FIPS Product: YES FIPS Kernel: NO FIPS Mode: NO NSS DB directory: sql:/etc/ipsec.d Initializing NSS Opening NSS database "sql:/etc/ipsec.d" read-only NSS initialized NSS crypto library initialized FIPS HMAC integrity support [enabled] FIPS mode disabled for pluto daemon FIPS HMAC integrity verification self-test FAILED libcap-ng support [enabled] Linux audit support [enabled] Linux audit activated Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version v3.28-685-gbfd5aef521-master-s2 XFRM(netkey) esp-hw-offload FORK PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO NSS (IPsec profile) DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC SECCOMP LIBCAP_NG LINUX_AUDIT XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER CURL(non-NSS)) pid:22550 core dump dir: /var/tmp secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets leak-detective enabled NSS crypto [enabled] XAUTH PAM support [enabled] | libevent is using pluto's memory allocator Initializing libevent in pthreads mode: headers: 2.1.8-stable (2010800); library: 2.1.8-stable (2010800) | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0826e8 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd082668 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0825e8 size 40 | creating event base | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074218 size 56 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fcffddb8 size 664 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bcd08 size 24 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bcd58 size 384 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bccc8 size 16 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd082568 size 40 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0824e8 size 48 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fcffda48 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bcf08 size 16 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074218 | libevent initialized | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074218 size 64 | global periodic timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | init_nat_traversal() initialized with keep_alive=0s NAT-Traversal support [enabled] | global one-shot timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE initialized | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET enabled with interval of 3600 seconds | global one-shot timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS initialized | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS enabled with interval of 60 seconds | global periodic timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 enabled with interval of 120 seconds Encryption algorithms: AES_CCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm, aes_ccm_c AES_CCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_b AES_CCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_ccm_a 3DES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS [*192] 3des CAMELLIA_CTR IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP {256,192,*128} CAMELLIA_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} camellia AES_GCM_16 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm, aes_gcm_c AES_GCM_12 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_b AES_GCM_8 IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gcm_a AES_CTR IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aesctr AES_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes SERPENT_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} serpent TWOFISH_CBC IKEv1: IKE ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish TWOFISH_SSH IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP {256,192,*128} twofish_cbc_ssh NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP FIPS {256,192,*128} aes_gmac NULL IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: ESP [] CHACHA20_POLY1305 IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP [*256] chacha20poly1305 Hash algorithms: MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha2, sha256 SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha384 SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: FIPS sha512 PRF algorithms: HMAC_MD5 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE md5 HMAC_SHA1 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha, sha1 HMAC_SHA2_256 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_384 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha384, sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_512 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE FIPS sha512, sha2_512 AES_XCBC IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE aes128_xcbc Integrity algorithms: HMAC_MD5_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH md5, hmac_md5 HMAC_SHA1_96 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha, sha1, sha1_96, hmac_sha1 HMAC_SHA2_512_256 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha512, sha2_512, sha2_512_256, hmac_sha2_512 HMAC_SHA2_384_192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha384, sha2_384, sha2_384_192, hmac_sha2_384 HMAC_SHA2_256_128 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS sha2, sha256, sha2_256, sha2_256_128, hmac_sha2_256 HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: AH AES_XCBC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH aes_xcbc, aes128_xcbc, aes128_xcbc_96 AES_CMAC_96 IKEv1: ESP AH IKEv2: ESP AH FIPS aes_cmac NONE IKEv1: ESP IKEv2: IKE ESP FIPS null DH algorithms: NONE IKEv1: IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS null, dh0 MODP1536 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH dh5 MODP2048 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh14 MODP3072 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh15 MODP4096 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh16 MODP6144 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh17 MODP8192 IKEv1: IKE ESP AH IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS dh18 DH19 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_256, ecp256 DH20 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_384, ecp384 DH21 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH FIPS ecp_521, ecp521 DH31 IKEv1: IKE IKEv2: IKE ESP AH curve25519 testing CAMELLIA_CBC: Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 128-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key Camellia: 16 bytes with 256-bit key testing AES_GCM_16: empty string one block two blocks two blocks with associated data testing AES_CTR: Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 128-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 192-bit key Encrypting 16 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 32 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key Encrypting 36 octets using AES-CTR with 256-bit key testing AES_CBC: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key testing AES_XCBC: RFC 3566 Test Case #1: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 0-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #2: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 3-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #3: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 16-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #4: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 20-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #5: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 32-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #6: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 34-byte input RFC 3566 Test Case #7: AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 1000-byte input RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 16) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 10) RFC 4434 Test Case AES-XCBC-PRF-128 with 20-byte input (key length 18) testing HMAC_MD5: RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 1 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 2 RFC 2104: MD5_HMAC test 3 8 CPU cores online starting up 7 crypto helpers started thread for crypto helper 0 | starting up helper thread 0 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 started thread for crypto helper 1 | starting up helper thread 1 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) started thread for crypto helper 2 started thread for crypto helper 3 | starting up helper thread 3 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 3) 22 started thread for crypto helper 4 | starting up helper thread 4 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 4) 22 started thread for crypto helper 5 started thread for crypto helper 6 | starting up helper thread 5 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 5) 22 | checking IKEv1 state table | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | crypto helper 3 waiting (nothing to do) | -> MAIN_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | crypto helper 4 waiting (nothing to do) | starting up helper thread 6 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 6) 22 | crypto helper 6 waiting (nothing to do) | crypto helper 5 waiting (nothing to do) | MAIN_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> MAIN_R2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I3 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_RETRANSMIT | MAIN_R2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_I3: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MAIN_R3: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MAIN_I4: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD | AGGR_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_R1: category: open IKE SA flags: 200: | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | -> AGGR_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | AGGR_I2: category: established IKE SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | AGGR_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R0: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | QUICK_I1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_I2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_R1: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> QUICK_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | QUICK_I2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 200: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | QUICK_R2: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | INFO_PROTECTED: category: informational flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_R1 EVENT_NULL | XAUTH_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_R3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R0: category: informational flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MODE_CFG_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | MODE_CFG_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> UNDEFINED EVENT_NULL | MODE_CFG_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_SA_REPLACE | XAUTH_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> XAUTH_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | XAUTH_I1: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> MAIN_I4 EVENT_RETRANSMIT | checking IKEv2 state table | PARENT_I0: category: ignore flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_I1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I1 EVENT_RETAIN send-request (Initiator: process SA_INIT reply notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) | PARENT_I2: category: open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process INVALID_SYNTAX AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process AUTHENTICATION_FAILED AUTH notification) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (Initiator: process UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD AUTH notification) | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response) | -> PARENT_I2 EVENT_NULL (IKE SA: process IKE_AUTH response containing unknown notification) | PARENT_I3: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: Informational Response) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_RETAIN (I3: INFORMATIONAL Response) | PARENT_R0: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SO_DISCARD send-request (Respond to IKE_SA_INIT) | PARENT_R1: category: half-open IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R1 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)) | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Responder: process IKE_AUTH request) | PARENT_R2: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process Informational Response) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Request) | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_RETAIN (R2: process INFORMATIONAL Response) | V2_CREATE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_CREATE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA) | V2_CREATE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_I EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Response) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_IKE_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_IKE_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_I3 EVENT_SA_REPLACE (Process CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey Response) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_REKEY_CHILD_I EVENT_RETRANSMIT send-request (Initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec Rekey SA) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_I: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_CREATE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> V2_IPSEC_R EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IPsec SA Request) | V2_REKEY_IKE_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> PARENT_R2 EVENT_SA_REPLACE send-request (Respond to CREATE_CHILD_SA IKE Rekey) | V2_REKEY_CHILD_R: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_I: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | V2_IPSEC_R: category: established CHILD SA flags: 0: | IKESA_DEL: category: established IKE SA flags: 0: | -> IKESA_DEL EVENT_RETAIN (IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL) | CHILDSA_DEL: category: informational flags: 0: Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 5.1.18-200.fc29.x86_64 | Hard-wiring algorithms | adding AES_CCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding 3DES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding CAMELLIA_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_16 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_12 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_GCM_8 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CTR to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding SERPENT_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding TWOFISH_CBC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to kernel algorithm db | adding NULL to kernel algorithm db | adding CHACHA20_POLY1305 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_MD5_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA1_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_512_256 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_384_192 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_128 to kernel algorithm db | adding HMAC_SHA2_256_TRUNCBUG to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_XCBC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding AES_CMAC_96 to kernel algorithm db | adding NONE to kernel algorithm db | net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1 ignore ipv6 holes | global periodic timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN enabled with interval of 20 seconds | setup kernel fd callback | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_XRM_FD-pe@0x55d3fd07c408 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bb478 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0c2508 size 16 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new KERNEL_ROUTE_FD-pe@0x55d3fd0c2498 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074ec8 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0c2168 size 16 | global one-shot timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS initialized selinux support is enabled. | unbound context created - setting debug level to 5 | /etc/hosts lookups activated | /etc/resolv.conf usage activated | outgoing-port-avoid set 0-65535 | outgoing-port-permit set 32768-60999 | Loading dnssec root key from:/var/lib/unbound/root.key | No additional dnssec trust anchors defined via dnssec-trusted= option | Setting up events, loop start | add_fd_read_event_handler: new PLUTO_CTL_FD-pe@0x55d3fd0c2938 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ce818 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9b08 size 16 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9b48 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9c78 size 8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9cb8 size 144 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0809d8 size 152 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9d78 size 16 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9db8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fcffe728 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9df8 size 8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9e38 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP installed | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9f08 size 8 | libevent_realloc: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9cb8 | libevent_realloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9f48 size 256 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da078 size 152 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS installed | starting up helper thread 2 | status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 | crypto helper 2 waiting (nothing to do) | created addconn helper (pid:22655) using fork+execve | forked child 22655 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 Kernel supports NIC esp-hw-offload adding interface eth1/eth1 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.1.2.23:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 adding interface eth0/eth0 (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 192.0.2.254:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 adding interface lo/lo (esp-hw-offload not supported by kernel) 127.0.0.1:500 | NAT-Traversal: Trying sockopt style NAT-T | NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for sockopt style NAT-T family IPv4 adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 | no interfaces to sort | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da658 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ce768 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da6c8 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da708 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074f78 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da778 size 16 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da7b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074898 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da828 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da868 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c158 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da8d8 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da918 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c258 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da988 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da9c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c358 size 128 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0daa38 size 16 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.582 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) listening for IKE messages | Inspecting interface lo | found lo with address 127.0.0.1 | Inspecting interface eth0 | found eth0 with address 192.0.2.254 | Inspecting interface eth1 | found eth1 with address 192.1.2.23 | no interfaces to sort | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ce768 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da658 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da658 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ce768 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:4500 fd 22 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074f78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da708 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da708 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074f78 size 128 | setup callback for interface lo 127.0.0.1:500 fd 21 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074898 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da7b8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da7b8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074898 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 fd 20 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c158 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da868 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da868 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c158 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth0 192.0.2.254:500 fd 19 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c258 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da918 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da918 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c258 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 fd 18 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c358 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da9c8 | add_fd_read_event_handler: new ethX-pe@0x55d3fd0da9c8 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c358 size 128 | setup callback for interface eth1 192.1.2.23:500 fd 17 | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" | saving Modulus | saving PublicExponent | ignoring PrivateExponent | ignoring Prime1 | ignoring Prime2 | ignoring Exponent1 | ignoring Exponent2 | ignoring Coefficient | ignoring CKAIDNSS | computed rsa CKAID 61 55 99 73 d3 ac ef 7d 3a 37 0e 3e 82 ad 92 c1 | computed rsa CKAID 8a 82 25 f1 loaded private key for keyid: PKK_RSA:AQO9bJbr3 | certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.323 milliseconds in whack | processing signal PLUTO_SIGCHLD | waitpid returned pid 22655 (exited with status 0) | reaped addconn helper child (status 0) | waitpid returned ECHILD (no child processes left) | spent 0.0164 milliseconds in signal handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in foreach_connection_by_alias | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in conn_by_name | Added new connection san with policy RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | ike (phase1) algorithm values: AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 | from whack: got --esp= | ESP/AH string values: AES_GCM_16_256-NONE, AES_GCM_16_128-NONE, AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128, AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512_256+HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | counting wild cards for %fromcert is 0 | ASCII to DN <= "C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org" | ASCII to DN => 30 81 84 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | ASCII to DN => 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | ASCII to DN => 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 54 6f 72 | ASCII to DN => 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 13 09 4c | ASCII to DN => 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | ASCII to DN => 0b 13 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | ASCII to DN => 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 13 1a 65 61 73 | ASCII to DN => 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | ASCII to DN => 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | loading right certificate 'east' pubkey | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d3fd0de078 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d3fd0de028 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d3fd0ddfd8 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d3fd0ddd28 | get_pluto_gn_from_nss_cert: allocated pluto_gn 0x55d3fd0ddcd8 | unreference key: 0x55d3fd0de0c8 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | certs and keys locked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | certs and keys unlocked by 'lsw_add_rsa_secret' | counting wild cards for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org is 0 | connect_to_host_pair: 192.1.2.23:500 192.1.2.45:500 -> hp@(nil): none | new hp@0x55d3fd0ddfd8 added connection description "san" | ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; replay_window: 32; policy: RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO | 192.1.2.23<192.1.2.23>[C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org]...192.1.2.45<192.1.2.45>[%fromcert] | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 1.14 milliseconds in whack | spent 0.00277 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 828 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3c 22 00 01 b4 | 02 00 00 64 01 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 64 02 01 00 0b 03 00 00 0c | 01 00 00 14 80 0e 00 80 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 | 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 02 00 00 74 03 01 00 0d | 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 | 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 03 00 00 08 | 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 03 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f 00 00 00 74 | 04 01 00 0d 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 0c 80 0e 00 80 | 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 05 | 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 0c | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0e 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 0f | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 10 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 12 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 13 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 14 | 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 15 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 1f | 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 4b 49 3c 7c 97 15 7c d0 | 53 b2 c2 72 7b 01 08 7f c8 80 81 1e 2a 2d 66 6d | ad b9 dc a3 2e 8d 7c 95 a7 44 f5 f5 89 5c 40 c2 | 9d dd fe 9d fb 14 d2 63 b2 3f 46 29 32 1e 92 b9 | 06 59 79 2f 2c a0 1c 0c f3 c9 ba 51 8d 6e 1f 9a | e7 6d 81 bf 25 ce 09 26 a7 d9 0c 17 00 42 dd 88 | ff a0 4f 5c ee ea cd fc 7a e4 4f 32 be b4 a5 8b | 43 36 89 62 00 dc 40 37 96 2d c8 14 f7 52 90 68 | ad 90 76 41 7d ba 2f 3f 7e 1b c5 90 28 92 47 87 | 67 66 c4 be 79 2a 83 7c f2 cb a1 a0 98 03 c0 47 | f1 e1 3c 45 77 e7 0c a9 50 1c 4a 30 70 0a a7 c6 | 15 a8 33 3b db 4e 10 73 21 a9 5f 83 21 0e dd 1b | 63 5e ad c4 dd 31 b4 b1 62 5b 30 34 66 76 ae 3e | 74 3d c3 aa e9 57 1b c7 f1 d2 a0 a2 28 50 9f b4 | b6 10 fc ce 9b a9 0c 2a 55 cc 45 ec 6b 73 3d 7a | 6f 79 48 5e 5f 9f cc 77 30 30 50 b1 cf 4b 72 69 | 8b 0c 36 65 af dd 52 98 29 00 00 24 d6 1d 46 fd | fa fa 80 04 1c c6 12 9c 5e 42 2f d4 c1 7e ef a1 | eb 63 a7 44 31 19 75 9b fa 4f e8 25 29 00 00 08 | 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 d7 6d 5d a3 | 69 0c be d6 f3 d8 d0 89 64 eb af 5c 0f 86 73 20 | 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 c4 cc 39 f2 9f 55 42 83 | 21 b2 c3 2b ae ab c7 3e 30 97 1e 83 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | length: 828 (0x33c) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (34) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT request | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_ike_sa_by_initiator_spi) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (0x22) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 436 (0x1b4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=432) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (0x28) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 264 (0x108) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=256) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 36 (0x24) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=32) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=0) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | ***parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 28 (0x1c) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=20) | DDOS disabled and no cookie sent, continuing | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (san) | find_next_host_connection returns empty | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote= policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | initial parent SA message received on 192.1.2.23:500 but no connection has been authorized with policy ECDSA+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_host_connection local=192.1.2.23:500 remote=192.1.2.45:500 policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW but ignoring ports | find_host_pair: comparing 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 but ignoring ports | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | found policy = RSASIG+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV2_ALLOW+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW+ESN_NO (san) | find_next_host_connection returns san | find_next_host_connection policy=RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | find_next_host_connection returns empty | found connection: san with policy RSASIG+IKEV2_ALLOW | creating state object #1 at 0x55d3fd0e51d8 | State DB: adding IKEv2 state #1 in UNDEFINED | pstats #1 ikev2.ike started | Message ID: init #1: msgid=0 lastack=4294967295 nextuse=0 lastrecv=4294967295 lastreplied=0 | parent state #1: UNDEFINED(ignore) => PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: init_ike #1; ike: initiator.sent=0->-1 initiator.recv=0->-1 responder.sent=0->-1 responder.recv=0->-1 wip.initiator=0->-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv -1 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000000 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->0 | #1 in state PARENT_R0: processing SA_INIT request | selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | constructing local IKE proposals for san (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals) | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_GCM_16_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_256-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | converting ike_info AES_CBC_128-HMAC_SHA2_512+HMAC_SHA2_256-MODP2048+MODP3072+MODP4096+MODP8192+DH19+DH20+DH21+DH31 to ikev2 ... | ... ikev2_proposal: 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 "san": constructed local IKE proposals for san (IKE SA responder matching remote proposals): 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=NONE;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512,HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256,HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048,MODP3072,MODP4096,MODP8192,ECP_256,ECP_384,ECP_521,CURVE25519 | Comparing remote proposals against IKE responder 4 local proposals | local proposal 1 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 1 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 1 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 1 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 1 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 2 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 2 type INTEG has 1 transforms | local proposal 2 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 2 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 2 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG | local proposal 3 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 3 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 3 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 3 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 3 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | local proposal 4 type ENCR has 1 transforms | local proposal 4 type PRF has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type INTEG has 2 transforms | local proposal 4 type DH has 8 transforms | local proposal 4 type ESN has 0 transforms | local proposal 4 transforms: required: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; optional: none | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 1 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..4] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | remote proposal 1 transform 0 (ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256) matches local proposal 1 type 1 (ENCR) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 1 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 2 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 3 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 1 (PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512) matches local proposal 4 type 2 (PRF) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 1 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 2 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 3 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | remote proposal 1 transform 3 (DH=MODP2048) matches local proposal 4 type 4 (DH) transform 0 | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 1 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH; unmatched: none | comparing remote proposal 1 containing ENCR+PRF+DH transforms to local proposal 1; required: ENCR+PRF+DH; optional: INTEG; matched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 1 matches local proposal 1 | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 100 (0x64) | prop #: 2 (0x2) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 11 (0xb) | Comparing remote proposal 2 containing 11 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 2 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+DH | remote proposal 2 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_NON_LAST (0x2) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 3 (0x3) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 3 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 3 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 3 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | length: 116 (0x74) | prop #: 4 (0x4) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 13 (0xd) | Comparing remote proposal 4 containing 13 transforms against local proposal [1..0] of 4 local proposals | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 12 (0xc) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_CBC (0xc) | ******parse IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 128 (0x80) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 (0x5) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG (0x3) | IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 (0xc) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072 (0xf) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096 (0x10) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192 (0x12) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_256 (0x13) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_384 (0x14) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_ECP_521 (0x15) | *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | length: 8 (0x8) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE25519 (0x1f) | remote proposal 4 proposed transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH; matched: none; unmatched: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH | remote proposal 4 does not match; unmatched remote transforms: ENCR+PRF+INTEG+DH "san" #1: proposal 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 chosen from remote proposals 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519[first-match] 2:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 3:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 4:IKE:ENCR=AES_CBC_128;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_512_256;INTEG=HMAC_SHA2_256_128;DH=MODP2048;DH=MODP3072;DH=MODP4096;DH=MODP8192;DH=ECP_256;DH=ECP_384;DH=ECP_521;DH=CURVE25519 | accepted IKE proposal ikev2_proposal: 1:IKE:ENCR=AES_GCM_C_256;PRF=HMAC_SHA2_512;DH=MODP2048 | converting proposal to internal trans attrs | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d3fb887800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= c4 cc 39 f2 9f 55 42 83 21 b2 c3 2b ae ab c7 3e | natd_hash: hash= 30 97 1e 83 | natd_hash: rcookie is zero | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d3fb887800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= d7 6d 5d a3 69 0c be d6 f3 d8 d0 89 64 eb af 5c | natd_hash: hash= 0f 86 73 20 | NAT_TRAVERSAL encaps using auto-detect | NAT_TRAVERSAL this end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL that end is NOT behind NAT | NAT_TRAVERSAL nat-keepalive enabled 192.1.2.45 | adding ikev2_inI1outR1 KE work-order 1 for state #1 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d3fd0e1d98 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ddc28 size 128 | #1 spent 0.503 milliseconds in processing: Respond to IKE_SA_INIT in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | crypto helper 0 resuming | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | crypto helper 0 starting work-order 1 for state #1 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "san" #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R0 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | crypto helper 0 doing build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 | #1 spent 0.809 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.819 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 0 finished build KE and nonce (ikev2_inI1outR1 KE); request ID 1 time elapsed 0.000991 seconds | (#1) spent 0.988 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 1: ikev2_inI1outR1 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 0 sending results from work-order 1 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f2938002888 size 128 | crypto helper 0 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 | calling continuation function 0x55d3fb7b2b50 | ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT (0x22) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 0 (0x0) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | Emitting ikev2_proposal ... | ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Security Association Payload (33:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: | last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST (0x0) | prop #: 1 (0x1) | proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE (0x1) | spi size: 0 (0x0) | # transforms: 3 (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR (0x1) | IKEv2 transform ID: AES_GCM_C (0x14) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | ******emit IKEv2 Attribute Substructure Payload: | af+type: AF+IKEv2_KEY_LENGTH (0x800e) | length/value: 256 (0x100) | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 12 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF (0x2) | IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 (0x7) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: | last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST (0x0) | IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH (0x4) | IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST (0x3) | last substructure: saving location 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' | emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 | emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload'.'last transform' is 0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 | last substructure: checking 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload'.'last proposal' is 0 | ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048 (0xe) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Security Association Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload (34:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 256 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload | ikev2 g^x 47 f3 43 0c a1 65 6b d1 9a d9 94 41 0c 03 a6 67 | ikev2 g^x fb 2e 96 5e 55 e3 6e cc de 81 f9 75 8f 42 ba 47 | ikev2 g^x 9c 84 da 88 66 93 c4 a8 58 18 d0 48 b6 c5 1d f2 | ikev2 g^x 4a a8 b8 25 0e d7 09 ad 53 bd d1 6f 30 82 26 8b | ikev2 g^x 60 06 91 e1 c5 9c 27 5f 9f fd 48 2d a6 f9 c7 f6 | ikev2 g^x 42 e2 7c d0 81 ac 6e 5d 91 d3 22 6b d3 36 4e 79 | ikev2 g^x 1f 5e 6b 4a cc 98 a0 fa fc 34 a7 0e e6 57 49 93 | ikev2 g^x 56 69 70 a3 4a 51 43 2f c5 7a d0 b1 e7 b1 c1 b9 | ikev2 g^x f2 32 13 de 43 49 51 45 33 93 70 c0 64 5d 7f db | ikev2 g^x ee 65 ba 5c b8 36 f6 f3 f9 38 ca 19 42 cd 13 7c | ikev2 g^x 2f ec 9b 77 55 0e e1 b4 85 a1 8f 0d aa 08 cd 0c | ikev2 g^x 6f 2e 1a 82 45 0c 45 33 04 4c 82 05 78 f7 b2 13 | ikev2 g^x f4 f9 f5 53 46 de ec ef f3 81 20 5c ac b4 ac 3b | ikev2 g^x df cf 22 72 07 45 7b 4b ab 24 c4 49 6c 56 b3 38 | ikev2 g^x 69 54 7e 58 c2 4c bf e1 70 f5 e8 cf 0b 0b 95 8a | ikev2 g^x 08 ba c2 2a 7e 4c 7a 93 dc b4 0d 14 01 d3 20 62 | emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 264 | ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (0x29) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: ignoring supplied 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' value 41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Nonce Payload (40:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 32 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload | IKEv2 nonce 54 db 47 dd 6f e8 71 21 52 1e 79 ff 1f 34 ad 72 | IKEv2 nonce df 0b f6 0f 15 8b 3d fb df 74 e7 97 a2 02 fb a0 | emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 36 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED (0x402e) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Nonce Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d3fb887800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | natd_hash: rcookie= 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 17 | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= 97 7b 58 7f fd c1 30 15 79 97 69 79 1c 05 dc 93 | natd_hash: hash= 1a dd 26 65 | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP (0x4004) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data 97 7b 58 7f fd c1 30 15 79 97 69 79 1c 05 dc 93 | Notify data 1a dd 26 65 | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | natd_hash: hasher=0x55d3fb887800(20) | natd_hash: icookie= fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | natd_hash: rcookie= 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | natd_hash: ip= c0 01 02 2d | natd_hash: port=500 | natd_hash: hash= f4 cd 70 15 d8 8d 09 bd 1c 0d 8d 84 34 1c 85 e3 | natd_hash: hash= 88 13 72 ce | Adding a v2N Payload | ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP (0x4005) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload | Notify data f4 cd 70 15 d8 8d 09 bd 1c 0d 8d 84 34 1c 85 e3 | Notify data 88 13 72 ce | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 | going to send a certreq | connection->kind is CK_PERMANENT so send CERTREQ | ***emit IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload (38:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload'.'next payload type' in 'reply packet' | emitting length of IKEv2 Certificate Request Payload: 5 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 437 | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R0->PARENT_R1 with status STF_OK | IKEv2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R0 to state STATE_PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R0(half-open IKE SA) => PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) | Message ID: updating counters for #1 to 0 after switching state | Message ID: recv #1 request 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1 responder.recv=-1->0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=0->-1 | Message ID: sent #1 response 0; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=-1->0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1 "san" #1: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=AES_GCM_16_256 integ=n/a prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 group=MODP2048} | sending V2 new request packet to 192.1.2.45:500 (from 192.1.2.23:500) | sending 437 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R0 through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 b5 22 00 00 28 | 00 00 00 24 01 01 00 03 03 00 00 0c 01 00 00 14 | 80 0e 01 00 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 | 04 00 00 0e 28 00 01 08 00 0e 00 00 47 f3 43 0c | a1 65 6b d1 9a d9 94 41 0c 03 a6 67 fb 2e 96 5e | 55 e3 6e cc de 81 f9 75 8f 42 ba 47 9c 84 da 88 | 66 93 c4 a8 58 18 d0 48 b6 c5 1d f2 4a a8 b8 25 | 0e d7 09 ad 53 bd d1 6f 30 82 26 8b 60 06 91 e1 | c5 9c 27 5f 9f fd 48 2d a6 f9 c7 f6 42 e2 7c d0 | 81 ac 6e 5d 91 d3 22 6b d3 36 4e 79 1f 5e 6b 4a | cc 98 a0 fa fc 34 a7 0e e6 57 49 93 56 69 70 a3 | 4a 51 43 2f c5 7a d0 b1 e7 b1 c1 b9 f2 32 13 de | 43 49 51 45 33 93 70 c0 64 5d 7f db ee 65 ba 5c | b8 36 f6 f3 f9 38 ca 19 42 cd 13 7c 2f ec 9b 77 | 55 0e e1 b4 85 a1 8f 0d aa 08 cd 0c 6f 2e 1a 82 | 45 0c 45 33 04 4c 82 05 78 f7 b2 13 f4 f9 f5 53 | 46 de ec ef f3 81 20 5c ac b4 ac 3b df cf 22 72 | 07 45 7b 4b ab 24 c4 49 6c 56 b3 38 69 54 7e 58 | c2 4c bf e1 70 f5 e8 cf 0b 0b 95 8a 08 ba c2 2a | 7e 4c 7a 93 dc b4 0d 14 01 d3 20 62 29 00 00 24 | 54 db 47 dd 6f e8 71 21 52 1e 79 ff 1f 34 ad 72 | df 0b f6 0f 15 8b 3d fb df 74 e7 97 a2 02 fb a0 | 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 | 97 7b 58 7f fd c1 30 15 79 97 69 79 1c 05 dc 93 | 1a dd 26 65 26 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 f4 cd 70 15 | d8 8d 09 bd 1c 0d 8d 84 34 1c 85 e3 88 13 72 ce | 00 00 00 05 04 | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ddc28 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d3fd0e1d98 | event_schedule: new EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55d3fd0e1d98 | inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 200 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0e1e08 size 128 | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | #1 spent 0.346 milliseconds in resume sending helper answer | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f2938002888 | spent 0.00267 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 23 00 01 ff | 00 01 00 05 a2 b6 1a 5b 82 f2 20 f6 e9 1a 58 5a | 50 38 f3 77 06 f7 56 5e 1d ef 0e 33 88 e7 76 7f | ca d3 2b bb cd 86 ca a7 47 ed fb 85 88 eb 75 df | 43 28 32 61 70 13 db 7a e6 50 e6 27 24 c3 1e 6e | 30 d6 3d 43 e7 2a 72 4c 4a f1 25 61 97 46 fc 0f | 27 a6 8c 34 d6 fe 30 2c 37 54 fc 79 72 bc 44 17 | 46 6a 43 45 19 16 85 84 c8 f1 ac d1 60 15 b3 fc | f7 22 26 45 cf b8 32 63 22 31 42 bd de b0 33 75 | 2a ad 42 eb 53 27 14 30 3c be c4 7a f1 2e 77 5e | bc cb 76 ad 4b 61 43 1f 0f cc ff f0 56 a0 4e 33 | 31 91 d3 fe 62 17 a8 51 82 13 67 14 77 ad 24 3b | 36 31 0b 52 f2 7b d1 a9 19 02 07 b8 db cf 65 c0 | 03 44 66 09 fb 82 c1 8e 8b 3d dc 87 88 50 45 9d | af db cd c7 23 41 f1 c8 94 22 a6 af 1c 4d 2f b7 | e3 a3 59 51 b2 33 3f 26 46 08 5c b9 67 81 28 83 | d9 f8 14 5c af 51 d0 0f 1e b3 a1 9b 24 01 64 11 | ac d8 b5 11 53 f6 6a d0 d8 5c 3a ea c6 ce f0 81 | b4 44 60 95 9b 33 80 07 7a a0 69 ce ef 86 1e ed | 29 be bf 91 f9 11 d2 23 f7 55 65 51 05 57 73 a1 | a5 e1 67 60 14 fa 58 29 1f cf c9 e3 94 2d 98 7f | 00 62 1d 0c 2c cd 0a 5b b5 86 99 ff 6e 59 b0 71 | b2 90 c2 a0 0a cf 9d cd 9a a9 3a 72 68 43 43 7a | 2f bb 73 21 33 81 fb 54 14 0f 7f e1 ed ec 71 86 | 7f e8 df 72 fd 67 37 6c 99 6b a6 df 22 14 bd ec | 95 c9 7a ee a8 07 8d 28 da 0f c9 f3 60 8c 80 2d | e4 1d 9f 8e cc cd a6 ef 55 ec 2e e5 8a b7 d9 5f | da 66 ef b2 61 69 2a 2c 8f 41 08 07 ea eb cd 8c | 1f b7 82 42 1b f5 a8 d6 13 4c 5d bd 15 dc 96 dc | 38 43 fe 0b f6 2f 02 93 c0 12 f4 02 22 18 76 dc | 28 0c a1 ae 1d 75 c6 30 12 1c f1 08 bd 39 47 59 | 96 82 d9 9e 49 9b 4f 8c 54 a7 29 e1 31 08 ea 76 | 66 68 f7 4a f8 1f 42 02 58 36 97 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2064) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - message is new; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (0x23) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 1 (0x1) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | Message ID: start-responder #1 request 1; ike: initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=-1->1 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '1', total number '5', next payload '35' | updated IKE fragment state to respond using fragments without waiting for re-transmits | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.185 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.199 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00135 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 02 00 05 c8 92 92 8f 79 83 da c1 6e 3f 51 e5 | 3e e4 48 a3 bd b5 d3 ae cf 4a 35 91 f3 e8 f5 f0 | fc fd 0b ad 10 b5 55 15 b2 31 6e a1 1d 16 e7 e0 | b3 dd 9c 69 fb 83 b0 33 e9 3d 5c 35 b2 ec 9d aa | a8 08 58 5b 98 40 d7 74 7c fd 94 38 77 d6 5f 9b | d2 7b 59 ef 8e b3 12 17 47 36 46 fe 01 13 98 f0 | cc cf 4a 4a 23 0f be 6b 5e b6 28 27 dd 00 eb 55 | 31 fa 2b 44 78 57 ee 2f 1e e4 42 ed 49 e2 b7 16 | ce d7 ac b4 9e 89 1c fc 61 a5 7f 18 38 ed 07 6c | e4 76 fb 5e 1b e5 d4 6f 08 34 19 8f 64 0a cf 37 | 95 f3 45 78 93 12 51 32 4c ff 6f c8 45 b8 ed c3 | 8c 21 ae 5e 07 35 e9 0e d4 51 25 bb 72 89 2d 41 | 0a dc ed b2 99 12 a3 9f 25 6b 34 c9 00 ac bb 46 | 9f 8a 44 5e 95 f0 c2 c7 38 f0 1f 41 33 a6 69 2d | d5 4a e3 9f c5 9b c8 d3 c2 0f e1 2c 8e 10 22 3e | 57 29 dc bd 6f 7b 86 ae 14 e0 36 e1 51 a9 4a 0f | 2a 75 6d b6 4f 5a 07 ef ac 62 e4 26 09 7f cb 27 | 2a 32 66 66 23 58 a9 e8 f3 50 34 25 f5 4b 01 68 | 39 e9 8a de 5b 0a 94 09 bf 5c e6 85 92 e3 60 b4 | 85 fc e6 7b 6a 66 00 c1 ef 38 38 53 32 a5 a4 4c | 0a 9e 5d ef 0c 9c 05 45 0d e1 60 39 40 e4 3b 7b | 13 23 f8 7a f5 2a e7 69 ad b2 a2 a3 65 8b 60 a0 | 80 9c 6e ce 7d f1 4a 56 42 1d 4b 1a d6 c6 41 f4 | 5d b0 23 75 b7 f7 51 cd e9 c8 6f 9c e2 0e c0 26 | a6 a4 36 9b 37 ad 93 f7 c6 a1 11 c2 d5 3f 36 f7 | 86 27 d4 8a 76 68 4d 0b d0 35 12 04 90 45 74 a4 | 95 f5 1f 61 4d 2b ba dc 1a 85 cb 4a c8 84 55 a3 | 31 a6 66 75 0b a4 4e 8c 85 95 b6 09 af 71 7c 4b | dd fc 3b a0 f0 23 22 b1 d4 fb a6 27 f1 ed b4 56 | b7 20 e3 b0 b0 13 ad 7d 4d 1a db 3e 9b b5 f0 43 | 2b 27 fc a6 30 74 15 3a ad 4f 82 4c dc a6 8e 07 | b0 58 28 61 1b 55 c4 c2 a4 0f 92 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 2 (0x2) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '2', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.163 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.175 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00132 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 03 00 05 2e 10 8d 7a c2 10 68 21 17 83 24 11 | 6e 65 e7 6d ec 3d b1 2e 4d e4 c5 bd 9e 16 3f 77 | 1e 38 4b 67 f2 23 3b fa a9 2c 0a c7 c0 e8 30 4f | 8f e5 7a 95 e4 23 31 a4 c2 5a 8a 6a 73 41 72 5b | 13 18 d2 e4 85 1d 7a ce 94 b4 82 de 64 9f 90 49 | 63 00 1b fa 0a af c2 df cb b2 e8 2d 37 8f 48 ba | db 4d c8 80 9e f2 74 2a 12 b7 b6 01 f6 a1 9f b3 | 1f c4 34 12 28 79 d1 02 64 e6 c3 c8 f6 55 12 ee | 55 5b 2f 5f 6d 3b 64 6c 9e cf ad 8d 32 bd 15 4a | 22 ff 3b 4b 9c 2b be a2 f9 75 cf 7a 08 e9 68 c0 | 7c c5 08 50 50 e8 27 b6 39 72 ad 11 81 16 ca 46 | 61 30 d6 73 c4 40 a6 44 17 9f ea 05 a7 46 59 bd | a0 d9 9d f6 f3 41 2b d9 e3 2f 46 d8 79 4f a3 df | 46 36 53 2e 27 1d c8 eb 98 4f 2d b2 f5 c8 42 63 | 29 fd 36 a2 47 31 47 5e 86 c9 ce f7 c1 5e d3 dd | 8c ad eb f0 10 24 e3 ae 38 2e 07 93 42 c6 24 5f | 7b 2c d2 11 75 97 77 08 b5 40 de 5f be 6e 27 cd | 1a 69 8a df 48 c1 32 4c 70 c1 77 60 df 9d 7e 71 | 0e c8 de a4 47 01 23 36 ba b8 00 01 c7 27 0a 06 | df 2e bb fc de 88 03 ab 10 c8 e4 e3 0c 2a 5f 54 | a6 09 10 d6 ec 82 db 73 b8 96 af 6a fd 46 07 75 | 48 80 61 b7 22 87 1d 87 bb b4 1e f1 86 fa b1 78 | c3 b0 e8 81 79 59 18 49 3d cc 2f 3e 9f 6b 05 26 | be dd 1b ce 0b 5b 3f 26 6c 3a 92 c9 50 48 77 bf | c5 11 e4 b3 52 79 f9 e5 e8 96 46 ae fb 59 ac f4 | b1 ea 33 62 71 ee 1c cb f3 33 ef 87 b3 50 a8 e7 | 9c ff a3 7b 7b af 63 f3 96 6b fa 71 06 73 40 b9 | 00 f1 3e be 16 f8 c2 07 fb d7 17 4c 03 14 3b fc | 05 1d 6e f9 e6 94 f5 19 15 4e 6d 20 43 af 16 ce | ef b9 49 a1 39 4e ff fb aa e8 25 c9 5b d3 4a 72 | db ac a7 f1 15 f4 53 e2 d2 88 89 cc f4 72 b3 d4 | 15 bb a3 e1 40 be bb 92 95 28 95 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 3 (0x3) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '3', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.155 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.167 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00123 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 539 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 1b 00 00 01 ff | 00 04 00 05 45 af 7b 68 c1 77 ad c4 3a ba eb b0 | 06 1c 23 78 e4 84 cb bf 9c 1c dc ab 9c 95 0a eb | b2 7f d3 86 75 df 0d 2a f0 9f a2 2b 04 f8 6d 4a | 00 4b d1 73 2e 49 2e b2 02 62 45 bb 9d ff 77 85 | f2 93 7c 80 5a 57 8e 9b c5 31 90 20 6c a1 03 bc | 2e 4a 5c 2c db 6d dc ed 79 fb 04 f7 47 15 26 74 | 4a 65 93 f9 a1 e2 dd a0 6b d3 aa 73 8a 64 f5 32 | 4c 8c b1 04 fc 9a 9e 5a 31 6f b4 46 6a 7d 29 d9 | 61 f4 5b f7 7f 3f 7b f8 75 a4 b4 2e 28 d8 b0 8e | 50 f4 23 c6 5b 1d 4e 1f a3 85 51 ba 81 af 74 f9 | 73 63 86 dc 49 6b 2d dc cd 0e 31 be 9c 08 3f b5 | a7 4a 5d 95 83 0e c0 85 35 b1 fe f3 df 88 f9 a1 | 19 eb 78 77 4e e1 25 a9 0b e9 ae e7 d5 30 9d b5 | 6b c0 c7 0f dd e7 25 d2 b8 2e 46 8f f8 a5 00 c5 | 28 d4 b5 21 13 0e e0 75 a8 0f e7 09 42 58 d3 ed | 20 4e ba da bb cd 65 ef 71 7c 34 6d 53 98 73 07 | 0f d2 64 00 8a 19 c0 94 a8 f1 98 46 af 3f 81 77 | e2 d9 ab 4c b8 6d f0 9d 23 f9 7c 57 9d c6 02 0e | 66 34 f7 fb ed a0 1a 67 25 21 38 53 5b 06 8a 93 | 3b c8 5a d0 20 66 dc d2 71 3c f6 ae 59 57 1c 0e | 41 da d3 da f8 7d 66 33 d2 25 82 bf 56 fb 00 8d | 13 3b 85 46 6d 9b 63 36 8d db c6 12 5f 92 88 90 | 5d d7 82 f5 d0 19 3c 4f e7 24 51 d0 73 cd cf 3d | 66 2f 30 9f 80 aa cb 21 97 20 4a 73 5d a2 60 e2 | d9 d1 50 f9 55 60 e8 c9 27 32 be 11 7b 0c de 46 | 6d 34 a2 e4 9d 2e 96 e9 72 e2 3f f8 4f a1 51 2c | 6f 1d d5 e2 57 dc b9 99 d4 91 40 f3 41 1d 81 78 | 60 5e 34 73 2b d6 56 20 d4 97 6e 9c a7 82 58 6e | b0 74 a0 2f df a8 88 20 f2 fd c1 f2 90 78 69 56 | d3 3e 4b 7c 14 e7 40 05 2f 2c b5 75 35 6e d9 23 | ec 9d c1 4b 4f 41 8d 91 75 eb f9 9a a8 d9 d7 13 | db 48 f7 08 2e 2e 28 c6 93 b8 d6 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 539 (0x21b) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 511 (0x1ff) | fragment number: 4 (0x4) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=503) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '4', total number '5', next payload '0' | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.157 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.169 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | spent 0.00125 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() calling check_incoming_msg_errqueue() | *received 209 bytes from 192.1.2.45:500 on eth1 (192.1.2.23:500) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 d1 00 00 00 b5 | 00 05 00 05 d8 97 ab 6a 74 d5 0e 60 52 d0 05 e2 | e5 f0 ac cd d3 c5 27 aa 8e d5 04 26 f3 7c 39 13 | 45 89 05 89 98 8e 3a ae 63 5f f8 a7 04 06 b8 1c | 00 fe f6 1f 7f 08 97 65 61 7e 4a 11 a7 04 28 ef | 6d ab 04 f7 46 4f 46 c8 c1 41 97 c7 83 eb 6a e2 | 64 ad a2 d9 ad 0c ed 7b 48 bb 8e 0a 4e c7 af 58 | f4 5e 25 54 45 a0 79 f8 67 15 a0 6e 94 c3 f7 f8 | 07 96 7c 9d 34 e7 14 88 60 8f 4a 77 e1 fb 6e 05 | 91 e2 a4 68 d4 c0 23 2f 71 7a fe 47 5d c8 bf c9 | 80 58 23 5f f2 63 70 a7 b3 6e 83 b1 b6 59 bb be | 04 39 d6 e8 af e2 6f 56 43 3b 15 e3 a3 ac a8 54 | 36 | start processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:378) | **parse ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (0x35) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_IKE_INIT (0x8) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | length: 209 (0xd1) | processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (35) | I am the IKE SA Original Responder receiving an IKEv2 IKE_AUTH request | State DB: found IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 (find_v2_ike_sa) | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2016) | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ike_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2062) | #1 st.st_msgid_lastrecv 0 md.hdr.isa_msgid 00000001 | #1 is idle | #1 idle | Message ID: #1 not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments; initiator.sent=-1 initiator.recv=-1 responder.sent=0 responder.recv=0 wip.initiator=-1 wip.responder=1 | unpacking clear payload | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) | ***parse IKEv2 Encrypted Fragment: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 181 (0xb5) | fragment number: 5 (0x5) | total fragments: 5 (0x5) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF (len=173) | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | received IKE encrypted fragment number '5', total number '5', next payload '0' | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) | ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 | offloading IKEv2 SKEYSEED using prf=HMAC_SHA2_512 integ=NONE cipherkey=AES_GCM_16 | adding ikev2_inI2outR2 KE work-order 2 for state #1 | state #1 requesting EVENT_SO_DISCARD to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0e1e08 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_SO_DISCARD-pe@0x55d3fd0e1d98 | event_schedule: new EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d3fd0e1d98 | inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, timeout in 60 seconds for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f2938002888 size 128 | #1 spent 0.0371 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED) in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->PARENT_R1 with status STF_SUSPEND | suspending state #1 and saving MD | #1 is busy; has a suspended MD | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in log_stf_suspend() at ikev2.c:3269) | "san" #1 complete v2 state STATE_PARENT_R1 transition with STF_SUSPEND suspended from complete_v2_state_transition:3451 | stop processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in ikev2_process_packet() at ikev2.c:2018) | #1 spent 0.185 milliseconds in ikev2_process_packet() | stop processing: from 192.1.2.45:500 (in process_md() at demux.c:380) | processing: STOP state #0 (in process_md() at demux.c:382) | processing: STOP connection NULL (in process_md() at demux.c:383) | spent 0.197 milliseconds in comm_handle_cb() reading and processing packet | crypto helper 1 resuming | crypto helper 1 starting work-order 2 for state #1 | crypto helper 1 doing compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 | calculating skeyseed using prf=sha2_512 integ=none cipherkey-size=32 salt-size=4 | crypto helper 1 finished compute dh (V2) (ikev2_inI2outR2 KE); request ID 2 time elapsed 0.001384 seconds | (#1) spent 1.39 milliseconds in crypto helper computing work-order 2: ikev2_inI2outR2 KE (pcr) | crypto helper 1 sending results from work-order 2 for state #1 to event queue | scheduling resume sending helper answer for #1 | libevent_malloc: new ptr-libevent@0x7f2930000f48 size 128 | crypto helper 1 waiting (nothing to do) | processing resume sending helper answer for #1 | start processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in resume_handler() at server.c:797) | crypto helper 1 replies to request ID 2 | calling continuation function 0x55d3fb7b2b50 | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 | #1 in state PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection | #1 ikev2 ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH decrypt success | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) | **parse IKEv2 Identification - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (0x25) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 191 (0xbf) | ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (0x9) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=183) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT) | **parse IKEv2 Certificate Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (0x27) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 1265 (0x4f1) | ikev2 cert encoding: CERT_X509_SIGNATURE (0x4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT (len=1260) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) | **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (0x21) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 392 (0x188) | auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_RSA (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=384) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) | **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (0x2c) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 164 (0xa4) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=160) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Initiator - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (0x2d) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=16) | Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) | **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector - Responder - Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | length: 24 (0x18) | number of TS: 1 (0x1) | processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=16) | selected state microcode Responder: process IKE_AUTH request | Now let's proceed with state specific processing | calling processor Responder: process IKE_AUTH request "san" #1: processing decrypted IKE_AUTH request: SK{IDi,CERT,AUTH,SA,TSi,TSr} | #1 updating local interface from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.23:500 using md->iface (in update_ike_endpoints() at state.c:2669) | global one-shot timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS scheduled in 300 seconds loading root certificate cache | spent 3.61 milliseconds in get_root_certs() calling PK11_ListCertsInSlot() | spent 0.0251 milliseconds in get_root_certs() filtering CAs | #1 spent 3.68 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling get_root_certs() | checking for known CERT payloads | saving certificate of type 'X509_SIGNATURE' | decoded cert: E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org,CN=west.testing.libreswan.org,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.199 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling decode_cert_payloads() | cert_issuer_has_current_crl: looking for a CRL issued by E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA | #1 spent 0.0404 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling crl_update_check() | missing or expired CRL | crl_strict: 0, ocsp: 0, ocsp_strict: 0, ocsp_post: 0 | verify_end_cert trying profile IPsec "san" #1: Certificate E=testing@libreswan.org,CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca,OU=Test Department,O=Libreswan,L=Toronto,ST=Ontario,C=CA failed IPsec verification "san" #1: ERROR: The certificate was signed using a signature algorithm that is disabled because it is not secure. | #1 spent 0.426 milliseconds in find_and_verify_certs() calling verify_end_cert() "san" #1: X509: Certificate rejected for this connection "san" #1: X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked | DER ASN1 DN: 30 81 b4 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 43 41 | DER ASN1 DN: 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 0c 07 4f 6e 74 61 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 69 6f 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 0c 07 54 6f 72 | DER ASN1 DN: 6f 6e 74 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 09 4c | DER ASN1 DN: 69 62 72 65 73 77 61 6e 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 | DER ASN1 DN: 0b 0c 0f 54 65 73 74 20 44 65 70 61 72 74 6d 65 | DER ASN1 DN: 6e 74 31 23 30 21 06 03 55 04 03 0c 1a 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 2e 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 31 2e 30 2c 06 09 2a 86 48 | DER ASN1 DN: 86 f7 0d 01 09 01 16 1f 75 73 65 72 2d 77 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 74 40 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 2e 6c 69 62 72 65 73 | DER ASN1 DN: 77 61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 | refine_host_connection for IKEv2: starting with "san" | match_id a=C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org | b=%fromcert | results fail | refine_host_connection: checking "san" against "san", best=(none) with match=0(id=0(0)/ca=1(0)/reqca=1(0)) | Warning: not switching back to template of current instance | No IDr payload received from peer | refine_host_connection: checked san against san, now for see if best | started looking for secret for C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org->%fromcert of kind PKK_RSA | searching for certificate PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef vs PKK_RSA:AwEAAbEef | refine_host_connection: picking new best "san" (wild=0, peer_pathlen=0/our=0) | refine going into 2nd loop allowing instantiated conns as well | returning since no better match than original best_found | copying ID for fromcert | offered CA: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=Libreswan test CA for mainca, E=testing@libreswan.org' "san" #1: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_DER_ASN1_DN: 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | verifying AUTH payload | required RSA CA is '%any' | checking RSA keyid 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'user-east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '@east.testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid 'east@testing.libreswan.org' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | checking RSA keyid '192.1.2.23' for match with 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' "san" #1: no RSA public key known for 'C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=west.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-west@testing.libreswan.org' | #1 spent 0.0662 milliseconds in ikev2_verify_rsa_hash() "san" #1: RSA authentication of I2 Auth Payload failed "san" #1: responding to IKE_AUTH message (ID 1) from 192.1.2.45:500 with encrypted notification AUTHENTICATION_FAILED | Opening output PBS encrypted notification | **emit ISAKMP Message: | initiator cookie: | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 | responder cookie: | 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (0x0) | ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) (0x20) | exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH (0x23) | flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_v2_MSG_RESPONSE (0x20) | Message ID: 1 (0x1) | next payload chain: saving message location 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' | ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | next payload chain: setting previous 'ISAKMP Message'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Encryption Payload (46:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting 8 zero bytes of IV into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | Adding a v2N Payload | ****emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: | next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE (0x0) | flags: none (0x0) | Protocol ID: PROTO_v2_RESERVED (0x0) | SPI size: 0 (0x0) | Notify Message Type: v2N_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED (0x18) | next payload chain: setting previous 'IKEv2 Encryption Payload'.'next payload type' to current IKEv2 Notify Payload (41:ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) | next payload chain: saving location 'IKEv2 Notify Payload'.'next payload type' in 'encrypted notification' | emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 | adding 1 bytes of padding (including 1 byte padding-length) | emitting 1 0x00 repeated bytes of padding and length into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting 16 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC/KEY into IKEv2 Encryption Payload | emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 37 | emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 65 | sending 65 bytes for v2 notify through eth1 from 192.1.2.23:500 to 192.1.2.45:500 (using #1) | fe cb 14 1f d3 e4 a4 c0 29 27 bd c7 0a c1 b7 f3 | 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 41 29 00 00 25 | 48 c2 e1 aa 2a ad 0b 8e f5 b0 45 6c f3 2c b2 d7 | 00 cc 19 c7 9a e6 65 81 4f 7a 39 f9 f9 3f d4 7a | 3e | pstats #1 ikev2.ike failed auth-failed | ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue_tail returned STF_FATAL | #1 spent 4.8 milliseconds in processing: Responder: process IKE_AUTH request in ikev2_process_state_packet() | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in complete_v2_state_transition() at ikev2.c:3379) | #1 complete_v2_state_transition() PARENT_R1->V2_IPSEC_R with status STF_FATAL | release_pending_whacks: state #1 has no whack fd | pstats #1 ikev2.ike deleted auth-failed | #1 spent 4.37 milliseconds in total | [RE]START processing: state #1 connection "san" from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:879) "san" #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R1) aged 0.023s and NOT sending notification | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => delete | state #1 requesting EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT to be deleted | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f2938002888 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT-pe@0x55d3fd0e1d98 | State DB: IKEv2 state not found (flush_incomplete_children) | in connection_discard for connection san | State DB: deleting IKEv2 state #1 in PARENT_R1 | parent state #1: PARENT_R1(half-open IKE SA) => UNDEFINED(ignore) | stop processing: state #1 from 192.1.2.45:500 (in delete_state() at state.c:1143) | resume sending helper answer for #1 suppresed complete_v2_state_transition() | in statetime_stop() and could not find #1 | processing: STOP state #0 (in resume_handler() at server.c:833) | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x7f2930000f48 | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_CONNECTION_... in show_connections_status | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in show_states_status (sort_states) | close_any(fd@16) (in whack_process() at rcv_whack.c:700) | spent 0.316 milliseconds in whack | accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen) -> fd@16 (in whack_handle() at rcv_whack.c:722) shutting down | processing: RESET whack log_fd (was fd@16) (in exit_pluto() at plutomain.c:1825) destroying root certificate cache | certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' forgetting secrets | certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshared_secrets' | unreference key: 0x55d3fd0e3888 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Libreswan, OU=Test Department, CN=east.testing.libreswan.org, E=user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d3fd0e3408 user-east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d3fd0e2ea8 @east.testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d3fd0e1768 east@testing.libreswan.org cnt 1-- | unreference key: 0x55d3fd0e1548 192.1.2.23 cnt 1-- | start processing: connection "san" (in delete_connection() at connections.c:189) | Deleting states for connection - including all other IPsec SA's of this IKE SA | pass 0 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | pass 1 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in foreach_state_by_connection_func_delete | free hp@0x55d3fd0ddfd8 | flush revival: connection 'san' wasn't on the list | stop processing: connection "san" (in discard_connection() at connections.c:249) | crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' | crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:4500 shutting down interface eth0/eth0 192.0.2.254:500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:4500 shutting down interface eth1/eth1 192.1.2.23:500 | FOR_EACH_STATE_... in delete_states_dead_interfaces | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ce768 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da658 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074f78 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da708 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074898 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da7b8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c158 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da868 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c258 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da918 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd07c358 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0da9c8 | FOR_EACH_UNORIENTED_CONNECTION_... in check_orientations | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0ce818 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0c2938 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074ec8 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd0c2498 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bb478 | free_event_entry: release EVENT_NULL-pe@0x55d3fd07c408 | global timer EVENT_REINIT_SECRET uninitialized | global timer EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_DDNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 uninitialized | global timer EVENT_CHECK_CRLS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_REVIVE_CONNS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_FREE_ROOT_CERTS uninitialized | global timer EVENT_RESET_LOG_RATE_LIMIT uninitialized | global timer EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE uninitialized | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0809d8 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGCHLD uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fcffe728 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGTERM uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9e38 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGHUP uninstalled | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da078 | signal event handler PLUTO_SIGSYS uninstalled | releasing event base | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9f48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bcd58 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bcd08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd074218 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bccc8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9b08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9d78 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0bcf08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0c2508 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0c2168 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0daa38 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da988 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da8d8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da828 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da778 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0da6c8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fcffda48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9df8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9db8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9c78 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9f08 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0d9b48 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd082568 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0824e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fcffddb8 | releasing global libevent data | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0826e8 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd082668 | libevent_free: release ptr-libevent@0x55d3fd0825e8 leak detective found no leaks