79 da 86 9f 07 ba | sending 450 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:4500 (using #1) | 00 00 00 00 80 49 45 bb fe 44 4c 6b 5a 6d 8d 92 | 0d 68 f6 f0 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 be | 00 00 01 a2 00 04 00 04 39 09 cb 1e c8 e6 dc e9 | 3b d7 46 c3 a9 e9 4b 33 16 84 06 f4 9f e9 75 5e | 25 2f bd 2f e2 b6 39 71 b3 0a fe 8d 93 8c 6c 52 | 9c eb 39 77 e9 ad 6a 18 c7 9b f0 2b b7 07 ee 75 | b0 25 e1 da 2f 73 f2 c6 83 3b 71 c3 05 0d af 05 | 97 2a 21 a2 03 db 8c 93 08 cf d6 48 df 8b 50 a8 | c3 ea 42 e8 2f b4 32 73 0c 99 f6 11 ed 6e 26 41 | 0d fb 8b 63 7a 69 e0 17 a5 ec 48 ef 29 e6 34 bc | 68 f0 8b 7f 15 15 5f 79 bd 6e 4c ab df 79 c6 26 | b9 71 f0 bf f8 45 a2 11 cb c6 51 88 98 d8 6d e9 | bc 36 77 50 2a a5 84 ac f2 46 2f 84 29 4e eb 90 | 22 f9 e4 22 5c ed 23 32 74 71 a5 3a 40 1e 7c 5f | 51 a7 03 a6 b6 9d 9e a0 0d 06 1e 64 e9 a3 f9 1b | cf 46 22 fe 33 be 7b e8 aa eb 32 74 fc bc b9 1a | 1d 14 30 9d b4 31 49 79 87 05 4d 02 f8 9a ab ca | 95 8b 97 f0 b9 ef 73 91 cf 7b 1b 9b 76 72 dd 6e | 33 46 26 12 49 61 10 e9 14 dc ed 37 b0 96 3d cb | 33 c3 52 e2 b8 ef cc 02 68 3b e3 60 67 66 2d 8a | 05 05 e0 9f 05 0e c7 3a 69 5f bb f1 ec 09 03 c5 | 8c 46 27 83 74 4b 05 c2 55 52 25 d8 2d 0c 04 94 | 7f e5 84 b3 c8 ec 1c c3 3d ae 0c ae 54 5f 53 6b | 9e 0c e3 03 80 58 19 e4 90 f2 b2 85 8e 5b 5b 17 | a0 8a 7a fc fc bc 1f e1 c6 1f 50 f7 c6 f7 79 a3 | d3 08 09 02 76 63 90 ed 45 af b7 0b af 1d 52 78 | 10 04 c0 92 8a 67 06 6f df c8 b4 f0 f4 e5 2e af | fa 57 cd f1 8e a9 2a 1e 10 cc 64 b2 e8 bc 10 cc | f8 63 | sent 4 fragments | releasing whack for #2 (sock=fd@-1) | releasing whack and unpending for parent #1 | unpending state #1 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | #2 will start re-keying in 28530 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x7fa738002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 28530 seconds for #2 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febda23f8 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 18.8 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #2 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:4500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa730000f48 | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00324 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00189 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.00186 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | spent 0.00336 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.254:473 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 c5 fc 33 92 ea 38 12 33 | 1b 83 0f 92 e3 73 f3 f5 6d c1 67 8a b0 87 9e cc | c0 e5 23 bc 19 9f 86 ee ed 1f e6 8c 1c bd 1c e9 | 67 42 5a eb 96 08 9f 87 c2 23 65 ce 6d a4 f7 0d | 35 c3 72 94 e4 de 0a 67 ad d0 b3 57 d4 da e6 3b | e4 04 de a9 ed 36 8d 1c d5 4f c8 9e 9a 77 a8 29 | 53 8c 87 81 8a 27 63 e0 e6 8f 30 5f 13 12 d5 8b | ef 4e 02 d3 d6 36 2e 7b 06 a4 3d 86 3e 90 4d 04 | 93 9f cc dc c6 cf 74 7c c2 5a 18 e6 3a a4 0b d3 | 00 c6 8d 20 de d2 3f 87 19 28 57 bc 91 3c 21 b5 | 5f 00 9d 85 dc 1c 41 9e 8a 83 76 73 c7 2e 17 85 | fe 1f 85 48 e9 39 b8 05 7b e1 77 95 3e 32 1a 50 | 1c cf d0 49 99 80 9b df 7d 6c 8c 72 ed 0f 2e ee | 97 b9 84 04 8e 59 07 8b 22 4a a9 2d db ba ed 3c | 39 5c eb 60 3b 7b 22 89 5e 32 f9 13 dd 55 4b fc | b6 0d ce e7 52 52 b6 9a 81 23 0e 93 89 ce 27 4d | 4b a7 93 65 d3 42 37 5b 29 00 00 24 27 4f 35 d5 | 27 78 35 a7 71 46 96 b1 77 15 c9 b0 69 b5 33 41 | aa fb 26 fd c8 28 b9 fa 4d 32 ac 00 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 fe 06 26 3e | a4 b9 7e 55 15 1b 43 ce d1 29 ba 53 b5 70 a2 a3 | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 84 b3 5d 15 81 c0 63 9e | 39 16 8c c8 ba 56 7c bc cb db 8a 81 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:473 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:473 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.254:473 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_ALLOW_NARROWING+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (rw) | find_next_host_connection returns rw[1] 192.1.2.254 | found connection: rw[1] 192.1.2.254 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #3 at 0x563febd9e738 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #3 in UNDEFINED | pstats #3 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #3: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #3: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #3; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #3 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #3 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #3 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | using existing local IKE proposals for connection rw (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 84 b3 5d 15 81 c0 63 9e 39 16 8c c8 ba 56 7c bc | natd_hash: hash= cb db 8a 81 | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port=473 | natd_hash: hash= b8 e1 76 91 cd ce e3 24 91 53 52 06 bb dc 4a db | natd_hash: hash= bf 50 21 bb | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is behind NAT 192.1.2.254 | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.254 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 3 for state #3 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa730000f48 size 128 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x563febd2a2a8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febd939f8 size 128 | #3 spent 0.831 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | crypto helper 2 resuming | crypto helper 2 starting work-order 3 for state #3 | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #3 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #3 and saving MD | #3 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 1.3 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:473 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.31 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 2 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 3 | crypto helper 2 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 3 time elapsed 0.001051 seconds | (#3) spent 1 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 3: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 2 sending results from work-order 3 for state #3 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa734002888 size 128 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #3 | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 2 replies to request ID 3 | calling continuation function 0x563feb00db50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #3: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x 95 f5 ba a9 8f 6b a0 9a 59 00 f5 f3 4a c8 f6 57 | ikev2 g^x 76 00 10 5e 04 e5 71 9a 2a 08 40 98 53 98 4a e0 | ikev2 g^x 0a 42 01 41 3e 23 72 23 d4 c8 9c d5 5b 51 43 cb | ikev2 g^x 34 53 2c 28 61 b9 96 71 50 74 c5 ae 85 6d 7a 58 | ikev2 g^x 3f 7a 88 70 af e6 c5 0c 57 8d dc b8 35 ad 38 32 | ikev2 g^x a6 66 03 70 a7 12 65 13 70 6c 02 ce 53 02 bb 9c | ikev2 g^x 4b 41 d2 55 55 12 62 16 8e d3 b0 8d b2 ca b3 0c | ikev2 g^x 94 5b 71 3e bd e1 6b 50 f5 0c 8e 14 6d 12 8a b6 | ikev2 g^x 05 0d 2a e4 e6 af ca cf 43 35 a4 91 ac f7 59 23 | ikev2 g^x 8d 49 2e 30 19 5d fc 84 a6 a9 4f e1 36 24 8a 1c | ikev2 g^x 4c f5 77 d3 e0 62 cf 35 de 2b 2d 83 58 0d 71 57 | ikev2 g^x 8a ec 74 a9 03 ea 4b 70 53 4d ea 54 fd 23 41 04 | ikev2 g^x 38 15 5b c6 c2 f2 8d 33 70 0c 70 2c 30 92 7c 5c | ikev2 g^x e8 24 36 8b 61 e3 97 9c 24 e3 04 5e 87 2c fb f5 | ikev2 g^x 78 19 ea 46 8a 4b 8d b0 c2 be 41 d0 35 d7 8d 5c | ikev2 g^x ad ae e1 83 78 02 a1 e2 ec ba ca b0 06 80 f4 dc | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 19 8f d2 3d 51 6b 57 7e 4c a5 11 07 93 be d4 d1 | IKEv2 nonce fd fb b2 a4 cb be b5 db 73 be 13 b6 25 1e 8d 99 | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | natd_hash: rcookie= c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= b0 09 60 78 a8 72 37 bb 9d 32 12 7c fc 34 80 06 | natd_hash: hash= fc 60 db 72 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data b0 09 60 78 a8 72 37 bb 9d 32 12 7c fc 34 80 06 | Notify data fc 60 db 72 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x563feb0e2800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | natd_hash: rcookie= c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 fe | natd_hash: port=473 | natd_hash: hash= ec 7a f9 c6 17 a4 37 f5 52 09 79 7d 37 f3 75 4c | natd_hash: hash= dc f8 40 c0 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data ec 7a f9 c6 17 a4 37 f5 52 09 79 7d 37 f3 75 4c | Notify data dc f8 40 c0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #3 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #3: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #3 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #3 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #3 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:473 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.254:473 (using #3) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 95 f5 ba a9 | 8f 6b a0 9a 59 00 f5 f3 4a c8 f6 57 76 00 10 5e | 04 e5 71 9a 2a 08 40 98 53 98 4a e0 0a 42 01 41 | 3e 23 72 23 d4 c8 9c d5 5b 51 43 cb 34 53 2c 28 | 61 b9 96 71 50 74 c5 ae 85 6d 7a 58 3f 7a 88 70 | af e6 c5 0c 57 8d dc b8 35 ad 38 32 a6 66 03 70 | a7 12 65 13 70 6c 02 ce 53 02 bb 9c 4b 41 d2 55 | 55 12 62 16 8e d3 b0 8d b2 ca b3 0c 94 5b 71 3e | bd e1 6b 50 f5 0c 8e 14 6d 12 8a b6 05 0d 2a e4 | e6 af ca cf 43 35 a4 91 ac f7 59 23 8d 49 2e 30 | 19 5d fc 84 a6 a9 4f e1 36 24 8a 1c 4c f5 77 d3 | e0 62 cf 35 de 2b 2d 83 58 0d 71 57 8a ec 74 a9 | 03 ea 4b 70 53 4d ea 54 fd 23 41 04 38 15 5b c6 | c2 f2 8d 33 70 0c 70 2c 30 92 7c 5c e8 24 36 8b | 61 e3 97 9c 24 e3 04 5e 87 2c fb f5 78 19 ea 46 | 8a 4b 8d b0 c2 be 41 d0 35 d7 8d 5c ad ae e1 83 | 78 02 a1 e2 ec ba ca b0 06 80 f4 dc 29 00 00 24 | 19 8f d2 3d 51 6b 57 7e 4c a5 11 07 93 be d4 d1 | fd fb b2 a4 cb be b5 db 73 be 13 b6 25 1e 8d 99 | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | b0 09 60 78 a8 72 37 bb 9d 32 12 7c fc 34 80 06 | fc 60 db 72 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 ec 7a f9 c6 | 17 a4 37 f5 52 09 79 7d 37 f3 75 4c dc f8 40 c0 | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #3 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa730000f48 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febdae268 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #3 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #3 spent 0.351 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa734002888 | spent 0.00279 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:51559 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 23 00 01 fb | 00 01 00 05 9a 2f 42 c4 a3 08 d3 d0 8d c6 48 70 | 36 b9 ee 24 a0 7e af e8 10 15 d6 7a 01 ae 8b 52 | 94 cd b0 28 cb fe e2 62 6e b7 51 e9 22 b9 10 99 | 97 27 98 88 cb f0 0b 30 60 29 1f 97 b9 d4 95 6b | a1 3c b6 bb 5a 3e 2c 21 9f d3 1b c5 62 11 de 58 | cd 7c 0d 06 a2 60 13 38 f6 8d 00 34 35 7a 90 25 | ac 2f fd 55 4b a4 50 96 d9 c0 b9 16 fd 16 3a c3 | 8f 90 65 fc f5 01 d6 cd 63 c6 e5 93 8d 83 35 86 | a1 75 46 02 de cb f6 6a 30 d8 e0 75 d7 26 22 ff | ee 2d 36 3e e7 e9 ff 10 25 f9 82 cf ac bb 07 aa | 39 58 35 8d 02 3b e7 21 33 f7 e8 ee 3d b4 b7 47 | 2f 5e eb 7b 24 c8 91 62 87 3b c4 72 ef 2e 83 c6 | 13 cf c2 49 df 59 20 fd ef ae e6 d8 7b d1 36 c4 | bb ba 64 41 3d 93 b3 62 66 ce ad bc c4 5e 89 7b | 15 31 1c 8b 44 c8 f3 c8 76 41 0e 00 ff 82 5d 0d | a2 d0 6f 3d 48 ab f5 1a d1 2e cc a1 85 34 0e 13 | 5f 76 4f 5a 6e c8 17 9f e2 c4 d9 1c 15 16 cd 96 | 07 94 57 b2 80 8d 92 7b b7 70 f4 99 53 7f af 04 | 27 8f 75 0a a8 a9 61 b3 c7 5c ca 5b 8f e2 fc ef | 77 a0 53 01 86 aa fa 07 2a e9 ae 2a 78 f8 bf d7 | 20 ff cb 71 5c 1f f8 91 82 54 8e 65 fa 9e 29 45 | 13 db 74 f7 80 29 ae 51 87 67 b0 d2 77 cb e1 0e | 3f 85 18 f2 78 3f 7a 1d cc ae de b5 57 26 1d f7 | ec f1 a0 13 5a 75 bb c7 6f 0c 30 0f 5c 2a 82 ba | ba 51 93 e8 75 df 9f f7 d1 ef 68 91 b6 bf 93 41 | ef 82 af 40 31 b9 61 ed 94 62 43 a7 29 e0 9f 7d | 0a e9 16 26 aa eb e7 61 07 17 6b 4e 56 58 2c b5 | 93 76 b2 d5 79 70 b9 1e c8 ed 7b d8 e0 e3 fd 30 | 10 03 d6 83 01 18 a9 1b 51 14 a7 fb 97 04 f3 32 | 79 24 f3 4b 98 7c 4c c4 b5 e9 92 a5 bb 1b c9 0a | 4e c4 0e 2a 7b 8c dd 61 34 3e 73 bf 26 e8 7d 47 | 37 d1 b8 06 07 1c 6f | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | Message ID: start-responder #3 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.113 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.122 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00113 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:51559 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 02 00 05 55 47 02 23 ba 5f 93 ce 4f fc 86 52 | 04 91 6b be f2 24 36 73 1a 7b 92 f6 5d 2c c2 69 | 95 91 a6 2c 77 a6 86 44 97 5a dd 8c 66 90 2b af | b3 ae d6 e3 d0 72 00 f3 b1 d8 25 e4 58 4b 68 40 | a8 90 3d c9 5a ec e0 95 b4 51 fa d5 8b 82 f4 d1 | 0a df a9 03 81 0b 5a 11 78 cd ba 93 23 d4 6c 4a | 4d d4 dc e7 8e d7 01 f9 c6 a3 cd eb 77 fc 44 16 | 61 43 03 c6 81 dd 4a d8 cd 83 8e e0 d2 41 e9 00 | bc 94 0a f7 8e 51 31 0c f2 9e 53 03 84 92 66 7b | ce 23 6c 60 aa 21 30 7f 90 22 a6 e2 20 90 b7 2a | 8c 62 77 37 fc 95 bc b2 03 6a 3b df 8e f7 4e 77 | 5a 9c b3 ce 5d 51 08 c2 69 41 c6 1e 03 8f a5 c8 | 87 b3 9d 46 1d 7f 66 77 b0 f2 be ef 04 4e 7e 2b | 16 39 51 a9 34 88 2b 3d d3 c1 e3 2a 44 ee 09 7e | bd b3 23 c0 a7 6b cc 03 b9 42 6a 10 17 7f 56 02 | bb ee ba 96 32 25 2b 09 94 a9 ed 75 4a d2 26 62 | ff 79 a8 76 d9 2d 12 72 34 cf 50 ee d6 63 29 66 | e4 8c 51 ae e5 df 66 9a 83 a4 c6 3c d9 09 e1 2f | 67 a3 48 ab 2c 14 f1 33 48 ec 78 50 d2 28 b5 23 | c4 3a 9f df e4 f2 56 8b f0 12 a8 92 41 da fb ee | 34 19 b0 28 76 af e1 22 db 30 e9 d0 64 07 91 50 | 3b a8 5e aa fb d5 51 f1 ac 2e 80 52 c4 34 0f d0 | a1 7b 86 20 08 56 6a 7e ff 32 06 09 27 46 34 97 | 22 16 43 da fd 19 77 b7 70 d1 52 db 5f 00 d4 22 | ea 34 c4 9a 02 7c 6e 52 25 d0 46 ac 6a dc 91 c6 | d7 48 a1 db ec ef fe 3e 93 e0 6d 47 b4 3f 65 7f | 5e 26 4f c7 9d 00 72 19 14 a9 c6 24 12 dc ce f6 | 7d 2a 72 89 ed 35 3b 68 dc 1c 43 e0 5e fb 78 eb | ce 89 fa 55 60 50 b5 bf 22 3f b2 32 3f 53 12 5f | 4a 04 d5 20 5e 5c b2 2a 15 a2 ce 15 a7 bd 08 04 | d4 50 3e fa d0 07 00 ce 11 01 8d 69 15 ab 7b 14 | 47 5d 3f 0a 54 7a c5 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.104 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.111 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00145 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:51559 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 03 00 05 70 38 99 63 12 2a 80 4f 6f 1c 11 74 | 19 28 ba bc 5c a4 31 da 5f 0c b0 77 9e ed be 75 | 4a c1 ac 62 de 70 44 5b 08 db 3a 64 eb f0 8a 2a | ef 37 fb fb 56 0a 6d bc 2e dd 5a 39 8c 01 2f ca | ee b9 35 26 a1 37 b8 8f 8f bc 2b f0 e5 d0 06 77 | 36 fc 80 01 52 59 44 8a 2d 59 ab d3 77 17 d4 2a | e3 06 ef d7 88 42 02 39 8c cc 35 7a 5e b9 ec 9e | 95 ee fe 45 c8 5a da 4e 6b 08 ed 68 29 fb a8 11 | 8f 05 91 d5 2c e8 e7 e2 68 5e 13 d6 90 48 34 01 | 9e 46 41 81 54 c6 6f 33 fd 97 3b 74 ce 0a ee 36 | b9 97 e1 57 84 73 05 b5 71 27 3f 8f 14 99 6d 41 | 6a 38 f0 7f cc 63 c2 71 2a 64 73 7a 29 0b d7 dd | e3 8f ee 27 47 0a 0d da c6 48 b2 f6 91 32 63 5b | 75 67 2a f6 c5 c2 aa 5f fc 82 11 05 87 71 c7 42 | 9d e7 cb 1f 23 73 53 2d 6b 96 e9 fd e5 64 83 1f | 7e 00 7b a9 fa 58 c9 d4 0b 5b e2 fd a5 a3 ec 79 | d6 26 82 f8 79 d5 f6 85 52 53 06 0a 30 6f a7 0d | 63 cc af 42 ce 86 56 25 3b e8 12 ac 75 54 d6 d7 | d2 27 37 6b 43 57 fa 3e 54 fd 83 04 7a de 98 75 | 47 9a 37 ac ba f3 5d 7d 3a 0d db d4 ca 54 e3 d5 | 68 88 8f 7d e0 83 b5 e0 e6 54 7a f2 b0 a2 a4 01 | 78 98 1c fc 4a 5c 37 5d 09 f8 1b a3 75 c7 19 ce | d4 35 40 87 cb 28 64 d2 50 ed cf 16 4c ea f2 e0 | 85 b1 14 a9 7e 0a a5 9d 48 d6 f0 76 6e 8a e5 b4 | a7 8e 25 c3 b8 d8 cb 58 1f 8a 04 22 7b e2 13 12 | 87 e5 39 be 15 f2 c5 87 42 a3 2e 16 8b 72 6e db | 56 85 4e 38 22 23 f1 1e 33 bd d2 e4 9d 41 e1 a5 | 98 49 0f 29 c0 bd fc 21 f1 c4 99 bf a1 18 71 39 | 19 0f ff 93 0e 8b b6 a6 71 17 b8 10 77 a8 93 5d | 6b 1b 25 b5 b5 0e c8 73 f8 0b d2 70 5a d7 f5 00 | 8d 87 ef 6d 85 68 8d d9 f4 5a f0 80 47 b6 de 2f | ce 23 9b 6b b6 65 bf | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.15 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.158 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00118 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 535 bytes from 192.1.2.254:51559 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 00 00 01 fb | 00 04 00 05 5f e3 25 fc 1c 4c 45 77 e9 1a a5 71 | b1 06 1c 80 7b cb 55 38 2d 93 b3 fc ff b0 fa ed | 26 4d c4 51 f0 7e 8c ec 6d 0c 28 90 dd f6 cf 32 | bf db 99 c2 f5 ef 08 a1 e4 2e bb f6 bd 86 00 05 | 66 0a 51 5c 32 ab e2 f0 85 ac 46 1a fd 46 27 e1 | 82 09 8d 6c b3 44 46 51 5e 64 25 05 98 3e 9f 50 | f8 26 21 c2 09 7e e4 ed 47 49 bd b6 62 d0 30 f1 | 9e bc a2 ef 75 5e 00 37 71 37 6b 0c 53 38 97 03 | 7c e7 70 85 99 32 97 f6 11 0d a6 84 66 26 78 a8 | 0b 4f 42 80 65 b5 8d 25 f6 cb be 5c c4 c9 92 db | b3 d9 ca 81 7d 66 b5 e7 09 db 81 bd f4 eb 06 91 | 7e f9 d7 09 33 bd 39 d4 fb de ef 63 fb 75 af e0 | 47 aa 34 e0 46 d7 46 43 02 93 ef f1 35 ab a9 09 | 4c 7d 17 e0 ce 60 34 00 52 72 df 8f 7a 2c 03 db | 8f 0e 33 7e 64 5e b1 09 5a 3c 02 ed 79 3c 49 65 | e4 59 a5 e5 af cd 87 7a d9 d6 0a b5 ee fd ac 9a | f0 5c 54 b2 74 49 ea 3b eb 9a a8 10 55 b6 6a 27 | c1 59 ac 6f f5 a4 a1 fa 86 b9 fc c3 42 38 72 87 | 47 45 15 f3 bf 85 c5 56 1e 57 7a e4 36 43 ad 57 | 60 cc be 8b dd c8 55 dd 35 de 12 4b f3 c2 42 8b | c4 34 e8 5f 71 66 0d 86 17 ed 90 43 6b 9e c7 ca | 77 a2 e1 f7 3f d6 e5 c4 04 53 14 ae 28 52 ce af | 4f 32 ae 42 45 84 85 fc ba 63 1a 8a f7 9a 83 e2 | ff a3 06 14 67 27 95 7a e8 5b c3 6d f8 e8 b1 18 | 6d 75 5f 23 a4 e8 61 1f 15 ff 2e 8a dc 3d 99 5d | ea 6f 79 d4 f7 31 04 b6 fc 57 a9 ad f7 d4 2d b0 | 52 9a 3f ac 8f 08 d4 66 55 8b 58 6e ba 7e c5 cb | 1a fd bf bb 69 d1 57 ab 66 de 42 1a ac bc 42 a9 | 14 90 28 ca 3c d7 ed fa d5 e8 ca 25 4e 6e 5e dc | 53 34 81 c5 20 46 da b2 4a b4 09 84 c8 da 57 e1 | 93 8c 73 34 3f 59 51 45 2e e9 49 ed b1 52 81 e1 | e9 63 ce b2 d1 23 26 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 535 (0x217) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 507 (0x1fb) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=499) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #3 spent 0.0884 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.095 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.000965 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 251 bytes from 192.1.2.254:51559 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:4500) | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fb 00 00 00 df | 00 05 00 05 ce bf 41 2d 37 03 48 51 64 54 bb b2 | e8 a8 2d be 5b 3d 83 49 38 47 86 6d 1a 2c ed 2a | 0c 20 ca f1 d2 e7 60 ad 74 ee 84 7a 0d 28 fe d4 | ac 72 e4 2c 1c 6f da 2c e6 06 fa 8d 7a eb b0 af | ac bd 40 82 eb 61 5b a5 cb db 86 1b 1c 00 96 37 | af fa 15 2c 6d d7 48 3f 55 37 f3 dd bf d6 9c bd | a5 08 0f ad 82 cd f5 77 47 9a a2 c7 03 a0 ca 8a | d6 d4 a6 58 f0 2e b4 ea c4 48 ee c2 31 a4 49 f7 | 66 2b 3c 69 46 a7 9f f3 2e 4c d5 1b 72 d1 96 a8 | 69 24 f4 40 ab f7 ec 35 83 75 93 f0 32 56 bc da | 3e 07 7c 36 1b 75 ea df b4 9b be d4 f0 a8 4b 13 | 4a 71 6c 9c 19 4b 1f 4c 58 bc b7 56 5a 97 7e 2d | a2 64 25 92 e3 93 cc 66 9c dc 7a 41 97 58 03 a7 | 9c 0c 53 5b 31 58 8b 75 99 c8 c6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 251 (0xfb) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #3 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #3 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #3 is idle | #3 idle | Message ID: #3 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 223 (0xdf) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=215) | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 4 for state #3 | state #3 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x563febdae268 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa734002888 size 128 | #3 spent 0.0231 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #3 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #3 and saving MD | #3 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | crypto helper 3 resuming | crypto helper 3 starting work-order 4 for state #3 | stop processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | crypto helper 3 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 4 | #3 spent 0.162 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.17 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 3 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 4 time elapsed 0.000813 seconds | (#3) spent 0.817 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 4: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 3 sending results from work-order 4 for state #3 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fa728000fe8 size 128 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #3 | start processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:473 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 3 replies to request ID 4 | calling continuation function 0x563feb00db50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #3: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #3 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #3 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1229 (0x4cd) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1224) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 34 (0x22) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (len=26) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | **parse IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REQUEST (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,IDr,AUTH,CP,SA,TSi,TSr} | #3 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:4500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds | #3 spent 0.00506 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #3 spent 0.047 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #3 spent 0.102 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec | certificate is valid (profile IPsec) | #3 spent 0.0712 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: certificate verified OK: E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org,CN=road.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febdba888 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febdb9ec8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x563febdb3718 | unreference key: 0x563febd98458 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | #3 spent 0.148 milliseconds in decode_certs() calling add_pubkey_from_nss_cert() | #3 spent 0.397 milliseconds in decode_certs() | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 72 6f 61 | DER ASN1 DN: 64 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | received IDr payload - extracting our alleged ID | ID_DER_ASN1_DN 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' needs further ID comparison against 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | ID_DER_ASN1_DN 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' matched our ID | X509: CERT and ID matches current connection | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | results matched | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw[1] 192.1.2.254, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | refine_host_connection: picking new best "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 (wild=0, peer_pathlen=7/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org | b=%fromcert | results fail | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | refine_host_connection: checking "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 against "rw", best=rw with match=0(id=0(0)/ca=1(7)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | Peer expects us to be @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) according to its IDr payload | This connection's local id is @east.testing.libreswan.org (ID_FQDN) | subjectAltname east.testing.libreswan.org matched east.testing.libreswan.org in certificate | IDr payload '@east.testing.libreswan.org' is a valid certificate SAN for this connection | refine_host_connection: checked rw[1] 192.1.2.254 against rw, now for see if best | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->%fromcert of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | returning since no better match than original best_found | offered CA: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | trusted_ca_nss: trustee A = 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | key issuer CA is 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' | an RSA Sig check passed with *AwEAAd7rc [remote certificates] | #3 spent 0.0946 milliseconds in try_all_RSA_keys() trying a pubkey "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: Authenticated using RSA | #3 spent 0.119 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() | parent state #3: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R2(established IKE SA) | #3 will start re-keying in 3330 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | state #3 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa734002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x563febd6cd18 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 3330 seconds for #3 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febdae268 size 128 | pstats #3 ikev2.ike established | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | IKEv2 CERT: send a certificate? | IKEv2 CERT: OK to send a certificate (always) | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | ****emit IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ID type: ID_FQDN (0x2) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload (36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 26 raw bytes of my identity into IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload | my identity 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 | my identity 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | emitting length of IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload: 34 | assembled IDr payload | Sending [CERT] of certificate: E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org,CN=east.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | ****emit IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Identification - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Payload (37:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 1260 raw bytes of CERT into IKEv2 Certificate Payload | CERT 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 | CERT 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 | CERT 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 | CERT 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 | CERT 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f | CERT 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 | CERT 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b | CERT 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e | CERT 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f | CERT 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 | CERT 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 | CERT 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 | CERT 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 38 32 34 30 39 30 37 35 33 | CERT 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 38 32 33 30 39 30 37 35 | CERT 33 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 | CERT 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 | CERT 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 | CERT 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c | CERT 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 | CERT 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 | CERT 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a | CERT 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 | CERT 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 | CERT 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f | CERT 00 30 82 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b1 1e 7c b3 bf 11 | CERT 96 94 23 ca 97 5e c7 66 36 55 71 49 95 8d 0c 2a | CERT 5c 30 4d 58 29 a3 7b 4d 3b 3f 03 06 46 a6 04 63 | CERT 71 0d e1 59 4f 9c ec 3a 17 24 8d 91 6a a8 e2 da | CERT 57 41 de f4 ff 65 bf f6 11 34 d3 7d 5a 7f 6e 3a | CERT 3b 74 3c 51 2b e4 bf ce 6b b2 14 47 26 52 f5 57 | CERT 28 bc c5 fb f9 bc 2d 4e b9 f8 46 54 c7 95 41 a7 | CERT a4 b4 d3 b3 fe 55 4b df f5 c3 78 39 8b 4e 04 57 | CERT c0 1d 5b 17 3c 28 eb 40 9d 1d 7c b3 bb 0f f0 63 | CERT c7 c0 84 b0 4e e4 a9 7c c5 4b 08 43 a6 2d 00 22 | CERT fd 98 d4 03 d0 ad 97 85 d1 48 15 d3 e4 e5 2d 46 | CERT 7c ab 41 97 05 27 61 77 3d b6 b1 58 a0 5f e0 8d | CERT 26 84 9b 03 20 ce 5e 27 7f 7d 14 03 b6 9d 6b 9f | CERT fd 0c d4 c7 2d eb be ea 62 87 fa 99 e0 a6 1c 85 | CERT 4f 34 da 93 2e 5f db 03 10 58 a8 c4 99 17 2d b1 | CERT bc e5 7b bd af 0e 28 aa a5 74 ea 69 74 5e fa 2c | CERT c3 00 3c 2f 58 d0 20 cf e3 46 8d de aa f9 f7 30 | CERT 5c 16 05 04 89 4c 92 9b 8a 33 11 70 83 17 58 24 | CERT 2a 4b ab be b6 ec 84 9c 78 9c 11 04 2a 02 ce 27 | CERT 83 a1 1f 2b 38 3f 27 7d 46 94 63 ff 64 59 4e 6c | CERT 87 ca 3e e6 31 df 1e 7d 48 88 02 c7 9d fa 4a d7 | CERT f2 5b a5 fd 7f 1b c6 dc 1a bb a6 c4 f8 32 cd bf | CERT a7 0b 71 8b 2b 31 41 17 25 a4 18 52 7d 32 fc 0f | CERT 5f b8 bb ca e1 94 1a 42 4d 1f 37 16 67 84 ae b4 | CERT 32 42 9c 5a 91 71 62 b4 4b 07 02 03 01 00 01 a3 | CERT 82 01 06 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 | CERT 30 00 30 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 | CERT 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 | CERT 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 73 74 40 | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b 06 03 55 | CERT 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 | CERT 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 06 08 2b | CERT 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 | CERT 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e | CERT 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | CERT 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 03 55 1d | CERT 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c 68 74 74 | CERT 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e | CERT 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 2f 72 65 | CERT 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 | CERT 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 3a 56 a3 7d | CERT b1 4e 62 2f 82 0d e3 fe 74 40 ef cb eb 93 ea ad | CERT e4 74 8b 80 6f ae 8b 65 87 12 a6 24 0d 21 9c 5f | CERT 70 5c 6f d9 66 8d 98 8b ea 59 f8 96 52 6a 6c 86 | CERT d6 7d ba 37 a9 8c 33 8c 77 18 23 0b 1b 2a 66 47 | CERT e7 95 94 e6 75 84 30 d4 db b8 23 eb 89 82 a9 fd | CERT ed 46 8b ce 46 7f f9 19 8f 49 da 29 2e 1e 97 cd | CERT 12 42 86 c7 57 fc 4f 0a 19 26 8a a1 0d 26 81 4d | CERT 53 f4 5c 92 a1 03 03 8d 6c 51 33 cc | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Payload: 1265 | CHILD SA proposals received | going to assemble AUTH payload | ****emit IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP (0x2f) | flags: none (0x0) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' value 47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Certificate Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Authentication Payload (39:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | started looking for secret for @east.testing.libreswan.org->C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | #3 spent 5.08 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() calling sign_hash_RSA() | emitting 384 raw bytes of rsa signature into IKEv2 Authentication Payload | rsa signature 37 a8 2c c3 43 a6 54 9e ae 05 85 3e ec bb d3 48 | rsa signature 68 90 05 3e df d7 28 e5 44 9a 63 24 e5 9e 61 a3 | rsa signature 26 d9 2b be e8 39 7e a1 13 4a a5 b4 c4 b7 7e 11 | rsa signature aa 07 f7 5e 86 7e cc 78 3a 69 bd 1d 52 d8 45 c0 | rsa signature 6d 6e 12 97 fb 6a dd c1 10 58 90 67 56 54 b5 b0 | rsa signature 34 24 46 42 11 16 e4 a6 2c cb be c5 73 e9 56 88 | rsa signature 6e c8 3f 4a 84 fc 89 8a 90 ee 8b 48 8e 78 66 0d | rsa signature a7 59 8d 23 1f 99 49 d0 17 bb a6 c9 49 e4 d4 81 | rsa signature 89 29 cf 45 82 bd 3a 91 ef c8 6e bc d5 a2 d2 75 | rsa signature ee 88 87 50 1a 15 9c 4b 2e d2 58 f3 ed 13 91 82 | rsa signature 67 3f d9 5a 68 4d 48 85 bb b5 da aa 35 65 db 47 | rsa signature 7c 23 61 a7 4e 8e 58 f9 c8 74 61 3e e7 84 2a d8 | rsa signature 06 98 cb 80 cc 64 75 b2 5e 61 fe 49 40 07 7b 86 | rsa signature 27 5a 3b b9 59 fe 1c 4c 79 c1 75 01 be 34 d0 b6 | rsa signature 71 24 16 f2 94 63 5b 21 9c 62 0a 42 69 f8 99 34 | rsa signature 39 ef 5a 99 96 8c 77 3d b5 ca cf 04 b5 67 bf 90 | rsa signature a3 1f 5e ec 41 a0 7d 99 af 44 38 a4 ad 1a cf 47 | rsa signature 2d 23 34 9f 86 3c 57 9a 87 51 bc 77 1b b7 94 a1 | rsa signature 63 00 10 dc 4d 0c fe 53 9a bb d3 3d 56 59 c5 72 | rsa signature b9 5e 31 e7 27 05 c6 d9 20 1e e9 f7 83 26 29 72 | rsa signature 84 19 48 ca d7 1c 2f 00 58 a6 91 ba 6e e4 80 c1 | rsa signature 73 da c5 4d bb 24 55 12 7b 15 12 3a 8e 16 48 4f | rsa signature 05 8a 11 7a 5d 13 7d 50 2f a7 b5 d8 d6 58 db 3e | rsa signature 5c 50 ed 46 43 7c cb 4c 06 20 fd d2 33 90 00 5a | #3 spent 5.17 milliseconds in ikev2_calculate_rsa_hash() | emitting length of IKEv2 Authentication Payload: 392 | request lease from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 reference count 2 thatid '' that.client.addr 100.64.0.1 | cannot share a lease, find a new lease IP | New lease from addresspool index 1 | new lease 100.64.0.2 from addresspool 100.64.0.1-100.64.0.10 to that.client.addr 100.64.0.1 thatid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=road.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-road@testing.libreswan.org' | creating state object #4 at 0x563febdb8ef8 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #4 in UNDEFINED | pstats #4 ikev2.child started | duplicating state object #3 "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 as #4 for IPSEC SA | #4 setting local endpoint to 192.1.2.23:4500 from #3.st_localport (in duplicate_state() at state.c:1484) | Message ID: init_child #3.#4; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: switch-from #3 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: switch-to #3.#4 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | Send Configuration Payload reply | ****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2_cfg_type: IKEv2_CP_CFG_REPLY (0x2) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' value 33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Authentication Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Configuration Payload (47:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS (0x1) | emitting 4 raw bytes of Internal IP Address into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | Internal IP Address 64 40 00 02 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | *****emit IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: | Attribute Type: IKEv2_INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (0x3) | emitting 4 raw bytes of IP4_DNS into IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute | IP4_DNS 01 02 03 04 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute: 4 | emitting length of IKEv2 Configuration Payload: 24 | using existing local ESP/AH proposals for rw (IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals): 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;INTEG=NONE;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=NONE;ESN=DISABLED | Comparing remote proposals against IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; optional: DH | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 1a 28 77 cf | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 1 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 2 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 3 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (ESN=DISABLED) matches local proposal 4 type 5 (ESN) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: ENCR+ESN; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+ESN transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+ESN; optional: INTEG+DH; matched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 32 (0x20) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 1a 28 77 cf | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 2 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+ESN | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 1a 28 77 cf | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 48 (0x30) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 4 (0x4) | parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into remote SPI | remote SPI 1a 28 77 cf | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 4 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+INTEG+ESN | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+INTEG+ESN "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #3: proposal 1:ESP:SPI=1a2877cf;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED chosen from remote proposals 1:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED[first-match] 2:ESP:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;ESN=DISABLED 3:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED 4:ESP:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;ESN=DISABLED | IKE_AUTH responder matching remote ESP/AH proposals ikev2_proposal: 1:ESP:SPI=1a2877cf;ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;ESN=DISABLED | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x94b9e910 for esp.0@192.1.2.23 | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ****emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Configuration Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP (0x3) | spi size: 4 (0x4) | # transforms: 2 (0x2) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | emitting 4 raw bytes of our spi into IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload | our spi 94 b9 e9 10 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | *******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | ******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN (0x5) | IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED (0x0) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 32 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload (44:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 start 64 40 00 02 | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 end 64 40 00 02 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: 24 | ****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload (45:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: | TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (0x7) | IP Protocol ID: 0 (0x0) | start port: 0 (0x0) | end port: 65535 (0xffff) | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 start into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 start c0 00 02 00 | emitting 4 raw bytes of ipv4 end into IKEv2 Traffic Selector | ipv4 end c0 00 02 ff | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 16 | emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: 24 | Initiator child policy is compress=no, NOT sending v2N_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED | integ=none: .key_size=0 encrypt=aes_gcm_16: .key_size=32 .salt_size=4 keymat_len=36 | uniqueIDs disabled, not contemplating releasing older self | install_ipsec_sa() for #4: inbound and outbound | could_route called for rw (kind=CK_INSTANCE) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 erouted: self; eroute owner: self | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.1a2877cf@192.1.2.254 included non-error error | set up outgoing SA, ref=0/0 | looking for alg with encrypt: AES_GCM_16 keylen: 256 integ: NONE | encrypt AES_GCM_16 keylen=256 transid=20, key_size=32, encryptalg=20 | AES_GCM_16 requires 4 salt bytes | st->st_esp.keymat_len=36 is encrypt_keymat_size=36 + integ_keymat_size=0 | setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 | NIC esp-hw-offload not for connection 'rw' not available on interface eth1 | netlink: enabling tunnel mode | netlink: setting IPsec SA replay-window to 32 using old-style req | netlink: esp-hw-offload not set for IPsec SA | netlink response for Add SA esp.94b9e910@192.1.2.23 included non-error error | set up incoming SA, ref=0/0 | sr for #4: erouted | route_and_eroute() for proto 0, and source port 0 dest port 0 | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in route_owner | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 vs | conn rw mark 0/00000000, 0/00000000 | route owner of "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 erouted: self; eroute owner: self | route_and_eroute with c: rw (next: none) ero:rw esr:{(nil)} ro:rw rosr:{(nil)} and state: #4 | priority calculation of connection "rw" is 0xfe7df | eroute_connection replace eroute 192.0.2.0/24:0 --0-> 100.64.0.2/32:0 => tun.0@192.1.2.254>tun.0@192.1.2.254 (raw_eroute) | IPsec Sa SPD priority set to 1042399 | raw_eroute result=success | route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true | route_and_eroute: instance "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254, setting eroute_owner {spd=0x563febd97ed8,sr=0x563febd97ed8} to #4 (was #2) (newest_ipsec_sa=#2) | #3 spent 0.269 milliseconds in install_ipsec_sa() | ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH: instance rw[1], setting IKEv2 newest_ipsec_sa to #4 (was #2) (spd.eroute=#4) cloned from #3 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 1828 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 1856 | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK (0x2e) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 1856 (0x740) | **parse IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1828 (0x724) | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr (0x24) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 36:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 25 00 00 22 02 00 00 00 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f | cleartext fragment 72 67 27 00 04 f1 04 30 82 04 e8 30 82 04 51 a0 | cleartext fragment 03 02 01 02 02 01 03 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 | cleartext fragment 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 81 ac 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c | cleartext fragment 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 | cleartext fragment 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 | cleartext fragment 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 | cleartext fragment 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 | cleartext fragment 03 0c 1c 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 20 74 65 73 | cleartext fragment 74 20 43 41 20 66 6f 72 20 6d 61 69 6e 63 61 31 | cleartext fragment 24 30 22 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 15 | cleartext fragment 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 40 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 2e 6f 72 67 30 22 18 0f 32 30 31 39 30 38 32 | cleartext fragment 34 30 39 30 37 35 33 5a 18 0f 32 30 32 32 30 38 | cleartext fragment 32 33 30 39 30 37 35 33 5a 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 | cleartext fragment 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 | cleartext fragment 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 | cleartext fragment 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 65 61 73 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 | cleartext fragment 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 65 61 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 a2 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 8f 00 30 82 | cleartext fragment 01 8a 02 82 01 81 00 b1 1e 7c b3 bf 11 96 94 23 | cleartext fragment ca 97 5e c7 66 36 55 71 49 95 8d 0c 2a 5c 30 4d | cleartext fragment 58 29 a3 7b 4d 3b 3f 03 06 46 a6 04 63 71 0d e1 | cleartext fragment 59 4f 9c ec 3a 17 24 8d 91 6a a8 e2 da 57 41 de | cleartext fragment f4 ff 65 bf f6 11 34 d3 7d 5a 7f 6e 3a 3b 74 3c | cleartext fragment 51 2b e4 bf ce 6b b2 14 47 26 52 f5 57 28 bc c5 | cleartext fragment fb f9 bc 2d 4e b9 f8 46 54 c7 95 41 a7 a4 b4 d3 | cleartext fragment b3 fe 55 4b df f5 c3 78 39 8b 4e 04 57 c0 1d 5b | cleartext fragment 17 3c 28 eb 40 9d 1d 7c b3 bb 0f f0 63 c7 c0 84 | cleartext fragment b0 4e e4 a9 7c c5 4b 08 43 a6 2d 00 22 fd 98 d4 | cleartext fragment 03 d0 ad 97 85 d1 48 15 d3 e4 e5 2d 46 7c ab 41 | cleartext fragment 97 05 27 61 77 3d b6 b1 58 a0 5f e0 8d 26 84 9b | cleartext fragment 03 20 ce 5e 27 7f 7d 14 03 b6 9d 6b 9f fd 0c d4 | cleartext fragment c7 2d eb be ea 62 87 fa 99 e0 a6 1c 85 4f 34 da | cleartext fragment 93 2e 5f db 03 10 58 a8 c4 99 17 2d b1 bc e5 7b | cleartext fragment bd af 0e 28 aa a5 74 ea 69 74 5e fa 2c c3 00 3c | cleartext fragment 2f 58 d0 20 cf e3 46 8d de aa f9 f7 30 5c 16 05 | cleartext fragment 04 89 4c 92 9b 8a 33 11 70 83 17 58 24 2a 4b ab | cleartext fragment be b6 ec 84 9c 78 9c 11 04 2a 02 ce 27 83 a1 1f | cleartext fragment 2b 38 3f 27 7d 46 94 63 ff 64 59 4e 6c 87 ca 3e | cleartext fragment e6 31 df 1e 7d 48 88 02 c7 9d fa 4a d7 f2 5b a5 | cleartext fragment fd 7f 1b c6 dc 1a bb a6 c4 f8 32 cd bf a7 0b 71 | cleartext fragment 8b 2b 31 41 17 25 a4 18 52 7d 32 fc 0f 5f b8 bb | cleartext fragment ca e1 94 1a 42 4d 1f 37 16 67 84 ae b4 32 42 9c | cleartext fragment 5a 91 71 62 b4 4b 07 02 03 01 00 01 a3 82 01 06 | cleartext fragment 30 82 01 02 30 09 06 03 55 1d 13 04 02 30 00 30 | cleartext fragment 47 06 03 55 1d 11 04 40 30 3e 82 1a 65 61 73 74 | cleartext fragment 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 | cleartext fragment 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 81 1a 65 61 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 474 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 73 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 87 04 c0 01 02 17 30 0b | cleartext fragment 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 | cleartext fragment 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 | cleartext fragment 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 41 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 35 30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06 | cleartext fragment 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 25 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e | cleartext fragment 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 | cleartext fragment 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 3a 32 35 36 30 30 3d 06 | cleartext fragment 03 55 1d 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0 30 a0 2e 86 2c | cleartext fragment 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 6e 69 63 2e 74 65 73 74 69 | cleartext fragment 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | cleartext fragment 2f 72 65 76 6f 6b 65 64 2e 63 72 6c 30 0d 06 09 | cleartext fragment 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 81 81 00 3a | cleartext fragment 56 a3 7d b1 4e 62 2f 82 0d e3 fe 74 40 ef cb eb | cleartext fragment 93 ea ad e4 74 8b 80 6f ae 8b 65 87 12 a6 24 0d | cleartext fragment 21 9c 5f 70 5c 6f d9 66 8d 98 8b ea 59 f8 96 52 | cleartext fragment 6a 6c 86 d6 7d ba 37 a9 8c 33 8c 77 18 23 0b 1b | cleartext fragment 2a 66 47 e7 95 94 e6 75 84 30 d4 db b8 23 eb 89 | cleartext fragment 82 a9 fd ed 46 8b ce 46 7f f9 19 8f 49 da 29 2e | cleartext fragment 1e 97 cd 12 42 86 c7 57 fc 4f 0a 19 26 8a a1 0d | cleartext fragment 26 81 4d 53 f4 5c 92 a1 03 03 8d 6c 51 33 cc 2f | cleartext fragment 00 01 88 01 00 00 00 37 a8 2c c3 43 a6 54 9e ae | cleartext fragment 05 85 3e ec bb d3 48 68 90 05 3e df d7 28 e5 44 | cleartext fragment 9a 63 24 e5 9e 61 a3 26 d9 2b be e8 39 7e a1 13 | cleartext fragment 4a a5 b4 c4 b7 7e 11 aa 07 f7 5e 86 7e cc 78 3a | cleartext fragment 69 bd 1d 52 d8 45 c0 6d 6e 12 97 fb 6a dd c1 10 | cleartext fragment 58 90 67 56 54 b5 b0 34 24 46 42 11 16 e4 a6 2c | cleartext fragment cb be c5 73 e9 56 88 6e c8 3f 4a 84 fc 89 8a 90 | cleartext fragment ee 8b 48 8e 78 66 0d a7 59 8d | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 507 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 535 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 | responder cookie: | c5 c5 58 c0 b5 8e 10 28 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 4 (0x4) | next payload chain: using supplied v2SKF 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' value 0:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment (53:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment'.'next payload type' in 'reply frag packet' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 377 raw bytes of cleartext fragment into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | cleartext fragment 23 1f 99 49 d0 17 bb a6 c9 49 e4 d4 81 89 29 cf | cleartext fragment 45 82 bd 3a 91 ef c8 6e bc d5 a2 d2 75 ee 88 87 | cleartext fragment 50 1a 15 9c 4b 2e d2 58 f3 ed 13 91 82 67 3f d9 | cleartext fragment 5a 68 4d 48 85 bb b5 da aa 35 65 db 47 7c 23 61 | cleartext fragment a7 4e 8e 58 f9 c8 74 61 3e e7 84 2a d8 06 98 cb | cleartext fragment 80 cc 64 75 b2 5e 61 fe 49 40 07 7b 86 27 5a 3b | cleartext fragment b9 59 fe 1c 4c 79 c1 75 01 be 34 d0 b6 71 24 16 | cleartext fragment f2 94 63 5b 21 9c 62 0a 42 69 f8 99 34 39 ef 5a | cleartext fragment 99 96 8c 77 3d b5 ca cf 04 b5 67 bf 90 a3 1f 5e | cleartext fragment ec 41 a0 7d 99 af 44 38 a4 ad 1a cf 47 2d 23 34 | cleartext fragment 9f 86 3c 57 9a 87 51 bc 77 1b b7 94 a1 63 00 10 | cleartext fragment dc 4d 0c fe 53 9a bb d3 3d 56 59 c5 72 b9 5e 31 | cleartext fragment e7 27 05 c6 d9 20 1e e9 f7 83 26 29 72 84 19 48 | cleartext fragment ca d7 1c 2f 00 58 a6 91 ba 6e e4 80 c1 73 da c5 | cleartext fragment 4d bb 24 55 12 7b 15 12 3a 8e 16 48 4f 05 8a 11 | cleartext fragment 7a 5d 13 7d 50 2f a7 b5 d8 d6 58 db 3e 5c 50 ed | cleartext fragment 46 43 7c cb 4c 06 20 fd d2 33 90 00 5a 21 00 00 | cleartext fragment 18 02 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 64 40 00 02 00 03 00 | cleartext fragment 04 01 02 03 04 2c 00 00 24 00 00 00 20 01 03 04 | cleartext fragment 02 94 b9 e9 10 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 80 0e 01 | cleartext fragment 00 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 18 01 00 00 | cleartext fragment 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff ff 64 40 00 02 64 40 00 | cleartext fragment 02 00 00 00 18 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 10 00 00 ff | cleartext fragment ff c0 00 02 00 c0 00 02 ff | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment | emitting length of IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: 410 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 438 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_OK | #3 spent 7.34 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | suspend processing: state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | start processing: state #4 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #4 complete_v2_state_transition() md.from_state=PARENT_R1 md.svm.state[from]=PARENT_R1 UNDEFINED->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R1 to state STATE_V2_IPSEC_R | child state #4: UNDEFINED(ignore) => V2_IPSEC_R(established CHILD SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #4 to 1 after switching state | Message ID: recv #3.#4 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0->1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1->-1 | Message ID: sent #3.#4 response 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0->1 responder.recv=1; child: wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 | pstats #4 ikev2.child established "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #4: negotiated connection [192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255:0-65535 0] -> [100.64.0.2-100.64.0.2:0-65535 0] | NAT-T: NAT Traversal detected - their IKE port is '500' | NAT-T: encaps is 'auto' "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 #4: STATE_V2_IPSEC_R: IPsec SA established tunnel mode {ESP/NAT=>0x1a2877cf <0x94b9e910 xfrm=AES_GCM_16_256-NONE NATOA=none NATD=192.1.2.254:51559 DPD=passive} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.254:51559 (from 192.1.2.23:4500) | sending fragments ... | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:51559 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 | b5 8e 10 28 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 24 00 01 fb 00 01 00 04 c0 9a db e0 95 98 97 28 | cc 36 b1 fe b5 3a 6e 2f 92 95 f8 f4 69 9c 9b 3e | ab f6 7e 18 68 7c ba d1 31 59 9c ea d3 cf d2 6b | bf 96 0c e8 e8 30 68 bd 5c b1 6d d5 60 0b 1a 19 | 4f 4c 39 3f d4 7c 25 43 47 57 19 61 e6 6e 16 ad | 31 61 e4 a9 cb 3b 55 95 ce 01 2f 5b b1 2a 3b 71 | ae 70 cc 21 39 ec e4 e5 09 0f 72 a6 ba 75 16 ec | 3a 78 aa bb b4 a5 81 57 c6 66 e2 50 f1 82 a3 95 | 11 6a 89 ed 65 66 c8 81 43 6c 91 b3 ac 3d 5c 36 | ad 41 56 4f cd 7b 54 f6 05 ee f6 cd fb 71 d3 eb | 14 f7 0f b8 54 aa fa 4c 22 91 34 63 b3 c4 41 59 | 2d 9d e2 09 af 31 cb d9 e5 25 a3 e4 5e 3d 32 5c | 1f 14 e6 42 a5 99 0f c0 f7 34 f2 b9 bc f7 53 4e | 0a 2d fd 99 a0 f4 da 86 72 f3 b0 00 87 51 75 71 | 54 28 de 27 1e 74 94 f2 dd c6 a5 65 39 52 da 53 | 51 6b 81 c2 78 5f d5 b6 ac b7 cc d5 75 19 ae 97 | 86 2e f9 c6 b7 d2 10 40 55 c0 a1 e7 7b 6a 72 32 | ca 1a d3 cd 0f 8a 3c 87 88 af bb 0d 55 d2 37 27 | c5 66 c3 ef 56 03 15 e7 74 ca 4d 6d 5a 12 29 22 | 29 1f d2 98 28 78 34 a1 4f 6a de 14 10 56 d2 53 | 92 15 0a 81 27 65 cc e9 bf 41 c6 e2 5e 48 86 44 | 57 23 e1 c0 1c fc 2e 7c cd 16 ca 73 8d d3 4d ac | 91 ff c9 fb e7 6c d5 5f 6d 83 7b 8b 10 5b b9 3f | e3 4f 4f 44 ad 54 53 20 d5 f1 47 cb 80 38 1a 05 | 8b 27 eb 40 3b 75 30 e5 a7 99 39 5c 13 14 c3 42 | 33 fa ee d2 c3 48 4d 60 9d 67 e8 8b 59 1c 5b 9b | b2 8a a5 07 b3 51 9a fe eb 32 83 5b 63 2a 5a a9 | f1 2e af 73 69 fb cf 2e 04 dd d5 a6 88 2b 9b b2 | 04 dc 91 aa 53 8a 0c ce a1 ef 8f 58 f8 b4 ed 8f | 35 d1 ac d5 44 f1 f2 b5 c0 fa f3 fd a1 96 df 06 | 38 d4 cb fb 2c 2c 55 16 29 0f cf c9 6f 80 d7 6c | d2 8c 60 59 2a 92 cf bf 0c 8b 1f | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:51559 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 | b5 8e 10 28 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 02 00 04 c5 99 60 1a c8 6f 94 2b | f0 67 55 be a4 68 94 bb fe 2a 2c 60 a6 2f a8 0a | 61 d2 33 1f 4b 50 36 89 d2 4d 6c cd 21 53 14 09 | ba 8f 4b ee 54 7e 0e d1 7d 6f 7f 86 57 df ba b5 | 24 e1 f7 50 45 2b e5 45 28 4e ce dc 18 3a fc ea | 33 9b c8 58 af 27 35 49 e9 7b a7 48 89 b7 df 65 | bf 25 a3 51 f5 62 f9 38 87 29 b0 65 94 22 cb 2d | f9 79 f8 ed de 71 34 d2 32 85 58 98 a6 5f ac 60 | 96 d7 16 1e 01 f6 50 3e 12 ac b5 68 77 e8 70 36 | e8 ba b1 eb 0f a9 3b 96 b8 2d eb da 47 78 e7 f2 | f2 75 c6 bd 27 31 92 2f 24 5f 5b 1c 68 9c 58 f1 | f2 40 e3 33 f3 c4 37 e3 0c 9d 7a 80 b9 41 da 05 | 35 d0 ee c4 8d e0 ab 87 52 d9 c7 5c 0f 33 ef 18 | f4 e7 51 8d 51 95 d8 21 b1 20 ea 9c e3 a7 3a 9b | 41 d4 28 99 dc 73 d0 ef 89 77 19 68 c5 2a b3 af | 2a 9f 43 d0 5b 1d 02 14 40 3b c8 3a 87 13 11 99 | 5b 68 98 4d bb f2 6e 8b fa c0 0e bb f7 88 ae 73 | de 8e d6 e6 22 84 05 4f 94 b3 50 5a b3 5a aa 1f | 3b 63 e8 4f 17 ea 7a 9d 49 a5 04 5f 4b 00 63 d6 | 7f ae 0d 46 75 a5 5e d6 df 67 4d fc 46 a9 eb fb | 58 91 c0 83 39 fb 48 e2 a4 72 9a 7b de 55 96 81 | c6 af 67 a8 54 0e 04 5f 1b 6e 49 62 a5 63 01 1b | dc 42 be 74 b2 ae e8 92 ad c5 79 f0 d8 75 f5 a9 | b0 18 2b f6 ec 3a 6d 35 68 f4 92 52 06 78 4f e6 | 32 f4 f9 1a 55 76 94 7d 4b 82 d2 14 a3 a8 29 4c | d7 11 bf 54 da 9e a4 f1 22 63 e6 7c 3a 82 7a 8a | dd 8b a0 22 92 27 cf a4 df c8 4b 0a 3a a8 05 57 | 8b 00 60 c7 7c e2 c8 2b 2d 41 a8 e5 09 46 ae 88 | 5e f8 63 28 09 33 c9 c2 d4 c0 22 78 81 0f cf c7 | 26 04 ad 2c 57 da 58 48 b0 89 9d 77 b1 c1 2c 6d | a9 3a 04 3c e5 a0 7e c5 19 48 a2 ef 47 d9 4a 9a | f2 6e 8d 36 bb 05 99 57 47 f1 75 | sending 539 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:51559 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 | b5 8e 10 28 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 17 | 00 00 01 fb 00 03 00 04 f6 c3 36 f3 4d 28 05 78 | 40 4e 46 d4 18 b3 58 6a 6f df d3 03 2e 5c 8c 45 | 78 e3 8d 54 10 8d c5 e2 a6 38 27 49 ea b9 05 e1 | 20 e6 cf 74 ad 29 50 70 25 ec 43 ea c1 76 80 b2 | cc d6 19 06 d6 c9 0d 4b 81 72 8a 68 68 42 0c 2c | bb ec ed a4 0b d4 98 da 3b e4 02 65 bd d1 cd 3e | 9f 9c 81 86 9f f0 77 79 3b 74 34 d1 13 d1 b9 ad | d1 67 2b ad b5 b8 c9 4a a7 a5 de b6 99 37 60 6c | 21 e2 fd af 5a 6e b9 b1 c8 1e 1f 95 cd ad 11 9e | ff ce e1 e0 2b 9d 04 ed 39 78 60 eb 1b 12 69 42 | 80 83 cc 10 0c 2e de 66 17 9f 4e f3 b6 cd 07 45 | 36 2a d2 63 9b 62 2c 49 89 7d 8a 9e ee 55 d9 0e | 8c 84 3c 1f 39 0e 00 5a ec 7d 5c 7a db 9a 84 00 | a1 72 04 98 cc f2 f1 f4 d6 40 a9 bb ba bd e7 c6 | 90 6e 5a 1f ef 38 9b 0c 9a a8 86 0d 00 2a 6d 3c | ce 3e 00 df 12 0a 16 b3 8a cb 4b 73 b4 47 a4 72 | 7b ba b2 80 f5 d4 31 55 e6 56 ea e1 da bd 6b df | 82 24 7d 5c cf f8 ee eb 3d 94 52 4e 54 18 ff d7 | 0c 8e e1 e2 f7 c2 7b 94 49 71 85 5b bf 0f dc 85 | 54 36 c3 d5 d9 f7 93 a0 c5 2d 96 22 51 05 aa 60 | cd d6 b1 ed b8 6b 3f 13 c5 87 f3 73 3a 63 3b 42 | f2 37 0d db 1f 02 8c a7 dd 7f 09 a6 6a cc d2 19 | c7 27 42 8a 44 49 15 9c a5 0d 5e c5 a9 66 61 a4 | c2 af 7d cf e3 8c 9e 84 d6 a9 4c 56 13 cc 5f bd | 2f 35 a3 30 94 48 93 59 ef 57 3f 0b 65 45 1b d0 | 57 1e 2c bd fb 21 4e 3e 74 0e 49 cc 5f 81 24 76 | 61 7d d3 e3 99 84 a8 96 ec e0 0b 48 69 b2 81 21 | da eb 1a f2 fb f8 e2 0c e3 4c 25 8f 42 1d 1b fd | 97 9d a8 ca 8c 4a 54 5c 10 c8 e8 0d ec cb 6d 09 | 9f 13 eb 55 21 08 3e 8b 63 3c 0b 5f 5c e0 50 00 | c5 c5 df 89 57 55 c4 95 4e 19 8a 39 c6 f4 5c b4 | a9 be ed 9b dd 32 22 93 c0 98 db | sending 442 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:4500 to 192.1.2.254:51559 (using #3) | 00 00 00 00 07 84 47 5f 47 c3 43 13 c5 c5 58 c0 | b5 8e 10 28 35 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 b6 | 00 00 01 9a 00 04 00 04 b2 bf c4 ae 15 a1 dd 82 | 9c 8a 4d 3e 56 35 06 cc 0a 10 1d 21 86 48 14 2b | 28 34 44 35 0b 4b 66 02 a2 52 b7 f7 67 c5 e0 01 | df de 3a 6c 36 fd 1b df 51 fc 62 5d 24 e6 e6 30 | 7b b8 a2 de f6 14 cb f0 41 15 b9 31 3d 51 2d 1f | 86 1e df 92 5c a5 e0 df b6 f9 88 da 02 d0 83 28 | 4b 96 61 37 34 a0 3f 21 82 1a 16 f7 d0 e1 c5 c4 | 5f 41 22 27 1e a9 0e 55 38 82 33 ed 2e 23 77 75 | e3 cf c1 f7 26 53 c0 e0 97 1e aa 1d db 3c f7 18 | 3c 2d 0f 98 87 2e de 34 6c ee d6 b4 e1 04 cc a1 | 56 b9 02 02 00 a1 98 40 62 99 93 b1 2e 88 b6 29 | 4a c5 d0 b6 fa 20 0c 3d a2 af d1 64 1f a5 d1 78 | f1 4b 80 63 8b 15 ef 2a 97 17 76 e1 fc f1 94 ed | e8 02 b3 02 e6 c6 dd b8 53 19 6e 98 6e bc 99 a7 | 1f 73 dd 1b 28 97 b8 71 bd ea 99 37 00 1a fc 38 | a8 75 74 5c e5 84 59 d2 db fa c2 d6 b5 91 a5 5b | c6 57 c9 db ce 24 62 59 56 0e 7e 20 cc 62 df f3 | 61 23 82 e8 08 19 e1 ed 92 c6 ff 7e 16 a6 c6 25 | 8b 64 9c 6f 14 7e 1d 0a 2b 7a 27 29 00 8d 4d 38 | bf 9f e2 ce 3e e2 16 78 69 e4 0c 61 a2 18 e8 a8 | d4 59 ee af e8 c5 cf bd 46 2b b4 ad 2c 96 21 be | d2 c3 35 64 28 51 43 36 37 9c 51 94 27 b9 fc c2 | a0 0c 0c 73 a2 89 c2 f8 ba d4 6f fb 32 f4 f0 28 | 6f 80 00 e2 5b 9a bb e1 52 cb 14 62 0b 28 a9 71 | ce 33 0f 12 60 bf 71 74 b1 df 66 a7 68 4e aa 71 | 26 ec 27 81 8b 4d d6 f5 32 7f | sent 4 fragments | releasing whack for #4 (sock=fd@-1) | releasing whack and unpending for parent #3 | unpending state #3 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 | #4 will start re-keying in 28530 seconds with margin of 270 seconds (attempting re-key) | event_schedule: new EVENT_SA_REKEY-pe@0x7fa734002b78 | inserting event EVENT_SA_REKEY, timeout in 28530 seconds for #4 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x563febdb3618 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #3 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #3 spent 7.7 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #4 connection "rw"[1] 192.1.2.254 from 192.1.2.254:51559 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fa728000fe8