Basic pluto with IKEv2 using PSK on the initiator (west), and on the responder.

This is the reverse of ikev2-algo-02-modp2048-responder

This time, one end has an ike=aes128-sha1-modp2048 specified. This will
cause a negotiation failure in 2.6.06 and earlier, visible in the logs with:

|                   prf=  (policy:prf-hmac-md5 vs offered:prf-hmac-sha1)
|                   dh=   (policy:(null) vs offered:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048)
| proposal 1       encr= (policy:3des vs offered:aes-cbc)
|             failed integ=(policy:auth-hmac-sha1-96 vs offered:auth-hmac-sha1-96)
|             failed prf=  (policy:prf-hmac-sha1 vs offered:prf-hmac-sha1)
|                   dh=   (policy:(null) vs offered:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048)
| proposal 1       encr= (policy:3des vs offered:aes-cbc)
|             failed integ=(policy:auth-hmac-sha1-96 vs offered:auth-hmac-sha1-96)
|                   prf=  (policy:prf-hmac-md5 vs offered:prf-hmac-sha1)
|                   dh=   (policy:(null) vs offered:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048)
| complete v2 state transition with (null)
| state transition function for STATE_PARENT_R1 failed: NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN


note: this test was updated from SHA1 to SHA2, since SHA1 is no longer in the list
of default algorithms. It is not entirely clear this test is still testing anything.