/home/build/quick-libreswan-2/programs/pluto/ikev2.c

Bug Summary

File:	programs/pluto/ikev2.c
Warning:	line 2905, column 8 Dereference of null pointer
Annotated Source Code

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clang -cc1 -cc1 -triple x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu -analyze -disable-free -disable-llvm-verifier -discard-value-names -main-file-name ikev2.c -analyzer-store=region -analyzer-opt-analyze-nested-blocks -analyzer-checker=core -analyzer-checker=apiModeling -analyzer-checker=unix -analyzer-checker=deadcode -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.UncheckedReturn -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.getpw -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.gets -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.mktemp -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.mkstemp -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.vfork -analyzer-checker=nullability.NullPassedToNonnull -analyzer-checker=nullability.NullReturnedFromNonnull -analyzer-output plist -w -setup-static-analyzer -mrelocation-model pic -pic-level 2 -pic-is-pie -mframe-pointer=all -relaxed-aliasing -fmath-errno -fno-rounding-math -mconstructor-aliases -munwind-tables -target-cpu x86-64 -tune-cpu generic -debugger-tuning=gdb -fcoverage-compilation-dir=/home/build/quick-libreswan-2/programs/pluto -resource-dir /usr/lib64/clang/13.0.0 -D TimeZoneOffset=timezone -D PIE -D NSS_IPSEC_PROFILE -D XFRM_LIFETIME_DEFAULT=30 -D USE_IKEv1 -D XFRM_SUPPORT -D USE_XFRM_INTERFACE -D USE_DNSSEC -D DEFAULT_DNSSEC_ROOTKEY_FILE="/var/lib/unbound/root.key" -D HAVE_LABELED_IPSEC -D HAVE_SECCOMP -D LIBCURL -D USE_LINUX_AUDIT -D HAVE_NM -D USE_PAM_AUTH -D USE_3DES -D USE_AES -D USE_CAMELLIA -D USE_CHACHA -D USE_DH31 -D USE_MD5 -D USE_SHA1 -D USE_SHA2 -D USE_PRF_AES_XCBC -D USE_NSS_KDF -D DEFAULT_RUNDIR="/run/pluto" -D IPSEC_CONF="/etc/ipsec.conf" -D IPSEC_CONFDDIR="/etc/ipsec.d" -D IPSEC_NSSDIR="/var/lib/ipsec/nss" -D IPSEC_CONFDIR="/etc" -D IPSEC_EXECDIR="/usr/local/libexec/ipsec" -D IPSEC_SBINDIR="/usr/local/sbin" -D IPSEC_VARDIR="/var" -D POLICYGROUPSDIR="/etc/ipsec.d/policies" -D IPSEC_SECRETS_FILE="/etc/ipsec.secrets" -D FORCE_PR_ASSERT -D USE_FORK=1 -D USE_VFORK=0 -D USE_DAEMON=0 -D USE_PTHREAD_SETSCHEDPRIO=1 -D GCC_LINT -D HAVE_LIBCAP_NG -I . -I ../../OBJ.linux.x86_64/programs/pluto -I ../../include -I /usr/include/nss3 -I /usr/include/nspr4 -I /home/build/quick-libreswan-2/programs/pluto/linux-copy -D HERE_FILENAME="programs/pluto/ikev2.c" -internal-isystem /usr/lib64/clang/13.0.0/include -internal-isystem /usr/local/include -internal-isystem /usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/11/../../../../x86_64-redhat-linux/include -internal-externc-isystem /include -internal-externc-isystem /usr/include -std=gnu99 -fdebug-compilation-dir=/home/build/quick-libreswan-2/programs/pluto -ferror-limit 19 -stack-protector 3 -fgnuc-version=4.2.1 -analyzer-output=html -faddrsig -D__GCC_HAVE_DWARF2_CFI_ASM=1 -o /tmp/scan-build-2022-01-01-205714-1273399-1 -x c /home/build/quick-libreswan-2/programs/pluto/ikev2.c
1/* demultiplex incoming IKE messages
*
* Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
* Copyright (C) 1998-2010,2013-2017 D. Hugh Redelmeier <hugh@mimosa.com>
* Copyright (C) 2007-2008 Michael Richardson <mcr@xelerance.com>
* Copyright (C) 2009 David McCullough <david_mccullough@securecomputing.com>
* Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
* Copyright (C) 2010 Simon Deziel <simon@xelerance.com>
* Copyright (C) 2010 Tuomo Soini <tis@foobar.fi>
* Copyright (C) 2011-2012 Avesh Agarwal <avagarwa@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2012 Paul Wouters <paul@libreswan.org>
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2013 Matt Rogers <mrogers@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Andrew Cagney
* Copyright (C) 2016-2018 Antony Antony <appu@phenome.org>
* Copyright (C) 2017 Sahana Prasad <sahana.prasad07@gmail.com>
* Copyright (C) 2020 Yulia Kuzovkova <ukuzovkova@gmail.com>
* Copyright (C) 2021 Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version.  See <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl2.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*
*/

32#include <unistd.h>
33#include <sys/types.h>
34#include <sys/socket.h>
35#include <netinet/in.h>
36#include <arpa/inet.h>


39#include "sysdep.h"
40#include "constants.h"

42#include "defs.h"
43#include "id.h"
44#include "x509.h"
45#include "pluto_x509.h"
46#include "certs.h"
47#include "connections.h"        /* needs id.h */
48#include "state.h"
49#include "packet.h"
50#include "crypto.h"
51#include "crypt_symkey.h"
52#include "ike_alg.h"
53#include "log.h"
54#include "demux.h"      /* needs packet.h */
55#include "ikev2.h"
56#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
57#include "timer.h"
58#include "whack.h"      /* requires connections.h */
59#include "server.h"
60#include "nat_traversal.h"
61#include "vendor.h"
62#include "ip_address.h"
63#include "ikev2_send.h"
64#include "state_db.h"
65#include "ietf_constants.h"
66#include "ikev2_cookie.h"
67#include "plutoalg.h" /* for default_ike_groups */
68#include "ikev2_message.h"	/* for ikev2_decrypt_msg() */
69#include "pluto_stats.h"
70#include "keywords.h"
71#include "ikev2_msgid.h"
72#include "ikev2_redirect.h"
73#include "ikev2_states.h"
74#include "ip_endpoint.h"
75#include "host_pair.h"		/* for find_v2_host_connection() */
76#include "kernel.h"
77#include "iface.h"
78#include "ikev2_notify.h"
79#include "unpack.h"
80#include "pending.h"		/* for release_pending_whacks() */
81#include "ikev2_host_pair.h"
82#include "ikev2_ike_sa_init.h"
83#include "ikev2_informational.h"
84#include "ikev2_create_child_sa.h"
85#include "ikev2_ike_intermediate.h"
86#include "ikev2_ike_auth.h"
87#include "ikev2_delete.h"		/* for record_v2_delete() */
88#include "ikev2_child.h"		/* for jam_v2_child_sa_details() */

90/*
* IKEv2 has slightly different states than IKEv1.
*
* IKEv2 puts all the responsibility for retransmission on the end that
* wants to do something, usually, that the initiator. (But, not always
* the original initiator, of the responder decides it needs to rekey first)
*
* Each exchange has a bit that indicates if it is an Initiator message,
* or if it is a response.  The Responder never retransmits its messages
* except in response to an Initiator retransmission.
*
* The message ID is *NOT* used in the cryptographic state at all, but instead
* serves the role of a sequence number.  This makes the state machine far
* simpler, and there really are no exceptions.
*
* The upper level state machine is therefore much simpler.
* The lower level takes care of retransmissions, and the upper layer state
* machine just has to worry about whether it needs to go into cookie mode,
* etc.
*
* Like IKEv1, IKEv2 can have multiple child SAs.  Like IKEv1, each one of
* the child SAs ("Phase 2") will get their own state. Unlike IKEv1,
* an implementation may negotiate multiple CHILD_SAs at the same time
* using different MessageIDs.  This is enabled by an option (a notify)
* that the responder sends to the initiator.  The initiator may only
* do concurrent negotiations if it sees the notify.
*
* XXX This implementation does not support concurrency, but it shouldn't be
*     that hard to do.  The most difficult part will be to map the message IDs
*     to the right state. Some CHILD_SAs may take multiple round trips,
*     and each one will have to be mapped to the same state.
*
* The IKEv2 state values are chosen from the same state space as IKEv1.
*
*/

126/*
* From RFC 5996 syntax: [optional] and {encrypted}
*
* Initiator                         Responder
* -------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* IKE_SA_INIT exchange (initial exchange):
*
* HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni            -->
*                                 <--  HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
*
* IKE_AUTH exchange (after IKE_SA_INIT exchange):
*
* HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
*        [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2,
*        TSi, TSr}              -->
*                                 <--  HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
*                                           SAr2, TSi, TSr}
* [Parent SA (SAx1) established. Child SA (SAx2) may have been established]
*
*
* Extended IKE_AUTH (see RFC 5996bis 2.6):
*
* HDR(A,0), SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->
*                              <--  HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE)
* HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE), SAi1,
*     KEi, Ni  -->
*                              <--  HDR(A,B), SAr1, KEr,
*                                       Nr, [CERTREQ]
* HDR(A,B), SK {IDi, [CERT,]
*     [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH,
*     SAi2, TSi, TSr}  -->
*                              <--  HDR(A,B), SK {IDr, [CERT,]
*                                       AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
* [Parent SA (SAx1) established. Child SA (SAx2) may have been established]
*
*
* CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange (new child variant RFC 5996 1.3.1):
*
* HDR, SK {SA, Ni, [KEi],
*            TSi, TSr}  -->
*                              <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
*                                       TSi, TSr}
*
*
* CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange (rekey child variant RFC 5996 1.3.3):
*
* HDR, SK {N(REKEY_SA), SA, Ni, [KEi],
*     TSi, TSr}   -->
*                    <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
*                             TSi, TSr}
*
*
* CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange (rekey parent SA variant RFC 5996 1.3.2):
*
* HDR, SK {SA, Ni, KEi} -->
*                            <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr}
*/

185/* Short forms for building payload type sets */

187#define P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_v2##N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2##N))

189/*
* IKEv2 State transitions (aka microcodes).
*
* This table contains all possible state transitions, some of which
* involve a message.
*
* During initialization this table parsed populating the
* corresponding IKEv2 finite states.  While not the most efficient,
* it seems to work.
*/

200static /*const*/ struct v2_state_transition v2_state_transition_table[] = {

202#define req_clear_payloads message_payloads.required   /* required unencrypted payloads (allows just one) for received packet */
203#define opt_clear_payloads message_payloads.optional   /* optional unencrypted payloads (none or one) for received packet */
204#define req_enc_payloads   encrypted_payloads.required /* required encrypted payloads (allows just one) for received packet */
205#define opt_enc_payloads   encrypted_payloads.optional /* optional encrypted payloads (none or one) for received packet */

/* no state:   --> I1
* HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
*/
{ .story      = "initiate IKE_SA_INIT",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_I1,
 .send       = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .processor  = NULL((void*)0),
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETRANSMIT, },

/* STATE_V2_PARENT_I1: R1B --> I1B
*                     <--  HDR, N
* HDR, N, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
*/

{ .story      = "received anti-DDOS COOKIE notify response; resending IKE_SA_INIT request with cookie payload added",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_I0,
 .flags = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG,
 .send       = NO_MESSAGE,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)), .notification = v2N_COOKIE, },
 .processor = ikev2_in_IKE_SA_INIT_R_v2N_COOKIE,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_DISCARD, },

{ .story      = "received IKE_SA_INIT INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notify response; resending IKE_SA_INIT with new KE payload",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_I0,
 .flags = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG,
 .send       = NO_MESSAGE,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)), .notification = v2N_INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, },
 .processor = process_v2_IKE_SA_INIT_response_v2N_INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_DISCARD, },

{ .story      = "received REDIRECT notify response; resending IKE_SA_INIT request to new destination",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_IKE_SA_DELETE,
 .flags = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG,
 .send       = NO_MESSAGE,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)), .notification = v2N_REDIRECT, },
 .processor = ikev2_in_IKE_SA_INIT_R_v2N_REDIRECT,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT,
 /* XXX: this is an instant timeout */
 .timeout_event = EVENT_v2_REDIRECT,
},

/* STATE_V2_PARENT_I1: R1 --> I2
*                     <--  HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
* HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
*      [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2,
*      TSi, TSr}      -->
*/
{ .story      = "Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH or IKE_INTERMEDIATE",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_I2,
 .send       = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)) | P(Nr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Nr)),
 .opt_clear_payloads = P(CERTREQ)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ)),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_SA_INIT_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETRANSMIT, },

{ .story      = "Initiator: process IKE_INTERMEDIATE reply, initiate IKE_AUTH or IKE_INTERMEDIATE",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I2,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_I2,
 .flags = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .send = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .opt_clear_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETRANSMIT, },

/* STATE_V2_PARENT_I2: R2 -->
*                     <--  HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
*                               SAr2, TSi, TSr}
* [Parent SA established]
*/

/*
* This pair of state transitions should be merged?
*/
{ .story      = "Initiator: process IKE_AUTH response",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I2,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 /* logged mid transition */
 .flags      = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG|SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = P(IDr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr)) | P(AUTH)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(CERT)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)) | P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(TSi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi)) | P(TSr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr)),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_AUTH_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE,
},

{ .story      = "Initiator: processing IKE_AUTH failure response",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_I2,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_I2,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)), },
 /* .encrypted_payloads = { .required = P(N), }, */
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_AUTH_failure_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH,
},

/* no state: none I1 --> R1
*                <-- HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni
* HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ] -->
*/
{ .story      = "Respond to IKE_SA_INIT",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_R0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_SA_INIT_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_DISCARD, },

/* STATE_V2_PARENT_R1: I2 --> R2
*                  <-- HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
*                             [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2,
*                             TSi, TSr}
* HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
*      SAr2, TSi, TSr} -->
*
* [Parent SA established]
*/
{ .story      = "Responder: process IKE_AUTH request (no SKEYSEED)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .flags = SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .opt_enc_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_AUTH_request_no_skeyseed,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_DISCARD, },

{ .story      = "Responder: process IKE_INTERMEDIATE request (no SKEYSEED)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .flags = MESSAGE_REQUEST | SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED,
 .send = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .opt_enc_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE_request_no_skeyseed,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_DISCARD, },

{ .story      = "Responder: process IKE_INTERMEDIATE request (with SKEYSEED)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .flags = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .send = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .opt_enc_payloads = LEMPTY((lset_t)0),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_DISCARD, },

/*
* These two transitions should be merged; the no-child
* variant is just so that the code can be hobbled.
*/

{ .story      = "Responder: process IKE_AUTH request",
 .state      = STATE_V2_PARENT_R1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG|SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = P(IDi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi)) | P(AUTH)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(CERT)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERT)) | P(CERTREQ)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CERTREQ)) | P(IDr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)) | P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(TSi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi)) | P(TSr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr)),
 .processor  = process_v2_IKE_AUTH_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE, },

/*
* There are three different CREATE_CHILD_SA's invocations,
* this is the combined write up (not in RFC). See above for
* individual cases from RFC.
*
* The order that they rekey here matters.
*
* HDR, SK {SA, Ni, [KEi], [N(REKEY_SA)], [TSi, TSr]} -->
*                <-- HDR, SK {N}
*                <-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr], [TSi, TSr]}
*/

/*
* CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to rekey IKE SA.
*
* In the responder, note the lack of TS (traffic selectors)
* payload.  Since rekey and create child exchanges contain TS
* they won't match.
*/

/* no state:   --> CREATE_CHILD IKE Rekey Request
* HDR, SAi, KEi, Ni -->
*/

{ .story      = "initiate rekey IKE_SA (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_I0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_I1,
 .send       = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .processor  = initiate_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_rekey_ike_request,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETRANSMIT, },

{ .story      = "process rekey IKE SA request (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_R0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)) | P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)),
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_rekey_ike_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE },

{ .story      = "process rekey IKE SA response (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)) |  P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)),
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_rekey_ike_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE, },

{ .story      = "process rekey IKE SA failure response (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_CHILD_SA_DELETE, /* never reached */
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)), },
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_failure_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, /* no timeout really */
},

/*
* CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to rekey existing child.
*
* In the responder, note the presence of both TS (traffic
* selectors) payload and REKEY_SA notification.  Since a
* create child does not include the REKEY_SA notify it won't
* match.
*/

{ .story      = "initiate rekey Child SA (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_CHILD_I0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_REKEY_CHILD_I1,
 .send       = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .processor  = initiate_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_rekey_child_request,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETRANSMIT, },

{ .story      = "process rekey Child SA request (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_CHILD_R0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .message_payloads.required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .encrypted_payloads.required = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)) | P(TSi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi)) | P(TSr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr)),
 .encrypted_payloads.optional = P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)) | P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .encrypted_payloads.notification = v2N_REKEY_SA,
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_rekey_child_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE, },

{ .story      = "process rekey Child SA response (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_CHILD_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .message_payloads.required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .encrypted_payloads.required = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)) | P(TSi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi)) | P(TSr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr)),
 .encrypted_payloads.optional = P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)) | P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_rekey_child_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE, },

{ .story      = "process rekey Child SA failure response (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_REKEY_CHILD_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_CHILD_SA_DELETE, /* never reached */
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)), },
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_failure_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, /* no timeout really */
},

/*
* CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to create a new child.
*
* In the responder note the presence of just TS (traffic
* selectors) payloads.  Earlier rules will have weeded out
* both rekey IKE (no TS payload) and rekey Child (has
* REKEY_SA notify) leaving just create new child.
*/

{ .story      = "initiate create Child SA (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I1,
 .send       = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .processor  = initiate_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_new_child_request,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETRANSMIT, },

{ .story      = "process create Child SA request (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_R0,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)) | P(TSi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi)) | P(TSr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)) | P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_new_child_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE, },

{ .story      = "process create Child SA response (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .req_enc_payloads = P(SA)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)) | P(Ni)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)) | P(TSi)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi)) | P(TSr)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(KE)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)) | P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_new_child_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_SA_REPLACE, },

{ .story      = "process create Child SA failure response (CREATE_CHILD_SA)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I1,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_CHILD_SA_DELETE, /* never reached */
 .flags      = SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .message_payloads = { .required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)), },
 .processor  = process_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA_failure_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, /* no timeout really */
},

/* Informational Exchange */

/* RFC 5996 1.4 "The INFORMATIONAL Exchange"
*
* HDR, SK {[N,] [D,] [CP,] ...}  -->
*   <--  HDR, SK {[N,] [D,] [CP], ...}
*
* A liveness exchange is a special empty message.
*
* XXX: since these just generate an empty response, they
* might as well have a dedicated liveness function.
*
* XXX: rather than all this transition duplication, the
* established states should share common transition stored
* outside of this table.
*/

{ .story      = "Informational Request (liveness probe)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .message_payloads.required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .processor  = process_v2_INFORMATIONAL_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, },

{ .story      = "Informational Response (liveness probe)",
 .state      = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .flags      = SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG|SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK,
 .message_payloads.required = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .processor  = process_v2_INFORMATIONAL_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, },

{ .story      = "Informational Request",
 .state      = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .send       = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(D)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2D)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .processor  = process_v2_INFORMATIONAL_request,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_REQUEST,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, },

{ .story      = "Informational Response",
 .state      = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(D)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2D)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .processor  = process_v2_INFORMATIONAL_response,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, },

{ .story      = "IKE_SA_DEL: process INFORMATIONAL response",
 .state      = STATE_V2_IKE_SA_DELETE,
 .next_state = STATE_V2_IKE_SA_DELETE,
 .flags      = 0,
 .req_clear_payloads = P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)),
 .opt_enc_payloads = P(N)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N)) | P(D)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2D)) | P(CP)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2CP)),
 .processor  = IKE_SA_DEL_process_v2_INFORMATIONAL_response,
 .recv_role  = MESSAGE_RESPONSE,
 .recv_type  = ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL,
 .timeout_event = EVENT_RETAIN, },

/* last entry */
{ .story      = "roof",
 .state      = STATE_IKEv2_ROOF }

643#undef req_clear_payloads
644#undef opt_clear_payloads
645#undef req_enc_payloads
646#undef opt_enc_payloads

648};

650void init_ikev2(void)
651{
dbg("checking IKEv2 state table"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("checking IKEv2 state table"); } };

/*
* Fill in FINITE_STATES[].
*
* This is a hack until each finite-state is a separate object
* with corresponding edges (aka microcodes).
*
* XXX: Long term goal is to have a constant FINITE_STATES[]
* contain constant pointers and this static writeable array
* to just go away.
*/
for (enum state_kind kind = STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR; kind < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF; kind++) {
/* fill in using static struct */
const struct finite_state *fs = &v2_states[kind - STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR];
passert(fs->kind == kind)({ _Bool assertion__ = fs->kind == kind; if (!assertion__)
 { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 667, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "fs->kind == kind"); }
 (void) 1; });
passert(finite_states[kind] == NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = finite_states[kind] == ((void*)0); if (
!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 668, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "finite_states[kind] == ((void*)0)"
); } (void) 1; });
finite_states[kind] = fs;
}

/*
* Iterate over the state transitions filling in missing bits
* and checking for consistency.
*/
for (struct v2_state_transition *t = v2_state_transition_table;
    t->state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF; t++) {

passert(t->state >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR)({ _Bool assertion__ = t->state >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR; if
 (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 679, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ =
 &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "t->state >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR"
); } (void) 1; });
passert(t->state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF)({ _Bool assertion__ = t->state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 680, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "t->state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF"
); } (void) 1; });
struct finite_state *from = &v2_states[t->state - STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR];

passert(t->next_state >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR)({ _Bool assertion__ = t->next_state >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 683, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ =
 &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "t->next_state >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR"
); } (void) 1; });
passert(t->next_state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF)({ _Bool assertion__ = t->next_state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 684, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ =
 &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "t->next_state < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF"
); } (void) 1; });
const struct finite_state *to = finite_states[t->next_state];
passert(to != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = to != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 686, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert
(logger_, here, "%s", "to != ((void*)0)"); } (void) 1; });

if (DBGP(DBG_BASE)(cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX))))) {
	if (from->nr_transitions == 0) {
		LSWLOG_DEBUG(buf)for (char lswbuf[((size_t)1024)], *lswbuf_ = lswbuf; lswbuf_ !=
 ((void*)0); lswbuf_ = ((void*)0)) for (struct jambuf jambuf =
 array_as_jambuf((lswbuf), sizeof(lswbuf)), *buf = &jambuf
; buf != ((void*)0); buf = ((void*)0)) for (; buf != ((void*)
0); jambuf_to_logger(buf, &failsafe_logger, DEBUG_STREAM)
, buf = ((void*)0)) {
			jam(buf, "  ");
			lswlog_finite_state(buf, from);
			jam(buf, ":");
		}
	}
	const char *send;
	switch (t->send) {
	case NO_MESSAGE: send = ""; break;
	case MESSAGE_REQUEST: send = " send-request"; break;
	case MESSAGE_RESPONSE: send = " send-response"; break;
	default: bad_case(t->send)libreswan_bad_case("t->send", (t->send), ({ static const
 struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 701, }; &here; }));
	}
	DBG_log("    -> %s %s%s (%s)", to->short_name,
		enum_name_short(&event_type_names,
				t->timeout_event),
		send, t->story);
}

/*
 * Check that the NOTIFY -> PBS -> MD.pbs[]!=NULL will work.
 */
if (t->message_payloads.notification != v2N_NOTHING_WRONG) {
	pexpect(v2_pd_from_notification(t->message_payloads.notification) != PD_v2_INVALID)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_pd_from_notification(t->message_payloads
.notification) != PD_v2_INVALID; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_
 = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 713, }; &here; }); const
 struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(
logger_, here_, "%s", "v2_pd_from_notification(t->message_payloads.notification) != PD_v2_INVALID"
); } assertion__; });
}
if (t->encrypted_payloads.notification != v2N_NOTHING_WRONG) {
	pexpect(v2_pd_from_notification(t->encrypted_payloads.notification) != PD_v2_INVALID)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_pd_from_notification(t->encrypted_payloads
.notification) != PD_v2_INVALID; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_
 = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 716, }; &here; }); const
 struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(
logger_, here_, "%s", "v2_pd_from_notification(t->encrypted_payloads.notification) != PD_v2_INVALID"
); } assertion__; });
}

/*
 * Check recv:MESSAGE_REQUEST->send:MESSAGE_RESPONSE.
 */
pexpect(t->recv_role == MESSAGE_REQUEST ? t->send = MESSAGE_RESPONSE : true)({ _Bool assertion__ = t->recv_role == MESSAGE_REQUEST ? t
->send = MESSAGE_RESPONSE : 1; if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 722, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "t->recv_role == MESSAGE_REQUEST ? t->send = MESSAGE_RESPONSE : 1"
); } assertion__; });

/*
 * Check recv_type && recv_role
 */
pexpect(t->recv_role == NO_MESSAGE ? t->recv_type == 0 : t->recv_type != 0)({ _Bool assertion__ = t->recv_role == NO_MESSAGE ? t->
recv_type == 0 : t->recv_type != 0; if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 727, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "t->recv_role == NO_MESSAGE ? t->recv_type == 0 : t->recv_type != 0"
); } assertion__; });

/*
 * Point .fs_v2_microcode at the first transition for
 * the from state.  All other transitions for the from
 * state should follow immediately after (or to put it
 * another way, previous should match).
 */
if (from->v2_transitions == NULL((void*)0)) {
	/* start of the next state */
	passert(from->nr_transitions == 0)({ _Bool assertion__ = from->nr_transitions == 0; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 737, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "from->nr_transitions == 0"
); } (void) 1; });
	from->v2_transitions = t;
} else {
	passert(t[-1].state == t->state)({ _Bool assertion__ = t[-1].state == t->state; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 740, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "t[-1].state == t->state"
); } (void) 1; });
}
from->nr_transitions++;
}
744}

746/*
* split an incoming message into payloads
*/
749struct payload_summary ikev2_decode_payloads(struct logger *log,
			     struct msg_digest *md,
			     pb_stream *in_pbs,
			     enum next_payload_types_ikev2 np)
753{
struct payload_summary summary = {
.parsed = true1,
.n = v2N_NOTHING_WRONG,
};

/*
* ??? zero out the digest descriptors -- might nuke
* ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK digest!
*
* XXX: and v2SKF? Safer to leave them as is and just use new
* ones - always add to MD, never take away.
*/

/*
* XXX: Currently, when a message containing an SK payload is
* decoded, the encrypted payloads get appended to the
* previously decoded non-encrypted payloads.  For instance,
* given a message containing two notifications:
*
*     N(1), SK{ N(2) }
*
* The notification digest would contain both the unencrypted
* N(1) and encrypted N(2).  Since the unencrypted value is
* protected, while not very good, isn't really dangerous.
*/

while (np != ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE) {
esb_buf b;
dbg("Now let's proceed with payload (%s)",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Now let's proceed with payload (%s)", enum_show
(&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b)); } }
    enum_show(&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b)){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Now let's proceed with payload (%s)", enum_show
(&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b)); } };

if (md->digest_roof >= elemsof(md->digest)(sizeof(md->digest) / sizeof(*(md->digest)))) {
	llog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, log,
		    "more than %zu payloads in message; ignored",
		    elemsof(md->digest)(sizeof(md->digest) / sizeof(*(md->digest))));
	summary.n = v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX;
	break;
}

/*
 * *pd is the payload digest for this payload.
 * It has three fields:
 *	pbs is filled in by in_struct
 *	payload is filled in by in_struct
 *	next is filled in by list linking logic
 */
struct payload_digest *const pd = md->digest + md->digest_roof;

/*
 * map the payload onto its payload descriptor which
 * describes how to decode it
 */
const struct_desc *sd = v2_payload_desc(np);

if (sd == NULL((void*)0)) {
	/*
	 * This payload is unknown to us.  RFCs 4306
	 * and 5996 2.5 say that if the payload has
	 * the Critical Bit, we should be upset but if
	 * it does not, we should just ignore it.
	 */
	diag_t d = pbs_in_struct(in_pbs, &ikev2_generic_desc,
				 &pd->payload, sizeof(pd->payload), &pd->pbs);
	if (d != NULL((void*)0)) {
		llog_diag(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, log, &d,
			 "malformed payload in packet");
		summary.n = v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX;
		break;
	}
	if (pd->payload.v2gen.isag_critical & ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_CRITICAL(1<<ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_FLAG_CRITICAL_IX)) {
		/*
		 * It was critical.  See RFC 5996 1.5
		 * "Version Numbers and Forward
		 * Compatibility"
		 */
		const char *role;
		switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
		case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
			role = "request";
			break;
		case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
			role = "response";
			break;
		default:
			bad_case(v2_msg_role(md))libreswan_bad_case("v2_msg_role(md)", (v2_msg_role(md)), ({ static
 const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 838, }; &here; }));
		}
		esb_buf b;
		llog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, log,
		     "message %s contained an unknown critical payload type (%s)",
		     role, enum_show(&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b));
		summary.n = v2N_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD;
		summary.data[0] = np;
		summary.data_size = 1;
		break;
	}
	esb_buf eb;
	llog(RC_COMMENT, log,
	     "non-critical payload ignored because it contains an unknown or unexpected payload type (%s) at the outermost level",
	     enum_show(&ikev2_payload_names, np, &eb));
	np = pd->payload.generic.isag_np;
	continue;
}

if (np >= LELEM_ROOF64) {
	dbg("huge next-payload %u", np){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("huge next-payload %u", np); } };
	summary.n = v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX;
	break;
}
summary.repeated |= (summary.present & LELEM(np)((lset_t)1 << (np)));
summary.present |= LELEM(np)((lset_t)1 << (np));

/*
 * Read in the payload recording what type it should
 * be.
 */
pd->payload_type = np;
diag_t d = pbs_in_struct(in_pbs, sd,
			 &pd->payload, sizeof(pd->payload),
			 &pd->pbs);
if (d != NULL((void*)0)) {
	llog_diag(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, log, &d,
		 "malformed payload in packet");
	summary.n = v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX;
	break;
}

dbg("processing payload: %s (len=%zu)",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("processing payload: %s (len=%zu)", enum_show(
&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b), ((size_t)((&pd->
pbs)->roof - (&pd->pbs)->cur))); } }
    enum_show(&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b),{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("processing payload: %s (len=%zu)", enum_show(
&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b), ((size_t)((&pd->
pbs)->roof - (&pd->pbs)->cur))); } }
    pbs_left(&pd->pbs)){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("processing payload: %s (len=%zu)", enum_show(
&ikev2_payload_names, np, &b), ((size_t)((&pd->
pbs)->roof - (&pd->pbs)->cur))); } };

/*
 * Place payload at the end of the chain for this
 * type.
 */
if (md->last[np] == NULL((void*)0)) {
	/* first */
	md->chain[np] = md->last[np] = pd;
	pd->next = NULL((void*)0);
} else {
	/* append */
	md->last[np]->next = pd;
	md->last[np] = pd;
	pd->next = NULL((void*)0);
}

/*
 * Go deeper:
 *
 * XXX: should this do 'deeper' analysis of packets.
 * For instance checking the SPI of a notification
 * payload?  Probably not as the value may be ignored.
 *
 * The exception is seems to be v2N - both cookie and
 * redirect code happen early and use the values.
 */

switch (np) {
case ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N:
	decode_v2N_payload(log, md, pd);
	break;
default:
	break;
}

/*
 * Determine the next payload.
 *
 * SK and SKF are special - their next-payload field
 * is for the first embedded payload - so force it to
 * NONE:
 *
 * RFC 5996 2.14 "Encrypted Payload":
 *
 * Next Payload - The payload type of the first
 * embedded payload.  Note that this is an exception
 * in the standard header format, since the Encrypted
 * payload is the last payload in the message and
 * therefore the Next Payload field would normally be
 * zero.  But because the content of this payload is
 * embedded payloads and there was no natural place to
 * put the type of the first one, that type is placed
 * here.
 */
switch (np) {
case ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK:
case ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF:
	/* special */
	np = ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE;
	break;
default:
	np = pd->payload.generic.isag_np;
	break;
}

md->digest_roof++;
}

return summary;
952}

954static struct child_sa *process_v2_child_ix(struct ike_sa *ike,
			    const struct v2_state_transition *svm)
956{
/*
* XXX: Still a mess.  Should call processor with the IKE SA.
* The processor can then create a nested state.
*/
enum sa_type sa_type;
switch (svm->state) {
case STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_R0:
case STATE_V2_REKEY_CHILD_R0:
sa_type = IPSEC_SA;
break;
default:
pexpect(svm->state == STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_R0)({ _Bool assertion__ = svm->state == STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_R0
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 968, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ =
 &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "svm->state == STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_R0"
); } assertion__; });
sa_type = IKE_SA;
}

struct child_sa *child = new_v2_child_state(ike->sa.st_connection,
				    ike, sa_type,
				    SA_RESPONDER,
				    svm->state,
				    null_fd((struct fd *) ((void*)0)));

connection_buf ibuf;
connection_buf cbuf;
dbg(PRI_CONNECTION" #%lu received %s CREATE_CHILD_SA Child "PRI_CONNECTION" #%lu in %s will process it further",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("\"%s\"%s"" #%lu received %s CREATE_CHILD_SA Child "
"\"%s\"%s"" #%lu in %s will process it further", (ike->sa.
st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(ike->sa.st_connection
, &ibuf), ike->sa.st_serialno, svm->story, (child->
sa.st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(child->
sa.st_connection, &cbuf), child->sa.st_serialno, child
->sa.st_state->name); } }
   pri_connection(ike->sa.st_connection, &ibuf),{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("\"%s\"%s"" #%lu received %s CREATE_CHILD_SA Child "
"\"%s\"%s"" #%lu in %s will process it further", (ike->sa.
st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(ike->sa.st_connection
, &ibuf), ike->sa.st_serialno, svm->story, (child->
sa.st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(child->
sa.st_connection, &cbuf), child->sa.st_serialno, child
->sa.st_state->name); } }
   ike->sa.st_serialno, svm->story,{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("\"%s\"%s"" #%lu received %s CREATE_CHILD_SA Child "
"\"%s\"%s"" #%lu in %s will process it further", (ike->sa.
st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(ike->sa.st_connection
, &ibuf), ike->sa.st_serialno, svm->story, (child->
sa.st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(child->
sa.st_connection, &cbuf), child->sa.st_serialno, child
->sa.st_state->name); } }
   pri_connection(child->sa.st_connection, &cbuf),{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("\"%s\"%s"" #%lu received %s CREATE_CHILD_SA Child "
"\"%s\"%s"" #%lu in %s will process it further", (ike->sa.
st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(ike->sa.st_connection
, &ibuf), ike->sa.st_serialno, svm->story, (child->
sa.st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(child->
sa.st_connection, &cbuf), child->sa.st_serialno, child
->sa.st_state->name); } }
   child->sa.st_serialno, child->sa.st_state->name){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("\"%s\"%s"" #%lu received %s CREATE_CHILD_SA Child "
"\"%s\"%s"" #%lu in %s will process it further", (ike->sa.
st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(ike->sa.st_connection
, &ibuf), ike->sa.st_serialno, svm->story, (child->
sa.st_connection)->name, str_connection_instance(child->
sa.st_connection, &cbuf), child->sa.st_serialno, child
->sa.st_state->name); } };

return child;
987}

989/*
* Find the SA (IKE or CHILD), within IKE's family, that is initiated
* or is responding to Message ID.
*
* XXX: There's overlap between this and the is_duplicate_*() code.
* For instance, there's little point in looking for a state when the
* IKE SA's window shows it too old (at least if we ignore
* record'n'send bugs).
*/

999static struct state *find_v2_sa_by_initiator_wip(struct ike_sa *ike, const msgid_t msgid)
1000{
/*
* XXX: Would a linked list of CHILD SAs work better, would
* mean reference counting?  Should this also check that MSGID
* is within the IKE SA's window?
*/
struct state *st;
if (ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid) {
/* short-cut */
st = &ike->sa;
} else {
struct state_query stq = {
	.where = HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1012, }; &here; }),
	.ike_version = IKEv2,
	.ike_spis = &ike->sa.st_ike_spis,
};
st = NULL((void*)0);
while (old2new_state(&stq)) {
	if (stq.st->st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid) {
		st = stq.st;
		break;
	}
}
}
pexpect(st == NULL ||({ _Bool assertion__ = st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom
 == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1026, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno"
); } assertion__; })
st->st_clonedfrom == SOS_NOBODY ||({ _Bool assertion__ = st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom
 == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1026, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno"
); } assertion__; })
st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno)({ _Bool assertion__ = st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom
 == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1026, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno"
); } assertion__; });
return st;
1028}

1030static struct state *find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip(struct ike_sa *ike, const msgid_t msgid)
1031{
/*
* XXX: Would a linked list of CHILD SAs work better, would
* mean reference counting?  Should this also check that MSGID
* is within the IKE SA's window?
*/
struct state *st;
if (ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid) {
/* short-cut */
st = &ike->sa;
} else {
struct state_query stq = {
	.where = HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1043, }; &here; }),
	.ike_version = IKEv2,
	.ike_spis = &ike->sa.st_ike_spis,
};
st = NULL((void*)0);
while (old2new_state(&stq)) {
	if (stq.st->st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid) {
		st = stq.st;
		break;
	}
}
}
pexpect(st == NULL ||({ _Bool assertion__ = st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom
 == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1057, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno"
); } assertion__; })
st->st_clonedfrom == SOS_NOBODY ||({ _Bool assertion__ = st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom
 == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1057, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno"
); } assertion__; })
st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno)({ _Bool assertion__ = st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom
 == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno; if (
!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1057, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st == ((void*)0) || st->st_clonedfrom == 0 || st->st_clonedfrom == ike->sa.st_serialno"
); } assertion__; });
return st;
1059}

1061/*
* Is this a duplicate message?
*
* XXX:
*
* record'n'send bypassing the send queue can result in pluto having
* more outstanding messages then the negotiated window size.
*
* This and the find_v2_sa_by_*_wip() have some overlap.  For
* instance, little point in searching for a state when the IKE SA's
* window shows the Message ID is too old (only record'n'send breakage
* means it might still have a message, argh!).
*/

1075/*
* A duplicate request could be:
*
* - the request still being processed (for instance waiting on
*   crypto), which can be tossed
*
* - the request last processed, which should trigger a retransmit of
*   the response
*
* - an older request which can be tossed
*
* But if it is a fragment, much of this is skipped.
*/
1088static bool_Bool is_duplicate_request(struct ike_sa *ike,
		 struct msg_digest *md)
1090{
passert(v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST; if
 (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1091, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST"
); } (void) 1; });
intmax_t msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;

/* lie to keep test results happy */
dbg("#%lu st.st_msgid_lastrecv %jd md.hdr.isa_msgid %08jx",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu st.st_msgid_lastrecv %jd md.hdr.isa_msgid %08jx"
, ike->sa.st_serialno, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder
.recv, msgid); } }
   ike->sa.st_serialno, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv, msgid){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu st.st_msgid_lastrecv %jd md.hdr.isa_msgid %08jx"
, ike->sa.st_serialno, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder
.recv, msgid); } };

/* the sliding window is really small?!? */
pexpect(ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv ==({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder
.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent; if (!
assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1100, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent"
); } assertion__; })
ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder
.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent; if (!
assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1100, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent"
); } assertion__; });

if (msgid < ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent) {
/*
 * this is an OLD retransmit and out sliding window
 * holds only the most recent response. we can't do
 * anything
 */
log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
	  "received too old retransmit: %jd < %jd",
	  msgid, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent);
return true1;
} else if (msgid == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent) {
/*
 * This was the last request processed and,
 * presumably, a response was sent.  Retransmit the
 * saved response (the response was saved right?).
 */
if (ike->sa.st_v2_outgoing[MESSAGE_RESPONSE] == NULL((void*)0)) {
	FAIL_V2_MSGID(ike, &ike->sa,fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1122, }; &here
; }), ike, &ike->sa, "retransmission for message %jd exchange %s failed responder.sent %jd - there is no stored message or fragments to retransmit"
, msgid, enum_name(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg
), ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)
		      "retransmission for message %jd exchange %s failed responder.sent %jd - there is no stored message or fragments to retransmit",fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1122, }; &here
; }), ike, &ike->sa, "retransmission for message %jd exchange %s failed responder.sent %jd - there is no stored message or fragments to retransmit"
, msgid, enum_name(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg
), ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)
		      msgid, enum_name(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg),fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1122, }; &here
; }), ike, &ike->sa, "retransmission for message %jd exchange %s failed responder.sent %jd - there is no stored message or fragments to retransmit"
, msgid, enum_name(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg
), ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)
		      ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1122, }; &here
; }), ike, &ike->sa, "retransmission for message %jd exchange %s failed responder.sent %jd - there is no stored message or fragments to retransmit"
, msgid, enum_name(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg
), ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent);
	return true1;
}
/*
 * If things are fragmented, only respond to the first
 * fragment.
 */
unsigned fragment = 0;
if (md->hdr.isa_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) {
	struct ikev2_skf skf;
	pb_stream in_pbs = md->message_pbs; /* copy */
	pb_stream ignored;
	diag_t d = pbs_in_struct(&in_pbs, &ikev2_skf_desc,
				 &skf, sizeof(skf), &ignored);
	if (d != NULL((void*)0)) {
		llog_diag(RC_LOG, ike->sa.st_logger, &d, "%s", "");
		return true1;
	}
	fragment = skf.isaskf_number;
}
if (fragment == 0) {
	log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
		  "received duplicate %s message request (Message ID %jd); retransmitting response",
		  enum_name_short(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg),
		  msgid);
	send_recorded_v2_message(ike, "ikev2-responder-retransmit",
				 MESSAGE_RESPONSE);
} else if (fragment == 1) {
	log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
		  "received duplicate %s message request (Message ID %jd, fragment %u); retransmitting response",
		  enum_name_short(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg),
		  msgid, fragment);
	send_recorded_v2_message(ike, "ikev2-responder-retransmt (fragment 1)",
				 MESSAGE_RESPONSE);
} else {
	dbg_v2_msgid(ike, &ike->sa,
		     "received duplicate %s message request (Message ID %jd, fragment %u); discarded as not fragment 1",
		     enum_name_short(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg),
		     msgid, fragment);
}
return true1;
} else {
/* all that is left */
pexpect(msgid > ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)({ _Bool assertion__ = msgid > ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows
.responder.sent; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static
 const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 1165, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "msgid > ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent"
); } assertion__; });
}

/*
* Is something already processing this request?
*
* Processing only starts for real once a responder has
* accumulated all fragments and obtained KEYMAT.
*/
{
struct state *responder = find_v2_sa_by_responder_wip(ike, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
/* only a true responder */
pexpect(responder == NULL ||({ _Bool assertion__ = responder == ((void*)0) || responder->
st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid; if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1178, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "responder == ((void*)0) || responder->st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid"
); } assertion__; })
	responder->st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid)({ _Bool assertion__ = responder == ((void*)0) || responder->
st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid; if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1178, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "responder == ((void*)0) || responder->st_v2_msgid_wip.responder == msgid"
); } assertion__; });
if (responder != NULL((void*)0)) {
	/* this generates the log message */
	pexpect(verbose_state_busy(responder))({ _Bool assertion__ = verbose_state_busy(responder); if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1181, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "verbose_state_busy(responder)"
); } assertion__; });
	return true1;
}
}

/*
* The IKE SA responder, having accumulated all the fragments
* for the IKE_AUTH request, is computing the SKEYSEED.  When
* SKEYSEED finishes .st_v2_rfrags is wiped and the Message
* IDs updated to flag that the message as work-in-progress
* (so above check will have succeeded).
*/
if (state_is_busy(&ike->sa)) {
/*
 * To keep tests happy, try to output text matching
 * verbose_state_busy(); but with some extra detail.
 */
1198#if 0
/*
 * XXX: hang onto this code for now - it shows how to
 * lightly unpack fragments.  Will be useful when
 * fragmentation code is moved out of the state lookup
 * code.
 */
unsigned fragment = 0;
if (md->hdr.isa_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF) {
	struct ikev2_skf skf;
	pb_stream in_pbs = md->message_pbs; /* copy */
	pb_stream ignored;
	diag_t d = pbs_in_struct(&skf, &ikev2_skf_desc, &in_pbs, &ignored);
	if (d != NULL((void*)0)) {
		llog_diag(RC_LOG, st->st_logger, &d, "%s", "");
		return true1;
	}
	fragment = skf.isaskf_number;
}
if (fragment == 0) {
	log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
		  "discarding packet received during asynchronous work (DNS or crypto) in %s",
		  ike->sa.st_state->name);
} else if (fragment == 1) {
	log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
		  "discarding fragments received during asynchronous work (DNS or crypto) in %s",
		  ike->sa.st_state->name);
} else {
	dbg_v2_msgid(ike, &ike->sa,
		     "discarding fragment %u received during asynchronous work (DNS or crypto) in %s",
		     fragment, ike->sa.st_state->name);
}
1230#else
log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
	  "discarding packet received during asynchronous work (DNS or crypto) in %s",
	  ike->sa.st_state->name);
1234#endif
return true1;
}

struct v2_incoming_fragments *frags = ike->sa.st_v2_incoming[MESSAGE_REQUEST];
if (frags != NULL((void*)0)) {
pexpect(frags->count < frags->total)({ _Bool assertion__ = frags->count < frags->total; if
 (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1240, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "frags->count < frags->total"
); } assertion__; });
dbg_v2_msgid(ike, &ike->sa,
	     "not a duplicate - responder is accumulating fragments for message request %jd",
	     msgid);
} else {
dbg_v2_msgid(ike, &ike->sa,
	     "not a duplicate - message request %jd is new",
	     msgid);
}

return false0;
1251}

1253/*
* A duplicate response could be:
*
* - for an old request where there's no longer an initiator waiting,
*   and can be dropped
*
* - the initiator is busy, presumably because this response is a
*   duplicate and the initiator is waiting on crypto to complete so
*   it can decrypt the response
*/
1263static bool_Bool is_duplicate_response(struct ike_sa *ike,
		  struct state *initiator,
		  struct msg_digest *md)
1266{
passert(v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE; if
 (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1267, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE"
); } (void) 1; });
intmax_t msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;

/* only a true initiator */
pexpect(initiator == NULL ||({ _Bool assertion__ = initiator == ((void*)0) || initiator->
st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid; if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1272, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "initiator == ((void*)0) || initiator->st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid"
); } assertion__; })
initiator->st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid)({ _Bool assertion__ = initiator == ((void*)0) || initiator->
st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid; if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1272, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "initiator == ((void*)0) || initiator->st_v2_msgid_wip.initiator == msgid"
); } assertion__; });

/* the sliding window is really small?!? */
pexpect(ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv ==({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder
.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent; if (!
assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1276, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent"
); } assertion__; })
ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder
.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent; if (!
assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1276, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.recv == ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.responder.sent"
); } assertion__; });

if (msgid <= ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.initiator.recv) {
/*
 * Processing of the response was completed so drop as
 * too old.
 *
 * XXX: Should be rate_log() but that shows up in the
 * whack output.  While "correct" it messes with test
 * output.  The old log line didn't show up because
 * current-state wasn't set.
 *
 * Here's roughly why INITIATOR can be non-NULL:
 *
 * - west.#8 needs a rekey, so west.#11 is created and
 * it sends a CREATE_CHILD_SA with Message ID 3.
 *
 * - west.#8 gives up on the re-key so it forces a
 * delete request (aka record'n'send), sending a
 * second message with ID 4
 *
 * West has two outstanding messages yet its window
 * size of 1!
 *
 * - east receives the rekey with ID 3, creates
 * east.#11 and and sends it off for further
 * processing
 *
 * - east receives the delete with ID 4, forces a
 * message ID update and sends an ID 4 response
 * confirming the delete
 *
 * - east.#11 finishes its crypto so east sends back
 * its response with Message ID 3 for a re-keyed SA it
 * just deleted?!?!
 *
 * East has responded with two out-of-order messages
 * (if the window size was 2 this would be ok but it
 * isn't).
 *
 * - west receives the ID 4 response, tries to delete
 * the IKE SA but can't because west.#11 is lurking;
 * but regardless the ID window is forced 2->4
 *
 * - west receives the ID 3 response, which is clearly
 * to-old so doesn't expect there to be a matching
 * initiator, arrg
 */
if (initiator != NULL((void*)0)) {
	dbg_v2_msgid(ike, initiator, "XXX: expecting initiator==NULL - suspect record'n'send with an out-of-order wrong packet response; discarding packet");
} else {
	dbg_v2_msgid(ike, initiator, "already processed response %jd (%s); discarding packet",
		     msgid, enum_name_short(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg));
}
return true1;
}

if (initiator == NULL((void*)0)) {
/*
 * While there's an IKE SA matching the IKE SPIs,
 * there's no corresponding initiator for the message.
 *
 * XXX: rate_log() sends to whack which, while making
 * sense, but churns the test output.
 */
log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
	  "%s message response with Message ID %jd has no matching SA",
	  enum_name(&ikev2_exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg), msgid);
return true1;
}

/*
* Sanity check the MSGID and initiator against the IKE SA
* Message ID window.
*/

if (msgid > ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.initiator.sent) {
/*
 * There was an initiator waiting for a message that,
 * according to the IKE SA, has yet to be sent?!?
 */
FAIL_V2_MSGID(ike, initiator,fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1359, }; &here
; }), ike, initiator, "dropping response with Message ID %jd which is from the future - last request sent was %jd"
, msgid, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.initiator.sent)
	      "dropping response with Message ID %jd which is from the future - last request sent was %jd",fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1359, }; &here
; }), ike, initiator, "dropping response with Message ID %jd which is from the future - last request sent was %jd"
, msgid, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.initiator.sent)
	      msgid, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.initiator.sent)fail_v2_msgid(({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1359, }; &here
; }), ike, initiator, "dropping response with Message ID %jd which is from the future - last request sent was %jd"
, msgid, ike->sa.st_v2_msgid_windows.initiator.sent);
return true1;
}

/*
* If the state is busy, presumably doing something like
* crypto, skip further processing.
*
* For fragments, things only go busy once all fragments have
* been received (and re-transmitted fragments are ignored).
* If this changes then a lot more than this code will need to
* be moved.
*
* XXX: Is there a better way to handle this?
*/
if (verbose_state_busy(initiator)) {
return true1;
}

return false0;
1379}

1381/*
* process an input packet, possibly generating a reply.
*
* If all goes well, this routine eventually calls a state-specific
* transition function.
*
* This routine will not release_any_md(mdp).  It is expected that its
* caller will do this.  In fact, it will zap *mdp to NULL if it thinks
* **mdp should not be freed.  So the caller should be prepared for
* *mdp being set to NULL.
*
* Start by looking for (or creating) the IKE SA responsible for the
* IKE SPIs group .....
*/

1396static void ike_process_packet(struct msg_digest *mdp, struct ike_sa *ike);

1398void ikev2_process_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
1399{
/* Look for an state that matches the various things we know:
*
* 1) exchange type received?
* 2) is it initiator or not?
*/
const enum isakmp_xchg_type ix = md->hdr.isa_xchg;

/*
* If the IKE SA initiator sent the message then this end is
* looking for the IKE SA responder (and vice versa).
*/
enum sa_role expected_local_ike_role = (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAGS_v2_IKE_I(1<<ISAKMP_FLAGS_v2_IKE_I_IX)) ? SA_RESPONDER : SA_INITIATOR;

/*
* Dump what the message says, once a state has been found
* this can be checked against what is.
*/
LSWDBGP(DBG_BASE, buf)for (_Bool lswlog_p = (cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_BASE_IX)))); lswlog_p; lswlog_p = 0) for (char lswbuf[(
(size_t)1024)], *lswbuf_ = lswbuf; lswbuf_ != ((void*)0); lswbuf_
 = ((void*)0)) for (struct jambuf jambuf = array_as_jambuf((lswbuf
), sizeof(lswbuf)), *buf = &jambuf; buf != ((void*)0); buf
 = ((void*)0)) for (; buf != ((void*)0); jambuf_to_logger(buf
, &failsafe_logger, DEBUG_STREAM), buf = ((void*)0)) {
switch (expected_local_ike_role) {
case SA_RESPONDER:
	jam(buf, "I am the IKE SA Original Responder");
	break;
case SA_INITIATOR:
	jam(buf, "I am the IKE SA Original Initiator");
	break;
default:
	bad_case(expected_local_ike_role)libreswan_bad_case("expected_local_ike_role", (expected_local_ike_role
), ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1426, }; &here; }));
}
jam(buf, " receiving an IKEv2 ");
jam_enum_short(buf, &ikev2_exchange_names, ix);
switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
	jam(buf, " response ");
	break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
	jam(buf, " request ");
	break;
default:
	bad_case(v2_msg_role(md))libreswan_bad_case("v2_msg_role(md)", (v2_msg_role(md)), ({ static
 const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 1438, }; &here; }));
}
}

/*
* If the message is a new IKE_SA_INIT request (or previously
* discarded request due to cookies) then there is no IKE SA,
* and no point trying to use the state machinery.
*
* If the message is an IKE_SA_INIT response, then there might
* be an IKE SA; but the number of checks required means that
* it is also a good idea to just avoid the state machinery.
*/

if (ix == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT) {
process_v2_IKE_SA_INIT(md);
return;
}

passert(v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST ||({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST || v2_msg_role
(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE; if (!assertion__) { where_t here = (
{ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file =
 "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1458, }; &here; }); const
 struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(
logger_, here, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST || v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE"
); } (void) 1; })
v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST || v2_msg_role
(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE; if (!assertion__) { where_t here = (
{ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file =
 "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1458, }; &here; }); const
 struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(
logger_, here, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST || v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE"
); } (void) 1; });

/*
* Find the IKE SA with matching SPIs.
*
* The IKE SA's Message IDs can then be used to determine if
* the message fits in the message window (new request,
* expected response, or old message).
*/
struct ike_sa *ike = find_v2_ike_sa(&md->hdr.isa_ike_spis,
			    expected_local_ike_role);
if (ike == NULL((void*)0)) {
esb_buf ixb;
rate_log(md, "%s message %s has no corresponding IKE SA",
	 enum_show_short(&ikev2_exchange_names, ix, &ixb),
	 v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST ? "request" : "response");
return;
}

/*
* There's at least an IKE SA, and possibly ST willing to
* process the message.
*/
passert(ike != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) {
 where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func =
 __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1481, };
 &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "ike != ((void*)0)"); } (
void) 1; });

/*
* Re-check ST's IKE SA's role against the I(Initiator) flag
* in the headers.  Since above searches will only find an IKE
* SA when the IKE SA's role is correct, this should always
* work.
*/
if (!pexpect(ike->sa.st_sa_role == expected_local_ike_role)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.st_sa_role == expected_local_ike_role
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1489, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.st_sa_role == expected_local_ike_role"
); } assertion__; })) {
return;
}

/*
* Since there's an IKE SA start billing and logging against
* it.
*/
statetime_t start = statetime_backdate(&ike->sa, &md->md_inception);
ike_process_packet(md, ike);
statetime_stop(&start, "%s()", __func__);
1500}

1502/*
* The IKE SA for the message has been found (or created).  Continue
* verification, and identify the state (ST) that the message should
* be sent to.
*/

1508static void ike_process_packet(struct msg_digest *md, struct ike_sa *ike)
1509{
/*
* Deal with duplicate messages and busy states.
*/
struct state *st;
switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
/*
 * The IKE SA always processes requests.
 *
 * XXX: except further down where the code creates a
 * new state when CREATE_CHILD_SA and switches to
 * that.
 *
 * The other quirk is with fragments; but the only
 * case that matters it when the IKE SA accumulating
 * them.
 */
if (md->fake_clone) {
	log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa, "IMPAIR: processing a fake (cloned) message");
}
/*
 * Is this duplicate?
 *
 * If MD is a fragment then it isn't considered a
 * duplicate.
 */
if (is_duplicate_request(ike, md)) {
	return;
}
st = &ike->sa;
break;
case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
/*
 * This is the response to an earlier request; use the
 * IKE SA to find the state that initiated the
 * exchange (sent that request).
 *
 * If the response is a fragment then ST will be
 * non-NULL; is_duplicate_state() gets to figure out
 * if the fragments are complete or need to wait
 * longer.
 */
st = find_v2_sa_by_initiator_wip(ike, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
if (md->fake_clone) {
	log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa, "IMPAIR: processing a fake (cloned) message");
}
if (is_duplicate_response(ike, st, md)) {
	return;
}
pexpect(st != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = st != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1559, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect
(logger_, here_, "%s", "st != ((void*)0)"); } assertion__; });
break;
default:
bad_case(v2_msg_role(md))libreswan_bad_case("v2_msg_role(md)", (v2_msg_role(md)), ({ static
 const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 1562, }; &here; }));
}

/*
* Now that the state that is to process the message has been
* selected, switch logging to it.
*
* XXX: why the need to constantly pick a single winner and
* switch to it?  Because tests expect messages to be logged
* against a specific state.  It would be better of that code
* specified that state as a parameter.
*/
passert(st != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = st != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1574, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert
(logger_, here, "%s", "st != ((void*)0)"); } (void) 1; });
/* XXX: debug-logging this is redundant */

/*
* Have a state an and IKE SA, time to decode the payloads.
*/
dbg("unpacking clear payload"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("unpacking clear payload"); } };
passert(!md->message_payloads.parsed)({ _Bool assertion__ = !md->message_payloads.parsed; if (!
assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here
 = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line
 = 1581, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &
failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "!md->message_payloads.parsed"
); } (void) 1; });
pexpect(v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE ||({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE ||
 md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1583, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE || md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT"
); } assertion__; })
md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE ||
 md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1583, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE || md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT"
); } assertion__; });
md->message_payloads =
ikev2_decode_payloads(ike->sa.st_logger, md,
		      &md->message_pbs,
		      md->hdr.isa_np);
if (md->message_payloads.n != v2N_NOTHING_WRONG) {
/*
 * Should only respond when the message is an
 * IKE_SA_INIT request.  But that was handled above
 * when dealing with cookies so here, there's zero
 * reason to respond.
 *
 * decode calls packet code and that logs errors on
 * the spot
 */
/* already logged */
return;
}

ikev2_process_state_packet(ike, st, md);
1603}

1605/*
* XXX: Hack to find the transition that would have been run if the
* packet was ok, so it can be 'failed'.
*
* This is largely astetic.  It could use the first transition but
* often a later transition reads better.  Perhaps the last transition
* since, presumably, that is the most generic?
*/

1614static void hack_error_transition(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md)
1615{
passert(md != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = md != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1616, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert
(logger_, here, "%s", "md != ((void*)0)"); } (void) 1; });
const struct v2_state_transition *transition;
const struct finite_state *state = st->st_state;
switch (state->kind) {
case STATE_V2_PARENT_R1:
/*
 * Responding to either an IKE_INTERMEDIATE or
 * IKE_AUTH request: look for the NOSKEYSEED
 * transitions (and prefer IKE_AUTH).
 *
 * Once SKEYSEED is off-loaded and STATE_V2_PARENT_I1 has
 * only one (ok, two) transition, this is no longer a
 * hack.
 */
pexpect(state->nr_transitions == 4)({ _Bool assertion__ = state->nr_transitions == 4; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1630, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "state->nr_transitions == 4"
); } assertion__; });
if (md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE) {
	transition = &state->v2_transitions[2];
	pexpect(transition->recv_type == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->recv_type == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1633, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->recv_type == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_INTERMEDIATE"
); } assertion__; });
	pexpect(transition->next_state == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->next_state == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1634, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->next_state == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1"
); } assertion__; });
} else {
	transition = &state->v2_transitions[3];
	pexpect(transition->recv_type == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->recv_type == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1637, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->recv_type == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_AUTH"
); } assertion__; });
	pexpect(transition->next_state == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->next_state == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1638, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->next_state == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA"
); } assertion__; });
}
pexpect((transition->flags & SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED) == 0)({ _Bool assertion__ = (transition->flags & SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED
) == 0; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct
 where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 1640, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "(transition->flags & SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED) == 0"
); } assertion__; });
pexpect(transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1641, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1"
); } assertion__; });
break;
case STATE_V2_PARENT_I2:
{
/*
 * Receiving IKE_AUTH response: it is buried deep
 * down; would adding an extra transition that always
 * matches be better?
 */
unsigned transition_nr = 1;
pexpect(state->nr_transitions > transition_nr)({ _Bool assertion__ = state->nr_transitions > transition_nr
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1651, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "state->nr_transitions > transition_nr"
); } assertion__; });
transition = &state->v2_transitions[transition_nr];
pexpect(transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1653, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2"
); } assertion__; });
pexpect(transition->next_state == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->next_state == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1654, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->next_state == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA"
); } assertion__; });
break;
}
default:
if (/*pexpect*/(state->nr_transitions > 0)) {
	transition = &state->v2_transitions[state->nr_transitions - 1];
} else {
	static const struct v2_state_transition undefined_transition = {
		.story = "suspect message",
		.state = STATE_UNDEFINED,
		.next_state = STATE_UNDEFINED,
	};
	transition = &undefined_transition;
}
break;
}
/*pexpect(st->st_v2_transition == NULL);*/
st->st_v2_transition = transition;
1672}

1674/*
* The SA the message is intended for has also been identified.
* Continue ...
*
* XXX: Well except for a CREATE_CHILD_SA request where, after further
* processing the SA may get created.  Should this message instead be
* sent to the IKE SA, which can then create a WIP child?
*/

1683void ikev2_process_state_packet(struct ike_sa *ike, struct state *st,
		struct msg_digest *md)
1685{
passert(ike != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) {
 where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func =
 __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1686, };
 &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "ike != ((void*)0)"); } (
void) 1; });
passert(st != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = st != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1687, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert
(logger_, here, "%s", "st != ((void*)0)"); } (void) 1; });

/*
* There is no "struct state" object if-and-only-if we're
* responding to a shiny new SA_INIT message.  The start-state
* transition will (probably) create the object.
*
* But what about when pluto, as the initial responder, is
* fending of an attack attack by sending back and requiring
* cookies - won't the cookie need a "struct state"?
* According to the RFC: no.  Instead a small table of
* constants can be used to generate cookies on the fly.
*/
const struct finite_state *from_state = st->st_state;
dbg("#%lu in state %s: %s", st->st_serialno,{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu in state %s: %s", st->st_serialno, from_state
->short_name, from_state->story); } }
   from_state->short_name, from_state->story){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu in state %s: %s", st->st_serialno, from_state
->short_name, from_state->story); } };

struct ikev2_payload_errors message_payload_status = { .bad = false0 };
struct ikev2_payload_errors encrypted_payload_status = { .bad = false0 };

const enum isakmp_xchg_type ix = md->hdr.isa_xchg;

/*
* XXX: Unlike find_v2_state_transition(), the below scans
* every single state transition and then, in the case of a
* CREATE_CHILD_SA, ignores the "from" state.
*
* XXX: Unlike find_v2_state_transition(), this code detects
* and decrypts packets and fragments in the middle of the
* lookup.  Being more aggressive with decrypting fragments
* will likely force that logic to be moved to before this
* lookup.
*/

const struct v2_state_transition *svm;
for (svm = v2_state_transition_table; svm->state != STATE_IKEv2_ROOF;
    svm++) {

/*
 * Does the message match the state transition?
 */
if (svm->recv_type != ix) {
	continue;
}
if (svm->recv_role != v2_msg_role(md)) {
	continue;
}

/*
 * Does the from state match the SA's current state?
 *
 * XXX: Eventually this part won't be needed as each
 * state will have its own list of transitions.  See
 * find_v2_state_transition() which is currently only
 * used by IKES_SA_INIT.
 *
 * Unfortunately ...
 *
 * For CREATE_CHILD_SA, the responder ignores the
 * .from_state and instead applies some other magic
 * (the .from_state ends up being used when creating
 * the Child SA).
 */
if (ix == ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA &&
    /* matched above */ svm->recv_role == MESSAGE_REQUEST) {
	dbg("potential CREATE_CHILD_SA responder stumbling through to process_v2_child_ix()"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("potential CREATE_CHILD_SA responder stumbling through to process_v2_child_ix()"
); } };
} else if (svm->state != from_state->kind) {
	continue;
}

/*
 * Check the message payloads are as expected.
 */
pexpect(md->message_payloads.parsed)({ _Bool assertion__ = md->message_payloads.parsed; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 1760, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "md->message_payloads.parsed"
); } assertion__; });
struct ikev2_payload_errors message_payload_errors
	= ikev2_verify_payloads(md, &md->message_payloads,
				&svm->message_payloads);
if (message_payload_errors.bad) {
	/* Save this failure for later logging. */
	message_payload_status = message_payload_errors;
	continue;
}

/*
 * If there is no SK (or SKF) payload then checking is
 * complete and things have matched.
 *
 * (.seen&(P(SK)|P(SKF))!=0 is equivalent.
 */
if (!(svm->message_payloads.required & P(SK)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK)))) {
	break;
}

/*
 * Since the encrypted payload appears plausible, deal
 * with fragmentation.
 */
if (!md->encrypted_payloads.parsed) {
	/*
	 * Deal with fragmentation.  The function
	 * returns FALSE either when there are more
	 * fragments, the fragment is corrupt, the
	 * fragment is a duplicate, or the fragment
	 * count changed (it also drops all
	 * fragments).  Either way stop processing.
	 *
	 * Only upon _first_ arrival of the last
	 * fragment, does the function return TRUE.
	 * The the processing flow below can then
	 * continue to the SKEYSEED check.
	 *
	 * However, if SKEYSEED (g^{xy}) needed to be
	 * computed then this code will be re-entered
	 * with all fragments present (so "the"
	 * function should not be called).
	 */
	struct v2_incoming_fragments *frags =
		ike->sa.st_v2_incoming[v2_msg_role(md)];
	bool_Bool have_all_fragments =
		(frags != NULL((void*)0) && frags->count == frags->total);
	/*
	 * XXX: Because fragments are only checked
	 * all-at-once after they have all arrived, a
	 * single corrupt fragment will cause all
	 * fragments being thrown away, and the entire
	 * process re-start (Is this tested?)
	 *
	 * XXX: This code should instead check
	 * fragments as they arrive.  That means
	 * kicking off the g^{xy} calculation in the
	 * background (if it were in the foreground,
	 * the fragments would be dropped).  Later.
	 */
	if (md->message_payloads.present & P(SKF)((lset_t)1 << (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SKF))) {
		if (have_all_fragments) {
			dbg("already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("already have all fragments, skipping fragment collection"
); } };
		} else if (!ikev2_collect_fragment(md, ike)) {
			return;
		}
	}
	/*
	 * For this state transition, does it only
	 * apply when there's no SKEYSEED?  If so, and
	 * SKEYSEED is missing, then things match; else
	 * things can't match.
	 */
	if (svm->flags & SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED) {
		if (ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_skeyid_calculated) {
			continue;
		} else {
			break;
		}
	}
	/*
	 * XXX: Shouldn't reach this point without
	 * SKEYSEED so bail if somehow that hasn't
	 * happened.  No point in even calling
	 * ikev2_decrypt_msg() (it will also fail).
	 *
	 * Suspect it would be cleaner if the state
	 * machine included an explicit SMF2_SKEYSEED
	 * flag and all states requiring integrity
	 * were marked with that. Currently P(SK) and
	 * P(SKF) imply this.
	 */
	if (!pexpect(ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_skeyid_calculated)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_skeyid_calculated
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 1852, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_skeyid_calculated"
); } assertion__; })) {
		return;
	}
	/*
	 * Decrypt the packet, checking it for
	 * integrity.  Anything lacking integrity is
	 * dropped.
	 */
	if (!ikev2_decrypt_msg(ike, md)) {
		log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa,
			  "encrypted payload seems to be corrupt; dropping packet");
		return;
	}
	/*
	 * The message is protected - the integrity
	 * check passed - so it was definitely sent by
	 * the other end of the secured IKE SA.
	 *
	 * However, for an AUTH packet, the other end
	 * hasn't yet been authenticated (and an
	 * INFORMATIONAL exchange immediately
	 * following AUTH be due to failed
	 * authentication).
	 *
	 * If there's something wrong with the message
	 * contents, then the IKE SA gets abandoned,
	 * but a new new one may be initiated.
	 *
	 * See "2.21.2.  Error Handling in IKE_AUTH"
	 * and "2.21.3.  Error Handling after IKE SA
	 * is Authenticated".
	 *
	 * For UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD, while the
	 * RFC clearly states that for the initial
	 * exchanges and an INFORMATIONAL exchange
	 * immediately following, the notification
	 * causes a delete, it says nothing for
	 * exchanges that follow.
	 *
	 * For moment treat it the same.  Given the
	 * PAYLOAD ID that should identify the problem
	 * isn't being returned this is the least of
	 * our problems.
	 */
	struct payload_digest *sk = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SK];
	md->encrypted_payloads = ikev2_decode_payloads(ike->sa.st_logger, md, &sk->pbs,
						       sk->payload.generic.isag_np);
	if (md->encrypted_payloads.n != v2N_NOTHING_WRONG) {
		/*
		 * XXX: Hack to get the
		 * transition that would have
		 * been run so it can be
		 * 'failed'.
		 */
		hack_error_transition(st, md);
		switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
		case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
			/*
			 * Send back a protected error
			 * response.  Need to first
			 * put the IKE SA into
			 * responder mode.
			 */
			v2_msgid_start_responder(ike, st, md);
			chunk_t data = chunk2(md->encrypted_payloads.data,
					      md->encrypted_payloads.data_size);
			record_v2N_response(st->st_logger, ike, md,
					    md->encrypted_payloads.n, &data,
					    ENCRYPTED_PAYLOAD);
			break;
		case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
			/*
			 * Can't respond so kill the
			 * IKE SA.  The secured
			 * message contained crap so
			 * there's little that can be
			 * done.
			 */
			break;
		default:
			bad_case(v2_msg_role(md))libreswan_bad_case("v2_msg_role(md)", (v2_msg_role(md)), ({ static
 const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 1932, }; &here; }));
		}
		complete_v2_state_transition(st, md, STF_FATAL);
		return;
	}
} /* else { go ahead } */
struct ikev2_payload_errors encrypted_payload_errors
	= ikev2_verify_payloads(md, &md->encrypted_payloads,
				&svm->encrypted_payloads);
if (encrypted_payload_errors.bad) {
	/* Save this failure for later logging. */
	encrypted_payload_status = encrypted_payload_errors;
	continue;
}

if (svm->state != from_state->kind && ix == ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA) {
	/*
	 * The IKE SA is receiving a CREATE_CHILD_SA
	 * request.  Unlike STATE_V2_PARENT_R0 (and the
	 * initial responder) the R0 state isn't
	 * obvious - rekey IKE SA, rekey CHILD SA, and
	 * create CHILD SA are all slightly different.
	 *
	 * The code deals with this by ignoring the
	 * from_state, and then later, forcing MD's
	 * from state to values in the table.
	 */
	dbg("state #%lu forced to match CREATE_CHILD_SA from %s->%s by ignoring from state",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("state #%lu forced to match CREATE_CHILD_SA from %s->%s by ignoring from state"
, st->st_serialno, finite_states[svm->state]->name, finite_states
[svm->next_state]->name); } }
	    st->st_serialno,{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("state #%lu forced to match CREATE_CHILD_SA from %s->%s by ignoring from state"
, st->st_serialno, finite_states[svm->state]->name, finite_states
[svm->next_state]->name); } }
	    finite_states[svm->state]->name,{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("state #%lu forced to match CREATE_CHILD_SA from %s->%s by ignoring from state"
, st->st_serialno, finite_states[svm->state]->name, finite_states
[svm->next_state]->name); } }
	    finite_states[svm->next_state]->name){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("state #%lu forced to match CREATE_CHILD_SA from %s->%s by ignoring from state"
, st->st_serialno, finite_states[svm->state]->name, finite_states
[svm->next_state]->name); } };
}

/* must be the right state machine entry */
break;
}

dbg("selected state microcode %s", svm->story){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("selected state microcode %s", svm->story);
 } };

/* no useful state microcode entry? */
if (svm->state == STATE_IKEv2_ROOF) {
/* count all the error notifications */
for (struct payload_digest *ntfy = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N];
     ntfy != NULL((void*)0); ntfy = ntfy->next) {
	pstat(ikev2_recv_notifies_e, ntfy->payload.v2n.isan_type){ const unsigned pstat_ = (ntfy->payload.v2n.isan_type); const
 struct pluto_stat *ps_ = &pstats_ikev2_recv_notifies_e; if
 (pstat_ < ps_->floor || pstat_ >= ps_->roof) { ps_
->count[ps_->roof - ps_->floor]++; } else { ps_->
count[pstat_-ps_->floor]++; } };
}
/*
 * All branches: log error, [complete transition]
 * (why), return so first error wins.
 */
if (message_payload_status.bad) {
	/*
	 * A very messed up message - none of the
	 * state transitions recognized it!.
	 */
	log_v2_payload_errors(st->st_logger, md,
			      &message_payload_status);
	return;
}
if (encrypted_payload_status.bad) {
	/*
	 * Payload decrypted and integrity was ok but
	 * contents weren't valid.
	 *
	 * XXX: According to "2.21.2.  Error Handling
	 * in IKE_AUTH" and "2.21.3.  Error Handling
	 * after IKE SA is Authenticated" this should
	 * be fatal, killing the IKE SA.  Oops.
	 *
	 * XXX: how can one complete a state
	 * transition on something that was never
	 * started?  Since this is fatal, the state
	 * needs to be deleted.
	 *
	 * XXX: an alternative would be to treat this
	 * like some new but as-of-yet not supported
	 * message combination so just ignore it (but
	 * update Message IDs).
	 */
	log_v2_payload_errors(st->st_logger, md,
			      &encrypted_payload_status);
	/*
	 * XXX: Hack to get the transition
	 * that would have been run so it can
	 * be 'failed'.
	 */
	hack_error_transition(st, md);
	switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
	case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
		/*
		 * Send back a protected error
		 * response.  Need to first put the
		 * IKE SA into responder mode.
		 */
		v2_msgid_start_responder(ike, st, md);
		record_v2N_response(st->st_logger, ike, md,
				    v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX, NULL((void*)0),
				    ENCRYPTED_PAYLOAD);
		break;
	case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
		/*
		 * Can't respond so kill the IKE SA -
		 * the secured message contained crap
		 * so there's little that can be done.
		 */
		break;
	default:
		bad_case(v2_msg_role(md))libreswan_bad_case("v2_msg_role(md)", (v2_msg_role(md)), ({ static
 const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 2039, }; &here; }));
	}
	/* XXX: calls delete_state() */
	complete_v2_state_transition(st, md, STF_FATAL);
	return;
}
/*
 * Presumably things are pretty messed up.  While
 * there might be a state there probably isn't an
 * established IKE SA (so don't even consider trying
 * to send an encrypted response), for instance:
 *
 * - instead of an IKE_AUTH request, the initiator
 * sends something totally unexpected (such as an
 * informational) and things end up here
 *
 * - when an IKE_AUTH request's IKE SA succeeeds but
 * CHILD SA fails (and pluto screws up the IKE SA by
 * updating its state but not its Message ID and not
 * responding), the re-transmitted IKE_AUTH ends up
 * here
 *
 * If a request, should it send an un-encrypted
 * v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX?
 */
log_state(RC_LOG, &ike->sa, "no useful state microcode entry found for incoming packet");
/* "dropping message with no matching microcode" */
return;
}

if (ix == ISAKMP_v2_CREATE_CHILD_SA) {
/*
 * XXX: This code was embedded in the end of the FSM
 * search loop.  Since it was always executed when the
 * state matches, move it out of the loop.  Suspect
 * this, and the code below, really belong in the
 * state transition function proper.
 */
/* going to switch to child st. before that update parent */
if (!LHAS(ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal, NATED_HOST)(((ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal) & ((lset_t
)1 << (NATED_HOST))) != ((lset_t)0)))
	update_ike_endpoints(ike, md);

/* bit further processing of create CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange */

/*
 * let's get a child state either new or existing to
 * proceed
 */
struct child_sa *child;
if (v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE) {
	child = pexpect_child_sa(st);
} else {
	pexpect(IS_IKE_SA(st))({ _Bool assertion__ = ((st)->st_clonedfrom == 0); if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2091, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "((st)->st_clonedfrom == 0)"
); } assertion__; });
	child = process_v2_child_ix(ike, svm);
}

/*
 * Switch to child state (possibly from the same child
 * state, see above)
 */
dbg("forcing ST #%lu to CHILD #%lu.#%lu in FSM processor",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("forcing ST #%lu to CHILD #%lu.#%lu in FSM processor"
, st->st_serialno, ike->sa.st_serialno, child->sa.st_serialno
); } }
    st->st_serialno, ike->sa.st_serialno, child->sa.st_serialno){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("forcing ST #%lu to CHILD #%lu.#%lu in FSM processor"
, st->st_serialno, ike->sa.st_serialno, child->sa.st_serialno
); } };
st = &child->sa;
}

v2_dispatch(ike, st, md, svm);
2105}

2107void v2_dispatch(struct ike_sa *ike, struct state *st,
 struct msg_digest *md,
 const struct v2_state_transition *svm)
2110{
md->svm = svm;

/*
* For the responder, update the work-in-progress Message ID
* window (since work has commenced).
*
* Exclude the SKEYSEED calculation - the message has yet to
* be decrypted so true work on the message is yet to comence.
*/
if (v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST &&
   !(svm->flags & SMF2_NO_SKEYSEED)) {
v2_msgid_start_responder(ike, st, md);
}

if (DBGP(DBG_BASE)(cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX))))) {
if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)((size_t)((&md->message_pbs)->roof - (&md->message_pbs
)->cur)) != 0)
	DBG_log("removing %d bytes of padding",
		(int) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)((size_t)((&md->message_pbs)->roof - (&md->message_pbs
)->cur)));
}

md->message_pbs.roof = md->message_pbs.cur;	/* trim padding (not actually legit) */

dbg("calling processor %s", svm->story){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("calling processor %s", svm->story); } };

/*
* XXX: for now pass in the possibly NULL child; suspect a
* better model is to drop the child and instead have the IKE
* SA run a nested state machine for the child.
*
* For instance, when a CREATE_CHILD_SA request arrives, pass
* that to the IKE SA and then let it do all the create child
* magic.
*/
so_serial_t old_st = st->st_serialno;

statetime_t start = statetime_start(st);
struct child_sa *child = IS_CHILD_SA(st)((st)->st_clonedfrom != 0) ? pexpect_child_sa(st) : NULL((void*)0);
/* danger: st may not be valid */
stf_status e = svm->processor(ike, child, md);

if (e == STF_SKIP_COMPLETE_STATE_TRANSITION) {
/*
 * Danger! Processor did something dodgy like free ST!
 */
dbg("processor '%s' for #%lu suppresed complete st_v2_transition",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("processor '%s' for #%lu suppresed complete st_v2_transition"
, svm->story, old_st); } }
    svm->story, old_st){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("processor '%s' for #%lu suppresed complete st_v2_transition"
, svm->story, old_st); } };
} else {
complete_v2_state_transition(st, md, e);
}

statetime_stop(&start, "processing: %s in %s()", svm->story, __func__);
/* our caller with release_any_md(mdp) */
2163}

2165/*
* This logs to the main log the authentication and encryption keys
* for an IKEv2 SA.  This is done in a format that is compatible with
* tcpdump 4.0's -E option.
*
* The log message will require that a cut command is used to remove
* the initial text.
*
* DANGER: this intentionally leaks cryptographic secrets.
*/
2175void ikev2_log_parentSA(const struct state *st)
2176{
if (DBGP(DBG_PRIVATE)(cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_PRIVATE_IX))))) {
if (st->st_oakley.ta_integ == NULL((void*)0) ||
    st->st_oakley.ta_encrypt == NULL((void*)0))
	return;

/* format initiator SPI */
char tispi[3 + 2*IKE_SA_SPI_SIZE8];
(void)datatot(st->st_ike_spis.initiator.bytes, sizeof(st->st_ike_spis.initiator.bytes),
	'x',
	tispi, sizeof(tispi));

/* format responder SPI */
char trspi[3 + 2*IKE_SA_SPI_SIZE8];
(void)datatot(st->st_ike_spis.responder.bytes, sizeof(st->st_ike_spis.responder.bytes),
	'x',
	trspi, sizeof(trspi));

const char *authalgo = st->st_oakley.ta_integ->integ_tcpdump_name;
const char *encalgo = st->st_oakley.ta_encrypt->encrypt_tcpdump_name;

/*
 * Text of encryption key length (suffix for encalgo).
 * No more than 3 digits, but compiler fears it might be 5.
 */
char tekl[6] = "";
if (st->st_oakley.enckeylen != 0)
	snprintf(tekl, sizeof(tekl), "%u",
		 st->st_oakley.enckeylen);

/* v2 IKE authentication key for initiator (256 bit bound) */
chunk_t ai = chunk_from_symkey("ai", st->st_skey_ai_nss,
			       st->st_logger);
char tai[3 + 2 * BYTES_FOR_BITS(256)(((256) + 8 - 1) / 8)] = "";
(void)datatot(ai.ptr, ai.len, 'x', tai, sizeof(tai));
free_chunk_content(&ai);

/* v2 IKE encryption key for initiator (256 bit bound) */
chunk_t ei = chunk_from_symkey("ei", st->st_skey_ei_nss,
			       st->st_logger);
char tei[3 + 2 * BYTES_FOR_BITS(256)(((256) + 8 - 1) / 8)] = "";
(void)datatot(ei.ptr, ei.len, 'x', tei, sizeof(tei));
free_chunk_content(&ei);

DBG_log("ikev2 I %s %s %s:%s %s%s:%s",
	tispi, trspi,
	authalgo, tai,
	encalgo, tekl, tei);

/* v2 IKE authentication key for responder (256 bit bound) */
chunk_t ar = chunk_from_symkey("ar", st->st_skey_ar_nss,
			       st->st_logger);
char tar[3 + 2 * BYTES_FOR_BITS(256)(((256) + 8 - 1) / 8)] = "";
(void)datatot(ar.ptr, ar.len, 'x', tar, sizeof(tar));
free_chunk_content(&ar);

/* v2 IKE encryption key for responder (256 bit bound) */
chunk_t er = chunk_from_symkey("er", st->st_skey_er_nss,
			       st->st_logger);
char ter[3 + 2 * BYTES_FOR_BITS(256)(((256) + 8 - 1) / 8)] = "";
(void)datatot(er.ptr, er.len, 'x', ter, sizeof(ter));
free_chunk_content(&er);

DBG_log("ikev2 R %s %s %s:%s %s%s:%s",
	tispi, trspi,
	authalgo, tar,
	encalgo, tekl, ter);
}
2244}

2246static void ikev2_child_emancipate(struct ike_sa *from, struct child_sa *to,
		   const struct v2_state_transition *transition)
2248{
/* initialize the the new IKE SA. reset and message ID */
to->sa.st_clonedfrom = SOS_NOBODY0;
v2_msgid_init_ike(pexpect_ike_sa(&to->sa));

/* Switch to the new IKE SPIs */
to->sa.st_ike_spis = to->sa.st_ike_rekey_spis;
rehash_state_cookies_in_db(&to->sa);

/* TO has correct IKE_SPI so can migrate */
v2_migrate_children(from, to);

dbg("moving over any pending requests"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("moving over any pending requests"); } };
v2_msgid_migrate_queue(from, to);

/* child is now a parent */
ikev2_ike_sa_established(pexpect_ike_sa(&to->sa),
		 transition, transition->next_state);
2266}

2268static void jam_v2_ike_details(struct jambuf *buf, struct state *st)
2269{
jam_parent_sa_details(buf, st);
2271}

2273static void success_v2_state_transition(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md,
			const struct v2_state_transition *transition)
2275{
/*
* XXX: the transition's from state can lie - it may be
* different to the ST's state!
*/
enum state_kind from_state = transition->state;
struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
struct ike_sa *ike = ike_sa(st, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2282, }; &here; }));

if (from_state != transition->next_state) {
dbg("transitioning from state %s to state %s",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("transitioning from state %s to state %s", finite_states
[from_state]->name, finite_states[transition->next_state
]->name); } }
    finite_states[from_state]->name,{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("transitioning from state %s to state %s", finite_states
[from_state]->name, finite_states[transition->next_state
]->name); } }
    finite_states[transition->next_state]->name){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("transitioning from state %s to state %s", finite_states
[from_state]->name, finite_states[transition->next_state
]->name); } };
}

/*
* Update counters, and if part of the transition, send the
* new message.
*/

dbg("Message ID: updating counters for #%lu", st->st_serialno){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Message ID: updating counters for #%lu", st->
st_serialno); } };
v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, st, md);
v2_msgid_update_sent(ike, st, md, transition->send);

bool_Bool established_before = (IS_IKE_SA_ESTABLISHED(st)((st)->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA) ||
		   IS_CHILD_SA_ESTABLISHED(st)((st)->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA));

if (from_state == STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_R0 ||
   from_state == STATE_V2_REKEY_IKE_I1) {
ikev2_child_emancipate(ike, pexpect_child_sa(st),
		       transition);
/* Emancipated ST answers to no one - it's an IKE SA */
v2_msgid_schedule_next_initiator(pexpect_ike_sa(st));
} else {
change_state(st, transition->next_state);
v2_msgid_schedule_next_initiator(ike);
}
passert(st->st_state->kind >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR)({ _Bool assertion__ = st->st_state->kind >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2312, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "st->st_state->kind >= STATE_IKEv2_FLOOR"
); } (void) 1; });
passert(st->st_state->kind <  STATE_IKEv2_ROOF)({ _Bool assertion__ = st->st_state->kind < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2313, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "st->st_state->kind < STATE_IKEv2_ROOF"
); } (void) 1; });

bool_Bool established_after = (IS_IKE_SA_ESTABLISHED(st)((st)->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_IKE_SA) ||
		  IS_CHILD_SA_ESTABLISHED(st)((st)->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA));

bool_Bool just_established = (!established_before && established_after);
if (just_established) {
/*
 * Count successful transition into an established
 * state.
 */
pstat_sa_established(st);
}

/*
* Tell whack and logs our progress.
*
* If it's OE or a state transition we're not telling anyone
* about, then be quiet.
*/

dbg("announcing the state transition"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("announcing the state transition"); } };
enum rc_type w;
void (*jam_details)(struct jambuf *buf, struct state *st);
bool_Bool suppress_log = ((transition->flags & SMF2_SUPPRESS_SUCCESS_LOG) ||
	     (c != NULL((void*)0) && (c->policy & POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC((lset_t)1 << (POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC_IX)))));
const char *sep = " ";
if (transition->state == transition->next_state) {
/*
 * HACK for seemingly going around in circles
 */
jam_details = NULL((void*)0);
w = RC_NEW_V2_STATE + st->st_state->kind;
} else if (IS_CHILD_SA(st)((st)->st_clonedfrom != 0) && just_established) {
jam_details = jam_v2_child_details;
suppress_log = false0;
sep = "; ";
w = RC_SUCCESS; /* also triggers detach */
} else if (IS_IKE_SA(st)((st)->st_clonedfrom == 0) && just_established) {
/* ike_sa_established() called elsewhere */
jam_details = jam_v2_ike_details;
w = RC_SUCCESS; /* also triggers detach */
} else if (transition->state == STATE_V2_PARENT_I1 &&
   transition->next_state == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2) {
jam_details = jam_v2_ike_details;
w = RC_NEW_V2_STATE + st->st_state->kind;
} else if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_PARENT_R1) {
jam_details = jam_v2_ike_details;
w = RC_NEW_V2_STATE + st->st_state->kind;
} else {
jam_details = NULL((void*)0);
w = RC_NEW_V2_STATE + st->st_state->kind;
}

      if (suppress_log) {
LSWDBGP(DBG_BASE, buf)for (_Bool lswlog_p = (cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_BASE_IX)))); lswlog_p; lswlog_p = 0) for (char lswbuf[(
(size_t)1024)], *lswbuf_ = lswbuf; lswbuf_ != ((void*)0); lswbuf_
 = ((void*)0)) for (struct jambuf jambuf = array_as_jambuf((lswbuf
), sizeof(lswbuf)), *buf = &jambuf; buf != ((void*)0); buf
 = ((void*)0)) for (; buf != ((void*)0); jambuf_to_logger(buf
, &failsafe_logger, DEBUG_STREAM), buf = ((void*)0)) {
	jam(buf, "%s", st->st_state->story);
	/* document SA details for admin's pleasure */
	if (jam_details != NULL((void*)0)) {
		jam_string(buf, sep);
		jam_details(buf, st);
	}
}
} else {
LLOG_JAMBUF(w, st->st_logger, buf)for (char lswbuf[((size_t)1024)], *lswbuf_ = lswbuf; lswbuf_ !=
 ((void*)0); lswbuf_ = ((void*)0)) for (struct jambuf jambuf =
 array_as_jambuf((lswbuf), sizeof(lswbuf)), *buf = &jambuf
; buf != ((void*)0); buf = ((void*)0)) for (({ if (((w) &
 NO_PREFIX) == ((lset_t)0) && (((w) & STREAM_MASK
) != DEBUG_STREAM || (cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_ADD_PREFIX_IX)))))) { (st->st_logger)->object_vec
->jam_object_prefix(buf, (st->st_logger)->object); }
 }); buf != ((void*)0); jambuf_to_logger(buf, (st->st_logger
), w), buf = ((void*)0)) {
	jam(buf, "%s", st->st_state->story);
	/* document SA details for admin's pleasure */
	if (jam_details != NULL((void*)0)) {
		jam_string(buf, sep);
		jam_details(buf, st);
	}
}
}

/*
* 2.23.  NAT Traversal
*
* There are cases where a NAT box decides to remove mappings
* that are still alive (for example, the keepalive interval
* is too long, or the NAT box is rebooted).  This will be
* apparent to a host if it receives a packet whose integrity
* protection validates, but has a different port, address, or
* both from the one that was associated with the SA in the
* validated packet.  When such a validated packet is found, a
* host that does not support other methods of recovery such
* as IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) [MOBIKE], and
* that is not behind a NAT, SHOULD send all packets
* (including retransmission packets) to the IP address and
* port in the validated packet, and SHOULD store this as the
* new address and port combination for the SA (that is, they
* SHOULD dynamically update the address).  A host behind a
* NAT SHOULD NOT do this type of dynamic address update if a
* validated packet has different port and/or address values
* because it opens a possible DoS attack (such as allowing an
* attacker to break the connection with a single packet).
* Also, dynamic address update should only be done in
* response to a new packet; otherwise, an attacker can revert
* the addresses with old replayed packets.  Because of this,
* dynamic updates can only be done safely if replay
* protection is enabled.  When IKEv2 is used with MOBIKE,
* dynamically updating the addresses described above
* interferes with MOBIKE's way of recovering from the same
* situation.  See Section 3.8 of [MOBIKE] for more
* information.
*
* XXX: so ....
*
* - replay protection?
*
* - IKE_AUTH exchange? Already handled? Exclude?
*/
if (nat_traversal_enabled &&
   /*
    * Only when responding ...
    */
   transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE &&
   pexpect(v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST; if
 (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2429, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST"
); } assertion__; }) &&
   /*
    * Only when the request changes the remote's endpoint ...
    */
   !endpoint_eq_endpoint(ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, md->sender) &&
   /*
    * Only when the request was protected and passes
    * integrity ...
    *
    * Once keymat is present, only encrypted messessages with
    * valid integrity can successfully complete a transaction
    * with STF_OK.  True?  True.
    *
    * IS_IKE_SA_ESTABLISHED() better?  False.  IKE_AUTH
    * messages meet the above requirements.
    */
   ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_skeyid_calculated &&
   md->encrypted_payloads.parsed &&
   md->encrypted_payloads.n == v2N_NOTHING_WRONG &&
   /*
    * Only when the local IKE SA isn't behind NAT but the
    * remote IKE SA is ...
    */
   !LHAS(ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal, NATED_HOST)(((ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal) & ((lset_t
)1 << (NATED_HOST))) != ((lset_t)0)) &&
   LHAS(ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal, NATED_PEER)(((ike->sa.hidden_variables.st_nat_traversal) & ((lset_t
)1 << (NATED_PEER))) != ((lset_t)0))) {
/*
 * Things are looking plausible.
 */
if (ike->sa.st_ike_sent_v2n_mobike_supported &&
    ike->sa.st_ike_seen_v2n_mobike_supported &&
    md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL) {
	/*
	 * Only when MOBIKE has not been negotiated ...
	 */
	endpoint_buf sb, mb;
	dbg("NAT: MOBIKE: skipping remote sender from %s -> %s as MOBIKE delt with it in informational code(?)",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("NAT: MOBIKE: skipping remote sender from %s -> %s as MOBIKE delt with it in informational code(?)"
, str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb), str_endpoint
(&md->sender, &mb)); } }
	    str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb),{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("NAT: MOBIKE: skipping remote sender from %s -> %s as MOBIKE delt with it in informational code(?)"
, str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb), str_endpoint
(&md->sender, &mb)); } }
	    str_endpoint(&md->sender, &mb)){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("NAT: MOBIKE: skipping remote sender from %s -> %s as MOBIKE delt with it in informational code(?)"
, str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb), str_endpoint
(&md->sender, &mb)); } };
} else {
	endpoint_buf sb, mb;
	dbg("NAT: MOBKIE: updating remote sender from %s -> %s as non-MOBIKE or non-INFORMATIONAL",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("NAT: MOBKIE: updating remote sender from %s -> %s as non-MOBIKE or non-INFORMATIONAL"
, str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb), str_endpoint
(&md->sender, &mb)); } }
	    str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb),{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("NAT: MOBKIE: updating remote sender from %s -> %s as non-MOBIKE or non-INFORMATIONAL"
, str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb), str_endpoint
(&md->sender, &mb)); } }
	    str_endpoint(&md->sender, &mb)){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("NAT: MOBKIE: updating remote sender from %s -> %s as non-MOBIKE or non-INFORMATIONAL"
, str_endpoint(&ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint, &sb), str_endpoint
(&md->sender, &mb)); } };
	ike->sa.st_remote_endpoint = md->sender;
}
}

/* if requested, send the new reply packet */
switch (transition->send) {
case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
send_recorded_v2_message(ike, finite_states[from_state]->name,
			 transition->send);
break;
case NO_MESSAGE:
break;
default:
bad_case(transition->send)libreswan_bad_case("transition->send", (transition->send
), ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2486, }; &here; }));;
}

if (just_established) {
release_any_whack(st, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2490, }; &here; }), "IKEv2 transitions finished");

/* XXX should call unpend again on parent SA */
if (IS_CHILD_SA(st)((st)->st_clonedfrom != 0)) {
	/* with failed child sa, we end up here with an orphan?? */
	dbg("unpending #%lu's IKE SA #%lu", st->st_serialno,{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("unpending #%lu's IKE SA #%lu", st->st_serialno
, ike->sa.st_serialno); } }
	    ike->sa.st_serialno){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("unpending #%lu's IKE SA #%lu", st->st_serialno
, ike->sa.st_serialno); } };
	/* a better call unpend in ikev2_ike_sa_established? */
	unpend(ike, c);

	/*
	 * If this was an OE connection, check for removing a potential
	 * matching bare shunt entry - bare shunts are always a %pass or
	 * %hold SPI but are found regardless of whether we passed in
	 * SPI_PASS or SPI_HOLD ?
	 */
	if (LIN(POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC, c->policy)(((((lset_t)1 << (POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC_IX))) & (c->
policy)) == (((lset_t)1 << (POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC_IX))))) {
		struct spd_route *sr = &c->spd;
		struct bare_shunt **bs = bare_shunt_ptr(&sr->this.client,
							&sr->that.client,
							sr->this.protocol,
							"old bare shunt to delete");

		if (bs != NULL((void*)0)) {
			dbg("deleting old bare shunt"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("deleting old bare shunt"); } };
			if (!delete_bare_shunt(&c->spd.this.host_addr,
					       &c->spd.that.host_addr,
					       c->spd.this.protocol,
					       SPI_PASS /* else its not bare */,
					       /*skip_xfrm_policy_delete?*/true1,
					       "installed IPsec SA replaced old bare shunt",
					       st->st_logger)) {
				log_state(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, &ike->sa,
					  "Failed to delete old bare shunt");
			}
		}
	}
	release_any_whack(&ike->sa, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2527, }; &here; }), "IKEv2 transitions finished so releaseing IKE SA");
}
} else if (transition->flags & SMF2_RELEASE_WHACK) {
dbg("releasing whack"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("releasing whack"); } };
release_any_whack(st, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2531, }; &here; }), "ST per transition");
if (st != &ike->sa) {
	release_any_whack(&ike->sa, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2533, }; &here; }), "IKE per transition");
}
}

/* Schedule for whatever timeout is specified */
{
enum event_type kind = transition->timeout_event;
struct connection *c = st->st_connection;

switch (kind) {

case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:
	/*
	 * Event retransmit is really a secret code to
	 * indicate that a request is being sent and a
	 * retransmit should already be scheduled.
	 */
	dbg("checking that a retransmit timeout_event was already"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("checking that a retransmit timeout_event was already"
); } };
	delete_event(st); /* relying on retransmit */
	pexpect(ike->sa.st_retransmit_event != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = ike->sa.st_retransmit_event != ((void
*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct
 where here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c"
, .line = 2552, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "ike->sa.st_retransmit_event != ((void*)0)"
); } assertion__; });
	pexpect(transition->send == MESSAGE_REQUEST)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->send == MESSAGE_REQUEST
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2553, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->send == MESSAGE_REQUEST"
); } assertion__; });
	break;

case EVENT_SA_REPLACE: /* IKE or Child SA replacement event */
	schedule_v2_replace_event(st);
	break;

case EVENT_SA_DISCARD:
	delete_event(st);
	event_schedule(kind, MAXIMUM_RESPONDER_WAIT_DELAYdeltatime(200), st);
	break;

case EVENT_NULL:
	/*
	 * Is there really no case where we want to
	 * set no timer?  more likely an accident?
	 */
	pexpect_failllog_pexpect(st->st_logger, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2570, }; &here; }),
		     "V2 microcode entry (%s) has unspecified timeout_event",
		     transition->story);
	break;

case EVENT_v2_REDIRECT:
	event_delete(EVENT_v2_REDIRECT, st);
	event_schedule(EVENT_v2_REDIRECT, deltatime(0), st);
	break;

case EVENT_RETAIN:
	/* the previous event is retained */
	dbg("#%lu is retaining %s with is previously set timeout",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu is retaining %s with is previously set timeout"
, st->st_serialno, (st->st_event == ((void*)0) ? "<no-event>"
 : enum_name(&event_type_names, st->st_event->ev_type
))); } }
	    st->st_serialno, (st->st_event == NULL ? "<no-event>" :{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu is retaining %s with is previously set timeout"
, st->st_serialno, (st->st_event == ((void*)0) ? "<no-event>"
 : enum_name(&event_type_names, st->st_event->ev_type
))); } }
			      enum_name(&event_type_names, st->st_event->ev_type))){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("#%lu is retaining %s with is previously set timeout"
, st->st_serialno, (st->st_event == ((void*)0) ? "<no-event>"
 : enum_name(&event_type_names, st->st_event->ev_type
))); } };
	break;

default:
	bad_case(kind)libreswan_bad_case("kind", (kind), ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2588, }; &here; }));
	break;
}
/*
 * start liveness checks if set, making sure we only
 * schedule once when moving from I2->I3 or R1->R2
 */
if (st->st_state->kind != from_state &&
	st->st_state->kind != STATE_UNDEFINED &&
	IS_CHILD_SA_ESTABLISHED(st)((st)->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_ESTABLISHED_CHILD_SA) &&
	dpd_active_locally(st)) {
	dbg("dpd enabled, scheduling ikev2 liveness checks"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("dpd enabled, scheduling ikev2 liveness checks"
); } };
	deltatime_t delay = deltatime_max(c->dpd_delay, deltatime(MIN_LIVENESS1));
	event_schedule(EVENT_v2_LIVENESS, delay, st);
}
}
2604}

2606/*
* Dependent on RESULT, either complete, suspend, abandon, or abort
* (delete state) the state transition started by the state-specific
* state transition function.
*
* Since this is function is meaningless without a state, ST really
* should be non-NULL.
*
* XXX: A broken exception is when responding to an IKE_SA_INIT
* request - the state machine calls the state transition function
* with no state (trusting that the transition function will do the
* job, but that isn't always true).  The fix is to create the state
* before calling the state transition function (like is done for the
* CHILD_SA code).
*
* Since, when initiating an exchange there is no message, code can't
* assume that (*MDP) is non-NULL.
*
* XXX: Some state transition functions switch state part way (see
* AUTH child code) and then tunnel the new state to this code via
* (*MDP)->st and some callers passing in (*MDP)->st).  The fix is for
* the AUTH code to handle the CHILD SA as a nested or separate
* transition.
*
* XXX: The state transition structure (microcode) is stored in (*MDP)
* forcing that structure to be created.  The fix is to store the
* state's transition in the state.  As a bonus this makes determining
* if a state is busy really really easy - if there's a
* state-transition then it must be.
*
* This routine does not free (*MDP) (using release_any_md(mdp)).
* However, when suspending a state transition, it will save it in ST
* and zap (*MDP) so that the caller can't free it.  Hence, the caller
* must be prepared for (*MDP) being set to NULL.
*
* XXX: At some point (*MDP) was being used for:
*
* - find st
* - success_v2_state_transition(st, md);
*   - for svm:
*     - svm->next_state,
*     - svm->flags & SMF2_SEND,
*     - svm->timeout_event,
*     -svm->flags, story
*   - find from_state (st might be gone)
*   - ikev2_update_msgid_counters(md);
*   - nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, st)
* - !(md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAGS_v2_MSG_R) to gate Notify payloads/exchanges [WRONG]
* - find note for STF_INTERNAL_ERROR
* - find note for STF_FAIL (might not be part of result (STF_FAIL+note))
*
* We don't use these but complete_v1_state_transition does:
* - record md->event_already_set
* - remember_received_packet(st, md);
* - fragvid, dpd, nortel
*/
2662void complete_v2_state_transition(struct state *st,
		  struct msg_digest *md,
		  stf_status result)
2665{
passert(st != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = st != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2666, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert
(logger_, here, "%s", "st != ((void*)0)"); } (void) 1; });
1
Assuming 'st' is not equal to null→
2
←
Taking false branch→
struct ike_sa *ike = ike_sa(st, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2667, }; &here; }));
/* struct child_sa *child = IS_CHILD_SA(st) ? pexpect_child_sa(st) : NULL; */

/* statistics */
/* this really depends on the type of error whether it is an IKE or IPsec fail */
if (result > STF_FAIL) {
3
←
Assuming 'result' is > STF_FAIL→
4
←
Taking true branch→
pstats(ike_stf, STF_FAIL){ const unsigned __pstat = (STF_FAIL); if (__pstat < (sizeof
(pstats_ike_stf) / sizeof(*(pstats_ike_stf)))) { pstats_ike_stf
[__pstat]++; } else if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_BASE_IX))))) { DBG_log("pstats %s %d", "ike_stf", __pstat
); } };
5
←
Taking true branch→
} else {
pstats(ike_stf, result){ const unsigned __pstat = (result); if (__pstat < (sizeof
(pstats_ike_stf) / sizeof(*(pstats_ike_stf)))) { pstats_ike_stf
[__pstat]++; } else if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_BASE_IX))))) { DBG_log("pstats %s %d", "ike_stf", __pstat
); } };
}

/*
* Try to get the transition that is being completed ...
*
* For the moment this comes from the (presumably non-NULL)
* MD.SVM.
*
* XXX: However, when a packet is bad and no transition is
* selected, this code is still called:
*
* STF_IGNORE: to undo the v2_msgid_start_responder() call;
* better would probably be to move that call to after a
* transition has been found (but fragmentation makes this
* messy).
*
* STF_FATAL: to discard a state in response to a bad exchange
* (for instance a protected packet's contents are bogus).
*
* Long term, this value should be extracted from the state
* and .st_v2_state_transition - it just isn't possible to
* squeeze both the IKE and CHILD transitions into MD.ST.
*/
2699#if 0
const struct v2_state_transition *transition = st->st_v2_transition;
if (!pexpect(transition != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2701, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition != ((void*)0)"
); } assertion__; }) && md != NULL((void*)0)) {
transition = md->svm;
}
2704#else
const struct v2_state_transition *transition = (md != NULL((void*)0) && md->svm != NULL((void*)0) ? md->svm :
6
←
Assuming 'md' is equal to NULL→
				       st->st_v2_transition);
2707#endif
static const struct v2_state_transition undefined_transition = {
.story = "suspect message",
.state = STATE_UNDEFINED,
.next_state = STATE_UNDEFINED,
};
/* double negative */
if (!pexpect(transition != NULL)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition != ((void*)0); if (!assertion__
) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2714, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition != ((void*)0)"
); } assertion__; })) {
7
←
Assuming 'transition' is not equal to null→
8
←
Taking false branch→
9
←
Taking false branch→
transition = &undefined_transition;
}

LSWDBGP(DBG_BASE, buf)for (_Bool lswlog_p = (cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_BASE_IX)))); lswlog_p; lswlog_p = 0) for (char lswbuf[(
(size_t)1024)], *lswbuf_ = lswbuf; lswbuf_ != ((void*)0); lswbuf_
 = ((void*)0)) for (struct jambuf jambuf = array_as_jambuf((lswbuf
), sizeof(lswbuf)), *buf = &jambuf; buf != ((void*)0); buf
 = ((void*)0)) for (; buf != ((void*)0); jambuf_to_logger(buf
, &failsafe_logger, DEBUG_STREAM), buf = ((void*)0)) {
10
←
Loop condition is false. Execution continues on line 2741→
const struct finite_state *transition_from = finite_states[transition->state];

jam(buf, "#%lu complete_v2_state_transition()", st->st_serialno);
if (st->st_state != transition_from) {
	jam(buf, " in state %s", st->st_state->short_name);
}
jam(buf, " ");
jam_v2_transition(buf, transition);
jam(buf, " with status ");
jam_v2_stf_status(buf, result);
/* does MD.SVM diverge? */
if (md != NULL((void*)0) && transition != md->svm) {
	jam(buf, "; md.svm=");
	jam_v2_transition(buf, md->svm);
}
/* does ST.ST_V2_TRANSITION diverge? */
if (transition != st->st_v2_transition) {
	jam(buf, "; .st_v2_transition=");
	jam_v2_transition(buf, st->st_v2_transition);
}
}

switch (result) {
11
←
Control jumps to the 'default' case at line 2880→

case STF_SUSPEND:
/*
 * If this transition was triggered by an
 * incoming packet, save it.
 *
 * XXX: some initiator code creates a fake MD
 * (there isn't a real one); save that as
 * well.
 *
 * XXX: should the helper code be responsible for
 * saving an MD reference?
 */
suspend_any_md(st, md){ if (md != ((void*)0)) { { if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t
)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX))))) { DBG_log("suspending state #%lu and saving MD %p"
, (st)->st_serialno, md); } }; ({ _Bool assertion__ = (st)
->st_suspended_md == ((void*)0); if (!assertion__) { where_t
 here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__
, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2755, }; &here
; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger; llog_passert
(logger_, here, "%s", "(st)->st_suspended_md == ((void*)0)"
); } (void) 1; }); (st)->st_suspended_md = md_addref(md, (
{ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file =
 "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2755, }; &here; })); (
st)->st_suspended_md_func = __func__; (st)->st_suspended_md_line
 = 2755; ({ _Bool assertion__ = state_is_busy(st); if (!assertion__
) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2755, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "state_is_busy(st)"); } (
void) 1; }); } else { { if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 <<
 (DBG_BASE_IX))))) { DBG_log("no MD to suspend"); } }; } };
return;

case STF_IGNORE:
/*
 * logged above
 *
 * XXX: really?  Suspect this means to say logged
 * where STF_IGNORE is returned.
 *
 * XXX: even when a packet is invalid and no
 * transition is selected (TRANSITION==NULL) this code
 * is executed - caller needs to cancel the responder
 * processing the message.
 */
if (v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST) {
	v2_msgid_cancel_responder(ike, st, md);
}
return;

case STF_OK:
/* advance the state */
success_v2_state_transition(st, md, transition);
break;

case STF_INTERNAL_ERROR:
log_state(RC_INTERNALERR, st, "state transition function for %s had internal error",
	  st->st_state->name);
release_pending_whacks(st, "internal error");
break;

case STF_V2_DELETE_IKE_AUTH_INITIATOR:
/*
 * XXX: this is a hack so that IKE_AUTH initiator can
 * both delete the IKE SA and send an IKE SA delete
 * notification because the IKE_AUTH response was
 * rejected.
 */
/*
 * Initiator processing response, finish current
 * exchange ready for delete request.
 */
dbg("Message ID: forcing a response received update (deleting IKE_AUTH initiator)"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Message ID: forcing a response received update (deleting IKE_AUTH initiator)"
); } };
pexpect(st->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2)({ _Bool assertion__ = st->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2798, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "st->st_state->kind == STATE_V2_PARENT_I2"
); } assertion__; });
pexpect(v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE)({ _Bool assertion__ = v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE; if
 (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2799, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_RESPONSE"
); } assertion__; });
v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, &ike->sa, md);
/*
 * All done, now delete the IKE family sending out a
 * last gasp delete.
 *
 * XXX: this call will fire and forget.  It should
 * call v2_msgid_queue_initiator() with high priority
 * so this is performed as a separate transition?
 */
delete_ike_family(ike, DO_SEND_DELETE);
/* get out of here -- everything is invalid */
ike = NULL((void*)0);
st = NULL((void*)0);
return;

case STF_FATAL:
/*
 * XXX: even when a packet is invalid and no
 * transition is selected (TRANSITION==NULL) this code
 * is executed - caller needs to kill the state.
 */
log_state(RC_FATAL, st, "encountered fatal error in state %s",
	  st->st_state->name);
switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
	dbg("Message ID: forcing a response received update"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Message ID: forcing a response received update"
); } };
	v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, NULL((void*)0), md);
	break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
	dbg("Message ID: responding with recorded fatal error"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Message ID: responding with recorded fatal error"
); } };
	pexpect(transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2830, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE"
); } assertion__; });
	if (ike->sa.st_v2_outgoing[MESSAGE_RESPONSE] != NULL((void*)0)) {
		v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, st, md);
		v2_msgid_update_sent(ike, st, md, transition->send);
		send_recorded_v2_message(ike, "STF_FATAL",
					 MESSAGE_RESPONSE);
	} else {
		dbg("Message ID: exchange zombie as no response?"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Message ID: exchange zombie as no response?")
; } };
	}
	break;
case NO_MESSAGE:
	break;
}

/* if this was a child fail, don't destroy the IKE SA */
if (IS_IKE_SA(st)((st)->st_clonedfrom == 0)) {
	delete_ike_family(ike, DONT_SEND_DELETE);
	ike = NULL((void*)0);
}

/* kill all st pointers */
st = NULL((void*)0);
break;

case STF_FAIL:
log_state(RC_NOTIFICATION, st, "state transition '%s' failed",
	  transition->story);
switch (v2_msg_role(md)) {
case MESSAGE_RESPONSE:
	v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, st, md);
	v2_msgid_schedule_next_initiator(ike);
	break;
case MESSAGE_REQUEST:
	dbg("Message ID: responding with recorded error"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("Message ID: responding with recorded error");
 } };
	pexpect(transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE)({ _Bool assertion__ = transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE
; if (!assertion__) { where_t here_ = ({ static const struct where
 here = { .func = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c",
 .line = 2864, }; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_
 = &failsafe_logger; llog_pexpect(logger_, here_, "%s", "transition->send == MESSAGE_RESPONSE"
); } assertion__; });
	v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, st, md);
	v2_msgid_update_sent(ike, st, md, transition->send);
	send_recorded_v2_message(ike, "STF_FAIL", MESSAGE_RESPONSE);
	break;
case NO_MESSAGE:
	break;
}
release_pending_whacks(st, "fatal error"); /* fatal != STF_FATAL  :) */
delete_state(st);

/* kill all st pointers */
st = NULL((void*)0);
ike = NULL((void*)0);
break;

default: /* STF_FAIL+notification */
passert(result > STF_FAIL)({ _Bool assertion__ = result > STF_FAIL; if (!assertion__
) { where_t here = ({ static const struct where here = { .func
 = __func__, .file = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2881, }
; &here; }); const struct logger *logger_ = &failsafe_logger
; llog_passert(logger_, here, "%s", "result > STF_FAIL"); }
 (void) 1; });
12
←
Taking false branch→
/*
 * XXX: For IKEv2, this code path isn't sufficient - a
 * message request can result in a response that
 * contains both a success and a fail.  Better to
 * record the responses and and then return
 * STF_ZOMBIFY signaling both that the message should
 * be sent and the state deleted.
 */
v2_notification_t notification = result - STF_FAIL;
/* Only the responder sends a notification */
if (v2_msg_role(md) == MESSAGE_REQUEST) {
13
←
Assuming the condition is true→
14
←
Taking true branch→
	dbg("sending a notification reply"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("sending a notification reply"); } };
15
←
Assuming the condition is false→
16
←
Taking false branch→
	v2_msgid_update_recv(ike, st, md);
	record_v2N_response(st->st_logger, ike, md,
			    notification, NULL((void*)0)/*no data*/,
			    ENCRYPTED_PAYLOAD);
	v2_msgid_update_sent(ike, st, md, transition->send);
	send_recorded_v2_message(ike, "STF_FAIL",
				 MESSAGE_RESPONSE);
	/*
	 * XXX: is this always false; if true above
	 * record would pexpect()?
	 */
	if (md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_v2_IKE_SA_INIT) {
17
←
Dereference of null pointer
		delete_state(st);
		/* kill all st pointers */
		st = NULL((void*)0); ike = NULL((void*)0);
	} else {
		dbg("forcing #%lu to a discard event",{ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("forcing #%lu to a discard event", st->st_serialno
); } }
		    st->st_serialno){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("forcing #%lu to a discard event", st->st_serialno
); } };
		delete_event(st);
		event_schedule(EVENT_SA_DISCARD,
			       MAXIMUM_RESPONDER_WAIT_DELAYdeltatime(200),
			       st);
	}
} else {
	log_state(RC_NOTIFICATION+notification, st,
		  "state transition '%s' failed with %s",
		  transition->story, enum_name(&ikev2_notify_names, notification));
}
break;
}
2924}

2926void jam_v2_stf_status(struct jambuf *buf, unsigned status)
2927{
if (status <= STF_FAIL) {
jam_enum(buf, &stf_status_names, status);
} else {
jam(buf, "STF_FAIL+");
jam_enum(buf, &ikev2_notify_names, status - STF_FAIL);
}
2934}

2936static void reinitiate_ike_sa_init(struct state *st, void *arg)
2937{
if (st == NULL((void*)0)) {
dbg("re-initiate lost state"){ if ((cur_debugging & (((lset_t)1 << (DBG_BASE_IX)
)))) { DBG_log("re-initiate lost state"); } };
return;
}
struct ike_sa *ike = ike_sa(st, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2942, }; &here; }));
if (ike == NULL((void*)0)) {
/* already logged */
return;
}
stf_status (*resume)(struct ike_sa *ike) = arg;

/*
* Need to wind back the Message ID counters so that the send
* code things it is creating Message 0.
*/
v2_msgid_init_ike(ike);

/*
* Pretend to be running the initiate state.
*/
set_v2_transition(&ike->sa, finite_states[STATE_V2_PARENT_I0]->v2_transitions, HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2958, }; &here; })); /* first */
complete_v2_state_transition(&ike->sa, NULL((void*)0)/*no-MD*/, resume(ike));
2960}

2962void schedule_reinitiate_v2_ike_sa_init(struct ike_sa *ike,
			stf_status (*resume)(struct ike_sa *ike))
2964{
schedule_callback("reinitiating IKE_SA_INIT", ike->sa.st_serialno,
	  reinitiate_ike_sa_init, resume);
2967}

2969bool_Bool v2_notification_fatal(v2_notification_t n)
2970{
return (n == v2N_INVALID_SYNTAX ||
n == v2N_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED ||
n == v2N_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD);
2974}

2976stf_status stf_status_from_v2_notification(v2_notification_t n)
2977{
return (n == v2N_NOTHING_WRONG ? STF_OK :
v2_notification_fatal(n) ? STF_FATAL :
STF_FAIL);
2981}

2983bool_Bool already_has_larval_v2_child(struct ike_sa *ike, const struct connection *c)
2984{
const lset_t pending_states = (LELEM(STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I1)((lset_t)1 << (STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I1)) |
		       LELEM(STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I0)((lset_t)1 << (STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_I0)) |
		       LELEM(STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_R0)((lset_t)1 << (STATE_V2_NEW_CHILD_R0)));

struct state_query query = {
.where = HERE({ static const struct where here = { .func = __func__, .file
 = "programs/pluto/ikev2.c", .line = 2990, }; &here; }),
.ike_version = IKEv2,
.ike_spis = &ike->sa.st_ike_spis,
/* only children */
.ike = ike,
};

while (old2new_state(&query)) {
struct state *st = query.st;

/* larval child state? */
if (!LHAS(pending_states, st->st_state->kind)(((pending_states) & ((lset_t)1 << (st->st_state
->kind))) != ((lset_t)0))) {
	continue;
}
/* not an instance, but a connection? */
if (!streq(st->st_connection->name, c->name)(strcmp((st->st_connection->name), (c->name)) == 0)) {
	continue;
}
llog(RC_LOG, c->logger, "connection already has the pending Child SA negotiation #%lu using IKE SA #%lu",
     st->st_serialno, ike->sa.st_serialno);
return true1;
}

return false0;
3014}