FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:1015 core dump dir: /var/tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e748 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e6c8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e648 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20278 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07da9e48 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68d68 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68db8 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68d28 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e5c8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e548 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07da9ad8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68f68 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20278 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20278 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 1 | starting up helper thread 1 | starting up helper thread 2 started thread for crypto helper 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 5 | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 6 | checking IKEv1 state table | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x564f07e28468 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e674d8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e6e568 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x564f07e6e4f8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20f28 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e6e1c8 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x564f07e6e998 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e7a878 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85b68 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85ba8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85cd8 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85d18 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2ca38 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85dd8 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85e18 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07daa7b8 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85e58 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85e98 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85f68 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85d18 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85fa8 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e860d8 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | created addconn helper (pid:1076) using fork+execve | forked child 1076 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e866b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e7a7c8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86728 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86768 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20fd8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e867d8 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86818 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e208f8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86888 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e868c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e281b8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86938 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86978 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e282b8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e869e8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86a28 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e283b8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86a98 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.882 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e7a7c8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e866b8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e866b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e7a7c8 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20fd8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86768 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86768 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20fd8 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e208f8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86818 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86818 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e208f8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e281b8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e868c8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e868c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e281b8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e282b8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86978 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86978 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e282b8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e283b8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86a28 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x564f07e86a28 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e283b8 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.36 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 1076 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0197 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection main with policy RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | ASCII to DN <= "C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=*" | ASCII to DN => 30 60 31 0a 30 08 06 03 55 04 06 14 01 2a 31 0a | ASCII to DN => 30 08 06 03 55 04 08 14 01 2a 31 10 30 0e 06 03 | ASCII to DN => 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 6f 6e 74 6f 31 0a 30 08 | ASCII to DN => 06 03 55 04 0a 14 01 2a 31 0a 30 08 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 14 01 2a 31 0a 30 08 06 03 55 04 03 14 01 2a | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 | ASCII to DN => 01 2a | counting wild cards for C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* is 6 | setting ID to ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org,CN=east.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA' | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x564f07e8a188 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x564f07e8a138 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x564f07e89ff8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x564f07e89d48 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x564f07e89cf8 | unreference key: 0x564f07e8a1d8 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org is 0 | based upon policy, the connection is a template. | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 0.0.0.0:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x564f07e8d2f8 added connection description "main" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org]...%any[C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=*] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.997 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00276 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 70 63 06 88 26 65 ed 55 | 47 61 58 c4 c0 60 3b 74 a1 82 e8 de 4b 01 aa 3b | 27 40 5d 5d f8 94 fa d3 19 4c ff 40 2a 0b de 3a | c8 2d c4 74 4f 3c 30 b1 bc dd 25 3c c8 bd c3 e1 | d4 a4 27 b2 19 15 3c 2c 6d 2d 60 64 cb 60 dd 43 | 0c a7 bd af 14 8e 74 5b 62 1d 6c c8 73 16 f1 d3 | 29 57 28 2f d8 e7 fa aa dc ea ac 9a cb 5f 7c 18 | 81 b3 e0 e8 23 78 63 2a 79 b3 5d 63 f0 73 6f f5 | dc 38 c9 bf a7 1f cd 39 40 eb f4 b9 c5 3d 3e db | bd b8 87 8b ab 79 ba 6d 8e d5 86 ea 28 41 f1 9d | 05 07 c5 e5 26 03 5b 62 d6 0b ec e7 bc cf 99 72 | c2 db 59 46 09 89 57 d1 5b db 10 08 8b 7a 5d 86 | aa d0 fe d5 ec 8a 31 6d d8 3c 68 75 40 28 83 52 | 7c a3 3a af 71 07 b0 fc 07 fa 3b 91 f1 0d bf 6c | 6c 94 c4 d9 4e b1 b8 34 63 73 bc 2c db ac 6a 4c | 73 ce 49 52 6a ee 0e ff ff fc 2c 7e b2 4b 4e 8a | 4b 23 a5 60 fc 68 91 38 29 00 00 24 f8 17 ee bf | 9b c0 9f fe e7 04 e8 85 d7 7a 5f 7c 16 b4 4a af | d5 fb 1c 9a bd dd 6d 95 8b 31 eb 1b 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 d7 9e 30 a5 | 41 8b f4 b1 db d9 1a 71 45 ff 2d ac c9 91 10 e3 | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 eb 84 3a d3 71 fb 5a 79 | 2d 64 bd f4 b1 c8 62 63 47 11 c5 2d | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (main) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (main) | find_next_host_connection returns main | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | rw_instantiate | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x564f07e8e448 | rw_instantiate() instantiated "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 for 192.1.2.45 | found connection: main[1] 192.1.2.45 with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | creating state object #1 at 0x564f07e91348 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | constructing local IKE proposals for main (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "main"[1] 192.1.2.45: constructed local IKE proposals for main (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x564f064dd800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= eb 84 3a d3 71 fb 5a 79 2d 64 bd f4 b1 c8 62 63 | natd_hash: hash= 47 11 c5 2d | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x564f064dd800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= d7 9e 30 a5 41 8b f4 b1 db d9 1a 71 45 ff 2d ac | natd_hash: hash= c9 91 10 e3 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x564f07e8f2f8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e89c48 size 128 | #1 spent 0.84 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | crypto helper 0 resuming | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 1.35 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 1.35 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.000979 seconds | (#1) spent 0.963 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fd2c4002888 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x564f06408b50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x 59 13 d5 5f 7a c2 bb 49 85 7a 07 08 b2 f5 8c 0a | ikev2 g^x b9 94 70 26 bd 20 d7 c8 7b d0 c4 99 ca 7e 49 1e | ikev2 g^x 2b c2 46 9e 8d d3 57 f3 37 e5 a8 90 82 12 a0 56 | ikev2 g^x df f7 c6 5b 67 e4 91 2c 5d c4 21 04 98 53 45 78 | ikev2 g^x 3f 6c 6c 82 d9 e7 7e 37 08 b2 21 c4 61 46 b7 1d | ikev2 g^x 55 8a 17 70 2e 9f 4b fa 48 f9 b0 02 07 79 09 f2 | ikev2 g^x f3 7e f4 85 c3 62 3b b4 27 3d 77 e0 98 47 20 4e | ikev2 g^x ae a3 ec b2 fd fc 8a 2e 5d 47 42 90 c5 a0 81 e0 | ikev2 g^x d6 60 8b bc e4 0d 78 ec 39 a1 7c ea 81 07 d5 7d | ikev2 g^x 8a 51 70 11 b8 bd 94 d0 9c de 66 ce 5a f7 00 4a | ikev2 g^x 82 bc 4b 1d 94 fa c9 d8 03 b8 a2 fc b5 fd 86 67 | ikev2 g^x 14 d0 a5 8d 31 30 a9 56 51 02 7c b3 3c ec 5d f5 | ikev2 g^x 85 ed 1b d7 5c 79 7c 26 81 6c 97 fa 55 d0 ed c2 | ikev2 g^x dd 95 b4 2a 2f 29 01 f5 e0 09 89 1c 41 8c 5f 47 | ikev2 g^x 05 5e 77 dd 17 9b 52 2d 6b d1 82 21 e4 08 56 61 | ikev2 g^x fc 63 e2 2f 5c 92 af b9 26 12 3e df ae b3 d4 aa | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 17 48 b8 46 5c a5 e9 99 ee a3 14 f6 f2 d6 11 45 | IKEv2 nonce 73 24 dc b7 74 7e ba ba 54 84 f4 32 7c 9a d8 e0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x564f064dd800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | natd_hash: rcookie= 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= d1 f9 2d 66 e0 61 b0 95 b3 5b 8f bc 4d 44 cf 16 | natd_hash: hash= e7 34 4c ff | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data d1 f9 2d 66 e0 61 b0 95 b3 5b 8f bc 4d 44 cf 16 | Notify data e7 34 4c ff | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x564f064dd800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | natd_hash: rcookie= 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 5c f5 d2 cd e4 55 e5 78 0a e8 f5 4d 87 f4 49 20 | natd_hash: hash= 5f 01 cc 93 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 5c f5 d2 cd e4 55 e5 78 0a e8 f5 4d 87 f4 49 20 | Notify data 5f 01 cc 93 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is not CK_PERMANENT (instance), so collect CAs | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | Not a roadwarrior instance, sending empty CA in CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 59 13 d5 5f | 7a c2 bb 49 85 7a 07 08 b2 f5 8c 0a b9 94 70 26 | bd 20 d7 c8 7b d0 c4 99 ca 7e 49 1e 2b c2 46 9e | 8d d3 57 f3 37 e5 a8 90 82 12 a0 56 df f7 c6 5b | 67 e4 91 2c 5d c4 21 04 98 53 45 78 3f 6c 6c 82 | d9 e7 7e 37 08 b2 21 c4 61 46 b7 1d 55 8a 17 70 | 2e 9f 4b fa 48 f9 b0 02 07 79 09 f2 f3 7e f4 85 | c3 62 3b b4 27 3d 77 e0 98 47 20 4e ae a3 ec b2 | fd fc 8a 2e 5d 47 42 90 c5 a0 81 e0 d6 60 8b bc | e4 0d 78 ec 39 a1 7c ea 81 07 d5 7d 8a 51 70 11 | b8 bd 94 d0 9c de 66 ce 5a f7 00 4a 82 bc 4b 1d | 94 fa c9 d8 03 b8 a2 fc b5 fd 86 67 14 d0 a5 8d | 31 30 a9 56 51 02 7c b3 3c ec 5d f5 85 ed 1b d7 | 5c 79 7c 26 81 6c 97 fa 55 d0 ed c2 dd 95 b4 2a | 2f 29 01 f5 e0 09 89 1c 41 8c 5f 47 05 5e 77 dd | 17 9b 52 2d 6b d1 82 21 e4 08 56 61 fc 63 e2 2f | 5c 92 af b9 26 12 3e df ae b3 d4 aa 29 00 00 24 | 17 48 b8 46 5c a5 e9 99 ee a3 14 f6 f2 d6 11 45 | 73 24 dc b7 74 7e ba ba 54 84 f4 32 7c 9a d8 e0 | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | d1 f9 2d 66 e0 61 b0 95 b3 5b 8f bc 4d 44 cf 16 | e7 34 4c ff 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 5c f5 d2 cd | e4 55 e5 78 0a e8 f5 4d 87 f4 49 20 5f 01 cc 93 | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e89c48 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x564f07e8f2f8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x564f07e8f2f8 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x564f07e8e678 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.563 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fd2c4002888 | spent 0.00283 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 23 00 01 ff | 00 01 00 05 a7 bf fc 9f 1b 02 a1 2b dc 76 0f 36 | 2f c6 04 08 b2 65 c0 7f 82 62 69 0f ef e3 fb 8d | 8a f0 40 11 b0 6f 84 b9 15 bb 71 aa 68 e2 fc c5 | 2e 14 29 ab f5 bf b1 5e 07 6f 00 cc bb 5a ac f2 | 91 ed f5 69 a6 cf bd ff bf 16 2a 17 00 33 1b 50 | 15 0c 2b d8 d2 25 9e 2e 5a 33 3e 5f b7 42 aa 45 | 08 f7 63 63 8d 29 1d f1 fe ed 62 17 7b 51 d4 fb | d2 b9 5d 46 12 6c c7 66 92 fd 96 4d dd 59 be 6f | 27 53 44 4e f8 81 af c7 4f 0c ca 71 eb 02 b1 c4 | 98 87 aa ee 73 da ff 15 b2 b3 ac 1f 61 56 9f e6 | 3b 73 fb 8f 2b 6b b8 69 fc 14 0e 18 26 ee 17 67 | 03 39 a8 cb e9 76 1f e4 e6 b0 ef 76 23 33 db 9d | 88 1f 13 ae f0 f1 bb bc 24 eb 4b f1 6a 3c bd c6 | 34 21 b0 45 46 cb c2 12 00 a0 93 b8 1f bd 17 bc | e6 3b 46 b5 56 60 55 65 8d 77 51 8f dd fd 1d 20 | 59 53 b6 79 8b fb 0a ac f6 2b 8a 67 a9 db ae 76 | 0b a0 3a 01 4e b7 bd 9b fb 4a 3d d5 01 1e 28 92 | e1 ce 8d f1 48 a5 bb 68 5d 2b 4c 01 7e c5 22 fd | ed a0 32 6f 4e de f3 86 19 88 9d 9d 86 cf 00 2f | 4d 62 ea 9f 44 b3 9e e6 25 0e 98 79 f2 bf bd 30 | e4 8f 91 d6 07 05 14 54 8d f4 94 9d ce 47 07 68 | a2 bf 22 ee 13 6e 1a ea bf fd 85 c8 57 b2 03 96 | 1f 0e 45 8c 22 b3 78 7e 03 56 2b 74 ba aa 34 56 | 21 2e 0c 3b 9d 31 42 93 fd 28 2a 28 48 c4 5e 6c | 64 a4 0a 16 40 7b d2 c6 83 e9 f0 43 56 e5 e0 a0 | 6a 68 20 4d e3 79 33 6f 08 28 e3 cd 1d 0e 36 c2 | 5c 9b b2 13 4e 9d 39 74 30 9b a7 52 57 f8 31 78 | 92 1b 51 60 50 70 cf 9b 5f 3d 87 06 49 bc eb 36 | 45 02 5d 76 e1 72 df 78 11 86 c7 6e d8 f8 cd 0a | 61 ad d7 1b fa 66 8c a6 d1 eb 94 89 0a e0 a4 73 | 77 13 19 3c e9 0c f4 1f 42 b8 b1 f5 10 58 01 c1 | 7e da b6 1c e9 5a 66 4e ac 12 f0 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.163 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.176 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.0015 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 02 00 05 12 46 2c 0d d1 35 1d 95 96 48 3f a8 | a0 3b 11 5c fc 18 0d 93 96 85 43 46 b9 a9 36 01 | 2e 07 ad e2 a6 30 1a 19 8c 10 53 e6 40 e4 8d 33 | 8e 04 dd 1e 0b 3f 03 dc 75 fa 94 05 6e 0e 93 4f | 1a 72 06 20 ca a0 be 4a f8 1f 16 2d da 9b 16 cb | 55 82 86 26 e8 a3 76 40 b1 b2 23 76 ab ad 2a 09 | 15 bd 6f 91 5b fa 09 48 de e2 4c 81 48 88 75 dc | 67 34 88 bb 6b 5a fc 37 e7 ff d5 14 bd d0 78 3d | c3 e7 14 87 55 b3 2a 3f 1e 8e fb c4 43 3a 2a c5 | 0b e9 6f 42 de 6e 83 87 67 b7 97 8f 75 57 64 37 | c2 78 2e ba d5 57 37 1a fb 9d 40 09 77 b6 7b cd | f8 af 06 18 2e 76 fa 96 92 97 60 8c de 08 7c 6b | 97 ec e3 50 cd fe 71 dd 49 c4 ef 71 ac e6 5a 78 | 10 2a 1f 39 2d 4a 0a 25 26 46 1f b1 e3 b8 ba b4 | 65 92 bc cb 80 35 a1 29 75 bd d8 55 44 61 4e 6a | ee cd 09 8c b5 74 f9 2c 2a 2d 05 93 4a 25 21 49 | 04 a8 26 64 4c 71 f6 7b 46 bc 67 fd 33 61 e7 2e | df f1 31 6d 94 66 b1 20 86 5d ba 5d 3c d0 4a 38 | 80 1f c0 13 97 1c 8b de 34 87 13 74 89 da a2 bd | d7 78 d2 66 de 9d d0 6a 37 91 20 37 de c6 52 83 | 7e 41 b5 3a 66 91 2c 55 89 96 3c ad 86 9c f6 bd | aa 4f dd ba d5 cb 04 56 b8 aa 38 65 86 a2 04 dd | 1f d3 8a ce dc 3f 2f 9a 62 29 ce 6a d0 78 c9 1f | fd f2 05 44 e5 c6 f8 69 fb 13 1c 47 bd 30 98 4e | 1e 31 d8 ab 2a a2 82 11 7b 2f 40 59 6a 2f 8a ad | 84 96 2f 7f b8 f3 ee c1 80 bd 66 b8 43 5d f1 d6 | 2e bd 2e 8c 86 0e 3d f8 dd 8e de b3 ac 86 ae bf | 06 91 84 32 89 09 6d ba 4c 82 cc 26 a3 e8 39 1b | b4 b2 46 00 24 d3 03 57 48 9e 25 18 58 ee 12 87 | 2b 7e 90 34 ae a9 91 aa 09 d1 c4 ed d7 b2 25 11 | db f5 25 31 f4 dd b9 03 6e ad d5 35 9f 74 c8 26 | 42 3c 0b c9 8a e5 af 85 e2 93 cb | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.143 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.154 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00145 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 03 00 05 96 30 9f 7b 87 24 4f e7 31 4e 53 45 | 63 37 4a f9 7d 94 8d 44 9f ef da 5a 6c b2 67 24 | 42 83 6f 87 64 e2 65 fb 2e 60 2b e5 df c0 09 c0 | 46 c4 3e 8a cd 18 c8 0a 7a a7 88 17 70 b7 7d c6 | d0 2b ef 3f 7b f4 74 45 19 fc 1a 32 2e 90 a2 82 | 46 53 4c 9a 2a e6 40 b4 af b7 72 8f 08 2a c6 5d | a4 e1 fc c8 4f 91 bd c5 ec 7f d6 c8 1a 6c fe 4f | 02 13 8e 4d ee fd 75 38 05 43 70 09 a8 09 9a 8b | c6 5b 78 84 27 8c ed f0 a9 2e 0a 61 d9 5c 02 7b | fe 14 6c f5 17 31 0a ba a3 5a 0c 8c d9 70 ab b7 | 90 29 a6 9d 8f ba 19 9f 64 95 e1 da 8f cd 0a f6 | 32 1a cf 5b a7 0b 6a 8a 04 73 1a a3 0c db 10 92 | d6 07 53 f0 fe 09 c2 41 0c 75 ca a3 ec 43 63 cc | b1 9c a9 dd 0d 10 46 9a 0d fd 86 30 d2 7e 4d 91 | 58 5a ad 38 06 5b f6 da b6 0d 2e 25 fb c4 10 48 | d8 bc a8 a8 6d cf e6 f7 ed fe 45 6c d6 5f 5e 7d | f6 50 8d 79 14 09 ff fa 71 70 51 04 7d 17 80 48 | 8e 08 84 d4 5f 9c 28 aa 30 e8 c0 f5 07 08 c3 7b | e5 7c 1a e6 1c 51 f9 ea a0 35 8a 15 87 4e c5 fb | 4a 09 5b 5c af f0 76 1b 0b 55 90 76 c8 2f d1 de | bc 0f af 35 2b b0 59 ce 51 1b 91 ef 50 ab 30 8e | e3 80 88 06 8b 61 9f 95 de 51 71 0e 84 f8 10 b3 | ab 14 29 ab af 6e 62 b3 1e da c1 10 2a b2 d4 7f | f1 93 90 58 f8 80 dc 2c 33 36 da 31 b6 45 df c8 | a4 12 37 23 01 e0 f0 33 3b 3f bc 61 9e 40 97 c2 | 81 1e af 33 93 e4 42 76 cd e4 47 81 e2 31 8f dd | a9 5b 58 82 02 88 8e 6d 23 16 49 e6 89 c7 bd a1 | 4b 7c ce 99 bc a6 c0 4e ee 69 c4 5a 69 f2 44 63 | a9 1d f7 8b 51 1a 36 b5 17 a8 c7 c7 da 52 6c d4 | fa 53 1d 1f 6e c3 75 47 01 79 b7 f5 4a 40 b8 87 | 35 9a 94 d3 1b 25 d8 18 85 e7 87 c1 3b 75 92 de | b3 60 5e 8a a6 1f dc 40 ac 13 ce | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.154 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.165 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00141 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 04 00 05 43 96 5c b9 5f 18 a1 64 c0 40 82 6d | 19 53 fb ed 35 55 f8 86 a5 24 66 05 39 18 9e f7 | 15 b7 e6 5c 45 27 51 4e 2f 33 a2 89 b7 30 70 8b | 54 c7 b3 dc dd d0 36 a6 d5 c4 f6 9c e5 34 35 c8 | 67 e6 13 05 33 f6 e1 70 2a 8b fd c8 e5 58 75 62 | e3 07 41 58 8b ef 51 f9 35 c2 20 a7 c0 d3 2e ba | 33 fa 7f bc 06 7f 3d 33 0f 32 64 58 9b e0 c2 db | 18 25 6e 88 12 6f 39 ba 46 85 70 89 7a c7 b1 ba | 80 33 26 bf ec 8a 87 21 5c aa 84 e0 db f4 86 49 | b1 7d d2 98 05 5c 4c 77 e1 35 3d ba 60 a2 ee 4d | da 9d 26 07 31 02 3a 9d 7e c8 71 75 c1 96 8b c3 | a1 40 0e 80 cf 6f 99 03 bd 0d 8b 1a a1 d1 a1 a5 | 5b fb 7a 66 64 62 ba 86 ad 2c e6 ae 3d 06 47 cc | e5 6e 0e a7 ea 04 5f 83 85 10 08 f5 18 e5 b4 48 | 1f 2a 8b db 86 07 e8 f0 2b 64 b2 06 6c 11 b2 31 | 69 72 a8 3f cb a9 86 00 d9 3d 3d b1 42 d6 54 c9 | 43 83 53 19 84 07 b8 34 7c 54 9b 6c 6d 17 5a b9 | 9c ff 50 be d4 61 11 7e da 89 9c 92 7e 54 2b 3b | 7b 5a 40 dc ab f6 ff 25 6b 14 56 d4 0d 07 1b c0 | 5c 78 ce 8d 67 ff 75 f9 2a 3c 34 b5 5e 55 ca 21 | 7a aa 4c b9 b1 2e 0c db 7d 81 0f ee 59 32 63 ed | eb 4d 04 47 a9 f8 9d 9c 97 e9 56 ae 56 22 67 5d | a8 28 de 8f 66 3e f9 40 8c 53 eb f1 d9 03 d4 ec | 58 b0 3c fa 2f ad 37 18 c1 27 1a 8f 16 be da 10 | cd 69 07 55 5a dc 1b 69 86 69 68 8e 92 98 f5 8d | 3c 88 68 47 94 a4 93 b0 c5 e3 d0 c5 58 32 fb cc | f2 7f b6 83 a7 9e 7b d9 e6 b7 49 6a e6 7c a6 21 | 31 03 60 e0 6e d8 3d 0b c5 15 16 7c 86 f3 32 4b | f7 73 ce 6f 34 88 e5 d3 30 0f ca 43 99 d9 5d 2d | a0 f4 43 59 d1 1a 99 17 ce 65 4f 43 71 27 88 68 | 82 93 79 01 3d b5 42 38 86 5e fc de 02 07 61 c6 | b2 45 fb c4 e0 03 a8 72 41 70 4c | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.15 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.161 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00133 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 234 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ea 00 00 00 ce | 00 05 00 05 a6 f6 d0 51 50 bc 1f 45 65 fa c5 e6 | 29 57 14 08 b8 cd a8 b8 a9 b6 31 79 3c b3 a0 dc | 8d 80 61 85 26 3a 58 54 57 00 26 29 1c 02 01 f2 | 92 ed e0 ad c7 7d 9d 52 dd 60 93 d4 b6 4d 97 3c | da ea ad 8d 71 10 5e 95 06 42 1d c3 27 b3 af 29 | 1c 1a 9f 81 72 76 79 69 dc 21 00 ce 42 9c 2f 34 | f1 38 25 be 4b c3 12 db 19 c0 88 36 66 47 1c 45 | e2 9b e9 64 62 60 23 45 fc 00 20 60 16 98 98 47 | f4 ae fc b1 a5 9e 24 15 f0 6b d9 08 24 c1 7f b3 | a0 ba 60 ff ba 51 55 74 be 7c b7 c0 be d4 b1 62 | 4f 00 e2 1d 7d 69 fe 72 01 0b 15 97 51 69 fa 34 | 03 4b e1 01 8d 91 5c 43 21 db 0b 36 bc 20 f2 41 | d4 12 09 3a 2b b7 ca 2f 02 59 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 234 (0xea) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 206 (0xce) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=198) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e8e678 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x564f07e8f2f8 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x564f07e8f2f8 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fd2c4002888 size 128 | #1 spent 0.0338 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.001398 seconds | (#1) spent 1.4 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7fd2bc000f48 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.185 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.198 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x564f06408b50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ (0x26) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1265 (0x4f1) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1260) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 25 (0x19) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,CERTREQ,AUTH,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 4.2 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.0235 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 4.25 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org,CN=west.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.142 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.0424 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: Certificate E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA failed IPsec verification "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: ERROR: The certificate was signed using a signature algorithm that is disabled because it is not secure. | #1 spent 0.427 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: X509: Certificate rejected for this connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | CERT_X509_SIGNATURE CR: | 58 13 71 57 9d ee 1a 15 74 03 12 80 12 4d c1 85 | 2b 92 25 e9 | cert blob content is not binary ASN.1 | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 against "main"[1] 192.1.2.45, best=(none) with match=1(id=1(6)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked main[1] 192.1.2.45 against main[1] 192.1.2.45, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org->C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | refine_host_connection: picking new best "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 (wild=6, peer_pathlen=0/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 0.0.0.0:500 but ignoring ports | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* | results matched | refine_host_connection: checking "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 against "main", best=main with match=1(id=1(6)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked main[1] 192.1.2.45 against main, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org->C=*, ST=*, L=Toronto, O=*, OU=*, CN=*, E=* of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | returning since no better match than original best_found | offered CA: '%none' "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | received CERTREQ payload; going to decode it | CERT_X509_SIGNATURE CR: | 58 13 71 57 9d ee 1a 15 74 03 12 80 12 4d c1 85 | 2b 92 25 e9 | cert blob content is not binary ASN.1 | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '@east.testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '192.1.2.23' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: no RSA public key known for 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | #1 spent 0.0557 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: RSA authentication of I2 Auth Payload failed "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: responding to IKE_AUTH message (ID 1) from 192.1.2.45:500 with encrypted notification AUTHENTICATION_FAILED | Opening output PBS encrypted notification | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 | responder cookie: | 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Adding a v2N Payload | ****emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED (0x18) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 37 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 65 | sending 65 bytes for v2 notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | 42 bf de e1 39 66 ae 45 10 56 d2 4c 7d 4d ad 05 | 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 41 29 00 00 25 | 1e a3 b6 6b e7 b4 59 36 6b 95 d9 d7 e4 4d 0a 05 | ba 6f b3 92 4c ab 47 b0 80 b5 89 2d ba f4 58 a8 | 75 | pstats #1 ikev2.ike failed auth-failed | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_FATAL | #1 spent 5.37 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_FATAL | release_pending_whacks: state #1 has no whack fd | pstats #1 ikev2.ike deleted auth-failed | #1 spent 5.07 milliseconds in total | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R1) aged 0.025s and NOT sending notification | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => delete | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fd2c4002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x564f07e8f2f8 | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection main | connection is instance | not in pending use | State DB: state not found (connection_discard) | no states use this connection instance, deleting | start processing: connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 (BACKGROUND) (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) deleting connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 instance with peer 192.1.2.45 {isakmp=#0/ipsec=#0} | Deleting states for connection - not including other IPsec SA's | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | state #1 | free hp@0x564f07e8e448 | flush revival: connection 'main' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "main"[1] 192.1.2.45 (BACKGROUND) (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | State DB: deleting IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | in statetime_stop() and could not find #1 | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7fd2bc000f48 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_traffic_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.0397 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.319 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) destroying root certificate cache | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | unreference key: 0x564f07e8fa18 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x564f07e8f578 user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x564f07e8f058 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x564f07e8eb08 east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x564f07e8d6f8 192.1.2.23 cnt 1-- | start processing: connection "main" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | free hp@0x564f07e8d2f8 | flush revival: connection 'main' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "main" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e7a7c8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e866b8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20fd8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86768 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e208f8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86818 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e281b8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e868c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e282b8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86978 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e283b8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e86a28 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e7a878 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e6e998 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20f28 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e6e4f8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e674d8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x564f07e28468 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2ca38 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07daa7b8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85e98 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e860d8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85fa8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68db8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68d68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e20278 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68d28 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85b68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85dd8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e68f68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e6e568 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e6e1c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86a98 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e869e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86938 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86888 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e867d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e86728 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07da9ad8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85e58 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85e18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85cd8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85f68 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e85ba8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e5c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e548 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07da9e48 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e748 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e6c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x564f07e2e648 leak: issuer ca, item size: 175 leak detective found 1 leaks, total size 175